
G. Kneller Eques pinxit 1697.
Geo. Vertue Sculp. 1713.

Effigies Iohannis Locke

Ex Archetypo, quod in Musæo Alexandri Geekie Chirurgi adservatur expreſsa.

THE

WORKS

OF

JOHN LOCKE, Eſq;

In THREE VOLUMES.

The SIXTH EDITION.

To which is added,
The LIFE of the AUTHOR;
AND
A COLLECTION of ſeveral of his PIECES publiſhed
by Mr. DESMAIZEAUX.

VOL. I.

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THREE VOLUMES.

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THE LIFE OF THE AUTHOR.

MR. JOHN LOCKE was the ſon of JOHN LOCKE of Penſford in Somerſetſhire; he was born at Wrington, ſeven or eight miles from Briſtol, and according to the pariſh regiſter, baptiſed the 29th of Auguſt, 1632. His father was heir to a much greater eſtate than he left behind him; and was a captain in the parliament's army during the civil wars under King Charles I. It is poſſible that he loſt part of his eſtate, thro' the misfortunes of the war: for our author always ſpoke of his father with great reſpect, as a man of ſtrict probity and ſobriety. Tho' his parents married very young, they had but two children, of whom JOHN, the ſubject of theſe memoirs, was the elder. The younger ſon died of a conſumption in his minority. Mr. LOCKE's father took great care of him in his education, and obſerved a method of conduct towards him, which his ſon often mentioned with great approbation. He kept him at a great diſtance while he was a child, but as he grew up, he uſed him with more familiarity, till at laſt they lived together rather as friends, than as two perſons, one of which might juſtly claim reſpect from the other. Our author began his ſtudies in Weſtminſter ſchool, where he continued till the year 1651, and from thence was ſent to Chriſt-Church college in Oxford. He took the degree of batchelor of arts in 1655, and that of maſter in 1658. But tho' he made this progreſs in the uſual courſe of ſtudies at that time, yet he often ſaid, that what he had learned there was of little uſe to him, to enlighten and enlarge his mind. The firſt books which gave him a reliſh for the ſtudy of philoſophy, were the writings of Des Cartes; for tho' he did not always approve of his ſentiments, he found that he wrote with great perſpicuity. After ſome time he applied himſelf very cloſely to the ſtudy of medicine; not with any deſign of practiſing as a phyſician, but principally for the benefit of his own conſtitution, which was but weak. And we find he gained ſuch eſteem for his ſkill, even amongſt the moſt learned of the faculty of his time, that Dr. Thomas Sydenham, in his book entitled, "Obſervationes medicæ circa morborum acutorum hiſtoriam & curationem," gives him a high encomium in theſe words. "You know," ſays he, "likewiſe how much my method has been approved of by a perſon, who has "examined it to the bottom, and who is our common friend, I mean Mr. JOHN "LOCKE, who, if we conſider his genius, and penetrating and exact judgment, "or the purity of his morals, has ſcarce any ſuperior, and few equals now living." Hence, he was very often ſaluted by his acquaintance with the title, tho' he never took the degree, of doctor of medicine. * In the year 1664, Sir William

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* After the preface of Dr. Sydenham's book, follow ſome Latin elegiac Verſes of Mr. LOCKE's, which are full of wit and invention, but the ſtyle is not accurate and poetical. He had too little eſteem for the poets to ſpend much time in reading them, and to take much pains in imitating them. He ſubſcribes theſe verſes in this manner: "I. LOCKE, artium magiſter, ex Æde Chriſti Oxon."

Swan being appointed envoy from the Engliſh court to the elector of Brandenburg, and ſome other German princes, Mr. LOCKE attended him in the quality of his ſecretary: but returning to England again within the year, he applied himſelf with great vigour to his ſtudies, and particularly to that of natural philoſophy.* While he was at Oxford in 1666, he became acquainted with the lord Aſhley, afterwards earl of Shafteſbury. The occaſion of their acquaintance was this. Lord Aſhley by a fall had hurt his breaſt in ſuch a manner, that there was an abſceſs formed in it under his ſtomach; he was adviſed to drink the mineral waters at Aſtrop, which engaged him to write to Dr. Thomas, a phyſician of Oxford, to procure a quantity of theſe waters, which might be ready, againſt his arrival. Dr. Thomas being obliged to be abſent from Oxford, at that time, deſired his friend Mr. LOCKE to execute this commiſſion. But it happened, that the waters not being ready the day after the lord Aſhley's arrival, thro' the fault of the perſon, who had been ſent for them, Mr. LOCKE was obliged to wait on his lordſhip to make an excuſe for it. Lord Aſhley received him with great civility, according to his uſual manner, and was ſatisfied with his excuſes. Upon his riſing to go away, his lordſhip, who had already received great pleaſure from his converſation, detained him to ſupper, and engaged him to dine with him the next day, and even to drink the waters, that he might have the more of his company. When his lordſhip left Oxford to go to Sunning-Hill, where he drank the waters, he made Mr. LOCKE promiſe to come thither, as he did in the ſummer of the year 1667. Lord Aſhley afterwards returned, and obliged him to promiſe, that he would come and lodge at his houſe. Mr. LOCKE went thither, and tho' he had never practiſed phyſic, his Lordſhip confided entirely in his advice, with regard to the operation which was to be performed by opening the abſceſs in his breaſt; which ſaved his life, tho' it never cloſed afterwards. After this cure his lordſhip entertained ſo great an eſteem for Mr. LOCKE, that tho' he had experienced his great ſkill in medicine, yet he regarded this afterwards as the leaſt of his qualifications. He adviſed him to turn his thoughts another way, and would not ſuffer him to practiſe medicine out of his houſe, except among ſome of his particular friends. He urged him to apply himſelf to the ſtudy of political and religious matters; in which Mr. LOCKE made ſo great a progreſs, that lord Aſhley began to conſult him upon all occaſions. By his acquaintance with this lord, our author was afterwards introduced to the converſation of ſome of the moſt eminent perſons of that age: ſuch as, Villiers duke of Buckingham, the lord Hallifax, and other noblemen of the greateſt wit and parts, who were all charmed with his converſation. The liberty which Mr. LOCKE took with men of that rank, had ſomething in it very ſuitable to his character. One day, three or four of theſe lords having met at lord Aſhley's, when Mr. LOCKE was there; after ſome compliments cards were brought in, before ſcarce any converſation had paſſed between them. Mr. LOCKE looked upon them for ſome time, while they were at play; and then taking his pocket-book, began to write with great attention. One of the lords obſerving him, aſked him what he was writing. “My Lord,” ſays he, “I am endeavouring to profit, as far as I am able, in your company; for “having waited with impatience for the honour of being in an aſſembly of the “greateſt genius's of this age, and at laſt having obtained the good fortune, I “thought I could not do better than write down your converſation; and indeed “I have ſet down the ſubſtance of what hath been ſaid for this hour or two.” Mr. LOCKE had no occaſion to read much of this converſation; thoſe noble perſons ſaw the ridicule of it; and diverted themſelves with improving the jeſt. They quitted their play, and entering into rational diſcourſe, ſpent the reſt of the time in a manner more ſuitable to their character.

IN 1668 our author attended the earl and counteſs of Northumberland into France; but did not continue there long, becauſe the earl dying in his journey to Rome, the counteſs, whom he had left in France with Mr. LOCKE, returned to

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* This appears from the journal which he kept of the changes of the air, from the 24th of June 1666, to the 28th of March 1667; for the regular obſervation of which, he uſed a barometer, thermometer, and hygroſcope. This journal may be ſeen in “The General Hiſtory of the Air,” publiſhed by Mr. Boyle in 1692.

England ſooner than was at firſt deſigned. Mr. Locke, upon his return to his native country, lived, as before, at the lord Aſhley's, who was then chancellor of the exchequer, but made frequent viſits to Oxford, for conſulting books in the proſecution of his ſtudies, and keeping the changes of the air. While he was at the lord Aſhley's, he inſpected the education of that lord's only ſon, who was then about ſixteen years of age. This province he executed with great care, and to the full ſatisfaction of his noble patron. The young lord being of a very weakly conſtitution, his father thought to marry him betimes, leſt the family ſhould be extinct by his death. He was too young, and had too little experience, to chooſe a wife for himſelf; and lord Aſhley having the higheſt opinion of Mr. Locke's judgment, and the greateſt confidence in his integrity, deſired that he would make a ſuitable choice for his ſon. This, it muſt be owned, was no eaſy province; for tho' lord Aſhley did not require a great fortune for his ſon, yet he would have him marry a lady of a good family, an agreeable temper, and a fine perſon; and above all a lady of good education, and good underſtanding, whoſe conduct would be very different from that of the generality of court-ladies. Notwithſtanding all theſe difficulties, our author undertook the buſineſs, and acquitted himſelf in it very happily. From this marriage ſprung ſeven children, all very healthy, tho' the father was of ſo weakly a conſtitution. The eldeſt ſon, afterwards the noble author of the Characteriſticks, was committed to the care of Mr. Locke in his education. Here was a great genius, and a great maſter to direct and guide it, and the ſucceſs was every way equal to what might be expected. It is ſaid that this noble author always ſpoke of Mr. Locke with the higheſt eſteem, and manifeſted on all occaſions a grateful ſenſe of his obligations to him: but there are ſome paſſages in his works, in which he ſpeaks of Mr. Locke's philoſophy with great ſeverity [*].

In

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[*] In the "letters written by a nobleman to a young man at the univerſity," publiſhed 1716, which are now known to be lord Shafteſbury's, having obſerved that "Dr. Tindal's principles, whatever they were as to church-government, yet in morals and theology were very different from the author's of the "Rhapſody,"—he proceeds thus: "In general truly it has happened, that all thoſe
" they call free-writers now a-days, have eſpouſed thoſe principles, which Mr. Hobbes ſet a-foot
" in this laſt age. Mr. Locke, as much as I honour him on account of his other writings, (viz.
" on government, policy, trade, coin, education, toleration, &c.) and as well as I knew him, and
" can anſwer for his ſincerity as a moſt zealous chriſtian and believer, did however go in the ſelf-ſame
" track, and is followed by the Tindals and all the other ingenious free authors of our time. It was
" Mr. Locke that ſtruck the home-blow; for Mr. Hobbes's character and baſe ſlaviſh principles in
" government, took off the poiſon of his philoſophy. It was Mr. Locke that ſtruck at the fundamentals,
" threw all order and virtue out of the world, and made the very ideas of theſe (which are
" the ſame as thoſe of God) unnatural and without foundation in our minds. "Innate" is a word
" he poorly plays upon: the right word, tho' leſs uſed, is "connatural." For what has birth or
" progreſs of the fœtus out of the womb to do in this caſe? The queſtion is not about the time the
" ideas entered, or the moment that one body came out of the other: but whether the conſtitution
" of man be ſuch, that being adult and grown up, at ſuch or ſuch a time, ſooner or later, (no matter
" when) the idea and ſenſe of order, adminiſtration, and a God, will not infallibly, inevitably, neceſſarily
" ſpring up in him."—"Then comes the credulous Mr. Locke, with his Indian, Barbarian
" ſtories of wild nations, that have no ſuch idea; (as travellers, learned authors! and men of truth!
" and great philoſophers! have informed him;) not conſidering, that this is but a negative upon a
" hear-ſay, and ſo circumſtantiated, that the faith of the Indian denyer may be as well queſtioned,
" as the veracity or judgment of the relater, who cannot be ſuppoſed to know ſufficiently the myſteries
" and ſecrets of thoſe Barbarians, whoſe language they but imperfectly know, and to whom we good
" Chriſtians, have by our little mercy, given ſufficient reaſon to conceal many ſecrets from us, as we
" know particularly in reſpect of ſimples and vegetables; of which, tho' we got the Peruvian Bark,
" and ſome other noble remedies, yet it is certain, that thro' the cruelty of the Spaniards, as they
" have owned themſelves, many ſecrets in medicinal affairs have been ſuppreſſed." And again,
" But Mr. Locke, who had more faith, and was more learned in modern wonder-writers than in
" ancient philoſophy, gave up an argument for the Deity, which Cicero, tho' a profeſs'd ſceptic,
" would not explode, and which even the chief of the atheiſtic philoſophers antiently acknowledged,
" and ſolved only by their "primus in orbe Deos fecit timor." Thus virtue, according to Mr.
" Locke, has no other meaſure, law, or rule, than faſhion and cuſtom. Morality, juſtice, equity,
" depend only on law and will; and God indeed is a perfect "free agent" in his ſenſe, i. e. "free
" to any thing, however ill;" for if he wills it, it will be made good: virtue may be vice, and vice
" virtue in its turn, if he pleaſes: and thus neither right nor wrong, virtue nor vice are any thing
" in themſelves; nor is there any trace or idea of them naturally imprinted on human minds. Experience
" and our catechiſm teach us all! I ſuppoſe it is ſomething of the like kind, which teaches
" birds their neſts, and how to fly the minute they have full feathers. Your Theocles (one of the
" interlocutors in the "Rhapſody") whom you commend ſo much, laughs at this, and as modeſtly

" as

In 1670 and the year following, our author began to form the paln of his "Eſſay on human underſtanding," at the earneſt requeſt of Mr. Tyrrell, Dr. Thomas, and ſome other friends, who met frequently in his chamber to converſe together on philoſophical ſubjects; but his employments and avocations prevented him from finiſhing it then.—About this time, it is ſuppoſed, he was made a fellow of the royal ſociety.

In 1672, his great patron lord Aſhley was created earl of Shafteſbury, and lord high chancellor of England, who appointed him ſecretary of the preſentation of benefices; which place he held till the end of the year 1673, when his lordſhip reſigned the great ſeal. Mr. Locke, to whom the earl had communicated his moſt ſecret affairs, was diſgraced together with him; and aſſiſted the earl in publiſhing ſome treatiſes, which were deſigned to excite the people to watch the conduct of the Roman Catholics, and to oppoſe the arbitrary deſigns of the court.

In 1675, he travelled into France, on account of his health. At Montpelier he ſtaid a conſiderable time; and there his firſt acquaintance aroſe with Mr. Herbert, afterwards earl of Pembroke, to whom he dedicated his "Eſſay on human underſtanding;" having the higheſt reſpect for that noble lord. From Montpelier he went to Paris, where he contracted a friendſhip with Mr. Juſtel, whoſe houſe was at time the place of reſort for men of letters: and there he ſaw monſieur Guenelon, the famous phyſician of Amſterdam, who read lectures in anatomy with great applauſe. He became acquainted likewiſe with Mr. Soignard, who ſhewed him a copy of his "Harmonia Evangelica;" which gave great pleaſure to Mr. Locke, as he had a high value for the ſcriptures. The earl of Shafteſbury being reſtored to favour at court, and made preſident of the council in 1679, thought proper to ſend for Mr. Locke to London; but that nobleman did not continue long in his poſt; for refuſing to comply with the deſigns of the court, which aimed at the eſtabliſhment of popery and arbitrary power, freſh crimes were laid to his charge, and he was ſent to the Tower: when the earl obtained his diſcharge from that place, he retired to Holland; and Mr. Locke not thinking himſelf ſafe in England, followed his noble patron thither, who died ſoon after. During our author's ſtay in Holland, he renewed his acquaintance with Mr. Guenelon, who introduced him to many learned perſons of Amſterdam. Here Mr. Locke contracted a friendſhip with Mr. Limborch, profeſſor of divinity among the Remonſtrants, and the moſt learned Mr. Le Clerc, which he cultivated after his return into England, and continued to the end of his life.

During his reſidence in Holland, he was accuſed at court of having writ certain tracts againſt the government, which were afterwards diſcovered to be written by another perſon; and upon that ſuſpicion he was deprived of his place of "Student of Chriſt-Church."

After the death of king Charles II. Mr. William Penn, who had known our author at the univerſity, uſed his intereſt with king James to procure a pardon for him; and would have obtained it, if Mr. Locke had not anſwered,

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"as he can, aſks a Lockiſt, whether the idea of women, and what is ſought after in women, be not "taught alſo by ſome catechiſm, and dictated to the man? Perhaps if we had no ſchool of Venus, "nor ſuch horrid lewd books or lewd companions, we might have no underſtanding of this, till we "were taught by our parents: and if the tradition ſhould happen to be loſt, the race of mankind "might periſh in a ſober nation. This is very poor philoſophy. But the gibberiſh of the ſchools, for "theſe ſeveral centuries, has in theſe later days of liberty, made any contrary philoſophy of good "reliſh and highly ſavoury with all men of wit; ſuch as have been emancipated from that egregious "form of intellectual bondage."—However he ſpeaks very highly of Mr. Locke's Eſſay on human Underſtanding,—Says, "that it may as well qualify men for buſineſs and the world, as for the "ſciences and univerſity." "No one," ſays he, "has done more towards the recalling of philo"ſophy from barbarity into the uſe and practice of the world, and into the company of the better and "politer ſort, who might well be aſhamed of it in its other dreſs. No one has opened a better and "clearer way to reaſoning." Theſe letters, which are full of good inſtruction, were written by the lord Shafteſbury to Mr. Ainſworth, then a ſtudent at the univerſity, at that lord's own expence. He was the ſon of a domeſtic ſervant of that noble lord, to whom he gave a learned education; and he proved a good and pious man, tho' he never diſtinguiſhed himſelf, according to his patron's expectations.

that he had no occaſion for a pardon, ſince he had not been guilty of any crime. In the year 1685, when the duke of Monmouth and his party were making preparations in Holland for his unfortunate enterprize, the Engliſh envoy at the Hague had orders to demand Mr. Locke and eighty three other perſons to be delivered up to the ſtates general; upon which he lay concealed to the year following. * During this confinement, our author wrote his "Letter of Toleration," which was firſt publiſhed in Latin, and entitled, "Epiſtola de Tolerantia ad Clariſſimum Virum, T. A. R. P. T. O. L. A. Scripta a P. A. P. O. I. L. A." The firſt letters ſignify, "Theologiæ apud Remonſtrantes Profeſſorem, Tyrannidis Oſorem, Limburgium Amſtelodamenſem;" and the latter, "Pacis Amico, Perſecutionis Oſore, Johanne Locke Anglo." This letter he afterwards tranſlated into Engliſh, and publiſhed at London in the year 1690. †

At Amſterdam he formed a weekly aſſembly, conſiſting of Mr. Limborch, Mr. Le Clerc, and others, for converſation upon important ſubjects: but theſe conferences were much interrupted by the frequent changes he was forced to make of the places of his reſidence.

Our author's great work, the "Eſſay concerning human Underſtanding," he had been employed about for ſome years, and he finiſhed it in Holland about the end of the year 1687. He made an abridgment of it himſelf, which his friend Mr. Le Clerc tranſlated into French, and inſerted in one of his "Bibliotheques." This abridgment was ſo highly approved of by all perſons of underſtanding, and ſincere lovers of truth, that they expreſſed the ſtrongeſt deſire to ſee the whole work.

At length the happy revolution in 1688, by the courage and good conduct of the Prince of Orange, opened a way for Mr. Locke's return into his own country; whither he came in the fleet which conveyed the Princeſs of Orange. And upon the reſtoration of public liberty, he thought it proper to aſſert his own private rights. He endeavoured therefore to procure his reſtoration to his place of ſtudent of Chriſt-church; not that he deſigned to return thither, but only that it might appear from thence, that he had been unjuſtly deprived of it. But when he found that the college could not be prevailed on to diſpoſſeſs the perſon who had been elected in his room, and that they would only admit him as a ſupernumerary ſtudent, he deſiſted from his claim. He was now at full liberty to purſue his ſpeculations, and accordingly, in the year 1689, he publiſhed his "Eſſay on human Underſtanding." This work, which has made our author's name immortal,

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* Mr. Le Clerc obſerves, that Mr. Locke had no correſpondence with the duke of Monmouth, having no great opinion of his undertaking. Beſides, his natural temper was timorous, not reſolute, and he was far from being fond of commotions. He had been at the end of the year 1684 at Utrecht, and returned in the ſpring to Amſterdam, with a deſign to go again to Utrecht, as he actually did, to avoid being charged with having any ſhare in the duke of Monmouth's enterprize. He had before ſome inclination to lodge with his friend Mr. Guenelon, but he excuſed himſelf, it not being the cuſtom of that city to admit ſtrangers to lodge, tho' he received Mr. Locke with great civility. But when Mr. Guenelon ſaw that his friend was in real danger, he ſerved him with great generoſity. He ſpoke to Mr. Veen, his father-in-law, and engaged him to receive Mr. Locke into his houſe. Upon this Mr. Locke came to Amſterdam, where he lay concealed at Mr. Veen's houſe two or three months. In the mean time Mr. Limborch took care to deliver him the letters which were written to him, and had the cuſtody of Mr. Locke's will, who deſired him to ſend it to ſome of his relations, whom he named, if he ſhould die. One of the principal magiſtrates of the city was conſulted, whether he might continue there in ſafety; but that magiſtrate anſwered, "That they could not protect him, if "the king of England ſhould demand him; however, that he ſhould not be betrayed, and that his "landlord ſhould have timely notice when there ſhould be occaſion." This gave him ſome kind of confidence, and he continued with Mr. Veen for ſome time, without going abroad, except at night, for fear of being known. In the mean time he was perſuaded to go to Cleves, but returned in about two months time, and lodged again at Mr. Veen's. At the end of the year he went to live with Mr. Guenelon, where he was likewiſe the year following. In 1686, he began to appear again in public, becauſe it was ſufficiently known, that he had no ſhare in the duke of Monmouth's invaſion. In autumn he went to Utrecht, and at the end of the year returned to Amſterdam, and lodged at Mr. Guenelon's, as before.

† This letter was ſo highly approved of in Holland, that it was immediately tranſlated into Dutch. But it was very ſeverely attacked by a clergyman of Oxford, who wrote no leſs than three pamphlets againſt it; two of which our author anſwered, defending his principles with invincible ſtrength of argument; and tho' he was in a declining ſtate of health, when his antagoniſt, after twelve years ſilence, publiſhed his third pamphlet againſt it, yet he began a reply to him in a "Fourth Letter concerning Toleration." Though this was not finiſhed, yet the fragment is publiſhed in this collection of his works.

mortal, and which does honour to our country, gave great offence to many people at the firſt publication. It was propoſed at a meeting of the heads of houſes of the univerſity of Oxford, to cenſure and diſcourage the reading of it; and after various debates among themſelves, it was concluded, that each head of an houſe ſhould endeavour to prevent its being read in his college. The reaſon of this is obvious; Mr. Locke had let in more light upon the minds of men, than was conſiſtent with the dark deſigns of ſome perſons.

In the ſame year, Mr. Locke alſo publiſhed his "Two Treatiſes on Government;" in which he fully vindicated the principles upon which "the revolution" was founded, and entirely overturned all the doctrines of ſlavery.

His writings had now procured him ſuch high eſteem, and he had merited ſo much of the government, that it would have been eaſy for him to have obtained a very conſiderable poſt; but he contented himſelf with that of "commiſſioner of appeals," worth about 200l. per annum. He was offered to go abroad in a public character, and it was left to his choice whether he would be envoy at the court of the emperor, the elector of Brandenburg, or any other, where he thought the air moſt ſuitable to him; but he declined it on account of his ill health.

About this time the public coin was very bad, having been ſo much clipped, and no care uſed to remedy it, that it wanted above a third of its due value. The effect of this was, that the people thought themſelves a great deal richer than indeed they were: for tho' the coin was not raiſed in its value by public authority, it was put off in trade for above a third part more than it weighed. Mr. Locke had obſerved this diſorder ever ſince his return to England; and he frequently ſpoke of it, that ſome meaſures might be taken to prevent it.—He ſaid, "that the nation was in greater danger, from a ſecret unobſerved abuſe, than from all thoſe other evils, of which perſons were generally ſo apprehenſive; and that if care was not taken to rectify the coin, that irregularity alone would prove fatal to us, tho' we ſhould ſucceed in every thing elſe." One day, when he ſeemed very much diſturbed about this matter, ſome perſons "rallied" him, as if he tormented himſelf with a groundleſs fear: he anſwered, "that perſons might laugh if they pleaſed, but they would find in a very ſhort time, that if care was not taken we ſhould want money in England to buy bread." And accordingly there were ſuch diſorders on this account, that the parliament took the matter into the moſt ſerious conſideration. To aſſiſt the great men at the head of affairs, (who are not always the beſt judges) to form a right underſtanding of this matter, and to excite them to rectify this ſhameful abuſe, Mr. Locke publiſhed a little treatiſe, entitled, "Some Conſiderations of the Conſequence of the lowering of the Intereſt, and raiſing the Value of Money;" in which there are many nice and curious obſervations on both thoſe ſubjects, as well as on trade in general. This treatiſe was ſhortly followed by two more upon the ſame ſubject, in which he obviated all objections, and confuted all his oppoſers.

He fully ſhewed to the world, by theſe diſcourſes, that he was as able to reaſon on trade and buſineſs, as on the moſt abſtract parts of ſcience, and that he was none of thoſe philoſophers, who ſpent their lives in ſearch of truths merely ſpeculative; and who by their ignorance of thoſe things which concern the public good, are incapable of ſerving their country. Theſe writings recommended him to the notice of the greateſt perſons, with whom he uſed to converſe very freely. He held weekly conferences with the earl of Pembroke, then lord keeper of the privy ſeal; and when the air of London began to affect his lungs, he went for ſome days to the earl of Peterborough's ſeat near Fullham, where he always met with the moſt friendly reception: but he was obliged afterwards entirely to leave London, at leaſt all the winter ſeaſon, and to go to ſome place at a greater diſtance. He had made frequent viſits at different times to Sir Francis Maſham's, who lived at Oates in Eſſex; where he found the air ſo good, ſo agreeable to his conſtitution, and the ſociety there ſo delightful, that he was eaſily prevailed with to become one of the family, and to ſettle there during his life. He was received upon his own terms, that he might have his entire liberty, and look upon himſelf as at his own houſe. Here he applied himſelf to his ſtudies as much as his weak health would allow, being ſeldom abſent, becauſe the air of London grew more and more troubleſome to him. He came to town only in the ſummer for three or four months, and if he returned to Oates any thing indiſpoſed, the air of that place ſoon recovered him.

In 1693 he publiſhed his "Thoughts concerning the Education of Children," but he improved it conſiderably afterwards.

In 1695 Mr. Locke publiſhed his treatiſe of "The Reaſonableneſs of Chriſtianity;" in which he has proved, that the Chriſtian religion, as delivered in the ſcriptures, and free from all corrupt mixtures, is the moſt reaſonable inſtitution in the world. This book was attacked by an ignorant, but zealous divine, Dr. Edwards, in a very rude and ſcurrilous manner. Mr. Locke anſwered Edwards, and defended his anſwer with ſuch ſtrength of reaſon, that he might juſtly have expected from his adverſary a public acknowledgment of his error, if he had not been one of thoſe writers, who have no more ſhame than reaſon in them. Mr. Locke was alſo obliged to Mr. Bolde, a worthy and pious clergyman, for vindicating his principles againſt the cavils of Edwards.

Some time before this, Mr. Toland publiſhed a book, entitled, "Chriſtianity not myſterious," in which he endeavoured to prove, "that there is nothing in "the Chriſtian religion, not only contrary to reaſon, but even nothing above it." Mr. Toland, in explaining ſome of his notions, uſed ſeveral arguments from Mr. Locke's "Eſſay on human Underſtanding." Some Unitarians alſo about this time publiſhed ſeveral treatiſes, in which they affirmed that there was nothing in the Chriſtian religion but what was rational and intelligible; and Mr. Locke having aſſerted in his writings that revelation delivers nothing contrary to reaſon; theſe things engaged Dr. Stillingfleet, the learned biſhop of Worceſter, to publiſh a treatiſe, in which he endeavoured to defend the doctrine of the trinity, againſt Mr. Toland and the Unitarians. In this treatiſe, the biſhop oppoſed ſome of Mr. Locke's principles, judging them heretical, and favouring the above-mentioned writers. Mr. Locke anſwered him, and the biſhop replied the ſame year. This reply was confuted, by a ſecond letter of Mr. Locke's, which drew a ſecond anſwer from the biſhop in 1698; and Mr. Locke again replied in a third letter, wherein he treated more largely of "the certainty of reaſon by ideas, of the certainty of faith, of the reſurrection of the ſame body, and the immateriality of the ſoul." He ſhewed the perfect agreement of his principles with the Chriſtian religion, and that he had advanced nothing which had the leaſt tendency to ſcepticiſm, which the biſhop had very ignorantly charged him with. But the biſhop died ſome time after this, and the diſpute ended. In this controverſy every body admired the ſtrength of Mr. Locke's reaſoning, his great clearneſs and exactneſs, both in explaining his own notions and principles, and confuting thoſe of his adverſary: nor were men of underſtanding leſs ſurpriſed, that ſo learned a man as the biſhop ſhould engage in a controverſy, wherein he had all the diſadvantages poſſible; for he was by no means able to maintain his opinions againſt Mr. Locke, whoſe reaſoning he neither underſtood, nor the thing itſelf about which he diſputed. This learned biſhop had ſpent the greateſt part of his time in the ſtudy of eccleſiaſtical antiquities, and reading a prodigious number of books, but was no great philoſopher; nor had he ever accuſtomed himſelf to that cloſe way of thinking and reaſoning, in which Mr. Locke did ſo highly excel. However, tho' our philoſopher had ſo great a victory over the biſhop, and had reaſon to complain of the biſhop's unjuſt charges againſt him, and for his writing on ſubjects of which he was ſo groſly ignorant; yet he did not make an inſolent triumph over his ignorance, but in the confutation of his errors treated him with great reſpect. He ſhews, indeed, that the biſhop did not underſtand the ſubject he wrote about, and that he was very incorrect and inaccurate in his expreſſions; but he rather inſinuates this by producing the biſhop's own words, and leaving his readers to judge, than reflect on him for it. In ſhort, never was a controverſy managed with ſo much art and ſkill on one ſide; nor, on the other, ſo unjuſtly, confuſedly, or ſo little to the credit of the author. Time, which is the beſt judge of things, has abundantly manifeſted this. The biſhop's writings on that ſubject are neglected, and buried in oblivion, but thoſe of our author will live for ever.

In 1695 Mr. Locke was appointed one of the "commiſſioners of trade and plantations," a place worth 1000l. per annum. The duties of this poſt he diſcharged with much care and diligence, and with univerſal approbation: he continued in it till the year 1700, when, upon the increaſe of his aſtmatic diſorder, he was forced to reſign it.

He acquainted no perſon with his deſign of leaving that place, till he had given up his commiſſion into the king's own hands. The king was very unwilling to diſmiſs him, and told our author, that he would be very well pleaſed with his continuance in that office, though he ſhould give little or no attendance; for that he did not deſire him to ſtay in town one day to the hurt of his health. But Mr. Locke told the king, that he could not in conſcience hold a place to which ſuch a ſalary was annexed, without diſcharging the duties of it; and therefore he begged leave to reſign it. King William had a great eſteem for our author, and would ſometimes ſend for him to diſcourſe on public affairs, and to know his ſentiments of things. Mr. Locke once told the king very plainly, that if the univerſities were not reformed, and other principles taught there, than had been formerly inculcated, they would either deſtroy him or ſome of his ſucceſſors, or both.

The laſt fourteen or fifteen years of his life, Mr. Locke ſpent chiefly at Oates, ſeldom coming to town; and during this agreeable retirement, he applied himſelf to the ſtudy of the ſcriptures, of the divinity of which he was thoroughly perſuaded. This ſtudy produced in him a very lively and ſincere piety, without any affectation. He admired the wiſdom and goodneſs of God, in the method found out for the ſalvation of mankind; and when he thought upon it, he could not forbear crying out, "O the depth of the riches of the goodneſs and knowledge of God!" He was perſuaded that men would be convinced of this by reading the ſcriptures without prejudice; and he frequently exhorted thoſe with whom he converſed, to a ſerious ſtudy of thoſe ſacred writings. His own application to this ſtudy, had given him a more noble and elevated idea of the Chriſtian religion, than he had before; and if his ſtrength would have allowed him to begin new works, it is probable that he would have written ſome, in order to inſpire others with the ſame grand and ſublime idea. There is a fine ode of Dr. Watts's, in his lyric poems, on occaſion of Mr. Locke's dangerous illneſs, ſome time after he had retired to ſtudy the ſcriptures. It is inſcribed to John Shute, Eſq; afterwards lord Barrington, and author of the Miſcellanea Sacra, and other valuable books on the ſcriptures, and who was honoured with the friendſhip of Mr. Locke, tho' then very young.

And muſt the man of wondrous mind,
(Now his rich thoughts are juſt refin'd)
Forſake our longing eyes?
Reaſon at length ſubmits to wear
The wings of faith, and lo! they rear
Her chariot high, and nobly bear
Her prophet to the ſkies.

II.

Go, friend, and wait the prophet's flight;
Watch if his mantle chance to light;
And ſeize it for thy own.
SHUTE is the darling of his years,
Young SHUTE his better likeneſs bears;
All but his wrinkles and his hairs
Are copy'd in his ſon.

III.

III.

Thus when our follies or our faults
Call for the pity of thy thoughts,
Thy pen ſhall make us wiſe:
The ſallies of whoſe youthful wit *
Could pierce the Britiſh fogs with light,
Place our true "intereſt" in our ſight,
And open half our eyes.

In 1704 our author's ſtrength began to fail him more than ever in the beginning of the ſummer; a ſeaſon, which for many years had reſtored him ſome degrees of ſtrength. His weakneſs made him apprehend his death was near. He often ſpoke of it himſelf, but always with great compoſure, tho' he omitted none of the precautions which his ſkill in medicine could ſuggeſt, in order to prolong his life. At length his legs began to ſwell; and that ſwelling encreaſing every day, his ſtrength diminiſhed very viſibly. He then ſaw how ſhort a time he had to live, and prepared to quit this world, with a deep ſenſe of the manifold bleſſings of God to him, which he took delight in recounting to his friends, and full of a ſincere reſignation to the divine will, and of firm hopes in his promiſes of a future life. Some weeks before his death, as he was no longer able to walk, he was carried about the houſe in a chair. And the lady Maſham going to ſee him. October 27th, inſtead of finding him in his ſtudy, where he uſed to be, ſhe found him in his bed. As ſhe ſhewed ſome ſurprize at this, Mr. Locke told her, that he had reſolved to continue in bed, ſince he was ſo much fatigued by riſing the day before, that he could not ſupport it; and therefore did not know whether he ſhould ever riſe again. He could not eat any dinner that day; and after dinner, thoſe who kept him company, propoſed to read to him ſomething that might amuſe him; but he refuſed it. However, a perſon having brought ſome papers into his chamber, he deſired to know what they were; upon which they were read to him: and then he ſaid, "that what he had to do, was now done, and "he thanked God for it." Upon this they went to his bed's ſide, and he added, that he deſired to be remembered by them in their prayers that evening. He was told, that if he would, the whole family ſhould be called to prayer in his chamber; to which he conſented. He was aſked, whether he thought himſelf near his death; to which he anſwered, "that it might perhaps happen that night, "but could not be delayed above three or four days." He then fell into a cold ſweat, but recovered himſelf ſoon after. He was offered a little Brunſwic mum, which he had drank with pleaſure the week before. He took ſome ſpoonfuls of it, and drank to the health of the company, ſaying, "I wiſh you all happineſs, "when I ſhall be departed." Thoſe who were in the chamber, having left it, except the lady Maſham, who ſate by his bed, he exhorted her "to regard this "world only as a ſtate of preparation for a better." He added, "that he had "lived long enough, and thanked God for having paſſed his life happily; but "that this life appeared to him a mere vanity." After ſupper, the family went up into his chamber to prayer, and between eleven and twelve at night he ſeemed a little better. Lady Maſham having deſired to ſit up with him, he would not permit her, and ſaid, that perhaps he might ſleep; but that if he found any change, he would have her called. He did not ſleep, but reſolved to try to riſe next morning, as he did. He was carried into his ſtudy, and placed in an eaſy chair, where he ſlept a conſiderable while at different times. Seeming to be a little refreſhed, he would be dreſſed as he uſed to be, and called for ſome ſmall beer, which he taſted very ſeldom; and then deſired the lady Maſham, who was reading ſome pſalms low, while he was dreſſing, to read aloud. She did ſo, and he appeared very attentive till the approach of death prevented him. He then deſired her to break off, and a few minutes after expired; on October the 28th, 1704, in the 73d year of his age.

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* Alluding to a treatiſe of Mr. Shute's.

Thus died this great and moſt excellent philoſopher, who after he had beſtowed many years in matters of ſcience and ſpeculation, happily turned his thoughts to the ſtudy of the ſcriptures, which he carefully examined with the ſame liberty he had uſed in his ſtudy of the other ſciences: and it is needleſs to ſay, how much the Chriſtian world is indebted to him for his paraphraſe and comments on ſome of the epiſtles, which were publiſhed after his death.

There is no occaſion to attempt a panegyric on our author. His writings are now well known, and valued, and will laſt as long as the Engliſh language. He had a great knowledge of the world, and of the buſineſs of it. He was prudent, without cunning; and he engaged men's eſteem by his probity; and took care to ſecure himſelf from the attacks of falſe friends, and ſordid flatterers. Averſe to all mean complaiſance, his wiſdom, his experience, his gentle manner gained him the reſpect of his inferiors, the eſteem of his equals, the friendſhip and confidence of thoſe of the higheſt quality. If there was any thing he could not bear, 'twas ill manners; this was ever ungrateful to him, unleſs when he perceived that it proceeded from ignorance; but when it was the effect of pride or ill nature, or brutality, he deteſted it. He looked on civility not only as a duty of humanity, but of chriſtianity; and he thought that it ought to be more preſſed and urged upon men than it commonly is. He recommended on this occaſion, a treatiſe in the moral eſſays written by the Gentlemen of the Port Royal, "concerning the means of preſerving peace among men;" and was a great admirer of Dr. Wichcote's ſermons * on moral ſubjects. He was very exact to his word, and religiouſly performed whatever he promiſed. He was very ſcrupulous of giving recommendations of perſons whom he did not well know: and would by no means commend thoſe whom he thought not to deſerve it. If he was told that his recommendations had not produced the effect expected, he would ſay, "the reaſon of that was, becauſe he had never deceived any perſon, by ſaying "more than he knew; that he never paſſed his word for any, but ſuch as he be- "lieved would anſwer the character he gave of them: and that if he ſhould do "otherwiſe, his recommendations would be worth nothing." Tho' he chiefly loved truths that were uſeful, and with ſuch fed his mind, and was generally very well pleaſed to make them the ſubject of converſation; yet he uſed to ſay, that in order to employ one part of this life in ſerious and important occupations, it was neceſſary to ſpend another in mere amuſements; and when an occaſion naturally offered, he gave himſelf up with pleaſure to the charms of a free and facetious converſation. He remembered a great many agreeable ſtories, which he always brought in properly; and generally made them yet more delightful by his natural and agreeable manner of telling them.

He had a peculiar art in converſation, to lead people to talk of what they underſtood beſt. With a gardener he diſcourſed of gardening; with a jeweller, of a diamond, &c. with a chemiſt, of chemiſtry: "by this," ſaid he, "I pleaſe all "thoſe men, who commonly can ſpeak pertinently upon nothing elſe. As they "believe I have an eſteem for their profeſſion, they are charmed with ſhewing "their abilities before me; and I, in the mean while, improve myſelf by their "diſcourſe." And indeed he had by this means acquired a very good inſight into all the arts, of which he daily learned more and more. He uſed to ſay too, that the knowledge of the arts contained more true philoſophy, than all thoſe fine learned hypotheſes, which having no relation to the nature of things, are fit only to make men loſe their time in inventing or comprehending them. By the ſeveral queſtions which he would put to artificers, he would find out the ſecret of their art, which they did not underſtand themſelves; and often give them views entirely new, which ſometimes they put in practice to their profit. He was ſo far from aſſuming thoſe airs of gravity, by which ſome perſons, learned and unlearned, love to diſtinguiſh themſelves from the reſt of the world; that on the contrary he looked on them as an infallible mark of impertinence. Nay ſometimes he would divert himſelf with imitating that ſtudied gravity, in order to turn it the better into ridicule; and upon this occaſion he always remembered this maxim of the

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* The ſelect ſermons, which were publiſhed with a preface by lord Shafteſbury.

the duke of la Rochefoucault, which he admired above all other, "that gravity "is a myſtery of the body, invented to conceal the defects of the mind." One thing, which thoſe who lived for any time with Mr. LOCKE could not help obſerving of him was, that he uſed his reaſon in every thing he did; and that nothing that was uſeful, ſeemed unworthy of his care. He often uſed to ſay, that there was an art in every thing, and that it was eaſy for any one to ſee it, from the manner in which he went about the moſt trifling things. As he always kept the uſeful in his eye in all his diſquiſitions, he eſteemed the employments of men only in proportion to the good they were capable of producing. For which reaſon he had no great value for thoſe critics and mere grammarians, who waſte their lives in comparing words and phraſes, and in coming to a determination in the choice of a various reading, in a paſſage of no importance. He valued yet leſs thoſe profeſſed diſputants, who being wholly poſſeſſed with a deſire of coming off with victory, fortify themſelves behind the ambiguity of a word, to give their adverſaries the more trouble. And whenever he had to do with this ſort of people, if he did not before-hand ſtrongly reſolve to keep his temper, he ſoon fell into paſſion. For, his natural temper was hot and choleric; but his anger never laſted long. If he retained any reſentment, it was againſt himſelf for having given way to ſo ridiculous a paſſion; which, as he uſed to ſay, may do a great deal of harm, but never yet did the leaſt good. He often would blame himſelf for this weakneſs. He diſliked thoſe authors, who labour only to deſtroy, without eſtabliſhing any thing themſelves. "A building," ſaid he, "diſpleaſes them. They find great "faults in it: let them demoliſh it and welcome, if they will but endeavour to "raiſe another in its place." He adviſed, that, whenever we have meditated any thing new, we ſhould throw it as ſoon as poſſible upon paper, in order to be the better able to judge of it by ſeeing it altogether; becauſe the mind of man is not capable of retaining clearly a long chain of conſequences, and of ſeeing without confuſion the relation of a great number of different ideas. Beſides, it often happens, that what we had moſt admired, when conſidered in the groſs and in a perplexed manner, appears to be utterly inconſiſtent and unſupportable, when we ſee every part of it diſtinctly.

HE was naturally very active, and employed himſelf as much as his health would permit. Sometimes he diverted himſelf with working in the garden, which he very well underſtood. He loved walking, but not being able to walk much, thro' the diſorder of his lungs, he uſed to ride out after dinner; and when he could not bear a horſe, he went in a chaiſe. He always choſe to have company with him, tho' it were but a child; for he took pleaſure in talking with children of a good education. His bad health was a diſturbance to none but himſelf; and any perſon might be with him without any other concern than that of ſeeing him ſuffer. He did not differ from others in his diet, but only in that his uſual drink was nothing but water; and he thought that was the means under God of lengthening out his life. To this he alſo thought, the preſervation of his ſight was in a great meaſure owing; for he could read by candle light all ſorts of books to the laſt, if they were not of a very ſmall print, without the uſe of ſpectacles. He had no other diſtemper but his aſthma, except a deafneſs for about ſix months, which he lamented in a letter to one of his friends, telling him, "he thought it "better to be blind than deaf, as it deprived him of all converſation." He left ſeveral manuſcripts behind him, beſides his paraphraſe on ſome of St. Paul's epiſtles, which were publiſhed at different times, and are all now added to this collection of his works.

TO THE

READER.

THOU haſt here a compleat collection of the ſeveral works of Mr. JOHN LOCKE, *which were publiſhed in his life-time, either with, or without, his name to them. And, that thou may'ſt be aſſured that the latter are truly his, I think it proper to tranſcribe the following clauſe out of his laſt will and teſtament:* "*Whereas the Reverend Dr. Hudſon, library keeper of the Bodleian library, in the univerſity of Oxford, writ to me ſome time ſince, deſiring of me, for the ſaid library, the books, whereof I was the author; I did, in return to the honour done me therein, preſent to the ſaid library, all the books that were publiſhed under my name; which, tho' accepted with honourable mention of me, yet were not underſtood to anſwer the requeſt made me, it being ſuppoſed that there were other treatiſes whereof I was the author, which have been publiſhed without my name to them. In compliance, therefore, with what was deſired, in the utmoſt extent of it, and in acknowledgement of the honour done me, in thinking my writings worthy to be placed among the works of the learned in that auguſt repoſitory; I do hereby further give to the publick library of the univerſity of Oxford, theſe following Books; that is to ſay,* Three Letters concerning Toleration; Two Treatiſes of Government, *(whereof Mr. Churchill has publiſhed ſeveral editions, but all very incorrect:)* The reaſonableneſs of Chriſtianity, as delivered in the Scriptures: A Vindication of the Reaſonableneſs of Chriſtianity from Mr. Edwards's Reflections: And, a ſecond Vindication of the Reaſonableneſs of Chriſtianity. *Theſe are all the books, whereof I am the author, which have been publiſhed without my name to them.*"

To theſe books publiſhed by Mr. LOCKE *in his life-time, are added theſe following, which have been printed ſince his death; viz.* His Paraphraſe on St. Paul's Epiſtles to the Galatians, Corinthians, Romans, *and* Epheſians: *To which is prefixed,* An Eſſay for the Underſtanding of St. Paul's Epiſtles, by conſulting St. Paul himſelf. His Poſthumous works: and ſome familiar Letters between him and his Friends.

To this Edition, " his REMAINS*" are added, formerly publiſhed by Mr. Dès Maizeaux: So that the Publick has now a compleat Collection of his Works together, with ſome Memoirs of his Life and Writings, chiefly drawn from the Author's great Friend, the moſt learned Monſieur Le Clerc.*

AN

AN
ESSAY
CONCERNING
Human Underſtanding.

In Four Books.

ECCLES. XI. 5.

As thou knoweſt not what is *the way of the Spirit,* nor *how the bones* do grow *in the womb of her that is with child: Even ſo thou knoweſt not the works of God, who maketh all things.*

Quam bellum eſt velle confiteri potius neſcire quod neſcias, quam iſta effutientem nauſeare, atque ipſum ſibi diſplicere!
Cic. de Nat. Deor. Lib. 1.

To the Right Honourable

THOMAS,

Earl of Pembroke and Montgomery,

Baron Herbert of Cardiff, Lord Roſs of Kendal, Par,
Fitzhugh, Marmion, St. Quintin, and Shurland;
Lord-Preſident of his Majeſty's moſt Honourable
Privy-Council; and Lord Lieutenant of the County
of Wilts, and of South-Wales.

My Lord,

THIS treatiſe, which has grown up under your Lordſhip's eye, and has ventured into the world by your order, does now, by a natural kind of right, come to your Lordſhip for that protection, which you ſeveral years ſince promiſed it. It is not that I think any name, how great ſoever, ſet at the beginning of a book, will be able to cover the faults that are to be found in it. Things in print muſt ſtand and fall by their own worth, or the reader's fanc[redacted] But there being nothing more to be deſired for truth, t unprejudiced hearing, no body is more likely to pr than your Lordſhip; who are allowed to have ate an acquaintance with her, in her more retired rece Your Lordſhip is known to have ſo far advanced your ſpeculations in the moſt abſtract and general knowledge of things, beyond the ordinary reach, or common methods, that your allowance and approbation of the deſign of this treatiſe, will at leaſt preſerve it from being condemned without reading; and will prevail to have thoſe parts a little weighed, which might otherwiſe, perhaps, be thought to deſerve no conſideration, for being ſomewhat out of the common road. The imputation of novelty is a terrible charge amongſt thoſe, who judge of men's heads, as they do of their perukes, by the faſhion; and can allow none to be right, but the received doctrines. Truth ſcarce ever yet carried it by vote, any where, at its firſt appearance: new opinions are always ſuſpected, and uſually oppoſed, without any other reaſon, but becauſe they are not already common. But truth, like gold, is not the leſs ſo, for being newly brought out of the mine. It is trial and examination muſt give it price, and not any antick faſhion: and tho' it be not yet current by the publick ſtamp; yet it may for all that, be as old as nature, and is certainly not the leſs genuine. Your Lordſhip can give great and convincing inſtances of this, whenever you pleaſe to oblige the publick with ſome of thoſe large and comprehenſive diſcoveries you have made of truths, hitherto unknown, unleſs to ſome few, to whom your Lordſhip has been pleaſed not wholly to conceal them. This alone were a ſufficient reaſon, were there no other, why I ſhould dedicate this Eſſay to your Lordſhip: and its having ſome little correſpondence with ſome parts of that nobler and vaſt ſyſtem of the ſciences, your Lordſhip has made ſo new, exact, and inſtructive a draught of, I think it glory enough, if your Lordſhip permit me to boaſt, that here and there I have fallen into ſome thoughts, not wholly different from your's. If your Lordſhip think fit, that, by your encouragement, this ſhould appear in the world, I hope it may be a reaſon, ſome time or other, to lead your Lordſhip farther; and you will allow me to ſay, that you here give the world an earneſt of ſomething, that, if they can bear with this, will be truly worth their expectation. This, my Lord, ſhews what a preſent I here make to your Lordſhip; juſt ſuch as the poor man does to his rich and great neighbour, by whom the baſket of flowers, or fruit, is not ill taken, tho' he has more plenty of his own growth, and in much greater perfection. Worthleſs things receive a value, when they are made the offerings of reſpect, eſteems and gratitude; theſe you have given me ſo mighty and peculiar reaſons to have, in the higheſt degree, for your Lordſhip, that if they can add a price to what they go along with, proportionable to their own greatneſs, I can with confidence brag, I here make your Lordſhip the richeſt preſent you ever received. This I am ſure, I am under the greateſt obligation to ſeek all occaſions to acknowledge a long train of favours, I have received from your Lordſhip; favours, tho' great and important in themſelves, yet made much more ſo by the forwardneſs, concern, and kindneſs, and other obliging circumſtances, that never fail to accompany them. To all this, you are pleaſed to add that, which gives yet more weight and reliſh to all the reſt: you vouchſafe to continue me in ſome degrees of your eſteem, and allow me a place in your good thoughts; I had almoſt ſaid friendſhip. This, my Lord, your words and actions ſo conſtantly ſhew, on all occaſions, even to others, when I am abſent, that it is not vanity in me to mention what every body knows: but it would be want of good manners, not to acknowledge what ſo many are witneſſes of, and every day tell me, I am indebted to your Lordſhip for. I wiſh they could as eaſily aſſiſt my gratitude, as they convince me of the great and growing engagements it has to your Lordſhip. This, I am ſure, I ſhould write of the underſtanding without having any, if I were not extremely ſenſible of them, and did not lay hold on this opportunity to teſtify to the world, how much I am obliged to be, and how much I am,

My LORD,

Your LORDSHIP's

Moſt Humble, and

Moſt Obedient Servant

John Locke.

Dorſet-court, 24th
May, 1689.

THE EPISTLE TO THE READER.

Reader,

I HERE put into thy hands, what has been the diverſion of ſome of my idle and heavy hours: if it has the good luck to prove ſo of any of thine, and thou haſt but half ſo much pleaſure in reading as I had in writing it, thou wilt as little think thy money, as I do my pains, ill beſtowed. Miſtake not this, for a commendation of my work; nor conclude becauſe I was pleaſed with the doing of it, that therefore I am fondly taken with it, now it is done. He that hawks at larks and ſparrows, has no leſs ſport, tho' a much leſs conſiderable quarry, than he that flies at nobler game: and he is little acquainted with the ſubject of this treatiſe, the UNDERSTANDING, who does not know that as it is the moſt elevated faculty of the ſoul, ſo it is employed with a greater and more conſtant delight, than any of the other. Its ſearches after truth, are a ſort of hawking and hunting, wherein the very purſuit makes a great part of the pleaſure. Every ſtep the mind takes, in its progreſs towards knowledge, makes ſome diſcovery, which is not only new, but the beſt too, for the time at leaſt.

For the underſtanding, like the eye, judging of objects only by its own ſight, cannot but be pleaſed with what it diſcovers, having leſs regret for what has eſcaped it, becauſe it is unknown. Thus he, who has raiſed himſelf above the alms-baſket, and not content to live lazy on ſcraps of begged opinions, ſets his own thoughts on work, to find and follow truth, will (whatever he lights on) not miſs the hunter's ſatisfaction: every moment of his purſuit will reward his pains with ſome delight, and he will have reaſon to think his time not ill ſpent, even when he cannot much boaſt of any great acquiſition.

THIS, reader, is the entertainment of thoſe, who let looſe their own thoughts, and follow them in writing; which thou oughteſt not to envy them, ſince they afford thee an opportunity of the like diverſion, if thou wilt make uſe of thy own thoughts in reading. It is to them, if they are thy own, that I refer myſelf: but if they are taken upon truſt from others, it is no great matter what they are: they not following truth, but ſome meaner conſideration. And it is not worth while to be concerned, what he ſays or thinks, who ſays or thinks only as he is directed by another. If thou judgeſt for thy ſelf, I know thou wilt judge candidly; and then I ſhall not be harmed or offended, whatever be thy cenſure. For tho' it be certain, that there is nothing in this treatiſe, of the truth whereof I am not fully perſuaded; yet I conſider my ſelf as liable to miſtakes, as I can think thee; and know that this book muſt ſtand or fall with thee, not by any opinion I have of it, but by thy own. If thou findeſt little in it new, or inſtructive to thee, thou art not to blame me for it. It was not meant for thoſe that had already maſtered this ſubject, and made a thorough acquaintance with their

their own underſtandings; but for my own information, and the ſatisfaction of a few friends, who acknowledged themſelves not to have ſufficiently conſidered it. Were it fit to trouble thee with the hiſtory of this Eſſay, I ſhould tell thee, that five or ſix friends meeting at my chamber, and diſcourſing on a ſubject very remote from this, found themſelves quickly at a ſtand, by the difficulties that roſe on every ſide. After we had a while puzzled ourſelves, without coming any nearer a reſolution of thoſe doubts which perplexed us, it came into my thoughts, that we took a wrong courſe; and that before we ſet ourſelves upon enquiries of that nature, it was neceſſary to examine our own abilities, and ſee what objects our underſtandings were or were not fitted to deal with. This I propoſed to the company, who all readily aſſented; and thereupon it was agreed, that this ſhould be our firſt enquiry. Some haſty and undigeſted thoughts on a ſubject I had never before conſidered, which I ſet down againſt our next meeting, gave the firſt entrance into this diſcourſe; which having been thus begun by chance, was continued by intreaty; written by incoherent parcels; and after long intervals of neglect, reſumed again, as my humour, or occaſions permitted; and at laſt, in a retirement, where an attendance on my health gave me leiſure, it was brought into that order thou now ſeeſt it.

THIS diſcontinued way of writing, may have occaſioned, beſides others, two contrary faults, viz. that too little and too much may be ſaid in it. If thou findeſt any thing wanting, I ſhall be glad that what I have writ gives thee any deſire that I ſhould have gone further; if it ſeems too much to thee, thou muſt blame the ſubject; for when I firſt put pen to paper, I thought all I ſhould have to ſay on this matter, would have been contained in one ſheet of paper; but the further I went, the larger proſpect I had: new diſcoveries led me ſtill on, and ſo it grew inſenſibly to the bulk it now appears in. I will not deny, but poſſibly it might be reduced to a narrower compaſs than it is; and that ſome parts of it might be contracted: the way it has been writ in, by catches, and many long intervals of interruption, being apt to cauſe ſome repetitions. But to confeſs the truth, I am now too lazy, or too buſy to make it ſhorter.

I AM not ignorant how little I herein conſult my own reputation, when I knowingly let it go with a fault, ſo apt to diſguſt the moſt judicious, who are always the niceſt readers. But they who know ſloth is apt to content itſelf with any excuſe, will pardon me, if mine has prevailed on me, where, I think, I have a very good one. I will not therefore allege in my defence, that the ſame notion having different reſpects, may be convenient or neceſſary to prove or illuſtrate ſeveral parts of the ſame diſcourſe; and that ſo it has happened in many parts of this: but waving that, I ſhall frankly avow, that I have ſometimes dwelt long upon the ſame argument, and expreſſed it different ways, with a quite different deſign. I pretend not to publiſh this Eſſay for the information of men of large thoughts, and quick apprehenſions; to ſuch maſters of knowlege I profeſs my ſelf a ſcholar, and therefore warn them before-hand not to expect any thing here, but what being ſpun out of my own coarſe thoughts, is fitted to men of my own ſize; to whom, perhaps, it will not be unacceptable, that I have taken ſome pains to make plain and familiar to their thoughts ſome truths, which eſtabliſhed prejudice, or the abſtractedneſs of the ideas themſelves, might render difficult. Some objects had need be turned on every ſide; and when the notion is new, as I confeſs ſome of theſe are to me, or out of the ordinary road, as I ſuſpect they will appear to others, it is not one ſimple view of that will gain it admittance into every underſtanding, or fix it there with a clear and laſting impreſſion. There are few, I believe, who have not obſerved in themſelves, or others, that what in one way of propoſing was very obſcure, another way of expreſſing it has made very clear and intelligible: tho' afterward the mind found little difference in the phraſes, and wondered why one failed to be underſtood more than the other. But every thing does not hit alike upon every man's imagination. We have our underſtandings no leſs different than our palates; and he that thinks the ſame truth ſhall be equally reliſhed by every one in the ſame dreſs, may as well hope to feaſt every one with the ſame ſort of cookery: the meat may be the ſame and the nouriſhment good, yet every one not be able to receive it with that ſeaſoning; and it muſt be dreſſed another way, if you will have it go down with ſome, even of ſtrong conſtitutions. The truth is, thoſe who adviſed me to publiſh it, adviſed me, for this reaſon, to publiſh it as it is: and ſince I have been brought to let it go abroad, I deſire it ſhould be underſtood by whoever gives himſelf the pains to read it, I have ſo *little affection to be in print, that if I were not flattered, this Eſſay might be of ſome uſe to others, as I think it has been to me; I ſhould have confined it to the view of ſome friends, who gave the firſt occaſion to it. My appearing therefore in print, being on purpoſe to be as uſeful as I may, I think it neceſſary to make what I have to ſay, as eaſy and intelligible to all ſorts of readers, as I can. And I had much rather the ſpeculative and quick-ſighted ſhould complain of my being in ſome parts tedious, than that any one, not accuſtomed to abſtract ſpeculations, or prepoſſeſſed with different notions, ſhould miſtake, or not comprehend my meaning.*

IT will poſſibly be cenſured as a great piece of vanity, or inſolence, in me, to pretend to inſtruct this our knowing age; it amounting to little leſs, when I own, that I publiſh this Eſſay with hopes it may be uſeful to others. But if it may be permitted to ſpeak freely of thoſe, who with a feigned modeſty condemn, as uſeleſs, what they themſelves write, methinks it ſavours much more of vanity or inſolence, to publiſh a book for any other end; and he fails very much of that reſpect he owes the publick, who prints, and conſequently expects men ſhould read that, wherein he intends not they ſhould meet with any thing of uſe to themſelves or others: and ſhould nothing elſe be found allowable in this treatiſe, yet my deſign will not ceaſe to be ſo: and the goodneſs of my intention ought to be ſome excuſe for the worthleſſneſs of my preſent. It is that chiefly which ſecures me from the fear of cenſure, which I expect not to eſcape more than better writers. Men's principles, notions, and reliſhes are ſo different, that it is hard to find a book which pleaſes or diſpleaſes all men. I acknowledge the age, we live in, is not the leaſt knowing, and therefore not the moſt eaſy to be ſatisfied. If I have not the good luck to pleaſe, yet no body ought to be offended with me. I plainly tell all my readers, except half a dozen, this treatiſe was not at firſt intended for them; and therefore they need not be at the trouble to be of that number. But yet if any one thinks fit to be angry, and rail at it, he may do it ſecurely: for I ſhall find ſome better way of ſpending my time, than in ſuch kind of converſation. I ſhall always have the ſatisfaction to have aimed ſincerely at truth and uſefulneſs, tho' in one of the meaneſt ways. The commonwealth of learning is not at this time without maſter-builders, whoſe mighty deſigns, in advancing the ſciences, will leave laſting monuments to the admiration of poſterity: but every one muſt not hope to be a Boyle, *or a* Sydenham; *and in an age that produces ſuch maſters as the great*——Huygenius, *and the incomparable Mr.* Newton, *with ſome others of that ſtrain; it is ambition enough to be employed as an under-labourer in clearing ground a little, and removing ſome of the rubbiſh, that lies in the way to knowledge; which certainly had been very much more advanced in the world, if the endeavours of ingenious and induſtrious men had not been much cumbered with the learned, but frivolous uſe of uncouth, affected or unintelligible terms, introduced into the ſciences, and there made an art of, to that degree, that philoſophy, which is nothing but the true knowledge of things, was thought unfit, or uncapable to be brought into well-bred company, and polite converſation. Vague and inſignificant forms of ſpeech, and abuſe of language, have ſo long paſſed for myſteries of ſcience; or hard or miſapplied words, with little or no meaning, have, by preſcription, ſuch a right to be miſtaken for deep learning, and height of ſpeculation; that it will not be eaſy to perſuade, either thoſe who ſpeak, or thoſe who hear them, that they are but the covers of ignorance, and hindrance of true knowledge. To break in upon the ſanctuary of vanity and ignorance, will be, I ſuppoſe, ſome ſervice to human underſtanding: tho' ſo few are apt to think, they deceive or are deceived in the uſe of words; or that the language of the ſect they are of, has any faults in it, which ought to be examined or corrected; that I hope I ſhall be pardoned, if I have in the third book dwelt long on this ſubject; and endeavoured to make it ſo plain that neither the inveterateneſs of the miſchief, nor the prevalency of the faſhion, ſhall be any excuſe for thoſe, who will not take care about the meaning of their own words, and will not ſuffer the ſignificancy of their expreſſions to be enquired into.*

I HAVE been told, that a ſhort epitome of this treatiſe, which was printed 1688, *was by ſome condemned without reading, becauſe innate ideas were denied in it; they too haſtily concluding, that if innate ideas were not ſuppoſed, there would be little left, either of the notion or proof of ſpirits. If any one take the like offence at the entrance of this treatiſe, I ſhall deſire him to read it thorough; and then I hope he will be convinced, that the taking away falſe foundations, is not to the prejudice, but advantage of* *truth; which is never injured or endangered ſo much, as when mixed with, or built on falſhood. In the ſecond edition I added as followeth.*

THE bookſeller will not forgive me, if I ſay nothing of this ſecond edition, which he has promiſed, by the correctneſs of it, ſhall make amends for the many faults committed in the former. He deſires too, that it ſhould be known, that it has one whole new chapter concerning identity, and many additions and amendments in other places. Theſe I muſt inform my reader, are not all new matter, but moſt of them either farther confirmation of what I had ſaid, or explications, to prevent others being miſtaken in the ſenſe of what was formerly printed, and not any variation in me from it: I muſt only except the alterations I have made in book ii. chap. 21.

WHAT I had there writ concerning liberty and the will, I thought deſerved as accurate a view as I was capable of: thoſe ſubjects having, in all ages, exerciſed the learned part of the world with queſtions and difficulties, that have not a little perplexed morality and divinity; thoſe parts of knowledge that men are moſt concerned to be clear in. Upon a cloſer inſpection into the working of men's minds, and a ſtricter examination of thoſe motives and views they are turned by, I have found reaſon ſomewhat to alter the thoughts I formerly had, concerning that, which gives the laſt determination to the will in all voluntary actions. This I cannot forbear to acknowledge to the world with as much freedom and readineſs, as I at firſt publiſhed what then ſeemed to me to be right, thinking myſelf more concerned to quit and renounce any opinion of my own, than oppoſe that of another, when truth appears againſt it. For it is truth alone I ſeek, and that will always be welcome to me, when, or from whenceſoever it comes.

BUT what forwardneſs ſoever I have to reſign any opinion I have, or to recede from any thing I have writ, upon the firſt evidence of an error in it; yet this I muſt own, that I have not had the good luck to receive any light from thoſe exceptions I have met with in print againſt any part of my book; nor have, from any thing has been urged againſt it, found reaſon to alter my ſenſe, in any of the points have been queſtioned. Whether the ſubject I have in hand requires often more thought and attention, than curſory readers, at leaſt ſuch as are prepoſſeſſed, are willing to allow; or whether any obſcurity in my expreſſions caſts a cloud over it, and theſe notions are made difficult to others apprehenſion in my way of treating them: ſo it is, that my meaning, I find, is often miſtaken, and I have not the good luck to be every where rightly underſtood. There are ſo many inſtances of this, that I think it juſtice to my reader and myſelf to conclude, that either my book is plainly enough written to be rightly underſtood by thoſe who peruſe it with that attention and indifferency, which every one, who will give himſelf the pains to read, ought to employ in reading; or elſe that I have writ mine ſo obſcurely, that it is in vain to go about to mend it. Which ever of theſe be that truth, it is myſelf only am affected thereby, and therefore I ſhall be far from troubling my reader with what I think might be ſaid, in anſwer to thoſe ſeveral objections I have met with, to paſſages here and there of my book. Since I perſuade myſelf, that he who thinks them of moment enough to be concerned, whether they are true or falſe, will be able to ſee, that what is ſaid, is either not well founded, or elſe not contrary to my doctrine, when I and my oppoſer come both to be well underſtood.

IF any, careful that none of their good thoughts ſhould be loſt, have publiſhed their cenſures of my Eſſay, with this honour done to it, that they will not ſuffer it to be an Eſſay; I leave it to the publick to value the obligation they have to their critical pens, and ſhall not waſte my reader's time in ſo idle or ill-natured an employment of mine, as to leſſen the ſatisfaction any one has in himſelf, or gives to others in ſo haſty a confutation of what I have written.

THE bookſellers preparing for the fourth edition of my Eſſay, gave me notice of it, that I might, if I had leiſure, make any additions or alterations I ſhould think fit. Whereupon I thought it convenient to advertiſe the reader, that, beſides ſeveral corrections I had made here and there, there was one alteration which it was neceſſary to mention, becauſe it ran through the whole book, and is of conſequence to be rightly underſtood. What I thereupon ſaid, was this:

CLEAR and diſtinct ideas are terms, which, tho' familiar and frequent in men's mouths, I have reaſon to think every one who uſes, does not perfectly underſtand. And poſſibly it is but here and there one, who gives himſelf the trouble to conſider them ſo far *as to know what he himſelf or others preciſely mean by them: I have therefore in moſt places choſe to put determinate, or determined, inſtead of clear and diſtinct, as more likely to direct men's thoughts to my meaning in this matter. By thoſe denominations, I mean ſome object in the mind, and conſequently determined, i. e. ſuch as is there ſeen and perceived to be. This, I think, may fitly be called a determinate or determined idea, when ſuch as it is at any time objectively in the mind, and ſo determined there, it is annexed, and without variation determined to a name or articulate ſound, which is to be ſteadily the ſign of that very ſame object of the mind, or determinate idea.*

TO explain this a little more particularly. By determinate, when applied to a ſimple idea, I mean that ſimple appearance which the mind has in its view, or perceives in itſelf, when that idea is ſaid to be in it; by determined, when applied to a complex idea, I mean ſuch a one as conſiſts of a determinate number of certain ſimple or leſs complex ideas, joined in ſuch a proportion and ſituation, as the mind has before its view, and ſees in itſelf, when that idea is preſent in it, or ſhould be preſent in it, when a man gives a name to it. I ſay, ſhould be; becauſe it is not every one, nor perhaps any one, who is ſo careful of his language, as to uſe no word, till he views in his mind the preciſe determined idea, which he reſolves to make it the ſign of. The want of this, is the cauſe of no ſmall obſcurity and confuſion in men's thoughts and diſcourſes.

I KNOW there are not words enough in any language, to anſwer all the variety of ideas, that enter into men's diſcourſes and reaſonings. But this hinders not, but that when any one uſes any term, he may have in his mind a determined idea, which he makes it the ſign of, and to which he ſhould keep it ſteadily annexed, during that preſent diſcourſe. Where he does not, or cannot do this, he in vain pretends to clear or diſtinct ideas; it is plain his are not ſo; and therefore there can be expected nothing but obſcurity and confuſion, where ſuch terms are made uſe of which have not ſuch a preciſe determination.

UPON this ground I have thought determined ideas a way of ſpeaking leſs liable to miſtake, than clear and diſtinct: and where men have got ſuch determined ideas of all that they reaſon, enquire, or argue about, they will find a great part of their doubts and diſputes at an end. The greateſt part of the queſtions and controverſies that perplex mankind, depending on the doubtful and uncertain uſe of words, or (which is the ſame) indetermined ideas, which they are made to ſtand for; I have made choice of theſe terms to ſignify, 1. *Some immediate object of the mind, which it perceives and has before it, diſtinct from the ſound it uſes as a ſign of it.* 2. *That this idea, thus determined, i. e. which the mind has in itſelf, and knows and ſees there, be determined, without any change, to that name, and that name determined to that preciſe idea. If men had ſuch determined ideas in their enquiries and diſcourſes, they would both diſcern how far their own enquiries and diſcourſes went, and avoid the greateſt part of the diſputes and wranglings they have with others.*

BESIDES this, the bookſeller will think it neceſſary I ſhould advertiſe the reader, that there is an addition of two chapters wholly new; the one of the aſſociation of ideas, the other of enthuſiaſm. Theſe, with ſome other larger additions, never before printed, he had engaged to print by themſelves, after the ſame manner, and for the ſame purpoſe, as was done when this Eſſay had the ſecond impreſſion.

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15, 16. *Pleaſure and pain, what.*
17. *Shame.*
18. *Theſe inſtances do ſhew how our ideas of the paſſions are got from ſenſation and reflection.*

CHAP. XXI.

Of power.

SECT.

1. *This idea how got.*
2. *Power, active and paſſive.*
3. *Power includes relation.*
4. *The cleareſt idea of active power, had from ſpirit.*
5. *Will and underſtanding, two powers.*
6. *Faculties.*
7. *Whence the ideas of liberty and neceſſity.*
8. *Liberty, what.*
9. *Suppoſes underſtanding and will.*
10. *Belongs not to volition.*
11. *Voluntary oppoſed to involuntary, not to neceſſary.*
12. *Liberty, what.*
13. *Neceſſity, what.*
14, 20. *Liberty belongs not to the will.*
21. *But to the agent, or man.*
22, 24. *In reſpect of willing, a man is not free.*
25, 26, 27. } *The will determined by ſomething without it.*
28. *Volition, what.*
29. *What determines the will.*
30. *Will and deſire muſt not be confounded.*
31. *Uneaſineſs determines the will.*
32. *Deſire is uneaſineſs.*
33. *The uneaſineſs of deſire determines the will.*
34. *This the ſpring of action.*
35. *The greateſt poſitive good determines not the will, but uneaſineſs.*
36. *Becauſe the removal of uneaſineſs is the firſt ſtep to happineſs.*
37. *Becauſe uneaſineſs alone is preſent.*
38. *Becauſe all, who allow the joys of heaven poſſible, purſue them not. But a great uneaſineſs is never neglected.*
39. *Deſire accompanies all uneaſineſs.*
40. *The moſt preſſing uneaſineſs naturally determines the will.*
41. *All deſire happineſs.*

42. Happineſs, what.
43. What good is deſired, what not.
44. Why the greateſt good is not always deſired.
45. Why, not being deſired, it moves not the will.
46. Due conſideration raiſes deſire.
47. The power to ſuſpend the proſecution of any deſire, makes way for conſideration.
48. To be determined by our own judgment, is no reſtraint to liberty.
49. The freeſt agents are ſo determined.
50. A conſtant determination to a purſuit of happineſs, no abridgment of liberty.
51. The neceſſity of purſuing true happineſs, the foundation of all liberty.
52. The reaſon of it.
53. Government of our paſſions, the right improvement of liberty.
54, 55. How men come to purſue different courſes.
56. How men come to chuſe ill.
57. Firſt from bodily pains. Secondly, from wrong deſires, ariſing from wrong judgment.
58, 59. Our judgment of preſent good and evil always right.
60. From a wrong judgment of what makes a neceſſary part of their happineſs.
61, 62. A more particular account of wrong judgments.
63. In comparing preſent and future.
64, 65. Cauſes of this.
66. In conſidering conſequences of actions.
67. Cauſes of this.
68. Wrong judgment of what is neceſſary to our happineſs.
69. We can change the agreeableneſs, or diſagreeableneſs, in things.
70. Preference of vice to virtue, a manifeſt wrong judgment.
71, 72, 73. } Recapitulation.

CHAP. XXII

Of mixed modes.

SECT.

1. Mixed modes, what.
2. Made by the mind.
3. Sometimes got by the explication of their names.
4. The name ties the parts of mixed modes into one idea.
5. The cauſe of making mixed modes.
6. Why words in one language have none anſwering in another.
7. And languages change.
8. Mixed modes, where they exiſt.
9. How we get the ideas of mixed modes.
10. Motion, thinking, and power, have been moſt modified.
11. Several words ſeeming to ſignify action, ſignify but the effect.
12. Mixed modes, made alſo of other ideas.

CHAP. XXIII.

Of the complex ideas of ſubſtances.

SECT.

1. Ideas of ſubſtances, how made.
2. Our idea of ſubſtance in general.
3-6. Of the ſorts of ſubſtances.
4. No clear idea of ſubſtance in general.
5. As clear an idea of ſpirit as body.
7. Powers a great part of our complex ideas of ſubſtances.
8. And why.
9. Three ſorts of ideas make our complex ones of ſubſtances.
10. Powers make a great part of our complex ideas of ſubſtances.
11. The now ſecondary qualities of bodies would diſappear, if we could diſcover the primary ones of their minute parts.
12. Our faculties of diſcovery ſuited to our ſtate.
13. Conjecture about ſpirits.
14. Complex ideas of ſubſtances.
15. Idea of ſpiritual ſubſtances, as clear as of bodily ſubſtances.
16. No idea of abſtract ſubſtance.
17. The coheſion of ſolid parts, and impulſe, the primary ideas of body.
18. Thinking and motivity, the primary ideas of ſpirit.
19-21. Spirits capable of motion.
22. Idea of ſoul and body compared.
23-27. Coheſion of ſolid parts in body, as hard to be conceived, as thinking in a ſoul.
28, 29. Communication of motion by impulſe, or by thought, equally intelligible.
30. Ideas of body and ſpirit compared.
31. The notion of ſpirit involves no more difficulty in it, than that of body.
32. We know nothing beyond our ſimple ideas.
33-35. Idea of God.
36. No ideas in our complex one of ſpirits, but thoſe got from ſenſation or reflection.
37. Recapitulation.

CHAP XXIV.

Of collective ideas of ſubſtances.

SECT.

1. One idea.
2. Made by the power of compoſing in the mind.

3. All

3. *All artificial things are collective ideas.*

CHAP. XXV.

Of relation.

SECT.

1. *Relation, what.*
2. *Relations, without correlative terms, not eaſily perceived.*
3. *Some ſeemingly abſolute terms contain relations.*
4. *Relations different from the things related.*
5. *Change of relation may be, without any change in the ſubject.*
6. *Relation only betwixt two things.*
7. *All things capable of relation.*
8. *The ideas of relation, clearer often, than of the ſubjects related.*
9. *Relations all terminate in ſimple ideas.*
10. *Terms leading the mind beyond the ſubject denominated, are relative.*
11. *Concluſion.*

CHAP. XXVI.

Of cauſe, of effect, and other relations.

SECT.

1. *Whence their ideas got.*
2. *Creation, generation, making alteration.*

3, 4. *Relations of time.*

5. *Relations of place and extenſion.*
6. *Abſolute terms often ſtand for relations.*

CHAP. XXVII.

Of identity and diverſity.

SECT.

1. *Wherein identity conſiſts.*
2. *Identity of ſubſtances, identity of modes.*
3. *Principium individuationis.*
4. *Identity of vegetables.*
5. *Identity of animals.*
6. *Identity of man.*
7. *Identity ſuited to the idea.*
8. *Same man.*
9. *Perſonal identity.*
10. *Conſciouſneſs makes perſonal identity.*
11. *Perſonal identity in change of ſubſtances.*

12-15. *Whether in the change of thinking ſubſtances.*

16. *Conſciouſneſs makes the ſame perſon.*
17. *Self depends on conſciouſneſs.*

18, 19, 20. } *Objects of reward and puniſhment.*

21, 22. *Difference between identity of man and perſon.*

23, 24, 25. } *Conſciouſneſs alone makes ſelf.*

26, 27. *Perſon a forenſick term.*

28. *The difficulty from ill uſe of names.*
29. *Continued exiſtence makes identity.*

CHAP. XXVIII.

Of other relations.

SECT.

1. *Proportional.*
2. *Natural.*
3. *Inſtituted.*
4. *Moral.*
5. *Moral good and evil.*
6. *Moral rules.*
7. *Laws.*
8. *Divine law, the meaſure of ſin and duty.*
9. *Civil law, the meaſure of crimes and innocence.*

10, 11. *Philoſophical law, the meaſure of virtue and vice.*

12. *Its imforcements, commendation, and diſcredit.*
13. *Theſe three laws the rules of moral good and evil.*

14, 15. *Morality is the relations of actions to the rules.*

16. *The denominations of actions often miſlead us.*
17. *Relations innumerable.*
18. *All relations terminate in ſimple ideas.*
19. *We have ordinarily as clear (or clearer) notion of the relation, as of its foundation.*
20. *The notion of the relation is the ſame, whether the rule, any action is compared to, be true or falſe.*

CHAP. XXIX.

Of clear and diſtinct, obſcure and confuſed ideas.

SECT.

1. *Ideas, ſome clear and ſome diſtinct, others obſcure and confuſed.*
2. *Clear and obſcure, explained by ſight.*
3. *Cauſes of obſcurity.*
4. *Diſtinct and confuſed, what.*
5. *Objection.*
6. *Confuſion of ideas, is in reference to their names.*
7. *Defaults, which make confuſion. Firſt, complex ideas, made up of too few ſimple ones.*
8. *Secondly, or its ſimple ones jumbled diſorderly together.*
9. *Thirdly, or are mutable and undetermined.*
10. *Confuſion, without reference to names, hardly conceiveable.*

11. *Confuſion concerns always two ideas.*
12. *Cauſes of confuſion.*
13. *Complex ideas may be diſtinct in one part, and confuſed in another.*
14. *This, if not heeded, cauſes confuſion in our arguings.*
15. *Inſtance in eternity.*
16. *Diviſibility of matter.*

CHAP. XXX.

Of real and fantaſtical ideas.

SECT.
1. *Real ideas are conformable to their archetypes.*
2. *Simple ideas all real.*
3. *Complex ideas are voluntary combinations.*
4. *Mixed modes, made of conſiſtent ideas, are real.*
5. *Ideas of ſubſtances are real, when they agree with the exiſtence of things.*

CHAP. XXXI.

Of adequate and inadequate ideas.

SECT.
1. *Adequate ideas are ſuch as perfectly repreſent their archetypes.*
2. *Simple ideas all adequate.*
3. *Modes are all adequate.*
4, 5. *Modes, in reference to ſettled names, may be inadequate.*
6, 7. *Ideas of ſubſtances, as referred to real eſſences, not adequate.*
8-11. *Ideas of ſubſtances, as collections of their qualities, are all inadequate.*
12. *Simple ideas* ἔκτυπα, *and adequate.*
13. *Ideas of ſubſtances are* ἔκτυπα, *inadequate.*
14. *Ideas of modes and relations are archetypes, and cannot but be adequate.*

CHAP. XXXII.

Of true and falſe ideas.

SECT.
1. *Truth and falſhood properly belongs to propoſitions.*
2. *Metaphyſical truth contains a tacit propoſition.*
3. *No idea as an appearance in the mind, true or falſe.*
4. *Ideas, referred to any thing, may be true or falſe.*
5. *Other men's ideas, real exiſtence, and ſuppoſed real eſſences, are what men uſually refer their ideas to.*
6-8. *The cauſe of ſuch references.*
9. *Simple ideas may be falſe, in reference to others of the ſame name, but are leaſt liable to be ſo.*
10. *Ideas of mixed modes moſt liable to be falſe in this ſenſe.*
11. *Or at leaſt to be thought falſe.*
12. *And why.*
13. *As referred to real exiſtences, none of our ideas can be falſe, but thoſe of ſubſtances.*
14-16. *Firſt, ſimple ideas in this ſenſe not falſe, and why.*
15. *Tho' one man's idea of blue ſhould be different from another's.*
17. *Secondly, modes not falſe.*
18. *Thirdly, ideas of ſubſtances, when falſe.*
19. *Truth or falſhood always ſuppoſes affirmation or negation.*
20. *Ideas, in themſelves, neither true nor falſe.*
21. *But are falſe; firſt, when judged agreeable to another man's idea, without being ſo.*
22. *Secondly, when judged to agree to real exiſtence, when they do not.*
23. *Thirdly, when judged adequate, without being ſo.*
24. *Fourthly, when judged to repreſent the real eſſence.*
25. *Ideas, when falſe.*
26. *More properly to be called right or wrong.*

CHAP. XXXIII.

Of the aſſociation of ideas.

SECT.
1. *Something unreaſonable in moſt men.*
2. *Not wholly from ſelf-love.*
3. *Not from education.*
4. *A degree of madneſs.*
5. *From a wrong connection of ideas.*
6. *This connection, how made.*
7, 8. *Some antipathies, an effect of it.*
9. *A great cauſe of errors.*
10-12. *Inſtances.*
13. *Why time cures ſome diſorders in the mind, which reaſon cannot.*
14-16. *Farther inſtances of the effects of the aſſociation of ideas.*
17. *Its influence on intellectual habits.*
18. *Obſervable in different ſects.*
19. *Concluſion.*

BOOK III.

Of words.

CHAP. I.

Of words, or language in general.

SECT.

1. *Man fitted to form articulate ſounds.*
2. *To make them ſigns of ideas.*

3,4. *To make general ſigns.*

5. *Words ultimately derived from ſuch as ſignify ſenſible ideas.*
6. *Diſtribution.*

CHAP. II.

Of the ſignification of words.

SECT.

1. *Words are ſenſible ſigns, neceſſary for communication.*

2,3. *Words are the ſenſible ſigns of his ideas, who uſes them.*

4. *Words often ſecretly referred; firſt, to the ideas in other mens' minds.*
5. *Secondly, to the reality of things.*
6. *Words, by uſe, readily excite ideas.*
7. *Words often uſed without ſignification.*
8. *Their ſignification, perfectly arbitrary.*

CHAP. III.

Of general terms.

SECT.

1. *The greateſt part of words general.*
2. *For every particular thing to have a name is impoſſible.*

3,4. *And uſeleſs.*

5. *What things have proper names.*

6-8. *How general words are made.*

9. *General natures are nothing but abſtract ideas.*
10. *Why the genus is ordinarily made uſe of, in definitions.*
11. *General and univerſal are creatures of the underſtanding.*
12. *Abſtract ideas are the eſſences of the genera and ſpecies.*
13. *They are the workmanſhip of the underſtanding, but have their foundation in the ſimilitude of things.*
14. *Each diſtinct, abſtract idea is a diſtinct eſſence.*
15. *Real and nominal eſſence.*
16. *Conſtant connection between the name and nominal eſſence.*
17. *Suppoſition, that ſpecies are diſtinguiſhed by their real eſſences, uſeleſs.*
18. *Real and nominal eſſence, the ſame in ſimple ideas and modes, different in ſubſtances.*
19. *Eſſences ingenerable and incorruptible.*
20. *Recapitulation.*

CHAP. IV.

Of the names of ſimple ideas.

SECT.

1. *Names of ſimple ideas, modes, and ſubſtances, have each ſomething peculiar.*
2. *Firſt, names of ſimple ideas, and ſubſtances, intimate real exiſtence.*
3. *Secondly, names of ſimple ideas, and modes, ſignify always both real and nominal eſſence.*
4. *Thirdly, names of ſimple ideas, undefinable.*
5. *If all were definable, it would be a proceſs in infinitum.*
6. *What a definition is.*
7. *Simple ideas, why undefinable.*

8,9. *Inſtances. Motion.*

10. *Light.*
11. *Simple ideas, why undefinable, farther explained.*

12,13. *The contrary ſhewed in complex ideas, by inſtances of a ſtatue and rainbow.*

14. *The names of complex ideas, when to be made intelligible by words.*
15. *Fourthly, names of ſimple ideas, leaſt doubtful.*
16. *Fifthly, ſimple ideas have few aſcents in linea prædicamentali.*
17. *Sixthly, names of ſimple ideas ſtand for ideas, not at all arbitrary.*

CHAP. V.

Of the names of mixed modes and relations.

SECT.

1. *They ſtand for abſtract ideas, as other general names.*
2. *Firſt, the ideas they ſtand for, are made by the underſtanding.*
3. *Secondly, made arbitrarily, and without patterns.*
4. *How this is done.*
5. *Evidently arbitrary, in that the idea is often before the exiſtence.*
6. *Inſtances, murder, inceſt, ſtabbing.*
7. *But ſtill ſubſervient to the end of language.*
8. *Whereof the intranſlatable words of divers languages are a proof.*
9. *This ſhews ſpecies to be made for communication.*

10,11. *In mixed modes, 'tis the name that ties the combination together, and makes it a ſpecies.*

12. *For the originals of mixed modes, we*

look no further than the mind, which alſo ſhews them to be the workmanſhip of the underſtanding.
13. *Their being made by the underſtanding, without patterns, ſhews the reaſon why they are ſo compounded.*
14. *Names of mixed modes ſtand always for their real eſſences.*
15. *Why their names are uſually got before their ideas.*
16. *Reaſon of my being ſo large on this ſubject.*

CHAP. VI.

Of the names of ſubſtances.

SECT.

1. *The common names of ſubſtances ſtand for ſorts.*
2. *The eſſence of each ſort, is the abſtract idea.*
3. *The nominal and real eſſence different.*
4-6. *Nothing eſſential to individuals.*
7,8. *The nominal eſſence bounds the ſpecies.*
9. *Not the real eſſence, which we know not.*
10. *Not ſubſtantial forms, which we know leſs.*
11. *That the nominal eſſence is that whereby we diſtinguiſh ſpecies, farther evident from ſpirits.*
12. *Whereof there are, probably, numberleſs ſpecies.*
13. *The nominal eſſence that of the ſpecies, proved from water and ice.*
14-18. *Difficulties againſt a certain number of real eſſences.*
19,20. *Our nominal eſſences of ſubſtances, not perfect collections of properties.*
21. *But ſuch a collection as our name ſtands for.*
22. *Our abſtract ideas are to us the meaſures of ſpecies: inſtances in that of man.*
23. *Species not diſtinguiſhed by generation.*
24. *Not by ſubſtantial forms.*
25. *The ſpecifick eſſences are made by the mind.*
26,27. *Therefore very various and uncertain.*
28. *But not ſo arbitrary, as mixed modes.*
29. *Though very imperfect.*
30. *Which yet ſerve for common converſe.*
31. *But make ſeveral eſſences, ſignified by the ſame name.*
32. *The more general our ideas are, the more incompleat and partial they are.*
33. *This, all accommodated to the end of ſpeech.*
34. *Inſtance in caſſuaries.*
35. *Men make the ſpecies; inſtance, gold.*
36. *Though nature makes the ſimilitude.*
37. *And continues it in the races of things.*
38. *Each abſtract idea is an eſſence.*
39. *Genera and ſpecies, in order to naming; inſtance, watch.*
40. *Species of artificial things, leſs confuſed than natural.*
41. *Artificial things of diſtinct ſpecies.*
42. *Subſtances alone have proper names.*
43. *Difficulty to treat of words with words.*
44,45. *Inſtance of mixed modes in Kineah and Niouph.*
46,47. *Inſtances of ſubſtances in Zahab.*
48. *Their ideas perfect, and therefore various.*
49. *Therefore to fix their ſpecies, a real eſſence is ſuppoſed.*
50. *Which ſuppoſition is of no uſe.*
51. *Concluſion.*

CHAP. VII.

Of particles.

SECT.

1. *Particles connect parts, or whole ſentences together.*
2. *In them conſiſts the art of well ſpeaking.*
3,4. *They ſhew what relation the mind gives to its own thoughts.*
5. *Inſtance in But.*
6. *This matter but lightly touched here.*

CHAP. VIII.

Of abſtract and concrete terms.

SECT.

1. *Abſtract terms, not predicable, one of another, and why.*
2. *They ſhew the difference of our ideas.*

CHAP. IX.

Of the imperfection of Words.

SECT.

1. *Words are uſed for recording and communicating our thoughts.*
2. *Any words will ſerve for recording.*
3. *Communication by words, civil or philoſophical.*
4. *The imperfection of words, is the doubtfulneſs of their ſignification.*
5. *Cauſes of their imperfection.*
6. *The names of mixed modes doubtful: firſt, becauſe the ideas, they ſtand for, are ſo complex.*
7. *Secondly, becauſe they have no ſtandards.*
8. *Propriety not a ſufficient remedy.*
9. *The way of learning theſe names contributes alſo to their doubtfulneſs.*
10. *Hence unavoidable obſcurity in antient authors.*
11. *Names of ſubſtances, of doubtful ſignification.*
12. *Names of ſubſtances referred, firſt, to real eſſences, that cannot be known.*

13,14. *Secondly, to co-exiſting qualities, which are known but imperfectly.*
15. *With this imperfection they may ſerve for civil, but not well for philoſophical uſe.*
16. *Inſtance, liquor of nerves.*
17. *Inſtance, gold.*
18. *The names of ſimple ideas, the leaſt doubtful.*
19. *And next to them, ſimple modes.*
20. *The moſt doubtful, are the names of very compounded mixed modes and ſubſtances.*
21. *Why this imperfection charged upon words.*
22,23. *This ſhould teach us moderation in impoſing our own ſenſe of old authors.*

CHAP. X.

Of the abuſe of words.

SECT.

1. *Abuſe of words.*
2,3. *Firſt, words without any, or without clear ideas.*
4. *Occaſioned by learning names, before the ideas they belong to.*
5. *Secondly, unſteady application of them.*
6. *Thirdly, affected obſcurity, by wrong application.*
7. *Logick and diſpute has much contributed to this.*
8. *Calling it ſubtilty.*
9. *This learning very little benefits ſociety.*
10. *But deſtroys the inſtruments of knowledge and communication.*
11. *As uſeful as to confound the ſound of the letters.*
12. *This art has perplexed religion and juſtice.*
13. *And ought not to paſs for learning.*
14. *Fourthly, taking them for things.*
15. *Inſtance in matter.*
16. *This makes errors laſting.*
17. *Fifthly, ſetting them for what they cannot ſignify.*
18. *V. g. putting them for the real eſſences of ſubſtances.*
19. *Hence we think every change of our idea in ſubſtances, not to change the ſpecies.*
20. *The cauſe of this abuſe, a ſuppoſition of nature's working always regularly.*
21. *This abuſe contains two falſe ſuppoſitions.*
22. *Sixthly, a ſuppoſiion that words have a certain and evident ſignification.*
23. *The ends of language firſt to convey our ideas.*
24. *Secondly, to do it with quickneſs.*
25. *Thirdly, therewith to convey the knowledge of things.*
26-31. *How men's words fail in all theſe.*
32. *How in ſubſtances.*
33. *How in modes and relations.*
34. *Seventhly, figurative ſpeech alſo an abuſe of language.*

CHAP. XI.

Of the remedies of the foregoing imperfections and abuſes.

SECT.

1. *They are worth ſeeking.*
2. *Are not eaſy.*
3. *But yet neceſſary to philoſophy.*
4. *Miſuſe of words, the cauſe of great errors.*
5. *Obſtinacy.*
6. *And wrangling.*
7. *Inſtance, bat and bird.*
8. *Firſt remedy, to uſe no word without an idea.*
9. *Secondly, to have diſtinct ideas annexed to them in modes.*
10. *And diſtinct and conformable in ſubſtances.*
11. *Thirdly, propriety.*
12. *Fourthly, to make known their meaning.*
13. *And that three ways.*
14. *Firſt, in ſimple ideas by ſynonimous terms or ſhewing.*
15. *Secondly, in mixed modes by definition.*
16. *Morality capable of demonſtration.*
17. *Definitions can make moral diſcourſes clear.*
18. *And is the only way.*
19. *Thirdly, in ſubſtances, by ſhewing and defining.*
20,21. *Ideas of the leading qualities of ſubſtances, are beſt got by ſhewing.*
22. *The ideas of their powers, beſt by definition.*
23. *A reflection on the knowledge of ſpirits.*
24. *Ideas alſo of ſubſtances muſt be conformable to things.*
25. *Not eaſy to be made ſo.*
26. *Fifthly, by conſtancy in their ſignification.*
27. *When the variation is to be explained.*

BOOK IV.

Of Knowledge and opinion.

CHAP. I.

Of knowledge in general.

SECT.

1. *Our knowledge converſant about our ideas.*
2. *Knowledge is the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of two ideas.*
3. *This agreement fourfold.*
4. *Firſt, of identity, or diverſity.*
5. *Secondly, relation.*
6. *Thirdly, of co-exiſtence.*
7. *Fourthly, of real exiſtence.*
8. *Knowledge actual or habitual.*
9. *Habitual knowledge, twofold.*

CHAP. II.

Of the degrees of our knowledge.

SECT.

1. *Intuitive.*
2. *Demonſtrative.*
3. *Depends on proofs.*
4. *But not ſo eaſy.*
5. *Not without precedent doubt.*
6. *Not ſo clear.*
7. *Each ſtep muſt have intuitive evidence.*
8. *Hence the miſtake ex præcognitis & præconceſſis.*
9. *Demonſtration, not limited to quantity.*
10-13. *Why it has been ſo thought.*
14. *Senſitive knowledge of particular exiſtence.*
15. *Knowledge not always clear, where the ideas are ſo.*

CHAP. III.

Of the extent of human knowledge.

SECT.

1. *Firſt, no farther than we have ideas.*
2. *Secondly, no farther than we can perceive their agreement or diſagreement.*
3. *Thirdly, intuitive knowledge extends itſelf not to all the relations of all our ideas.*
4. *Fourthly, nor demonſtrative knowledge.*
5. *Fifthly, ſenſitive knowledge, narrower than either.*
6. *Sixthly, our knowledge, therefore, narrower than our ideas.*
7. *How far our knowledge reaches.*
8. *Firſt, our knowledge of identity and diverſity, as far as our ideas.*
9. *Secondly, of co-exiſtence, a very little way.*
10. *Becauſe the connection between moſt ſimple ideas is unknown.*
11. *Eſpecially of ſecondary qualities.*
12-14. *And farther, becauſe all connection between any ſecondary and primary qualities is undiſcoverable.*
15. *Of repugnancy to co-exiſt, larger.*
16. *Of the co-exiſtence of powers, a very little way.*
17. *Of ſpirits, yet narrower.*
18. *Thirdly, of other relations, it is not eaſy to ſay how far.*
Morality capable of demonſtration.
19. *Two things have made moral ideas thought uncapable of demonſtration. Their complexedneſs and want of ſenſible repreſentations.*
20. *Remedies of thoſe difficulties.*
21. *Fourthly, of real exiſtence, we have an intuitive knowledge of our own, demonſtrative of God's, ſenſitive of ſome few other things.*
22. *Our ignorance great.*
23. *Firſt, one cauſe of it, want of ideas, either ſuch as we have no conception of, or ſuch as particularly we have not.*
24. *Becauſe of their remoteneſs, or,*
25. *Becauſe of their minuteneſs.*
26. *Hence no ſcience of bodies.*
27. *Much leſs of ſpirits.*
28. *Secondly, want of a diſcoverable connection, between ideas we have.*
29. *Inſtances.*
30. *Thirdly, want of tracing our ideas.*
31. *Extent in reſpect of univerſality.*

CHAP IV.

Of the reality of our knowledge.

SECT.

1. *Objection, knowledge placed in ideas, may be all bare viſion.*
2,3. *Anſwer, not ſo, where ideas agree with things.*
4. *As, firſt, all ſimple ideas do.*
5. *Secondly, all complex ideas, except of ſubſtances.*
6. *Hence the reality of mathematical knowledge.*
7. *And of moral.*
8. *Exiſtence not required to make it real.*
9. *Nor will it be leſs true, or certain, becauſe moral ideas are of our own making and naming.*
10. *Miſ-naming diſturbs not the certainty of the knowledge.*
11. *Ideas of ſubſtances have their archetypes without us.*
12. *So far as they agree with thoſe, ſo far our*

our knowledge concerning them is real.
13. *In our inquiries about ſubſtances, we muſt conſider ideas, and not confine our thoughts to names, or ſpecies ſuppoſed ſet out by names.*
14,15. *Objection againſt a changeling being ſomething between man and beaſt, anſwered.*
16. *Monſters.*
17. *Words and ſpecies.*
18. *Recapitulation.*

CHAP. V.

Of truth in general.

SECT.
1. *What truth is.*
2. *A right joining, or ſeparating of ſigns; i. e. ideas or words.*
3. *Which make mental, or verbal propoſitions.*
4. *Mental propoſitions are very hard to be treated of.*
5. *Being nothing but the joining, or ſeparating ideas, without words.*
6. *When mental propoſitions contain real truth, and when verbal.*
7. *Objection againſt verbal truth, that thus it may be all chimerical.*
8. *Anſwered, real truth is about ideas, agreeing to things.*
9. *Falſhood is the joining of names, otherwiſe than their ideas agree.*
10. *General propoſitions to be treated of more at large.*
11. *Moral and metaphyſical truth.*

CHAP. VI.

Of univerſal propoſitions, their truth and certainty.

SECT.
1. *Treating of words, neceſſary to knowledge.*
2. *General truths, hardly to be underſtood, but in verbal propoſitions.*
3. *Certainty two-fold, of truth, and of knowledge.*
4. *No propoſition can be known to be true, where the eſſence of each ſpecies mentioned, is not known.*
5. *This more particularly concerns ſubſtances.*
6. *The truth of few univerſal propoſitions, concerning ſubſtances is to be known.*
7. *Becauſe co-exiſtence of ideas in few caſes is to be known.*
8,9. *Inſtance in gold.*
10. *As far as any ſuch co-exiſtence can be known, ſo far univerſal propoſitions may be certain. But this will go but a little way, becauſe,*
11,12. *The qualities, which make our complex ideas of ſubſtances, depend moſtly on external, remote, and unperceived cauſes.*
13. *Judgment may reach farther, but that is not knowledge.*
14. *What is requiſite for our knowledge of ſubſtances.*
15. *Whilſt our ideas of ſubſtances contain not their real conſtitutions, we can make but few general, certain propoſitions concerning them.*
16. *Wherein lies the general certainty of propoſitions.*

CHAP. VII.

Of maxims.

SECT.
1. *They are ſelf-evident.*
2. *Wherein that ſelf-evidence conſiſts.*
3. *Self-evidence not peculiar to received axioms.*
4. *Firſt, as to identity and diverſity, all propoſitions are equally ſelf-evident.*
5. *Secondly, in co-exiſtence, we have few ſelf-evident propoſitions.*
6. *Thirdly, in other relations we may have.*
7. *Fourthly, concerning real exiſtence, we have none.*
8. *Theſe axioms do not much influence our other knowledge.*
9. *Becauſe they are not the truths the firſt known.*
10. *Becauſe on them the other parts of our knowledge do not depend.*
11. *What uſe theſe general maxims have.*
12. *Maxims, if care be not taken in the uſe of words, may prove contradictions.*
13. *Inſtance in vacuum.*
14. *They prove not the exiſtence of things without us.*
15. *Their application dangerous, about complex ideas.*
16-18. *Inſtance in man.*
19. *Little uſe of theſe maxims, in proofs, where we have clear and diſtinct ideas.*
20. *Their uſe dangerous, where our ideas are confuſed.*

CHAP. VIII.

Of trifling propoſitions.

SECT.
1. *Some propoſitions bring no increaſe to our knowledge.*
2,3. *As, firſt, identical propoſitions.*
4. *Secondly, when a part of any complex idea is predicated of the whole.*
5. *As part of the definition of the terms defined.*
6. *Inſtance, man and palfry.*
7. *For this teaches but the ſignification of words.*
8. *But no real knowledge.*
9. *General propoſitions, concerning ſubſtances, are often trifling.*
10. *And why.*
11. *Thirdly, uſing words variouſly, is trifling with them.*

12. *Marks of verbal propoſitions, Firſt, predication in abſtract.*
13. *Secondly, a part of the definition, predicated of any terms.*

CHAP. IX.

Of our knowledge of exiſtence.

SECT.

1. *General, certain propoſitions concern not exiſtence.*
2. *A threefold knowledge of exiſtence.*
3. *Our knowledge of our own exiſtence, is intuitive.*

CHAP X.

Of the exiſtence of a GOD.

SECT.

1. *We are capable of knowing certainly that there is a* GOD.
2. *Man knows that he himſelf is.*
3. *He knows alſo, that nothing cannot produce a being, therefore ſomething eternal.*
4. *That eternal being muſt be moſt powerful.*
5. *And moſt knowing.*
6. *And therefore* GOD.
7. *Our idea of a moſt perfect being, not the ſole proof of a* GOD.
8. *Something from eternity.*
9. *Two ſorts of beings, cogitative and incogitative.*
10. *Incogitative being cannot produce a cogitative.*
11,12. *Therefore there has been an eternal wiſdom.*
13. *Whether material, or no.*
14. *Not material, firſt, becauſe every particle of matter is not cogitative.*
15. *Secondly, one particle alone of matter cannot be cogitative.*
16. *Thirdly, a ſyſtem of incogitative matter cannot be cogitative.*
17. *Whether in motion or at reſt.*
18,19. *Matter not co-eternal with an eternal mind.*

CHAP. XI.

Of the knowledge of the exiſtence of other things.

SECT.

1. *Is to be had only by ſenſation.*
2. *Inſtance, whiteneſs of this paper.*
3. *This, though not ſo certain as demonſtration, yet may be called knowledge, and proves the exiſtence of things without us.*
4. *Firſt, becauſe we cannot have them but by the inlet of the ſenſes.*
5. *Secondly, becauſe an idea from actual ſenſation, and another from memory, are very diſtinct perceptions.*
6. *Thirdly, pleaſure or pain, which accompanies actual ſenſation, accompanies not the returning of thoſe ideas, without the external objects.*
7. *Fourthly, our ſenſes aſſiſt one anothers teſtimony of the exiſtence of outward things.*
8. *This certainty is as great as our condition needs.*
9. *But reaches no farther than actual ſenſation.*
10. *Folly to expect demonſtration in every thing.*
11. *Paſt exiſtence is known by memory.*
12. *The exiſtence of ſpirits not knowable.*
13. *Particular propoſitions concerning exiſtence, are knowable.*
14. *And general propoſitions concerning abſtract ideas.*

CHAP. XI.

Of the improvement of our knowledge.

SECT.

1. *Knowledge is not from maxims.*
2. *(The occaſion of that opinion.)*
3. *But from the comparing clear and diſtinct ideas.*
4. *Dangerous to build upon precarious principles.*
5. *This no certain way to truth.*
6. *But to compare clear, compleat ideas under ſteady names.*
7. *The true method of advancing knowledge, is by conſidering our abſtract ideas.*
8. *By which, morality, alſo, may be made clearer.*
9. *But knowledge of bodies is to be improved, only by experience.*
10. *This may procure us convenience, not ſcience.*
11. *We are fitted for moral knowledge, and natural improvements.*
12. *But muſt beware of hypotheſes and wrong principles.*
13. *The true uſe of hypotheſes.*
14. *Clear and diſtinct ideas, with ſettled names, and the finding of thoſe, which ſhew their agreement or diſagreement, are the ways to enlarge our knowledge.*
15. *Mathematicks an inſtance of it.*

CHAP. XIII.

Some other conſiderations concerning our knowledge.

SECT.

1. *Our knowledge partly neceſſary, partly voluntary.*
2. *The application voluntary; but we know as things are, not as we pleaſe.*
3. *Inſtances in number, and in natural religion.*

CHAP. XIV.

Of judgment.

SECT.

1. *Our knowledge being ſhort, we want ſomething elſe.*

2. *What uſe to be made of this twilight eſtate.*
3. *Judgment ſupplies the want of knowledge.*
4. *Judgment is the preſuming things to be ſo, without perceiving it.*

CHAP. XV.

Of probability.

SECT.

1. *Probability is the appearance of agreement, upon fallible proofs.*
2. *It is to ſupply the want of knowledge.*
3. *Being that, which makes us preſume things to be true, before we know them to be ſo.*
4. *The grounds of probability are two; conformity with our own experience, or the teſtimony of others experience.*
5. *In this all the arguments, pro and con, ought to be examined, before we come to a judgment.*
6. *They being capable of great variety.*

CHAP. XVI.

Of the degrees of aſſent.

SECT.

1. *Our aſſent ought to be regulated by the grounds of probability.*
2. *Theſe cannot always be actually in view, and then we muſt content ourſelves with the remembrance, that we once ſaw ground for ſuch a degree of aſſent.*
3. *The ill conſequence of this, if our former judgment were not rightly made.*
4. *The right uſe of it, is mutual charity and forbearance.*
5. *Probability is either of matter of fact, or ſpeculation.*
6. *The concurrent experience of all other men with ours produces aſſurance approaching to knowledge.*
7. *Unqueſtionable teſtimony and experience for the moſt part produce confidence.*
8. *Fair teſtimony, and the nature of the thing indifferent, produces alſo confident belief.*
9. *Experience and teſtimonies claſhing, infinitely vary the degrees of probability.*
10. *Traditional teſtimonies, the farther removed, the leſs their proof.*
11. *Yet hiſtory is of great uſe.*
12. *In things, which ſenſe cannot diſcover, analogy is the great rule of probability.*
13. *One caſe, where contrary experience leſſens not the teſtimony.*
14. *The bare teſtimony of revelation is the higheſt certainty.*

CHAP. XVII.

Of reaſon.

SECT.

1. *Various ſignifications of the word reaſon.*
2. *Wherein reaſoning conſiſts.*
3. *Its four parts.*
4. *Syllogiſm, not the great inſtrument of reaſon.*
5. *Helps little in demonſtration, leſs in probability.*
6. *Serves not to increaſe our knowledge, but fence with it.*
7. *Other helps ſhould be ſought.*
8. *We reaſon about particulars.*
9. *Firſt, reaſon fails us for want of ideas.*
10. *Secondly, becauſe of obſcure and imperfect ideas.*
11. *Thirdly, for want of intermediate ideas.*
12. *Fourthly, becauſe of wrong principles.*
13. *Fifthly, becauſe of doubtful terms.*
14. *Our higheſt degree of knowledge is intuitive, without reaſoning.*
15. *The next is demonſtration by reaſoning.*
16. *To ſupply the narrowneſs of this, we have nothing but judgment upon probable reaſoning.*
17. *Intuition, demonſtration, judgment.*
18. *Conſequences of words, and conſequences of ideas.*
19. *Four ſorts of arguments: firſt, ad verecundiam.*
20. *Secondly, ad ignorantiam.*
21. *Thirdly, ad hominem.*
22. *Fourthly, ad judiciam.*
23. *Above, contrary, and according to reaſon.*
24. *Reaſon and faith not oppoſite.*

CHAP. XVIII.

Of faith and reaſon, and their diſtinct provinces.

SECT.

1. *Neceſſary to know their boundaries.*
2. *Faith and reaſon, what, as contradiſtinguiſhed.*
3. *No new ſimple idea can be conveyed by traditional revelation.*
4. *Traditional revelation may make us know propoſitions, knowable alſo by reaſon, but not with the ſame certainty that reaſon doth.*
5. *Revelation cannot be admitted, againſt the clear evidence of reaſon.*
6. *Traditional revelation much leſs.*
7. *Things above reaſon.*
8. *Or not contrary to reaſon, if revealed, are matter of faith.*
9. *Revelation in matters where reaſon cannot judge, or but probably, ought to be hearkened to.*
10. *In matters, where reaſon can afford certain knowledge, that is to be hearkened to.*
11. *If the boundaries be not ſet between faith and reaſon, no enthuſiaſm, or extravagancy in religion, can be contradicted.*

CHAP. XIX.

Of enthuſiaſm.

SECT.
1. *Love of truth neceſſary.*
2. *A forwardneſs to dictate, from whence.*
3. *Force of enthuſiaſm.*
4. *Reaſon and revelation.*
5. *Riſe of enthuſiaſm.*
6,7. *Enthuſiaſm.*
8,9. *Enthuſiaſm, miſtaken for ſeeing and feeling.*
10. *Enthuſiaſm, how to be diſcovered.*
11. *Enthuſiaſm fails of evidence, that the propoſition is from* GOD.
12. *Firmneſs of perſuaſion, no proof that any propoſition is from* GOD.
13. *Light in the mind, what.*
14. *Revelation muſt be judged of by reaſon.*
15,16. *Belief, no proof of revelation.*

CHAP. XX.

Of wrong aſſent, or error.

SECT.
1. *Cauſes of error.*
2. *Firſt, want of proofs.*
3. *Obj. what ſhall become of thoſe who want them, anſwered.*
4. *People hindred from enquiry.*
5. *Secondly, want of ſkill to uſe them.*
6. *Thirdly, want of will to uſe them.*
7. *Fourthly, wrong meaſures of probability; whereof,*
8,10. *Firſt, doubtful propoſitions, taken for principles.*
11. *Secondly, received hypotheſes.*
12. *Thirdly, predominant paſſions.*
13. *The means of evading probabilities, 1ſt, ſuppoſed fallacy.*
14. *2dly, ſuppoſed arguments for the contrary.*
15. *What probabilities determine the aſſent.*
16. *Where it is in our power to ſuſpend it.*
17. *Fourthly, authority.*
18. *Men not in ſo many errors, as is imagined.*

CHAP. XXI.

Of the diviſion of the ſciences.

SECT.
1. *Three ſorts.*
2. *Firſt, phyſica.*
3. *Secondly, practica.*
4. *Thirdly,* Σημειωτικὴ.
5. *This is the firſt diviſion of the objects of knowledge.*

7

OF
HUMAN UNDERSTANDING.

BOOK I.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTION.

An enquiry into the underſtanding, pleaſant and uſeful.

SINCE it is the underſtanding, that ſets man above the reſt of ſenſible beings, and gives him all the advantage and dominion, which he has over them; it is certainly a ſubject, even for its nobleneſs, worth our labour to enquire into. The underſtanding, like the eye, whilſt it makes us ſee, and perceive all other things, takes no notice of itſelf; and it requires art and pains to ſet it at a diſtance, and make it its own object. But, whatever be the difficulties that lie in the way of this enquiry; whatever it be, that keeps us ſo much in the dark to ourſelves; ſure I am, that all the light we can let in upon our own minds, all the acquaintance we can make with our own underſtandings, will not only be very pleaſant, but bring us great advantage, in directing our thoughts in the ſearch of other things.

Deſign.

§ 2. This, therefore, being my purpoſe, to enquire into the original, certainty, and extent of human knowledge; together with the grounds and degrees of belief, opinion and aſſent: I ſhall not at preſent meddle with the phyſical conſideration of the mind, or trouble myſelf to examine, wherein its eſſence conſiſts, or by what motions of our ſpirits, or alterations of our bodies, we come to have any ſenſation by our organs, or any ideas in our underſtandings; and whether thoſe ideas do in their formation, any, or all of them, depend on matter, or no. Theſe are ſpeculations, which, however curious and entertaining, I ſhall decline, as lying out of my way, in the deſign I am now upon. It ſhall ſuffice to my preſent purpoſe, to conſider the diſcerning faculties of a man, as they are employ'd about the objects, which they have to do with: And I ſhall imagine, I have not wholly miſemploy'd myſelf, in the thoughts I ſhall have on this occaſion, if in this hiſtorical, plain method, I can give any account of the ways, whereby our underſtandings come to attain thoſe notions of things we have, and can ſet down any meaſures of the certainty of our knowledge, or the grounds of thoſe perſuaſions, which are to be found amongſt men, ſo various, different, and wholly contradictory; and yet aſſerted, ſomewhere or other, with ſuch aſſurance and confidence, that he, that ſhall take a view of the opinions of mankind, obſerve their oppoſition, and at the ſame time conſider the fondneſs and devotion wherewith they are embrac'd, the reſolution and eagerneſs wherewith they are maintain'd; may perhaps have reaſon to ſuſpect, that either there is no ſuch thing as truth at all; or that mankind hath no ſufficient means to attain a certain knowledge of it.

Method.

§ 3. It is therefore, worth while to ſearch out the bounds between opinion and knowledge; and examine by what meaſures, in things, whereof we have no certain knowledge, we ought to regulate our aſſent, and moderate our perſuaſions. In order whereunto, I ſhall purſue this following method.

First, I ſhall enquire into the original of thoſe ideas, notions, or whatever elſe you pleaſe to call them, which a man obſerves, and is conſcious to himſelf he has in his mind; and the ways, whereby the underſtanding comes to be furniſh'd with them.

Secondly, I ſhall endeavour to ſhew, what knowledge the underſtanding hath by thoſe ideas; and the certainty, evidence, and extent of it.

Thirdly, I ſhall make ſome enquiry into the nature and grounds of faith, or opinion; whereby I mean that aſſent which we give to any propoſition as true, of whoſe truth yet we have no certain knowledge: and here we ſhall have occaſion to examine the reaſons and degrees of aſſent.

Uſeful to know the extent of our comprehenſion.

§ 4. If, by this enquiry into the nature of the underſtanding, I can diſcover the powers thereof, how far they reach, to what things they are in any degree proportionate, and where they fail us; I ſuppoſe it may be of uſe to prevail with the buſy mind of man, to be more cautious in meddling with things exceeding its comprehenſion; to ſtop, when it is at the utmoſt extent of its tether; and to ſit down in a quiet ignorance of thoſe things, which, upon examination, are found to be beyond the reach of our capacities. We ſhould not then perhaps be ſo forward, out of affectation of an univerſal knowledge, to raiſe queſtions, and perplex ourſelves and others with diſputes about things, to which our underſtandings are not ſuited; and of which we cannot frame in our minds any clear or diſtinct perceptions, or whereof (as it has perhaps too often happen'd) we have not any notions at all. If we can find out, how far the underſtanding can extend its view; how far it has faculties to attain certainty; and in what caſes it can only judge and gueſs, we may learn to content ourſelves with what is attainable by us in this ſtate.

Our capacity ſuited to our ſtate and concerns.

§ 5. For, tho' the comprehenſion of our underſtandings comes exceeding ſhort of the vaſt extent of things; yet we ſhall have cauſe enough to magnify the bountiful author of our being, for that portion and degree of knowledge he has beſtowed on us, ſo far above all the reſt of the inhabitants of this our manſion. Men have reaſon to be well ſatisfy'd with what God hath thought fit for them, ſince he has given them (as St. Peter ſays) *πάντα πρὸς ζωὴν ϗ εὐσέβειαν*, whatſoever is neceſſary for the conveniences of life, and information of virtue; and has put within the reach of their diſcovery, the comfortable proviſion for this life, and the way that leads to a better. How ſhort ſoever their knowledge may come, of an univerſal or perfect comprehenſion of whatſoever is, it yet ſecures their great concernments, that they have light enough to lead them to the knowledge of their maker, and the ſight of their own duties. Men may find matter ſufficient to buſy their heads, and employ their hands with variety, delight, and ſatisfaction; if they will not boldly quarrel with their own conſtitution, and throw away the bleſſings their hands are fill'd with, becauſe they are not big enough to graſp every thing. We ſhall not have much reaſon to complain of the narrowneſs of our minds, if we will but employ them about what may be of uſe to us; for of that they are very capable: and it will be an unpardonable, as well as childiſh peeviſhneſs, if we undervalue the advantages of our knowledge, and neglect to improve it, to the ends for which it was given us, becauſe there are ſome things that are ſet out of the reach of it. It will be no excuſe to an idle and untoward ſervant, who would not attend his buſineſs by candle-light, to plead that he had not broad ſun-ſhine. The candle, that is ſet up in us, ſhines bright enough for all our purpoſes. The diſcoveries we can make with this, ought to ſatisfy us: and we ſhall then uſe our underſtandings right, when we entertain all objects in that way and proportion, that they are ſuited to our faculties; and upon thoſe grounds they are capable of being propos'd to us; and not peremptorily, or intemperately require demonſtration, and demand certainty, where probability only is to be had, and which is ſufficient to govern all our concernments. If we will diſbelieve every thing, becauſe we cannot certainly know all things; we ſhall do much-what as wiſely as he, who would not uſe his legs, but ſit ſtill and periſh, becauſe he had no wings to fly.

Knowledge of our capacity, a cure of ſcepticiſm and idleneſs.

§ 6. When we know our own ſtrength, we ſhall the better know what to undertake with hopes of ſucceſs: and when we have well ſurvey'd the powers of our own minds, and made ſome eſtimate what we may expect from them, we ſhall not be inclin'd either to ſit ſtill, and not ſet our thoughts on work at all, in deſpair of knowing any thing; or, on the other ſide, queſtion every thing and diſclaim all knowledge, becauſe ſome things are not to be underſtood. 'Tis of great uſe to the ſailor, to know the length of his line, tho' he cannot with it fathom all the depths of the ocean. 'Tis well he knows that it is long enough to reach the bottom, at ſuch places as are neceſſary to direct his voyage, and caution him againſt running upon ſhoals that may ruin him. Our buſineſs here is not to know all things, but thoſe which concern our conduct. If we can find out thoſe meaſures, whereby a rational creature, put in that ſtate which man is in this world, may, and ought to govern his opinions and actions depending thereon, we need not to be troubled that ſome other things eſcape our knowledge.

Occaſion of this Eſſay.

§ 7. This was that which gave the firſt riſe to this Eſſay concerning the underſtanding. For I thought that the firſt ſtep towards ſatisfying ſeveral enquiries, the mind of man was very apt to run into, was, to take a ſurvey of our own underſtandings, examine our own powers, and ſee to what things they were adapted. Till that was done, I ſuſpected we began at the wrong end, and in vain ſought for ſatisfaction, in a quiet and ſure poſſeſſion of truths that moſt concern'd us, whilſt we let looſe our thoughts into the vaſt ocean of being; as if all that boundleſs extent were the natural and undoubted poſſeſſion of our underſtandings, wherein there was nothing exempt from its deciſions, or that eſcap'd its comprehenſion. Thus men, extending their enquiries beyond their capacities, and letting their thoughts wander into thoſe depths where they can find no ſure footing; 'tis no wonder that they raiſe queſtions, and multiply diſputes, which never coming to any clear reſolution, are proper only to continue and increaſe their doubts, and to confirm them at laſt in perfect ſcepticiſm. Whereas, were the capacities of our underſtandings well conſider'd, the extent of our knowledge once diſcover'd, and the horizon found, which ſets the bounds between the enlighten'd and dark parts of things, between what is, and what is not comprehenſible by us; men would perhaps with leſs ſcruple, acquieſce in the avow'd ignorance of the one, and imploy their thoughts and diſcourſe with more advantage and ſatisfaction in the other.

What idea ſtands for.

§ 8. Thus much I thought neceſſary to ſay concerning the occaſion of this enquiry into human underſtanding. But before I proceed on to what I have thought on this ſubject, I muſt here in the entrance beg pardon of my reader for the frequent uſe of the word “Idea,” which he will find in the following treatiſe. It being that term, which, I think, ſerves beſt to ſtand for whatſoever is the object of the underſtanding, when a man thinks; I have us'd it to expreſs whatever is meant by Phantaſm, Notion, Species, or whatever it is which the mind can be employ'd about in thinking; and I could not avoid frequently uſing it.

I presume it will be eaſily granted me, that there are ſuch ideas in men's minds; every one is conſcious of them in himſelf, and men's words and actions will ſatisfy him, that they are in others.

Our firſt enquiry then ſhall be, how they come into the mind?

CHAP. II.

No innate principles in the mind.

The way ſhown how we come by any knowledge, ſufficient to prove it not innate.

§ 1. It is an eſtabliſh'd opinion amongſt ſome men, that there are in the underſtanding certain innate principles; ſome primary notions, κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι, characters, as it were ſtamp'd upon the mind of man, which the ſoul receives in its very firſt being, and brings into the world with it. It would be ſufficient to convince unprejudic'd readers of the falſeneſs of this ſuppoſition, if I ſhould only ſhew (as I hope I ſhall in the following parts of this diſcourſe) how men, barely by the uſe of their natural faculties, may attain to all the knowledge they have, without the help of any innate impreſſions; and may arrive at certainty, without any ſuch original notions, or principles. For I imagine any one will eaſily grant, that it would be impertinent to ſuppoſe, the ideas of colours innate in a creature, to whom God hath given ſight, and a power to receive them by the eyes, from external objects: and no leſs unreaſonable would it be, to attribute ſeveral truths to the impreſſions of nature and innate characters, when we may obſerve in ourſelves faculties, fit to attain as eaſy and certain knowledge of them, as if they were originally imprinted on the mind.

But becauſe a man is not permitted without cenſure, to follow his own thoughts in the ſearch of truth, when they lead him ever ſo little out of the common road; I ſhall ſet down the reaſons, that made me doubt of the truth of that opinion, as an excuſe for my miſtake, if I be in one: which I leave to be conſider'd by thoſe, who, with me, diſpoſe themſelves to embrace truth, wherever they find it.

General aſſent, the great argument.

§ 2. There is nothing more commonly taken for granted, than that there are certain principles both ſpeculative and practical (for they ſpeak of both) univerſally agreed upon by all mankind; which therefore, they argue muſt needs be conſtant impreſſions, which the ſouls of men receive in their firſt beings, and which they bring into the world with them, as neceſſarily and really as they do any of their inherent faculties.

Univerſal conſent proves nothing innate.

§ 3. This argument, drawn from univerſal conſent, has this misfortune in it, that if it were true in matter of fact, that there were certain truths, wherein all mankind agreed, it would not prove them innate, if there can be any other way ſhewn, how men may come to that univerſal agreement, in the things they do conſent in; which I preſume may be done.

"What is, is;" and "'tis impoſſible for the ſame thing to be, and not to be," not univerſally aſſented to.

§ 4. But, which is worſe, this argument of univerſal conſent, which is made uſe of to prove innate principles, ſeems to me a demonſtration that there are none ſuch; becauſe there are none, to which all mankind give an univerſal aſſent. I ſhall begin with the ſpeculative, and inſtance in thoſe magnify'd principles of demonſtration: "whatſoever is, is;" and "'tis impoſſible for the ſame thing to be, and not to be;" which, of all others, I think, have the moſt allow'd title to innate. Theſe have ſo ſettled a reputation of maxims univerſally receiv'd, that 'twill, no doubt, be thought ſtrange, if any one ſhould ſeem to queſtion it. But yet I take liberty to ſay, that theſe propoſitions are ſo far from having an univerſal aſſent, that there are a great part of mankind, to whom they are not ſo much as known.

Not on the mind naturally imprinted, becauſe not known to children, idiots, &c.

§ 5. For, firſt 'tis evident, that all children and idiots have not the leaſt apprehenſion or thought of them; and the want of that is enough to deſtroy that univerſal aſſent, which muſt needs be the neceſſary concomitant of all innate truths: it ſeeming to me near a contradiction, to ſay, that there are truths imprinted on the ſoul, which it perceives or underſtands not; imprinting, if it ſignify any thing, being nothing elſe, but the making certain truths to be perceiv'd. For to imprint any thing on the mind, without the mind's perceiving it, ſeems to me hardly intelligible. If therefore children and idiots have ſouls, have minds, with thoſe impreſſions upon them, they muſt unavoidably perceive them, and neceſſarily know and aſſent to theſe truths; which ſince they do not, 'tis evident that there are no ſuch impreſſions. For if they are not notions naturally imprinted, how can they be innate? and if they are notions imprinted, how can they be unknown? To ſay a notion is imprinted on the mind, and yet at the ſame time to ſay, that the mind is ignorant of it, and never yet took notice of it, is to make this impreſſion nothing. No propoſition can be ſaid to be in the mind, which it never yet knew, which it was never yet conſcious of. For if any one may; then, by the ſame reaſon, all propoſitions that are true, and the mind is capable of ever aſſenting to, may be ſaid to be in the mind, and to be imprinted: ſince, if any one can be ſaid to be in the mind, which it never yet knew, it muſt be only, becauſe it is capable of knowing it; and ſo the mind is, of all truths it ever ſhall know. Nay, thus truths may be imprinted on the mind, which it never did, nor ever ſhall know: for a man may live long, and die at laſt, in ignorance of many truths, which his mind was capable of knowing, and that with certainty. So that, if the capacity of knowing be the natural impreſſion contended for, all the truths a man ever comes to know, will by this account, be every one of them innate; and this great point will amount to no more, but only to a very improper way of ſpeaking; which, whilſt it pretends to aſſert the contrary, ſays nothing different from thoſe, who deny innate principles. For no body, I think, ever deny'd, that the mind was capable of knowing ſeveral truths. The capacity, they ſay, is innate, the knowledge acquired. But then, to what end ſuch conteſt for certain, innate maxims? If truths can be imprinted on the underſtanding, without being perceiv'd, I can ſee no difference there can be between any truths, the mind is capable of knowing, in reſpect of their original: they muſt all be innate, or all adventitious: in vain ſhall a man go about to diſtinguiſh them. He therefore, that talks of innate notions in the underſtanding, cannot (if he intend thereby any diſtinct ſort of truths) mean ſuch truths to be in the underſtanding, as it never perceiv'd, and is yet wholly ignorant of. For if theſe words (to be in the underſtanding) have any propriety, they ſignify to be underſtood. So that, to be in the underſtanding, and not to be underſtood; to be in the mind, and never to be perceiv'd, is all one as to ſay, any thing is, and is not, in the mind, or underſtanding. If therefore, theſe two propoſitions, "whatſoever is, is"; and "'tis impoſſible for the ſame thing to be and not to be," are by nature imprinted, children cannot be ignorant of them; infants, and all that have ſouls, muſt neceſſarily have them in their underſtandings, know the truth of them, and aſſent to it.

§ 6. To avoid this, 'tis uſually anſwered, that all men know and aſſent to them, when they come to the uſe of reaſon; and this is enough to prove them innate. I anſwer,

That men know them, when they come to the uſe of reaſon, anſwer'd.

§ 7. Doubtful expreſſions, that have ſcarce any ſignification, go for clear reaſons, to thoſe, who being prepoſſeſs'd, take not the pains to examine, even what they themſelves ſay. For to apply this anſwer, with any tolerable ſenſe, to our preſent purpoſe, it muſt ſignify one of theſe two things; either, that, as ſoon as men come to the uſe of reaſon, theſe ſuppos'd native inſcriptions come to be known, and obſerved by them: or elſe, that the uſe and exerciſe of men's reaſon aſſiſts them in the diſcovery of theſe principles, and certainly makes them known to them.

If reaſon diſcover'd them, that would not prove them innate.

§ 8. If they mean that, by the uſe of reaſon, men may diſcover theſe principles; and that this is ſufficient to prove them innate; their way of arguing will ſtand thus, (viz.) that whatever truths reaſon can certainly diſcover to us, and make us firmly aſſent to, thoſe are all naturally imprinted on the mind: ſince that univerſal aſſent, which is made the mark of them, amounts to no more but this; that, by the uſe of reaſon, we are capable to come to a certain knowledge of, and aſſent to them: and, by this means, there will be no difference between the maxims of the mathematicians, and theorems they deduce from them. All muſt be equally allow'd innate, they being all diſcoveries made by the uſe of reaſon, and truths, that a rational creature may certainly come to know, if he apply his thoughts rightly that way.

'Tis falſe, that reaſon diſcovers them.

§ 9. But how can theſe men think the uſe of reaſon neceſſary to diſcover principles, that are ſuppos'd innate, when reaſon (if we may believe them) is nothing elſe, but the faculty of deducing unknown truths from principles, or propoſitions, that are already known? That certainly can never be thought innate, which we have need of reaſon to diſcover; unleſs, as I have ſaid, we will have all the certain truths, that reaſon ever teaches us, to be innate. We may as well think the uſe of reaſon neceſſary to make our eyes diſcover viſible objects, as that there ſhould be need of reaſon, or the exerciſe thereof, to make the underſtanding ſee what is originally engraven on it, and cannot be in the underſtanding before it be perceived by it. So that to make reaſon diſcover thoſe truths, thus imprinted, is to ſay, that the uſe of reaſon diſcovers to a man what he knew before; and if men have thoſe innate impreſs'd truths, originally, and before the uſe of reaſon, and yet are always ignorant of them, till they come to the uſe of reaſon, 'tis in effect to ſay, that men know, and know them not, at the ſame time.

§ 10. 'Twill here perhaps be ſaid, that mathematical demonſtrations, and other truths that are not innate, are not aſſented to, as ſoon as propos'd, wherein they are diſtinguiſh'd from theſe maxims, and other innate truths. I ſhall have occaſion to ſpeak of aſſent, upon the firſt propoſing, more particularly by and by.

I ſhall here only, and that very readily, allow that theſe maxims, and mathematical demonſtrations are in this different; that the one has need of reaſon, uſing of proofs, to make them out, and to gain our aſſent; but the other, as ſoon as underſtood, are, without any the leaſt reaſoning, embraced and aſſented to. But I withal beg leave to obſerve, that it lays open the weakneſs of this ſubterfuge, which requires the uſe of reaſon, for the diſcovery of theſe general truths: ſince it muſt be confeſs'd, that, in their diſcovery, there is no uſe made of reaſoning at all. And I think thoſe, who give this anſwer, will not be forward to affirm, that the knowledge of this maxim, "that it is impoſſible for the ſame thing to be, and not to be," is a deduction of our reaſon. For this would be to deſtroy that bounty of nature, they ſeem ſo fond of, whilſt they make the knowledge of thoſe principles to depend on the labour of our thoughts. For all reaſoning is ſearch, and caſting about, and requires pains and application. And how can it, with any tolerable ſenſe, be ſuppos'd, that what was imprinted by nature, as the foundation and guide of our reaſon, ſhould need the uſe of reaſon to diſcover it?

§ 11. Those, who will take the pains to reflect, with a little attention, on the operations of the underſtanding, will find, that this ready aſſent of the mind to ſome truths, depends not, either on native inſcription, or the uſe of reaſon; but on a faculty of the mind quite diſtinct from both of them, as we ſhall ſee hereafter. Reaſon therefore, having nothing to do in procuring our aſſent to theſe maxims, if by ſaying, that men know and aſſent to them, when they come to the uſe of reaſon, be meant, that the uſe of reaſon aſſiſts us in the knowledge of theſe maxims, it is utterly falſe; and were it true, would prove them not to be innate.

The coming to the uſe of reaſon, not the time we come to know theſe maxims.

§ 12. If by knowing and aſſenting to them, when we come to the uſe of reaſon, be meant, that this is the time, when they come to be taken notice of by the mind; and that, as ſoon as children come to the uſe of reaſon, they come alſo to know and aſſent to theſe maxims; this alſo is falſe and frivolous. Firſt, it is falſe; Becauſe it is evident, theſe maxims are not in the mind, ſo early as the uſe of reaſon; and therefore the coming to the uſe of reaſon, is falſly aſſign'd, as the time of their diſcovery. How many inſtances of the uſe of reaſon, may we obſerve in children, a long time before they had any knowledge of this maxim, "that it is impoſſible for the ſame thing to be, and not to be?" And a great part of illiterate people, and ſavages, paſs many years, even of their rational age, without ever thinking on this, and the like general propoſitions. I grant, men come not to the knowledge of theſe general and more abſtract truths, which are thought innate, till they come to the uſe of reaſon; and I add, nor then neither. Which is ſo; becauſe, till after they come to the uſe of reaſon, thoſe general abſtract ideas are not fram'd in the mind, about which thoſe general maxims are, which are miſtaken for innate principles, but are, indeed, diſcoveries made, and verities introduc'd, and brought into the mind, by the ſame way, and diſcover'd by the ſame ſteps, as ſeveral other propoſitions, which no body was ever ſo extravagant as to ſuppoſe innate. This I hope to make plain in the ſequel of this diſcourſe. I allow therefore a neceſſity, that men ſhould come to the uſe of reaſon, before they get the knowledge of thoſe general truths; but deny that men's coming to the uſe of reaſon is the time of their diſcovery.

By this, they are not diſtinguiſh'd from other knowable truths.

§ 13. In the mean time it is obſervable, that this ſaying, that men know, and aſſent to theſe maxims, when they come to the uſe of reaſon, amounts, in reality of fact, to no more but this, that they are never known, nor taken notice of, before the uſe of reaſon, but may, poſſibly, be aſſented to, ſome time after, during a man's life; but when, is uncertain; and ſo may all other knowable truths, as well as theſe, which therefore have no advantage, nor diſtinction from others, by this note of being known, when we come to the uſe of reaſon; nor are thereby prov'd to be innate, but quite the contrary.

If coming to the uſe of reaſon were the time of their diſcovery, it would not

§ 14. But, ſecondly, were it true, that the preciſe time of their being known, and aſſented to, were, when men come to the uſe of reaſon; neither would that prove them innate. This way of arguing is ſo frivolous, as the ſuppoſition of itſelf is falſe. For, by what kind of logick will it appear, that any notion is originally by nature imprinted in the mind, in its firſt conſtitution, becauſe it comes firſt to be obſerv'd, and aſſented to, when a faculty of the mind, which has quite

a diſ-proves them innate.

a diſtinct province, begins to exert itſelf? And therefore, the coming to the uſe of ſpeech, if it were ſuppos'd the time that theſe maxims are firſt aſſented to (which it may be with as much truth, as the time when men come to the uſe of reaſon) would be as good a proof that they were innate, as to ſay, they are innate, becauſe men aſſent to them, when they come to the uſe of reaſon. I agree then, with theſe men of innate principles, that there is no knowledge of theſe general and ſelf-evident maxims in the mind, till it comes to the exerciſe of reaſon: but I deny that the coming to the uſe of reaſon is the preciſe time, when they are firſt taken notice of; and if that were the preciſe time, I deny that it would prove them innate. All that can with any truth be meant by this propoſition, that men aſſent to them, when they come to the uſe of reaſon, is no more but this, that the making of general abſtract ideas, and the underſtanding of general names, being a concomitant of the rational faculty, and growing up with it, children commonly get not thoſe general ideas, nor learn the names, that ſtand for them, till having for a good while exercis'd their reaſon, about familiar and more particular ideas, they are, by their ordinary diſcourſe and actions with others, acknowledg'd to be capable of rational converſation. If aſſenting to theſe maxims, when men come to the uſe of reaſon, can be true, in any other ſenſe, I deſire it may be ſhewn; or at leaſt, how in this, or any other ſenſe, it proves them innate.

The ſteps, by which the mind attains ſeveral truths.

§ 15. The ſenſes at firſt let in particular ideas, and furniſh the yet empty cabinet: and the mind by degrees growing familiar with ſome of them, they are lodg'd in the memory, and names got to them. Afterwards the mind, proceeding farther, abſtracts them, and by degrees learns the uſe of general names. In this manner the mind comes to be furniſh'd with ideas and language, the materials about which to exerciſe its diſcurſive faculty: and the uſe of reaſon becomes daily more viſible, as theſe materials, that give it employment, increaſe. But tho' the having of general ideas, and the uſe of general words and reaſon, uſually grow together; yet, I ſee not, how this any way proves them innate. The knowledge of ſome truths, I confeſs, is very early in the mind; but in a way that ſhews them not to be innate. For, if we will obſerve, we ſhall find it ſtill to be about ideas, not innate, but acquir'd: it being about thoſe firſt, which are imprinted by external things, with which infants have earlieſt to do, which make the moſt frequent impreſſions on their ſenſes. In ideas thus got, the mind diſcovers, that ſome agree, and others differ, probably as ſoon as it has any uſe of memory; as ſoon as it is able to retain and perceive diſtinct ideas. But whether it be then, or no, this is certain it does ſo, long before it has the uſe of words, or comes to that which we commonly call, "the uſe of reaſon." For a child knows as certainly, before it can ſpeak, the difference between the ideas of ſweet and bitter, (i. e. that ſweet is not bitter) as it knows afterwards (when it comes to ſpeak) that wormwood and ſugarplums are not the ſame thing.

§ 16. A child knows not that three and four are equal to ſeven, till he comes to be able to count to ſeven, and has got the name and idea of equality: and then, upon explaining thoſe words, he preſently aſſents to, or rather perceives the truth of that propoſition. But neither does he then readily aſſent, becauſe it is an innate truth, nor was his aſſent wanting till then, becauſe he wanted the uſe of reaſon; but the truth of it appears to him, as ſoon as he has ſettled in his mind the clear and diſtinct ideas, that theſe names ſtand for: and then he knows the truth of that propoſition, upon the ſame grounds, and by the ſame means, that he knew before, that a rod and cherry are not the ſame thing; and upon the ſame grounds alſo, that he may come to know afterwards, "that 'tis impoſſible for the ſame thing to be, and not to be;" as ſhall be more fully ſhewn hereafter. So that the later it is, before any one comes to have thoſe general ideas, about which thoſe maxims are; or to know the ſignification of thoſe general terms, that ſtand for them; or to put together in his mind the ideas they ſtand for: the later alſo will it be, before he comes to aſſent to thoſe maxims, whoſe terms, with the ideas they ſtand for, being no more innate, than thoſe of a cat, or a weeſel, he muſt ſtay till time and obſervation have acquainted him with them; and then he will be in a capacity to know the truth of theſe maxims, upon the firſt occaſion, that ſhall make him put together thoſe ideas in his mind, and obſerve whether they agree or diſagree, according as is expreſs'd in thoſe propoſitions. And therefore it is, that a man knows that eighteen and nineteen are equal to thirty ſeven, by the ſame ſelf-evidence that he knows one and two to be equal to three: yet a child knows this not ſo ſoon as the other, not for want of the uſe of reaſon, but becauſe the ideas the words eighteen, nineteen, and thirty ſeven ſtand for, are not ſo ſoon got, as thoſe which are ſignify'd by one, two, and three.

Aſſenting, as ſoon as propos'd and underſtood, proves them not innate.

§ 17. This evaſion therefore, of general aſſent, when men come to the uſe of reaſon, failing, as it does, and leaving no difference between thoſe ſuppos'd innate and other truths, that are afterwards acquir'd and learnt; men have endeavoured to ſecure an univerſal aſſent to thoſe they call maxims, by ſaying, they are generally aſſented to, as ſoon as propos'd, and the terms, they are propos'd in, underſtood: ſeeing all men, even children, as ſoon as they hear and underſtand the terms, aſſent to theſe propoſitions, they think it is ſufficient to prove them innate. For ſince men never fail, after they have once underſtood the words, to acknowledge them for undoubted truths, they would infer, that certainly theſe propoſitions were firſt lodg'd in the underſtanding; which, without any teaching, the mind, at the very firſt propoſal, immediately cloſes with, and aſſents to, and after that never doubts again.

If ſuch an aſſent be a mark of innate, then "that one and two are equal to three; that ſweetneſs is not bitterneſs"; and a thouſand the like, muſt be innate.

§ 18. In anſwer to this, I demand "whether ready aſſent, given to a propoſition upon firſt hearing, and underſtanding the terms, be a certain mark of an innate principle?" If it be not, ſuch a general aſſent is in vain urg'd, as a proof of them: if it be ſaid, that it is a mark of innate, they muſt then allow all ſuch propoſitions to be innate, which are generally aſſented to, as ſoon as heard, whereby they will find themſelves plentifully ſtor'd with innate principles. For, upon the ſame ground, (viz.) of aſſent at firſt hearing and underſtanding the terms, that men would have thoſe maxims paſs for innate, they muſt alſo admit ſeveral propoſitions about numbers, to be innate: and thus, that one and two are equal to three; that two and two are equal to four; and a multitude of other the like propoſitions in numbers, that every body aſſents to, at firſt hearing, and underſtanding the terms, muſt have a place amongſt theſe innate axioms. Nor is this the prerogative of numbers alone, and propoſitions made about ſeveral of them; but even natural philoſophy, and all the other ſciences afford propoſitions, which are ſure to meet with aſſent, as ſoon as they are underſtood. That two bodies cannot be in the ſame place, is a truth that no body any more ſticks at, than at this maxim, that it is impoſſible for the ſame thing to be, and not to be; that white is not black; that a ſquare is not a circle; that yellowneſs is not ſweetneſs: theſe, and a million of other ſuch propoſitions, as many at leaſt as we have diſtinct ideas of, every man in his wits, at firſt hearing, and knowing what the names ſtand for, muſt neceſſarily aſſent to. If theſe men will be true to their own rule, and have aſſent at firſt hearing and underſtanding the terms, to be a mark of innate, they muſt allow, not only as many innate propoſitions, as men have diſtinct ideas; but as many as men can make propoſitions, wherein different ideas are denied one of another. Since every propoſition, where one different idea is denied of another, will as certainly find aſſent, at firſt hearing and underſtanding the terms, as this general one, "it is impoſſible for the ſame thing to be, and not to be;" or that which is the foundation of it, and is the eaſier underſtood of the two, "the ſame is not different:" by which account they will have legions of innate propoſitions of this one ſort, without mentioning any other. But, ſince no propoſition can be innate, unleſs the ideas, about which it is, be innate; this will be to ſuppoſe all our ideas of colours, ſounds, taſtes, figure, &c. innate; than which there cannot be any thing more oppoſite to reaſon and experience. Univerſal and ready aſſent, upon hearing and underſtanding the terms, is (I grant) a mark of ſelf-evidence; but ſelf-evidence depending, not on innate impreſſions, but on ſomething elſe (as we ſhall ſhew hereafter) belongs to ſeveral propoſitions, which no body was yet ſo extravagant as to pretend to be innate.

Such leſs general propoſitions known, before theſe univerſal maxims.

§ 19. Nor let it be ſaid, that thoſe more particular, ſelf-evident propoſitions, which are aſſented to at firſt hearing, as that one and two are equal to three, that green is not red, &c. are receiv'd as the conſequencs of thoſe more univerſal propoſitions, which are look'd on as innate principles: ſince any one, who will but take the pains to obſerve what paſſes in the underſtanding, will certainly find, that theſe and the like leſs general propoſitions, are certainly known and firmly aſſented to, by thoſe who are utterly ignorant of thoſe more general maxims; and ſo, being earlier in the mind than thoſe (as they are call'd) firſt principles, cannot owe to them the aſſent, wherewith they are receiv'd at firſt hearing.

One and one equal to two, &c. not general, not uſeful, anſwer'd.

§ 20. If it be ſaid that "theſe propoſitions, viz. two and two are equal to "four; red is not blue, &c. are not general maxims, nor of any great uſe:" I anſwer, that makes nothing to the argument of univerſal aſſent, upon hearing and underſtanding. For, if that be the certain mark of innate, whatever propoſition can be found, that receives general aſſent, as ſoon as heard and underſtood, that muſt be admitted for an innate propoſition, as well as this maxim, that "it is "impoſſible for the ſame thing to be, and not to be;" they being upon this ground equal. And, as to the difference of being more general, that makes this maxim more remote from being innate; thoſe general and abſtract ideas being more ſtrangers to our firſt apprehenſions, than thoſe of more particular ſelf-evident propoſitions; and therefore 'tis longer before they are admitted and aſſented to, by the growing underſtanding. And, as to the uſefulneſs of theſe magnify'd maxims, that perhaps will not be found ſo great, as is generally conceiv'd, when it comes to its due place to be more fully conſider'd.

Theſe maxims not being known, ſometimes, till propoſed, proves them not innate.

§ 21. But we have not yet done, with aſſenting to propoſitions at firſt hearing and underſtanding their terms; 'tis fit we firſt take notice, that this, inſtead of being a mark that they are innate, is a proof of the contrary: ſince it ſuppoſes, that ſeveral, who underſtand and know other things, are ignorant of theſe principles till they are propos'd to them; and that one may be unacquainted with theſe truths, till he hears them from others. For, if they were innate, what need they be propos'd, in order to gaining aſſent; when, by being in the underſtanding, by a natural and original impreſſion (if there were any ſuch) they could not but be known before? Or, doth the propoſing them, print them clearer in the mind than nature did? If ſo, then the conſequence will be, that a man knows them better, after he has been thus taught them, than he did before. Whence it will follow, that theſe principles may be made more evident to us, by others teaching, than nature has made them by impreſſion: which will ill agree with the opinion of innate principles, and give but little authority to them; but, on the contrary, makes them unfit to be the foundations of all our other knowledge, as they are pretended to be. This cannot be deny'd, that men grow firſt acquainted with many of theſe ſelf-evident truths, upon their being propos'd: but it is clear, that whoſoever does ſo, finds in himſelf, that he then begins to know a propoſition, which he knew not before, and which from thenceforth he never queſtions; not becauſe it was innate, but becauſe the conſideration of the nature of the things contain'd in thoſe words, would not ſuffer him to think otherwiſe; how, or whenſoever he is brought to reflect on them. And if whatever is aſſented to, at firſt hearing and underſtanding the terms, muſt paſs for an innate principle, every well grounded obſervation, drawn from particulars into a general rule, muſt be innate. When yet it is certain, that not all, but only ſagacious heads, light at firſt on theſe obſervations, and reduce them into general propoſitions; not innate, but collected from a preceding acquaintance and reflection on particular inſtances. Theſe, when obſerving men have made them, unobſerving men, when they are propos'd to them, cannot refuſe their aſſent to.

Implicitly known, before propoſing, ſignifies, that the mind is capable of underſtanding them, or elſe ſignifies nothing.

§ 22. If it be ſaid, "the underſtanding hath an implicit knowledge of theſe "principles, but not an explicit, before this firſt hearing," (as they muſt, who will ſay, "that they are in the underſtanding, before they are known") it will be hard to conceive, what is meant by a principle, imprinted on the underſtanding implicitly; unleſs it be this, that the mind is capable of underſtanding and aſſenting firmly to ſuch propoſitions. And thus all mathematical demonſtrations, as well as firſt principles, muſt be receiv'd, as native impreſſions on the mind; which, I fear, they will ſcarce allow them to be, who find it harder to demonſtrate a propoſition, than aſſent to it, when demonſtrated. And few mathematicians will be forward to believe, that all the diagrams they have drawn, were but copies of thoſe innate characters, which nature had engraven upon their minds.

The argument, of aſſenting on firſt hearing, is upon a falſe ſuppoſition of no precedent teaching.

§ 23. There is, I fear, this farther weakneſs in the foregoing argument, which would perſuade us, that therefore thoſe maxims are to be thought innate, which men admit at firſt hearing, becauſe they aſſent to propoſitions which they are not taught, nor do receive from the force of any argument, or demonſtration, but a bare explication or underſtanding of the terms. Under which there ſeems to me to lie this fallacy, that men are ſuppoſed not to be taught, nor to learn any thing "de novo;" when in truth they are taught, and do learn ſomething, they were ignorant of before. For firſt it is evident, they have learned the terms and their ſignification; neither of which was born with them. But this is not all the acquired knowledge in the caſe; the ideas themſelves, about which the propoſition is, are not born with them, no more than their names, but got afterwards. So that in all propoſitions that are aſſented to, at firſt hearing, the terms of the propoſition, their ſtanding for ſuch ideas, and the ideas themſelves that they ſtand for, being neither of them innate; I would fain know what there is remaining in ſuch propoſitions, that is innate. For I would gladly have any one name that propoſition, whoſe terms, or ideas, were either of them innate. We, by degrees, get ideas and names, and learn their appropriated connexion one with another; and then to propoſitions made in ſuch terms, whoſe ſignification we have learnt, and wherein the agreement or diſagreement we can perceive in our ideas, when put together, is expreſſed, we at firſt hearing aſſent: tho' to other propoſitions, in themſelves as certain and evident, but which are concerning ideas, not ſo ſoon or ſo eaſily got, we are at the ſame time no way capable of aſſenting. For tho' a child quickly aſſents to this propoſition, "that an apple is not fire," when by familiar acquaintance, he has got the ideas of thoſe two different things diſtinctly imprinted on his mind, and has learnt that the names apple and fire ſtand for them; yet it will be ſome years after, perhaps, before the ſame child will aſſent to this propoſition, "that it is impoſſible for the ſame thing to be, and not to be." Becauſe that, tho', perhaps, the words are as eaſy to be learnt; yet the ſignification of them being more large, comprehenſive, and abſtract, than of the names annexed to thoſe ſenſible things, the child hath to do with; it is longer before he learns their preciſe meaning, and it requires more time plainly to form in his mind thoſe general ideas, they ſtand for. 'Till that be done, you will in vain endeavour to make any child aſſent to a propoſition, made up of ſuch general terms; but, as ſoon as ever he has got thoſe ideas, and learn'd their names, he forwardly cloſes with the one, as well as the other, of the forementioned propoſitions: and with both, for the ſame reaſon, (viz.) becauſe he finds the ideas, he has in his mind, to agree, or diſagree, according as the words, ſtanding for them, are affirmed, or denied one of another, in the propoſition. But if propoſitions be brought to him in words, which ſtand for ideas he has not yet in his mind; to ſuch propoſitions, however evidently true or falſe in themſelves, he affords neither aſſent nor diſſent, but is ignorant. For words being but empty ſounds, any farther than they are ſigns of our ideas, we cannot but aſſent to them, as they correſpond to thoſe ideas we have, but no farther than that. But the ſhewing by what ſteps and ways knowledge comes into our minds, and the grounds of ſeveral degrees of aſſent, being the buſineſs of the following diſcourſe, it may ſuffice to have only touched on it here, as one reaſon that made me doubt of thoſe innate principles.

Not innate, becauſe not univerſally aſſented to.

§ 24. To conclude this argument of univerſal conſent, I agree with theſe defenders of innate principles, that if they are innate, they muſt needs have univerſal aſſent. For that a truth ſhould be innate, and yet not aſſented to, is to me as unintelligible, as for a man to know a truth, and be ignorant of it, at the ſame time. But then, by theſe men's own confeſſion, they cannot be innate; ſince they are not aſſented to, by thoſe who underſtand not the terms, nor by a great part of thoſe who do underſtand them, but have yet never heard, nor thought of thoſe propoſitions; which, I think, is at leaſt one half of mankind. But, were the number far leſs, it would be enough to deſtroy univerſal aſſent, and thereby ſhew theſe propoſitions not to be innate, if children alone were ignorant of them.

§ 25. But,

These maxims not the firſt known.

§ 25. But, that I may not be accuſed, to argue from the thoughts of infants, which are unknown to us, and to conclude, from what paſſes in their underſtandings before they expreſs it; I ſay next, that theſe two general propoſitions are not the truths, that firſt poſſeſs the minds of children, nor are antecedent to all acquired and adventitious notions; which, if they were innate, they muſt needs be. Whether we can determine it or no, it matters not, there is certainly a time when children begin to think; and their words and actions do aſſure us that they do ſo. When, therefore, they are capable of thought, of knowledge, of aſſent, can it rationally be ſuppos'd, they can be ignorant of thoſe notions, that nature has imprinted, were there any ſuch? Can it be imagin'd with any appearance of reaſon, that they perceive the impreſſions, from things without, and be at the ſame time ignorant of thoſe characters, which nature itſelf has taken care to ſtamp within? Can they receive and aſſent to adventitious notions, and be ignorant of thoſe, which are ſuppos'd woven into the very principles of their being, and imprinted there in indelible characters, to be the foundation and guide of all their acquir'd knowledge, and future reaſonings? This would be to make nature take pains to no purpoſe, or at leaſt to write very ill; ſince its characters could not be read by thoſe eyes, which ſaw other things very well; and thoſe are very ill ſuppoſed the cleareſt parts of truth, and the foundations of all our knowledge, which are not firſt known, and without which the undoubted knowledge of ſeveral other things may be had. The child certainly knows “that the nurſe that feeds it, is neither the cat it plays with, nor the blackmoor it is afraid of; that the wormſeed, or muſtard it refuſes, is not the apple or ſugar it cries for;” this it is certainly and undoubtedly aſſur'd of: but will any one ſay, it is by virtue of this principle, “that it is impoſſible for the ſame thing to be, and not to be,” that it ſo firmly aſſents to theſe, and other parts of its knowledge? Or that the child has any notion or apprehenſion of that propoſition, at an age, wherein yet 'tis plain, it knows a great many other truths? He that will ſay, children join theſe general abſtract ſpeculations with their ſucking-bottles and their rattles, may, perhaps, with juſtice, be thought to have more paſſion and zeal for his opinion, but leſs ſincerity and truth, than one of that age.

And ſo not innate.

§ 26. Though, therefore, there be ſeveral general propoſitions, that meet with conſtant and ready aſſent, as ſoon as propos'd to men grown up, who have attained the uſe of more general and abſtract ideas, and names ſtanding for them; yet they not being to be found in thoſe of tender years, who nevertheleſs know other things, they cannot pretend to univerſal aſſent of intelligent perſons, and ſo by no means can be ſuppos'd innate; it being impoſſible that any truth, which is innate (if there were any ſuch) ſhould be unknown, at leaſt to any one, who knows any thing elſe: ſince, if they are innate truths, they muſt be innate thoughts; there being nothing a truth in the mind, that it has never thought on. Whereby it is evident, if there be any innate truths, they muſt neceſſarily be the firſt of any thought on, the firſt that appear there.

Not innate, becauſe they appear leaſt, where, what is innate, ſhews itſelf cleareſt.

§ 27. That the general maxims, we are diſcourſing of, are not known to children, idiots, and a great part of mankind, we have already ſufficiently proved; whereby it is evident they have not an univerſal aſſent, nor are general impreſſions. But there is this farther argument in it, againſt their being innate; that theſe characters, if they were native and original impreſſions, ſhould appear faireſt and cleareſt in thoſe perſons, in whom yet we find no foot-ſteps of them: and 'tis, in my opinion, a ſtrong preſumption that they are not innate, ſince they are leaſt known to thoſe, in whom, if they were innate, they muſt needs exert themſelves with moſt force and vigour. For children, idiots, ſavages, and illiterate people, being of all others the leaſt corrupted by cuſtom, or borrow'd opinions; learning and education having not caſt their native thoughts into new moulds, nor by ſuper-inducing foreign and ſtudied doctrines, confounded thoſe fair characters nature had written there: one might reaſonably imagine, that in their minds theſe innate notions ſhould lie open fairly, to every one's view, as 'tis certain the thoughts of children do. It might very well be expected, that theſe principles ſhould be perfectly known to naturals; which, being ſtamped immediately on the ſoul (as theſe men ſuppoſe) can have no dependance on the conſtitutions, or organs of the body, the only confeſs'd difference between them and others. One would think, according to theſe men's principles, that all theſe native beams of light (were there any ſuch) ſhould in thoſe, who have no reſerves, no arts of concealment, ſhine out in their full luſtre, and leave us in no more doubt of their being there, than we are of their love of pleaſure, and abhorrence of pain. But alas! amongſt children, idiots, ſavages, and the groſly illiterate, what general maxims are to be found? What univerſal principles of knowledge? Their notions are few and narrow, borrow'd only from thoſe objects they have had moſt to do with, and which have made upon their ſenſes the frequenteſt and ſtrongeſt impreſſions. A child knows his nurſe and his cradle, and by degrees the play-things of a little more advanced age: and a young ſavage has, perhaps, his head fill'd with love and hunting, according to the faſhion of his tribe. But he that, from a child untaught, or a wild inhabitant of the woods, will expect theſe abſtract maxims, and reputed principles of ſciences; will, I fear, find himſelf miſtaken. Such kind of general propoſitions are ſeldom mention'd in the huts of Indians, much leſs are they to be found in the thoughts of children, or any impreſſions of them on the minds of naturals. They are the language and buſineſs of the ſchools and academies of learned nations, accuſtom'd to that ſort of converſation, or learning, where diſputes are frequent: theſe maxims being ſuited to artificial argumentation, and uſeful for conviction; but not much conducing to the diſcovery of truth, or advancement of knowledge. But of their ſmall uſe for the improvement of knowledge, I ſhall have occaſion to ſpeak more at large, B. iv. c. 7.

Recapitulation.

§ 28. I know not how abſurd this may ſeem to the maſters of demonſtration: and probably, it will hardly down with any body at firſt hearing; I muſt therefore beg a little truce with prejudice, and the forbearance of cenſure, till I have been heard out, in the ſequel of this diſcourſe, being very willing to ſubmit to better judgments. And ſince I impartially ſearch after truth, I ſhall not be ſorry to be convinc'd, that I have been too fond of my own notions: which I confeſs we are all apt to be, when application and ſtudy have warm'd our heads with them.

Upon the whole matter, I cannot ſee any ground to think theſe two famed ſpeculative maxims innate, ſince they are not univerſally aſſented to; and the aſſent they ſo generally find, is no other than what ſeveral propoſitions, not allow'd to be innate, equally partake in with them: and ſince the aſſent, that is given them, is produced another way, and comes not from natural inſcription, as I doubt not but to make appear, in the following diſcourſe. And if theſe firſt principles of knowledge and ſcience are found not to be innate, no other ſpeculative maxims can (I ſuppoſe) with better right pretend to be ſo.

CHAP. III.

No innate practical principles.

No moral principles ſo clear, and ſo generally receiv'd, as the fore-mention'd ſpeculative maxims.

§ 1. If thoſe ſpeculative maxims, whereof we diſcours'd in the foregoing chapter, have not an actual univerſal aſſent from all mankind, as we there prov'd, it is much more viſible, concerning practical principles, that they come ſhort of an univerſal reception: and I think it will be hard to inſtance any one moral rule, which can pretend to ſo general and ready an aſſent, as, "what is, is;" or to be ſo manifeſt a truth as this, "that it is impoſſible for the ſame thing to be, and not to be." Whereby it is evident, that they are farther remov'd from a title to be innate: and the doubt, of their being native impreſſions on the mind, is ſtronger againſt theſe moral principles, than the other. Not that it brings their truth at all in queſtion. They are equally true, tho' not equally evident. Thoſe ſpeculative maxims carry their own evidence with them: but moral principles require reaſoning and diſcourſe, and ſome exerciſe of the mind, to diſcover the certainty of their truth. They lie not open as natural characters ingraven on the mind; which, if any ſuch were, they muſt needs be viſible by themſelves, and by their own light be certain and known to every body. But this is no derogation to their truth and certainty, no more than it is to the truth, or certainty of the three angles of a triangle being equal to two right ones; becauſe it is not ſo evident, as, the whole is bigger than a part; nor ſo apt to be aſſented to, at firſt hearing. It may ſuffice, that theſe moral rules are capable of demonſtration: and therefore it is our own fault, if we come not to a certain knowledge of them. But the ignorance, wherein many men are of them, and the ſlowneſs of aſſent, wherewith others receive them, are manifeſt proofs, that they are not innate, and ſuch as offer themſelves to their view without ſearching.

Faith and juſtice, not own'd as principles by all men.

§ 2. WHETHER there be any ſuch moral principles, wherein all men do agree, I appeal to any, who have been but moderately converſant in the hiſtory of mankind, and look'd abroad beyond the ſmoak of their own chimneys. Where is that practical truth, that is univerſally receiv'd, without doubt or queſtion, as it muſt be, if innate? Juſtice, and keeping of contracts, is that which moſt men ſeem to agree in. This is a principle, which is thought to extend itſelf to the dens of thieves, and the confederacies of the greateſt villains; and they, who have gone fartheſt towards the putting off of humanity itſelf, keep faith and rules of juſtice one with another. I grant that out-laws themſelves do this one amongſt another: but 'tis without receiving theſe as the innate laws of nature. They practiſe them, as rules of convenience, within their own communities: but it is impoſſible to conceive, that he embraces juſtice, as a practical principle, who acts fairly with his fellow-high-way-men, and at the ſame time plunders, or kills the next honeſt man he meets with. Juſtice and truth are the common ties of ſociety; and therefore even out-laws, and robbers, who break with all the world beſides, muſt keep faith and rules of equity amongſt themſelves, or elſe they cannot hold together. But will any one ſay, that thoſe that live by fraud and rapine, have innate principles of truth and juſtice, which they allow and aſſent to?

Object. Tho' men deny them in their practice, yet they admit them in their thoughts, anſwer'd.

§ 3. PERHAPS it will be urg'd, that the tacit aſſent of their minds agrees to what their practice contradicts. I anſwer, firſt I have always thought the actions of men the beſt interpreters of their thoughts. But ſince it is certain, that moſt men's practice, and ſome men's open profeſſions, have either queſtion'd, or deny'd, theſe principles, it is impoſſible to eſtabliſh an univerſal conſent (tho' we ſhould look for it only amongſt grown men) without which, it is impoſſible to conclude them innate. Secondly, 'Tis very ſtrange and unreaſonable, to ſuppoſe innate practical principles, that terminate only in contemplation. Practical principles, derived from nature, are there for operation, and muſt produce conformity of action, not barely ſpeculative aſſent to their truth; or elſe they are in vain diſtinguiſh'd from ſpeculative maxims. Nature, I confeſs, has put into man a deſire of happineſs, and an averſion to miſery: theſe, indeed, are innate practical principles, which (as practical principles ought) do continue conſtantly to operate and influence all our actions, without ceaſing. Theſe may be obſerved in all perſons and all ages, ſteady and univerſal; but theſe are inclinations of the appetite to good, not impreſſions of truth on the underſtanding. I deny not, that there are natural tendencies, imprinted on the minds of men; and that from the very firſt inſtances of ſenſe and perception, there are ſome things that are grateful, and others unwelcome to them; ſome things that they incline to, and others that they fly: but this makes nothing for innate characters on the mind, which are to be the principles of knowledge, regulating our practice. Such natural impreſſions on the underſtanding, are ſo far from being confirmed hereby, that this is an argument againſt them; ſince, if there were certain characters, imprinted by nature on the underſtanding, as the principles of knowledge, we could not but perceive them conſtantly operate in us, and influence our knowledge, as we do thoſe others on the will and appetite; which never ceaſe to be the conſtant ſprings and motives of all our actions, to which we perpetually feel them ſtrongly impelling us.

Moral rules need a proof, ergo not innate.

§ 4. ANOTHER reaſon, that makes me doubt of any innate practical principles, is, that I think there cannot any one moral rule be propos'd, whereof a man may not juſtly demand a reaſon; which would be perfectly ridiculous and abſurd, if they were innate, or ſo much as ſelf-evident; which every innate principle muſt needs be, and not need any proof to aſcertain its truth, nor want any reaſon to gain its approbation. He would be thought void of common ſenſe, who aſk'd on the one ſide, or on the other ſide went to give, a reaſon, why it is impoſſible for the ſame thing to be, and not to be. It carries its own light and evidence with it, and needs no other proof: he that underſtands the terms, aſſents to it for its own ſake, or elſe nothing will ever be able to prevail with him to do it. But ſhould that moſt unſhaken rule of morality, and foundation of all ſocial virtue, "that one ſhould do as he would be done unto," be propos'd to one who never heard it before, but yet is of capacity to underſtand its meaning; might he not, without any abſurdity, aſk a reaſon why? And were not he that propos'd it bound to make out the truth and reaſonableneſs of it to him? Which plainly ſhews it not to be innate: for, if it were, it could neither want, nor receive any proof; but muſt needs (at leaſt as ſoon as heard and underſtood) be receiv'd and aſſented to, as an unqueſtionable truth, which a man can by no means doubt of. So that the truth of all theſe moral rules plainly depends upon ſome other antecedent to them, and from which they muſt be deduced; which could not be, if either they were innate, or ſo much as ſelf-evident.

Inſtance in keeping compacts.

§ 5. That men ſhould keep their compacts, is certainly a great and undeniable rule in morality: but yet, if a chriſtian, who has the view of happineſs and miſery in another life, be aſk'd, why a man muſt keep his word, he will give this as a reaſon: becauſe God, who has the power of eternal life and death, requires it of us. But if an Hobbiſt be aſk'd why, he will anſwer, Becauſe the publick requires it, and the Leviathan will puniſh you if you do not. And, if one of the old heathen philoſophers had been aſk'd, he would have anſwer'd; Becauſe it was diſhoneſt, below the dignity of a man, and oppoſite to virtue, the higheſt perfection of human nature, to do otherwiſe.

Virtue generally approv'd, not becauſe innate, but becauſe profitable.

§ 6. Hence naturally flows the great variety of opinions, concerning moral rules, which are to be found among men, according to the different ſorts of happineſs they have a proſpect of, or propoſe to themſelves: which could not be, if practical principles were innate, and imprinted in our minds, immediately by the hand of God. I grant the exiſtence of God is ſo many ways manifeſt, and the obedience, we owe him, ſo congruous to the light of reaſon, that a great part of mankind give teſtimony to the law of nature: but yet I think it muſt be allow'd, that ſeveral moral rules may receive from mankind a very general approbation, without either knowing, or admitting the true ground of morality; which can only be the will and law of a God, who ſees men in the dark, has in his hand rewards and puniſhments, and power enough to call to account the proudeſt offender. For God having, by an unſeparable connexion, join'd virtue and publick happineſs together, and made the practice thereof neceſſary to the preſervation of ſociety, and viſibly beneficial to all with whom the virtuous man has to do; it is no wonder, that every one ſhould not only allow, but recommend and magnify thoſe rules to others, from whoſe obſervance of them he is ſure to reap advantage to himſelf. He may, out of intereſt, as well as conviction, cry up that for ſacred; which, if once trampled on and profan'd, he himſelf cannot be ſafe, nor ſecure. This, tho' it takes nothing from the moral and eternal obligation, which theſe rules evidently have, yet it ſhews that the outward acknowledgment, men pay to them in their words, proves not that they are innate principles; nay, it proves not ſo much, as that men aſſent to them inwardly, in their own minds, as the inviolable rules of their own practice: ſince we find that ſelf-intereſt, and the conveniencies of this life, make many men own an outward profeſſion and approbation of them, whoſe actions ſufficiently prove, that they very little conſider the law-giver, that preſcribed theſe rules, nor the hell he has ordained, for the puniſhment of thoſe that tranſgreſs them.

Men's actions convince us, that the rule of virtue is not their internal principle.

§ 7. For, if we will not, in civility, allow too much ſincerity to the profeſſions of moſt men, but think their actions to be the interpreters of their thoughts, we ſhall find, that they have no ſuch internal veneration for theſe rules, nor ſo full a perſuaſion of their certainty and obligation. The great principle of morality, "to do as one would be done to," is more commended than practis'd; but the breach of this rule cannot be a greater vice, than to teach others, that it is no moral rule, nor obligatory, would be thought madneſs, and contrary to that intereſt men ſacrifice to, when they break it themſelves. Perhaps conſcience will be urg'd, as checking us for ſuch breaches, and ſo the internal obligation and eſtabliſhment of the rule be preſerv'd.

Conſcience, no proof of any innate, moral rule.

§ 8. To which I anſwer, that I doubt not but, without being written on their hearts, many men may, by the ſame way that they come to the knowledge of other things, come to aſſent to ſeveral moral rules, and be convinced of their obligation. Others alſo may come to be of the ſame mind from their education, company, and cuſtoms of their country: which perſuaſion, however got, will ſerve to ſet conſcience on work, which is nothing elſe but our own opinion, or judgment of the moral rectitude, or pravity of our own actions. And if conſcience be a proof of innate principles, contraries may be innate principles; ſince ſome men with the ſame bent of conſcience, proſecute what others avoid.

Inſtances of enormities, practis'd without remorſe.

§ 9. But I cannot ſee, how any men ſhould ever tranſgreſs thoſe moral rules, with confidence and ſerenity, were they innate, and ſtamp'd upon their minds. View but an army, at the ſacking of a town, and ſee what obſervation, or ſenſe of moral principles, or what touch of conſcience, for all the outrages they do. Robberies, murders, rapes, are the ſports of men, ſet at liberty from puniſhment and cenſure. Have there not been whole nations, and thoſe of the moſt civiliz'd people, amongſt whom the expoſing their children, and leaving them in the fields, to periſh by want, or wild beaſts, has been the practice, as little condemned, or ſcrupled, as the begetting them? Do they not ſtill, in ſome countries, put them into the ſame graves with their mothers, if they die in child-birth; or diſpatch them, if a pretended aſtrologer declares them to have unhappy ſtars? and are there not places where, at a certain age, they kill, or expoſe, their parents, without any remorſe at all? In a part of Aſia, the ſick, when their caſe comes to be thought deſperate, are carried out, and laid on the earth before they are dead, and left there, expoſed to wind and weather, to periſh without aſſiſtance, or pity. [a] It is familiar among the Mingrelians, a people profeſſing chriſtianity, to bury their children alive without ſcruple. [b] There are places where they eat their own children. [c] The Caribbes were wont to geld their children, on purpoſe to fat and eat them. [d] And Garcilaſſo de la Vega tells us of a people in Peru, which were wont to fat and eat the children they got on their female captives, whom they kept as concubines, for that purpoſe; and, when they were paſt breeding, the mothers themſelves were killed too and eaten. [e] The virtues, whereby the Tououpinambos believ'd they merited paradiſe, were revenge, and eating abundance of their enemies. [f] They have not ſo much as a name for God, and have no religion, no worſhip. The ſaints, who are canoniz'd amongſt the Turks, lead lives, which one cannot with modeſty relate. A remarkable paſſage to this purpoſe out of the voyage of Baumgarten, which is a book not every day to be met with, I ſhall ſet down at large, in the language it is publiſh'd in. "Ibi (ſc. prope Belbes in Ægypto) vidimus ſanctum unum Saracenicum, inter arenarum cumulos, ita, ut ex utero matris prodiit, nudum ſedentem. Mos eſt, ut didicimus, Mahometiſtis, ut eos, qui amentes & ſine ratione ſunt, pro ſanctis colant & venerentur. Inſuper & eos, qui cum diu vitam egerint inquinatiſſimam, voluntariam demum pœnitentiam & paupertatem, ſanctitate venerandos deputant. Ejuſmodi verò genus hominum libertatem quandam effrœnem habent, domos quas volunt intrandi, edendi, bibendi, & quod majus eſt, concumbendi; ex quo concubitu, ſi proles ſecuta fuerit, ſancta ſimiliter habetur. His ergo hominibus, dum vivunt, magnos exhibent honores; mortuis verò, vel templa, vel monumenta, extruunt ampliſſima, eoſque contingere ac ſepelire maximæ fortunæ ducunt loco. Audivimus hæc dicta & dicenda per interpretem à Mucrelo noſtro. Inſuper ſanctum illum, quem eo loco vidimus, publicitus apprimè commendari, eum eſſe hominem ſanctum, divinum ac integritate præcipuum; eo quod, nec fœminarum unquam eſſet, nec puerorum, ſed tantum modo aſellarum concubitor, atque mularum." Peregr. Baumgarten, l. ii. c. 1. p. 73. More of the ſame kind, concerning theſe precious ſaints amongſt the Turks, may be ſeen in Pietro della Valle, in his letter of the 25th of January, 1616.

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[a] Gruber apud Thevenot, part iv. p. 13.

[b] Lambert apud Thevenot, p. 38.

[c] Voſſius de Nili origine, c. 18, 19.

[d] P. Mart. Dec. 1.

[e] Hiſt. des Incas, l. i. c. 12.

[f] Lery, c. 16. 216, 231.

Where then are thoſe innate principles of juſtice, piety, gratitude, equity, chaſtity? Or where is that univerſal conſent, that aſſures us there are ſuch inbred rules? Murders in duels, when faſhion has made them honourable, are committed, without remorſe of conſcience; nay, in many places, innocence in this caſe is the greateſt ignominy. And if we look abroad, to take a view of men, as they are, we ſhall find that they have remorſe in one place, for doing, or omitting that which others, in another place, think they merit by.

Men have contrary practical principles.

§ 10. He, that will carefully peruſe the hiſtory of mankind, and look abroad into the ſeveral tribes of men, and with indifferency ſurvey their actions, will be able to ſatisfy himſelf, that there is ſcarce that principle of morality to be named, or rule of virtue to be thought on, (thoſe only excepted, that are abſolutely neceſſary to hold ſociety together, which commonly too are neglected betwixt diſtinct ſocieties) which is not ſome where or other, ſlighted and condemn'd, by the general faſhion of whole ſocieties of men, govern'd by practical opinions, and rules of living, quite oppoſite to others.

Whole nations reject ſeveral moral rules.

§ 11. Here, perhaps, 'twill be objected, that it is no argument that the rule is not known, becauſe it is broken. I grant the objection good, where men, tho' they tranſgreſs, yet diſown not the law; where fear of ſhame, cenſure, or puniſhment carries the mark of ſome awe it has upon them. But it is impoſſible, to conceive, that a whole nation of men ſhould all publickly reject and renounce, what every one of them, certainly and infallibly, knew to be a law; for ſo they muſt, who have it naturally imprinted on their minds. 'Tis poſſible men may ſometimes own rules of morality, which, in their private thoughts, they do not believe to be true, only to keep themſelves in reputation and eſteem, amongſt thoſe who are perſuaded of their obligation. But 'tis not to be imagin'd, that a whole ſociety of men ſhould, publickly and profeſſedly, diſown, and caſt off a rule, which they could not, in their own minds, but be infallibly certain was a law; nor be ignorant that all men, they ſhould have to do with, knew it to be ſuch: and therefore, muſt every one of them apprehend from others, all the contempt and abhorrence due to one, who profeſſes himſelf void of humanity; and one, who, confounding the known and natural meaſures of right and wrong, cannot but be look'd on, as the profeſs'd enemy of their peace and happineſs. Whatever practical principle is innate, cannot but be known, to every one, to be juſt and good. It is therefore, little leſs than a contradiction to ſuppoſe, that whole nations of men ſhould, both in their profeſſions and practice, unanimouſly and univerſally give the lie to what, by the moſt invincible evidence, every one of them knew to be true, right, and good. This is enough to ſatisfy us, that no practical rule, which is any where univerſally, and with publick approbation, or allowance, tranſgreſs'd, can be ſuppoſed innate. But I have ſomething farther to add, in anſwer to this objection.

§ 12. The breaking of a rule, ſay you, is no argument that it is unknown. I grant it: but the generally allow'd breach of it any where, I ſay, is a proof that it is not innate. For example; let us take any of theſe rules, which, being the moſt obvious deductions of human reaſon, and conformable to the natural inclination of the greateſt part of men, feweſt people have had the impudence to deny, or inconſideration to doubt of. If any can be thought to be naturally imprinted, none, I think, can have a fairer pretence to be innate than this; "parents, preſerve and cheriſh your children." When therefore you ſay, that this is an innate rule, what do you mean? Either that is an innate principle, which, upon all occaſions, excites and directs the actions of all men; or elſe, that it is a truth, which all men have imprinted on their minds, and which, therefore, they know and aſſent to: but in neither of theſe ſenſes is it innate. Firſt, that it is not a principle, which influences all men's actions, is what I have prov'd, by the examples before-cited; nor need we ſeek ſo far as Mingrelia, or Peru, to find inſtances of ſuch as neglect, abuſe, nay, and deſtroy their children; or look on it only as the more than brutality of ſome ſavage and barbarous nations, when we remember that it was a familiar and uncondemn'd practice amongſt the Greeks and Romans, to expoſe, without pity or remorſe, their innocent infants. Secondly, That it is an innate truth, known to all men, is alſo falſe; for, parents, preſerve your children, is ſo far from an innate truth, that it is no truth at all; it being a command, and not a propoſition, and ſo not capable of truth, or falſhood. To make it capable of being aſſented to, as true, it muſt be reduced to ſome ſuch propoſition as this; "it is the duty of parents to preſerve their children." But what duty is, cannot be underſtood, without a law; nor a law be known, or ſuppos'd, without a law-maker, or without reward and puniſhment: ſo that it is impoſſible that this, or any other practical principle, ſhould be innate, i. e. be imprinted on the mind, as a duty, without ſuppoſing the ideas of God, of law, of obligation, of puniſhment, of a life after this, innate: for that puniſhment follows not, in this life, the breach of this rule, and conſequently; that it has not the force of a law, in countries where the generally allow'd practice runs counter to it, is in itſelf evident. But theſe ideas (which muſt be all of them innate, if any thing as a duty be ſo) are ſo far from being innate, that 'tis not every ſtudious, or thinking man, much leſs every one that is born, in whom they are to be found clear and diſtinct: and that one of them, which of all others ſeems moſt likely to be innate, is not ſo, (I mean the idea of God) I think, in the next chapter, will appear very evident, to any conſidering man.

§ 13. FROM what has been ſaid, I think, we may ſafely conclude, that whatever practical rule is, in any place, generally, and with allowance broken, cannot be ſuppoſed innate; it being impoſſible that men ſhould, without ſhame or fear, confidently and ſerenely break a rule, which they could not but evidently know that God had ſet up, and would certainly puniſh the breach of (which they muſt, if it were innate) to a degree, to make it a very ill bargain to the tranſgreſſor. Without ſuch a knowledge as this, a man can never be certain that any thing is his duty. Ignorance, or doubt of the law, hopes to eſcape the knowledge, or power, of the law-maker, or the like, may make men give way to a preſent appetite: but let any one ſee the fault, and the rod by it, and, with the tranſgreſſion, a fire ready to puniſh it; a pleaſure tempting, and the hand of the almighty viſibly held up, and prepared to take vengeance (for this muſt be the caſe, where any duty is imprinted on the mind) and then tell me, whether it be poſſible for people, with ſuch a proſpect, ſuch a certain knowledge as this, wantonly, and without ſcruple, to offend againſt the law, which they carry about them, in indelible characters, and that ſtares them in the face, whilſt they are breaking it? Whether men, at the ſame time that they feel in themſelves the imprinted edicts of an omnipotent law-maker, can, with aſſurance and gayety, ſlight and trample under foot his moſt ſacred injunctions? And laſtly, whether it be poſſible, that, whilſt a man thus openly bids defiance to this innate law, and ſupreme law-giver, all the by-ſtanders, yea, even the governors and rulers of the people, full of the ſame ſenſe both of the law and law-maker, ſhould ſilently connive, without teſtifying their diſlike, or laying the leaſt blame on it? Principles of actions, indeed, there are lodg'd in men's appetites, but theſe are ſo far from being innate, moral principles, that, if they were left to their full ſwing, they would carry men to the over-turning of all morality. Moral laws are ſet as a curb and reſtraint to theſe exorbitant deſires, which they cannot be, but by rewards and puniſhments, that will over-balance the ſatisfaction, any one ſhall propoſe to himſelf, in the breach of the law. If, therefore, any thing be imprinted on the minds of all men, as a law, all men muſt have a certain and unavoidable knowledge, that certain and unavoidable puniſhment will attend the breach of it: for, if men can be ignorant, or doubtful, of what is innate, innate principles are inſiſted on, and urg'd, to no purpoſe. Truth and certainty (the things pretended) are not at all ſecured by them; but men are in the ſame uncertain, floating eſtate with, as without them. An evident, indubitable knowledge of unavoidable puniſhment, great enough to make the tranſgreſſion very uneligible, muſt accompany an innate law; unleſs, with an innate law, they can ſuppoſe an innate goſpel too. I would not here be miſtaken, as if, becauſe I deny an innate law, I thought there were none but poſitive laws. There is a great deal of difference between an innate law, and a law of nature: between ſomething imprinted on our minds in their very original, and ſomething that we, being ignorant of, may attain to the knowledge of, by the uſe and due application of our natural faculties. And I think they equally forſake the truth, who, running into contrary extremes, either affirm an innate law, or deny that there is a law, knowable by the light of nature, i. e. without the help of poſitive revelation.

Thoſe, who maintain innate practical principles, tell us not what they are.

§ 14. The difference there is amongſt men, in their practical principles, is ſo evident, that, I think, I need ſay no more to evince, that it will be impoſſible to find any innate, moral rules, by this mark of general aſſent: and 'tis enough to make one ſuſpect, that the ſuppoſition of ſuch innate principles, is but an opinion, taken up at pleaſure; ſince thoſe, who talk ſo confidently of them, are ſo ſparing to tell us which they are. This might with juſtice be expected from thoſe men, who lay ſtreſs upon this opinion: and it gives occaſion to diſtruſt, either their knowledge, or charity, who declaring, that God has imprinted on the minds of men the foundations of knowledge, and the rules of living, are yet ſo little favourable to the information of their neighbours, or the quiet of mankind, as not to point out to them which they are, in the variety men are diſtracted with. But, in truth, were there any ſuch innate principles, there would be no need to teach them. Did men find ſuch innate propoſitions, ſtamp'd on their minds, they would eaſily be able to diſtinguiſh them from other truths, that they afterwards learned and deduced from them; and there would be nothing more eaſy than to know what, and how many there were. There could be no more doubt about their number, than there is about the number of our fingers; and 'tis like then every ſyſtem would be ready to give them us by tale. But ſince no body, that I know, has ventured yet to give a catalogue of them, they cannot blame thoſe, who doubt of theſe innate principles; ſince even they, who require men to believe that there are ſuch innate propoſitions, do not tell us what they are. 'Tis eaſy to foreſee, that if different men, of different ſects, ſhould go about to give us a liſt of thoſe innate, practical principles, they would ſet down only ſuch as ſuited their diſtinct hypotheſes, and were fit to ſupport the doctrines of their particular ſchools, or churches; a plain evidence, that there are no ſuch innate truths! Nay, a great part of men are ſo far from finding any ſuch innate moral principles in themſelves, that, by denying freedom to mankind, and thereby making men no other than bare machines, they take away not only innate, but all moral rules whatſoever, and leave not a poſſibility to believe any ſuch, to thoſe who cannot conceive how any thing can be capable of a law, that is not a free agent: and, upon that ground they muſt neceſſarily reject all principles of virtue, who cannot put morality and mechaniſm together, which are not very eaſy to be reconcil'd, or made conſiſtent.

Lord Herbert's innate principles examin'd.

§ 15. When I had writ this, being inform'd that my lord Herbert had, in his books "de Veritate," aſſign'd theſe innate principles, I preſently conſulted him, hoping to find, in a man of ſo great parts, ſomething that might ſatisfy me in this point, and put an end to my enquiry. In his chapter, de Inſtinctu Naturali, p. 72. edit. 1656. I met with theſe ſix marks of his Notitiæ Communes. "1. Prioritas. " 2. Independentia. 3. Univerſalitas. 4. Certitudo. 5. Neceſſitas; i. e. as he explains " it, "faciunt ad hominis conſervationem." 6. Modus conformationis, i. e. "aſſenſus, nullâ interpoſitâ morâ." And at the latter end of his little treatiſe De Religione Laici, he ſays this, of theſe innate principles, "Adeo ut non uniuſcujuſvis religionis confinio arctentur, quæ ubique vigent veritates. Sunt enim in " ipſa mente cœlitus deſcriptæ, nulliſque traditionibus, ſive ſcriptis, ſive non " ſcriptis, obnoxiæ, p. 3. And, veritates noſtræ catholicæ, quæ, tanquam indubia Dei effata, in foro interiori deſcripta." Thus having given the marks of the innate principles, or common notions, and aſſerted their being imprinted on the minds of men, by the hand of God, he proceeds to ſet them down, and they are theſe: " 1. Eſſe aliquod ſupremum numen. 2. Numen illud coli debere. 3. Virtutem, cum pietate conjunctam, optimam eſſe rationem cultus divini. 4. Reſipiſcendum eſſe a peccatis. 5. Dari præmium, vel pœnam, poſt hanc vitam tranſactam." Tho' I allow theſe to be clear truths, and ſuch as, if rightly explain'd, a rational creature can hardly avoid giving his aſſent to;

yet I think he is far from proving them innate impreſſions, "in foro interiori deſcriptæ." For I muſt take leave to obſerve,

§ 16. First, That theſe five propoſitions are either not at all, or more than all, thoſe common notions, writ on our minds by the finger of God, if it were reaſonable to believe any at all to be ſo written: ſince there are other propoſitions, which, even by his own rules, have as juſt a pretence to ſuch an original, and may be as well admitted for innate principles, as at leaſt ſome of theſe five he enumerates, viz. "Do, as thou wouldſt be done unto;" and perhaps ſome hundreds of others, when well conſider'd.

§ 17. Secondly, That all his marks are not to be found in each of his five propoſitions, viz. his firſt, ſecond, and third marks agree perfectly to neither of them; and the firſt, ſecond, third, fourth, and ſixth marks agree but ill to his third, fourth, and fifth propoſitions. For, beſides that we are aſſured from hiſtory, of many men, nay, whole nations, who doubt, or diſbelieve ſome, or all of them; I cannot ſee how the third, viz. "that virtue, join'd with piety, is the beſt worſhip of God," can be an innate principle, when the name, or ſound, virtue," is ſo hard to be underſtood; liable to ſo much uncertainty in its ſignification; and the thing it ſtands for, ſo much contended about, and difficult to be known. And therefore, this can be but a very uncertain rule of human practice, and ſerve but very little to the conduct of our lives, and is therefore, very unfit to be aſſign'd as an innate, practical principle.

§ 18. For let us conſider this propoſition, as to its meaning (for it is the ſenſe, and not ſound, that is, and muſt be, the principle, or common notion) viz. "virtue is the beſt worſhip of God, i. e. is moſt acceptable to him;" which if virtue be taken, as moſt commonly it is, for thoſe actions, which, according to the different opinions of ſeveral countries, are accounted laudable, will be a propoſition ſo far from being certain, that it will not be true. If virtue be taken for actions conformable to God's will, or to the rule preſcrib'd by God, which is the true and only meaſure of virtue, when virtue is us'd to ſignify what is, in its own nature, right, and good; then this propoſition, that "virtue is the beſt worſhip of God," will be moſt true and certain, but of very little uſe in human life: ſince it will amount to no more but this, viz. that God is pleas'd with the doing of what he commands; which a man may certainly know to be true, without knowing what it is that God doth command; and ſo be as far from any rule, or principle of his actions, as he was before: and I think very few will take a propoſition, which amounts to no more than this. viz. "that God is pleaſed with the doing of what he himſelf commands," for an innate, moral principle, writ on the minds of all men (however true and certain it may be) ſince it teaches ſo little. Whoſoever does ſo, will have reaſon to think hundreds of propoſitions, innate principles; ſince there are many, which have as good a title as this, to be receiv'd for ſuch, which no body yet ever put into that rank of innate principles.

§ 19. Nor is the fourth propoſition, (viz.) "men muſt repent of their ſins," much more inſtructive, till what thoſe actions are, that are meant by ſins, be ſet down: for the word "peccata," or ſins, being put, as it uſually is, to ſignify in general, ill actions, that will draw puniſhment upon the doers; what great principle of morality can that be, to tell us we ſhould be ſorry, and ceaſe to do that which will bring miſchief upon us, without knowing what thoſe particular actions are, that will do ſo? Indeed, this is a very true propoſition, and fit to be inculcated on, and receiv'd by, thoſe who are ſuppos'd to have been taught, what actions in all kinds are ſins: but neither this, nor the former, can be imagin'd to be innate principles; nor to be of any uſe, if they were innate; unleſs the particular meaſures and bounds of all virtues and vices, were engraven in men's minds, and were innate principles alſo, which, I think, is very much to be doubted. And therefore, I imagine, it will ſcarce ſeem poſſible that God ſhould engrave principles in men's minds, in words of uncertain ſignification, ſuch as virtues and ſins, which, amongſt different men, ſtand for different things: nay, it cannot be ſuppos'd to be in words at all, which, being, in moſt of theſe principles, very general names, cannot be underſtood, but by knowing the particulars, comprehended under them. And, in the practical inſtances, the meaſures muſt be taken from the knowledge of the actions themſelves, and the rules of them, abſtracted from words, and antecedent to the knowledge of names; which rules a man muſt know, what language ſoever he chance to learn, whether Engliſh, or Japan, or if he ſhould learn no language at all, or never ſhould underſtand the uſe of words, as happens in the caſe of dumb and deaf men. When it ſhall be made out, that men, ignorant of words, or untaught by the laws and cuſtoms of their country, know that it is part of the worſhip of God, not to kill another man; not to know more women than one; not to procure abortion; not to expoſe their children; not to take from another what is his, tho' we want it ourſelves, but, on the contrary, relieve and ſupply his wants; and whenever we have done the contrary, we ought to repent, be ſorry, and reſolve to do ſo no more: when, I ſay, all men ſhall be proved actually to know, and allow all theſe, and a thouſand other ſuch rules, all which come under theſe two general words, made uſe of above, viz. "virtutes and peccata," virtues and ſins; there will be more reaſon for admitting theſe, and the like, for common notions, and practical principles. Yet, after all, univerſal conſent (were there any, in moral principles) to truths, the knowledge whereof may be attain'd otherwiſe, would ſcarce prove them to be innate; which is all I contend for.

Obj. Innate principles may be corrupted, anſwer'd.

§ 20. Nor will it be of much moment here, to offer that very ready, but not very material anſwer, (viz.) that the innate principles of morality, may, by education, and cuſtom, and the general opinion of thoſe, amongſt whom we converſe, be darken'd, and, at laſt, quite worn out of the minds of men. Which aſſertion of theirs, if true, quite takes away the argument of univerſal conſent, by which this opinion of innate principles is endeavour'd to be prov'd; unleſs thoſe men will think it reaſonable, that their private perſuaſions, or that of their party, ſhould paſs for univerſal conſent; a thing not unfrequently done, when men, preſuming themſelves to be the only maſters of right reaſon, caſt by the votes and opinions of the reſt of mankind, as not worthy the reckoning. And then their argument ſtands thus: "the principles, which all mankind allow for true, are innate; thoſe, that men of right reaſon admit, are the principles allow'd by all mankind: we, and thoſe of our mind, are men of reaſon, therefore, we agreeing, our principles are innate:" which is a very pretty way of arguing, and a ſhort cut to infallibility. For, otherwiſe, it will be very hard to underſtand, how there be ſome principles, which all men do acknowledge, and agree in; and yet there are none of thoſe principles, which are not, by deprav'd cuſtom, and ill education, blotted out of the minds of many men; which is to ſay, "that all men admit, but yet many men do deny, and diſſent from them." And, indeed, the ſuppoſition of ſuch firſt principles will ſerve us to very little purpoſe; and we ſhall be as much at a loſs with, as without them, if they may, by any human power, ſuch as is the will of our teachers, or opinions of our companions, be alter'd, or loſt in us: and, notwithſtanding all this boaſt of firſt principles, and innate light, we ſhall be as much in the dark, and uncertainty, as if there were no ſuch thing at all; it being all one to have no rule, and one that will warp any way; or among various and contrary rules, not to know which is the right. But, concerning innate principles, I deſire theſe men to ſay, whether they can, or cannot, by education and cuſtom, be blurr'd and blotted out: if they cannot, we muſt find them in all mankind alike, and they muſt be clear in every body: and if they may ſuffer variation, from adventitious notions, we muſt then find them cleareſt and moſt perſpicuous, neareſt the fountain, in children, and illiterate people, who have receiv'd leaſt impreſſion from foreign opinions. Let them take which ſide they pleaſe, they will certainly find it inconſiſtent with viſible matter of fact, and daily obſervation.

Contrary principles in the world.

§ 21. I easily grant, that there are great numbers of opinions, which, by men of different countries, educations and tempers, are received and embraced, as firſt and unqueſtionable principles; many whereof, both for their abſurdity, as well as oppoſition one to another, it is impoſſible ſhould be true. But yet all thoſe propoſitions, how remote ſoever from reaſon, are ſo ſacred, ſomewhere or other, that men, even of good underſtanding in other matters, will ſooner part with their lives, and whatever is deareſt to them, than ſuffer themſelves to doubt, or others to queſtion the truth of them.

How men commonly come by their principles.

§ 22. THIS, however ſtrange it may ſeem, is that which every day's experience confirms; and will not, perhaps, appear ſo wonderful, if we conſider the ways and ſteps, by which it is brought about; and how really it may come to paſs, that doctrines, that have been derived from no better original, than the ſuperſtition of a nurſe, or the authority of an old woman, may, by length of time, and conſent of neighbours, grow up to the dignity of principles in religion, or morality. For ſuch, who are careful (as they call it) to principle children well, (and few there be, who have not a ſet of thoſe principles for them, which they believe in) inſtil into the unwary, and as yet unprejudiced underſtanding (for white paper receives any characters) thoſe doctrines, they would have them retain and profeſs. Theſe being taught them, as ſoon as they have any apprehenſion, and ſtill, as they grow up, confirm'd to them, either by the open profeſſion, or tacit conſent, of all they have to do with; or, at leaſt, by thoſe, of whoſe wiſdom, knowledge, and piety, they have an opinion, who never ſuffer thoſe propoſitions to be otherwiſe mention'd, but as the baſis and foundation, on which they build their religion, or manners; come, by theſe means, to have the reputation of unqueſtionable, ſelf-evident, and innate truths.

§ 23. To which we may add, that when men, ſo inſtructed, are grown up, and reflect on their own minds, they cannot find any thing more antient there, than thoſe opinions, which were taught them, before their memory began to keep a regiſter of their actions, or date the time, when any new thing appeared to them; and therefore, make no ſcruple to conclude, that thoſe propoſitions, of whoſe knowledge they can find in themſelves no original, were certainly the impreſs of God and nature upon their minds, and not taught them by any one elſe. Theſe they entertain, and ſubmit to, as many do to their parents, with veneration; not becauſe it is natural; nor do children do it, where they are not ſo taught: but becauſe, having been always ſo educated, and having no remembrance of the beginning of this reſpect, they think it is natural.

§ 24. THIS will appear very likely, and almoſt unavoidably to come to paſs, if we conſider the nature of mankind, and the conſtitution of human affairs; wherein moſt men cannot live, without employing their time in the daily labours of their callings; nor be at quiet in their minds, without ſome foundation, or principles, to reſt their thoughts on. There is ſcarce any one ſo floating, and ſuperficial in his underſtanding, who hath not ſome reverenced propoſitions, which are to him the principles, on which he bottoms his reaſonings; and by which he judgeth of truth and falſhood, right and wrong; which, ſome, wanting ſkill and leiſure, and others the inclination, and ſome being taught, that they ought not to examine; there are few to be found, who are not expos'd by their ignorance, lazineſs, education, or precipitancy, to take them upon truſt.

§ 25. THIS is evidently the caſe of all children and young folk; and cuſtom, a greater power than nature, ſeldom failing to make them worſhip for divine, what ſhe hath inur'd them to bow their minds, and ſubmit their underſtandings to, it is no wonder that grown men, either perplex'd in the neceſſary affairs of life, or hot in the purſuit of pleaſures, ſhould not ſeriouſly ſit down to examine their own tenets; eſpecially, when one of their principles is, that principles ought not to be queſtioned. And, had men leiſure, parts, and will, who is there almoſt, that dare ſhake the foundations of all his paſt thoughts and actions, and endure to bring upon himſelf the ſhame of having been a long time wholly in miſtake and error? Who is there hardy enough to contend with the reproach, which is every where prepared for thoſe, who dare venture to diſſent from the receiv'd opinions of their country, or party? And where is the man to be found, that can patiently prepare himſelf to bear the name of whimſical, ſceptical, or atheiſt, which he is ſure to meet with, who does, in the leaſt, ſcruple any of the common opinions? And he will be much more afraid to queſtion thoſe principles, when he ſhall think them, as moſt men do, the ſtandards, ſet up by God in his mind, to be the rule, and touchſtone, of all other opinions. And what can hinder him from thinking them ſacred, when he finds them the earlieſt of all his own thoughts, and the moſt reverenced by others?

§ 26. It is eaſy to imagine, how, by theſe means, it comes to paſs, that men worſhip the idols, that have been ſet up in their minds; grow fond of the notions they have been long acquainted with there; and ſtamp the characters of divinity upon abſurdities and errors; become zealous votaries to bulls and monkeys; and contend too, fight, and die in defence of their opinion. "Dum ſolos credit habendos eſſe deos, quos ipſe colit." For ſince the reaſoning faculties of the ſoul, which are almoſt conſtantly, tho' not always warily, nor wiſely, employed, would not know how to move, for want of a foundation and footing, in moſt men; who, thro' lazineſs, or avocation, do not, or for want of time, or true helps, or for other cauſes, cannot penetrate into the principles of knowledge, and trace truth to its fountain and original; 'tis natural for them, and almoſt unavoidable, to take up with ſome borrowed principles; which being reputed, and preſumed, to be the evident proofs of other things, are thought not to need any other proof themſelves. Whoever ſhall receive any of theſe into his mind, and entertain them there, with the reverence uſually paid to principles, never venturing to examine them, but accuſtoming himſelf to believe them, becauſe they are to be believ'd may take up from his education, and the faſhions of his country, any abſurdity for innate principles; and, by long poring on the ſame objects, ſo dim his ſight, as to take monſters, lodg'd in his own brain, for the images of the deity, and the workmanſhip of his hands.

Principles muſt be examined.

§ 27. By this progreſs, how many there are, who arrive at principles, which they believe innate, may be eaſily obſerv'd, in the variety of oppoſite principles, held and contended for, by all ſorts and degrees of men. And he, that ſhall deny this to be the method, wherein moſt men proceed, to the aſſurance they have of the truth and evidence of their principles, will, perhaps, find it a hard matter, any other way, to account for the contrary tenets, which are firmly believed, confidently aſſerted, and which great numbers are ready, at any time, to ſeal with their blood. And, indeed, if it be the privilege of innate principles, to be received upon their own authority, without examination; I know not what may not be believed, or how any one's principles can be queſtioned. If they may, and ought to be examin'd, and try'd, I deſire to know how firſt and innate principles can be try'd; or at leaſt, it is reaſonable to demand the marks and characters, whereby the genuine, innate principles may be diſtinguiſhed from others; that ſo, amidſt the great variety of pretenders, I may be kept from miſtakes, in ſo material a point as this. When this is done, I ſhall be ready to embrace ſuch welcome and uſeful propoſitions; and, till then, I may, with modeſty, doubt; ſince I fear univerſal conſent, which is the only one produced, will ſcarce prove a ſufficient mark to direct my choice, and aſſure me of any innate principles. From what has been ſaid, I think it paſt doubt, that there are no practical principles, wherein all men agree; and therefore none innate.

CHAP. IV.

Other conſiderations concerning innate principles, both ſpeculative and practical.

CHAP. IV.

Principles not innate, unleſs their ideas be innate.

§ 1. HAD thoſe, who would perſuade us that there are innate principles, not taken them together in groſs, but conſidered ſeparately, the parts, out of which thoſe propoſitions are made; they would not, perhaps, have been ſo forward to believe they were innate: ſince if the ideas which made up thoſe truths were not, it was impoſſible that the propoſitions, made up of them, ſhould be innate, or our knowledge of them be born with us. For, if the ideas be not innate, there was a time, when the mind was without thoſe principles; and then they will not be innate, but be deriv'd from ſome other original. For, where the ideas themſelves are not, there can be no knowledge, no aſſent, no mental, or verbal, propoſitions about them.

Ideas, eſpecially thoſe belonging to principles, not born with children.

§ 2. If we will attentively conſider new-born children, we ſhall have little reaſon to think, that they bring many ideas into the world with them. For, bating perhaps, ſome faint ideas of hunger, and thirſt, and warmth, and ſome pains, which they may have felt in the womb, there is not the leaſt appearance of any ſettled ideas at all in them; eſpecially of ideas, anſwering the terms, which make up thoſe univerſal propoſitions, that are eſteem'd innate principles. One may perceive how, by degrees, afterwards, ideas come into their minds; and that they get no more, nor no other, than what experience; and the obſervation of things, that come in their way, furniſh them with; which might be enough to ſatisfy us, that they are not original characters, ſtamped on the mind.

§ 3. "It is impoſſible for the ſame thing to be, and not to be," is certainly (if there be any ſuch) an innate principle. But can any one think, or will any one ſay, that impoſſibility and identity, are two innate ideas? Are they ſuch as all mankind have, and bring into the world with them? And are they thoſe, that are the firſt in children, and antecedent to all acquir'd ones? If they are innate, they muſt needs be ſo. Hath a child an idea of impoſſibility and identity, before it has of white or black, ſweet or bitter? And is it from the knowledge of this principle, that it concludes, that wormwood rubb'd on the nipple, hath not the ſame taſte, that it uſed to receive from thence? Is it the actual knowledge of, "impoſſibile eſt idem eſſe, & non eſſe," that makes a child diſtinguiſh between its mother and a ſtranger; or that makes it fond of the one, and fly the other? Or does the mind regulate itſelf, and its aſſent, by ideas that it never yet had? Or the underſtanding draw concluſions from principles, which it yet never knew, or underſtood? The names impoſſibility and identity, ſtand for two ideas, ſo far from being innate, or born with us, that I think it requires great care and attention, to form them right in our underſtandings. They are ſo far from being brought into the world with us, ſo remote from the thoughts of infancy and childhood; that, I believe, upon examination, it will be found, that many grown men want them.

Identity, an idea not innate.

§ 4. If identity (to inſtance in that alone) be a native impreſſion, and, conſequently, ſo clear and obvious to us, that we muſt needs know it, even from our cradles; I would gladly be reſolved by one of ſeven, or ſeventy years old, whether a man, being a creature conſiſting of ſoul and body, be the ſame man, when his body is changed? Whether Euphorbus and Pythagoras, having had the ſame ſoul, were the ſame man, tho' they lived ſeveral ages aſunder? Nay, Whether the cock too, which had the ſame ſoul, were not the ſame with both of them? Whereby, perhaps, it will appear, that our idea of ſameneſs is not ſo ſettled and clear, as to deſerve to be thought innate in us. For, if thoſe innate ideas are not clear and diſtinct, ſo as to be univerſally known, and naturally agreed on, they cannot be ſubjects of univerſal and undoubted truths; but will be the unavoidable occaſion of perpetual uncertainty. For, I ſuppoſe, every one's idea of identity will not be the ſame that Pythagoras, and thouſands others of his followers have: and which then ſhall be the true? Which innate? Or are there two different ideas of identity, both innate.

§ 5. Nor let any one think, that the queſtions I have here propoſed, about the identity of man, are bare empty ſpeculations; which, if they were, would be enough to ſhew, that there was, in the underſtandings of men, no innate idea of identity. He that ſhall, with a little attention, reflect on the reſurrection, and conſider, that divine juſtice ſhall bring to judgment at the laſt day, the very ſame perſons, to be happy, or miſerable, in the other, who did well, or ill, in this life; will find it, perhaps, not eaſy to reſolve with himſelf, what makes the ſame man, or wherein identity conſiſts: and will not be forward to think he, and every one, even children themſelves, have, naturally, a clear idea of it.

Whole and part, not innate ideas.

§ 6. Let us examine that principle of mathematicks, viz. "that the whole is bigger than a part." This, I take it, is reckoned amongſt innate principles. I am ſure it has as good a title as any to be thought ſo; which, yet, no body can think it to be, when he conſiders the ideas it comprehends in it, "whole and part," are perfectly relative: but the poſitive ideas, to which they properly and immediately belong, are extenſion and number, of which, alone, whole and part are relations. So that, if whole and part are innate ideas, extenſion and number muſt be ſo too; it being impoſſible to have any idea of a relation, without having any at all of the thing, to which it belongs, and in which it is founded. Now, whether the minds of men have naturally imprinted on them the ideas of extenſion and number, I leave to be conſider'd by thoſe, who are the patrons of innate principles.

Idea of worſhip, not innate.

§ 7. "THAT God is to be worſhipped," is, without doubt, as great a truth as any can enter into the mind of man, and deſerves the firſt place amongſt all practical principles; but yet it can, by no means, be thought innate, unleſs the ideas of God and worſhip are innate. That the idea, the term worſhip ſtands for, is not in the underſtanding of children, and a character ſtamp'd on the mind, in its firſt original, I think, will be eaſily granted by any one, that conſiders how few there be amongſt grown men, who have a clear and diſtinct notion of it. And, I ſuppoſe there cannot be any thing more ridiculous, than to ſay, that children have this practical principle innate, "that God is to be worſhipped;" and yet, that they know not what that worſhip of God is, which is their duty. But to paſs by this:

Idea of God not innate.

§ 8. IF any idea can be imagined innate, the idea of God may, of all others, for many reaſons, be thought ſo; ſince it is hard to conceive, how there ſhould be innate moral principles, without an innate idea of a deity: without a notion of a law-maker, it is impoſſible to have a notion of a law, and an obligation to obſerve it. Beſides the atheiſts, taken notice of, amongſt the antients, and left branded upon the records of hiſtory, hath not navigation diſcover'd, in theſe latter ages, whole nations, as the bay of Soldania [a], in Brazil [b], in Boranday [c], and the Caribbee iſlands, &c. amongſt whom there was to be found no notion of a God, no religion? Nicholaus del Techo, in literis ex Paraquaria, de Caaiguarum converſione, has theſe words [d]: "Reperi eam gentem nullum nomen habere, quod "Deum et hominis animam ſignificet, nulla ſacra habet, nulla idola." Theſe are inſtances of nations, where uncultivated nature has been left to itſelf, without the help of letters, and diſcipline, and the improvements of arts and ſciences. But there are others to be found, who have enjoy'd theſe in a very great meaſure, who, yet, for want of a due application of their thoughts this way, want the idea and knowledge of God. 'Twill, I doubt not, be a ſurprize to others, as it was to me, to find the Siamites of this number. But, for this, let them conſult the king of France's late envoy thither [e], who gives no better account of the Chineſes themſelves [f]. And, if we will not believe La Loubere, the miſſionaries of China, even the Jeſuits themſelves, the great encomiaſts of the Chineſes, do all, to a man, agree, and will convince us, that the ſect of the literati, or learned, keeping to the old religion of China, and the ruling party there, are all of them atheiſts. Vid. Navarette, in the collection of voyages, vol. the firſt, and Hiſtoria cultus Sinenſium. And, perhaps, if we ſhould, with attention, mind the lives and diſcourſes of people, not ſo far off, we ſhould have too much reaſon to fear, that many, in more civilized countries, have no very ſtrong and clear impreſſions of a deity upon their minds; and that the complaints of atheiſm, made from the pulpit, are not without reaſon. And, tho' only ſome profligate wretches own it too barefacedly now; yet perhaps, we ſhould hear more, than we do of it, from others, did not the fear of the magiſtrate's ſword, or their neighbour's cenſure, tie up people's tongues: which, were the apprehenſions of puniſhment, or ſhame, taken away, would as openly proclaim their atheiſm, as their lives do.

§ 9. BUT had all mankind, every where, a notion of a God (whereof, yet, hiſtory tells us the contrary) it would not from thence follow, that the idea of him was innate. For tho' no nation were to be found without a name, and ſome few dark notions, of him; yet that would not prove them to be natural impreſſions on the mind, no more than the names of fire, or the ſun, heat, or number, do prove the ideas they ſtand for, to be innate: becauſe the names of thoſe things, and the ideas of them, are ſo univerſally received and known amongſt mankind. Nor, on the contrary, is the want of ſuch a name, or the abſence of ſuch a notion, out of men's minds, any argument againſt the being of a God; any more than it would be a proof, that there was no loadſtone in the world, becauſe a great part of mankind had neither a notion of any ſuch thing, nor a name for it; or be any ſhew of argument to prove, that there are no diſtinct and various ſpecies of angels, or intelligent beings above us, becauſe we have no ideas of ſuch diſtinct ſpecies, or names for them: For men, being furniſh'd with words, by the common language of their own countries, can ſcarce avoid having ſome kind of ideas of thoſe things, whoſe names, thoſe, they converſe with, have occaſion frequently to mention to them. And, if it carry with it the notion of excellency, greatneſs, or ſomething extraordinary; if apprehenſion and concernment accompany it; if the fear of abſolute and irreſiſtible power ſet it on upon the mind; the idea is likely to ſink the deeper, and ſpread the farther; eſpecially, if it be ſuch an idea, as is agreeable to the common light of reaſon, and naturally deducible from every part of our knowledge, as that of a God is. For the viſible marks of extraordinary wiſdom and power appear ſo plainly, in all the works of the creation, that a rational creature, who will but ſeriouſly reflect on them, cannot miſs the diſcovery of a deity. And the influence, that the diſcovery of ſuch a being muſt neceſſailry have on the minds of all, that have but once heard it, is ſo great, and carries ſuch a weight of thought and communication with it, that it ſeems ſtranger to me, that a whole nation of men ſhould be, any where, found ſo brutiſh, as to want the notion of a God; than that they ſhould be without any notion of numbers, or fire.

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[a] Rhoe apud Thevenot, p. 2. [b] Jo. de Lery, c. 16. [c] Martiniere $\frac{201}{322}$. Terry $\frac{17}{545}$ & $\frac{23}{545}$. Ovington, $\frac{489}{606}$. [d] Relatio triplex de rebus Indicis Caaiguarum $\frac{43}{70}$. [e] La Loubere du Royaume de Siam, t. 1. c. 9. ſect. 15, &c. 20. ſect. 22, &c. 22. ſect. 6. [f] Ib. t. 1. c. 20. ſect. 4, &c. 23.

§ 10. THE name of God being once mentioned, in any part of the world, to expreſs a ſuperior, powerful, wiſe, inviſible being, the ſuitableneſs of ſuch a notion to the principles of common reaſon, and the intereſt men will always have to mention it often, muſt neceſſarily ſpread it far and wide, and continue it down to all generations; tho', yet, the general reception of this name, and ſome imperfect and unſteady notions, convey'd thereby, to the unthinking part of mankind, prove not the idea to be innate; but only that they, who made the diſcovery, had made a right uſe of their reaſon, thought maturely of the cauſes of things, and traced them to their original; from whom other, leſs conſidering people, having once receiv'd ſo important a notion, it could not eaſily be loſt again.

§ 11. THIS is all could be infer'd from the notion of a God, were it to be found univerſally, in all the tribes of mankind, and generally acknowledg'd, by men grown to maturity, in all countries. For the generality of the acknowledging of a God, as I imagine, is extended no farther than that; which, if it be ſufficient to prove the idea of God innate, will as well prove the idea of fire innate: ſince, I think, it may truely be ſaid, that there is not a perſon in the world, who has a notion of a God, who has not alſo the idea of fire. I doubt not, but if a colony of young children ſhould be placed in an iſland, where no fire was, they would certainly neither have any notion of ſuch a thing, nor name for it; how generally ſoever it were receiv'd, and known in all the world beſides: and, perhaps too, their apprehenſions would be as far removed from any name, or notion of a God, till ſome one amongſt them had employ'd his thoughts, to enquire into the conſtitution and cauſes of things, which would eaſily lead him to the notion of a God: which, having once taught to others, reaſon, and the natural propenſity of their own thoughts, would afterwards propagate, and continue amongſt them.

Suitable to God's goodneſs, that all men ſhould have an idea of him, therefore naturally imprinted by him; anſwer'd.

§ 12. INDEED it is urg'd, that it is ſuitable to the goodneſs of God, to imprint, upon the minds of men, characters, and notions of himſelf, and not to leave them in the dark, and doubt, in ſo grand a concernment; and alſo, by that means, to ſecure to himſelf the homage and veneration, due from ſo intelligent a creature as man; and therefore he has done it.

THIS argument, if it be of any force, will prove much more than thoſe, who uſe it in this caſe, expect from it. For, if we may conclude, that God hath done for men, all that men ſhall judge is beſt for them, becauſe it is ſuitable to his goodneſs ſo to do; it will prove, not only that God has imprinted on the minds of men, an idea of himſelf, but that he hath plainly ſtamp'd there, in fair characters, all that men ought to know, or believe of him, all that they ought to do, in obedience to his will; and that he hath given them a will and affections conformable to it.

This, no doubt, every one will think better for men, than that they ſhould in the dark grope after knowledge, as St. Paul tells us, all nations did after God, Acts xvii. 27. than that their wills ſhould claſh with their underſtandings, and their appetites croſs their duty. The Romaniſts ſay, 'tis beſt for men, and ſo, ſuitable to the goodneſs of God, that there ſhould be an infallible judge of controverſies on earth; and therefore there is one. And I, by the ſame reaſon, ſay, 'tis better for men, that every man himſelf ſhould be infallible. I leave them to conſider, whether, by the force of this argument, they ſhall think, that every man is ſo. I think it a very good argument, to ſay, the infinitely wiſe God hath made it ſo: and therefore it is beſt. But it ſeems to me a little too much confidence of our own wiſdom, to ſay, "I think it beſt, and therefore God hath made it ſo;" and, in the matter in hand, it will be in vain to argue from ſuch a topick, that God hath done ſo, when certain experience ſhews us that he hath not. But the goodneſs of God hath not been wanting to men, without ſuch original impreſſions of knowledge, or ideas ſtamp'd on the mind: ſince he hath furniſh'd man with thoſe faculties, which will ſerve for the ſufficient diſcovery of all things, requiſite to the end of ſuch a being. And I doubt not but to ſhew, that a man, by the right uſe of his natural abilities, may, without any innate principles, attain the knowledge of a God, and other things that concern him. God, having endu'd man with thoſe faculties of knowing which he hath, was no more oblig'd, by his goodneſs, to implant thoſe innate notions in his mind, than that, having given him reaſon, hands, and materials, he ſhould build him bridges, or houſes; which ſome people in the world, however, of good parts, do either totally want, or are but ill provided of; as well as others are wholly without ideas of God, and principles of morality; or, at leaſt, have but very ill ones. The reaſon, in both caſes, being, that they never employ'd their parts, faculties, and powers, induſtriouſly, that way, but contented themſelves with the opinions, faſhions, and things of their country, as they found them, without looking any farther. Had you, or I, been born at the bay of Soldania, poſſibly our thoughts and notions had not exceeded thoſe brutiſh ones of the Hottentots, that inhabit there: and had the Virginia king Apochancana been educated in England, he had, perhaps, been as knowing a divine, and as good a mathematician, as any in it. The difference between him, and a more improved Engliſhman, lying barely in this, that the exerciſe of his faculties was bounded within the ways, modes, and notions of his own country, and never directed to any other, or farther enquiries: and, if he had not any idea of a God, it was only, becauſe he purſu'd not thoſe thoughts that would have led him to it.

Ideas of God various, in different men.

§ 13. I GRANT, that, if there were any ideas to be found, imprinted on the minds of men, we have reaſon to expect, it ſhould be the notion of their maker, as a mark God ſet on his own workmanſhip, to mind man of his dependance and duty; and that herein ſhould appear the firſt inſtances of human knowledge. But how late is it, before any ſuch notion is diſcoverable in children? And, when we find it there, how much more does it reſemble the opinion and notion of the teacher, than repreſent the true God? He, that ſhall obſerve in children the progreſs, whereby their minds attain the knowledge they have, will think that the objects, they do firſt, and moſt familiarly converſe with, are thoſe that make the firſt impreſſions on their underſtandings: nor will he find the leaſt footſteps of any other. It is eaſy to take notice, how their thoughts enlarge themſelves, only as they come to be acquainted with a greater variety of ſenſible objects, to retain the ideas of them in their memories; and to get the ſkill to compound and enlarge them, and ſeveral ways put them together. How, by theſe means, they come to frame in their minds an idea men have of a deity, I ſhall hereafter ſhew.

§ 14. CAN it be thought, that the ideas men have of God, are the characters and marks of himſelf, engraven in their minds, by his own finger: when we ſee that, in the ſame country, under one and the ſame name, men have far different, nay, often contrary and inconſiſtent ideas and conceptions of him? Their agreeing in a name, or ſound, will ſcarce prove an innate notion of him.

§ 15. WHAT true, or tolerable, notion of a deity could they have, who acknowledged, and worſhipped, hundreds? Every deity, that they own'd above one, was an infallible evidence of their ignorance of him, and a proof that they had no true notion of God, where unity, infinity, and eternity, were excluded. To which, if we add their groſs conceptions of corporeity, expreſs'd in their images, and repreſentations of their deities; the amours, marriages, copulations, luſts, quarrels, and other mean qualities, attributed by them to their gods; we ſhall have little reaſon to think, that the heathen world, i. e. the greateſt part of mankind, had ſuch ideas of God in their minds, as he himſelf, out of care that they ſhould not be miſtaken about him, was author of. And this univerſality of conſent, ſo much argu'd, if it prove any native impreſſions, 'twill be only this, that God imprinted on the minds of all men, ſpeaking the ſame language, a name for himſelf, but not any idea; ſince thoſe people, who agreed in the name, had, at the ſame time, far different apprehenſions about the thing ſignify'd. If they ſay, that the variety of deities, worſhipped by the heathen world, were but figurative ways of expreſſing the ſeveral attributes of that incomprehenſible being, or ſeveral parts of his providence: I anſwer, what they might be in their original, I will not here inquire; but that they were ſo, in the thoughts of the vulgar, I think no body will affirm. And he that will conſult the voyage of the biſhop of Beryte, c. 13. (not to mention other teſtimonies) will find, that the theology of the Siamites profeſſedly owns a plurality of gods: or, as the abbe de Choiſy more judiciouſly remarks, in his Journal du voiage de Siam, $\frac{107}{177}$, it conſiſts properly in acknowledging no God at all.

§ 15. If it be ſaid, that wiſe men, of all nations, came to have true conceptions of the unity and infinity of the deity, I grant it. But then this,

First, Excludes univerſality of conſent in any thing, but the name; for thoſe wiſe men, being very few, perhaps one of a thouſand, this univerſality is very narrow.

Secondly, It ſeems to me plainly to prove, that the trueſt and beſt notions, men had of God, were not imprinted, but acquired by thought and meditation, and a right uſe of their faculties; ſince the wiſe and conſiderate men of the world, by a right and careful employment of their thoughts and reaſon, attain'd true notions in this, as well as other things; whilſt the lazy and inconſiderate part of men, making the far greater number, took up their notions by chance, from common tradition, and vulgar conceptions, without much beating their heads about them. And, if it be a reaſon to think the notion of God innate, becauſe all wiſe men had it, virtue too muſt be thought innate, for that alſo wiſe men have always had.

§ 16. This was evidently the caſe of all Gentiliſm: nor hath, even amongſt Jews, Chriſtians, and Mahometans, who acknowledge but one God, this doctrine, and the care taken in thoſe nations, to teach men to have true notions of a God, prevail'd ſo far, as to make men to have the ſame, and true ideas of him. How many, even amongſt us, will be found, upon inquiry, to fancy him in the ſhape of a man, ſitting in heaven, and to have many other abſurd and unfit conceptions of him? Chriſtians, as well as Turks, have had whole ſects, owning and contending earneſtly for it, that the deity was corporeal, and of human ſhape: and tho' we find few amongſt us, who profeſs themſelves anthropomorphites, (tho' ſome I have met with, that own it) yet, I believe, he that will make it his buſineſs, may find, amongſt the ignorant and uninſtructed chriſtians, many of that opinion. Talk but with country-people, almoſt of any age, or young people, almoſt of any condition; and you ſhall find, that, tho' the name of God be frequently in their mouths; yet the notions, they apply this name to, are ſo odd, low, and pitiful, that no body can imagine they were taught by a rational man, much leſs that they were characters, writ by the finger of God himſelf. Nor do I ſee how it derogates more from the goodneſs of God, that he has given us minds unfurniſh'd, with theſe ideas of himſelf, than that he hath ſent us into the world with bodies uncloath'd, and that there is no art, or ſkill, born with us: for, being fitted with faculties to attain theſe, it is want of induſtry, and conſideration in us, and not of bounty in him, if we have them not. 'Tis as certain, that there is a God, as that the oppoſite angles, made by the interſection of two ſtraight lines, are equal. There was never any rational creature, that ſet himſelf, ſincerely, to examine the truth of theſe propoſitions, that could fail to aſſent to them; tho' yet it be paſt doubt, that there are many men, who, having not apply'd their thoughts that way, are ignorant both of the one and the other. If any one think fit to call this (which is the utmoſt of its extent) univerſal conſent, ſuch an one I eaſily allow; but ſuch an univerſal conſent as this, proves not the idea of God, no more than it does the idea of ſuch angles, innate.

If the idea of God be not innate, no other can be ſuppoſed innate.

§ 17. SINCE then, tho' the knowledge of a God be the moſt natural diſcovery of human reaſon, yet the idea of him is not innate, as I think, is evident from what has been ſaid; I imagine there will ſcarce be any other idea found, that can pretend to it: ſince, if God had ſet any impreſſion, any character, on the underſtanding of men, it is moſt reaſonable to expect, it ſhould have been ſome clear and uniform idea of himſelf, as far as our weak capacities were capable to receive ſo incomprehenſible and infinite an object. But our minds, being at firſt void of that idea, which we are moſt concern'd to have, it is a ſtrong preſumption againſt all other innate characters. I muſt own, as far as I can obſerve, I can find none, and would be glad to be inform'd by any other.

Idea of ſubſtance not innate.

§ 18. I CONFESS there is another idea, which would be of general uſe for mankind to have, as it is of general talk, as if they had it; and that is the idea of ſubſtance, which we neither have, nor can have, by ſenſation, or reflection. If nature took care to provide us any ideas, we might well expect they ſhould be ſuch, as, by our own faculties, we cannot procure to ourſelves: but we ſee, on the contrary, that ſince, by thoſe ways, whereby other ideas are brought into our minds, this is not; we have no ſuch clear idea at all, and, therefore, ſignify nothing, by the word ſubſtance, but only an uncertain ſuppoſition of we know not what (i. e. of ſomething, whereof we have no particular, diſtinct poſitive) idea, which we take to be the ſubſtratum, or ſupport, of thoſe ideas we do know.

No propoſitions can be innate, ſince no ideas are innate.

§ 19. WHATEVER then we talk of innate, either ſpeculative, or practical principles, it may, with as much probability, be ſaid, that a man hath 100l. ſterling in his pocket, and, yet, deny'd that he hath either penny, ſhilling, crown, or any other coin, out of which the ſum is to be made up; as to think that certain propoſitions are innate, when the ideas, about which they are, can, by no means, be ſuppos'd to be ſo. The general reception, and aſſent, that is given, doth not at all prove, that the ideas, expreſſed in them, are innate: For, in many caſes, however the ideas came there, the aſſent to words, expreſſing the agreement, or diſagreement, of ſuch ideas, will neceſſarily follow. Every one, that hath a true idea of God, and worſhip, will aſſent to this propoſition, "that God is to be worſhipped," when expreſſed in a language he underſtands: and every rational man, that hath not thought on it to-day, may be ready to aſſent to this propoſition to-morrow; and, yet, millions of men may be well ſuppoſed to want one, or both, of thoſe ideas to-day. For, if we will allow ſavages, and moſt country-people, to have ideas of God, and worſhip, (which converſation with them will not make one forward to believe) yet, I think, few children can be ſuppoſed to have thoſe ideas, which, therefore, they muſt begin to have ſome time or other, and then they will alſo begin to aſſent to that propoſition, and make very little queſtion of it ever after. But ſuch an aſſent, upon hearing, no more proves the ideas to be innate, than it does that one born blind (with cataracts, which will be couched to-morrow) had the innate ideas of the ſun, or light, or ſaffron, or yellow; becauſe, when his ſight is cleared, he will certainly aſſent to this propoſition, "that the ſun is lucid, or that ſaffron is yellow:" and, therefore, if ſuch an aſſent, upon hearing, cannot prove the ideas innate, it can much leſs the propoſitions, made up of theſe ideas. If they have any innate ideas, I would be glad to be told what, and how many they are.

No innate ideas in the memory.

§ 20. To which let me add: if there be any innate ideas, any ideas in the mind, which the mind does not actually think on, they muſt be lodg'd in the memory, and from thence muſt be brought into view by remembrance; i. e. muſt be known, when they are remembered, to have been perceptions in the mind before, unleſs remembrance can be without remembrance. For, to remember is to perceive any thing with memory, or with a conſciouſneſs, that it was known, or perceived before: without this, whatever idea comes into the mind is new, and not remembered; this conſciouſneſs, its having been in the mind before, being that which diſtinguiſhes remembering from all other ways of thinking. Whatever idea was never perceiv'd by the mind, was never in the mind. Whatever idea is in the mind, is either an actual perception; or elſe, having been an actual perception, is ſo in the mind, that, by the memory, it can be made an actual perception again. Whenever there is the actual perception of an idea, without memory, the idea appears perfectly new, and unknown before to the underſtanding. Whenever the memory brings any idea into actual view, it is with a conſciouſneſs, that it had been there before, and was not wholly a ſtranger to the mind. Whether this be not ſo, I appeal to every one's obſervation: and then I deſire an inſtance of an idea, pretended to be innate, which (before any impreſſion of it, by ways hereafter to be mentioned) any one could revive and remember, as an idea he had formerly known, without which conſciouſneſs of a former perception, there is no remembrance; and whatever idea comes into the mind, without that conſciouſneſs, is not remembered, or comes not out of the memory, nor can be ſaid to be in the mind, before that appearance: for what is not either actually in view, or in the memory, is in the mind no way at all, and is all one, as if it never had been there. Suppoſe a child had the uſe of his eyes, till he knows and diſtinguiſhes colours; but then cataracts ſhut the windows, and he is forty, or fifty, years perfectly in the dark, and in that time, perfectly loſes all memory of the ideas of colours he once had. This was the caſe of a blind man I once talk'd with, who loſt his ſight by the ſmall-pox, when he was a child, and had no more notion of colours than one born blind. I aſk, whether any one can ſay, this man had then any ideas of colours in his mind, any more than one born blind? And, I think, no body will ſay, that either of them had, in his mind, any ideas of colours at all. His cataracts are couched, and then he has the ideas (which he remembers not) of colours, *de novo*, by his reſtored ſight, conveyed to his mind, and that without any conſciouſneſs of a former acquaintance; and theſe now he can revive, and call to mind in the dark. In this caſe, all theſe ideas of colours, which, when out of view, can be revived, with a conſciouſneſs of a former acquaintance, being thus in the memory, are ſaid to be in the mind. The uſe I make of this, is, that whatever idea, being not actually in view, is in the mind, is there only by being in the memory; and, if it be not in the memory, it is not in the mind; and, if it be in the memory, it cannot, by the memory, be brought into actual view, without a perception that it comes out of the memory; which is this, that it had been known before, and is now remembered. If, therefore, there be any innate ideas, they muſt be in the memory, or elſe no where in the mind; and, if they be in the memory, they can be revived, without any impreſſion from without; and, whenever they are brought into the mind, they are remembered, i. e. they bring with them a perception of their not being wholly new to it. This being a conſtant and diſtinguiſhing difference between what is, and what is not in the memory, or in the mind; that what is not in the memory, whenever it appears there, appears perfectly new and unknown before; and what is in the memory, or in the mind, whenever it is ſuggeſted by the memory, appears not to be new, but the mind finds it in itſelf, and knows it was there before. By this it may be tried, whether there be any innate ideas in the mind, before impreſſion from ſenſation, or reflection. I would fain meet with the man, who, when he came to the uſe of reaſon, or, at any other time, remembered any of them; and, to whom, after he was born, they were never new. If any one will ſay, there are ideas in the mind, that are not in the memory; I deſire him to explain himſelf, and make what he ſays, intelligible.

Principles not innate, becauſe of little uſe, or little certainty.

§ 21. BESIDES what I have already ſaid, there is another reaſon why I doubt, that neither theſe, nor any other principles, are innate. I that am fully perſuaded, that the infinitely wiſe God made all things in perfect wiſdom, cannot ſatisfy myſelf, why he ſhould be ſuppoſed to print, upon the minds of men, ſome univerſal principles, whereof thoſe, that are pretended innate, and concern ſpeculation, are of no great uſe; and thoſe, that concern practice, not ſelf-evident; and neither of them diſtinguiſhable from ſome other truths, not allowed to be innate. For, to what purpoſe ſhould characters be graven on the mind, by the finger of God, which are not clearer there, than thoſe which are afterwards introduced, or cannot be diſtinguiſhed from them? If any one thinks there are ſuch innate ideas and propoſitions, which, by their clearneſs and uſefulneſs, are diſtinguiſhable from all that is adventitious in the mind, and acquired, it will not be a hard matter for him to tell us, which they a[illegible]; and then every one will be a fit judge, whether they be ſo or no; ſince if there be ſuch innate ideas and impreſſions, plainly different from all other perceptions, and knowledge, every one will find it true in himſelf. Of the evidence of theſe ſuppoſed innate maxims, I have ſpoken already; of their uſefulneſs, I ſhall have occaſion to ſpeak more hereafter.

Difference of men's diſcoveries depends upon the different application of their faculties.

§ 22. To conclude: ſome ideas forwardly offer themſelves to all men's underſtandings; ſome ſort of truths reſult from any ideas, as ſoon as the mind puts them into propoſitions; other truths require a train of ideas placed in order, a due comparing of them, and deductions made with attention, before they can be diſcovered and aſſented to. Some of the firſt ſort, becauſe of their general and eaſy reception, have been miſtaken for innate; but the truth is, ideas and notions are no more born with us, than arts and ſciences, tho' ſome of them, indeed, offer themſelves to our faculties more readily than others, and therefore are more generally received; tho' that too be according as the organs of our bodies, and powers of our minds, happen to be employed: God having fitted men with faculties, and means, to diſcover, receive, and retain truths, according as they are employed. The great difference, that is to be found in the notions of mankind, is from the different uſe they put their faculties to; whilſt ſome (and thoſe the moſt) taking things upon truſt, miſemploy their power of aſſent, by lazily enſlaving their minds to the dictates and dominion of others, in doctrines, which it is their duty carefully to examine, and not, blindly, with an implicit faith, to ſwallow. Others, employing their thoughts only about ſome few things, grow acquainted ſufficiently with them, attain great degrees of knowledge in them, and are ignorant of all other, having never let their thoughts looſe, in the ſearch of other inquiries. Thus; that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones, is a truth, as certain as any thing can be, and, I think, more evident than many of thoſe propoſitions that go for principles; and, yet, there are millions, however expert in other things, who know not this at all, becauſe they never ſet their thoughts on work about ſuch angles: and he, that certainly knows this propoſition, may, yet, be utterly ignorant of the truth of other propoſitions, in mathematicks itſelf, which are as clear and evident as this; becauſe, in his ſearch of thoſe mathematical truths, he ſtopped his thoughts ſhort, and went not ſo far. The ſame may happen concerning the notions we have of the being of a deity: for tho' there be no truth, which a man may more evidently make out to himſelf, than the exiſtence of a God; yet he that ſhall content himſelf with things, as he finds them in this world, as they miniſter to his pleaſures and paſſions, and not make enquiry a little farther, into their cauſes, ends, and admirable contrivances, and purſue the thoughts thereof, with diligence and attention, may live long without any notion of ſuch a being. And, if any perſon hath, by talk, put ſuch a notion into his head, he may, perhaps, believe it; but, if he hath never examin'd it, his knowledge of it will be no perfecter than his, who having been told, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones, takes it upon truſt, without examining the demonſtration, and may yield his aſſent, as a probable opinion, but hath no knowledge of the truth of it; which, yet, his faculties, if carefully employed, were able to make clear and evident to him. But this only by the by, to ſhew how much our knowledge depends upon the right uſe of thoſe powers, nature hath beſtowed upon us, and how little upon ſuch innate principles, as are in vain ſuppoſed to be in all mankind for their direction; which all men could not but know, if they were there, or elſe they would be there to no purpoſe: and which, ſince all men do not know, nor can diſtinguiſh from other adventitious truths, we may well conclude there are no ſuch.

Men muſt think, and know, for themſelves.

§ 23. What cenſure, doubting thus of innate principles, may deſerve from men, who will be apt to call it pulling up the old foundations of knowledge and certainty, I cannot tell; I perſuade myſelf at leaſt, that the way I have purſued, being conformable to truth, lays thoſe foundations ſurer. This, I am certain, I have not made it my buſineſs either to quit, or follow, any authority in the enſuing diſcourſe: truth has been my only aim, and, wherever that has appeared to lead, my thoughts have impartially followed, without minding whether the footſteps of any other lay that way, or no. Not that I want a due reſpect to other men's opinions; but, after all, the greateſt reverence is due to truth; and, I hope it will not be thought arrogance to ſay, that, perhaps, we ſhould make greater progreſs in the diſcovery of rational and contemplative knowledge, if we ſought it in the fountain, in the conſideration of things themſelves, and made uſe rather of our own thoughts, than other men's, to find it: For, I think, we may as rationally hope to ſee with other men's eyes, as to know by other men's underſtandings. So much as we ourſelves conſider, and comprehend, of truth and reaſon, ſo much we poſſeſs of real and true knowledge. The floating of other men's opinions in our brains, makes us not one jot the more knowing, tho' they happen to be true. What in them was ſcience, is in us but opiniatry; whilſt we give up our aſſent only to reverend names, and do not, as they did, employ our own reaſon, to underſtand thoſe truths, which gave them reputation. Ariſtotle was certainly a knowing man; but no body ever thought him ſo becauſe he blindly embraced and confidently vented the opinions of another. And if the taking up of another's principles, without examining them, made not him a philoſopher; I ſuppoſe it will hardly make any body elſe ſo. In the ſciences, every one has ſo much as he really knows, and comprehends: what he believes only, and takes upon truſt, are but ſhreds; which, however, will, in the whole piece, make no conſiderable addition to his ſtock, who gathers them. Such borrowed wealth, like fairy-money, tho' it were gold in the hand, from which he received it, will be but leaves and duſt when it comes to uſe.

Whence the opinion of innate principles.

§ 24. When men have found ſome general propoſitions, that could not be doubted of, as ſoon as underſtood, it was, I know, a ſhort and eaſy way to conclude them innate. This being once received, it eaſed the lazy from the pains of ſearch, and ſtopped the enquiry of the doubtful, concerning all that was once ſtiled innate. And it was of no ſmall advantage to thoſe, who affected to be maſters and teachers, to make this the principle of principles, "that principles muſt not be queſtioned;" for having once eſtabliſhed this tenet, that there are innate principles, it put their followers upon a neceſſity of receiving ſome doctrines as ſuch; which was to take them off from the uſe of their own reaſon and judgment, and put them on believing, and taking them upon truſt, without farther examination: In which poſture of blind credulity, they might be more eaſily governed by, and made uſeful to, ſome ſort of men, who had the ſkill and office to principle and guide them. Nor is it a ſmall power it gives one man over another, to have the authority to be the dictator of principles, and teacher of unqueſtionable truths, and to make a man ſwallow that for an innate principle, which may ſerve to his purpoſe, who teaches them; whereas, had they examined the ways, whereby men came to the knowledge of many univerſal truths, they would have found them to reſult, in the minds of men, from the being of things themſelves, when duly conſidered; and that they were diſcovered by the application of thoſe faculties, that were fitted by nature to receive and judge of them, when duly employed about them.

Concluſion.

§ 25. To ſhew how the underſtanding proceeds herein, is the deſign of the following diſcourſe; which I ſhall proceed to, when I have firſt premiſed, that hitherto, to clear my way to thoſe foundations, which, I conceive, are the only true ones, whereon to eſtabliſh thoſe notions we can have, of our own knowledge, it hath been neceſſary for me to give an account of the reaſons I had to doubt of innate principles. And ſince the arguments, which are againſt them, do ſome of them riſe from common, received opinions, I have been forced to take ſeveral things for granted, which is hardly avoidable to any one, whoſe taſk it is to ſhew the falſhood, or improbability, of any tenet: it happening, in controverſial diſcourſes, as it does in the aſſaulting of towns, where, if the ground be but firm, whereon the batteries are erected, there is no farther inquiry, of whom it is borrowed, nor whom it belongs to, ſo it affords but a fit riſe for the preſent purpoſe. But, in the future part of this diſcourſe, deſigning to raiſe an edifice uniform, and conſiſtent with itſelf, as far as my own experience and obſervation will aſſiſt me, I hope to erect it on ſuch a baſis, that I ſhall not need to ſhore it up with props and buttreſſes, leaning on borrowed, or begged foundations; or, at leaſt, if mine prove a caſtle in the air, I will endeavour it ſhall be all of a piece, and hang together. Wherein I warn the reader, not to expect undeniable, cogent demonſtrations, unleſs I may be allowed the privilege, not ſeldom aſſumed by others, to take my principles for granted; and then, I doubt not, but I can demonſtrate too. All that I ſhall ſay, for the principles I proceed on, is, that I can only appeal to men's own unprejudiced experience and obſervation, whether they be true, or no; and this is enough for a man, who profeſſes no more than to lay down candidly and freely his own conjectures, concerning a ſubject lying ſomewhat in the dark, without any other deſign, than an unbiaſſed inquiry after truth.

BOOK II.

CHAP. I.

Of ideas in general, and their original.

Chap. I.

Idea is the object of thinking.

EVERY man being conſcious to himſelf that he thinks, and that which his mind is applied about, whilſt thinking, being the ideas that are there, 'tis paſt doubt, that men have in their minds ſeveral ideas, ſuch as are thoſe expreſſed by the words, Whiteneſs, Hardneſs, Sweetneſs, Thinking, Motion, Man, Elephant, Army, Drunkenneſs, and others. It is in the firſt place then to be enquired, how he comes by them? I know it is a received doctrine, that men have native ideas, and original characters, ſtamped upon their minds, in their very firſt being. This opinion I have, at large, examined already; and, I ſuppoſe, what I have ſaid, in the foregoing book, will be much more eaſily admitted, when I have ſhewn, whence the underſtanding may get all the ideas it has, and by what ways and degrees they may come into the mind; for which I ſhall appeal to every one's own obſervation and experience.

All ideas come from ſenſation or reflection.

§ 2. LET us then ſuppoſe the mind to be, as we ſay, white paper, void of all characters, without any ideas; how comes it to be furniſhed? whence comes it by that vaſt ſtore, which the buſy and boundleſs fancy of man has painted on it, with an almoſt endleſs variety? whence has it all the materials of reaſon and knowledge? To this I anſwer, in one word, from experience; in that all our knowledge is founded, and from that it ultimately derives itſelf. Our obſervation employed, either about external, ſenſible objects, or about the internal operations of our minds, perceived, and reflected on, by ourſelves, is that which ſupplies our underſtandings with all the materials of thinking. Theſe two are the fountains of knowledge, from whence all the ideas we have, or can naturally have, do ſpring.

The objects of ſenſation, one ſource of ideas.

§ 3. FIRST, Our ſenſes, converſant about particular ſenſible objects, do convey into the mind ſeveral diſtinct perceptions of things, according to thoſe various ways, wherein thoſe objects do affect them: and thus we come by thoſe ideas we have of Yellow, White, Heat, Cold, Soft, Hard, Bitter, Sweet, and all thoſe, which we call ſenſible qualities; which, when I ſay the ſenſes convey into the mind, I mean, they, from external objects, convey into the mind what produces there thoſe perceptions. This great ſource of moſt of the ideas we have, depending wholly upon our ſenſes, and derived by them to the underſtanding, I call SENSATION.

The operations of our minds, the other ſource of them.

§ 4. SECONDLY, The other fountain, from which experience furniſheth the underſtanding with ideas, is the perception of the operations of our own mind within us, as it is employed about the ideas it has got; which operations, when the ſoul comes to reflect on, and conſider, do furniſh the underſtanding with another ſet of ideas, which could not be had from things without; and ſuch are Perception, Thinking, Doubting, Believing, Reaſoning, Knowing, Willing, and all the different actings of our own minds; which we being conſcious of, and obſerving in ourſelves, do, from theſe, receive into our underſtandings as diſtinct ideas, as we do from bodies affecting our ſenſes. This ſource of ideas every man has wholly in himſelf; and tho' it be not ſenſe, as having nothing to do with external objects, yet it is very like it, and might properly enough be called internal ſenſe. But, as I call the other, Senſation, ſo I call this, REFLECTION; the ideas it affords being ſuch only as the mind gets, by reflecting on its own operations within itſelf. By reflection then, in the following part of this diſcourſe, I would be underſtood to mean, that notice which the mind takes of its own operations, and the manner of them; by reaſon whereof there come to be ideas of theſe operations in the underſtanding. Theſe two, I ſay, viz. external, material things, as the objects of ſenſation; and the operations of our own minds within, as the objects of reflection; are, to me, the only originals, from whence all our ideas take their beginning. The term, Operations, here, I uſe in a large ſenſe, as comprehending not barely the actions of the mind, about its ideas, but ſome ſort of paſſions, ariſing ſometimes from them; ſuch as is the ſatisfaction, or uneaſineſs, ariſing from any thought.

All our ideas are of the one or the other of theſe.

§ 5. THE underſtanding ſeems to me not to have the leaſt glimmering of any ideas, which it doth not receive from one of theſe two. External objects furniſh the mind with the ideas of ſenſible qualities, which are all thoſe different perceptions they produce in us: and the mind furniſhes the underſtanding with ideas of its own operations.

THESE, when we have taken a full ſurvey of them, and their ſeveral modes, combinations, and relations, we ſhall find to contain all our whole ſtock of ideas; and that we have nothing in our minds, which did not come in one of theſe two ways. Let any one examine his own thoughts, and thoroughly ſearch into his underſtanding; and then let him tell me, "whether all the original ideas he has "there, are any other than of the objects of his ſenſes, or of the operations of "his mind, conſidered as objects of his reflection?" and how great a maſs of knowledge ſoever he imagines to be lodged there, he will, upon taking a ſtrict view, ſee that he has not any idea in his mind, but what one of theſe two have imprinted; tho', perhaps, with infinite variety, compounded and enlarged by the underſtanding; as we ſhall ſee hereafter.

Obſervable in children.

§ 6. HE, that attentively conſiders the ſtate of a child, at his firſt coming into the world, will have little reaſon to think him ſtored with plenty of ideas, that are to be the matter of his future knowledge: 'Tis by degrees he comes to be furniſhed with them. And, tho' the ideas of obvious and familiar qualities imprint themſelves, before the memory begins to keep a regiſter of time and order; yet, 'tis often ſo late, before ſome unuſual qualities come in the way, that there are few men, that cannot recollect the beginning of their acquaintance with them: and, if it were worth while, no doubt, a child might be ſo ordered, as to have but a very few even of the ordinary ideas, till he were grown up to a man. But all that are born into the world, being ſurrounded with bodies, that perpetually and diverſly affect them; variety of ideas, whether care be taken about it or no, are imprinted on the minds of children. Light and colours are buſy at hand, every where, when the eye is but open: ſounds, and ſome tangible qualities, fail not to ſollicite their proper ſenſes, and force an entrance to the mind; but yet, I think, it will be granted eaſily, that, if a child were kept in a place, where he never ſaw any other but black and white, till he were a man, he would have no more ideas of ſcarlet or green, than he, that from his childhood never taſted an oyſter, or a pine-apple, has of thoſe particular reliſhes.

Men are differently furniſhed with theſe, according to the different objects they converſe with.

§ 7. MEN then come to be furniſhed with fewer or more ſimple ideas, from without, according as the objects they converſe with, afford greater or leſs variety; and from the operations of their minds within, according as they more or leſs reflect on them. For tho' he, that contemplates the operations of his mind, cannot but have plain and clear ideas of them; yet, unleſs he turn his thoughts that way, and conſiders them attentively, he will no more have clear and diſtinct ideas of all the operations of his mind, and all that may be obſerved therein, than he will have all the particular ideas of any landſcape, or of the parts and motions of a clock, who will not turn his eyes to it, and with attention heed all the parts of it. The picture, or clock, may be ſo placed, that they may come in his way every day; but yet he will have but a confuſed idea of all the parts, they are made up of, 'till he applies himſelf with attention to conſider them each in particular.

Ideas of reflection later, becauſe they need attention.

§ 8. And hence we ſee the reaſon, why it is pretty late, before moſt children get ideas of the operations of their own minds; and ſome have not any very clear, or perfect ideas of the greateſt part of them, all their lives: becauſe, tho' they paſs there continually, yet, like floating viſions, they make not deep impreſſions enough, to leave in the mind, clear, diſtinct, laſting ideas, till the underſtanding turns inwards upon itſelf, reflects on its own operations, and makes them the object of its own contemplation. Children, when they firſt come into it, are ſurrounded with a world of new things, which, by a conſtant ſollicitation of their ſenſes, draw the mind conſtantly to them, forward to take notice of new, and apt to be delighted with the variety of changing objects. Thus, the firſt years are uſually employed and diverted in looking abroad. Men's buſineſs in them is to acquaint themſelves with what is to be found without; and ſo, growing up in a conſtant attention to outward ſenſations, ſeldom make any conſiderable reflection on what paſſes within them, till they come to be of riper years; and ſome ſcarce ever at all.

The ſoul begins to have ideas, when it begins to perceive.

§ 9. To aſk at what time a man has firſt any ideas, is to aſk when he begins to perceive; having ideas, and perception, being the ſame thing. I know it is an opinion, that the ſoul always thinks, and that it has the actual perception of ideas in itſelf, conſtantly, as long as it exiſts; and that actual thinking is as inſeparable from the ſoul, as actual extenſion is from the body: which, if true, to enquire after the beginning of a man's ideas, is the ſame as to enquire after the beginning of his ſoul. For by this account, ſoul, and its ideas, as body and its extenſion, will begin to exiſt, both at the ſame time.

The ſoul thinks not always; for this wants proofs.

§ 10. But whether the ſoul be ſuppoſed to exiſt antecedent to, or coeval with, or ſome time after, the firſt rudiments or organization, or the beginnings of life in the body; I leave to be diſputed by thoſe, who have better thought of that matter. I confeſs myſelf to have one of thoſe dull ſouls, that doth not perceive itſelf always to contemplate ideas; nor can conceive it any more neceſſary for the ſoul always to think, than for the body always to move: the perception of ideas being (as I conceive) to the ſoul, what motion is to the body; not its eſſence, but one of its operations. And therefore, tho' thinking be ſuppoſed ever ſo much the proper action of the ſoul, yet it is not neceſſary to ſuppoſe that it ſhould be always thinking, always in action: That, perhaps, is the privilege of the infinite author, and preſerver of things, who never ſlumbers, nor ſleeps; but is not competent to any finite being, at leaſt not to the ſoul of man. We know certainly by experience, that we ſometimes think, and thence draw this infallible conſequence, that there is ſomething in us, that has a power to think: but whether that ſubſtance perpetually thinks or no, we can be no farther aſſured, than experience informs us. For to ſay, that actual thinking is eſſential to the ſoul, and inſeparable from it, is to beg what is in queſtion, and not to prove it by reaſon; which is neceſſary to be done, if it be not a ſelf-evident propoſition. But whether this, "that the ſoul "always thinks," be a ſelf-evident propoſition, that every body aſſents to at firſt hearing, I appeal to mankind. It is doubted, whether I thought all laſt night, or no; the queſtion being about a matter of fact, it is begging it, to bring as a proof for it, an hypotheſis, which is the very thing in diſpute; by which way one may prove any thing: and it is but ſuppoſing that all watches, whilſt the balance beats, think; and it is ſufficiently proved, and paſt doubt, that my watch thought all laſt night. But he, that would not deceive himſelf, ought to build his hypotheſis on matter of fact, and make it out by ſenſible experience, and not preſume on matter of fact, becauſe of his hypotheſis; that is, becauſe he ſuppoſes it to be ſo: which way of proving amounts to this, that I muſt neceſſarily think all laſt night, becauſe another ſuppoſes I always think, tho' I myſelf cannot perceive that I always do ſo.

But men, in love with their opinions, may not only ſuppoſe what is in queſtion, but alledge wrong matter of fact. How elſe could any one make it an inference of mine, that a thing is hot, becauſe we are not ſenſible of it in our ſleep? I do not ſay, there is no ſoul in a man, becauſe he is not ſenſible of it in his ſleep: but I do ſay, he cannot think at any time, waking or ſleeping, without being ſenſible of it. Our being ſenſible of it, is not neceſſary to any thing, but to our thoughts; and to them it is, and to them it will always be neceſſary, till we can think, without being conſcious of it.

It is not always conſcious of it.

§ 11. I GRANT that the ſoul, in a waking man, is never without thought, becauſe it is the condition of being awake: but whether ſleeping, without dreaming, be not an affection of the whole man, mind as well as body, may be worth a waking man's conſideration; it being hard to conceive, that any thing ſhould think, and not be conſcious of it. If the ſoul doth think, in a ſleeping man, without being conſcious of it; I aſk, whether, during ſuch thinking, it has any pleaſure or pain, or be capable of happineſs or miſery? I am ſure, the man is not, no more than the bed or earth he lies on. For to be happy or miſerable, without being conſcious of it, ſeems to me utterly inconſiſtent and impoſſible. Or if it be poſſible that the ſoul can, whilſt the body is ſleeping, have its thinking, enjoyments, and concerns, its pleaſure, or pain, apart, which the man is not conſcious of, or partakes in; it is certain that Socrates aſleep, and Socrates awake, is not the ſame perſon: but his ſoul, when he ſleeps, and Socrates the man, conſiſting of body and ſoul, when he is waking, are two perſons; ſince waking Socrates has no knowledge of, or concernment for that happineſs, or miſery of his ſoul, which it enjoys alone by itſelf, whilſt he ſleeps, without perceiving any thing of it; no more than he has for the happineſs or miſery of a man in the Indies, whom he knows not. For, if we take wholly away all conſciouſneſs of our actions and ſenſations, eſpecially of pleaſure and pain, and the concernment that accompanies it, it will be hard to know wherein to place perſonal identity.

If a ſleeping man thinks, without knowing it, the ſleeping and waking man are two perſons.

§ 12. "THE ſoul, during ſound ſleep, thinks," ſay theſe men. Whilſt it thinks and perceives, it is capable certainly of thoſe of delight, or trouble, as well as any other perceptions; and it muſt neceſſarily be conſcious of its own perceptions. But it has all this apart; the ſleeping man, it is plain, is conſcious of nothing of all this. Let us ſuppoſe then, the ſoul of Caſtor, while he is ſleeping, retired from his body; which is no impoſſible ſuppoſition for the men I have here to do with, who ſo liberally allow life, without a thinking ſoul, to all other animals: Theſe men cannot then judge it impoſſible, or a contradiction, that the body ſhould live without the ſoul; nor that the ſoul ſhould ſubſiſt and think, or have perception, even perception of happineſs or miſery, without the body. Let us then, as I ſay, ſuppoſe the ſoul of Caſtor ſeparated, during his ſleep, from his body, to think apart. Let us ſuppoſe too, that it chuſes for its ſcene of thinking, the body of another man, v. g. Pollux, who is ſleeping without a ſoul: for if Caſtor's ſoul can think, whilſt Caſtor is aſleep, what Caſtor is never conſcious of, it is no matter what place it chuſes to think in. We have here then the bodies of two men, with only one ſoul between them, which we will ſuppoſe to ſleep and wake by turns; and the ſoul ſtill thinking in the waking man, whereof the ſleeping man is never conſcious, has never the leaſt perception. I aſk then, whether Caſtor and Pollux, thus with only one ſoul between them, which thinks and perceives in one what the other is never conſcious of, nor is concerned for, are not two as diſtinct perſons as Caſtor and Hercules, or as Socrates and Plato were? And whether one of them might not be very happy, and the other very miſerable? Juſt by the ſame reaſon they make the ſoul and the man two perſons, who make the ſoul think apart what the man is not conſcious of. For I ſuppoſe, no body will make identity of perſons to conſiſt in the ſoul's being united to the very ſame numerical particles of matter; for, if that be neceſſary to identity, it will be impoſſible, in that conſtant flux, of the particles of our bodies, that any man ſhould be the ſame perſon two days, or two moments, together.

Impoſſible to convince thoſe that ſleep, without dreaming, that they think.

§ 13. THUS, methinks, every drowſy nod ſhakes their doctrine, who teach, that the ſoul is always thinking. Thoſe at leaſt, who do at any time ſleep without dreaming, can never be convinced, that their thoughts are ſometimes for four hours buſy without their knowing of it; and if they are taken in the very act, waked in the middle of that ſleeping contemplation, can give no manner of account of it.

That men dream, without remembring it, in vain urged.

§ 14. It will perhaps be ſaid, that "the ſoul thinks even in the ſoundeſt ſleep; but the memory retains it not." That the ſoul in a ſleeping man ſhould be this moment buſy a thinking, and the next moment in a waking man, not remember, nor be able to recollect one jot of all thoſe thoughts, is very hard to be conceived, and would need ſome better proof than bare aſſertion, to make it be believed. For who can, without any more ado, but being barely told ſo, imagine, that the greateſt part of men do, during all their lives, for ſeveral hours every day, think of ſomething, which, if they were aſked, even in the middle of theſe thoughts, they could remember nothing at all of? Moſt men, I think, paſs a great part of their ſleep without dreaming. I once knew a man that was bred a ſcholar, and had no bad memory, who told me, he had never dreamed in his life, till he had that fever he was then newly recovered of, which was about the five or ſix and twentieth year of his age. I ſuppoſe, the world affords more ſuch inſtances: at leaſt every one's acquaintance will furniſh him with examples enough of ſuch as paſs moſt of their nights without dreaming.

Upon this hypotheſis, the thoughts of a ſleeping man ought to be moſt rational.

§ 15. To think often, and never to retain it, ſo much as one moment, is a very uſeleſs ſort of thinking: and the ſoul, in ſuch a ſtate of thinking, does very little, if at all, excell that of a looking-glaſs, which conſtantly receives variety of images, or ideas, but retains none; they diſappear and vaniſh, and there remain no footſteps of them; the looking-glaſs is never the better for ſuch ideas, nor the ſoul for ſuch thoughts. Perhaps it will be ſaid, "that in a waking man the materials of the body are employed, and made uſe of, in thinking; and that the memory of thoughts, is retained by the impreſſions that are made on the brain, and the traces there left, after ſuch thinking; but that in the thinking of the ſoul, which is not perceived in a ſleeping man, there the ſoul thinks apart, and making no uſe of the organs of the body, leaves no impreſſions on it, and conſequently, no memory of ſuch thoughts." Not to mention again the abſurdity of two diſtinct perſons, which follows from this ſuppoſition, I anſwer farther, that whatever ideas the mind can receive, and contemplate, without the help of the body, it is reaſonable to conclude, it can retain, without the help of the body too; or elſe the ſoul, or any ſeparate ſpirit, will have but little advantage by thinking. If it has no memory of its own thoughts; if it cannot lay them up for its uſe, and be able to recal them upon occaſion: if it cannot reflect upon what is paſt, and make uſe of its former experiences, reaſonings, and contemplations, to what purpoſe does it think? They, who make the ſoul a thinking thing, at this rate, will not make it a much more noble being, than thoſe do, whom they condemn, for allowing it to be nothing, but the ſubtileſt parts of matter. Characters drawn on duſt, that the firſt breath of wind effaces; or impreſſions made on a heap of atoms, or animal ſpirits, are altogether as uſeful, and render the ſubject as noble, as the thoughts of a ſoul, that periſh in thinking; that, once out of ſight, are gone for ever, and leave no memory of themſelves, behind them. Nature never makes excellent things for mean, or no uſes: and it is hardly to be conceived, that our infinitely wiſe Creator, ſhould make ſo admirable a faculty, as the power of thinking, that faculty, which comes neareſt the excellency of his own incomprehenſible being, to be ſo idly and uſeleſly employed, at leaſt a fourth part of its time here, as to think conſtantly, without remembering any of thoſe thoughts, without doing any good to itſelf, or others, or being any way uſeful to any other part of the creation. If we will examine it, we ſhall not find, I ſuppoſe, the motion of dull and ſenſeleſs matter, any where in the univerſe, made ſo little uſe of, and ſo wholly thrown away.

On this hypotheſis, the ſoul muſt have ideas, not derived from ſenſation or reflection, of which there is no appearance.

§ 16. It is true, we have ſometimes inſtances of perception, whilſt we are aſleep, and retain the memory of thoſe thoughts: but how extravagant and incoherent for the moſt part they are; how little conformable to the perfection and order of a rational being, thoſe, who are acquainted with dreams, need not be told. This I would willingly be ſatisfied in, whether the ſoul, when it thinks thus apart, and as it were ſeparate from the body, acts leſs rationally, than when conjointly with it, or no? If its ſeparate thoughts be leſs rational, then theſe men muſt ſay, that the ſoul owes the perfection of rational thinking to the body: if it does not, it is a wonder, that our dreams ſhould be, for the moſt part, ſo frivolous and irrational; and that the ſoul ſhould retain none of its more rational ſoliloquies and meditations.

If I think, when I know it not, no body elſe can know it.

§ 17. Those, who ſo confidently tell us, that the ſoul always actually thinks, I would they would alſo tell us, what thoſe ideas are, that are in the ſoul of a child, before, or juſt at the union with the body, before it hath received any by ſenſation? The dreams of ſleeping men are, as I take it, all made up of the waking man's ideas, tho' for the moſt part oddly put together. It is ſtrange, if the ſoul has ideas of its own, that it derived not from ſenſation or reflection, (as it muſt have, if it thought, before it received any impreſſion from the body) that it ſhould never, in its private thinking (ſo private, that the man himſelf perceives it not) retain any of them, the very moment it wakes out of them, and then make the man glad with new diſcoveries. Who can find it reaſonable, that the ſoul ſhould, in its retirement, during ſleep, have ſo many hours thoughts, and yet never light on any of thoſe ideas, it borrowed not from ſenſation or reflection; or at leaſt preſerve the memory of none but ſuch, which being occaſioned from the body, muſt needs be leſs natural to a ſpirit? It is ſtrange the ſoul ſhould never once, in a man's whole life, recal over any of its pure native thoughts, and thoſe ideas it had, before it borrowed any thing from the body: never bring into the waking man's view any other ideas, but what have a tang of the caſk, and manifeſtly derive their original from that union. If it always thinks, and ſo had ideas before it was united, or before it received any from the body, it is not to be ſuppoſed, but that during ſleep it recollects its native ideas; and, during that retirement from communicating with the body, whilſt it thinks by itſelf, the ideas it is buſied about ſhould be, ſometimes at leaſt, thoſe more natural and congenial ones, which it had in itſelf, underived from the body, or its own operations about them; which ſince the waking man never remembers, we muſt from this hypotheſis conclude, either that the ſoul remembers ſomething that the man does not; or elſe that memory belongs only to ſuch ideas, as are derived from the body, or the mind's operations about them.

How knows any one that the ſoul always thinks? For, if it be not a ſelf-evident propoſition, it needs proof.

§ 18. I would be glad alſo, to learn from theſe men, who ſo confidently pronounce, that the human ſoul, or, which is all one, that a man always thinks, how they come to know it? nay, how they come to know that they themſelves think, when they themſelves do not perceive it? This, I am afraid, is to be ſure, without proofs; and to know, without perceiving: It is, I ſuſpect, a confuſed notion, taken up to ſerve an hypotheſis; and none of thoſe clear truths, that either their own evidence forces us to admit, or common experience makes it impudence to deny. For the moſt that can be ſaid of it, is, that it is poſſible the ſoul may always think, but not always retain it in memory: and, I ſay, it is as poſſible that the ſoul may not always think; and much more probable, that it ſhould ſometimes not think, than that it ſhould often think, and that a long while together, and not be conſcious to itſelf the next moment after, that it had thought.

That a man ſhould be buſy in thinking, and yet not retain it the next moment, very improbable.

§ 19. To ſuppoſe the ſoul to think, and the man not to perceive it, is, as has been ſaid, to make two perſons in one man: and, if one conſiders well theſe men's way of ſpeaking, one ſhould be led into a ſuſpicion that they muſt do ſo. For they who tell us, that the ſoul always thinks, do never, that I remember, ſay, that a man always thinks. Can the ſoul think, and not the man? or a man think, and not be conſcious of it? This, perhaps, would be ſuſpected of jargon in others. If they ſay, the man thinks always, but is not always conſcious of it; they may as well ſay, his body is extended without having parts. For it is altogether as intelligible to ſay, that a body is extended without parts, as that any thing thinks without being conſcious of it, or perceiving that it does ſo. They, who talk thus, may, with as much reaſon, if it be neceſſary to their hypotheſis, ſay, that a man is always hungry, but that he does not always feel it: whereas, hunger conſiſts in that very ſenſation, as thinking conſiſts in being conſcious that one thinks. If they ſay, that a man is always conſcious to himſelf of thinking; I aſk, how they know it? Conſciouſneſs is the perception of what paſſes in a man's own mind. Can another man perceive that I am conſcious of any thing, when I perceive it not myſelf? No man's knowledge here can go beyond his experience. Wake a man out of a ſound ſleep, and aſk him, what he was that moment thinking on? If he himſelf be conſcious of nothing he then thought on; he muſt be a notable diviner of thoughts, that can aſſure him that he was thinking: may he not with more reaſon aſſure him he was not aſleep? This is ſomething beyond philoſophy; and it cannot be leſs than revelation, that diſcovers to another, thoughts in my mind, when I can find none there myſelf: and they muſt needs have a penetrating ſight, who can certainly ſee that I think, when I cannot perceive it myſelf, and when I declare that I do not; and yet can ſee that dogs, or elephants, do not think, when they give all the demonſtration of it imaginable, except only telling us that they do ſo. This, ſome may ſuſpect to be a ſtep beyond the Roſecrucians; it ſeeming eaſier to make one's ſelf inviſible to others, than to make another's thoughts viſible to me, which are not viſible to himſelf. But, it is but defining the ſoul to be "a ſubſtance that always thinks," and the buſineſs is done. If ſuch definition be of any authority, I know not what it can ſerve for, but to make many men ſuſpect, that they have no ſouls at all, ſince they find a good part of their lives paſs away without thinking. For no definitions, that I know, no ſuppoſitions of any ſect, are of force enough to deſtroy conſtant experience; and, perhaps, it is the affectation of knowing beyond what we perceive, that makes ſo much uſeleſs diſpute and noiſe in the world.

No ideas, but from ſenſation, or reflection, evident, if we obſerve children.

§ 20. I see no reaſon, therefore, to believe, that the ſoul thinks, before the ſenſes have furniſhed it with ideas to think on; and as thoſe are increaſed and retained, ſo it comes, by exerciſe, to improve its faculty of thinking, in the ſeveral parts of it, as well as afterwards, by compounding thoſe ideas, and reflecting on its own operations; it increaſes its ſtock, as well as facility, in remembring, imagining, reaſoning, and other modes of thinking.

§ 21. He that will ſuffer himſelf to be informed by obſervation and experience, and not make his own hypotheſis the rule of nature, will find few ſigns of a ſoul, accuſtomed to much thinking, in a new-born child, and much fewer of any reaſoning at all. And, yet, it is hard to imagine, that the rational ſoul ſhould think ſo much, and not reaſon at all. And he, that will conſider, that infants, newly come into the world, ſpend the greateſt part of their time in ſleep, and are ſeldom awake, but when either hunger calls for the teat, or ſome pain, (the moſt importunate of all ſenſations) or ſome other violent impreſſion upon the body, forces the mind to perceive, and attend to it: he, I ſay, who conſiders this, will, perhaps, find reaſon to imagine, that a fœtus, in the mother's womb, differs not much from the ſtate of a vegetable; but paſſes the greateſt part of its time without perception, or thought, doing very little but ſleep, in a place where it needs not ſeek for food, and is ſurrounded with liquor, always equally ſoft, and near of the ſame temper; where the eyes have no light, and the ears, ſo ſhut up, are not very ſuſceptible of ſounds; and where there is little or no variety, or change of objects, to move the ſenſes.

§ 22. Follow a child from its birth, and obſerve the alterations that time makes, and you ſhall find, as the mind, by the ſenſes, comes more and more to be furniſhed with ideas, it comes to be more and more awake; thinks more, the more it has matter to think on. After ſome time, it begins to know the objects, which, being moſt familiar with it, have made laſting impreſſions. Thus it comes by degrees to know the perſons it daily converſes with, and diſtinguiſh them from ſtrangers; which are inſtances and effects of its coming to retain and diſtinguiſh the ideas the ſenſes convey to it. And ſo we may obſerve how the mind, by degrees, improves in theſe, and advances to the exerciſe of thoſe other faculties of enlarging, compounding, and abſtracting its ideas, and of reaſoning about them, and reflecting upon all theſe; of which I ſhall have occaſion to ſpeak more hereafter.

§ 23. If it ſhall be demanded then, when a man begins to have any ideas? I think the true anſwer is, when he firſt has any ſenſation. For ſince there appear not to be any ideas in the mind, before the ſenſes have conveyed any in, I conceive, that ideas in the underſtanding are coeval with ſenſation; which is ſuch an impreſſion, or motion, made in ſome part of the body, as produces ſome perception in the underſtanding. It is about theſe impreſſions, made on our ſenſes by outward objects, that the mind ſeems firſt to employ itſelf in ſuch operations as we call perception, remembering, conſideration, reaſoning, &c.

The original of all our knowledge.

§ 24. In time the mind comes to reflect on its own operations, about the ideas got by ſenſation, and thereby ſtores itſelf with a new ſet of ideas, which I call ideas of reflection. Theſe are the impreſſions that are made on our ſenſes, by outward objects, that are extrinſecal to the mind; and its own operations, proceeding from powers intrinſecal and proper to itſelf, which, when reflected on by itſelf, become alſo objects of its contemplation, are, as I have ſaid, the original of all knowledge. Thus the firſt capacity of human intellect, is, that the mind is fitted to receive the impreſſions made on it; either thro' the ſenſes by outward objects; or by its own operations, when it reflects on them. This is the firſt ſtep a man makes towards the diſcovery of any thing, and the ground-work, whereon to build all thoſe notions, which ever he ſhall have naturally in this world. All thoſe ſublime thoughts, which tower above the clouds, and reach as high as heaven itſelf, take their riſe and footing here: in all that great extent, wherein the mind wanders, in thoſe remote ſpeculations, it may ſeem to be elevated with, it ſtirs not one jot beyond thoſe ideas, which ſenſe, or reflection, have offered for its contemplation.

In the reception of ſimple ideas, the underſtanding is for the moſt part paſſive.

§ 25. In this part the underſtanding is merely paſſive; and whether or no it will have theſe beginnings, and, as it were, materials of knowledge, is not in its own power. For the objects of our ſenſes do, many of them, obtrude their particular ideas upon our minds, whether we will or no: and the operations of our minds will not let us be without, at leaſt, ſome obſcure notions of them. No man can be wholly ignorant of what he does, when he thinks. Theſe ſimple ideas, when offered to the mind, the underſtanding can no more refuſe to have, nor alter, when they are imprinted, nor blot them out, and make new ones itſelf, than a mirror can refuſe, alter, or obliterate the images, or ideas, which the objects ſet before it do therein produce. As the bodies, that ſurround us, do diverſly affect our organs, the mind is forced to receive the impreſſions, and cannot avoid the perception of thoſe ideas that are annexed to them.

CHAP. II.

Of ſimple ideas.

CHAP. II.

§ 1. THE better to underſtand the nature, manner, and extent of our knowledge, one thing is carefully to be obſerved, concerning the ideas we have; and that is, that ſome of them are ſimple, and ſome complex.

Uncompounded appearances.

Tho' the qualities, that affect our ſenſes, are, in the things themſelves, ſo united and blended, that there is no ſeparation, no diſtance between them; yet it is plain, the ideas, they produce in the mind, enter by the ſenſes, ſimple and unmixed. For, tho' the ſight and touch often take in, from the ſame object, at the ſame time, different ideas; as a man ſees at once motion and colour; the hand feels ſoftneſs and warmth in the ſame piece of wax: yet the ſimple ideas, thus united in the ſame ſubject, are as perfectly diſtinct, as thoſe that come in by different ſenſes: the coldneſs and hardneſs, which a man feels in a piece of ice, being as diſtinct ideas in the mind, as the ſmell and whiteneſs of a lilly; or as the taſte of ſugar, and ſmell of a roſe. And there is nothing can be plainer to a man, than the clear and diſtinct perceptions he has of thoſe ſimple ideas; which, being each in itſelf uncompounded, contains in it nothing but one uniform appearance, or conception in the mind, and is not diſtinguiſhable into different ideas.

The mind can neither make nor deſtroy them.

§ 2. Theſe ſimple ideas, the materials of all our knowledge, are ſuggeſted and furniſhed to the mind, only by thoſe two ways above-mentioned, viz. ſenſation and reflection. When the underſtanding is once ſtored with theſe ſimple ideas, it has the power to repeat, compare, and unite them, even to an almoſt infinite variety; and ſo can make at pleaſure new complex ideas. But it is not in the power of the moſt exalted wit, or enlarged underſtanding, by any quickneſs, or variety of thoughts, to invent, or frame, one new ſimple idea in the mind, not taken in by the ways aforementioned: nor can any force of the underſtanding deſtroy thoſe that are there. The dominion of man, in this little world of his own underſtanding, being much-what the ſame as it is in the great world of viſible things; wherein his power, however managed by art and ſkill, reaches no farther than to compound and divide the materials that are made to his hand; but can do nothing towards the making the leaſt particle of new matter, or deſtroying one atom of what is already in being. The ſame inability will every one find in himſelf, who ſhall go about to faſhion in his underſtanding any ſimple idea, not received in by his ſenſes from external objects, or by reflection from the operations of his own mind about them. I would have any one to try to fancy any taſte which had never affected his palate; or frame the idea of a ſcent he had never ſmelt: and when he can do this, I will alſo conclude, that a blind man hath ideas of colours, and a deaf man true diſtinct notions of ſounds.

§ 3. This is the reaſon why, tho' we cannot believe it impoſſible to God to make a creature with other organs, and more ways to convey into the underſtanding the notice of corporeal things, than thoſe five, as they are uſually counted, which he has given to man: yet, I think, it is not poſſible for any one to imagine, any other qualities in bodies, howſoever conſtituted, whereby they can be taken notice of, beſides ſounds, taſtes, ſmells, viſible, and tangible qualities. And had mankind been made with but four ſenſes, the qualities then, which are the objects of the fifth ſenſe, had been as far from our notice, imagination, and conception, as now any belonging to a ſixth, ſeventh, or eighth ſenſe, can poſſibly be: which, whether yet ſome other creatures, in ſome other parts of this vaſt, and ſtupendous univerſe, may not have, will be a great preſumption to deny. He that will not ſet himſelf proudly at the top of all things; but will conſider the immenſity of this fabrick, and the great variety that is to be found in this little and inconſiderable part of it, which he has to do with, may be apt to think, that, in other manſions of it, there may be other and different intelligent beings, of whoſe faculties he has as little knowledge, or apprehenſion, as a worm ſhut up in one drawer of a cabinet hath of the ſenſes, or underſtanding, of a man: ſuch variety and excellency being ſuitable to the wiſdom and power of the maker. I have here followed the common opinion of man's having but five ſenſes; tho', perhaps, there may be juſtly counted more; but either ſuppoſition ſerves equally to my preſent purpoſe.

CHAP. III.

Of ideas of one ſenſe.

Chap. III. Diviſion of ſimple ideas.

§ 1. THE better to conceive the ideas we receive from ſenſation, it may not be amiſs for us to conſider them, in reference to the different ways, whereby they make their approaches to our minds, and make themſelves perceivable by us.

First, Then, there are ſome which come into our minds by one ſenſe only.

Secondly, There are others that convey themſelves into the mind by more ſenſes than one.

Thirdly, Others that are had from reflection only.

Fourthly, There are ſome that make themſelves way, and are ſuggeſted to the mind by all the ways of ſenſation and reflection.

We ſhall conſider them apart, under theſe ſeveral heads.

Ideas of one ſenſe, as colours, of ſeeing, ſound, of hearing, &c.

First, There are ſome ideas which have admittance only thro' one ſenſe, which is peculiarly adapted to receive them. Thus light and colours, as white, red, yellow, blue, with their ſeveral degrees, or ſhades, and mixtures, as green, ſcarlet, purple, ſea-green, and the reſt; come in only by the eyes: all kind of noiſes, ſounds, and tones, only by the ears: the ſeveral taſtes, and ſmells, by the noſe and palate. And if theſe organs, or the nerves which are the conduits to convey them, from without, to their audience in the brain, the mind's preſence-room (as I may call it) are, any of them, ſo diſordered, as not to perform their functions, they have no poſtern to be admitted by; no other way to bring themſelves into view, and be perceived by the underſtanding.

The moſt conſiderable of thoſe belonging to the touch, are heat, and cold, and ſolidity: all the reſt conſiſting almoſt wholly in the ſenſible configuration, as ſmooth and rough; or elſe more, or leſs, firm adheſion of the parts, as hard and ſoft, tough and brittle, are obvious enough.

Few ſimple ideas have names.

§ 2. I think, it will be needleſs to enumerate all the particular ſimple ideas, belonging to each ſenſe. Nor, indeed, is it poſſible, if we would; there being a great many more of them belonging to moſt of the ſenſes, than we have names for. The variety of ſmells, which are as many almoſt, if not more, than ſpecies of bodies in the world, do moſt of them want names. Sweet and ſtinking commonly ſerve our turn for theſe ideas, which, in effect, is little more than to call them pleaſing, or diſpleaſing; tho' the ſmell of a roſe and violet, both ſweet, are, certainly, very diſtinct ideas. Nor are the different taſtes, that, by our palates, we receive ideas of, much better provided with names. Sweet, bitter, ſour, harſh, and ſalt, are almoſt all the epithets we have to denominate that numberleſs variety of reliſhes, which are to be found diſtinct, not only in almoſt every ſort of creatures, but in the different parts of the ſame plant, fruit, or animal. The ſame may be ſaid of colours and ſounds. I ſhall, therefore, in the account of ſimple ideas I am here giving, content myſelf to ſet down only ſuch, as are moſt material to our preſent purpoſe, or are in themſelves leſs apt to be taken notice of, tho' they are very frequently the ingredients of our complex ideas, amongſt which, I think, I may well account ſolidity; which, therefore, I ſhall treat of in the next chapter.

CHAP. IV.

Of ſolidity.

CHAP. IV.

We receive this idea from touch.

§ 1. THE idea of ſolidity we receive by our touch; and it ariſes from the reſiſtance which we find in body, to the entrance of any other body into the place it poſſeſſes, till it has left it. There is no idea, which we receive more conſtantly from ſenſation, than ſolidity. Whether we move, or reſt, in what poſture ſoever we are, we always feel ſomething under us, that ſupports us, and hinders our farther ſinking downwards; and the bodies, which we daily handle, make us perceive, that whilſt they remain between them, they do, by an inſurmountable force, hinder the approach of the parts of our hands that preſs them. That, which thus hinders the approach of two bodies, when they are moving one towards another, I call ſolidity. I will not diſpute, whether this acceptation of the word ſolid, be nearer to its original ſignification, than that which mathematicians uſe it in; it ſuffices, that I think the common notion of ſolidity will allow, if not juſtify, this uſe of it; but, if any one think it better to call it impenetrability, he has my conſent. Only I have thought the term ſolidity, the more proper to expreſs this idea, not only becauſe of its vulgar uſe in that ſenſe; but, alſo, becauſe it carries ſomething more of poſitive in it than impenetrability, which is negative, and is, perhaps, more a conſequence of ſolidity, than ſolidity itſelf. This, of all other, ſeems the idea moſt intimately connected with, and eſſential to body; ſo as no where elſe to be found, or imagined, but only in matter. And, tho' our ſenſes take no notice of it, but in maſſes of matter, of a bulk ſufficient to cauſe a ſenſation in us; yet the mind, having once got this idea, from ſuch groſſer ſenſible bodies, traces it farther; and conſiders it, as well as figure, in the minuteſt particle of matter that can exiſt: and finds it inſeparably inherent in body, wherever, or however modified.

Solidity fills ſpace.

§ 2. This is the idea belongs to body, whereby we conceive it to fill ſpace. The idea of which filling of ſpace is, that, where we imagine any ſpace taken up by a ſolid ſubſtance, we conceive it ſo to poſſeſs it, that it excludes all other ſolid ſubſtances; and will for ever hinder any two other bodies, that move towards one another in a ſtraight line, from coming to touch one another, unleſs it removes from between them, in a line not parallel to that which they move in. This idea of it, the bodies which we ordinarily handle, ſufficiently furniſh us with.

Diſtinct from ſpace.

§ 3. THIS reſiſtance, whereby it keeps other bodies out of the ſpace which it poſſeſſes, is ſo great, that no force, how great ſoever, can ſurmount it. All the bodies in the world preſſing a drop of water on all ſides, will never be able to overcome the reſiſtance which it will make, as ſoft as it is, to their approaching one another, till it be removed out of their way: whereby our idea of ſolidity is diſtinguiſhed both from pure ſpace, which is capable neither of reſiſtance nor motion; and from the ordinary idea of hardneſs. For a man may conceive two bodies at a diſtance, ſo as they may approach one another, without touching, or diſplacing, any ſolid thing, till their ſuperficies come to meet: whereby, I think, we have the clear idea of ſpace without ſolidity. For (not to go ſo far as annihilation of any particular body) I aſk, whether a man cannot have the idea of the motion of one ſingle body alone, without any other ſucceeding immediately into its place? I think, it is evident he can: the idea of motion in one body no more including the idea of motion in another, than the idea of a ſquare figure in one body includes the idea of a ſquare figure in another. I do not aſk, whether bodies do ſo exiſt, that the motion of one body cannot really be without the motion of another. To determine this either way, is to beg the queſtion for, or againſt, a vacuum. But my queſtion is, whether one cannot have the idea of one body moved, whilſt others are at reſt? And, I think, this no one will deny. If ſo, then the place, it deſerted, gives us the idea of pure ſpace, without ſolidity, whereinto another body may enter, without either reſiſtance, or protruſion, of any thing. When the ſucker in a pump is drawn, the ſpace it filled in the tube is certainly the ſame, whether any other body follows the motion of the ſucker, or no: nor does it imply a contradiction, that, upon the motion of one body, another, that is only contiguous to it, ſhould not follow it. The neceſſity of ſuch a motion is built only on the ſuppoſition that the world is full, but not on the diſtinct ideas of ſpace and ſolidity; which are as different as reſiſtance, and not reſiſtance; protruſion, and not protruſion. And that men have ideas of ſpace, without body, their very diſputes about a vacuum plainly demonſtrate; as is ſhewed in another place.

From hardneſs.

§ 4. SOLIDITY is, hereby, alſo, differenced from hardneſs, in that ſolidity conſiſts in repletion, and ſo an utter excluſion of other bodies out of the ſpace it poſſeſſes; but hardneſs, in a firm coheſion of the parts of matter, making up maſſes of a ſenſible bulk, ſo that the whole does not eaſily change its figure. And, indeed, hard and ſoft, are names that we give to things, only in relation to the conſtitutions of our own bodies; that being generally called hard by us, which will put us to pain, ſooner than change figure, by the preſſure of any part of our bodies; and that, on the contrary, ſoft, which changes the ſituation of its parts upon an eaſy, and unpainful touch.

BUT this difficulty of changing the ſituation of the ſenſible parts amongſt themſelves, or of the figure of the whole, gives no more ſolidity to the hardeſt body in the world, than to the ſofteſt; nor is an adamant one jot more ſolid than water. For, tho' the two flat ſides of two pieces of marble will more eaſily approach each other, between which there is nothing but water, or air, than if there be a diamond between them: yet, it is not that the parts of the diamond are more ſolid than thoſe of water, or reſiſt more; but becauſe the parts of water being more eaſily ſeparable from each other, they will, by a ſide-motion, be more eaſily removed, and give way to the approach of the two pieces of marble. But if they could be kept from making place, by that ſide-motion, they would eternally hinder the approach of theſe two pieces of marble, as much as the diamond; and it would be as impoſſible, by any force, to ſurmount their reſiſtance, as to ſurmount the reſiſtance of the parts of a diamond. The ſofteſt body in the world, will as invincibly reſiſt the coming together of any two other bodies, if it be not put out of the way, but remain between them, as the hardeſt that can be found, or imagined. He that ſhall fill a yielding ſoft body well with air, or water, will quickly find its reſiſtance: and he that thinks that nothing but bodies that are hard, can keep his hands from approaching one another, may be pleaſed to make a trial, with the air incloſed in a foot-ball. The experiment, I have been told, was made at Florence, with a hollow globe of gold filled with water, and exactly cloſed, farther ſhews the ſolidity of ſo ſoft a body as water. For the golden globe, thus filled, being put into a preſs, which was driven by the extreme force of ſkrews, the water made itſelf way thro' the pores of that very cloſe metal; and finding no room for a nearer approach of its particles within, got to the outſide, where it roſe like a dew, and ſo fell in drops, before the ſides of the globe could be made to yield to the violent compreſſion of the engine that ſqueezed it.

On ſolidity depends impulſe, reſiſtance, and protruſion.

§ 5. By this idea of ſolidity, is the extenſion of body diſtinguiſhed from the extenſion of ſpace: the extenſion of body being nothing but the coheſion, or continuity of ſolid, ſeparable, moveable parts; and the extenſion of ſpace, the continuity of unſolid, inſeparable, and immoveable parts. Upon the ſolidity of body alſo depends their mutual impulſe, reſiſtance, and protruſion. Of pure ſpace then, and ſolidity, there are ſeveral (amongſt which, I confeſs myſelf one) who perſuade themſelves they have clear and diſtinct ideas: and that they can think on ſpace, without any thing in it, that reſiſts, or is protruded by, body. This is the idea of pure ſpace, which, they think, they have as clear, as any idea they can have of the extenſion of body; the idea of the diſtance between the oppoſite parts of a concave ſuperficies, being equally as clear without, as with the idea of any ſolid parts between: and, on the other ſide, they perſuade themſelves, that they have, diſtinct from that of pure ſpace, the idea of ſomething that fills ſpace, that can be protruded by the impulſe of other bodies, or reſiſt their motion. If there be others, that have not theſe two ideas diſtinct, but confound them, and make but one of them; I know not how men, who have the ſame idea under different names, or different ideas under the ſame name, can, in that caſe, talk with one another; any more than a man, who not being blind, or deaf, has diſtinct ideas of the colour of ſcarlet, and the ſound of a trumpet, could diſcourſe concerning ſcarlet-colour with the blind man I mention in another place, who fancied that the idea of ſcarlet was like the ſound of a trumpet.

What it is.

§ 6. If any one aſks me, what this ſolidity is? I ſend him to his ſenſes to inform him: let him put a flint, or a foot-ball, between his hands, and then endeavour to join them, and he will know. If he thinks this not a ſufficient explication of ſolidity, what it is, and wherein it conſiſts; I promiſe to tell him what it is, and wherein it conſiſts; when he tells me what thinking is, or wherein it conſiſts; or explains to me what extenſion, or motion, is, which, perhaps, ſeems much eaſier. The ſimple ideas we have, are ſuch as experience teaches them us; but, if beyond that, we endeavour, by words, to make them clearer in the mind, we ſhall ſucceed no better, than if we went about to clear up the darkneſs of a blind man's mind by talking; and to diſcourſe into him the ideas of light and colours. The reaſon of this I ſhall ſhew in another place.

CHAP. V.

Of ſimple ideas of divers ſenſes.

THE ideas we get by more than one ſenſe, are of ſpace, or extenſion, figure, reſt, and motion; for theſe make perceivable impreſſions, both on the eyes and touch: and we can receive, and convey into our minds, the ideas of the extenſion, figure, motion, and reſt of bodies, both by ſeeing and feeling. But having occaſion to ſpeak more at large of theſe in another place, I here only enumerate them.

CHAP. VI.

Of ſimple ideas of reflection.

Chap. VI.

Simple ideas are the operations of the mind, about its other ideas.

§ 1. THE mind, receiving the ideas, mentioned in the foregoing chapters, from without, when it turns its view inward upon itſelf, and obſerves its own actions, about thoſe ideas it has, takes from thence other ideas, which are as capable to be the objects of its contemplation, as any of thoſe it received from foreign things.

The idea of perception, and idea of willing, we have from reflection.

§ 2. THE two great, and principal, actions of the mind, which are moſt frequently conſidered, and which are ſo frequent, that every one that pleaſes may take notice of them in himſelf, are theſe two: Perception, or thinking; and Volition, or Willing. The power of thinking is called the Underſtanding, and the power of volition is called the Will; and theſe two powers, or abilities, in the mind, are denominated Faculties. Of ſome of the modes of theſe ſimple ideas of reflection, ſuch as are Remembrance, Diſcerning, Reaſoning, Judging, Knowledge, Faith, &c. I ſhall have occaſion to ſpeak hereafter.

CHAP. VII.

Of ſimple ideas of both ſenſation and reflection.

Chap. VII.

§ 1. THERE be other ſimple ideas, which convey themſelves into the mind, by all the ways of ſenſation and reflection, viz. Pleaſure, or Delight, and its oppoſite, Pain, or Uneaſineſs, Power, Exiſtence, Unity.

Pleaſure and pain.

§ 2. DELIGHT, or uneaſineſs, one or other of them, join themſelves to almoſt all our ideas, both of ſenſation and reflection: and there is ſcarce any affection of our ſenſes from without, any retired thought of our mind within, which is not able to produce in us pleaſure, or pain. By pleaſure and pain, I would be underſtood to ſignify whatſoever delights, or moleſts us; whether it ariſes from the thoughts of our minds, or any thing operating on our bodies. For whether we call it ſatisfaction, delight, pleaſure, happineſs, &c. on the one ſide; or uneaſineſs, trouble, pain, torment, anguiſh, miſery, &c. on the other; they are ſtill but different degrees of the ſame thing, and belong to the ideas of pleaſure or pain, delight or uneaſineſs: which are the names I ſhall moſt commonly uſe for thoſe two ſorts of ideas.

§ 3. THE infinitely wiſe author of our being, having given us the power over ſeveral parts of our bodies, to move or keep them at reſt, as we think fit; and alſo, by the motion of them, to move ourſelves and other contiguous bodies, in which conſiſt all the actions of our body: having alſo given a power to our minds, in ſeveral inſtances, to chooſe, among its ideas, which it will think on, and to purſue the inquiry of this, or that ſubject, with conſideration and attention, to excite us to theſe actions of thinking, and motion, that we are capable of; has been pleaſed to join to ſeveral thoughts, and ſeveral ſenſations, a perception of delight. If this were wholly ſeparated, from all our outward ſenſations, and inward thoughts, we ſhould have no reaſon to prefer one thought, or action, to another; negligence to attention; or motion to reſt. And ſo we ſhould neither ſtir our bodies, nor employ our minds, but let our thoughts (if I may ſo call it) run a-drift, without any direction, or deſign; and ſuffer the ideas of our minds, like unregarded ſhadows, to make their appearances there, as it happened, without attending to them. In which ſtate, man, however furniſhed with the faculties of underſtanding, and will, would be a very idle, unactive creature, and paſs his time only in a lazy, lethargick dream. It has, therefore, pleaſed our wiſe Creator, to annex to ſeveral objects, and to the ideas which we receive from them, as alſo, to ſeveral of our thoughts, a concomitant pleaſure, and that in ſeveral objects, to ſeveral degrees; that thoſe faculties, which he had endowed us with, might not remain wholly idle, and unemployed by us.

§ 4. PAIN has the ſame efficacy and uſe, to ſet us on work, that pleaſure has, we being as ready to employ our faculties, to avoid that, as to purſue this: only this is worth our conſideration, that pain is often produced by the ſame objects and ideas, that produce pleaſure in us. This, their near conjunction, which makes us often feel pain, in the ſenſations where we expected pleaſure, gives us new occaſion of admiring the wiſdom and goodneſs of our maker; who, deſigning the preſervation of our being, has annexed pain to the application of many things to our bodies, to warn us of the harm that they will do, and as advices to withdraw from them. But he, not deſigning our preſervation, barely, but the preſervation of every part, and organ in its perfection, hath, in many caſes, annexed pain to thoſe very ideas, which delight us. Thus heat, that is very agreeable to us in one degree, by a little greater increaſe of it, proves no ordinary torment; and the moſt pleaſant of all ſenſible objects, light itſelf, if there be too much of it, if increaſed beyond a due proportion to our eyes, cauſes a very painful ſenſation. Which is wiſely and favourably ſo ordered by nature, that when any object does by the vehemency of its operation, diſorder the inſtruments of ſenſation, whoſe ſtructures cannot but be very nice and delicate; we might, by the pain, be warned to withdraw, before the organ be quite put out of order, and ſo be unfitted for its proper functions for the future. The conſideration of thoſe objects that produce it, may well perſuade us, that this is the end or uſe of pain. For, tho' great light may be inſufferable to our eyes, yet the higheſt degree of darkneſs does not at all diſeaſe them; becauſe that cauſing no diſorderly motion in it, leaves that curious organ unharmed in it natural ſtate. But yet exceſs of cold, as well as heat, pains us, becauſe it is equally deſtructive to that temper, which is neceſſary to the preſervation of life, and the exerciſe of the ſeveral functions of the body, and which conſiſts in a moderate degree of warmth; or, if you pleaſe, a motion of the inſenſible parts of our bodies, confined within certain bounds.

§ 5. BEYOND all this, we may find another reaſon, why God hath ſcattered up and down, ſeveral degrees of pleaſure and pain, in all the things that environ and affect us, and blended them together, in almoſt all that our thoughts and ſenſes have to do with; that we, finding imperfection, diſſatisfaction, and want of compleat happineſs, in all the enjoyments, which the creatures can afford us, might be led to ſeek it in the enjoyment of him, with whom there is fulneſs of joy, and at whoſe right hand are pleaſures for evermore.

Pleaſure and pain.

§ 6. THO' what I have here ſaid may not, perhaps, make the ideas of pleaſure and pain clearer to us, than our own experience does, which is the only way, that we are capable of having them; yet the conſideration of the reaſon, why they are annexed to ſo many other ideas, ſerving to give us due ſentiments of the wiſdom and goodneſs of the ſovereign diſpoſer of all things, may not be unſuitable, to the main end of theſe enquiries: the knowledge and veneration of him, being the chief end of all our thoughts, and the proper buſineſs of all our underſtandings.

Exiſtence and unity.

§. 7. EXISTENCE and unity, are two other ideas, that are ſuggeſted to the underſtanding, by every object without, and every idea within. When ideas are in our mind, we conſider them as being actually there, as well as we conſider things to be actually without us; which is, that they exiſt, or have exiſtence; and whatever we can conſider as one thing, whether a real being, or idea, ſuggeſts to the underſtanding the idea of unity.

Power.

§. 8. POWER alſo, is another of thoſe ſimple ideas, which we receive from ſenſation and reflection. For, obſerving in ourſelves, that we can at pleaſure move ſeveral parts of our bodies, which were at reſt; the effects alſo, that natural bodies are able to produce in one another, occurring every moment to our ſenſes, we both theſe ways get the idea of power.

Succeſſion.

§. 9. BESIDES theſe there is another idea, which, though ſuggeſted by our ſenſes, yet is more conſtantly offered us, by what paſſes in our minds; and that is, the idea of ſucceſſion. For if we look immediately into ourſelves, and reflect on what is obſervable there, we ſhall find our ideas always, whilſt we are awake, or have any thought, paſſing in train, one going, and another coming, without intermiſſion.

Simple ideas, the materials of all our knowledge.

§ 10. These, if they are not all, are at leaſt, (as I think) the moſt conſiderable of thoſe ſimple ideas, which the mind has, and out of which is made all its other knowledge; all which, it receives only by the two forementioned ways of ſenſation and reflection.

Nor let any one think theſe too narrow bounds for the capacious mind of man, to expatiate in, which takes it flight farther than the ſtars, and cannot be confined by the limits of the world; that extends its thoughts often, even beyond the utmoſt expanſion of matter, and makes excurſions into that incomprehenſible inane. I grant all this, but deſire any one to aſſign any ſimple idea, which is not received from one of thoſe inlets before-mentioned, or any complex idea, not made out of thoſe ſimple ones. Nor will it be ſo ſtrange, to think theſe few ſimple ideas ſufficient to employ the quickeſt thought, or largeſt capacity; and to furniſh the materials of all that various knowledge, and more various fancies and opinions of all mankind, if we conſider how many words may be made out of the various compoſition of twenty-four letters; or, if going one ſtep farther, we will but reflect on the variety of combinations may be made, with barely one of the above mentioned ideas, viz. number, whoſe ſtock is inexhauſtible, and truly infinite: and what a large and immenſe field doth extenſion alone, afford the mathematicians?

CHAP. VIII.

Some farther conſiderations concerning our ſimple ideas.

Chap. VIII.

Poſitive ideas from privative cauſes.

§ 1. Concerning the ſimple ideas of ſenſation, it is to be conſidered, that whatſoever is ſo conſtituted in nature, as to be able, by affecting our ſenſes, to cauſe any perception in the mind, doth thereby produce in the underſtanding, a ſimple idea; which, whatever be the external cauſe of it, when it comes to be taken notice of, by our diſcerning faculty, it is by the mind looked on, and conſidered there, to be a real poſitive idea in the underſtanding, as much as any other whatſoever, tho' perhaps the cauſe of it be but a privation in the ſubject.

§ 2. Thus the ideas of heat and cold, light and darkneſs, white and black, motion and reſt, are equally clear, and poſitive ideas in the mind; tho' perhaps ſome of the cauſes, which produce them, are barely privations in thoſe ſubjects, from whence our ſenſes derive thoſe ideas. Theſe, the underſtanding in its view of them, conſiders all, as diſtinct, poſitive ideas, without taking notice of the cauſes that produce them; which is an enquiry not belonging to the idea, as it is in the underſtanding, but to the nature of the things, exiſting without us. Theſe are two very different things, and carefully to be diſtinguiſhed; it being one thing to perceive and know the idea of white, or black; and quite another, to examine what kind of particles they muſt be, and how rang'd in the ſuperficies, to make any object appear white or black.

§ 3. A painter, or dyer, who never enquired into their cauſes, hath the ideas of white and black, and other colours, as clearly, perfectly, and diſtinctly in his underſtanding, and perhaps more diſtinctly, than the philoſopher, who hath buſied himſelf in conſidering their natures, and thinks he knows how far either of them is in its cauſe poſitive, or privative; and the idea of black, is no leſs poſitive in his mind, than that of white, however, the cauſe of that colour in the external object, may be only a privation.

§ 4. If it were the deſign of my preſent undertaking, to enquire into the natural cauſes and manner of perception, I ſhould offer this as a reaſon, why a privative cauſe might, in ſome caſes at leaſt, produce a poſitive idea; viz. That all ſenſation, being produced in us only by different degrees, and modes of motion in our animal ſpirits, variouſly agitated by external objects, the abatement of any former motion, muſt as neceſſarily produce a new ſenſation, as the variation or increaſe of it; and ſo introduce a new idea, which depends only on a different motion of the animal ſpirits in that organ.

§ 5.

§ 5. But whether this be ſo, or no, I will not here determine; but appeal to every one's own experience, whether the ſhadow of a man, tho' it conſiſts of nothing but the abſence of light (and the more the abſence of light is, the more diſcernible is the ſhadow) does not, when a man looks on it, cauſe as clear and poſitive an idea in his mind, as a man himſelf, tho' covered over with clear ſunſhine? And the picture of a ſhadow is a poſitive thing. Indeed we have negative names, which ſtand not directly for poſitive ideas, but for their abſence, ſuch as Inſipid, Silence, Nihil, &c. which words denote poſitive ideas; v. g. taſte, ſound, being, with a ſignification of their abſence.

Poſitive ideas from privative cauſes.

§ 6. And thus one may truly be ſaid to ſee darkneſs. For ſuppoſing a hole perfectly dark, from whence no light is reflected, it is certain one may ſee the figure of it, or it may be painted; or whether the ink, I write with, makes any other idea is a queſtion. The privative cauſes I have here aſſigned, of poſitive ideas, are according to the common opinion; but in truth, it will be hard to determine, whether there be really any ideas from a privative cauſe, till it be determined, whether reſt be any more a privation than motion.

Ideas in the mind, qualities in bodies.

§ 7. To diſcover the nature of our ideas the better, and to diſcourſe of them intelligibly, it will be convenient to diſtinguiſh them as they are ideas, or perceptions, in our minds, and, as they are modifications of matter in the bodies, that cauſe ſuch perceptions in us; that ſo we may not think (as perhaps uſually is done) that they are exactly the images, and reſemblances, of ſomething inherent in the ſubject; moſt of thoſe of ſenſation being in the mind, no more the likeneſs of ſomething exiſting without us, than the names that ſtand for them are the likeneſs of our ideas, which yet upon hearing, they are apt to excite in us.

§ 8. Whatsoever the mind perceives in itſelf, or is the immediate object of perception, thought, or underſtanding, that I call idea; and the power to produce any idea in our mind, I call quality of the ſubject, wherein that power is. Thus a ſnow-ball, having the power to produce in us the ideas of white, cold, and round, the powers to produce thoſe ideas in us, as they are in the ſnow-ball, I call qualities; and as they are ſenſations, or perceptions, in our underſtandings, I call them ideas: which ideas, if I ſpeak of ſometimes as in the things themſelves, I would be underſtood, to mean thoſe qualities in the objects, which produce them in us.

Primary qualities.

§ 9. Qualities, thus conſidered in bodies, are, firſt, ſuch as are utterly inſeparable from the body, in what a ſtate ſoever it be; ſuch as, in all the alterations and changes it ſuffers, all the force can be uſed upon it, it conſtantly keeps; and ſuch as ſenſe conſtantly finds, in every particle of matter, which has bulk enough to be perceived, and the mind finds inſeparable from every particle of matter, tho' leſs than to make itſelf ſingly be perceived by our ſenſes; v. g. Take a grain of wheat, divide it into two parts, each part has ſtill ſolidity, extenſion, figure, and mobility; divide it again, and it retains ſtill the ſame qualities; and ſo divide it on, till the parts become inſenſible, they muſt retain ſtill, each of them, all thoſe qualities. For diviſion (which is all that a mill, or peſtle, or any other body does upon another, in reducing it to inſenſible parts) can never take away either ſolidity, extenſion, figure, or mobility from any body, but only makes two, or more diſtinct ſeparate maſſes of matter, of that which was but one before; all which diſtinct maſſes, reckoned as ſo many diſtinct bodies after diviſion, make a certain number. Theſe I call original, or primary qualities of body, which I think we may obſerve to produce ſimple ideas in us, viz. ſolidity, extenſion, figure, motion, or reſt, and number.

Secondary qualities.

§ 10. Secondly, ſuch qualities, which in truth are nothing in the objects themſelves, but powers to produce various ſenſations in us, by their primary qualities, i. e. by the bulk, figure, texture and motion of their inſenſible parts, as colours, ſounds, taſtes, &c. theſe I call ſecondary qualities. To theſe might be added a third ſort, which are allowed to be barely powers, tho' they are as much real qualities in the ſubject, as thoſe which I, to comply with the common way of ſpeaking, call qualities, but, for diſtinction, ſecondary qualities. For the power in fire to produce a new colour, or conſiſtency in wax, or clay, by its primary qualities, is as much a quality in fire, as the power it has to produce in me a new idea, or ſenſation of warmth, or burning, which I felt not before, by the ſame primary qualities, viz. the bulk, texture, and motion of its inſenſible parts.

How primary qualities produce their ideas.

§ 11. The next thing to be conſidered, is, how bodies produce ideas in us; and that is manifeſtly by impulſe, the only way which we can conceive bodies operate in.

§ 12. If then external objects be not united to our minds, when they produce ideas in it, and yet we perceive theſe original qualities, in ſuch of them as ſingly fall under our ſenſes; it is evident that ſome motion muſt be thence continued, by our nerves, or animal ſpirits, by ſome parts of our bodies, to the brains, or the ſeat of ſenſation, there to produce in our minds the particular ideas we have of them. And ſince the extenſion, figure, number, and motion of bodies of an obſervable bigneſs, may be perceived at a diſtance by the ſight; it is evident ſome ſingly imperceptible bodies, muſt come from them to the eyes, and thereby convey to the brain ſome motion, which produces theſe ideas, which we have of them in us.

How ſecondary.

§ 13. After the ſame manner, that the ideas of theſe original qualities are produced in us, we may conceive, that the ideas of ſecondary qualities are alſo produced, viz. by the operation of inſenſible particles on our ſenſes. For it being manifeſt, that there are bodies, and good ſtore of bodies, each whereof are ſo ſmall, that we cannot, by any of our ſenſes, diſcover either their bulk, figure, or motion; as is evident in the particles of the air, and water, and other extremely ſmaller than thoſe, perhaps as much ſmaller than the particles of air or water, as the particles of air or water are ſmaller than peas, or hail-ſtones: let us ſuppoſe at preſent, that the different motions and figures, bulk and number of ſuch particles, affecting the ſeveral organs of our ſenſes, produce in us thoſe different ſenſations, which we have from the colours, and ſmells of bodies; v. g. that a violet, by the impulſe of ſuch inſenſible particles of matter, of peculiar figures and bulks, and in different degrees, and modifications of their motions, cauſes the ideas of the blue colour, and ſweet ſcent of that flower to be produced in our minds; it being no more impoſſible to conceive, that God ſhould annex ſuch ideas to ſuch motions, with which they have no ſimilitude, than that he ſhould annex the idea of pain, to the motion of a piece of ſteel, dividing our fleſh, with which that idea hath no reſemblance.

§ 14. What I have ſaid, concerning colours and ſmells, may be underſtood alſo of taſtes and ſounds, and other the like ſenſible qualities; which, whatever reality we, by miſtake, attribute to them, are in truth nothing in the objects themſelves, but powers to produce various ſenſations in us, and depend on thoſe primary qualities, viz. bulk, figure, texture, and motion of parts; as I have ſaid.

Ideas of primary qualities, are reſemblances; of ſecondary, not.

§ 15. From whence I think it as eaſy to draw this obſervation, that the ideas of primary qualities of bodies, are reſemblances of them, and their patterns do really exiſt in the bodies themſelves; but the ideas, produced in us by theſe ſecondary qualities, have no reſemblance of them at all. There is nothing like our ideas exiſting in the bodies themſelves. They are in the bodies, we denominate from them, only a power to produce thoſe ſenſations in us: and what is ſweet, blue, or warm in idea, is but the certain bulk, figure, and motion of the inſenſible parts in the bodies themſelves, which we call ſo.

§ 16. Flame is denominated hot and light; ſnow, white and cold; and manna, white and ſweet; from the ideas they produce in us; which qualities are commonly thought to be the ſame in thoſe bodies, that thoſe ideas are in us, the one the perfect reſemblance of the other, as they are in a mirror; and it would, by moſt men, be judged very extravagant, if one ſhould ſay otherwiſe. And yet, he that will conſider that the ſame fire, that at one diſtance produces in us the ſenſation of warmth, does at a nearer approach, produce in us the far different ſenſation of pain, ought to bethink himſelf what reaſon he has to ſay, that his idea of warmth, which was produced in him by the fire, is actually in the fire; and his idea of pain, which the ſame fire produced in him the ſame way, is not in the fire. Why is whiteneſs and coldneſs in ſnow, and pain not, when it produces the one and the other idea in us; and can do neither, but by the bulk, figure, number, and motion of its ſolid parts?

§ 17. The particular bulk, number, figure, and motion of the parts of fire, or ſnow, are really in them, whether any one's ſenſes perceive them or no; and therefore they may be called real qualities, becauſe they really exiſt in thoſe bodies: but light, heat, whiteneſs, or coldneſs, are no more really in them, than ſickneſs or pain is in manna. Take away the ſenſation of them; let not the eyes ſee light, or colours, nor the ears hear ſounds; let the palate not taſte, nor the noſe ſmell; and all colours, taſtes, odours and ſounds, as they are ſuch particular ideas, vaniſh and ceaſe, and are reduced to their cauſes, i. e. bulk, figure, and motion of parts.

§ 18. A piece of manna, of a ſenſible bulk, is able to produce in us the idea of a round, or ſquare figure, and by being removed from one place to another, the idea of motion. This idea of motion repreſents it, as it really is in the manna, moving: a circle or ſquare are the ſame, whether in idea, or exiſtence, in the mind, or in the manna; and this both motion and figure are really in the manna, whether we take notice of them, or no: this every body is ready to agree to. Beſides, manna, by the bulk, figure, texture, and motion, of its parts, has a power to produce the ſenſations of ſickneſs, and ſometimes of acute pains, or gripings, in us. That theſe ideas of ſickneſs and pain are not in the manna, but effects of its operations on us, and are no where, when we feel them not: this alſo every one readily agrees to. And yet men are hardly to be brought to think, that ſweetneſs and whiteneſs are not really in manna; which are but the effects of the operations of manna, by the motion, ſize, and figure, of its particles, on the eyes and palate; as the pain and ſickneſs, cauſed by manna, are confeſſedly nothing, but the effects of its operation on the ſtomach and guts, by the ſize, motion, and figure, of its inſenſible parts, (for by nothing elſe can a body operate, as has been proved:) as if it could not operate on the eyes and palate, and thereby produce in the mind particular diſtinct ideas, which in itſelf it has not, as well as we allow it can operate on the guts and ſtomach, and thereby produce diſtinct ideas, which, in itſelf, it has not. Theſe ideas, being all effects of the operations of manna, on ſeveral parts of our bodies, by the ſize, figure, number, and motion, of its parts; why thoſe produced by the eyes and palate, ſhould rather be thought to be really in the manna, than thoſe produced by the ſtomach and guts; or why the pain and ſickneſs, ideas, that are the effects of manna, ſhould be thought to be no where, when they are not felt; and yet the ſweetneſs and whiteneſs, effects of the ſame manna on other parts of the body, by ways equally as unknown, ſhould be thought to exiſt in the manna, when they are not ſeen, nor taſted, would need ſome reaſon to explain.

Ideas of primary qualities, are reſemblances; of ſecondary, not.

§ 19. Let us conſider the red and white colours in porphyre: hinder light but from ſtriking on it, and its colours vaniſh, it no longer produces any ſuch ideas in us; upon the return of light, it produces theſe appearances on us again. Can any one think any real alterations are made in the porphyre, by the preſence, or abſence, of light; and that thoſe ideas of whiteneſs and redneſs, are really in porphyre, in the light, when, it is plain, it has no colour in the dark? It has, indeed, ſuch a configuration of particles, both night and day, as are apt, by the rays of light rebounding from ſome parts of that hard ſtone, to produce in us the idea of redneſs, and from others the idea of whiteneſs; but whiteneſs, or redneſs, are not in it at any time, but ſuch a texture, that hath the power to produce ſuch a ſenſation in us.

§ 20. Pound an almond, and the clear white colour will be altered into a dirty one, and the ſweet taſte into an oily one. What real alteration can the beating of the peſtle make in any body, but an alteration of the texture of it?

§ 21. Ideas being thus diſtinguiſhed and underſtood, we may be able to give an account, how the ſame water, at the ſame time, may produce the idea of cold by one hand, and of heat by the other; whereas, it is impoſſible that the ſame water, if thoſe ideas were really in it, ſhould, at the ſame time, be both hot and cold: for if we imagine warmth, as it is in our hands, to be nothing but a certain ſort and degree of motion in the minute particles of our nerves, or animal ſpirits, we may underſtand how it is poſſible, that the ſame water may, at the ſame time, produce the ſenſation of heat in one hand, and cold in the other; which, yet, figure never does; that never producing the idea of a ſquare by one hand, which has produced the idea of a globe by another. But, if the ſenſation of heat and cold be nothing, but the increaſe, or diminution, of the motion of the minute parts of our bodies, cauſed by the corpuſcles of any other body, it is eaſy to be underſtood, that, if that motion be greater in one hand than in the other; if a body be applied to the two hands, which has, in its minute particles, a greater motion, than in thoſe of one of the hands, and a leſs than in thoſe of the other; it will increaſe the motion of the one hand, and leſſen it in the other, and ſo cauſe the different ſenſations of heat and cold that depend thereon.

§ 22. I have, in what juſt goes before, been engaged in phyſical enquiries a little farther than, perhaps, I intended. But it being neceſſary, to make the nature of ſenſation a little underſtood, and to make the difference between the qualities in bodies, in the ideas produced by them in the mind, to be diſtinctly conceived, without which it were impoſſible to diſcourſe intelligibly of them; I hope I ſhall be pardoned this little excurſion into natural philoſophy, it being neceſſary, in our preſent enquiry, to diſtinguiſh the primary, and real qualities of bodies, which are always in them, (viz. ſolidity, extenſion, figure, number, and motion, or reſt; and are ſometimes perceived by us, viz. when the bodies, they are in, are big enough ſingly to be diſcerned) from thoſe ſecondary and imputed qualities, which are but the powers of ſeveral combinations of thoſe primary ones, when they operate, without being diſtinctly diſcerned; whereby we alſo may come to know what ideas are, and what are not reſemblances of ſomething really exiſting in the bodies we denominate from them.

Three ſorts of qualities in bodies.

§ 23. The qualities then that are in bodies rightly conſidered, are of three ſorts.

First, The bulk, figure, number, ſituation, and motion, or reſt of their ſolid parts; thoſe are in them whether we perceive them or no; and when they are of that ſize that we can diſcover them, we have, by theſe, an idea of the thing as it is in itſelf, as is plain in artificial things. Theſe I call primary qualities.

Secondly, The power that is in any body, by reaſon of its inſenſible, primary qualities, to operate after a peculiar manner on any of our ſenſes, and thereby produce in us the different ideas of ſeveral colours, ſounds, ſmells, taſtes, &c. Theſe are uſually called ſenſible qualities.

Thirdly, The power that is in any body, by reaſon of the particular conſtitution of its primary qualities, to make ſuch a change in the bulk, figure, texture, and motion of another body, as to make it operate on our ſenſes, differently from what it did before. Thus the ſun has a power to make wax white, and fire to make lead fluid. Theſe are uſually called powers.

The firſt of theſe, as has been ſaid, I think, may be properly called real, original, or primary qualities, becauſe they are in the things themſelves, whether they are perceived or no; and upon their different modifications, it is, that the ſecondary qualities depend.

The other two are only powers to act differently upon other things, which powers reſult from the different modifications of thoſe primary qualities.

The firſt are reſemblances. The ſecond thought reſemblances, but are not. The third neither are, nor are thought ſo.

§ 24. But, tho' theſe two latter ſorts of qualities are powers barely, and nothing but powers, relating to ſeveral other bodies, and reſulting from the different modifications of the original qualities; yet they are generally otherwiſe thought of. For the ſecond ſort, viz. the powers to produce ſeveral ideas in us, by our ſenſes, are looked upon as real qualities, in the things, thus affecting us: but the third ſort are called, and eſteemed, barely powers, v. g. the idea of heat, or light, which we receive by our eyes, or touch, from the ſun, are commonly thought real qualities, exiſting in the ſun, and ſomething more than mere powers in it. But, when we conſider the ſun, in reference to wax, which it melts, or blanches, we look on the whiteneſs and ſoftneſs produced in the wax, not as qualities in the ſun, but effects produced by powers in it: whereas, if rightly conſidered, theſe qualities of light and warmth, which are perceptions in me, when I am warmed, or enlightened by the ſun, are no otherwiſe in the ſun, than the changes made in the wax, when it is blanched, or melted, are in the ſun. They are all of them equally powers in the ſun, depending on its primary qualities, whereby it is able in the one caſe, ſo to alter the bulk, figure, texture, or motion, of ſome of the inſenſible parts of my eyes, or hands, as thereby to produce in me the idea of light, or heat; and, in the other, it is able ſo to alter the bulk, figure, texture, or motion, of the inſenſible parts of the wax, as to make them fit to produce in me the diſtinct ideas of white and fluid.

§ 25. The reaſon why the one are ordinarily taken for real qualities, and the other only for bare powers, ſeems to be, becauſe the ideas we have of diſtinct colours, ſounds, &c. containing nothing at all in them of bulk, figure, or motion, we are not apt to think them the effects of theſe primary qualities, which appear not to our ſenſes, to operate in their production; and with which they have not any apparent congruity, or conceivable connection. Hence it is that we are ſo forward to imagine, that thoſe ideas are the reſemblances of ſomething really exiſting in the objects themſelves: ſince ſenſation diſcovers nothing of bulk, figure, or motion of parts, in their production; nor can reaſon ſhew how bodies, by their bulk, figure, and motion, ſhould produce in the mind the ideas of blue, or yellow, &c. But, in the other caſe, in the operations of bodies, changing the qualities one of another, we plainly diſcover, that the quality produced hath commonly no reſemblance with any thing in the thing producing it; wherefore, we look on it as a bare effect of power. For, tho' receiving the idea of heat, or light, from the ſun, we are apt to think it is a perception and reſemblance of ſuch a quality in the ſun, yet, when we ſee wax, or a fair face, receive change of colour from the ſun, we cannot imagine that to be the perception, or reſemblance, of any thing in the ſun, becauſe we find not thoſe different colours in the ſun itſelf. For our ſenſes being able to obſerve a likeneſs, or unlikeneſs, of ſenſible qualities in two different external objects, we forwardly enough conclude the production of any ſenſible quality in any ſubject, to be an effect of bare power, and not the communication of any quality, which was really in the efficient, when we find no ſuch ſenſible quality in the thing that produced it. But our ſenſes, not being able to diſcover any unlikeneſs between the idea produced in us, and the quality of the object producing it; we are apt to imagine, that our ideas are reſemblances of ſomething in the objects, and not the effects of certain powers placed in the modification of their primary qualities; with which primary qualities the ideas produced in us have no reſemblance.

Secondary qualities two-fold: firſt, immediately perceivable; ſecondly, mediately perceivable.

§ 26. To conclude, beſides thoſe before-mentioned primary qualities in bodies, viz. bulk, figure, extenſion, number, and motion, of their ſolid parts: all the reſt whereby we take notice of bodies, and diſtinguiſh them one from another, are nothing elſe but ſeveral powers in them depending on thoſe primary qualities; whereby they are fitted, either by immediately operating on our bodies, to produce ſeveral different ideas in us; or elſe by operating on other bodies, ſo to change their primary qualities, as to render them capable of producing ideas in us, different from what before they did. The former of theſe, I think, may be called ſecondary qualities, immediately perceivable: the latter, ſecondary qualities, mediately perceivable.

CHAP. IX.

Of perception.

CHAP. IX.

Perception, the firſt ſimple idea of reflection.

§ 1. PERCEPTION, as it is the firſt faculty of the mind, exerciſed about our ideas; ſo it is the firſt and ſimpleſt idea we have from reflection, and is, by ſome, called thinking in general. Tho' thinking, in the propriety of the Engliſh tongue, ſignifies that ſort of operation of the mind about its ideas, wherein the mind is active; where it, with ſome degree of voluntary attention, conſiders any thing. For in bare naked perception, the mind is, for the moſt part, only paſſive; and what it perceives, it cannot avoid perceiving.

Is only when the mind receives the impreſſion.

§ 2. What perception is, every one will know better, by reflecting on what he does himſelf when he ſees, hears, feels, &c. or thinks, than by any diſcourſe of mine. Whoever reflects, on what paſſes in his own mind, cannot miſs it: and if he does not reflect, all the words in the world cannot make him have any notion of it.

§ 3. This is certain, that whatever alterations are made in the body, if they reach not the mind; whatever impreſſions are made on the outward parts, if they are not taken notice of within; there is no perception. Fire may burn our bodies, with no other effect than it does a billet, unleſs the motion be continued to the brain; and there the ſenſe of heat, or idea of pain, be produced in the mind, wherein conſiſts actual perception.

§ 4. How often may a man obſerve in himſelf, that whilſt his mind is intently employed in the contemplation of ſome objects, and curiouſly ſurveying ſome ideas that are there; it takes no notice of impreſſions of ſounding bodies, made upon the organ of hearing, with the ſame alteration that uſes to be for the producing the idea of ſound? A ſufficient impulſe there may be on the organ; but, it not reaching the obſervation of the mind, there follows no perception: and tho' the motion, that uſes to produce the idea of ſound, be made in the ear, yet no ſound is heard. Want of ſenſation, in this caſe, is not thro' any defect in the organ, or that the man's ears are leſs affected than at other times when he does hear: but that, which uſes to produce the idea, tho' conveyed in by the uſual organ, not being taken notice of, in the underſtanding, and ſo imprinting no idea on the mind, there follows no ſenſation. So that wherever there is ſenſe, or perception, there ſome idea is actually produced, and preſent in the underſtanding.

Children, tho' they have ideas in the womb, have none innate.

§ 5. Therefore I doubt not but children, by the exerciſe of their ſenſes, about objects that affect them in the womb, receive ſome few ideas, before they are born; as the unavoidable effects, either of the bodies that environ them, or elſe of thoſe wants, or diſeaſes, they ſuffer: among which (if one may conjecture, concerning things not very capable of examination) I think the ideas of hunger and warmth are two; which, probably, are ſome of the firſt that children have, and which they ſcarce ever part with again.

§ 6. But tho' it be reaſonable to imagine, that children receive ſome ideas, before they come into the world; yet theſe ſimple ideas are far from thoſe innate principles, which ſome contend for, and we above have rejected. Theſe here mentioned being the effects of ſenſation, are only from ſome affections of the body, which happen to them there, and ſo depend on ſomething exterior to the mind; no otherwiſe differing in their manner of production from other ideas, derived from ſenſe, but only in the precedency of time: whereas thoſe innate principles are ſuppoſed to be quite of another nature; not coming into the mind, by any accidental alterations in, or operations on the body; but as it were, original characters impreſſed upon it, in the very firſt moment of its being and conſtitution.

Which ideas firſt, is not evident.

§ 7. As there are ſome ideas, which we may reaſonably ſuppoſe may be introduced into the minds of children in the womb, ſubſervient to the neceſſities of their life and being there; ſo after they are born, thoſe ideas are the earlieſt imprinted, which happen to be the ſenſible qualities which firſt occur to them; amongſt which, light is not the leaſt conſiderable, nor of the weakeſt efficacy. And how covetous the mind is to be furniſhed with all ſuch ideas as have no pain accompanying them, may be a little gueſſed, by what is obſervable in children new-born, who always turn their eyes to that part, from whence the light comes, lay them how you pleaſe. But the ideas, that are moſt familiar at firſt, being various, according to the divers circumſtances of children's firſt entertainment in the world; the order wherein the ſeveral ideas come at firſt into the mind, is very various and uncertain alſo; neither is it much material to know it.

Ideas of ſenſation often changed by the judgment.

§ 8. We are farther to conſider, concerning perception, that the ideas, we receive by ſenſation, are often, in grown people, altered by the judgment, without our taking notice of it. When we ſet before our eyes a round globe, of any uniform colour, v. g. gold, alabaſter, or jet; it is certain that the idea, thereby imprinted in our mind, is of a flat circle variouſly ſhadowed, with ſeveral degrees of light and brightneſs coming to our eyes. But we having by uſe been accuſtomed to perceive, what kind of appearance convex bodies are wont to make in us; what alterations are made in the reflections of light, by the difference of the ſenſible figures of bodies; the judgment preſently, by an habitual cuſtom, alters the appearances into their cauſes: ſo that from that, which truly is variety of ſhadow or colour, collecting the figure, it makes it paſs for a mark of figure, and frames to itſelf the perception of a convex figure, and an uniform colour; when the idea we receive from thence is only a plain variouſly coloured, as is evident in painting. To which purpoſe I ſhall here inſert a problem of that very ingenious and ſtudious promoter of real knowledge, the learned and worthy Mr. Molineux, which he was pleaſed to ſend me in a letter, ſome months ſince; and it is this: Suppoſe a man born blind, and now adult, and taught by his touch to diſtinguiſh between a cube and a ſphere of the ſame metal, and nighly of the ſame bigneſs, ſo as to tell when he felt one and the other, which is the cube, which the ſphere. Suppoſe then the cube and ſphere placed on a table, and the blind man to be made to ſee: quære, “whether by his ſight, before he touched “them, he could now diſtinguiſh and tell, which is the globe, which the cube?” To which the acute and judicious propoſer anſwers: Not. For tho' he has obtained the experience of, how a globe, and how a cube affects his touch; yet he has not yet attained the experience, that, what affects his touch ſo or ſo, muſt affect his ſight ſo or ſo: or that a protuberant angle in the cube, that preſſed his hand unequally, ſhall appear to his eye as it does in the cube. I agree with this thinking gentleman, whom I am proud to call my friend, in his anſwer to this his problem; and am of opinion, that the blind man, at firſt ſight, would not be able, with certainty, to ſay which was the globe, which the cube, whilſt he only ſaw them; tho' he could unerringly name them by his touch, and certainly diſtinguiſh them by the difference of their figures felt. This I have ſet down, and leave with my reader, as an occaſion for him to conſider, how much he may be beholden to experience, improvement, and acquired notions, where he thinks he has not the leaſt uſe of, or help from them: and the rather, becauſe this obſerving gentleman farther adds, That having upon the occaſion of my book, propoſed this to divers very ingenious men, he hardly ever met with one, that at firſt gave the anſwer to it, which he thinks true, till, by hearing his reaſons, they were convinced.

§ 9. But this is not, I think, uſual in any of our ideas, but thoſe received by ſight: becauſe ſight, the moſt comprehenſive of all our ſenſes, conveying to our minds the ideas of light and colours, which are peculiar only to that ſenſe; and alſo the far different ideas of ſpace, figure, and motion, the ſeveral varieties whereof change the appearances of its proper object, viz. light and colours; we bring ourſelves by uſe to judge of the one by the other. This, in many caſes, by a ſettled habit, in things whereof we have frequent experience, is performed ſo conſtantly and ſo quick, that we take that for the perception of our ſenſation, which is an idea formed by our judgment; ſo that one, viz. that of ſenſation, ſerves only to excite the other, and is ſcarce taken notice of itſelf: as a man, who reads or hears with attention and underſtanding, takes little notice of the characters, or ſounds, but of the ideas that are excited in him by them.

§ 10. Nor need we wonder, that this is done with ſo little notice, if we conſider how very quick the actions of the mind are performed: for, as itſelf is thought to take up no ſpace, to have no extenſion; ſo its actions ſeem to require no time, but many of them ſeem to be crouded into an inſtant. I ſpeak this in compariſon to the actions of the body. Any one may eaſily obſerve this in his own thoughts, who will take the pains to reflect on them. How, as it were in an inſtant, do our minds, with one glance, ſee all the parts of a demonſtration, which may very well be called a long one, if we conſider the time it will require to put it into words, and ſtep by ſtep ſhew it another. Secondly, we ſhall not be ſo much ſurpriſed, that this is done in us with ſo little notice, if we conſider how the facility, which we get of doing things, by a cuſtom of doing, makes them often paſs in us without our notice. Habits, eſpecially ſuch as are begun very early, come at laſt to produce actions in us, which often eſcape our obſervation. How frequently do we, in a day, cover our eyes with our eye-lids, without perceiving that we are at all in the dark? Men that by cuſtom have got the uſe of a by-word, do almoſt in every ſentence pronounce ſounds, which tho' taken notice of by others, they themſelves neither hear, nor obſerve. And therefore it is not ſo ſtrange, that our mind ſhould often change the idea of its ſenſation, into that of its judgment, and make one ſerve only to excite the other, without our taking notice of it.

Perception puts the difference between animals and inferior beings.

§ 11. This faculty of perception ſeems to me to be that, which puts the diſtinction betwixt the animal kingdom and the inferior parts of nature. For however vegetables have, many of them, ſome degrees of motion, and, upon the different application of other bodies to them, do very briſkly alter their figure and motion, and ſo have obtained the name of ſenſitive plants, from a motion which has ſome reſemblance to that, which in animals follows upon ſenſation: yet, I ſuppoſe it is all bare mechaniſm; and no otherwiſe produced, than the turning of a wild oat-beard, by the inſinuation of the particles of moiſture; or the ſhortening of a rope, by the affuſion of water. All which is done without any ſenſation in the ſubject, or the having or receiving any ideas.

§ 12. Perception, I believe, is in ſome degree in all ſorts of animals; tho' in ſome, poſſibly, the avenues, provided by nature for the reception of ſenſations, are ſo few, and the perception, they are received with, ſo obſcure and dull, that it comes extremely ſhort of the quickneſs, and variety of ſenſations, which is in the other animals: but yet it is ſufficient for, and wiſely adapted to, the ſtate and condition of that ſort of animals, who are thus made. So that the wiſdom and goodneſs of the maker plainly appears, in all the parts of this ſtupendous fabrick, and all the ſeveral degrees, and ranks of creatures in it.

§ 13. We may, I think, from the make of an oyſter, or cockle, reaſonably conclude, that it has not ſo many, nor ſo quick ſenſes, as a man, or ſeveral other animals; nor if it had, would it, in that ſtate and incapacity of transferring itſelf from one place to another, be bettered by them. What good would ſight, and hearing, do to a creature that cannot move itſelf to, or from the objects, wherein at a diſtance it perceives good or evil? And would not quickneſs of ſenſation be an inconvenience to an animal, that muſt lie ſtill, where chance has once placed it; and there receive the afflux of colder or warmer, clean or foul water, as it happens to come to it?

§ 14. But yet I cannot but think, there is ſome ſmall dull perception, whereby they are diſtinguiſhed from perfect inſenſibility. And that this may be ſo, we have plain inſtances, even in mankind itſelf. Take one, in whom decrepid old age has blotted out the memory of his paſt knowledge, and clearly wiped out the ideas, his mind was formerly ſtored with; and has, by deſtroying his ſight, hearing, and ſmell quite, and his taſte to a great degree, ſtopped up almoſt all the paſſages for new ones to enter: or, if there be ſome of the inlets yet half open, the impreſſions made are ſcarce perceived, or not at all retained. How far ſuch an one (notwithſtanding all that is boaſted of innate principles) is in his knowledge and intellectual faculties, above the condition of a cockle, or an oyſter, I leave to be conſidered. And, if a man has paſſed ſixty years in ſuch a ſtate, as it is poſſible he might, as well as three days; I wonder what difference there would have been in any intellectual perfections, between him and the loweſt degree of animals.

Perception, the inlet of knowledge.

§ 15. Perception then, being the firſt ſtep and degree towards knowledge, and the inlet of all the materials of it; the fewer ſenſes any man, as well as any other creature, hath; and the fewer and duller the impreſſions are, that are made by them; and the duller the faculties are, that are employed about them; the more remote are they from that knowledge, which is to be found in ſome men. But this being in great variety of degrees (as may be perceived amongſt men) cannot certainly be diſcovered in the ſeveral ſpecies of animals, much leſs in their particular individuals. It ſuffices me only to have remarked here, that perception is the firſt operation of all our intellectual faculties, and the inlet of all knowledge into our minds. And I am apt too to imagine, that it is perception in the loweſt degree of it, which puts the boundaries between animals, and the inferiour ranks of creatures. But this I mention only as my conjecture, by the by; it being indifferent to the matter in hand, which way the learned ſhall determine of it.

CHAP.

CHAP. X.

Of retention.

CHAP. X.

Contemplation.

§ 1. THE next faculty of the mind, whereby it makes a farther progreſs towards knowledge, is that which I call retention, or the keeping of thoſe ſimple ideas, which from ſenſation, or reflection, it hath received. This is done two ways: firſt, by keeping the idea, which is brought into it, for ſome time actually in view; which is called contemplation.

Memory.

§ 2. THE other way of retention, is the power to revive again in our minds thoſe ideas, which after imprinting have diſappeared, or have been as it were laid aſide out of ſight: and thus we do, when we conceive heat or light, yellow or ſweet, the object being removed. This is memory, which is as it were, the ſtore-houſe of our ideas. For the narrow mind of man, not being capable of having many ideas under view, and conſideration at once, it was neceſſary to have a repoſitory to lay up thoſe ideas, which at another time it might have uſe of. But our ideas being nothing but actual perceptions in the mind, which ceaſe to be any thing, when there is no perception of them, this laying up of our ideas in the repoſitory of the memory, ſignifies no more but this, that the mind has a power in many caſes to revive perceptions, which it has once had, with this additional perception annexed to them, that it has had them before. And in this ſenſe it is, that our ideas are ſaid to be in our memories, when indeed they are actually no where; but only there is an ability in the mind, when it will, to revive them again, and, as it were, paint them a-new on itſelf, tho' ſome with more, ſome with leſs difficulty; ſome more lively, and others more obſcurely. And thus it is, by the aſſiſtance of this faculty, that we are ſaid to have all thoſe ideas in our underſtandings, which, tho' we do not actually contemplate, yet we can bring in ſight, and make appear again, and be the objects of our thoughts, without the help of thoſe ſenſible qualities, which firſt imprinted them there.

Attention, repetition, pleaſure and pain, fix ideas.

§ 3. ATTENTION and repetition help much to the fixing any ideas in the memory: but thoſe, which naturally at firſt make the deepeſt and moſt laſting impreſſion, are thoſe which are accompanied with pleaſure or pain. The great buſineſs of the ſenſes, being to make us take notice of what hurts, or advantages, the body, it is wiſely ordered by nature (as has been ſhewn) that pain ſhould accompany the reception of ſeveral ideas; which, ſupplying the place of conſideration and reaſoning in children, and acting quicker than conſideration in grown men, makes both the old and young avoid painful objects, with that haſte which is neceſſary for their preſervation; and in both, ſettles in the memory a caution for the future.

Ideas fade in the memory.

§ 4. CONCERNING the ſeveral degrees of laſting, wherewith ideas are imprinted on the memory, we may obſerve, that ſome of them have been produced in the underſtanding, by an object affecting the ſenſes once only, and no more than once; others, that have more than once offered themſelves to the ſenſes, have yet been little taken notice of: the mind, either heedleſs, as in children, or otherwiſe employed, as in men, intent only on one thing, not ſettling the ſtamp deep into itſelf. And in ſome, where they are ſet on with care and repeated impreſſions, either thro' the temper of the body, or ſome other default, the memory is very weak. In all theſe caſes, ideas in the mind quickly fade, and often vaniſh quite out of the underſtanding, leaving no more footſteps or remaining characters of themſelves, than ſhadows do, flying over fields of corn; and the mind is as void of them, as if they never had been there.

§ 5. THUS many of thoſe ideas, which were produced in the minds of children, in the beginning of their ſenſation, (ſome of which, perhaps, as of ſome pleaſures and pains, were before they were born, and others in their infancy) if in the future courſe of their lives they are not repeated again, are quite loſt, without the leaſt glimpſe remaining of them. This may be obſerved in thoſe, who by ſome miſchance have loſt their ſight, when they were very young, in whom the ideas of colours, having been but ſlightly taken notice of, and ceaſing to be repeated, do quite wear out; ſo that ſome years after, there is no more notion, nor memory of colours left in their minds, than in thoſe of people born blind. The memory in ſome men, it is true, is very tenacious, even to a miracle; but yet there ſeems to be a conſtant decay of all our ideas, even of thoſe which are ſtruck deepeſt, and in minds the moſt retentive; ſo that if they be not ſometimes renewed by repeated exerciſe of the ſenſes, or reflection on thoſe kinds of objects, which at firſt occaſioned them, the print wears out, and at laſt there remains nothing to be ſeen. Thus the ideas, as well as children, of our youth, often die before us: and our minds repreſent to us thoſe tombs, to which we are approaching; where, tho' the braſs and marble remain, yet the inſcriptions are effaced by time, and the imagery moulders away. The pictures drawn in our minds, are laid in fading colours; and if not ſometimes refreſhed, vaniſh and diſappear. How much the conſtitution of our bodies, and the make of our animal ſpirits are concerned in this, and whether the temper of the brain makes this difference, that in ſome it retains the characters drawn on it like marble, in others like free-ſtone, and in others little better than ſand; I ſhall not here enquire: tho' it may ſeem probable, that the conſtitution of the body does ſometimes influence the memory; ſince we oftentimes find a diſeaſe quite ſtrip the mind of all its ideas, and the flames of a fever, in a few days calcine all thoſe images to duſt and confuſion, which ſeemed to be as laſting, as if graved in marble.

Conſtantly repeated ideas can ſcarce be loſt.

§ 6. But, concerning the ideas themſelves, it is eaſy to remark, that thoſe that are ofteneſt refreſhed (amongſt which are thoſe that are conveyed into the mind, by more ways than one) by a frequent return of the objects, or actions, that produced them, fix themſelves beſt in the memory, and remain cleareſt and longeſt there: and therefore thoſe, which are of the original qualities of bodies, viz. ſolidity, extenſion, figure, motion, and reſt; and thoſe, that almoſt conſtantly affect our bodies, as heat and cold; and thoſe, which are the affections of all kinds of beings, as exiſtence, duration, and number, which almoſt every object, that affects our ſenſes, every thought, which employs our minds, bring along with them: theſe, I ſay, and the like ideas, are ſeldom quite loſt, whilſt the mind retains any ideas at all.

In remembering, the mind is oſten active.

§ 7. In this ſecondary perception, as I may ſo call it, or viewing again the ideas that are lodged in the memory, the mind is oftentimes more than barely paſſive; the appearances of thoſe dormant pictures, depending ſometimes on the will. The mind very often ſets itſelf on work, in ſearch of ſome hidden idea, and turns as it were the eye of the ſoul upon it; tho' ſometimes too, they ſtart up in our minds of their own accord, and offer themſelves to the underſtanding; and very often are rouſed and tumbled out of their dark cells, into open day-light, by ſome turbulent and tempeſtuous paſſions: our affections bringing ideas to our memory, which had otherwiſe lain quiet and unregarded. This farther is to be obſerved, concerning ideas lodged in the memory, and upon occaſion revived by the mind, that they are not only (as the word, revive, imports) none of them new ones; but alſo that the mind takes notice of them, as of a former impreſſion, and renews its acquaintance with them, as with ideas it had known before. So that, tho' ideas formerly imprinted are not all conſtantly in view, yet, in remembrance, they are conſtantly known to be ſuch as have been formerly imprinted; i. e. in view, and taken notice of before, by the underſtanding.

Two defects in the memory, oblivion and ſlowneſs.

§ 8. Memory, in an intellectual creature, is neceſſary in the next degree to perception. It is of ſo great moment, that where it is wanting, all the reſt of our faculties are in a great meaſure uſeleſs: and we, in our thoughts, reaſonings, and knowledge, could not proceed beyond preſent objects, were it not for the aſſiſtance of our memories, wherein there may be two defects.

First, That it loſes the idea quite, and ſo far it produces perfect ignorance. For, ſince we can know nothing farther than we have the idea of it, when that is gone, we are in perfect ignorance.

Secondly, That it moves ſlowly, and retrieves not the ideas that it has, and are laid up in ſtore, quick enough to ſerve the mind upon occaſions. This, if it be to a great degree, is ſtupidity; and he, who, thro' this default in his memory, has not the ideas, that are really preſerved there, ready at hand, when need and occaſion calls for them, were almoſt as good be without them quite, ſince they ſerve him to little purpoſe. The dull man, who loſes the opportunity, whilſt he is ſeeking in his mind for thoſe ideas that ſhould ſerve his turn, is not much more happy in his knowledge than one that is perfectly ignorant. It is the buſineſs, therefore, of the memory, to furniſh to the mind thoſe dormant ideas, which it has preſent occaſion for; in the having them ready at hand on all occaſions, conſiſts that which we call invention, fancy, and quickneſs of parts.

§ 9. These are defects, we may obſerve, in the memory of one man compared with another. There is another defect, which we may conceive to be in the memory of man in general, compared with ſome ſuperior, created, intellectual beings, which, in this faculty, may ſo far excel man, that they may have conſtantly in view the whole ſcene of all their former actions, wherein no one of the thoughts, they have ever had, may ſlip out of their ſight. The omniſcience of God, who knows all things paſt, preſent, and to come, and to whom the thoughts of men's hearts always lie open, may ſatisfy us of the poſſibility of this. For who can doubt, but God may communicate to thoſe glorious ſpirits, his immediate attendants, any of his perfections in what proportion he pleaſes, as far as created finite beings can be capable? It is reported of that prodigy of parts Monſieur Paſcal, that, till the decay of his health had impaired his memory, he forgot nothing of what he had done, read, or thought, in any part of his rational age. This is a privilege ſo little known to moſt men, that it ſeems almoſt incredible to thoſe, who, after the ordinary way, meaſure all others by themſelves; but yet, when conſidered, may help us to enlarge our thoughts towards greater perfections of it in ſuperiour ranks of ſpirits. For this of Mr. Paſcal was ſtill with a narrowneſs, that human minds are confined to here, of having great variety of ideas only by ſucceſſion, not all at once: whereas the ſeveral degrees of angels may probably have larger views, and ſome of them be endowed with capacities able to retain together, and conſtantly ſet before them as in one picture, all their paſt knowledge at once. This, we may conceive, would be no ſmall advantage to the knowledge of a thinking man, if all his paſt thoughts and reaſonings could be always preſent to him. And therefore, we may ſuppoſe it one of thoſe ways, wherein the knowledge of ſeparate ſpirits may exceedingly ſurpaſs ours.

Brutes have memory.

§ 10. This faculty of laying up, and retaining the ideas, that are brought into the mind, ſeveral other animals ſeem to have to a great degree, as well as man. For, to paſs by other inſtances, birds learning of tunes, and the endeavours one may obſerve in them to hit the notes right, put it paſt doubt with me, that they have perception, and retain ideas in their memories, and uſe them for patterns. For it ſeems to me impoſſible, that they ſhould endeavour to conform their voices to notes (as it is plain they do) of which they had no ideas. For tho' I ſhould grant ſound may mechanically cauſe a certain motion of the animal ſpirits, in the brains of thoſe birds, whilſt the tune is actually playing; and that motion may be continued on, to the muſcles of the wings, and ſo the bird mechanically be driven away by certain noiſes, becauſe this may tend to the bird's preſervation: yet that can never be ſuppoſed a reaſon, why it ſhould cauſe mechanically, either whilſt the tune was playing, much leſs after it has ceaſed, ſuch a motion in the organs of the bird's voice, as ſhould conform it to the notes of a foreign ſound, which imitation can be of no uſe to the bird's preſervation. But which is more, it cannot, with any appearance of reaſon, be ſuppoſed (much leſs proved) that birds, without ſenſe and memory, can approach their notes nearer, and nearer, by degrees, to a tune played yeſterday; which, if they have no idea of in their memory, is now no where, nor can be a pattern for them to imitate, or which any repeated eſſays can bring them nearer to. Since there is no reaſon, why the ſound of a pipe ſhould leave traces in their brains, which, not at firſt, but by their after-endeavours, ſhould produce the like ſounds; and why the ſounds they make themſelves, ſhould not make traces which they ſhould follow as well as thoſe of the pipe, is impoſſible to conceive.

CHAP. XI.

Of diſcerning, and other operations of the mind.

CHAP. XI.

No knowledge without diſcerning.

§ 1. ANOTHER faculty we may take notice of, in our minds, is that of diſcerning and diſtinguiſhing between the ſeveral ideas it has. It is not enough to have a confuſed perception of ſomething in general: unleſs the mind had a diſtinct perception of different objects and their qualities, it would be capable of very little knowledge; tho' the bodies that affect us were as buſy about us as they are now, and the mind were continually employed in thinking. On this faculty of diſtinguiſhing one thing from another, depends the evidence and certainty of ſeveral, even very general propoſitions, which have paſſed for innate truths; becauſe men overlooking the true cauſe why thoſe propoſitions find univerſal aſſent, impute it wholly to native uniform impreſſions: whereas it in truth depends upon this clear diſcerning faculty of the mind, whereby it perceives two ideas to be the ſame, or different. But of this more hereafter.

The difference of wit and judgment.

§ 2. How much the imperfection of accurately diſcriminating ideas one from another, lies either in the dulneſs, or faults, of the organs of ſenſe; or want of acuteneſs, exerciſe, or attention, in the underſtanding; or haſtineſs and precipitancy, natural to ſome tempers, I will not here examine: it ſuffices to take notice, that this is one of the operations, that the mind may reflect on, and obſerve in itſelf. It is of that conſequence to its other knowledge, that, ſo far as this faculty is in itſelf dull, or not rightly made uſe of, for the diſtinguiſhing one thing from another; ſo far our notions are confuſed, and our reaſon and judgment diſturbed, or miſled. If in having our ideas in the memory ready at hand, conſiſts quickneſs of parts; in this of having them unconfuſed, and being able nicely to diſtinguiſh one thing from another, where there is but the leaſt difference, conſiſts, in a great meaſure, the exactneſs of judgment, and clearneſs of reaſon, which is to be obſerved in one man above another. And hence, perhaps, may be given ſome reaſon of that common obſervation, that men, who have a great deal of wit, and prompt memories, have not always the cleareſt judgment, or deepeſt reaſon: for wit, lying moſt in the aſſemblage of ideas, and putting thoſe together with quickneſs and variety, wherein can be found any reſemblance, or congruity, thereby to make up pleaſant pictures, and agreeable viſions in the fancy; judgment, on the contrary, lies quite on the other ſide, in ſeparating carefully one from another, ideas, wherein can be found the leaſt difference, thereby to avoid being miſled by ſimilitude, and by affinity to take one thing for another. This is a way of proceeding quite contrary to metaphor and alluſion, wherein, for the moſt part, lies that entertainment and pleaſantry of wit which ſtrikes ſo lively on the fancy, and therefore is ſo acceptable to all people; becauſe its beauty appears at firſt ſight, and there is required no labour of thought to examine what truth, or reaſon, there is in it. The mind, without looking any farther, reſts ſatisfied with the agreeableneſs of the picture, and the gaiety of the fancy, and it is a kind of an affront to go about to examine it, by the ſevere rules of truth and good reaſon; whereby it appears, that it conſiſts in ſomething that is not perfectly conformable to them.

Clearneſs alone hinders confuſion.

§ 3. To the well diſtinguiſhing our ideas, it chiefly contributes, that they be clear and determinate: and, when they are ſo, it will not breed any confuſion, or miſtake, about them, tho' the ſenſes ſhould (as ſometimes they do) convey them from the ſame object differently, on different occaſions, and ſo ſeem to err. For tho' a man in a fever ſhould from ſugar have a bitter taſte, which, at another time, would produce a ſweet one; yet, the idea of bitter in that man's mind, would be as clear and diſtinct from the idea of ſweet, as if he had taſted only gall. Nor does it make any more confuſion, between the two ideas of ſweet and bitter, that the ſame ſort of body produces at one time one, and at another time another idea, by the taſte, than it makes a confuſion in two ideas of white and ſweet, or white and round, that the ſame piece of ſugar produces them both in the mind at the ſame time. And the ideas of orange-colour and azure, that are produced in the mind, by the ſame parcel of the infuſion of lignum nephriticum, are no leſs diſtinct ideas, than thoſe of the ſame colours, taken from two very different bodies.

Comparing.

§ 4. THE comparing them one with another, in reſpect of extent, degrees, time, place, or any other circumſtances, is another operation of the mind about its ideas, and is that upon which depends all that large tribe of ideas, comprehended under relation; which, of how vaſt an extent it is, I ſhall have occaſion to conſider hereafter.

Brutes compare but imperfectly.

§ 5. How far brutes partake in this faculty, is not eaſy to determine; I imagine they have it not in any great degree: for tho' they probably have ſeveral ideas diſtinct enough, yet it ſeems to me to be the prerogative of human underſtanding, when it has ſufficiently diſtinguiſhed any ideas, ſo as to perceive them to be perfectly different, and ſo conſequently too, to caſt about and conſider in what circumſtances they are capable to be compared: and therefore, I think, beaſts compare not their ideas farther than ſome ſenſible circumſtances annexed to the objects themſelves. The other power of comparing, which may be obſerved in men belonging to general ideas, and uſeful only to abſtract reaſonings, we may probably conjecture beaſts have not.

Compounding.

§ 6. THE next operation, we may obſerve in the mind about its ideas, is Compoſition; whereby it puts together ſeveral of thoſe ſimple ones it has received from ſenſation and reflection, and combines them into complex ones. Under this of compoſition may be reckoned alſo that of Enlarging; wherein, tho' the compoſition does not ſo much appear, as in more complex ones, yet it is, nevertheleſs, a putting ſeveral ideas together, tho' of the ſame kind. Thus, by adding ſeveral units together, we make the idea of a dozen; and putting together the repeated ideas of ſeveral perches, we frame that of a furlong.

Brutes compound but little.

§ 7. IN this alſo, I ſuppoſe, brutes come far ſhort of men: for tho' they take in, and retain together ſeveral combinations of ſimple ideas; as, poſſibly, the ſhape, ſmell, and voice of his maſter, make up the complex idea a dog has of him, or, rather, are ſo many diſtinct marks, whereby he knows him; yet, I do not think they do of themſelves ever compound them, and make complex ideas: and perhaps, even where we think they have complex ideas, it is only one ſimple one that directs them in the knowledge of ſeveral things, which, poſſibly, they diſtinguiſh leſs by their ſight than we imagine: for I have been credibly informed, that a bitch will nurſe, play with, and be fond of young foxes, as much as, and in place of her puppies, if you can but get them once to ſuck her ſo long, that her milk may go thro' them. And thoſe animals, which have a numerous brood of young ones at once, appear not to have any knowledge of their number: for, tho' they are mightily concerned for any of their young that are taken from them, whilſt they are in ſight, or hearing; yet, if one, or two, of them be ſtolen from them in their abſence, or without noiſe, they appear not to miſs them, or to have any ſenſe that their number is leſſened.

Naming.

§ 8. WHEN children have, by repeated ſenſations, got ideas fixed in their memories, they begin, by degrees, to learn the uſe of ſigns. And, when they have got the ſkill to apply the organs of ſpeech to the framing of articulate ſounds, they begin to make uſe of words, to ſignify their ideas to others. Theſe verbal ſigns they ſometimes borrow from others, and ſometimes make themſelves, as one may obſerve among the new and unuſual names children often give to things, in their firſt uſe of language.

Abſtracting.

§ 9. THE uſe of words then being to ſtand as outward marks of our internal ideas, and thoſe ideas being taken from particular things, if every particular idea that we take in, ſhould have a diſtinct name, names muſt be endleſs. To prevent this, the mind makes the particular ideas, received from particular objects, to become general; which is done by conſidering them as they are in the mind ſuch appearances, ſeparate from all other exiſtences, and the circumſtances of real exiſtence, as time, place, or any other concomitant ideas. This is called Abſtraction, whereby ideas, taken from particular beings, become general repreſentatives of all of the ſame kind, and their names, general names, applicable to whatever exiſts conformable to ſuch abſtract ideas. Such preciſe, naked appearances in the mind, without conſidering how, whence, or with what others they came there, the underſtanding lays up (with names commonly annexed to them) as the ſtandards to rank real exiſtences into ſorts, as they agree with theſe patterns, and to denominate them accordingly. Thus, the ſame colour, being obſerved to day in chalk, or ſnow, which the mind, yeſterday, received from milk, it conſiders that appearance alone makes it a repreſentative of all of that kind; and having given it the name, whiteneſs, it, by that ſound, ſignifies the ſame quality, whereſoever to be imagined, or met with: and thus univerſals, whether ideas, or terms, are made.

Brutes abſtract not.

§ 10. If it may be doubted, whether beaſts compound and enlarge their ideas that way to any degree; this, I think, I may be poſitive in, that the power of abſtracting is not at all in them; and that the having of general ideas, is that which puts a perfect diſtinction betwixt man and brutes, and is an excellency, which the faculty of brutes do, by no means, attain to. For it is evident, we obſerve no footſteps in them, of making uſe of general ſigns for univerſal ideas; from which we have reaſon to imagine, that they have not the faculty of abſtracting, or making general ideas, ſince they have no uſe of words, or any other general ſigns.

§ 11. Nor can it be imputed to their want of fit organs to frame articulate ſounds, that they have no uſe, or knowledge, of general words; ſince many of them, we find, can faſhion ſuch ſounds, and pronounce words diſtinctly enough, but never with any ſuch application. And on the other ſide, men, who, thro' ſome defect in the organs, want words, yet fail not to expreſs their univerſal ideas by ſigns, which ſerve them inſtead of general words; a faculty which we ſee beaſts come ſhort in. And therefore, I think, we may ſuppoſe, that it is in this, that the ſpecies of brutes are diſcriminated from man; and it is that proper difference, wherein they are wholly ſeparated, and which at laſt widens to ſo vaſt a diſtance: for if they have any ideas at all, and are not bare machines (as ſome would have them) we cannot deny them to have ſome reaſon. It ſeems as evident to me, that they do ſome of them, in certain inſtances, reaſon, as that they have ſenſe; but it is only in particular ideas, juſt as they received them from their ſenſes. They are the beſt of them tied up within thoſe narrow bounds, and have not (as I think) the faculty to enlarge them by any kind of abſtraction.

Idiots and madmen.

§ 12. How far idiots are concerned in the want, or weakneſs, of any, or all of the foregoing faculties, an exact obſervation of their ſeveral ways of faltering would no doubt diſcover: for thoſe, who either perceive but dully, or retain the ideas that come into their minds but ill, who cannot readily excite or compound them, will have little matter to think on. Thoſe, who cannot diſtinguiſh, compare, and abſtract, would hardly be able to underſtand and make uſe of language, or judge, or reaſon to any tolerable degree; but only a little and imperfectly about things preſent, and very familiar to their ſenſes. And indeed, any of the forementioned faculties, if wanting, or out of order, produce ſuitable defects in men's underſtandings and knowledge.

§ 13. In fine, the defects in naturals ſeem to proceed from want of quickneſs, activity, and motion in the intellectual faculties, whereby they are deprived of reaſon; whereas madmen, on the other ſide, ſeem to ſuffer by the other extreme: for they do not appear to me to have loſt the faculty of reaſoning; but having joined together ſome ideas very wrongly, they miſtake them for truths, and they err, as men do that argue right from wrong principles. For, by the violence of their imaginations, having taken their fancies for realities, they make right deductions from them. Thus you ſhall find a diſtracted man fancying himſelf a king, with a right inference, require ſuitable attendance, reſpect, and obedience: others, who have thought themſelves made of glaſs, have uſed the caution neceſſary to preſerve ſuch brittle bodies. Hence it comes to paſs, that a man who is very ſober, and of a right underſtanding in all other things, may in one particular, be as frantick as any in Bedlam; if either by any ſudden very ſtrong impreſſion, or long fixing his fancy upon one ſort of thoughts, incoherent ideas have been cemented together ſo powerfully, as to remain united. But there are degrees of madneſs, as of folly; the diſorderly jumbling ideas together, is in ſome more, and ſome leſs. In ſhort, herein ſeems to lie the difference between idiots and madmen, that madmen put wrong ideas together, and ſo make wrong propoſitions, but argue and reaſon right from them; but idiots make very few or no propoſitions, and reaſon ſcarce at all.

Method.

§ 14. These, I think, are the firſt faculties and operations of the mind, which it makes uſe of in underſtanding; and tho' they are exerciſed about all its ideas in general, yet the inſtances I have hitherto given, have been chiefly in ſimple ideas: and I have ſubjoined the explication of theſe faculties of the mind, to that of ſimple ideas, before I come to what I have to ſay concerning complex ones, for theſe following reaſons:

First, Becauſe ſeveral of theſe faculties being exerciſed at firſt, principally about ſimple ideas, we might, by following nature in its ordinary method, trace and diſcover them in their riſe, progreſs, and gradual improvements.

Secondly, Becauſe, obſerving the faculties of the mind, how they operate about ſimple ideas, which are uſually, in moſt men's minds, much more clear, preciſe, and diſtinct, than complex ones; we may the better examine and learn how the mind abſtracts, denominates, compares, and exerciſes its other operations, about thoſe which are complex, wherein we are much more liable to miſtake.

Thirdly, Becauſe theſe very operations of the mind, about ideas, received from ſenſation, are themſelves, when reflected on, another ſet of ideas, derived from that other ſource of our knowledge which I call reflection, and therefore fit to be conſidered in this place, after the ſimple ideas of ſenſation. Of compounding, comparing, abſtracting, &c. I have but juſt ſpoken, having occaſion to treat of them more at large in other places.

These are the beginnings of human knowledge.

§ 15. And thus I have given a ſhort, and, I think, true hiſtory of the firſt beginnings of human knowledge, whence the mind has its firſt objects, and by what ſteps it makes its progreſs, to the laying in, and ſtoring up thoſe ideas, out of which is to be framed all the knowledge it is capable of; wherein I muſt appeal to experience and obſervation, whether I am in the right: the beſt way to come to truth, being to examine things as really they are, and not to conclude they are, as we fancy of ourſelves, or have been taught by others to imagine.

Appeal to experience.

§ 16. To deal truly, this is the only way that I can diſcover, whereby the ideas of things are brought into the underſtanding: if other men have either innate ideas, or infuſed principles, they have reaſon to enjoy them; and if they are ſure of it, it is impoſſible for others to deny them the privilege that they have above their neighbours. I can ſpeak but of what I find in myſelf, and is agreeable to thoſe notions; which, if we will examine the whole courſe of men, in their ſeveral ages, countries, and educations, ſeem to depend on thoſe foundations which I have laid, and to correſpond with this method, in all the parts and degrees thereof.

Dark room.

§ 17. I pretend not to teach, but to enquire, and therefore cannot but confeſs here again, that external and internal ſenſation are the only paſſages that I can find of knowledge to the underſtanding. Theſe alone, as far as I can diſcover, are the windows, by which light is let into this dark room: for methinks the underſtanding is not much unlike a cloſet, wholly ſhut from light, with only ſome little opening left, to let in external viſible reſemblances, or ideas of things without: would the pictures coming into ſuch a dark room but ſtay there and lie ſo orderly as to be found upon occaſion, it would very much reſemble the underſtanding of a man, in reference to all objects of ſight, and the ideas of them.

These are my gueſſes concerning the means, whereby the underſtanding comes to have and retain ſimple ideas, and the modes of them, with ſome other operations about them. I proceed now to examine ſome of theſe ſimple ideas and their modes, a little more particularly.

CHAP. XII.

Of complex ideas.

CHAP. XII.

Made by the mind out of ſimple ones.

§ 1. WE have hitherto conſidered thoſe ideas, in the reception whereof the mind is only paſſive, which are thoſe ſimple ones, received from ſenſation and reflection before mentioned, whereof the mind cannot make one to itſelf, nor have any idea, which does not wholly conſiſt of them. But, as the mind is wholly paſſive in the reception of all its ſimple ideas, ſo it exerts ſeveral acts of its own, whereby, out of its ſimple ideas, as the materials and foundations of the reſt, the other are framed. The acts of the mind, wherein it exerts its power over its ſimple ideas, are chiefly theſe three: 1. Combining ſeveral ſimple ideas into one compound one, and thus all complex ideas are made. 2. The ſecond is bringing two ideas, whether ſimple or complex, together, and ſetting them by one another, ſo as to take a view of them at once, without uniting them into one; by which way it gets all its ideas of relations. 3. The third is ſeparating them from all other ideas, that accompany them in their real exiſtence; this is called Abſtraction: and thus all its general ideas are made. This ſhews man's power, and its way of operation, to be much what the ſame in the material and intellectual world. For the materials in both being ſuch as he has no power over, either to make or deſtroy, all that man can do, is either to unite them together, or to ſet them by one another, or wholly ſeparate them. I ſhall here begin with the firſt of theſe, in the conſideration of complex ideas, and come to the other two, in their due places. As ſimple ideas are obſerved to exiſt, in ſeveral combinations united together, ſo the mind has a power to conſider ſeveral of them, united together, as one idea; and that not only as they are united in external objects, but as itſelf has joined them. Ideas, thus made of ſeveral ſimple ones put together, I call complex; ſuch as are beauty, gratitude, a man, an army, the univerſe; which tho' complicated of various ſimple ideas, or complex ideas made up of ſimple ones, yet are, when the mind pleaſes, conſidered each, by itſelf, as one entire thing, and ſignified by one name.

Made voluntarily.

§ 2. IN this faculty of repeating and joining together its ideas, the mind has great power, in varying and multiplying the objects of its thoughts, infinitely beyond what ſenſation or reflection furniſhed it with; but all this ſtill confined to thoſe ſimple ideas, which it received from thoſe two ſources, and which are the ultimate materials of all its compoſitions: for ſimple ideas are all from things themſelves, and of theſe the mind can have no more, nor other than what are ſuggeſted to it. It can have no other ideas of ſenſible qualities than what come from without, by the ſenſes, nor any ideas of other kind of operations, of a thinking ſubſtance, than what it finds in itſelf; but, when it has once got theſe ſimple ideas, it is not confined barely to obſervation, and what offers itſelf from without: it can by its own power, put together thoſe ideas it has, and make new complex ones, which it never received ſo united.

Are either modes, ſubſtances, or relations.

§ 3. COMPLEX ideas, however compounded and decompounded, tho' their number be infinite, and the variety endleſs, wherewith they fill and entertain the thoughts of men; yet, I think, they may be all reduced under theſe three heads. 1. Modes, 2. Subſtances, 3. Relations.

Modes.

§ 4. FIRST, Modes I call ſuch complex ideas, which, however compounded, contain not in them the ſuppoſition of ſubſiſting by themſelves, but are conſidered as dependances on, or affections of ſubſtances; ſuch are the ideas, ſignified by the words triangle, gratitude, murder, &c. And if in this I uſe the word mode in ſomewhat a different ſenſe from its ordinary ſignification, I beg pardon; it being unavoidable in diſcourſes, differing from the ordinary, received notions, either to make new words, or to uſe old words, in ſomewhat a new ſignification: the latter whereof, in our preſent caſe, is perhaps the more tolerable of the two.

Simple and mixed modes.

§ 5. Of theſe modes, there are two ſorts which deſerve diſtinct conſideration. Firſt, there are ſome which are only variations, or different combinations of the ſame ſimple idea, without the mixture of any other; as a dozen, or ſcore; which are nothing but the ideas of ſo many diſtinct units added together: and theſe I call ſimple modes, as being contained within the bounds of one ſimple idea.

Secondly, There are others compounded of ſimple ideas of ſeveral kinds, put together to make one complex one; v. g. beauty, conſiſting of a certain compoſition of colour and figure, cauſing delight in the beholder; theft, which being the concealed change of the poſſeſſion of any thing, without the conſent of the proprietor, contains, as is viſible, a combination of ſeveral ideas of ſeveral kinds: and theſe I call mixed modes.

Subſtances ſingle or collective.

§ 6. Secondly, The ideas of ſubſtances are ſuch combinations of ſimple ideas, as are taken to repreſent diſtinct particular things, ſubſiſting by themſelves: in which the ſuppoſed, or confuſed idea of ſubſtance, ſuch as it is, is always the firſt and chief. Thus, if to ſubſtance be joined the ſimple idea of a certain dull, whitiſh colour, with certain degrees of weight, hardneſs, ductility and fuſibility, we have the idea of lead; and a combination of the ideas of a certain ſort of figure, with the powers of motion, thought, and reaſoning, joined to ſubſtance, make the ordinary idea of a man. Now of ſubſtances alſo there are two ſorts of ideas, one of ſingle ſubſtances, as they exiſt ſeparately, as of a man, or a ſheep; the other of ſeveral of thoſe put together, as an army of men, or flock of ſheep: which collective ideas of ſeveral ſubſtances thus put together, are as much each of them one ſingle idea, as that of a man, or an unit.

Relation.

§ 7. Thirdly, The laſt ſort of complex ideas, is that we call relation, which conſiſts in the conſideration and comparing one idea with another. Of theſe ſeveral kinds we ſhall treat in their order.

The abſtruſeſt ideas from theſe two ſources.

§ 8. If we trace the progreſs of our minds, and with attention obſerve how it repeats, adds together, and unites its ſimple ideas, received from ſenſation or reflection, it will lead us farther, than at firſt perhaps we ſhould have imagined. And I believe we ſhall find, if we warily obſerve the originals of our notions, that even the moſt abſtruſe ideas, how remote ſoever they may ſeem from ſenſe, or from any operation of our minds, are yet only ſuch as the underſtanding frames to itſelf, by repeating and joining together ideas, that it had either from objects of ſenſe, or from its own operations about them: ſo that thoſe even large and abſtract ideas, are derived from ſenſation or reflection, being no other than what the mind, by the ordinary uſe of its own faculties, employed about ideas, received from objects of ſenſe, or from the operations it obſerves in itſelf about them, may and does attain unto. This I ſhall endeavour to ſhew, in the ideas we have of ſpace, time, and infinity, and ſome few others, that ſeem the moſt remote from thoſe originals.

CHAP. XIII.

Of ſimple modes; and, firſt, of the ſimple modes of ſpace.

Chap. XIII.

Simple modes.

§ 1. THO' in the foregoing part I have often mentioned ſimple ideas which are truly the materials of all our knowledge; yet having treated of them there, rather in the way that they come into the mind, than as diſtinguiſhed from others more compounded, it will not be perhaps amiſs to take a view of ſome of them again under this conſideration, and examine thoſe different modifications of the ſame idea; which the mind either finds in things exiſting, or is able to make within itſelf, without the help of any extrinſecal object, or any foreign ſuggeſtion.

Those modifications of any one ſimple idea (which, as has been ſaid, I call ſimple modes) are as perfectly different and diſtinct ideas in the mind, as thoſe of the greateſt diſtance and contrariety. For the idea of two is as diſtinct from that of one, as blueneſs from heat, or either of them, from any number: and yet it is made up only of that ſimple idea of an unit repeated; and repetitions of this kind joined together, make thoſe diſtinct ſimple modes, of a dozen, a groſs, a million.

Idea of ſpace.

§ 2. I shall begin with the ſimple idea of ſpace. I have ſhewed above, chap. iv. that we get the idea of ſpace, both by our ſight and touch; which, I think, is ſo evident, that it would be as needleſs to go to prove that men perceive, by their ſight, a diſtance between bodies of different colours, or between the parts of the ſame body, as that they ſee colours themſelves; nor is it leſs obvious, that they can do ſo, in the dark, by feeling and touch.

Space and extenſion.

§ 3. This ſpace, conſidered barely in length between any two beings, without conſidering any thing elſe between them, is called diſtance; if conſidered in length, breadth, and thickneſs, I think it may be called capacity. The term extenſion, is uſually applied to it, in what manner ſoever conſidered.

Immenſity.

§ 4. Each different diſtance, is a different modification of ſpace; and each idea of any different diſtance, or ſpace, is a ſimple mode of this idea. Men, for the uſe, and by the cuſtom of meaſuring, ſettle in their minds the ideas of certain ſtated lengths, ſuch as are an inch, foot, yard, fathom, mile, diameter of the earth, &c. which are ſo many diſtinct ideas, made up only of ſpace. When any ſuch ſtated lengths, or meaſures of ſpace, are made familiar to men's thoughts, they can, in their minds, repeat them as often as they will, without mixing or joining to them the idea body, or any thing elſe; and frame to themſelves the ideas of long, ſquare, or cubic, feet, yards, or fathoms, here amongſt the bodies of the univerſe, or elſe beyond the utmoſt bounds of all bodies; and by adding theſe ſtill one to another, enlarge their idea of ſpace, as much as they pleaſe. This power of repeating, or doubling any idea we have of any diſtance, and adding it to the former, as often as we will, without being ever able to come to any ſtop or ſtint, let us enlarge it as much as we will, is that which gives us the idea of immenſity.

Figure.

§ 5. There is another modification of this idea, which is nothing but the relation, which the parts of the termination of extenſion, or circumſcribed ſpace, have amongſt themſelves. This the touch diſcovers in ſenſible bodies, whoſe extremities come within our reach; and the eye takes, both from bodies and colours, whoſe boundaries are within its view: where, obſerving how the extremities terminate either in ſtreight lines, which meet at diſcernible angles; or in crooked lines, wherein no angles can be perceived, by conſidering theſe as they relate to one another, in all parts of the extremities of any body, or ſpace, it has that idea we call figure, which affords to the mind infinite variety. For, beſides the vaſt number of different figures that do really exiſt in the coherent maſſes of matter, the ſtock that the mind has in its power, by varying the idea of ſpace, and thereby making ſtill new compoſitions, by repeating its own ideas, and joining them as it pleaſes, is perfectly inexhauſtible; and ſo it can multiply figures in infinitum.

§ 6. For the mind, having a power to repeat the idea of any length directly ſtretched out, and join it to another in the ſame direction, which is to double the length of that ſtreight line, or elſe join it to another with what inclination it thinks fit, and ſo make what ſort of angles it pleaſes; and being able alſo to ſhorten any line it imagines, by taking from it one half, or one fourth, or what part it pleaſes, without being able to come to an end of any ſuch diviſions, it can make an angle of any bigneſs; ſo, alſo, the lines, that are its ſides, of what length it pleaſes; which joining again to other lines of different lengths, and at different angles, till it has wholly incloſed any ſpace, it is evident, that it can multiply figures both in their ſhape and capacity in infinitum; all which are but ſo many different ſimple modes of ſpace.

The ſame that it can do with ſtreight lines, it can do alſo with crooked, or crooked and ſtreight together; and the ſame it can do in lines, it can alſo in ſuperficies; by which we may be led into farther thoughts of the endleſs variety of figures, that the mind has a power to make, and thereby to multiply the ſimple modes of ſpace.

Place.

§ 7. ANOTHER idea coming under this head, and belonging to this tribe, is that we call place: as, in ſimple ſpace, we conſider the relation of diſtance between any two bodies, or points; ſo, in our idea of place, we conſider the relation of diſtance betwixt any thing, and any two, or more points, which are conſidered as keeping the ſame diſtance one with another, and ſo conſidered as at reſt: for when we find any thing at the ſame diſtance now, which it was yeſterday, from any two, or more points, which have not ſince changed their diſtance one with another, and with which we then compared it, we ſay it hath kept the ſame place; but if it hath ſenſibly altered its diſtance with either of thoſe points, we ſay it hath changed its place: tho', vulgarly ſpeaking, in the common notion of place, we do not always exactly obſerve the diſtance from preciſe points; but from larger portions of ſenſible objects, to which we conſider the thing placed to bear relation, and its diſtance from which we have ſome reaſon to obſerve.

§ 8. THUS, a company of cheſs-men, ſtanding on the ſame ſquares of the cheſs-board, where we left them, we ſay they are all in the ſame place, or unmoved; tho', perhaps, the cheſs-board hath been in the mean time carried out of one room into another, becauſe we compared them only to the parts of the cheſs-board, which keep the ſame diſtance one with another. The cheſs-board, we alſo ſay, is in the ſame place it was, if it remain in the ſame part of the cabin, tho', perhaps, the ſhip, which it is in, ſails all the while: and the ſhip is ſaid to be in the ſame place, ſuppoſing it kept the ſame diſtance with the parts of the neighbouring land; tho', perhaps, the earth hath turned round: and ſo both cheſs-men, and board, and ſhip, have every one changed place, in reſpect of remoter bodies, which have kept the ſame diſtance one with another. But yet the diſtance from certain parts of the board being that which determines the place of the cheſs-men; and the diſtance from the fixed parts of the cabin (with which we made the compariſon) being that which determined the place of the cheſs-board; and the fixed parts of the earth, that by which we determined the place of the ſhip; theſe things may be ſaid to be in the ſame place in thoſe reſpects: tho' their diſtance from ſome other things, which, in this matter, we did not conſider, being varied, they have, undoubtedly, changed place in that reſpect, and we our ſelves ſhall think ſo, when we have occaſion to compare them with thoſe other.

§ 9. BUT this modification of diſtance, we call place, being made by men, for their common uſe, that by it they might be able to deſign the particular poſition of things, where they had occaſion for ſuch deſignation; men conſider and determine of this place, by reference to thoſe adjacent things, which beſt ſerved to their preſent purpoſe, without conſidering other things, which, to another purpoſe, would better determine the place of the ſame thing. Thus, in the cheſs-board, the uſe of the deſignation of the place of each cheſs-man, being determined only within that checquered piece of wood; it would croſs that purpoſe, to meaſure it by any thing elſe: but, when theſe very cheſs-men are put up in a bag, if any one ſhould aſk where the black king is, it would be proper to determine the place, by the parts of the room it was in, and not by the cheſs-board; there being another uſe of deſigning the place it is now in, than when in play it was on the cheſs-board, and ſo muſt be determined by other bodies. So, if any one ſhould aſk, in what place are the verſes, which report the ſtory of Niſus and Euryalus, it would be very improper to determine this place, by ſaying they were in ſuch a part of the earth, or in Bodley's library: but the right deſignation of the place would be, by the parts of Virgil's works; and the proper anſwer would be, that theſe verſes were about the middle of the ninth book of his Æneids; and that they have been always conſtantly in the ſame place, ever ſince Virgil was printed: which is true, tho' the book itſelf hath moved a thouſand times; the uſe of the idea of place here, being to know only in what part of the book that ſtory is, that ſo, upon occaſion, we may know where to find it, and have recourſe to it for our uſe.

§ 10. THAT our idea of place is nothing elſe, but ſuch a relative poſition of any thing, as I have before mentioned, I think is plain, and will be eaſily admitted, when we conſider that we can have no idea of the place of the univerſe, tho' we can of all the parts of it; becauſe beyond that we have not the idea of any fixed, diſtinct, particular beings, in reference to which we can imagine it to have any relation of diſtance; but all beyond it is one uniform ſpace, or expanſion, wherein the mind finds no variety, no marks. For to ſay, that the world is ſomewhere, means no more than that it does exiſt: this, tho' a phraſe borrowed from place, ſignifying only its exiſtence, not location; and when one can find out, and frame in his mind clearly and diſtinctly the place of the univerſe, he will be able to tell us, whether it moves, or ſtands ſtill, in the undiſtinguiſhable innane of infinite ſpace; tho' it be true, that the word place has, ſometimes, a more confuſed ſenſe, and ſtands for that ſpace which any body takes up; and ſo the univerſe is in a place. The idea, therefore, of place we have by the ſame means that we get the idea of ſpace, (whereof this is but a particular, limited conſideration) viz. by our ſight and touch; by either of which we receive into our minds the ideas of extenſion, or diſtance.

Extenſion and body, not the ſame.

§ 11. There are ſome, that would perſuade us, that body and extenſion are the ſame thing; who either change the ſignification of words, which I would not ſuſpect them of, they having ſo ſeverely condemned the philoſophy of others, becauſe it hath been too much placed in the uncertain meaning, or deceitful obſcurity of doubtful, or inſignificant terms. If, therefore, they mean by body, and extenſion, the ſame that other people do, viz. by body, ſomething, that is ſolid and extended, whoſe parts are ſeparable and moveable different ways; and by extenſion, only the ſpace that lies between the extremities of thoſe ſolid, coherent parts, and which is poſſeſſed by them; they confound very different ideas one with another. For I appeal to every man's own thoughts, whether the idea of ſpace be not as diſtinct from that of ſolidity, as it is from the idea of ſcarlet-colour? It is true, ſolidity cannot exiſt without extenſion, neither can ſcarlet-colour exiſt without extenſion; but this hinders not, but that they are diſtinct ideas. Many ideas require others as neceſſary to their exiſtence, or conception, which, yet, are very diſtinct ideas. Motion can neither be, nor be conceived without ſpace; and yet motion is not ſpace, nor ſpace motion; ſpace can exiſt without it, and they are very diſtinct ideas; and ſo, I think, are thoſe of ſpace and ſolidity. Solidity is ſo inſeparable an idea from body, that upon that depends its filling of ſpace, its contact, impulſe, and communication of motion upon impulſe. And, if it be a reaſon to prove, that ſpirit is different from body, becauſe thinking includes not the idea of extenſion in it; the ſame reaſon will be as valid, I ſuppoſe, to prove, that ſpace is not body, becauſe it includes not the idea of ſolidity in it: ſpace and ſolidity being as diſtinct ideas, as thinking and extenſion, and as wholly ſeparable in the mind one from another. Body, then, and extenſion, it is evident, are two diſtinct ideas. For,

§ 12. First, Extenſion includes no ſolidity, nor reſiſtance to the motion of body, as body does.

§ 13. Secondly, The parts of pure ſpace are inſeparable one from the other; ſo that the continuity cannot be ſeparated, neither really, nor mentally. For I demand of any one, to remove any part of it from another, with which it is continued, even ſo much as in thought. To divide and ſeparate actually, is, as I think, by removing the parts one from another, to make two ſuperficies, where, before, there was a continuity: and to divide mentally, is to make in the mind two ſuperficies, where, before, there was a continuity, and conſider them as removed one from the other; which can only be done, in things conſidered by the mind, as capable of being ſeparated; and, by ſeparation, of acquiring new diſtinct ſuperficies, which they then have not, but are capable of: but neither of theſe ways of ſeparation, whether real, or mental, is, as I think, compatible to pure ſpace.

It is true, a man may conſider ſo much of ſuch a ſpace, as is anſwerable, or commenſurate, to a foot, without conſidering the reſt; which is, indeed, a partial conſideration, but not ſo much as a mental ſeparation, or diviſion: ſince a man can no more mentally divide, without conſidering two ſuperficies, ſeparate one from the other, than he can actually divide, without making two ſuperficies disjoined one from the other: but a partial conſideration is not ſeparating. A man may conſider light in the ſun, without its heat; or mobility in body without its extenſion, without thinking of their ſeparation. One is only a partial conſideration, terminating in one alone; and the other is a conſideration of both, as exiſting ſeparately.

§ 14. THIRDLY, The parts of pure ſpace are immoveable, which follows from their inſeparability; motion being nothing but change of diſtance between any two things: but this cannot be between parts that are inſeparable; which, therefore, muſt needs be at perpetual reſt one amongſt another.

THUS the determined idea of ſimple ſpace diſtinguiſhes it plainly and ſufficiently from body; ſince its parts are inſeparable, immoveable, and without reſiſtance to the motion of body.

The definition of extenſion, explains it not.

§ 15. IF any one aſk me, what this ſpace, I ſpeak of, is? I will tell him, when he tells me what his extenſion is. For to ſay, as is uſually done, that extenſion is to have partes extra partes, is to ſay only, that extenſion is extenſion: for what am I the better informed in the nature of extenſion, when I am told, that extenſion is to have parts that are extended, exterior to parts that are extended, i. e. extenſion conſiſts of extended parts; as if one aſking, what a fibre was; I ſhould anſwer him, that it was a thing made up of ſeveral fibres; would he hereby be enabled to underſtand what a fibre was, better than he did before? Or, rather, would he not have reaſon to think, that my deſign was to make ſport with him, rather than ſeriouſly to inſtruct him.

Diviſion of beings into bodies and ſpirits, proves not ſpace and body the ſame.

§ 16. THOSE who contend that ſpace and body are the ſame, bring this dilemma: either this ſpace is ſomething, or nothing; if nothing be between two bodies, they muſt neceſſarily touch: if it be allowed to be ſomething, they aſk, whether it be body, or ſpirit? To which I anſwer, by another queſtion, who told them, that there was, or could be nothing but ſolid beings, which could not think, and thinking beings that were not extended? which is all they mean by the terms body and ſpirit.

Subſtance which we know not, no proof againſt ſpace without body.

§ 17. IF it be demanded (as uſually it is) whether this ſpace, void of body, be ſubſtance, or accident? I ſhall readily anſwer, I know not; nor ſhall be aſhamed to own my ignorance, till they that aſk, ſhew me a clear diſtinct idea of ſubſtance.

§ 18. I ENDEAVOUR, as much as I can, to deliver myſelf from thoſe fallacies which we are apt to put upon ourſelves, by taking words for things. It helps not our ignorance, to feign a knowledge where we have none, by making a noiſe with ſounds, without clear and diſtinct ſignifications. Names made at pleaſure neither alter the nature of things, nor make us underſtand them, but as they are ſigns of, and ſtand for determined ideas. And I deſire thoſe who lay ſo much ſtreſs on the ſound of theſe two ſyllables, ſubſtance, to conſider whether applying it, as they do, to the infinite incomprehenſible God, to finite ſpirit, and to body, it be in the ſame ſenſe; and whether it ſtands for the ſame idea, when each of thoſe three ſo different beings are called ſubſtances. If ſo, whether it will not thence follow, that God, ſpirits, and body, agreeing in the ſame common nature of ſubſtance, differ any otherwiſe, than in a bare different modification of that ſubſtance; as a tree and a pebble being in the ſame ſenſe body, and agreeing in the common nature of body, differ only in a bare modification of that common matter: which will be a very harſh doctrine. If they ſay, that they apply it to God, finite ſpirits, and matter, in three different ſignifications; and that it ſtands for one idea, when God is ſaid to be a ſubſtance; for another when the ſoul is called ſubſtance; and for a third, when a body is called ſo: if the name ſubſtance ſtands for three ſeveral diſtinct ideas, they would do well to make known thoſe diſtinct ideas, or, at leaſt, to give three diſtinct names to them, to prevent in ſo important a notion the confuſion and errors that will naturally follow from the promiſcuous uſe of ſo doubtful a term; which is ſo far from being ſuſpected to have three diſtinct, that, in ordinary uſe, it has ſcarce one clear diſtinct ſignification: and if they can thus make three diſtinct ideas of ſubſtance, what hinders why another may not make a fourth?

Subſtance and accidents, of little uſe in philoſophy.

§ 19. THEY who firſt ran into the notion of accidents, as a ſort of real beings, that needed ſomething to inhere in, were forced to find out the word ſubſtance to ſupport them. Had the poor Indian philoſopher (who imagined that the earth alſo wanted ſomething to bear it up) but thought of this word ſubſtance, he needed not to have been at the trouble to find an elephant to ſupport it, and a tortoiſe to ſupport his elephant: the word ſubſtance would have done it effectually. And he, that enquired, might have taken it for as good an anſwer from an Indian philoſopher, that ſubſtance, without knowing what it is, is that which ſupports the earth; as we take it for a ſufficient anſwer, and good doctrine, from our European philoſophers, that ſubſtance, without knowing what it is, is that which ſupports accidents. So that of ſubſtance we have no idea of what it is, but only a confuſed obſcure one of what it does.

§ 20. WHATEVER a learned man may do here, an intelligent American, who enquired into the nature of things, would ſcarce take it for a ſatisfactory account, if, deſiring to learn our architecture, he ſhould be told, that a pillar was a thing ſupported by a baſis, and a baſis ſomething that ſupported a pillar. Would he not think himſelf mocked, inſtead of taught, with ſuch an account as this? And a ſtranger to them would be very liberally inſtructed in the nature of books, and the things they contained, if he ſhould be told, that all learned books conſiſted of paper and letter, and that letters were things inhering in paper, and paper a thing that held forth letters: a notable way of having clear ideas of letters and paper; but were the latin words inhærentia and ſubſtantia put into the plain Engliſh ones that anſwer them, and were called ſticking on, and underpropping, they would better diſcover to us the very great clearneſs there is in the doctrine of ſubſtance and accidents, and ſhew of what uſe they are in deciding of queſtions in philoſophy.

A vacuum beyond the utmoſt bounds of body.

§ 21. BUT to return to our idea of ſpace. If body be not ſuppoſed infinite, which I think no one will affirm, I would aſk, whether if God placed a man at the extremity of corporeal beings, he could not ſtretch his hand beyond his body? If he could, then he would put his arm, where there was before ſpace without body; and if there he ſpread his fingers, there would ſtill be ſpace between them without body. If he could not ſtretch out his hand, it muſt be becauſe of ſome external hindrance; (for we ſuppoſe him alive, with ſuch a power of moving the parts of his body that he hath now, which is not in itſelf impoſſible, if God ſo pleaſed to have it; or at leaſt it is not impoſſible for God ſo to move him:) And then I aſk, whether that, which hinders his hand from moving outwards, be ſubſtance or accident, ſomething or nothing? And, when they have reſolved that, they will be able to reſolve themſelves what that is, which is or may be between two bodies at a diſtance, that is not body, and has no ſolidity. In the mean time, the argument is at leaſt as good, that where nothing hinders (as beyond the utmoſt bounds of all bodies) a body put into motion may move on; as where there is nothing between, there two bodies muſt neceſſarily touch: for pure ſpace between, is ſufficient to take away the neceſſity of mutual contact; but bare ſpace in the way, is not ſufficient to ſtop motion. The truth is, theſe men muſt either own that they think body infinite, tho' they are loth to ſpeak it out, or elſe affirm that ſpace is not body. For I would fain meet with that thinking man, that can in his thoughts ſet any bounds to ſpace, more than he can to duration; or by thinking, hope to arrive at the end of either: and, therefore, if his idea of eternity be infinite, ſo is his idea of immenſity; they are both finite or infinite alike.

The power of annihilation proves a vacuum.

§ 22. FARTHER, thoſe, who aſſert the impoſſibility of ſpace exiſting without matter, muſt not only make body infinite, but muſt alſo deny a power in God to annihilate any part of matter. No one, I ſuppoſe, will deny that God can put an end to all motion that is in matter, and fix all the bodies of the univerſe in a perfect quiet and reſt, and continue them ſo as long as he pleaſes. Whoever then will allow, that God can, during ſuch a general reſt, annihilate either this book, or the body of him that reads it, muſt neceſſarily admit the poſſibility of a vacuum: for it is evident that the ſpace, that was filled by the parts of the annihilated body, will ſtill remain, and be a ſpace without body. For the circumambient bodies being in perfect reſt, are a wall of adamant, and in that ſtate make it a perfect impoſſibility, for any other body to get into that ſpace. And indeed the neceſſary motion of one particle of matter, into the place, from whence another particle of matter is removed, is but a conſequence from the ſuppoſition of plenitude; which will therefore need ſome better proof than a ſuppoſed matter of fact, which experiment can never make out: our own clear and diſtinct ideas plainly ſatisfying us, that there is no neceſſary connection between ſpace and ſolidity, ſince we can conceive the one without the other. And thoſe who diſpute for, or againſt a vacuum, do thereby confeſs they have diſtinct ideas of vacuum and plenum, i. e. that they have an idea of extenſion, void of ſolidity, tho' they deny its exiſtence; or elſe they diſpute about nothing at all. For they, who ſo much alter the ſignification of words, as to call extenſion body, and conſequently make the whole eſſence of body to be nothing but pure extenſion, without ſolidity, muſt talk abſurdly, whenever they ſpeak of vacuum, ſince it is impoſſible for extenſion to be without extenſion. For vacuum, whether we affirm, or deny its exiſtence, ſignifies ſpace without body, whoſe very exiſtence no one can deny to be poſſible, who will not make matter infinite, and take from God a power to annihilate any particle of it.

Motion proves a vacuum.

§ 23. But not to go ſo far, as beyond the utmoſt bounds of body in the univerſe, nor appeal to God's omnipotency, to find a vacuum, the motion of bodies, that are in our view and neighbourhood, ſeems to me plainly to evince it. For I deſire any one ſo to divide a ſolid body, of any dimenſion he pleaſes, as to make it poſſible for the ſolid parts, to move up and down freely every way, within the bounds of that ſuperficies, if there be not left in it a void ſpace, as big as the leaſt part, into which he has divided the ſaid ſolid body. And if, where the leaſt particle of the body divided, is as big as a muſtard-ſeed, a void ſpace equal to the bulk of a muſtard-ſeed be requiſite to make room for the free motion of the parts of the divided body, within the bounds of its ſuperficies, where the particles of matter are 100,000,000 times leſs than a muſtard-ſeed, there muſt alſo be a ſpace void of ſolid matter, as big as 100,000,000th part of a muſtard-ſeed; for if it hold in one, it will hold in the other, and ſo on in infinitum. And let this void ſpace be as little as it will, it deſtroys the hypotheſis of plenitude. For, if there can be a ſpace void of body equal to the ſmalleſt ſeparate particle of matter now exiſting in nature, it is ſtill ſpace without body, and makes as great a difference between ſpace and body, as if it were μεγα χάσμα, a diſtance as wide as any in nature. And therefore, if we ſuppoſe not the void ſpace neceſſary to motion, equal to the leaſt parcel of the divided ſolid matter, but to $\frac{1}{10}$ or $\frac{1}{1000}$ of it; the ſame conſequence will always follow, of ſpace without matter.

The ideas of ſpace and body diſtinct.

§ 24. But the queſtion being here, "whether the idea of ſpace or extenſion "be the ſame with the idea of the body," it is not neceſſary to prove the real exiſtence of a vacuum, but the idea of it; which it is plain men have, when they enquire and diſpute, whether there be a vacuum, or no. For, if they had not the idea of ſpace without body, they could not make a queſtion about its exiſtence: and, if their idea of body did not include in it ſomething more than the bare idea of ſpace, they could have no doubt about the plenitude of the world; and it would be as abſurd to demand whether there were ſpace without body, as whether there were ſpace without ſpace, or body without body, ſince theſe were but different names of the ſame idea.

Extenſion being inſeparable from body, proves it not the ſame.

§ 25. It is true the idea of extenſion joins itſelf ſo inſeparably with all viſible and moſt tangible qualities, that it ſuffers us to ſee no one, or feel very few external objects, without taking in impreſſions of extenſion too. This readineſs of extenſion, to make itſelf be taken notice of, ſo conſtantly, with other ideas, has been the occaſion, I gueſs, that ſome have made the whole eſſence of body to conſiſt in extenſion; which is not much to be wondered at, ſince ſome have had their minds, by their eyes and touch, (the buſieſt of all our ſenſes) ſo filled with the idea of extenſion, and as it where wholly poſſeſſed with it, that they allowed no exiſtence to any thing that had not extenſion. I ſhall not now argue with thoſe men, who take the meaſure and poſſibility of all being, only from their narrow and groſs imaginations: but having here to do only with thoſe, who conclude the eſſence of body to be extenſion, becauſe they ſay they cannot imagine any ſenſible quality of any body without extenſion; I ſhall deſire them to conſider, that had they reflected on their ideas of taſtes and ſmells, as much as on thoſe of ſight and touch; nay, had they examined their ideas of hunger and thirſt, and ſeveral other pains, they would have found, that they included in them no idea of extenſion at all; which is but an affection of body, as well as the reſt, diſcoverable by our ſenſes, which are ſcarce acute enough to look into the pure eſſences of things.

§ 26. IF thoſe ideas, which are conſtantly joined to all others, muſt therefore be concluded to be the eſſence of thoſe things, which have conſtantly thoſe ideas joined to them, and are inſeparable from them; then unity is without doubt the eſſence of every thing. For there is not any object of ſenſation, or reflection, which does not carry with it the idea of one: but the weakneſs of this kind of argument we have already ſhewn ſufficiently.

Ideas of ſpace and ſolidity diſtinct.

§ 27. To conclude, whatever men ſhall think, concerning the exiſtence of a vacuum, this is plain to me, that we have as clear an idea of ſpace, diſtinct from ſolidity, as we have of ſolidity diſtinct from motion, or motion from ſpace. We have not any two more diſtinct ideas, and we can as eaſily conceive ſpace, without ſolidity, as we can conceive body, or ſpace, without motion; tho' it be ever ſo certain, that neither body, nor motion, can exiſt without ſpace. But whether any one will take ſpace to be only a relation, reſulting from the exiſtence of other beings at a diſtance, or whether they will think the words of the moſt knowing king Solomon, "The heaven, and the heaven of heavens, cannot contain thee;" or thoſe more emphatical ones of the inſpired philoſopher St. Paul, "In him we live, move, and have our being;" are to be underſtood in a literal ſenſe, I leave every one to conſider: only our idea of ſpace is, I think, ſuch as I have mentioned, and diſtinct from that of body. For, whether we conſider in matter itſelf, the diſtance of its coherent, ſolid parts, and call it, in reſpect of thoſe ſolid parts, extenſion; or whether conſidering it as lying between the extremities of any body, in its ſeveral dimenſions, we call it length, breadth, and thickneſs; or elſe, conſidering it as lying between any two bodies, or poſitive beings, without any conſideration, whether there be any matter or no between, we call it diſtance: however named, or conſidered, it is always the ſame uniform ſimple idea of ſpace, taken from objects, about which our ſenſes have been converſant; whereof, having ſettled ideas in our minds, we can revive, repeat, and add them one to another, as often as we will, and conſider the ſpace, or diſtance ſo imagined, either as filled with ſolid parts, ſo that another body cannot come there, without diſplacing and thruſting out the body that was there before; or elſe, as void of ſolidity, ſo that a body of equal dimenſions to that empty, or pure ſpace may be placed in it, without the removing or expulſion of any thing that was there. But, to avoid confuſion in diſcourſes concerning this matter, it were poſſibly to be wiſhed, that the name extenſion were applied only to matter, or the diſtance of the extremities of particular bodies; and the term expanſion to ſpace in general, with or without ſolid matter poſſeſſing it, ſo as to ſay ſpace is expanded, and body extended. But in this every one has his liberty: I propoſe it only for the more clear and diſtinct way of ſpeaking.

Men differ little in clear ſimple ideas.

§ 28. THE knowing preciſely what our words ſtand for, would, I imagine, in this as well as a great many other caſes, quickly end the diſpute. For I am apt to think that men, when they come to examine them, find their ſimple ideas all generally to agree, tho', in diſcourſe with one another, they perhaps confound one another with different names. I imagine that men, who abſtract their thoughts, and do well examine the ideas of their own minds, cannot much differ in thinking; however they may perplex themſelves with words, according to the way of ſpeaking of the ſeveral ſchools, or ſects, they have been bred up in: tho' amongſt unthinking men, who examine not ſcrupulouſly and carefully their own ideas, and ſtrip them not from the marks men uſe for them, but confound them with words, there muſt be endleſs diſpute, wrangling, and jargon; eſpecially if they be learned, bookiſh men, devoted to ſome ſect, and accuſtomed to the language of it, and have learned to talk after others. But, if it ſhould happen that any two thinking men, ſhould really have different ideas, I do not ſee how they could diſcourſe, or argue one with another. Here I muſt not be miſtaken, to think that every floating imagination in men's brains, is preſently of that ſort of ideas I ſpeak of. It is not eaſy for the mind to put off thoſe confuſed notions and prejudices it has imbibed from cuſtom, inadvertency, and common converſation: it requires pains and aſſiduity to examine its ideas, till it reſolves them into thoſe clear and diſtinct ſimple ones, out of which they are compounded; and to ſee which amongſt its ſimple ones, have or have not a neceſſary connexion and dependance one upon another. Till a man doth this, in the primary and original notions of things, he builds upon floating and uncertain principles, and will often find himſelf at a loſs.

CHAP. XIV.

Of duration, and its ſimple modes.

Duration is fleeting extenſion.

§ 1. THERE is another ſort of diſtance, or length, the idea whereof we get, not from the permanent parts of ſpace, but from the fleeting and perpetually periſhing parts of ſucceſſion. This we call duration, the ſimple modes whereof are any different lengths of it, whereof we have diſtinct ideas; as hours, days, years, &c. time and eternity.

Its idea from reflection on the train of our ideas.

§ 2. THE anſwer of a great man, to one who aſked what time was, "Si non rogas, intelligo," (which amounts to this; the more I ſet myſelf to think of it, the leſs I underſtand it) might perhaps perſuade one, that time, which reveals all other things, is itſelf not to be diſcovered. Duration, time, and eternity, are, not without reaſon, thought to have ſomething very abſtruſe in their nature. But, however remote theſe may ſeem from our comprehenſion, yet, if we trace them right to their originals, I doubt not but one of thoſe ſources of all our knowledge, viz. ſenſation, and reflection, will be able to furniſh us with theſe ideas, as clear and diſtinct as many other, which are thought much leſs obſcure; and we ſhall find, that the idea of eternity itſelf is derived from the ſame common original with the reſt of our ideas.

§ 3. To underſtand time and eternity aright, we ought with attention to conſider what idea it is we have of duration, and how we came by it. It is evident to any one, who will but obſerve what paſſes in his own mind, that there is a train of ideas, which conſtantly ſucceed one another in his underſtanding, as long as he is awake. Reflection on theſe appearances of ſeveral ideas, one after another, in our minds, is that which furniſhes us with the idea of ſucceſſion: and the diſtance between any parts of that ſucceſſion, or between the appearance of any two ideas in our minds, is that we call duration. For, whilſt we are thinking, or whilſt we receive ſucceſſively ſeveral ideas in our minds, we know that we do exiſt; and ſo we call the exiſtence, or the continuation of the exiſtence of ourſelves, or any thing elſe commenſurate to the ſucceſſion of any ideas in our minds, the duration of ourſelves, or any ſuch other thing, co-exiſting with our thinking.

§ 4. THAT we have our notion of ſucceſſion and duration from this original, viz. from reflection on the train of ideas, which we find to appear one after another in our own minds, ſeems plain to me, in that we have no perception of duration, but by conſidering the train of ideas, that take their turns in our underſtandings. When that ſucceſſion of ideas ceaſes, our perception of duration ceaſes with it; which every one clearly experiments in himſelf, whilſt he ſleeps ſoundly, whether an hour or a day, a month or a year; of which duration of things, whilſt he ſleeps or thinks not, he has no perception at all, but it is quite loſt to him; and the moment, wherein he leaves off to think, till the moment he begins to think again, ſeems to him to have no diſtance. And ſo I doubt not it would be to a waking man, if it were poſſible for him to keep only one idea in his mind, without variation, and the ſucceſſion of others: and we ſee, that one who fixes his thoughts very intently on one thing, ſo as to take but little notice of the ſucceſſion of ideas that paſs in his mind, whilſt he is taken up with that earneſt contemplation, lets ſlip out of his account a good part of that duration, and thinks that time ſhorter than it is. But, if ſleep commonly unites the diſtant parts of duration, it is becauſe, during that time, we have no ſucceſſion of ideas in our minds. For if a man, during his ſleep, dreams, and variety of ideas make themſelves perceptible in his mind one after another; he hath then, during ſuch a dreaming, a ſenſation of duration, and of the length of it; by which it is to me very clear, that men derive their ideas of duration from their reflexion on the train of the ideas, they obſerve to ſucceed one another in their own underſtandings; without which obſervation they can have no notion of duration, whatever may happen in the world.

The ideas of duration, applicable to things whilſt we ſleep.

§ 5. INDEED a man having, from reflecting on the ſucceſſion and number of his own thoughts, got the notion, or idea, of duration, he can apply that notion to things which exiſt while he does not think; as he that has got the idea of extenſion from bodies, by his ſight, or touch, can apply it to diſtances, where no body is ſeen, or felt. And therefore, tho' a man has no perception of the length of duration, which paſſed whilſt he ſlept, or thought not; yet, having obſerved the revolution of days and nights, and found the length of their duration to be in appearance regular and conſtant, he can, upon the ſuppoſition that that revolution has proceeded after the ſame manner, whilſt he was aſleep, or thought not, as it uſed to do at other times; he can, I ſay, imagine, and make allowance for, the length of duration, whilſt he ſlept. But, if Adam and Eve (when they were alone in the world) inſtead of their ordinary night's ſleep, had paſſed the whole twenty-four hours in one continued ſleep, the duration of that twenty-four hours had been irrecoverably loſt to them, and been for ever left out of their account of time.

The idea of ſucceſſion not from motion.

§ 6. THUS by reflecting on the appearing of various ideas one after another, in our underſtandings, we get the notion of ſucceſſion; which, if any one ſhould think we did rather get from our obſervation of motion by our ſenſes, he will, perhaps, be of my mind, when he conſiders that even motion produces in his mind an idea of ſucceſſion, no otherwiſe than as it produces there a continued train of diſtinguiſhable ideas. For a man looking upon a body really moving, perceives, yet, no motion at all, unleſs that motion produces a conſtant train of ſucceſſive ideas: v. g. a man becalmed at ſea, out of ſight of land in a fair day, may look on the ſun, or ſea, or ſhip, a whole hour together, and perceive no motion at all in either; tho' it be certain, that two, and, perhaps, all of them, have moved, during that time, a great way. But, as ſoon as he perceives either of them to have changed diſtance with ſome other body, as ſoon as this motion produces any new idea in him, then he perceives that there has been motion. But, wherever a man is with all things at reſt about him, without perceiving any motion at all; if, during this hour of quiet, he has been thinking, he will perceive the various ideas of his own thoughts in his own mind, appearing one after another, and thereby obſerve and find ſucceſſion where he could obſerve no motion.

§ 7. AND this, I think, is the reaſon, why motions, very ſlow, tho' they are conſtant, are not perceived by us; becauſe, in their remove from one ſenſible part towards another, their change of diſtance is ſo ſlow, that it cauſes no new ideas in us, but a good while one after another: and ſo, not cauſing a conſtant train of new ideas to follow one another immediately in our minds, we have no perception of motion; which, conſiſting in a conſtant ſucceſſion, we cannot perceive that ſucceſſion, without a conſtant ſucceſſion of varying ideas ariſing from it.

§ 8. ON the contrary, things that move ſo ſwift, as not to affect the ſenſes diſtinctly, with ſeveral diſtinguiſhable diſtances of their motion, and ſo cauſe not any train of ideas in the mind, are not alſo perceived to move: for any thing, that moves round about in a circle, in leſs time than our ideas are wont to ſucceed one another in our minds, is not perceived to move; but ſeems to be a perfect entire circle of that matter, or colour, and not a part of a circle in motion.

The train of ideas has a certain degree of quickneſs.

§ 9. HENCE I leave it to others to judge, whether it be not probable that our ideas do, whilſt we are awake, ſucceed one another in our minds, at certain diſtances, not much unlike the images in the inſide of a lanthorn, turned round by the heat of a candle. This appearance of theirs in train, tho', perhaps, it may be ſometimes faſter, and ſometimes ſlower, yet, I gueſs, varies not very much in a waking man. There ſeem to be certain bounds to the quickneſs, and ſlowneſs, of the ſucceſſion of thoſe ideas one to another in our minds, beyond which they can neither delay, nor haſten.

§ 10. THE reaſon I have for this odd conjecture, is, from obſerving that in the impreſſions made upon any of our ſenſes, we can but to a certain degree perceive any ſucceſſion; which, if exceeding quick, the ſenſe of ſucceſſion is loſt, even in caſes where it is evident that there is a real ſucceſſion. Let a cannon-bullet paſs thro' a room, and in its way take with it any limb, or fleſhy parts of a man; it is as clear as any demonſtration can be, that it muſt ſtrike ſucceſſively the two ſides of the room: it is alſo evident, that it muſt touch one part of the fleſh firſt; and another after, and ſo in ſucceſſion: and yet I believe no body, who ever felt the pain of ſuch a ſhot, or heard the blow againſt the two diſtant walls, could perceive any ſucceſſion either in the pain, or ſound, of ſo ſwift a ſtroke. Such a part of duration, as this, wherein we perceive no ſucceſſion, is that which we may call an inſtant, and is that which takes up the time of only one idea in our minds, without the ſucceſſion of another, wherein, therefore, we perceive no ſucceſſion at all.

§ 11. THIS alſo happens, where the motion is ſo ſlow, as not to ſupply a conſtant train of freſh ideas to the ſenſes, as faſt as the mind is capable of receiving new ones into it; and ſo other ideas of our own thoughts, having room to come into our minds, between thoſe offered to our ſenſes by the moving body, there the ſenſe of motion is loſt; and the body, tho' it really moves, yet not changing perceivable diſtance with ſome other bodies, as faſt as the ideas of our own minds do naturally follow one another in train, the thing ſeems to ſtand ſtill, as is evident in the hands of clocks, and ſhadows of ſun-dials, and other conſtant, but ſlow motions; where, tho' after certain intervals, we perceive by the change of diſtance that it hath moved, yet the motion itſelf we perceive not.

This train, the meaſure of other ſucceſſions.

§ 12. So that to me it ſeems, that the conſtant and regular ſucceſſion of ideas in a waking man, is, as it were, the meaſure and ſtandard of all other ſucceſſions, whereof, if any one either exceeds the pace of our ideas, as where two ſounds, or pains, &c. take up in their ſucceſſion the duration of but one idea, or elſe where any motion, or ſucceſſion, is ſo ſlow, as that it keeps not pace with the ideas in our minds, or the quickneſs in which they take their turns; as when any one, or more ideas, in their ordinary courſe, come into our mind, between thoſe which are offered to the ſight, by the different perceptible diſtances of a body in motion, or between ſounds, or ſmells, following one another, there alſo the ſenſe of a conſtant continued ſucceſſion is loſt, and we perceive it not, but with certain gaps of reſt between.

The mind cannot fix long on one invariable idea.

§ 13. IF it be ſo that the ideas of our minds, whilſt we have any there, do conſtantly change and ſhift, in a continual ſucceſſion, it would be impoſſible, may any one ſay, for a man to think long of any one thing. By which if it be meant, that a man may have one ſelf-ſame ſingle idea a long time alone in his mind, without any variation at all, I think, in matter of fact, it is not poſſible; for which (not knowing how the ideas of our minds are framed, of what materials they are made, whence they have their light, and how they come to make their appearances) I can give no other reaſon but experience: and I would have any one try, whether he can keep one, unvaried, ſingle idea in his mind, without any other, for any conſiderable time together.

§ 14. FOR trial, let him take any figure, any degree of light, or whiteneſs, or what other he pleaſes; and he will, I ſuppoſe, find it difficult to keep all other ideas out of his mind: but that ſome, either of another kind, or various conſideration of that idea (each of which conſiderations is a new idea) will conſtantly ſucceed one another in his thoughts, let him be as wary as he can.

§ 15. All that is in a man's power in this caſe, I think, is only to mind and obſerve what the ideas are, that take their turns in his underſtanding; or elſe to direct the ſort, and call in ſuch as he hath a deſire, or uſe of: but hinder the conſtant ſucceſſion of freſh ones, I think he cannot, tho' he may commonly chuſe whether he will heedfully obſerve and conſider them.

Ideas, however made, include no ſenſe of motion.

§ 16. Whether theſe ſeveral ideas in a man's mind be made by certain motions, I will not here diſpute; but this I am ſure, that they include no idea of motion, in their appearance; and, if a man had not the idea of motion otherwiſe, I think he would have none at all: which is enough to my preſent purpoſe, and ſufficiently ſhews, that the notice we take of the ideas of our own minds, appearing there one after another, is that, which gives us the idea of ſucceſſion and duration, without which we ſhould have no ſuch ideas at all. It is not then motion, but the conſtant train of ideas in our minds, whilſt we are waking, that furniſhes us with the idea of duration, whereof motion no otherwiſe gives us any perception, than as it cauſes in our minds a conſtant ſucceſſion of ideas, as I have before ſhewed: and we have as clear an idea of ſucceſſion and duration, by the train of other ideas, ſucceeding one another in our minds, without the idea of any motion, as by the train of ideas, cauſed by the uninterrupted, ſenſible change of diſtance between two bodies, which we have from motion; and therefore we ſhould as well have the idea of duration, were there no ſenſe of motion at all.

Time is duration ſet out by meaſures.

§ 17. Having thus got the idea of duration, the next thing natural for the mind to do, is to get ſome meaſure of this common duration, whereby it might judge of its different lengths, and conſider the diſtinct order, wherein ſeveral things exiſt, without which a great part of our knowledge would be confuſed, and a great part of hiſtory be rendered very uſeleſs. This conſideration of duration, as ſet out by certain periods, and marked by certain meaſures, or epochs, is that, I think, which, moſt properly, we call time.

A good meaſure of time muſt divide its whole duration into equal periods.

§ 18. In the meaſuring of extenſion, there is nothing more required but the application of the ſtandard, or meaſure, we make uſe of, to the thing, of whoſe extenſion we would be informed. But in the meaſuring of duration this cannot be done, becauſe no two different parts of ſucceſſion can be put together, to meaſure one another: and nothing being a meaſure of duration, but duration, as nothing is of extenſion, but extenſion, we cannot keep by us any ſtanding, unvarying meaſure of duration, which conſiſts in a conſtant fleeting ſucceſſion, as we can of certain lengths of extenſion, as inches, feet, yards, &c. marked out in permanent parcels of matter. Nothing then could ſerve well for a convenient meaſure of time, but what has divided the whole length of its duration into apparently equal portions, by conſtantly repeated periods. What portions of duration are not diſtinguiſhed, or conſidered as diſtinguiſhed and meaſured by ſuch periods, come not ſo properly under the notion of time, as appears by ſuch phraſes as theſe, viz. before all time, and when time ſhall be no more.

The revolutions of the ſun and moon, the propereſt meaſures of time.

§ 19. The diurnal and annual revolutions of the ſun, as having been, from the beginning of nature, conſtant, regular, and univerſally obſervable by all mankind, and ſuppoſed equal to one another, have been, with reaſon, made uſe of, for the meaſure of duration. But the diſtinction of days and years having depended on the motion of the ſun, it has brought this miſtake with it, that it has been thought that motion and duration were the meaſure one of another: for men, in the meaſuring of the length of time, having been accuſtomed to the ideas of minutes, hours, days, months, years, &c. which they found themſelves, upon any mention of time, or duration, preſently to think on, all which portions of time were meaſured out, by the motion of thoſe heavenly bodies; they were apt to confound time and motion, or, at leaſt, to think that they had a neceſſary connexion one with another: whereas any conſtant, periodical appearance, or alteration of ideas, in ſeemingly equidiſtant ſpaces of duration, if conſtant and univerſally obſervable, would have as well diſtinguiſhed the intervals of time, as thoſe that have been made uſe of. For, ſuppoſing the ſun, which ſome have taken to be a fire, had been lighted up at the ſame diſtance of time, that it now every day comes about to the ſame meridian, and then gone out again about twelve hours after, and that in the ſpace of an annual revolution, it had ſenſibly increaſed in brightneſs and heat, and ſo decreaſed again; would not ſuch regular appearances ſerve to meaſure out the diſtances of duration to all that could obſerve it, as well without as with motion? For, if the appearances were conſtant, univerſally obſervable, and in equidiſtant periods, they would ſerve mankind for meaſure of time as well, were the motion away.

But not by their motion, but periodical appearances.

§ 20. FOR the freezing of water, or the blowing of a plant, returning at equidiſtant periods in all parts of the earth, would as well ſerve men to reckon their years by, as the motions of the ſun: and, in effect, we ſee, that ſome people in America counted their years by the coming of certain birds amongſt them at their certain ſeaſons, and leaving them at others. For a fit of an ague, the ſenſe of hunger, or thirſt, a ſmell, or a taſte, or any other idea, returning conſtantly at equidiſtant periods, and making itſelf univerſally be taken notice of, would not fail to meaſure out the courſe of ſucceſſion, and diſtinguiſh the diſtances of time. Thus we ſee that men born blind count time well enough by years, whoſe revolutions yet they cannot diſtinguiſh by motions, that they perceive not: and, I aſk, whether a blind man, who diſtinguiſhed his years either by the heat of ſummer, or cold of winter; by the ſmell of any flower of the ſpring, or taſte of any fruit of the autumn; would not have a better meaſure of time than the Romans had, before the reformation of their calendar by Julius Cæſar, or many other people, whoſe years, notwithſtanding the motion of the ſun, which they pretend to make uſe of, are very irregular? And it adds no ſmall difficulty to chronology, that the exact length of the years that ſeveral nations counted by, are hard to be known, they differing very much one from another: and, I think, I may ſay, all of them from the preciſe motions of the ſun. And, if the ſun moved from the creation to the flood conſtantly in the æquator, and ſo equally diſperſed its light and heat to all the habitable parts of the earth, in days all of the ſame length, without its annual variations to the tropicks, as a late, ingenious author ſuppoſes[a]; I do not think it very eaſy to imagine, that (notwithſtanding the motion of the ſun) men ſhould, in the antediluvian world, from the beginning, count by years, or meaſure their time by periods, that had no ſenſible marks, very obvious to diſtinguiſh them by.

No two parts of duration can be certainly known to be equal.

§ 21. BUT, perhaps, it will be ſaid, without a regular motion, ſuch as of the ſun, or ſome other, how could it ever be known that ſuch periods were equal? To which I anſwer, the equality of any other returning appearances might be known by the ſame way that that of days was known, or preſumed to be ſo at firſt; which was only by judging of them by the train of ideas, which had paſſed in men's minds in the intervals: by which train of ideas diſcovering inequality in the natural days, but none in the artificial days, the artificial days, or νυχθήμερα, were gueſſed to be equal, which was ſufficient to make them ſerve for a meaſure. Tho' exacter ſearch has ſince diſcovered inequality in the diurnal revolutions of the ſun, and we know not whether the annual alſo be not unequal: theſe, yet, by their preſumed and apparent equality, ſerve as well to reckon time by (tho' not to meaſure the parts of duration exactly) as if they could be proved to be exactly equal. We muſt, therefore, carefully diſtinguiſh betwixt duration itſelf, and the meaſures we make uſe of, to judge of its length. Duration in itſelf is to be conſidered as going on in one conſtant, equal, uniform courſe: but none of the meaſures of it, which we make uſe of, can be known to do ſo; nor can we be aſſured, that their aſſigned parts, or periods, are equal in duration one to another; for two ſucceſſive lengths of duration, however meaſured, can never be demonſtrated to be equal. The motion of the ſun, which the world uſed ſo long, and ſo confidently, for an exact meaſure of duration, has, as I ſaid, been found in its ſeveral parts unequal: and tho' men have of late made uſe of a pendulum, as a more ſteady and regular motion than that of the ſun, or (to ſpeak more truly) of the earth; yet, if any one ſhould be aſked how he certainly knows that the two ſucceſſive ſwings of a pendulm are equal, it would be very hard to ſatisfy him that they are infallibly ſo; ſince we cannot be ſure, that the cauſe of that motion, which is unknown to us, ſhall always operate equally; and we are ſure that the medium, in which the pendulum moves, is not conſtantly the ſame: either of which varying, may alter the equality of ſuch periods, and thereby deſtroy the certainty and exactneſs of the meaſure by motion, as well as any other periods of other appearances; the notion of duration ſtill remaining clear, tho' our meaſures of it cannot any of them be demonſtrated to be exact. Since, then, no two portions of ſucceſſion can be brought together, it is impoſſible ever certainly to know their equality. All that we can do for a meaſure of time, is to take ſuch as have continual ſucceſſive appearances at ſeemingly equidiſtant periods; of which ſeeming equality we have no other meaſure, but ſuch as the train of our own ideas have lodged in our memories, with the concurrence of other probable reaſons, to perſuade us of their equality.

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[a] Dr. Burnet's Theory of the earth.

Time not the meaſure of motion.

§ 22. One thing ſeems ſtrange to me, that, whilſt all men manifeſtly meaſured time by the motion of the great and viſible bodies of the world, time yet ſhould be defined to be the "meaſure of motion;" whereas it is obvious to every one, who reflects ever ſo little on it, that to meaſure motion, ſpace is as neceſſary to be conſidered as time; and thoſe, who look a little farther, will find alſo the bulk of the thing moved, neceſſary to be taken into the computation, by any one who will eſtimate or meaſure motion, ſo as to judge right of it. Nor indeed does motion any otherwiſe conduce to the meaſuring of duration, than as it conſtantly brings about the return of certain ſenſible ideas, in ſeeming equidiſtant periods. For, if the motion of the ſun were as unequal as of a ſhip driven by unſteady winds, ſometimes very ſlow, and at others irregularly very ſwift; or, if being conſtantly equally ſwift, it yet was not circular, and produced not the ſame appearances, it would not at all help us to meaſure time, any more than the ſeeming unequal motion of a comet does.

Minutes, hours, and years, not neceſſary meaſures of duration.

§ 23. Minutes, hours, days and years, are then no more neceſſary to time, or duration, than inches, feet, yards and miles, marked out in any matter, are to extenſion: for tho' we, in this part of the univerſe, by the conſtant uſe of them, as of periods ſet out by the revolutions of the ſun, or as known parts of ſuch periods, have fixed the ideas of ſuch lengths of duration in our minds, which we apply to all parts of time, whoſe lengths we would conſider; yet there may be other parts of the univerſe, where they no more uſe theſe meaſures of our's, than in Japan they do our inches, feet or miles; but yet ſomething analogous to them there muſt be. For, without ſome regular periodical returns, we could not meaſure ourſelves, or ſignify to others the length of any duration, tho' at the ſame time the world were as full of motion as it is now, but no part of it diſpoſed into regular and apparently equidiſtant revolutions. But the different meaſures, that may be made uſe of for the account of time, do not at all alter the notion of duration, which is the thing to be meaſured; no more than the different ſtandards of a foot and a cubit, alter the notion of extenſion to thoſe, who make uſe of thoſe different meaſures.

Our meaſure of time, applicable to duration, before time.

§ 25. The mind, having once got ſuch a meaſure of time, as the annual revolution of the ſun, can apply that meaſure to duration, wherein that meaſure itſelf did not exiſt, and with which, in the reality of its being, it had nothing to do: for ſhould one ſay, that Abraham was born in the two thouſand ſeven hundred and twelfth year of the Julian period, it is altogether as intelligible, as reckoning from the beginning of the world, tho' there were ſo far back no motion of the ſun, nor any other motion at all. For, tho' the Julian period be ſuppoſed to begin ſeveral hundred years before there were really either days, nights, or years, marked out by any revolutions of the ſun; yet we reckon as right, and thereby meaſure duration as well, as if really at that time the ſun had exiſted, and kept the ſame ordinary motion it doth now. The idea of duration, equal to an annual revolution of the ſun, is as eaſily applicable in our thoughts to duration, where no ſun, nor motion was, as the idea of a foot, or yard, taken from bodies, here, can be applied in our thoughts, to diſtances, beyond the confines of the world, where are no bodies at all.

§ 26. For ſuppoſing it were five thouſand ſix hundred and thirty nine miles, or millions of miles, from this place to the remoteſt body of the univerſe (for, being finite, it muſt be at a certain diſtance) as we ſuppoſe it to be five thouſand

ſand ſix hundred and thirty nine years from this time, to the firſt exiſtence of any body in the beginning of the world; we can, in our thoughts, apply this meaſure of a year, to duration before the creation, or beyond the duration of bodies, or motion, as we can this meaſure of a mile to ſpace, beyond the utmoſt bodies: and by the one meaſure duration, where there was no motion, as well as by the other meaſure ſpace in our thoughts, where there is no body.

§ 27. If it be objected to me here, that in this way of explaining of time, I have begged what I ſhould not, viz. "That the world is neither eternal, nor infinite;" I anſwer, that to my preſent purpoſe it is not needful, in this place, to make uſe of arguments, to evince the world to be finite, both in duration, and extenſion; but, it being at leaſt as conceivable as the contrary, I have certainly the liberty to ſuppoſe it, as well as any one hath to ſuppoſe the contrary: and I doubt not but that every one, that will go about it, may eaſily conceive in his mind the beginning of motion, tho' not of all duration, and ſo may come to a ſtop, and non ultra, in his conſideration of motion. So alſo in his thoughts he may ſet limits to body, and the extenſion belonging to it, but not to ſpace, where no body is; the utmoſt bounds of ſpace and duration being beyond the reach of thought, as well as the utmoſt bounds of number are beyond the largeſt comprehenſion of the mind; and all for the ſame reaſon, as we ſhall ſee in another place.

Eternity.

§ 28. By the ſame means therefore, and from the ſame original that we come to have the idea of time, we have alſo that idea, which we call eternity, viz. having got the idea of ſucceſſion and duration, by reflecting on the train of our own ideas, cauſed in us, either by the natural appearances of thoſe ideas coming conſtantly of themſelves into our waking thoughts, or elſe cauſed by external objects, ſucceſſively affecting our ſenſes; and, having, from the revolutions of the ſun, got the ideas of certain lengths of duration, we can, in our thoughts, add ſuch lengths of duration, to one another, as often as we pleaſe, and apply them, ſo added, to durations paſt, or to come: and this we can continue to do on, without bounds, or limits, and proceed in infinitum, and apply thus the length of the annual motion of the ſun to duration, ſuppoſed before the ſun's, or any other motion had its being; which is no more difficult, or abſurd, than to apply the notion I have, of the moving of a ſhadow one hour to-day upon the ſun-dial, to the duration of ſomething laſt night, v. g. the burning of a candle, which is now abſolutely ſeparate from all actual motion, and it is as impoſſible for the duration of that flame, for an hour laſt night, to co-exiſt with any motion that now is, or ever ſhall be, as for any part of duration, that was before the beginning of the world, to co-exiſt with the motion of the ſun now. But yet this hinders not, but that having the idea of the length of the motion of the ſhadow on a dial, between the marks of two hours, I can as diſtinctly meaſure in my thoughts the duration of that candle-light, laſt night, as I can the duration of any thing that does now exiſt: and it is no more than to think, that had the ſun ſhone then on the dial, and moved after the ſame rate it doth now, the ſhadow on the dial would have paſſed from one hour-line to another, whilſt that flame of the candle laſted.

§ 29. The notion of an hour, day, or year, being only the idea I have of the length of certain periodical, regular motions, neither of which motions do ever all at once exiſt, but only in the ideas I have of them in my memory, derived from my ſenſes, or reflection; I can with the ſame eaſe, and for the ſame reaſon, apply it in my thoughts to duration, antecedent to all manner of motion, as well as to any thing that is but a minute, or a day, antecedent to the motion, that at this very moment the ſun is in. All things paſt are equally and perfectly at reſt; and to this way of conſideration of them are all one, whether they were before the beginning of the world, or but yeſterday: the meaſuring of any duration, by ſome motion, depending not at all on the real co-exiſtence of that thing to that motion, or any other periods of revolution; but the having a clear idea of the length of ſome periodical, known motion, or other intervals of duration, in my mind, and applying that to the duration of the thing I would meaſure.

§ 30. Hence we ſee, that ſome men imagine the duration of the world, from its firſt exiſtence to this preſent year 1689, to have been five thouſand ſix hundred and thirty nine years, or equal to five thouſand ſix hundred and thirty nine annual revolutions of the ſun, and others a great deal more: as the Egyptians of old, who, in the time of Alexander, counted twenty three thouſand years from the reign of the ſun; and the Chineſes now, who account the world three million, two hundred and ſixty nine thouſand years old, or more: which longer duration of the world, according to their computation, tho' I ſhould not believe to be true; yet I can equally imagine it with them, and as truly underſtand, and ſay one is longer than the other, as I underſtand that Methuſalem's life was longer than Enoch's. And if the common reckoning of five thouſand, ſix hundred, and thirty-nine ſhould be true (as it may be, as well as any other aſſign'd) it hinders not at all my imagining what others mean, when they make the world a thouſand years older, ſince every one may, with the ſame facility, imagine (I do not ſay believe) the world to be fifty thouſand years old, as five thouſand, ſix hundred, and thirty-nine; and may as well conceive the duration of fifty thouſand years, as five thouſand, ſix hundred, and thirty-nine. Whereby it appears, that to the meaſuring the duration of any thing by time, it is not requiſite that that thing ſhould be co-exiſtent to the motion, we meaſure by, or any other periodical revolution; but it ſuffices to this purpoſe, that we have the idea of the length of any regular, periodical appearances, which we can in our minds apply to duration, with which the motion, or appearance, never coexiſted.

§ 31. For, as in the hiſtory of the creation deliver'd by Moſes, I can imagine that light exiſted three days, before the ſun was, or had any motion, barely by thinking, that the duration of light before the ſun was created, was ſo long as (if the ſun had mov'd then, as it doth now) would have been equal to three of his diurnal revolutions; ſo by the ſame way I can have an idea of the chaos, or angels, being created, before there was either light, or any continued motion, a minute, an hour, a day, a year, or a thouſand years. For, if I can but conſider duration equal to one minute, before either the being or motion of any body, I can add one minute more, till I come to fixty; and by the ſame way of adding minutes, hours, or years, (i. e. ſuch or ſuch parts of the ſun's revolution, or any other period, whereof I have the idea) proceed in infinitum, and ſuppoſe a duration, exceeding as many ſuch periods as I can reckon, let me add whilſt I will: which I think is the notion we have of eternity, of whoſe infinity we have no other notion, than we have of the infinity of number, to which we can add for ever without end.

§ 32. And thus I think it is plain, that from thoſe two fountains of all knowledge before-mentioned, viz. reflection and ſenſation, we get the ideas of duration, and the meaſures of it.

For, firſt, by obſerving what paſſes in our minds, how our ideas there in train conſtantly, ſome vaniſh, and others begin to appear, we come by the idea of ſucceſſion.

Secondly, by obſerving a diſtance in the parts of this ſucceſſion, we get the idea of duration.

Thirdly, by ſenſation obſerving certain appearances, at certain regular and ſeeming equidiſtant periods, we get the ideas of certain lengths, or meaſures of duration, as minutes, hours, days, years, &c.

Fourthly, by being able to repeat thoſe meaſures of time, our ideas of ſtated length of duration in our minds, as often as we will, we can come to imagine duration, where nothing does really endure or exiſt; and thus we imagine tomorrow, next year, or ſeven years hence.

Fifthly, by being able to repeat any ſuch idea of any length of time, as of a minute, a year, or an age, as often as we will in our own thoughts, and adding them to one another, without ever coming to the end of ſuch addition, any nearer than we can to the end of number, to which we can always add, we come by the idea of eternity, as the future, eternal duration of our ſouls, as well as the eternity of that infinite being, which muſt neceſſarily have always exiſted.

SIXTHLY, by conſidering any part of infinite duration, as ſet out by periodical meaſures, we come by the idea of what we call time in general.

CHAP. XIV.

CHAP. XV.

Of duration and expanſion, conſider'd together.

§ 1. THO' we have, in the precedent chapters, dwelt pretty long on the conſiderations of ſpace and duration; yet, they being ideas of general concernment, that have ſomething very abſtruſe and peculiar in their nature, the comparing them one with another may, perhaps, be of uſe for their illuſtration; and we may have the more clear and diſtinct conception of them, by taking a view of them together. Diſtance or ſpace, in its ſimple, abſtract conception, to avoid confuſion, I call expanſion, to diſtinguiſh it from extenſion, which by ſome is uſed to expreſs this diſtance only, as it is in the ſolid parts of matter, and ſo includes, or at leaſt intimates the idea of body: whereas the idea of pure diſtance includes no ſuch thing. I prefer alſo the word expanſion to ſpace, becauſe ſpace is often applied to diſtance of fleeting ſucceſſive parts, which never exiſt together, as well as to thoſe which are permanent. In both theſe (viz. expanſion and duration) the mind has this common idea of continued lengths, capable of greater, or leſs quantities: for a man has as clear an idea of the difference of the length of an hour, and a day, as of an inch and a foot.

CHAP. XV.

Both capable of greater and leſs.

§ 2. THE mind, having got the idea of the length of any part of expanſion, let it be a ſpan, or a pace, or what length you will, can, as has been ſaid, repeat that idea; and ſo adding it to the former, enlarge its idea of length, and make it equal to two ſpans, or two paces; and ſo as often as it will, till it equals the diſtance of any parts of the earth one from another, and increaſe thus, till it amounts to the diſtance of the ſun, or remoteſt ſtar. By ſuch a progreſſion as this, ſetting out from the place where it is, or any other place, it can proceed and paſs beyond all thoſe lengths, and find nothing to ſtop its going on, either in or without body. 'Tis true, we can eaſily in our thoughts come to the end of ſolid extenſion; the extremity and bounds of all body, we have no difficulty to arrive at: but when the mind is there, it finds nothing to hinder its progreſs into this endleſs expanſion; of that it can neither find, nor conceive any end. Nor let any one ſay, that beyond the bounds of body, there is nothing at all, unleſs he will confine God within the limits of matter. Solomon, whoſe underſtanding was filled and enlarged with wiſdom, ſeems to have other thoughts, when he ſays, "heaven, and the heaven of heavens cannot contain thee:" and he, I think, very much magnifies to himſelf the capacity of his own underſtanding, who perſuades himſelf, that he can extend his thoughts farther than God exiſts, or imagine any expanſion where he is not.

Expanſion not bounded by matter.

§ 3. JUST ſo is it in duration. The mind having got the idea of any length of duration, can double, multiply, and enlarge it, not only beyond its own, but beyond the exiſtence of all corporeal beings, and all the meaſures of time, taken from the great bodies of the world, and their motions. But yet every one eaſily admits, that tho' we make duration boundleſs, as certainly it is, we cannot yet extend it beyond all being. God, every one eaſily allows, fills eternity; and it is hard to find a reaſon, why any one ſhould doubt, that he likewiſe fills immenſity. His infinite being is certainly as boundleſs one way as another; and methinks it aſcribes a little too much to matter, to ſay, where there is no body, there is nothing.

Nor duration by motion.

§ 4. HENCE, I think, we may learn the reaſon why every one familiarly, and without the leaſt heſitation, ſpeaks of, and ſuppoſes eternity, and ſticks not to aſcribe infinity to duration; but it is with more doubting and reſerve, that many admit, or ſuppoſe the infinity of ſpace. The reaſon whereof ſeems to me to be this, that duration and extenſion being uſed as names of affections, belonging to other beings, we eaſily conceive in God infinite duration, and we

Why men more eaſily admit infinite duration, than infinite expanſion.

cannot avoid doing ſo: but not attributing to him extenſion, but only to matter, which is finite, we are apter to doubt of the exiſtence of expanſion without matter; of which alone we commonly ſuppoſe it an attribute. And therefore when men purſue their thoughts of ſpace, they are apt to ſtop at the confines of body; as if ſpace were there at an end too, and reached no farther. Or, if their ideas upon conſideration carry them farther, yet they term what is beyond the limits of the univerſe, imaginary ſpace; as if it were nothing, becauſe there is no body exiſting in it. Whereas duration, antecedent to all body, and to the motions which it is meaſured by, they never term imaginary; becauſe it is never ſuppoſed void of ſome other real exiſtence. And, if the names of things may at all direct our thoughts towards the originals of men's ideas (as I am apt to think they may very much) one may have occaſion to think, by the name duration, that the continuation of exiſtence, with a kind of reſiſtance to any deſtructive force, and the continuation of ſolidity, (which is apt to be confounded with, and if we will look into the minute, anatomical parts of matter, is little different from hardneſs) were thought to have ſome analogy, and gave occaſion to words, ſo near of kin as durare and durum eſſe. And that durare is apply'd to the idea of hardneſs, as well as that of exiſtence, we ſee in Horace, epod xvi. "ferro duravit ſæcula." But, be that as it will, this is certain, that whoever purſues his own thoughts, will find them ſometimes launch out, beyond the extent of body, into the infinity of ſpace, or expanſion; the idea whereof is diſtinct and ſeparate from body, and all other things: which may (to thoſe who pleaſe) be a ſubject of farther meditation.

Time to duration, is as place to expanſion.

§ 5. Time in general is to duration, as place to expanſion. They are ſo much of thoſe boundleſs oceans of eternity, and immenſity, as is ſet out and diſtinguiſhed from the reſt, as it were by land-marks; and ſo are made uſe of to denote the poſition of finite, real beings, in reſpect one to another, in thoſe uniform, infinite oceans of duration and ſpace. Theſe, rightly conſidered, are only ideas of determinate diſtances, from certain known points, fixed in diſtinguiſhable ſenſible things, and ſuppoſed to keep the ſame diſtance one from another. From ſuch points, fixed in ſenſible beings, we reckon, and from them we meaſure our portions of thoſe infinite quantities; which, ſo conſidered, are that which we call time and place. For duration and ſpace being in themſelves uniform and boundleſs, the order and poſition of things, without ſuch known ſettled points, would be loſt in them, and all things would lie jumbled in an incurable confuſion.

Time and place are taken for ſo much of either, as are ſet out by the exiſtence and motion of bodies.

§ 6. Time and place taken thus for determinate, diſtinguiſhable portions of thoſe infinite abyſſes of ſpace and duration, ſet out, or ſuppoſed to be diſtinguiſhed from the reſt by marks, and known boundaries, have each of them a twofold acceptation.

First, Time in general, is commonly taken for ſo much of infinite duration, as is meaſured out by, and co-exiſtent with the exiſtence and motions of the great bodies of the univerſe, as far as we know any of them: and in this ſenſe, time begins and ends with the frame of this ſenſible world, as in theſe phraſes before-mentioned, before all time, or when time ſhall be no more: place likewiſe is taken ſometimes for that portion of infinite ſpace, which is poſſeſſed by, and comprehended within the material world; and is thereby diſtinguiſhed from the reſt of expanſion; tho' this may more properly be called extenſion, than place. Within theſe two are confined, and by the obſervable parts of them are meaſur'd and determin'd the particular time, or duration, and the particular extenſion and place of all corporeal beings.

Sometimes for ſo much of either, as we deſign by meaſures, taken from the bulk, or motion of bodies.

§ 7. Secondly, Sometimes the word time is uſed in a larger ſenſe, and is apply'd to parts of that infinite duration, not that were really diſtinguiſh'd, and meaſur'd out, by this real exiſtence, and periodical motions of bodies, that were appointed from the beginning to be for ſigns, and for ſeaſons, and for days, and for years, and are accordingly our meaſures of time; but ſuch other portions too, of that infinite, uniform duration, which we, upon any occaſion, do ſuppoſe equal to certain lengths of meaſured time; and ſo conſider them as bounded, and determined. For, if we ſhould ſuppoſe the creation, or fall of the angels, was at the beginning of the Julian period, we ſhould ſpeak properly enough, and ſhould be underſtood, if we ſaid, 'tis a longer time ſince the creation of angels, than the creation of the world, by ſeven hundred, and ſixty-four years: whereby we would mark out ſo much of that undiſtinguiſh'd duration, as we ſuppoſe equal to, and would have admitted ſeven hundred, and ſixty-four annual revolutions of the ſun, moving at the rate it now does. And thus likewiſe we ſometimes ſpeak of place, diſtance, or bulk in the great innate, beyond the confines of the world, when we conſider ſo much of that ſpace as is equal to, or capable to receive a body, of any aſſign'd dimenſions, as a cubick-foot; or do ſuppoſe a point in it at ſuch a certain diſtance from any part of the univerſe.

They belong to all beings.

§ 8. Where and When are queſtions belonging to all finite exiſtences, and are by us always reckon'd from ſome known parts of this ſenſible world, and from ſome certain epochs mark'd out to us by the motions obſervable in it. Without ſome ſuch fix'd parts, or periods, the order of things would be loſt to our finite underſtandings, in the boundleſs, invariable oceans of duration and expanſion; which comprehend in them all finite beings, and in their full extent belong only to the deity. And therefore, we are apt not to wonder that we comprehend them not, and do ſo often find our thoughts at a loſs, when we would conſider them, either abſtractly in themſelves, or as any way attributed to the firſt incomprehenſible being. But, when applyed to any particular, finite beings, the extenſion of any body is ſo much of that infinite ſpace, as the bulk of that body takes up. And place is the poſition of any body, when conſider'd at a certain diſtance from ſome other. As the idea of the particular duration of any thing is an idea of that portion of infinite duration which paſſes during the exiſtence of that thing; ſo the time, when the thing exiſted, is the idea of that ſpace of duration, which paſs'd between ſome known and fix'd period of duration, and the being of that thing. One ſhews the diſtance of the extremities of the bulk, or exiſtence of the ſame thing, as that it is a foot ſquare, or laſted two years; the other ſhews the diſtance of it in place, or exiſtence, from other fix'd points of ſpace, or duration, as that it was in the middle of Lincolns-inn-fields, or the firſt degree of Taurus, and in the year of our Lord 1671, or the 1000th year of the Julian period: all which diſtances we meaſure, by preconceiv'd ideas of certain lengths of ſpace and duration, as inches, feet, miles, and degrees; and in the other, minutes, days, and years, &c.

All the parts of extenſion, are extenſion; and all the parts of duration, are duration.

§ 9. There is one thing more, wherein ſpace and duration have a great conformity; and that is, tho' they are juſtly reckon'd amongſt our ſimple ideas, yet none of the diſtinct ideas we have of either, is without all manner of compoſition [a]; it is the very nature of both of them to conſiſt of parts: but their parts being all of the ſame kind, and without the mixture of any other idea, hinder them not from having a place amongſt ſimple ideas. Could the mind, as in number, come to ſo ſmall a part of extenſion or duration, as excluded diviſibility, that would be, as it were, the indiviſible unit, or idea; by repetition of which, it would make its more enlarged ideas of extenſion and duration. But, ſince the mind is not able to frame an idea of any ſpace without parts; inſtead

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[a] It has been objected to Mr. Locke, that if ſpace conſiſts of parts, as it is confeſs'd in this place, he ſhould not have reckoned it in the number of ſimple ideas; becauſe it ſeems to be inconſiſtent with what he ſays elſewhere, that a ſimple idea is uncompounded, and contains in it nothing but one uniform appearance, or conception of the mind, and is not diſtinguiſhable into different ideas. 'Tis farther objected, that Mr. Locke has not given in the ſecond chapter of the ſecond book, where he begins to ſpeak of ſimple ideas, an exact definition of what he underſtands by the word ſimple ideas. To theſe difficulties Mr. Locke anſwers thus: to begin with the laſt, he declares, that he has not treated this ſubject in an order perfectly ſcholaſtick, having not had much familiarity with thoſe ſort of books, during the writing of his, and not remembering at all the method in which they are written; and therefore his readers ought not to expect definitions, regularly placed at the beginning of each new ſubject. Mr. Locke contents himſelf to employ the principal terms that he uſes, ſo, that from his uſe of them the reader may eaſily comprehend what he means by them. But, with reſpect to the term ſimple idea, he has had the good luck to define that, in the place cited in the objection; and therefore there is no reaſon to ſupply that defect. The queſtion then is to know, whether the idea of extenſion agrees with this definition: which will effectually agree to it, if it be underſtood in the ſenſe, which Mr. Locke had principally in his view; for that compoſition which he deſign'd to exclude in that definition, was a compoſition of different ideas in the mind, and not a compoſition of the ſame kind in a thing whoſe eſſence conſiſts in having parts of the ſame kind, where you can never come to a part entirely exempted from this compoſition. So that if the idea of extenſion

ſtead thereof it makes uſe of the common meaſures, which by familiar uſe, in each country, have imprinted themſelves on the memory (as inches and feet; or cubits and paraſangs; and ſo ſeconds, minutes, hours, days, and years in duration:) the mind makes uſe, I ſay, of ſuch ideas as theſe, as ſimple ones; and theſe are the component parts of larger ideas, which the mind, upon occaſion, makes, by the addition of ſuch known lengths, which it is acquainted with. On the other ſide, the ordinary ſmalleſt meaſure we have of either, is look'd on as an unit in number, when the mind by diviſion would reduce them into leſs fractions. Tho' on both ſides, both in addition and diviſion, either of ſpace or duration, when the idea under conſideration becomes very big, or very ſmall, its preciſe bulk becomes very obſcure and confuſed; and it is the number of its repeated additions, or diviſions, that alone remains clear and diſtinct, as will eaſily appear to any one, who will let his thoughts looſe in the vaſt expanſion of ſpace, or diviſibility of matter. Every part of duration, is duration too; and every part of extenſion, is extenſion, both of them capable of addition or diviſion in infinitum. But the leaſt portions of either of them, whereof we have clear and diſtinct ideas, may perhaps be fitteſt to be conſidered by us, as the ſimple ideas of that kind, out of which our complex modes of ſpace, extenſion, and duration, are made up, and into which they can again be diſtinctly reſolv'd. Such a ſmall part in duration may be call'd a moment, and is the time of one idea in our minds, in the train of their ordinary ſucceſſion there. The other, wanting a proper name, I know not whether I may be allow'd to call a ſenſible point, meaning thereby the leaſt particle of matter or ſpace, we can diſcern, which is ordinarily about a minute, and to the ſharpeſt eyes ſeldom leſs than thirty ſeconds of a circle, whereof the eye is the center.

Their parts inſeparable.

§ 10. EXPANSION and duration have this farther agreement, that tho' they are both conſider'd by us as having parts, yet their parts are not ſeparable one from another, no not even in thought: tho' the parts of bodies, from whence we take our meaſure of the one, and the parts of motion, or rather the ſucceſſion of ideas in our minds, from whence we take the meaſure of the other, may be interrupted and ſeparated; as the one is often by reſt, and the other is by ſleep, which we call reſt too.

Duration is as a line, expanſion as a ſolid.

§ 11. BUT yet there is this manifeſt difference between them, that the ideas of length, which we have of expanſion, are turn'd every way, and ſo make figure, and breadth, and thickneſs; but duration is but as it were the length of one ſtreight line, extended in infinitum, not capable of multiplicity, variation, or figure; but is one common meaſure of all exiſtence whatſoever, wherein all things, whilſt they exiſt, equally partake. For this preſent moment is common to all things that are now in being, and equally comprehends that part of their exiſtence, as much as if they were all but one ſingle being; and we may truly ſay, they all exiſt in the ſame moment of time. Whether angels

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ſion conſiſts in having partes extra partes (as the ſchools ſpeak) 'tis always, in the ſenſe of Mr. Locke, a ſimple idea; becauſe the idea, of having partes extra partes, cannot be reſolved into two other ideas. For the remainder of the objection made to Mr. Locke, with reſpect to the nature of extenſion, Mr. Locke was aware of it, as may be ſeen in § 9. chap. xv. of the ſecond book, where he ſays, that "the leaſt portion of ſpace, or extenſion, whereof we have a clear and diſtinct idea, "may perhaps be the fitteſt to be conſider'd by us, as a ſimple idea of that kind, out of which our "complex modes of ſpace and extenſion are made up." So that, according to Mr. Locke, it may very fitly be called a ſimple idea, ſince it is the leaſt idea of ſpace, that the mind can form to itſelf, and that cannot be divided by the mind into any leſs, whereof it has in itſelf any determined perception. From whence it follows, that it is to the mind one ſimple idea; and that is ſufficient to take away this objection: for it is not the deſign of Mr. Locke, in this place, to diſcourſe of any thing, but concerning the ideas of the mind. But if this is not ſufficient to clear the difficulty, Mr. Locke hath nothing more to add, but that if the idea of extenſion is ſo peculiar, that it cannot exactly agree with the definition, that he has given of thoſe ſimple ideas, ſo that it differs in ſome manner from all others of that kind, he thinks it is better to leave it there expoſed to this difficulty, than to make a new diviſion in its favour. 'Tis enough for Mr. Locke that his meaning can be underſtood. 'Tis very common to obſerve intelligible diſcourſes ſpoil'd by too much ſubtilty in nice diviſions. We ought to put things together, as well as we can, doctrinæ cauſâ; but after all, ſeveral things will not be bundled up together, under our terms, and ways of ſpeaking.

and ſpirits have any analogy to this in reſpect of expanſion, is beyond my comprehenſion: and perhaps for us, who have underſtandings and comprehenſions ſuited to our own preſervation, and the ends of our own being, but not to the reality and extent of all other beings; 'tis near as hard to conceive any exiſtence, or to have an idea of any real being, with a perfect negation of all manner of expanſion; as it is to have the idea of any real exiſtence, with a perfect negation of all manner of duration: and therefore, what ſpirits have to do with ſpace, or how they communicate in it, we know not. All that we know, is, that bodies do each ſingly poſſeſs its proper portion of it, according to the extent of its ſolid parts; and thereby exclude all other bodies from having any ſhare in that particular portion of ſpace, whilſt it remains there.

Duration has never two parts together, expanſion all together.

§ 12. Duration, and time which is a part of it, is the idea we have of periſhing diſtance, of which no two parts exiſt together, but follow each other in ſucceſſion; as expanſion is the idea of laſting diſtance, all whoſe parts exiſt together, and are not capable of ſucceſſion. And therefore, tho' we cannot conceive any duration without ſucceſſion, nor can put it together in our thoughts, that any being does now exiſt to-morrow, or poſſeſs at once more than the preſent moment of duration; yet we can conceive the eternal duration of the Almighty far different from that of man, or any other finite being. Becauſe man comprehends not in his knowledge, or power, all paſt and future things: his thoughts are but of yeſterday, and he knows not what to-morrow will bring forth. What is once paſt, he can never recal: and what is yet to come, he cannot make preſent. What I ſay of man, I ſay of all finite beings; who tho' they may far exceed man in knowledge and power, yet are no more than the meaneſt creature, in compariſon with God himſelf. Finite of any magnitude, holds not any proportion to infinite. God's infinite duration being accompany'd with infinite knowledge and infinite power, he ſees all things paſt and to come; and they are no more diſtant from his knowledge, no farther remov'd from his ſight, than the preſent: they all lie under the ſame view; and there is nothing which he cannot make exiſt each moment he pleaſes. For, the exiſtence of all things depending upon his good pleaſure, all things exiſt every moment that he thinks fit to have them exiſt. To conclude, expanſion and duration do mutually embrace and comprehend each other; every part of ſpace being in every part of duration, and every part of duration in every part of expanſion. Such a combination of two diſtinct ideas, is, I ſuppoſe, ſcarce to be found in all that great variety we do, or can conceive, and may afford matter to farther ſpeculation.

CHAP. XVI.

Of number.

CHAP. XVI.

Number, the ſimpleſt and moſt univerſal idea.

§ 1. AMONGST all the ideas we have, as there is none ſuggeſted to the mind by more ways, ſo there is none more ſimple than that of unity, or one. It has no ſhadow of variety, or compoſition in it; every object our ſenſes are employed about, every idea in our underſtandings, every thought of our minds, brings this idea along with it. And, therefore, it is the moſt intimate to our thoughts, as well as it is, in its agreement to all other things, the moſt univerſal idea we have. For number applies itſelf to men, angels, actions, thoughts, every thing that either doth exiſt, or can be imagined.

Its modes made by addition.

§ 2. By repeating this idea in our minds, and adding the repetitions together, we come by the complex ideas of the modes of it. Thus, by adding one to one, we have the complex idea of a couple; by putting twelve units together, we have the complex idea of a dozen; and of a ſcore, or a million, or any other number.

Each mode diſtinct.

§ 3. The ſimple modes of number are, of all other, the moſt diſtinct; every the leaſt variation, which is an unit, making each combination as clearly different, from that which approacheth neareſt to it, as the moſt remote: two being as diſtinct from one, as two hundred; and the idea of two as diſtinct from the idea of three, as the magnitude of the whole earth is from that of a mite. This is not ſo in other ſimple modes, in which it is not ſo eaſy, nor perhaps, poſſible for us, to diſtinguiſh betwixt two approaching ideas, which yet, are really different. For who will undertake to find a difference between the white of this paper, and that of the next degree to it; or can form diſtinct ideas of every the leaſt exceſs in extenſion?

Therefore demonſtrations in numbers, the moſt preciſe.

§ 4. THE clearneſs and diſtinctneſs of each mode of number from all others, even thoſe that approach neareſt, makes me apt to think that demonſtrations in numbers, if they are not more evident and exact than in extenſion, yet they are more general in their uſe, and more determinate in their application. Becauſe the ideas of numbers are more preciſe and diſtinguiſhable, than in extenſion, where every equality and exceſs are not ſo eaſy to be obſerved, or meaſured; becauſe our thoughts cannot in ſpace arrive at any determined ſmallneſs, beyond which it cannot go, as an unit; and, therefore, the quantity, or proportion, of any the leaſt exceſs cannot be diſcovered: which is clear otherwiſe in number, where, as has been ſaid, ninety-one is as diſtinguiſhable from ninety, as from nine thouſand, tho' ninety-one be the next immediate exceſs to ninety. But it is not ſo in extenſion, where whatſoever is more than juſt a foot, or an inch, is not diſtinguiſhable from the ſtandard of a foot, or an inch; and in lines, which appear of an equal length, one may be longer than the other, by innumerable parts; nor can any one aſſign an angle, which ſhall be the next biggeſt to a right one.

Names neceſſary to numbers.

§ 5. BY the repeating, as has been ſaid, of the idea of an unit, and joining it to another unit, we make thereof one collective idea, marked by the name two. And whoſoever can do this, and proceed on, ſtill adding one more to the laſt collective idea which he had of any number, and give a name to it, may count, or have ideas for ſeveral collections of units, diſtinguiſhed one from another, as far as he hath a ſeries of names for following numbers, and a memory to retain that ſeries, with their ſeveral names: all numeration being but ſtill the adding of one unit more, and giving to the whole together, as comprehended in one idea, a new, or diſtinct name, or ſign, whereby to know it from thoſe before and after, and diſtinguiſh it from every ſmaller, or greater multitude of units. So that he that can add one to one, and ſo to two, and ſo go on with his tale, taking ſtill with him the diſtinct names belonging to every progreſſion; and ſo again, by abſtracting an unit from each collection, retreat and leſſen them, is capable of all the ideas of numbers, within the compaſs of his language, or for which he hath names, tho' not, perhaps, of more. For the ſeveral ſimple modes of numbers, being in our minds but ſo many combinations of units, which have no variety, nor are capable of any other difference, but more or leſs, names or marks, for each diſtinct combination, ſeem more neceſſary than in any other ſort of ideas. For, without ſuch names, or marks, we can hardly well make uſe of numbers in reckoning, eſpecially where the combination is made up of any great multitude of units; which put together, without a name, or mark, to diſtinguiſh that preciſe collection, will hardly be kept from being a heap in confuſion.

§ 6. THIS I think to be the reaſon, why ſome Americans I have ſpoken with, (who were otherwiſe of quick and rational parts enough) could not, as we do, by any means, count to one thouſand; nor had any diſtinct idea of that number, tho' they could reckon very well to twenty. Becauſe their language being ſcanty, and accommodated only to the few neceſſaries of a needy, ſimple life, unacquainted either with trade, or mathematicks, had no words in it to ſtand for a thouſand; ſo that, when they were diſcourſed with, of thoſe greater numbers, they would ſhew the hairs of their head, to expreſs a great multitude, which they could not number: which inability, I ſuppoſe, proceeded from their want of names. The Tououpinambos had no names for numbers above five; any number beyond that, they made out by ſhewing their fingers, and the fingers of others who were preſent[a]. And I doubt not but we ourſelves might diſtinctly number in words a great deal farther than we uſually do, would we find out but ſome fit denominations to ſignify them by; whereas, in the way we take now to name them by millions of millions of millions, &c. it is hard to go beyond eighteen, or, at moſt, four and twenty decimal progreſſions, without confuſion. But to ſhew how much diſtinct names conduce to our well reckoning, or having uſeful ideas of numbers, let us ſet all theſe following figures in one continued line, as the marks of one number; v. g.

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[a] Hiſtoire d'un voyage, fait en la terre du Braſil, par Jean de Lery, c. 20. $\frac{307}{382}$.

nonilions.	octilions.	ſeptilions.	ſextilions.	quintilions.	quartillons.	trilions.	bilions.	millions.	units.
857324.	162486.	345896.	437916.	423147.	248106.	235421.	261734.	368149.	623137.

THE ordinary way of naming this number in Engliſh, will be the often repeating of millions, of millions, of millions, of millions, of millions, of millions, of millions, of millions, (which is the denomination of the ſecond ſix figures.) In which way, it will be very hard to have any diſtinguiſhing notions of this number: but, whether, by giving every ſix figures a new and orderly denomination, theſe, and, perhaps, a great many more figures in progreſſion, might not eaſily be counted diſtinctly, and ideas of them both got more eaſily to ourſelves, and more plainly ſignified to others, I leave it to be conſidered. This I mention, only to ſhew how neceſſary diſtinct names are to numbering, without pretending to introduce new ones of my invention.

Why children number not earlier.

§ 7. THUS children, either for want of names, to mark the ſeveral progreſſions of numbers, or not having yet the faculty to collect ſcattered ideas into complex ones, and range them in a regular order, and ſo retain them in their memories, as is neceſſary to reckoning; do not begin to number very early, nor proceed in it very far, or ſteadily, till a good while after they are well furniſhed with good ſtore of other ideas: and one may often obſerve them diſcourſe and reaſon pretty well, and have very clear conceptions of ſeveral other things, before they can tell twenty. And ſome, thro' the default of their memories, who cannot retain the ſeveral combinations of numbers, with their names annexed in their diſtinct orders, and the dependance of ſo long a train of numeral progreſſions, and their relation one to another, are not able all their lifetime to reckon, or regularly go over any moderated ſeries of numbers. For he that will count twenty, or have any idea of that number, muſt know that nineteen went before, with the diſtinct name, or ſign, of every one of them, as they ſtand marked in their order; for wherever this fails, a gap is made, the chain breaks, and the progreſs in numbering can go no farther. So that to reckon right, it is required, 1. That the mind diſtinguiſhes carefully two ideas, which are different one from another, only by the addition, or ſubſtraction, of one unit. 2. That it retains in memory the names, or marks, of the ſeveral combinations, from an unit to that number; and that not confuſedly, and at random, but in that exact order, that the numbers follow one another: in either of which, if it trips, the whole buſineſs of numbering will be diſturbed, and there will remain only the confuſed idea of multitude, but the ideas neceſſary to diſtinct numeration will not be attained to.

Number measures all measurables.

§ 8. THIS farther is obſervable in number, that it is that which the mind makes uſe of, in meaſuring all things, that by us are meaſurable, which principally are expanſion and duration; and our idea of infinity, even when applied to thoſe, ſeems to be nothing but the infinity of number. For what elſe are our ideas of eternity, and immenſity, but the repeated additions of certain ideas of imagined parts of duration and expanſion, with the infinity of number in which we can come to no end of addition? For ſuch an inexhauſtible ſtock, number, of all other our ideas, moſt clearly furniſhes us with, as is obvious to every one. For let a man collect into one ſum as great a number as he pleaſes, this multitude, how great ſoever, leſſens not one jot the power of adding to it, or brings him any nearer the end of the inexhauſtible ſtock of number, where ſtill there remains as much to be added, as if none were taken out. And this endleſs addition, or addibility (if any one like the word better) of numbers, ſo apparent to the mind, is that, I think, which gives us the cleareſt and moſt diſtinct idea of infinity: of which more in the following chapter.

CHAP. XVII.

Of infinity.

Chap. XVII.

Infinity, in its original intention, attributed to ſpace, duration, and number.

§ 1. HE, that would know what kind of idea it is, to which we give the name of infinity, cannot do it better, than by conſidering to what infinity is by the mind more immediately attributed, and then how the mind comes to frame it.

Finite and infinite ſeem to me to be looked upon by the mind as the modes of quantity, and to be attributed primarily in their firſt deſignation only to thoſe things which have parts, and are capable of increaſe, or diminution, by the addition, or ſubſtraction, of any the leaſt part: and ſuch are the ideas of ſpace, duration, and number, which we have conſidered in the foregoing chapters. It is true, that we cannot but be aſſured, that the great God, of whom, and from whom are all things, is incomprehenſibly infinite: but yet, when we apply to that firſt and ſupreme being our idea of infinite, in our weak and narrow thoughts, we do it primarily in reſpect of his duration and ubiquity; and, I think, more figuratively to his power, wiſdom, and goodneſs, and other attributes, which are properly inexhauſtible, and incomprehenſible, &c. For when we call them infinite, we have no other idea of this infinity, but what carries with it ſome reflection on an intimation of that number, or extent, of the acts, or objects, of God's power, wiſdom, and goodneſs, which can never be ſuppos'd ſo great, or ſo many, which theſe attributes will not always ſurmount and exceed, let us multiply them in our thoughts, as far as we can, with all the infinity of endleſs number. I do not pretend to ſay how theſe attributes are in God, who is infinitely beyond the reach of our narrow capacities. They do, without doubt, contain in them all poſſible perfection: but this, I ſay, is our way of conceiving them, and theſe our ideas of their infinity.

The idea of finite eaſily got.

§ 2. Finite then, and infinite, being by the mind look'd on as modifications of expanſion and duration, the next thing to be conſidered, is, how the mind comes by them. As for the idea of finite, there is no great difficulty. The obvious portions of extenſion, that affect our ſenſes, carry with them into the mind the idea of finite: and the ordinary periods of ſucceſſion, whereby we meaſure time and duration, as hours, days, and years, are bounded lengths. The difficulty is, how we come by thoſe boundleſs ideas of eternity and immenſity; ſince the objects, which we converſe with, come ſo much ſhort of any approach, or proportion, to that largeneſs.

How we come by the idea of infinity.

§ 3. Every one, that has any idea of any ſtated lengths of ſpace, as a foot, finds that he can repeat that idea; and joining it to the former, make the idea of two feet; and by the addition of a third, three feet; and ſo on; without ever coming to an end of his additions, whether of the ſame idea of a foot, or, if he pleaſes, of doubling it, or any other idea he has of any length, as a mile, or diameter of the earth, or of the orbis magnus: for whichſoever of theſe he takes, and how often ſoever he doubles, or any otherwiſe multiplies it, he finds that, after he has continued his doubling in his thoughts, and enlarged his idea as much as he pleaſes, he has no more reaſon to ſtop, nor is one jot nearer the end of ſuch addition, than he was at firſt ſetting out. The power of enlarging his idea of ſpace, by farther additions, remaining ſtill the ſame, he hence takes the idea of infinite ſpace.

Our idea of ſpace boundleſs.

§ 4. This, I think, is the way, whereby the mind gets the idea of infinite ſpace. 'Tis a quite different conſideration, to examine, whether the mind has the idea of ſuch a boundleſs ſpace actually exiſting, ſince our ideas are not always proofs of the exiſtence of things; but yet, ſince this comes here in our way, I ſuppoſe I may ſay, that we are apt to think, that ſpace in itſelf is actually boundleſs; to which imagination, the idea of ſpace, or expanſion, of itſelf, naturally leads us. For it being conſidered by us, either as the extenſion of body, or as exiſting by itſelf, without any ſolid matter taking it up, (for of ſuch a void ſpace we have not only the idea, but I have proved, as I think, from the motion of body, its neceſſary exiſtence) it is impoſſible the mind ſhould be ever able to find, or ſuppoſe, any end of it, or be ſtopped any where, in its progreſs in this ſpace, how far ſoever it extends its thoughts. Any bounds made with body, even adamantine walls, are ſo far from putting a ſtop to the mind in its farther progreſs, in ſpace and extenſion, that it rather facilitates and enlarges it; for ſo far as that body reaches, ſo far no one can doubt of extenſion: and when we are come to the utmoſt extremity of body, what is there that can there put a ſtop, and ſatisfy the mind, that it is at the end of ſpace, when it perceives it is not, nay, when it is ſatisfied that body itſelf can move into it? For, if it be neceſſary for the motion of body, that there ſhould be an empty ſpace, tho' ever ſo little, here amongſt bodies; and if it be poſſible for body to move in, or thro' that empty ſpace; nay, it is impoſſible for any particle of matter to move, but into an empty ſpace: the ſame poſſibility of a body's moving into a void ſpace, beyond the utmoſt bounds of body, as well as into a void ſpace interſperſed amongſt bodies, will always remain clear and evident: the idea of empty pure ſpace, whether within, or beyond, the confines of all bodies, being exactly the ſame, differing not in nature, tho' in bulk; and there being nothing to hinder body from moving into it. So that wherever the mind places itſelf, by any thought, either amongſt, or remote from all bodies, it can in this uniform idea of ſpace no-where find any bounds, any end; and ſo muſt neceſſarily conclude it, by the very nature and idea of each part of it, to be actually infinite.

And ſo of duration.

§ 5. As by the power we find in ourſelves of repeating, as often as we will, any idea of ſpace, we get the idea of immenſity; ſo by being able to repeat the idea of any length of duration we have in our minds, with all the endleſs addition of number, we come by the idea of eternity. For we find in ourſelves, we can no more come to an end of ſuch repeated ideas, than we can come to the end of number, which every one perceives he cannot. But here again it is another queſtion, quite different from our having an idea of eternity, to know, whether there were any real being, whoſe duration has been eternal. And as to this, I ſay, he that conſiders ſomething now exiſting, muſt neceſſarily come to ſomething eternal. But having ſpoke of this in another place, I ſhall ſay here no more of it, but proceed to ſome other conſiderations of our idea of infinity.

Why other ideas are not capable of infinity.

§ 6. If it be ſo, that our idea of infinity be got from the power we obſerve in ourſelves, of repeating without end our own ideas; it may be demanded, "why we do not attribute infinity to other ideas, as well as thoſe of ſpace and "duration?" ſince they may be as eaſily, and as often repeated in our minds, as the other: and yet no body ever thinks of infinite ſweetneſs, or infinite whiteneſs, tho' he can repeat the idea of ſweet, or white, as frequently as thoſe of a yard, or a day. To which I anſwer: all the ideas that are conſidered as having parts, and are capable of increaſe, by the addition of any equal or leſs parts, afford us, by their repetition, the idea of infinity; becauſe, with this endleſs repetition, there is continued an enlargement, of which there can be no end. But in other ideas it is not ſo; for to the largeſt idea of extenſion, or duration, that I at preſent have, the addition of any the leaſt part makes an increaſe; but to the perfecteſt idea I have of the whiteſt whiteneſs, if I add another of a leſs or equal whiteneſs (and of a whiter than I have, I cannot add the idea) it makes no increaſe, and enlarges not my idea at all: and therefore the different ideas of whiteneſs, &c. are called degrees. For thoſe ideas that conſiſt of parts, are capable of being augmented by every addition of the leaſt part; but, if you take the idea of white, which one parcel of ſnow yielded yeſterday to your ſight, and another idea of white from another parcel of ſnow you ſee to-day, and put them together in your mind, they embody, as it were, and run into one, and the idea of whiteneſs is not at all increaſed; and if we add a leſs degree of whiteneſs to a greater, we are ſo far from increaſing, that we diminiſh it. Thoſe ideas that conſiſt not of parts, cannot be augmented to what proportion men pleaſe, or be ſtretched beyond what they have received by their ſenſes; but ſpace, duration, and number, being capable of increaſe by repetition, leave in the mind an idea of an endleſs room for more; nor can we conceive any where a ſtop to a farther

ther addition, or progreſſion, and ſo thoſe ideas alone lead our minds towards the thought of infinity.

Difference between infinity of ſpace, and ſpace infinite.

§ 7. THO' our idea of infinity ariſe from the contemplation of quantity, and the endleſs increaſe the mind is able to make in quantity, by the repeated additions of what portions thereof it pleaſes; yet, I gueſs, we cauſe great confuſion in our thoughts, when we join infinity to any ſuppoſed idea of quantity the mind can be thought to have, and ſo diſcourſe, or reaſon, about an infinite quantity, viz. an infinite ſpace, or an infinite duration. For, our idea of infinity being, as I think, an endleſs growing idea, but the idea of any quantity the mind has, being at that time terminated in that idea, (for be it as great as it will, it can be no greater than it is) to join infinity to it, is to adjuſt a ſtanding meaſure to a growing bulk; and, therefore, I think, it is not an inſignificant ſubtilty, if I ſay, that we are carefully to diſtinguiſh between the idea of the infinity of ſpace, and the idea of a ſpace infinite; the firſt is nothing but a ſuppoſed endleſs progreſſion of the mind, over what repeated ideas of ſpace it pleaſes; but to have actually in the mind the idea of a ſpace infinite, is to ſuppoſe the mind already paſſed over, and actually to have a view of all thoſe repeated ideas of ſpace, which an endleſs repetition can never totally repreſent to it; which carries in it a plain contradiction.

We have no idea of infinite ſpace.

§ 8. THIS, perhaps, will be a little plainer, if we conſider it in numbers. The infinity of numbers, to the end of whoſe addition every one perceives there is no approach, eaſily appears to any one that reflects on it: but how clear ſoever this idea of the infinity of number be, there is nothing yet more evident, than the abſurdity of the actual idea of an infinite number. Whatſoever poſitive ideas we have in our minds of any ſpace, duration, or number, let them be ever ſo great, they are ſtill finite; but, when we ſuppoſe an inexhauſtible remainder, from which we remove all bounds, and wherein we allow the mind an endleſs progreſſion of thought, without ever compleating the idea, there we have our idea of infinity, which, tho' it ſeems to be pretty clear, when we conſider nothing elſe in it, but the negation of an end, yet, when we would frame in our minds the idea of an infinite ſpace, or duration, that idea is very obſcure and confuſed, becauſe it is made up of two parts, very different, if not inconſiſtent. For let a man frame in his mind an idea of any ſpace, or number, as great as he will; it is plain the mind reſts and terminates in that idea, which is contrary to the idea of infinity, which conſiſts in a ſuppoſed endleſs progreſſion. And, therefore, I think it is, that we are ſo eaſily confounded, when we come to argue and reaſon about infinite ſpace, or duration, &c. becauſe the parts of ſuch an idea not being perceived to be, as they are, inconſiſtent, the one ſide or other always perplexes whatever conſequences we draw from the other; as an idea of motion not paſſing on, would perplex any one, who ſhould argue from ſuch an idea, which is not better than an idea of motion at reſt: and ſuch another ſeems to me to be the idea of a ſpace, or (which is the ſame thing) a number infinite, i. e. of a ſpace, or number, which the mind actually has, and ſo views, and terminates in; and of a ſpace, or number, which, in a conſtant and endleſs enlarging and progreſſion, it can, in thought, never attain to. For how large ſoever an idea of ſpace I have in my mind, it is no larger than it is that inſtant that I have it, tho' I be capable the next inſtant to double it, and ſo on in infinitum: for that alone is infinite, which has no bounds; and that the idea of infinity, in which our thoughts can find none.

Number affords us the cleareſt idea of infinity.

§ 9. BUT of all other ideas, it is number, as I have ſaid, which, I think, furniſhes us with the cleareſt and moſt diſtinct idea of infinity we are capable of. For even in ſpace and duration, when the mind purſues the idea of infinity, it there makes uſe of the ideas and repetitions of numbers, as of millions of millions of miles, or years, which are ſo many diſtinct ideas, kept beſt by number from running into a confuſed heap, wherein the mind loſes itſelf; and when it has added together as many millions, &c. as it pleaſes, of known lengths of ſpace, or duration, the cleareſt idea it can get of infinity, is the confus'd incomprehenſible remainder of endleſs addible numbers, which affords no proſpect of ſtop, or boundary.

Our different conception of the infinity of number, duration, and expanſion.

§ 10. It will perhaps give us a little farther light, into the idea we have of infinity, and diſcover to us that it is nothing but the infinity of number, apply'd to determinate parts, of which we have in our minds the diſtinct ideas, if we conſider, that number is not generally thought by us infinite, whereas duration and extenſion are apt to be ſo; which ariſes from hence, that in number we are at one end as it were: for there being in number nothing leſs than an unit, we there ſtop, and are at an end; but in addition, or increaſe of number, we can ſet no bounds: and ſo it is like a line, whereof one end terminating with us, the other is extended ſtill forwards, beyond all that we can conceive; but in ſpace, and duration, it is otherwiſe. For in duration we conſider it, as if this line of number were extended both ways to an unconceiveable, undeterminate, and infinite length; which is evident to any one, that will but reflect on what conſideration he hath of eternity: which, I ſuppoſe, he will find to be nothing elſe, but the turning this infinity of number both ways, à parte ante, and à parte poſt, as they ſpeak. For when we would conſider eternity, à parte ante, what do we but, beginning from ourſelves and the preſent time we are in, repeat in our minds the ideas of years, or ages, or any other aſſignable portion of duration paſt, with a proſpect of proceeding in ſuch addition, with all the infinity of number? And, when we would conſider eternity, à parte poſt, we juſt after the ſame rate begin from our ſelves, and reckon by multiply'd periods yet to come, ſtill extending that line of number, as before. And theſe two being put together, are that infinite duration we call eternity; which, as we turn our view either way forwards or backwards, appears infinite, becauſe we ſtill turn that way the infinite end of number, i. e. the power ſtill of adding more.

§ 11. The ſame happens alſo in ſpace, wherein, conceiving ourſelves to be as it were in the center, we do on all ſides purſue thoſe indeterminable lines of number; and reckoning any way from ourſelves, a yard, mile, diameter of the earth, or orbis magnus, by the infinity of number, we add others to them as often as we will; and having no more reaſon to ſet bounds to thoſe repeated ideas than we have to ſet bounds to number, we have that indeterminable idea of immenſity.

Infinite diviſibility.

§ 12. And ſince, in any bulk of matter, our thoughts can never arrive at the utmoſt diviſibility, therefore there is an apparent infinity to us alſo, in that which has the infinity alſo of number; but with this difference, that in the former conſiderations of the infinity of ſpace and duration, we only uſe addition of numbers; whereas this is like the diviſion of an unit into its fractions, wherein the mind alſo can proceed in infinitum, as well as in the former additions, it being indeed but the addition ſtill of new numbers: tho' in the addition of the one, we can have no more the poſitive idea of a ſpace, infinitely great, than in the diviſion of the other, we can have the idea of a body infinitely little; our idea of infinity being, as I may ſo ſay, a growing and fugitive idea, ſtill in a boundleſs progreſſion, that can ſtop no where.

No poſitive idea of infinite.

§ 13. Tho' it be hard, I think, to find any one ſo abſurd as to ſay, he has the poſitive idea of an actual, infinite number; the infinity whereof lies only in a power ſtill of adding any combination of units to any former number, and that as long and as much as one will; the like alſo being in the infinity of ſpace and duration, which power leaves always to the mind room for endleſs additions; yet there be thoſe, who imagine they have poſitive ideas of infinite duration and ſpace. It would, I think, be enough to deſtroy any ſuch poſitive idea of infinite, to aſk him that has it, "whether he could add to it or no?" which would eaſily ſhew the miſtake of ſuch a poſitive idea. We can, I think, have no poſitive idea of any ſpace, or duration, which is not made up of, and commenſurate to repeated numbers of feet, or yards, or days, and years, which are the common meaſures, whereof we have the ideas in our minds, and whereby we judge of the greatneſs of theſe ſort of quantities. And therefore, ſince an idea of infinite ſpace, or duration, muſt needs be made up of infinite parts, it can have no other infinity than that of number, capable ſtill of farther addition, but not an actual, poſitive idea of a number infinite. For, I think, it is evident, that the addition of finite things together (as are all lengths, whereof we have the poſitive ideas) can never otherwiſe produce the idea of infinite than as number does; which, conſiſting of additions of finite units one to another, ſuggeſts the idea of infinite, only by a power we find we have of ſtill increaſing the ſum, and adding more of the ſame kind, without coming one jot nearer the end of ſuch progreſſion.

§ 14. THEY who would prove their idea of infinite to be poſitive, ſeem to me to do it by a pleaſant argument, taken from the negation of an end; which being negative, the negation of it is poſitive. He that conſiders that the end is, in body, but the extremity or ſuperficies of that body, will not perhaps be forward to grant that the end is a bare negative: and he that perceives the end of his pen is black, or white, will be apt to think that the end is ſomething more than a pure negation. Nor is it, when applied to duration, the bare negation of exiſtence, but more properly the laſt moment of it. But if they will have the end to be nothing but the bare negation of exiſtence, I am ſure they cannot deny but that the beginning is the firſt inſtant of being, and is not by any body conceiv'd to be a bare negation; and therefore by their own argument, the idea of eternal, *à parte ante*, or of a duration without a beginning, is but a negative idea.

What is poſitive, what negative, in our idea of infinite.

§ 15. THE idea of infinite has, I confeſs, ſomething of poſitive, in all thoſe things we apply it to. When we would think of infinite ſpace, or duration, we at firſt ſtep uſually make ſome very large idea, as perhaps of millions of ages, or miles, which poſſibly we double, and multiply, ſeveral times. All that we thus amaſs together in our thoughts is poſitive, and the aſſemblage of a great number of poſitive ideas of ſpace, or duration. But what ſtill remains beyond this, we have no more a poſitive diſtinct notion of, than a mariner has of the depth of the ſea; where having let down a large portion of his ſounding-line, he reaches no bottom: whereby he knows the depth to be ſo many fathoms, and more; but how much that more is, he hath no diſtinct notion at all: and could he always ſupply new line, and find the plummet always ſink, without ever ſtopping, he would be ſomething in the poſture of the mind, reaching after a complete and poſitive idea of infinity. In which caſe let this line be ten, or ten thouſand fathoms long, it equally diſcovers what is beyond it; and gives only this confuſ'd and comparative idea, that this is not all, but one may yet go farther. So much as the mind comprehends of any ſpace, it has a poſitive idea of: but in endeavouring to make it infinite, it being always enlarging, always advancing, the idea is ſtill imperfect and incomplete. So much ſpace, as the mind takes a view of, in its contemplation of greatneſs, is a clear picture, and poſitive in the underſtanding: but infinite is ſtill greater. 1. Then, the idea of ſo much, is poſitive, and clear. 2. The idea of greater is alſo clear, but it is but a comparative idea. 3. The idea of ſo much greater, as cannot be comprehended; and this is plainly negative, not poſitive. For he has no poſitive, clear idea of the largeneſs of any extenſion (which is that ſought for, in the idea of infinite) that has not a comprehenſive idea of the dimenſions of it; and ſuch no body, I think, pretends to in what is infinite. For to ſay a man has a poſitive, clear idea of any quantity, without knowing how great it is, is as reaſonable as to ſay, he has the poſitive, clear idea of the number of the ſands on the ſea-ſhore, who knows not how many they be; but only that they are more than twenty. For juſt ſuch a perfect and poſitive idea has he of an infinite ſpace, or duration, who ſays, it is larger than the extent, or duration of ten, a hundred, or a thouſand, or any other number of miles, or years, whereof he has, or can have a poſitive idea; which is all the idea, I think, we have of infinite. So that what lies beyond our poſitive idea towards infinity, lies in obſcurity; and has the undeterminate confuſion of a negative idea, wherein I know I neither do, nor can comprehend all I would, it being too large for a finite and narrow capacity: and that cannot but be very far from a poſitive, complete idea, wherein the greateſt part, of what I would comprehend, is left out, under the undeterminate intimation of being ſtill greater: for to ſay, that having, in any quantity, meaſur'd ſo much, or gone ſo far, you are not yet at an end, is only to ſay, that that quantity is greater. So that the negation of an end in any quantity, is in other words, only to ſay, that it is bigger: and a total negation of an end, is but the carrying this bigger ſtill with you, in all the progreſſions your thoughts ſhall make in quantity; and adding this idea of ſtill greater to all the ideas you have, or can be ſuppos'd to have, of quantity. Now, whether ſuch an idea, as that, be poſitive, I leave any one to conſider.

We have no poſitive idea of an infinite duration.

§ 16. I ASK thoſe, who ſay they have a poſitive idea of eternity, whether their idea of duration includes in it ſucceſſion, or not? If it does not, they ought to ſhew the difference of their notion of duration, when apply'd to an eternal being, and to a finite: ſince perhaps there may be others, as well as I, who will own to them their weakneſs of underſtanding in this point; and acknowledge, that the notion they have of duration forces them to conceive, that whatever has duration, is of a longer continuance to-day than it was yeſterday. If to avoid ſucceſſion in eternal exiſtence, they recur to the punctum ſtans of the ſchools, I ſuppoſe they will thereby very little mend the matter, or help us to a more clear and poſitive idea of infinite duration, there being nothing more inconceiveable to me than duration without ſucceſſion. Beſides that punctum ſtans, if it ſignify any thing, being not quantum, finite or infinite, cannot belong to it. But if our weak apprehenſions cannot ſeparate ſucceſſion from any duration whatſoever, our idea of eternity can be nothing but of infinite ſucceſſion of moments of duration, wherein any thing does exiſt; and whether any one has, or can have a poſitive idea of an actual infinite number; I leave him to conſider, till his infinite number be ſo great that he himſelf can add no more to it; and as long as he can increaſe it, I doubt he himſelf will think the idea he hath of it, a little too ſcanty for poſitive infinity.

§ 17. I THINK it unavoidable, for every conſidering rational creature, that will but examine his own or any other exiſtence, to have the notion of an eternal, wiſe being, who had no beginning: and ſuch an idea of infinite duration I am ſure I have. But this negation of a beginning being but the negation of a poſitive thing, ſcarce gives me a poſitive idea of infinity; which, whenever I endeavour to extend my thoughts to, I confeſs myſelf at a loſs, and find I cannot attain any clear comprehenſion of it.

No poſitive idea of infinite ſpace.

§ 18. HE that thinks he has a poſitive idea of infinite ſpace, will, when he conſiders it, find that he can no more have a poſitive idea of the greateſt, than he has of the leaſt ſpace. For in this latter, which ſeems the eaſier of the two, and more within our comprehenſion, we are capable only of a comparative idea of ſmallneſs, which will always be leſs than any one whereof we have the poſitive idea. All our poſitive ideas of any quantity, whether great or little, have always bounds; tho' our comparative idea, whereby we can always add to the one and take from the other, hath no bounds: for that which remains, either great or little, not being comprehended in that poſitive idea, which we have, lies in obſcurity; and we have no other idea of it, but of the power of enlarging the one, and diminiſhing the other, without ceaſing. A peſtle and mortar will as ſoon bring any particle of matter to indiviſibility, as the acuteſt thought of a mathematician; and a ſurveyor may as ſoon with his chain meaſure out infinite ſpace, as a philoſopher by the quickeſt flight of mind reach it, or by thinking comprehend it; which is to have a poſitive idea of it. He that thinks on a cube of an inch diameter, has a clear and poſitive idea of it in his mind, and ſo can frame one of $\frac{1}{2}$, $\frac{1}{4}$, $\frac{1}{8}$, and ſo on till he has the idea in his thoughts of ſomething very little; but yet reaches not the idea of that incomprehenſible littleneſs which diviſion can produce. What remains of ſmallneſs, is as far from his thoughts as when he firſt began; and therefore he never comes at all to have a clear and poſitive idea of that ſmallneſs, which is conſequent to infinite diviſibility.

What is poſitive, what negative, in our idea of infinite.

§ 19. EVERY one that looks towards infinity, does, as I have ſaid, at firſt glance, make ſome very large idea of that which he applies it to, let it be ſpace or duration; and poſſibly he wearies his thoughts, by multiplying in his mind that firſt large idea: but yet by that he comes no nearer to the having a poſitive, clear idea, of what remains to make up a poſitive infinite, than the country-

fellow

Book II.

fellow had of the water, which was yet to come and paſs the channel of the river where he ſtood:

> Ruſticus expectat dum tranſeat amnis; at ille
> Labitur, et labetur in omne volubilis ævum.

Some think they have a poſitive idea of eternity, and not of infinite ſpace.

§ 20. THERE are ſome I have met with, that put ſo much difference between infinite duration and infinite ſpace, that they perſuade themſelves that they have a poſitive idea of eternity; but that they have not, nor can have, any idea of infinite ſpace. The reaſon of which miſtake I ſuppoſe to be this, that finding, by a due contemplation of cauſes and effects, that it is neceſſary to admit ſome eternal being, and ſo to conſider the real exiſtence of that being, as taking up and commenſurate to their idea of eternity; but, on the other ſide, not finding it neceſſary; but on the contrary, apparently abſurd, that body ſhould be infinite; they forwardly conclude, they can have no idea of infinite ſpace, becauſe they can have no idea of infinite matter. Which conſequence, I conceive, is very ill collected; becauſe the exiſtence of matter is no ways neceſſary to the exiſtence of ſpace, no more than the exiſtence of motion, or the ſun, is neceſſary to duration, tho' duration uſes to be meaſured by it: and I doubt not but a man may have the idea of ten thouſand miles ſquare, without any body ſo big, as well as the idea of ten thouſand years, without any body ſo old. It ſeems as eaſy to me, to have the idea of ſpace, empty of body, as to think of the capacity of a buſhel, without corn, or the hollow of a nutſhel, without a kernel in it: it being no more neceſſary that there ſhould be exiſting a ſolid body, infinitely extended, becauſe we have an idea of the infinity of ſpace, than it is neceſſary that the world ſhould be eternal, becauſe we have an idea of infinite duration. And why ſhould we think our idea of infinite ſpace requires the real exiſtence of matter to ſupport it, when we find, that we have as clear an idea of infinite duration to come, as we have of infinite duration paſt? Tho', I ſuppoſe, no body thinks it conceiveable, that any thing does, or has exiſted in that future duration. Nor is it poſſible, to join our idea of future duration, with preſent or paſt exiſtence, any more than it is poſſible to make the ideas of yeſterday, to-day, and to-morrow, to be the ſame; or bring ages paſt and future together, and make them contemporary. But, if theſe men are of the mind, that they have clearer ideas of infinite duration, than of infinite ſpace; becauſe it is paſt doubt, that God exiſted from all eternity, but there is no real matter co-extended with infinite ſpace; yet thoſe philoſophers, who are of opinion, that infinite ſpace is poſſeſs'd by God's infinite omnipreſence, as well as infinite duration by his eternal exiſtence, muſt be allow'd to have as clear an idea of infinite ſpace as of infinite duration; tho' neither of them, I think, has any poſitive idea of infinity in either caſe. For whatſoever poſitive ideas a man has in his mind, of any quantity, he can repeat it, and add it to the former, as eaſily as he can add together the idea of two days, or two paces; which are poſitive ideas of lengths he has in his mind, and ſo on, as long as he pleaſes: whereby, if a man had a poſitive idea of infinite, either duration, or ſpace, he could add two infinites together; nay, make one infinite infinitely bigger than another: abſurdities too groſs to be confuted!

Suppoſed poſitive idea of infinity, cauſe of miſtakes.

§ 21. BUT yet, after all this, there being men, who perſuade themſelves that they have clear, poſitive, comprehenſive ideas of infinity, it is fit they enjoy their privilege: and I ſhould be very glad (with ſome others that I know, who acknowledge they have none ſuch) to be better informed by their communication. For I have been hitherto apt to think that the great and inextricable difficulties, which perpetually involve all diſcourſes concerning infinity, whether of ſpace, duration, or diviſibility, have been the certain marks of a defect in our ideas of infinity, and the diſproportion the nature thereof has to the comprehenſion of our narrow capacities. For whilſt men talk and diſpute of infinite ſpace, or duration, as if they had as compleat and poſitive ideas of them, as they have of the names they uſe for them, or they have of a yard, or an hour, or any other determinate quantity: it is no wonder if the incomprehenſible nature of the thing they diſcourſe of, or reaſon about, leads them into perplexities and contradictions; and their minds be overlaid by an object too large and mighty to be ſurveyed and managed by them.

CHAP. XVII.

All theſe ideas from ſenſation and reflection.

§ 22. If I have dwelt pretty long on the conſiderations of duration, ſpace, and number, and what ariſes from the contemplation of them, infinity; it is poſſibly no more than the matter requires, there being few ſimple ideas whoſe modes give more exerciſe to the thoughts of men than theſe do. I pretend not to treat of them in their full latitude; it ſuffices to my deſign, to ſhew how the mind receives them, ſuch as they are, from ſenſation and reflection; and how even the idea we have of infinity, how remote ſoever it may ſeem to be from any object of ſenſe, or operation of our mind, has nevertheleſs, as all our other ideas, its original there. Some mathematicians, perhaps, of advanced ſpeculations, may have other ways to introduce into their minds ideas of infinity; but this hinders not, but that they themſelves, as well as all other men, got the firſt ideas, which they had of infinity, from ſenſation and reflection, in the method we have here ſet down.

CHAP. XVIII.

Of other ſimple modes.

CHAP. XVIII.

Modes of motion.

§ 1. THO' I have in the foregoing chapters ſhewn, how, from ſimple ideas, taken in by ſenſation, the mind comes to extend itſelf, even to infinity; which, however, it may, of all others, ſeem moſt remote from any ſenſible perception; yet, at laſt, hath nothing in it, but what is made out of ſimple ideas, received into the mind by the ſenſes, and afterwards there put together by the faculty the mind has to repeat its own ideas: tho', I ſay, theſe might be inſtances enough of ſimple modes of the ſimple ideas of ſenſation, and ſuffice to ſhew how the mind comes by them; yet I ſhall, for method's ſake, tho' briefly, give an account of ſome few more, and then proceed to more complex ideas.

§ 2. To ſlide, roll, tumble, walk, creep, run, dance, leap, ſkip, and abundance of others that might be named, are words which are no ſooner heard, but every one, who underſtands Engliſh, has preſently in his mind diſtinct ideas, which are all but the different modifications of motion. Modes of motion anſwer thoſe of extenſion: ſwift and ſlow are two different ideas of motion, the meaſures whereof are made of the diſtances of time, and ſpace, put together; ſo they are complex ideas comprehending time and ſpace with motion.

Modes of ſounds.

§ 3. The like variety have we in ſounds. Every articulate word is a different modification of ſound: by which we ſee, that from the ſenſe of hearing, by ſuch modifications, the mind may be furniſhed with diſtinct ideas to almoſt an infinite number. Sounds alſo, beſides the diſtinct cries of birds and beaſts, are modified by diverſity of notes, of different length, put together, which make that complex idea called a tune, which a muſician may have in his mind, when he hears, or makes, no ſound at all, by reflecting on the ideas of thoſe ſounds ſo put together ſilently in his own fancy.

Modes of colours.

§ 4. Those of colours are alſo very various: ſome we take notice of, as the different degrees, or, as they are termed, ſhades of the ſame colour. But ſince we very ſeldom make aſſemblages of colours, either for uſe, or delight, but figure is taken in alſo, and has its part in it; as in painting, weaving, needle-works, &c. thoſe which are taken notice of, do moſt commonly belong to mixed modes, as being made up of ideas of divers kinds, viz. figure and colour; ſuch as beauty, rainbow, &c.

Modes of taſte.

§ 5. All compounded taſtes and ſmells are alſo modes made up of the ſimple ideas of thoſe ſenſes. But they being ſuch as generally we have no names for, are leſs taken notice of, and cannot be ſet down in writing; and, therefore, muſt be left without enumeration to the thoughts and experience of my reader.

Some ſimple modes have no names.

§ 6. In general it may be obſerved, that thoſe ſimple modes which are conſidered but as different degrees of the ſame ſimple idea, tho' they are in themſelves, many of them, very diſtinct ideas, yet have ordinarily no diſtinct names, nor are much taken notice of as diſtinct ideas, where the difference is but very ſmall between them. Whether men have neglected theſe modes, and given no names to them, as wanting meaſures nicely to diſtinguiſh them; or becauſe, when they were ſo diſtinguiſhed, that knowledge would not be of general, or neceſſary uſe, I leave it to the thoughts of others: it is ſufficient to my purpoſe to ſhew, that all our ſimple ideas come to our minds only by ſenſation and reflection; and that, when the mind has them, it can variouſly repeat and compound them, and ſo make new complex ideas. But tho' white, red, or ſweet, &c. have not been modified, or made into complex ideas, by ſeveral combinations ſo as to be named, and thereby ranked into ſpecies; yet ſome others of the ſimple ideas, viz. thoſe of unity, duration, motion, &c. above inſtanced in, as alſo power and thinking, have been thus modified, to a great variety of complex ideas, with names belonging to them.

Why ſome modes have, and others have not names.

§ 7. The reaſon whereof, I ſuppoſe, has been this, that the great concernment of men being with men, one amongſt another, the knowledge of men and their actions, and the ſignifying of them to one another, was moſt neceſſary; and, therefore, they made ideas of actions, very nicely modified, and gave thoſe complex ideas, names, that they might the more eaſily record, and diſcourſe of thoſe things they were daily converſant in, without long ambages and circumlocutions: and that the things, they were continually to give and receive information about, might be the eaſier and quicker underſtood. That this is ſo, and that men, in framing different complex ideas, and giving them names, have been much governed by the end of ſpeech in general, (which is a very ſhort and expedite way of conveying their thoughts one to another) is evident in the names, which in ſeveral arts have been found out, and applied to ſeveral complex ideas of modified actions, belonging to their ſeveral trades, for diſpatch ſake, in their direction, or diſcourſes, about them. Which ideas are not generally framed in the minds of men, not converſant about theſe operations. And thence the words that ſtand for them, by the greateſt part of men of the ſame language, are not underſtood: v. g. colſhire, drilling, filtration, cohobation, are words ſtanding for certain complex ideas, which being ſeldom in the minds of any, but thoſe few, whoſe particular imployments do at every turn ſuggeſt them to their thoughts, thoſe names of them are not generally underſtood, but by ſmiths and chymiſts; who having framed the complex ideas, which theſe words ſtand for, and having given names to them, or received them from others, upon hearing of theſe names in communication, readily conceive thoſe ideas in their minds; as by cohobation all the ſimple ideas of diſtilling, and the pouring the liquor diſtilled from any thing back upon the remaining matter, and diſtilling it again. Thus we ſee, that there are great varieties of ſimple ideas, as of taſtes and ſmells, which have no names; and of modes many more. Which either not having been generally enough obſerved, or elſe not being of any great uſe to be taken notice of, in the affairs and converſe of men, they have not had names given to them, and ſo paſs not for ſpecies. This we ſhall have occaſion hereafter to conſider more at large, when we come to ſpeak of words.

CHAP. XIX.

Of the modes of thinking.

Chap. XIX.

Senſation, remembrance, contemplation, &c.

§ 1. When the mind turns its view inwards upon itſelf, and contemplates its own actions, thinking is the firſt that occurs. In it the mind obſerves a great variety of modifications, and from thence receives diſtinct ideas. Thus the perception which actually accompanies, and is annexed to any impreſſion on the body, made by an external object, being diſtinct from all other modifications of thinking, furniſhes the mind with a diſtinct idea, which we call ſenſation; which is, as it were, the actual entrance of any idea into the underſtanding, by the ſenſes. The ſame idea, when it again recurs, without the

operation

operation of the like object on the external ſenſory, is remembrance: if it be ſought after by the mind, and with pain and endeavour found, and brought again in view, it is recollection: if it be held there long under attentive conſideration, it is contemplation. When ideas float in our mind, without any reflection, or regard of the underſtanding, it is that which the French call reverie; our language has ſcarce a name for it. When the ideas that offer themſelves (for, as I have obſerved in another place, whilſt we are awake, there will always be a train of ideas, ſucceeding one another, in our minds) are taken notice of, and, as it were, regiſtered in the memory, it is attention. When the mind, with great earneſtneſs, and of choice, fixes its view on any idea, conſiders it on all ſides, and will not be called off, by the ordinary ſollicitation of other ideas, it is that we call intention, or ſtudy: ſleep, without dreaming, is reſt from all theſe: and dreaming itſelf, is the having of ideas (whilſt the outward ſenſes are ſtopped, ſo that they receive not outward objects, with their uſual quickneſs) in the mind, not ſuggeſted by any external objects, or known occaſion, nor under any choice, or conduct, of the underſtanding at all. And whether that, which we call extaſy, be not dreaming with the eyes open, I leave to be examined.

§ 2. These are ſome few inſtances of thoſe various modes of thinking, which the mind may obſerve in itſelf, and ſo have as diſtinct ideas of, as it hath of white, and red, a ſquare, or a circle. I do not pretend to enumerate them all, nor to treat at large of this ſet of ideas, which are got from reflection: that would be to make a volume. It ſuffices to my preſent purpoſe to have ſhewn here, by ſome few examples, of what ſort theſe ideas are, and how the mind comes by them; eſpecially, ſince I ſhall have occaſion hereafter to treat more at large of reaſoning, judging, volition, and knowledge, which are ſome of the moſt conſiderable operations of the mind, and modes of thinking.

The various attention of the mind in thinking.

§ 3. But, perhaps, it may not be an unpardonable digreſſion, nor wholly impertinent to our preſent deſign, if we reflect here upon the different ſtate of the mind in thinking, which thoſe inſtances of attention, reverie, and dreaming, &c. before-mentioned, naturally enough ſuggeſt. That there are ideas, ſome, or other, always preſent, in the mind of a waking man, every one's experience convinces him, tho' the mind imploys itſelf about them with ſeveral degrees of attention. Sometimes the mind fixes itſelf with ſo much earneſtneſs on the contemplation of ſome objects, that it turns their ideas on all ſides, remarks their relations and circumſtances, and views every part ſo nicely, and with ſuch intention, that it ſhuts out all other thoughts, and takes no notice of the ordinary impreſſions made then on the ſenſes, which, at another ſeaſon, would produce very ſenſible perceptions: at other times it barely obſerves the train of ideas that ſucceed in the underſtanding, without directing and purſuing any of them; and at other times it lets them paſs almoſt quite unregarded, as faint ſhadows that make no impreſſion.

Hence it is probable, that thinking is the action, not eſſence of the ſoul.

§ 4. This difference of intention, and remiſſion of the mind in thinking, with a great variety of degrees between earneſt ſtudy, and very near minding nothing at all; every one, I think, has experimented in himſelf. Trace it a little farther, and you find the mind in ſleep retired as it were from the ſenſes; and out of the reach of thoſe motions made on the organs of ſenſe, which at other times produce very vivid and ſenſible ideas. I need not, for this, inſtance in thoſe who ſleep out whole ſtormy nights, without hearing the thunder, or ſeeing the lightning, or feeling the ſhaking of the houſe, which are ſenſible enough to thoſe who are waking: but in this retirement of the mind from the ſenſes, it often retains a yet more looſe and incoherent manner of thinking, which we call dreaming; and laſt of all, ſound ſleep cloſes the ſcene quite, and puts an end to all appearances. This, I think, almoſt every one has experience of in himſelf, and his own obſervation, without difficulty, leads him thus far. That which I would farther conclude from hence, is, that ſince the mind can ſenſibly put on, at ſeveral times, ſeveral degrees of thinking, and be ſometimes, even in a waking man, ſo remiſs, as to have thoughts dim and obſcure to that degree, that they are very little removed from none at all; and, at laſt, in the dark retirements of ſound ſleep, loſes the ſight perfectly of all ideas whatſoever:

ſince, I ſay, this is evidently ſo in matter of fact, and conſtant experience, I aſk, whether it be not probable, that thinking is the action, and not the eſſence of the ſoul? ſince the operations of agents will eaſily admit of intention and remiſſion, but the eſſences of things are not conceived capable of any ſuch variation. But this by the by.

CHAP. XX.

Of modes of pleaſure and pain.

Chap. XX.

Pleaſure and pain ſimple ideas.

§ 1. AMONGST the ſimple ideas, which we receive, both from ſenſation and reflection, pain and pleaſure are two very conſiderable ones. For, as in the body there is ſenſation barely in itſelf, or accompanied with pain, or pleaſure; ſo the thought, or perception of the mind is ſimply ſo, or elſe accompanied alſo with pleaſure or pain, delight or trouble, call it how you pleaſe. Theſe, like other ſimple ideas, cannot be deſcribed, nor their names defined; the way of knowing them, is, as of the ſimple ideas of the ſenſes, only by experience. For to define them by the preſence of good, or evil, is no otherwiſe to make them known to us, than by making us reflect on what we feel in ourſelves, upon the ſeveral and various operations of good and evil upon our minds, as they are differently applied to, or conſidered by us.

Good and evil, what.

§ 2. THINGS then are good, or evil, only in reference to pleaſure, or pain. That we call good, which is apt to cauſe, or increaſe pleaſure, or diminiſh pain in us; or elſe to procure, or preſerve us the poſſeſſion of any other good, or abſence of any evil. And, on the contrary, we name that evil, which is apt to produce, or increaſe, any pain, or diminiſh any pleaſure in us; or elſe to procure us any evil, or deprive us of any good. By pleaſure and pain, I muſt be underſtood to mean of body, or mind, as they are commonly diſtinguiſhed; tho', in truth, they be only different conſtitutions of the mind, ſometimes occaſioned by diſorder in the body, ſometimes by thoughts in the mind.

Our paſſions moved by good and evil.

§ 3. PLEASURE and pain, and that which cauſes them, good and evil, are the hinges on which our paſſions turn: and, if we reflect on ourſelves and obſerve how theſe, under various conſiderations, operate in us; what modifications or tempers of mind, what internal ſenſations (if I may ſo call them) they produce in us, we may thence form to ourſelves the ideas of our paſſions.

Love.

§ 4. THUS any one reflecting upon the thought he has of the delight, which any preſent or abſent thing is apt to produce in him, has the idea we call love. For when a man declares in autumn, when he is eating them, or in ſpring, when there are none, that he loves grapes, it is no more but that the taſte of grapes delights him; let an alteration of health, or conſtitution, deſtroy the delight of their taſte, and he then can be ſaid to love grapes no longer.

Hatred.

§ 5. ON the contrary, the thought of the pain, which any thing preſent or abſent is apt to produce in us, is what we call hatred. Were it my buſineſs here to enquire any farther than into the bare ideas of our paſſions, as they depend on different modifications of pleaſure and pain, I ſhould remark, that our love and hatred of inanimate, inſenſible beings, is commonly founded on that pleaſure and pain, which we receive from their uſe and application, any way, to our ſenſes, tho' with their deſtruction: but hatred or love, to beings capable of happineſs, or miſery, is often the uneaſineſs or delight, which we find in ourſelves, ariſing from a conſideration of their very being, or happineſs. Thus the being and welfare of a man's children, or friends, producing conſtant delight in him, he is ſaid conſtantly to love them. But it ſuffices to note, that our ideas of love and hatred are but the diſpoſitions of the mind, in reſpect of pleaſure and pain in general, however cauſed in us.

Deſire.

§ 6. THE uneaſineſs a man finds in himſelf upon the abſence of any thing, whoſe preſent enjoyment carries the idea of delight with it, is that we call deſire; which is greater or leſs, as that uneaſineſs is more or leſs vehement. Where by the by, it may perhaps be of ſome uſe to remark, that the chief, if not only ſpur to human induſtry and action, is uneaſineſs. For, whatever good is propos'd, if its abſence carries no diſpleaſure nor pain with it, if a man be eaſy and content without it, there is no deſire of it, nor endeavour after it; there is no more but a bare velleity, the term uſed to ſignify the loweſt degree of deſire, and that which is next to none at all, when there is ſo little uneaſineſs in the abſence of any thing, that it carries a man no farther than ſome faint wiſhes for it, without any more effectual, or vigorous uſe of the means to attain it. Deſire alſo is ſtopp'd or abated by the opinion of the impoſſibility or unattainableneſs of the good propos'd, as far as the uneaſineſs is cur'd or allay'd by that conſideration. This might carry our thoughts farther, were it ſeaſonable in this place.

Joy.

§ 7. Joy is a delight of the mind, from the conſideration of the preſent, or aſſur'd, approaching poſſeſſion of a good; and we are then poſſeſs'd of any good, when we have it ſo in our power, that we can uſe it when we pleaſe. Thus a man, almoſt ſtarv'd, has joy at the arrival of relief, even before he has the pleaſure of uſing it: and a father, in whom the very well-being of his children cauſes delight, is always, as long as his children are in ſuch a ſtate, in the poſſeſſion of that good; for he needs but to reflect on it, to have that pleaſure.

Sorrow.

§ 8. Sorrow is uneaſineſs in the mind, upon the thought of a good loſt, which might have been enjoy'd longer; or the ſenſe of a preſent evil.

Hope.

§ 9. Hope is that pleaſure in the mind, which every one finds in himſelf, upon the thought of a profitable, future enjoyment of a thing, which is apt to delight him.

Fear.

§ 10. Fear is an uneaſineſs of the mind, upon the thought of future evil likely to befal us.

Deſpair.

§ 11. Despair is the thought of the unattainableneſs of any good, which works differently in men's minds, ſometimes producing uneaſineſs, or pain, ſometimes reſt and indolency.

Anger.

§ 12. Anger is uneaſineſs, or diſcompoſure of the mind, upon the receipt of any injury, with a preſent purpoſe of revenge.

Envy.

§ 13. Envy is an uneaſineſs of mind, caus'd by the conſideration of a good we deſire, obtain'd by one we think ſhould not have had it before us.

What paſſions all men have.

§ 14. These two laſt, envy and anger, not being caus'd by pain and pleaſure ſimply in themſelves, but having in them ſome mix'd conſiderations of ourſelves and others, are not therefore to be found in all men; becauſe thoſe others parts of valuing their merits, or intending revenge, is wanting in them: but all the reſt, terminated purely, in pain and pleaſure, are, I think, to be found in all men. For we love, deſire, rejoice, and hope, only in reſpect of pleaſure; we hate, fear and grieve, only in reſpect of pain ultimately: in fine, all theſe paſſions are mov'd by things, only as they appear to be the cauſes of pleaſure and pain, or to have pleaſure, or pain, ſome way or other annex'd to them. Thus we extend our hatred uſually to the ſubject (at leaſt if a ſenſible, or voluntary agent) which has produc'd pain in us; becauſe the fear it leaves, is a conſtant pain: but we do not ſo conſtantly love what has done us good; becauſe pleaſure operates not ſo ſtrongly on us as pain, and becauſe we are not ſo ready to have hope it will do ſo again. But this by the by.

Pleaſure and pain what.

§ 15. By pleaſure and pain, delight and uneaſineſs, I muſt all along be underſtood (as I have above intimated) to mean not only bodily pain and pleaſure, but whatſoever delight or uneaſineſs is felt by us, whether ariſing from any grateful, or unacceptable ſenſation or reflection.

§ 16. 'Tis farther to be conſider'd, that in reference to the paſſions, the removal or leſſening of a pain is conſider'd, and operates as a pleaſure; and the loſs or diminiſhing of a pleaſure, as a pain.

Shame.

§ 17. The paſſions too, have moſt of them in moſt perſons operations on the body, and cauſe various changes in it, which not being always ſenſible, do not make a neceſſary part of the idea of each paſſion. For ſhame, which is an uneaſineſs of the mind, upon the thought of having done ſomething which is indecent, or will leſſen the valued eſteem, which others have for us, has not always bluſhing accompanying it.

These inſtances do ſhew how our ideas of the paſſions are got from ſenſation and reflection.

§ 18. I WOULD not be miſtaken here, as if I meant this as a diſcourſe of the paſſions; they are many more than thoſe I have here named: and thoſe I have taken notice of, would each of them require a much larger, and more accurate diſcourſe. I have only mention'd theſe here, as ſo many inſtances of modes of pleaſure and pain, reſulting in our minds from various conſiderations of good and evil. I might perhaps have inſtanc'd in other modes of pleaſure and pain, more ſimple than theſe; as the pain of hunger and thirſt, and the pleaſure of eating and drinking to remove them; the pain of tender eyes, and the pleaſure of muſick; pain from captious, uninſtructive wrangling, and the pleaſure of rational converſation with a friend, or of well-directed ſtudy, in the ſearch and diſcovery of truth. But the paſſions, being of much more concernment to us, I rather made choice to inſtance in them, and ſhew how the ideas we have of them are deriv'd from ſenſation and reflection.

CHAP. XXI.

Of power.

Chap. XXI.

This idea how got.

§ 1. THE mind being every day inform'd, by the ſenſes, of the alteration of thoſe ſimple ideas it obſerves in things without, and taking notice how one comes to an end, and ceaſes to be, and another begins to exiſt which was not before; reflecting alſo on what paſſes within itſelf, and obſerving a conſtant change of its ideas, ſometimes by the impreſſion of outward objects on the ſenſes, and ſometimes by the determination of its own choice; and concluding from what it has ſo conſtantly obſerv'd to have been, that the like changes will for the future be made in the ſame things, by like agents, and by the like ways; conſiders in one thing the poſſibility of having any of its ſimple ideas chang'd, and in another the poſſibility of making that change; and ſo comes by that idea which we call power. Thus we ſay, fire has a power to melt gold, i. e. to deſtroy the conſiſtency of its inſenſible parts, and conſequently its hardneſs, and make it fluid; and gold has a power to be melted: that the ſun has a power to blanch wax, and wax a power to be blanched by the ſun, whereby the yellowneſs is deſtroyed, and whiteneſs made to exiſt in its room. In which, and the like caſes, the power, we conſider, is in reference to the change of perceivable ideas; for we cannot obſerve any alteration to be made in, or operation upon any thing, but by the obſervable change of its ſenſible ideas: nor conceive any alteration to be made, but by conceiving a change of ſome of its ideas.

Power active and paſſive.

§ 2. POWER, thus conſidered, is two-fold, viz. as able to make, or able to receive any change: the one may be called active, and the other paſſive power. Whether matter be not wholly deſtitute of active power, as its author God is truly above all paſſive power; and whether the intermediate ſtate of created ſpirits be not that, alone, which is capable of both active and paſſive power, may be worth conſideration. I ſhall not now enter into that enquiry; my preſent buſineſs being not to ſearch into the original of power, but how we come by the idea of it. But ſince active powers make ſo great a part of our complex ideas of natural ſubſtances, (as we ſhall ſee hereafter) and I mention them, as ſuch, according to common apprehenſion; yet they being not perhaps ſo truly active powers, as our haſty thoughts are apt to repreſent them, I judge it not amiſs, by this intimation, to direct our minds to the conſideration of God and ſpirits, for the cleareſt idea of active powers.

Power includes relation.

§ 3. I CONFESS power includes in it ſome kind of relation, (a relation to action or change) as indeed which of our ideas, of what kind ſoever, when attentively conſider'd, does not? For our ideas of extenſion, duration, and number, do they not all contain in them a ſecret relation of the parts? Figure and motion have ſomething relative in them, much more viſibly: and ſenſible qualities, as colours, and ſmells, &c. what are they but the powers of different bodies, in relation to our perception, &c? And, if conſidered in the things themſelves, do they not depend on the bulk, figure, texture, and motion of the parts? All which include ſome kind of relation in them. Our idea, therefore, of power, I think, may well have a place among other ſimple ideas, and be conſidered as one of them, being one of thoſe, that make a principal ingredient in our complex ideas of ſubſtances, as we ſhall hereafter have occaſion to obſerve.

The cleareſt idea of active power, had from ſpirit.

§ 4. We are abundantly furniſhed with the idea of paſſive power, by almoſt all ſorts of ſenſible things. In moſt of them we cannot avoid obſerving their ſenſible qualities; nay, their very ſubſtances to be in a continual flux: and therefore, with reaſon, we look on them as liable ſtill to the ſame change. Nor have we of active power (which is the more proper ſignification of the word power) fewer inſtances; ſince whatever change is obſerved, the mind muſt collect a power, ſomewhere, able to make that change, as well as a poſſibility in the thing itſelf to receive it. But yet, if we will conſider it attentively, bodies, by our ſenſes, do not afford us ſo clear and diſtinct an idea of active power, as we have from reflection on the operations of our minds. For all power relating to action, and there being but two ſorts of action, whereof we have any idea, viz. thinking and motion; let us conſider whence we have the cleareſt ideas of the powers, which produce theſe actions. 1. Of thinking, body affords us no idea at all, it is only from reflection that we have that. 2. Neither have we from body any idea of the beginning of motion. A body at reſt affords us no idea of any active power to move; and when it is ſet in motion itſelf, that motion is rather a paſſion, than an action in it. For, when the ball obeys the ſtroke of a billiard-ſtick, it is not any action of the ball, but bare paſſion: alſo, when by impulſe it ſets another ball in motion that lay in its way, it only communicates the motion it had received from another, and loſes in itſelf ſo much as the other received; which gives us but a very obſcure idea of an active power of moving in body, whilſt we obſerve it only to transfer, but not produce any motion. For it is but a very obſcure idea of power, which reaches not the production of the action, but the continuation of the paſſion. For ſo is motion, in a body impelled by another: the continuation of the alteration made in it from reſt to motion, being little more an action, than the continuation of the alteration of its figure by the ſame blow, is an action. The idea of the beginning of motion we have only from reflection on what paſſes in our ſelves, where we find by experience, that barely by willing it, barely by a thought of the mind, we can move the parts of our bodies, which were before at reſt. So that it ſeems, to me, we have from the obſervation of the operation of bodies, by our ſenſes, but a very imperfect obſcure idea of active power, ſince they afford us not any idea in themſelves of the power to begin any action, either motion, or thought. But if, from the impulſe bodies are obſerved to make one upon another, any one thinks he has a clear idea of power, it ſerves as well to my purpoſe, ſenſation being one of thoſe ways, whereby the mind comes by its ideas: only I thought it worth while to conſider here, by the way, whether the mind doth not receive its idea of active power clearer from reflection on its own operations, than it doth from any external ſenſation.

Will and underſtanding, two powers.

§ 5. This at leaſt I think evident, that we find in our ſelves a power to begin, or forbear, continue, or end, ſeveral actions of our minds, and motions of our bodies, barely by a thought, or preference, of the mind, ordering, or, as it were, commanding the doing, or not doing, ſuch or ſuch a particular action. This power, which the mind has thus to order the conſideration of any idea, or the forbearing to conſider it; or to prefer the motion of any part of the body to its reſt, and vice verſa, in any particular inſtance, is that which we call the will. The actual exerciſe of that power, by directing any particular action, or its forbearance, is that which we call volition, or willing. The forbearance of that action, conſequent to ſuch order, or command, of the mind, is called voluntary: and whatſoever action is performed, without ſuch a thought of the mind, is caled involuntary. The power of perception is that, which we call the underſtanding. Perception, which we make the act of the underſtanding, is of three ſorts: 1. The perception of ideas in our mind. 2. The perception of the ſignification of ſigns. 3. The perception of the connexion, or repugnancy, agreement,

ment, or diſagreement, that there is between any of our ideas. All theſe are attributed to the underſtanding, or perceptive power, tho' it be the two latter only that uſe allows us to ſay we underſtand.

Faculties.

§ 6. These powers of the mind, viz. of perceiving, and of preferring, are uſually called by another name: and the ordinary way of ſpeaking is, that the underſtanding and will are two faculties of the mind; a word proper enough, if it be uſed, as all words ſhould be, ſo as not to breed any confuſion in men's thoughts, by being ſuppoſed (as I ſuſpect it has been) to ſtand for ſome real beings in the ſoul, that performed thoſe actions of underſtanding and volition. For, when we ſay, the will is the commanding and ſuperior faculty of the ſoul; that it is, or is not free; that it determines the inferior faculties; that it follows the dictates of the underſtanding, &c. tho' theſe, and the like expreſſions, by thoſe that carefully attend to their own ideas, and conduct their thoughts, more by the evidence of things, than the ſound of words, may be underſtood in a clear and diſtinct ſenſe; yet I ſuſpect, I ſay, that this way of ſpeaking of faculties, has miſled many into a confuſed notion of ſo many diſtinct agents in us, which had their ſeveral provinces and authorities, and did command, obey, and perform ſeveral actions, as ſo many diſtinct beings; which has been no ſmall occaſion of wrangling, obſcurity, and uncertainty in queſtions relating to them.

Whence the ideas of liberty and neceſſity.

§ 7. Every one, I think, finds in himſelf a power to begin, or forbear, continue, or put an end to ſeveral actions in himſelf. From the conſideration of the extent of this power of the mind, over the actions of the man, which every one finds in himſelf, ariſe the ideas of liberty and neceſſity.

Liberty, what.

§ 8. All the actions, that we have any idea of, reducing themſelves, as has been ſaid, to theſe two, viz. thinking and motion; ſo far as a man has a power to think, or not to think; to move, or not to move, according to the preference, or direction, of his own mind, ſo far is a man free. Wherever any performance, or forbearance, are not equally in a man's power; wherever doing, or not doing, will not equally follow upon the preference of his mind directing it, there he is not free, tho', perhaps, the action may be voluntary. So that the idea of liberty, is the idea of a power in any agent to do, or forbear, any particular action, according to the determination, or thought, of the mind, whereby either of them is preferred to the other; where either of them is not in the power of the agent to be produced by him, according to his volition, there he is not at liberty, that agent is under neceſſity. So that liberty cannot be, where there is no thought, no volition, no will; but there may be thought, there may be will, there may be volition, where there is no liberty. A little conſideration of an obvious inſtance or two, may make this clear.

Suppoſes the underſtanding and will.

§ 9. A tennis ball, whether in motion, by the ſtroke of a racket, or lying ſtill at reſt, is not, by any one, taken to be a free-agent. If we enquire into the reaſon, we ſhall find it is becauſe we conceive not a tennis-ball to think, and, conſequently, not to have any volition, or preference of motion to reſt, or vice verſa; and, therefore, has not liberty, is not a free agent; but all its both motion and reſt, come under our idea of neceſſary, and are ſo called. Likewiſe a man falling into the water (a bridge breaking under him) has not herein liberty, is not a free agent. For tho' he has volition, tho' he prefers his not falling to falling; yet the forbearance of that motion not being in his power, the ſtop, or ceſſation, of that motion, follows not upon his volition; and therefore, therein he is not free. So a man ſtriking himſelf, or his friend, by a convulſive motion of his arm, which it is not in his power, by volition, or the direction of his mind, to ſtop, or forbear, no body thinks he has in this liberty; every one pities him, as acting by neceſſity and conſtraint.

Belongs not to volition.

§ 10. Again, ſuppoſe a man be carried, whilſt faſt aſleep, into a room where is a perſon he longs to ſee and ſpeak with; and be there locked faſt in, beyond his power to get out; he awakes, and is glad to find himſelf in ſo deſirable company, which he ſtays willingly in, i. e. prefers his ſtay to going away: I aſk, is not this ſtay voluntary? I think no body will doubt it; and yet being locked faſt in, it is evident he is not at liberty not to ſtay, he has not freedom to be gone. So that liberty is not an idea belonging to volition, or preferring; but to

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the perſon having the power of doing, or forbearing to do, according as the mind ſhall chooſe, or direct. Our idea of liberty reaches as far as that power, and no farther. For wherever reſtraint comes to check that power, or compulſion takes away that indifferency of ability on either ſide to act, or to forbear acting; there liberty, and our notion of it, preſently ceaſes.

Voluntary oppoſed to involuntary, not to neceſſary.

§ 11. We have inſtances enough, and often more than enough, in our own bodies. A man's heart beats, and the blood circulates, which it is not in his power, by any thought, or volition, to ſtop; and, therefore, in reſpect of theſe motions, where reſt depends not on his choice, nor would follow the determination of his mind, if it ſhould prefer it, he is not a free agent. Convulſive motions agitate his legs, ſo that, tho' he wills it ever ſo much, he cannot by any power of his mind ſtop their motion, (as in that odd diſeaſe called chorea ſancti viti) but he is perpetually dancing: he is not at liberty in this action, but under as much neceſſity of moving, as a ſtone that falls, or a tennis-ball ſtruck with a racket. On the other ſide, a palſy, or the ſtocks, hinder his legs from obeying the determination of his mind, if it would thereby transfer his body to another place. In all theſe there is want of freedom; tho' the ſitting ſtill even of a paralytick, whilſt he prefers it to a removal, is truly voluntary. Voluntary then is not oppoſed to neceſſary, but to involuntary. For a man may prefer what he can do, to what he cannot do; the ſtate he is in, to its abſence or change, tho' neceſſity has made it in itſelf unalterable.

Liberty, what.

§ 12. As it is in the motions of the body, ſo it is in the thoughts of our minds: where any one is ſuch, that we have power to take it up, or lay it by, according to the preference of the mind, there we are at liberty. A waking man being under the neceſſity of having ſome ideas conſtantly in his mind, is not at liberty to think, or not to think; no more than he is at liberty, whether his body ſhall touch any other, or no: but whether he will remove his contemplation from one idea to another, is many times in his choice; and then he is, in reſpect of his ideas, as much at liberty, as he is in reſpect of bodies he reſts on: he can, at pleaſure, remove himſelf from one to another. But yet ſome ideas to the mind, like ſome motions to the body, are ſuch as in certain circumſtances it cannot avoid, nor obtain their abſence by the utmoſt effort it can uſe. A man on the rack is not at liberty to lay by the idea of pain, and divert himſelf with other contemplations: and ſometimes a boiſterous paſſion hurries our thoughts as a hurricane does our bodies, without leaving us the liberty of thinking on other things, which we would rather chooſe. But as ſoon as the mind regains the power to ſtop, or continue, begin, or forbear, any of theſe motions of the body without, or thoughts within, according as it thinks fit to prefer either to the other, we then conſider the man as a free agent again.

Neceſſity, what.

§ 13. Wherever thought is wholly wanting, or the power to act, or forbear, according to the direction of thought, there neceſſity takes place. This, in an agent capable of volition, when the beginning, or continuation, of any action, is contrary to that preference of his mind, is called compulſion; when the hindering, or ſtopping, any action, is contrary to his volition, is called reſtraint. Agents, that have no thought, no volition at all, are in every thing neceſſary agents.

Liberty belongs not to the will.

§ 14. If this be ſo, (as I imagine it is) I leave it to be conſidered, whether it may not help to put an end to that long-agitated, and, I think, unreaſonable, becauſe unintelligible, queſtion, viz. whether man's will be free, or no? For, if I miſtake not, it follows from what I have ſaid, that the queſtion itſelf is altogether improper; and it is as inſignificant to aſk, whether man's will be free, as to aſk whether his ſleep be ſwift, or his virtue ſquare; liberty being as little applicable to the will, as ſwiftneſs of motion is to ſleep, or ſquareneſs to virtue. Every one would laugh at the abſurdity of ſuch a queſtion, as either of theſe; becauſe it is obvious, that the modifications of motions belong not to ſleep, nor the difference of figure to virtue: and, when any one well conſiders it, I think he will as plainly perceive, that liberty, which is but a power, belongs only to agents, and cannot be an attribute, or modification of the will, which is alſo but a power.

Volition.

§ 15. Such is the difficulty of explaining and giving clear notions of internal actions by ſounds, that I muſt here warn my reader, that ordering, directing, chuſing, preferring, &c. which I have made uſe of, will not diſtinctly enough expreſs volition, unleſs he will reflect on what he himſelf does when he wills. For example, preferring, which ſeems, perhaps, beſt to expreſs the act of volition, does it not preciſely. For tho' a man would prefer flying to walking, yet who can ſay he ever wills it? Volition, it is plain, is an act of the mind, knowingly exerting that dominion it takes itſelf to have over any part of the man, by employing it in, or with-holding it from any particular action. And what is the will, but the faculty to do this? And is that faculty any thing more in effect than a power, the power of the mind to determine its thought, to the producing, continuing, or ſtopping any action, as far as it depends on us? For can it be denied, that whatever agent has a power to think on its own actions, and to prefer their doing, or omiſſion, either to other, has that faculty called will? Will then is nothing but ſuch a power. Liberty, on the other ſide, is the power a man has to do, or forbear doing, any particular action, according as its doing, or forbearance, has the actual preference in the mind; which is the ſame thing as to ſay, according as he himſelf wills it.

Powers belong to agents.

§ 16. It is plain then, that the will is nothing but one power, or ability, and freedom another power, or ability; ſo that to aſk, whether the will has freedom, is to aſk, whether one power has another power, one ability another ability? a queſtion at firſt ſight too groſsly abſurd to make a diſpute, or need an anſwer. For who is it that ſees not that powers belong only to agents, and are attributes only of ſubſtances, and not of powers themſelves? So that this way of putting the queſtion, viz. whether the will be free? is, in effect, to aſk, whether the will be ſubſtance, and agent? or, at leaſt, to ſuppoſe it, ſince freedom can properly be attributed to nothing elſe. If freedom can with any propriety of ſpeech be applied to power, it may be attributed to the power that is in a man to produce, or forbear producing motion in parts of his body, by choice, or preference; which is that which denominates him free, and is freedom itſelf. But if any one ſhould aſk, whether freedom were free, he would be ſuſpected not to underſtand well what he ſaid; and he would be thought to deſerve Midas's ears, who knowing that rich was a denomination from the poſſeſſion of riches, ſhould demand whether riches themſelves were rich?

§ 17. However, the name faculty, which men have given to this power, called the will, and whereby they have been led into a way of talking of the will, as acting, may, by an appropriation that diſguiſes its true ſenſe, ſerve a little to palliate the abſurdity; yet the will in truth ſignifies nothing but a power, or ability, to prefer, or chuſe: and when the will, under the name of a faculty, is conſidered as it is, barely as an ability to do ſomething, the abſurdity in ſaying it is free, or not free, will eaſily diſcover itſelf. For if it be reaſonable to ſuppoſe and talk of faculties, as diſtinct beings that can act, (as we do, when we ſay the will orders, and the will is free) it is fit that we ſhould make a ſpeaking faculty, and a walking faculty, and a dancing faculty, by which thoſe actions are produced, which are but ſeveral modes of motion; as well as we make the will and underſtanding to be faculties, by which the actions of chuſing and perceiving are produced, which are but ſeveral modes of thinking: and we may as properly ſay, that it is the ſinging faculty ſings, and the dancing faculty dances; as that the will chuſes, or that the underſtanding conceives; or, as is uſual, that the will directs the underſtanding, or the underſtanding obeys, or obeys not the will: it being altogether as proper and intelligible to ſay, that the power of ſpeaking directs the power of ſinging, or the power of ſinging obeys, or diſobeys, the power of ſpeaking.

§ 18. This way of talking, nevertheleſs, has prevailed, and, as I gueſs, produced great confuſion. For theſe being all different powers in the mind, or in the man, to do ſeveral actions, he exerts them as he thinks fit: but the power to do one action, is not operated on by the power of doing another action. For the power of thinking operates not on the power of chuſing, nor the power of chuſing on the power of thinking; no more than the power of dancing operates on the power of ſinging, or the power of ſinging on the power of dancing; as any one, who reflects on it, will eaſily perceive: and yet this is it which we ſay, when we thus ſpeak, that the will operates on the underſtanding, or the underſtanding on the will.

§ 19. I GRANT, that this or that actual thought may be the occaſion of volition, or exerciſing the power a man has to chuſe; or the actual choice of the mind, the cauſe of actual thinking on this, or that thing: as the actual ſinging of ſuch a tune, may be the occaſion of dancing ſuch a dance, and the actual dancing of ſuch a dance the occaſion of ſinging ſuch a tune. But in all theſe it is not one power that operates on another: but it is the mind that operates, and exerts theſe powers; it is the man that does the action, it is the agent that has power, or is able to do. For powers are relations, not agents: and that which has the power, or not the power, to operate, is that alone which is, or is not free, and not the power itſelf. For freedom, or not freedom, can belong to nothing, but what has, or has not, a power to act.

Liberty belongs not to the will;

§ 20. THE attributing to faculties, that which belonged not to them, has given an occaſion to this way of talking: but the introducing into diſcourſes concerning the mind, with the name of faculties, a notion of their operating, has, I ſuppoſe, as little advanced our knowledge in that part of ourſelves, as the great uſe and mention in the like invention of faculties, in the operations of the body, has helped us in the knowledge of phyſick. Not that I deny there are faculties, both in the body and mind: they both of them have their powers of operating, elſe neither the one nor the other could operate. For nothing can operate, that is not able to operate; and that is not able to operate, that has no power to operate. Nor do I deny, that thoſe words, and the like, are to have their place in the common uſe of languages, that have made them current. It looks like too much affectation wholly to lay them by: and philoſophy itſelf, tho' it likes not a gaudy dreſs, yet, when it appears in publick, muſt have ſo much complacency, as to be clothed in the ordinary faſhion and language of the country, ſo far as it can conſiſt with truth and perſpicuity. But the fault has been, that faculties have been ſpoken of, and repreſented as ſo many diſtinct agents. For it being aſked, what it was that digeſted the meat in our ſtomachs? it was a ready and very ſatisfactory anſwer, to ſay, that it was the digeſtive faculty. What was it that made any thing come out of the body? the expulſive faculty. What moved? the motive faculty. And ſo in the mind, the intellectual faculty, or the underſtanding, underſtood; and the elective faculty, or the will, willed or commanded. Which is in ſhort to ſay, that the ability to digeſt, digeſted; and the ability to move, moved; and the ability to underſtand, underſtood. For faculty, ability, and power, I think, are but different names of the ſame things: which ways of ſpeaking, when put into more intelligible words, will I think amount to thus much; that digeſtion is performed by ſomething that is able to digeſt, motion by ſomething able to move, and underſtanding by ſomething able to underſtand. And in truth it would be very ſtrange if it ſhould be otherwiſe; as ſtrange as it would be, for a man to be free without being able to be free.

But to the agent or man.

§ 21. To return then to the enquiry about liberty, I think the queſtion is not proper, whether the will be free, but whether a man be free. Thus, I think,

1. THAT ſo far as any one can, by the direction or choice of his mind, preferring the exiſtence of any action to the non-exiſtence of that action, and vice verſa make it to exiſt, or not exiſt, ſo far he is free. For if I can by a thought directing the motion of my finger, make it move when it was at reſt, or vice verſa; it is evident, that in reſpect of that I am free: and if I can by a like thought of my mind, preferring one to the other, produce either words, or ſilence, I am at liberty to ſpeak, or hold my peace; and as far as this power reaches, of acting, or not acting, by the determination of his own thought preferring either, ſo far is a man free. For how can we think any one freer, than to have the power to do what he will? And ſo far as any one can, by preferring any action to its not being, or reſt to any action, produce that action or reſt, ſo far can he do what he will. For ſuch a preferring of action to its abſence, is the

willing of it; and we can ſcarce tell how to imagine any being freer, than to be able to do what he wills. So that in reſpect of actions, within the reach of ſuch a power in him, a man ſeems as free, as it is poſſible for freedom to make him.

In reſpect of willing, a man is not free.

§ 22. But the inquiſitive mind of man, willing to ſhift off from himſelf, as far as he can, all thoughts of guilt, tho' it be by putting himſelf into a worſe ſtate than that of fatal neceſſity, is not content with this: freedom, unleſs it reaches farther than this, will not ſerve the turn: and it paſſes for a good plea, that a man is not free at all, if he be not as free to will, as he is to act what he wills. Concerning a man's liberty, there yet therefore is raiſed this farther queſtion, whether a man be free to will? which I think is what is meant, when it is diſputed whether the will be free. And as to that I imagine,

§ 23. 2. That willing, or volition, being an action, and freedom conſiſting in a power of acting or not acting, a man in reſpect of willing, or the act of volition, when any action in his power is once propoſed to his thoughts, as preſently to be done, cannot be free. The reaſon whereof is very manifeſt: for it being unavoidable, that the action, depending on his will, ſhould exiſt, or not exiſt; and its exiſtence, or not exiſtence, following perfectly the determination and preference of his will, he cannot avoid willing the exiſtence, or not exiſtence of that action; it is abſolutely neceſſary that he will the one, or the other, i. e. prefer the one to the other; ſince one of them muſt neceſſarily follow; and that which does follow, follows by the choice and determination of his own mind, that is, by his willing it: for if he did not will it, it would not be. So that in reſpect of the act of willing, a man in ſuch a caſe is not free: liberty conſiſting in a power to act, or not to act; which, in regard of volition, a man, upon ſuch a propoſal, has not. For it is unavoidably neceſſary to prefer the doing, or forbearance of an action in a man's power, which is once ſo propos'd to his thoughts; a man muſt neceſſarily will the one or the other of them, upon which preference or volition, the action or its forbearance certainly follows and is truly voluntary. But the act of volition, or preferring one of the two, being that which he cannot avoid, a man in reſpect of that act of willing, is under a neceſſity, and ſo cannot be free; unleſs neceſſity and freedom can conſiſt together, and a man can be free and bound at once.

§ 24. This then is evident, that in all propoſals of preſent action, a man is not at liberty to will or not to will, becauſe he cannot forbear willing: liberty conſiſting in a power to act, or to forbear acting, and that only. For a man that ſits ſtill, is ſaid yet to be at liberty, becauſe he can walk if he wills it. But, if a man, ſitting ſtill, has not a power to remove himſelf, he is not at liberty; ſo likewiſe a man falling down a precipice, tho' in motion, is not at liberty, becauſe he cannot ſtop that motion if he would. This being ſo, it is plain that a man that is walking, to whom it is propoſed to give off walking, is not at liberty whether he will determine himſelf to walk, or give off walking, or no: He muſt neceſſarily prefer one, or the other of them, walking or not walking; and ſo it is in regard of all other actions in our power ſo propoſed, which are the far greater number. For conſidering the vaſt number of voluntary actions that ſucceed one another every moment, that we are awake, in the courſe of our lives, there are but few of them that are thought on, or propoſed to the will, till the time they are to be done: and in all ſuch actions, as I have ſhewn, the mind in reſpect of willing, has not a power to act, or not to act, wherein conſiſts liberty. The mind in that caſe has not a power to forbear willing; it cannot avoid ſome determination concerning them, let the conſideration be as ſhort, the thought as quick as it will, it either leaves the man in the ſtate he was before thinking, or changes it; continues the action, or puts an end to it. Whereby it is manifeſt, that it orders and directs one, in preference to, or with neglect of the other, and thereby either the continuation or change becomes unavoidably voluntary.

The will determined by ſomething without it.

§ 25. Since then it is plain, that in moſt caſes a man is not at liberty, whether he will or no; the next thing demanded, is, whether a man be at liberty to will which of the two he pleaſes, motion or reſt? This queſtion carries the abſurdity of it ſo manifeſtly in itſelf, that one might thereby ſufficiently be convinced, that liberty concerns not the will. For to aſk, whether a man be at liberty to will either motion or reſt, ſpeaking or ſilence, which he pleaſes; is to aſk, whether a man can will what he wills, or be pleas'd with what he is pleaſed with? A queſtion which, I think, needs no anſwer; and they who can make a queſtion of it, muſt ſuppoſe one will to determine the acts of another, and another to determine that; and ſo on in infinitum.

§ 26. To avoid theſe, and the like abſurdities, nothing can be of greater uſe, than to eſtabliſh in our minds determined ideas of the things under conſideration. If the ideas of liberty and volition were well fixed in our underſtandings, and carried along with us in our minds, as they ought, through all the queſtions that are raiſed about them; I ſuppoſe a great part of the difficulties that perplex men's thoughts, and entangle their underſtandings, would be much eaſier reſolved; and we ſhould perceive where the confuſed ſignification of terms, or where the nature of the thing, cauſed the obſcurity.

Freedom.

§ 27. FIRST then, it is carefully to be remembered, that freedom conſiſts in the dependence of the exiſtence, or not exiſtence, of any action upon our volition of it; and not in the dependence of any action, or its contrary, on our preference. A man ſtanding on a cliff, is at liberty to leap twenty yards downwards into the ſea, not becauſe he has a power to do the contrary action, which is to leap twenty yards upwards, for that he cannot do; but he is therefore free, becauſe he has a power to leap, or not to leap. But if a greater force than his either holds him faſt, or tumbles him down, he is no longer free in that caſe; becauſe the doing, or forbearance, of that particular action, is no longer in his power. He that is a cloſe priſoner in a room, twenty foot ſquare, being at the north-ſide of his chamber, is at liberty to walk twenty foot ſouthward, becauſe he can walk, or not walk it; but is not, at the ſame time, at liberty to do the contrary, i. e. to walk twenty foot northward.

IN this then conſiſts freedom, viz. in our being able to act or not to act, according as we ſhall chuſe or will.

Volition what.

§ 28. SECONDLY, We muſt remember, that volition, or willing, is an act of the mind directing its thought to the production of any action, and thereby exerting its power to produce it. To avoid multiplying of words, I would crave leave here, under the word action, to comprehend the forbearance too of any action propoſed; ſitting ſtill, or holding one's peace, when walking or ſpeaking are propoſed, tho' mere forbearances, requiring as much the determination of the will, and being often as weighty in their conſequences, as the contrary actions, may, on that conſideration, well enough paſs for actions too: but this I ſay, that I may not be miſtaken, if for brevity ſake I ſpeak thus.

What determines the will.

§ 29. THIRDLY, The will being nothing but a power in the mind to direct the operative faculties of a man to motion or reſt, as far as they depend on ſuch direction: to the queſtion, what is it determines the will? the true and proper anſwer is, the mind. For that which determines the general power of directing to this or that particular direction, is nothing but the agent itſelf exerciſing the power it has that particular way. If this anſwer ſatisfies not, it is plain the meaning of the queſtion, what determines the will? is this, what moves the mind, in every particular inſtance, to determine its general power of directing to this or that particular motion, or reſt? And to this I anſwer, the motive for continuing in the ſame ſtate, or action, is only the preſent ſatisfaction in it; the motive to change, is always ſome uneaſineſs: nothing ſetting us upon the change of ſtate, or upon any new action, but ſome uneaſineſs. This is the great motive that works on the mind to put it upon action, which for ſhortneſs ſake we will call determining of the will; which I ſhall more at large explain.

Will and deſire muſt not be confounded.

§ 30. BUT in the way to it, it will be neceſſary to premiſe, that tho' I have above endeavoured to expreſs the act of volition by chuſing, preferring, and the like terms, that ſignify deſire as well as volition, for want of other words, to mark that act of the mind, whoſe proper name is willing, or volition; yet it being a very ſimple act, whoſoever deſires to underſtand what it is, will better find it, by reflecting on his own mind, and obſerving what it does, when it wills, than by any variety of articulate ſounds whatſoever. This caution of being careful not to be miſled by expreſſions, that do not enough keep up the difference between the will and ſeveral acts of the mind that are quite diſtinct from it, I think the more neceſſary; becauſe I find the will often confounded with ſeveral of the affections, eſpecially deſire, and one put for the other; and that by men who would not willingly be thought not to have had very diſtinct notions of things, and not to have writ very clearly about them. This, I imagine, has been no ſmall occaſion of obſcurity and miſtake in this matter; and therefore is, as much as may be, to be avoided. For he that ſhall turn his thoughts inwards upon what paſſes in his mind when he wills, ſhall ſee that the will, or power of volition, is converſant about nothing, but that particular determination of the mind, whereby barely by a thought, the mind endeavours to give riſe, continuation, or ſtop to any action, which it takes to be in its power. This well conſidered, plainly ſhews that the will is perfectly diſtinguiſhed from deſire; which in the very ſame action may have a quite contrary tendency from that which our wills ſets us upon. A man, whom I cannot deny, may oblige me to uſe perſuaſions to another, which, at the ſame time I am ſpeaking, I may wiſh may not prevail on him. In this caſe, it is plain the will and deſire run counter. I will the action that tends one way, whilſt my deſire tends another, and that the direct contrary. A man, who, by a violent fit of the gout in his limbs, finds a dozineſs in his head, or a want of appetite in his ſtomach removed, deſires to be eaſed too of the pain of his feet, or hands, (for wherever there is pain, there is deſire to be rid of it) tho' yet, whilſt he apprehends that the removal of the pain may tranſlate the noxious humour to a more vital part, his will is never determined to any one action, that may ſerve to remove this pain. Whence it is evident, that deſiring and willing are two diſtinct acts of the mind; and conſequently that the will, which is but the power of volition, is much more diſtinct from deſire.

Uneaſineſs determines the will.

§ 31. To return then to the enquiry, what is it that determines the will, in regard to our actions? And that, upon ſecond thoughts, I am apt to imagine is not, as is generally ſuppoſed, the greater good in view; but ſome (and for the moſt part the moſt preſſing) uneaſineſs a man is at preſent under. This is that which ſucceſſively determines the will, and ſets us upon thoſe actions we perform. This uneaſineſs we may call, as it is, deſire; which is an uneaſineſs of the mind for want of ſome abſent good. All pain of the body, of what ſort ſoever, and diſquiet of the mind, is uneaſineſs: and with this is always joined deſire, equal to the pain, or uneaſineſs felt, and is ſcarce diſtinguiſhable from it. For deſire being nothing but an uneaſineſs in the want of an abſent good, in reference to any pain felt, eaſe is that abſent good; and till that eaſe be attained, we may call it deſire, no body feeling pain that he wiſhes not to be eaſed of, with a deſire equal to that pain, and inſeparable from it. Beſides this deſire of eaſe from pain, there is another of abſent, poſitive good; and here alſo the deſire, and uneaſineſs is equal. As much as we deſire any abſent good, ſo much are we in pain for it. But here all abſent good does not, according to the greatneſs it has or is acknowledged to have, cauſe pain equal to that greatneſs; as all pain cauſes deſire equal to itſelf: becauſe the abſence of good is not always a pain, as the preſence of pain is. And therefore abſent good may be looked on, and conſidered without deſire. But ſo much as there is any where of deſire, ſo much there is of uneaſineſs.

Deſire is uneaſineſs.

§ 32. That deſire is a ſtate of uneaſineſs, every one who reflects on himſelf will quickly find. Who is there that has not felt in deſire what the wiſe man ſays of hope (which is not much different from it) that it being deferred, makes the heart ſick? and that ſtill proportionable to the greatneſs of the deſire; which ſometimes raiſes the uneaſineſs to that pitch, that it makes people cry out, give me children, give me the thing deſired, or I die? Life itſelf, and all its enjoyments, is a burden cannot be borne under the laſting and unremoved preſſure of ſuch an uneaſineſs.

The uneaſineſs of deſire determines the will.

§ 33. Good and evil, preſent and abſent, it is true, work upon the mind: but that which immediately determines the will, from time to time, to every voluntary action, is the uneaſineſs of deſire, fixed on ſome abſent good; either negative, as indolence to one in pain, or poſitive, as enjoyment of pleaſure. That it is this uneaſineſs, that determines the will, to the ſucceſſive, voluntary actions, whereof the greateſt part of our lives is made up, and by which we are conducted through different courſes to different ends; I ſhall endeavour to ſhew, both from experience, and the reaſon of the thing.

This the ſpring of action.

§ 34. When a man is perfectly content with the ſtate he is in, which is when he is perfectly without any uneaſineſs, what induſtry, what action, what will is there left, but to continue in it? Of this every man's obſervation will ſatisfy him. And thus we ſee our all-wiſe maker, ſuitable to our conſtitution and frame, and knowing what it is that determines the will, has put into man the uneaſineſs of hunger and thirſt, and other natural deſires, that return at their ſeaſons, to move and determine their wills, for the preſervation of themſelves, and the continuation of their ſpecies. For, I think, we may conclude, that if the bare contemplation of theſe good ends, to which we are carried by theſe ſeveral uneaſineſſes, had been ſufficient to determine the will, and ſet us on work, we ſhould have had none of theſe natural pains, and perhaps, in this world, little, or no pain at all. "It is better to marry than to burn," ſays St. Paul; where we may ſee what it is that chiefly drives men into the enjoyments of a conjugal life. A little burning felt, puſhes us more powerfully, than greater pleaſures in proſpect draw, or allure.

The greateſt poſitive good determines not the will, but uneaſineſs.

§ 35. It ſeems ſo eſtabliſhed and ſettled a maxim, by the general conſent of all mankind, that good, the greater good, determines the will, that I do not at all wonder, that when I firſt publiſhed my thoughts on this ſubject, I took it for granted; and, I imagine, that by a great many I ſhall be thought more excuſable, for having then done ſo, than that now I have ventured to recede from ſo received an opinion. But yet, upon a ſtricter inquiry, I am forced to conclude, that good, the greater good, tho' apprehended and acknowledged to be ſo, does not determine the will, until our deſire, raiſed proportionably to it, make us uneaſy in the want of it. Convince a man ever ſo much, that plenty has its advantages over poverty; make him ſee and own, that the handſome conveniencies of life are better than naſty penury; yet, as long as he is content with the latter, and finds no uneaſineſs in it, he moves not: his will never is determined to any action, that ſhall bring him out of it. Let a man be ever ſo well perſuaded of the advantages of virtue, that it is as neceſſary to a man, who has any great aims in this world, or hopes in the next, as food to life; yet, till he hungers and thirſts after righteouſneſs, till he feels an uneaſineſs in the want of it, his will will not be determined to any action in purſuit of this confeſſed, greater good; but any other uneaſineſſes he feels in himſelf, ſhall take place, and carry his will to other actions. On the other ſide, let a drunkard ſee that his health decays, his eſtate waſtes; diſcredit and diſeaſes, and the want of all things, even of his beloved drink, attends him in the courſe he follows; yet the returns of uneaſineſs to miſs his companions, the habitual thirſt after his cups, at the uſual time, drives him to the tavern, tho' he has in his view the loſs of health and plenty, and, perhaps, of the joys of another life: the leaſt of which is no inconſiderable good, but ſuch as he confeſſes is far greater than the tickling of his palate with a glaſs of wine, or the idle chat of a ſoaking club. It is not for want of viewing the greater good; for he ſees and acknowledges it, and, in the intervals of his drinking hours, will take reſolutions to purſue the greater good; but when the uneaſineſs to miſs his accuſtomed delight returns, the greater, acknowledged good loſes its hold, and the preſent uneaſineſs determines the will to the accuſtomed action; which thereby gets ſtronger footing to prevail againſt the next occaſion, tho' he at the ſame time makes ſecret promiſes to himſelf, that he will do ſo no more; this is the laſt time he will act againſt the attainment of thoſe greater goods. And thus he is, from time to time, in the ſtate of that unhappy complainer, "video meliora proboque, deteriora ſequor:" which ſentence, allowed for true, and made good by conſtant experience, may this, and, poſſibly, no other way, be eaſily made intelligible.

Becauſe the removal of uneaſineſs is the firſt ſtep to happineſs.

§ 36. If we enquire into the reaſon of what experience makes ſo evident in fact, and examine why it is uneaſineſs alone operates on the will, and determines in its choice, we ſhall find, that we being capable but of one determination of the will to one action at once; the preſent uneaſineſs, that we are under, does naturally determine the will, in order to that happineſs which we all aim at in all our actions; foraſmuch as whilſt we are under any uneaſineſs, we cannot apprehend our ſelves happy, or in the way to it. Pain and uneaſineſs being, by every one, concluded and felt to be inconſiſtent with happineſs, ſpoiling the reliſh even of thoſe good things which we have; a little pain ſerving to mar all the pleaſure we rejoiced in. And therefore that which of courſe determines the choice of our will to the next action, will always be the removing of pain, as long as we have any left, as the firſt and neceſſary ſtep towards happineſs.

Becauſe uneaſineſs alone is preſent.

§ 37. Another reaſon, why it is uneaſineſs alone determines the will, may be this; becauſe that alone is preſent, and it is againſt the nature of things, that what is abſent ſhould operate where it is not. It may be ſaid, that abſent good may, by contemplation, be brought home to the mind, and made preſent. The idea of it, indeed, may be in the mind, and viewed as preſent there; but nothing will be in the mind as a preſent good, able to counter-ballance the removal of any uneaſineſs which we are under, till it raiſes our deſire; and the uneaſineſs of that has the prevalency in determining the will. Till then, the idea in the mind of whatever good, is there only like other ideas, the object of bare unactive ſpeculation, but operates not on the will, nor ſets us on work; the reaſon whereof I ſhall ſhew by and by. How many are to be found, that have had lively repreſentations ſet before their minds of the unſpeakable joys of heaven, which they acknowledge both poſſible and probable too, who yet would be content to take up with their happineſs here? And ſo the prevailing uneaſineſs of their deſires, let looſe after the enjoyments of this life, take their turns in the determining their wills; and all that while they take not one ſtep, are not one jot moved towards the good things of another life, conſidered as ever ſo great.

Becauſe all, who allow the joys of heaven poſſible, purſue them not.

§ 38. Were the will determined by the views of good, as it appears, in contemplation, greater or leſs to the underſtanding, which is the ſtate of all abſent good, and that which in the received opinion the will is ſuppoſed to move to, and to be moved by, I do not ſee how it could ever get looſe from the infinite eternal joys of heaven, once propoſed and conſidered as poſſible. For all abſent good, by which alone, barely propoſed and coming in view, the will is thought to be determined, and ſo to ſet us on action, being only poſſible, but not infallibly certain; it is unavoidable that the infinitely greater poſſible good ſhould regularly and conſtantly determine the will in all the ſucceſſive actions it directs: and then we ſhould keep conſtantly and ſteadily in our courſe towards heaven, without ever ſtanding ſtill, or directing our actions to any other end. The eternal condition of a future ſtate infinitely outweighing the expectation of riches, or honour, or any other worldly pleaſure which we can propoſe to our ſelves, tho' we ſhould grant theſe the more probable to be attained: for nothing future is yet in poſſeſſion, and ſo the expectation, even in theſe, may deceive us. If it were ſo, that the greater good in view determines the will, ſo great a good once propoſed could not but ſeize the will, and hold it faſt to the purſuit of this infinitely greateſt good, without ever letting it go again: for the will having a power over, and directing the thoughts as well as other actions, would, if it were ſo, hold the contemplation of the mind fixed to that good.

But any great uneaſineſs is never neglected.

§ 39. This would be the ſtate of the mind, and regular tendency of the will in all its determinations, were it determined by that which is conſidered, and in view the greater good; but that it is not ſo, is viſible in experience: the infinitely greateſt, confeſſed good being often neglected, to ſatiſfy the ſucceſſive uneaſineſs of our deſires purſuing trifles. But tho' the greateſt allowed, even everlaſting, unſpeakable good, which has ſometimes moved and affected the mind, does not ſtedfaſtly hold the will, yet we ſee any very great and prevailing uneaſineſs, having once laid hold on the will, lets it not go: by which we may be convinced, what it is that determines the will. Thus any vehement pain of the body, the ungovernable paſſion of a man violently in love, or the impatient deſire of revenge, keeps the will ſteady and intent; and the will, thus determined, never lets the underſtanding lay by the object, but all the thoughts of the mind, and powers of the body are uninterruptedly imployed that way, by the determinations of the will, influenced by that topping uneaſineſs as long as it laſts; whereby it ſeems to me evident, that the will, or power, of ſetting us upon one action in preference to all other, is determined in us by uneaſineſs. And whether this be not ſo, I deſire every one to obſerve in himſelf.

Deſire accompanies all uneaſineſs.

§ 39. I have hitherto chiefly inſtanced in the uneaſineſs of deſire, as that which determines the will; becauſe that is the chief and moſt ſenſible, and the will ſeldom orders any action, nor is there any voluntary action performed, without ſome deſire accompanying it; which, I think, is the reaſon why the will and deſire are ſo often confounded. But yet we are not to look upon the uneaſineſs, which makes up, or at leaſt, accompanies moſt of the other paſſions, as wholly excluded in the caſe. Averſion, fear, anger, envy, ſhame, &c. have each their uneaſineſs too, and thereby influence the will. Theſe paſſions are ſcarce any of them in life and practice ſimple and alone, and wholly unmixed with others; tho' uſually in diſcourſe and contemplation, that carries the name which operates ſtrongeſt, and appears moſt in the preſent ſtate of the mind: nay there is, I think, ſcarce any of the paſſions to be found without deſire joined with it. I am ſure, wherever there is uneaſineſs, there is deſire: for we conſtantly deſire happineſs; and whatever we feel of uneaſineſs, ſo much it is certain we want of happineſs, even in our own opinion, let our ſtate and condition otherwiſe be what it will. Beſides, the preſent moment not being our eternity, whatever our enjoyment be, we look beyond the preſent, and deſire goes with our foreſight, and that ſtill carries the will with it. So that even in joy itſelf, that which keeps up the action, whereon the enjoyment depends, is the deſire to continue it, and fear to loſe it: and whenever a greater uneaſineſs than that takes place in the mind, the will preſently is by that determined to ſome new action, and the preſent delight neglected.

The moſt preſſing uneaſineſs naturally determines the will.

§ 40. But we being in this world beſet with ſundry uneaſineſſes, diſtracted with different deſires, the next inquiry naturally will be, which of them has the precedency, in determining the will, to the next action; and, to that, the anſwer is, that ordinarily which is the moſt preſſing of thoſe that are judged capable of being then removed. For the will, being the power of directing our operative faculties to ſome action, for ſome end, cannot at any time be moved towards what is judged at that time unattainable: that would be to ſuppoſe an intelligent being, deſignedly, to act for an end, only to loſe its labour, for ſo it is to act for what is judged not attainable; and therefore, very great uneaſineſſes move not the will, when they are judged not capable of a cure: they, in that caſe, put us not upon endeavours. But theſe ſet a-part, the moſt important and urgent uneaſineſs we at that time feel, is that, which ordinarily determines the will ſucceſſively, in that train of voluntary actions which makes up our lives. The greateſt preſent uneaſineſs is the ſpur to action, that is conſtantly felt, and, for the moſt part, determines the will in its choice of the next action. For this we muſt carry along with us, that the proper and only object of the will is ſome action of our's, and nothing elſe: for we producing nothing, by our willing it, but ſome action in our power, it is there the will terminates, and reaches no farther.

All deſire happineſs.

§ 41. If it be farther aſked, what it is moves deſire? I anſwer, happineſs, and that alone. Happineſs and miſery are the names of two extremes, the utmoſt bounds whereof we know not; "it is what eye hath not ſeen, ear hath not heard, nor hath it entered into the heart of man to conceive." But of ſome degrees of both we have very lively impreſſions, made by ſeveral inſtances of delight and joy, on the one ſide, and torment and ſorrow, on the other; which, for ſhortneſs ſake, I ſhall comprehend under the names of pleaſure and pain; there being pleaſure and pain of the mind, as well as the body: "with him is fulneſs of joy, and pleaſure for evermore." Or, to ſpeak truly, they are all of the mind; tho' ſome have their riſe in the mind, from thought, others in the body, from certain modifications of motion.

Happineſs what.

§ 42. Happineſs then, in its full extent, is the utmoſt pleaſure we are capable of, and miſery the utmoſt pain: and the loweſt degree of what can be called happineſs, is ſo much eaſe from all pain, and ſo much preſent pleaſure, as without which any one cannot be content. Now, becauſe pleaſure and pain are produced in us, by the operation of certain objects, either on our minds, or our bodies, and in different degrees: therefore what has an aptneſs to produce pleaſure in us, is that we call good; and what is apt to produce pain in us, we call evil, for no other reaſon, but for its aptneſs to produce pleaſure and pain in us, wherein conſiſts our happineſs and miſery. Farther, tho' what is apt to produce any degree of pleaſure, be in itſelf good; and what is apt to produce any degree of pain, be evil; yet it often happens, that we do not call it ſo, when it comes in competition with a greater of its ſort; becauſe, when they come in competition, the degrees alſo of pleaſure and pain have juſtly a preference. So that, if we will rightly eſtimate what we call good and evil, we ſhall find it lies much in compariſon; for the cauſe of every leſs degree of pain, as well as every greater degree of pleaſure, has the nature of good, and vice verſa.

What good is deſired, what not.

§ 43. Tho' this be that which is called good and evil; and all good be the proper object of deſire in general; yet all good, even ſeen, and confeſſed to be ſo, does not neceſſarily move every particular man's deſire, but only that part, or ſo much of it, as is conſidered and taken to make a neceſſary part of his happineſs. All other good, however great in reality, or appearance, excites not a man's deſires, who looks not on it to make a part of that happineſs, wherewith he, in his preſent thoughts, can ſatisfy himſelf. Happineſs, under this view, every one conſtantly purſues, and deſires what makes any part of it: other things, acknowledged to be good, he can look upon, without deſire, paſs by, and be content without. There is no body, I think, ſo ſenſeleſs, as to deny, that there is pleaſure in knowledge: and for the pleaſures of ſenſe they have too many followers to let it be queſtioned, whether men are taken with them, or no. Now, let one man place his ſatisfaction in ſenſual pleaſures, another in the delight of knowledge: tho' each of them cannot but confeſs, there is great pleaſure in what the other purſues; yet neither of them, making the other's delight a part of his happineſs, their deſires are not moved, but each is ſatisfied without what the other enjoys, and ſo his will is not determined to the purſuit of it. But yet, as ſoon as the ſtudious man's hunger and thirſt makes him uneaſy, he, whoſe will was never determined to any purſuit of good chear, poignant ſauces, delicious wine, by the pleaſant taſte he has found in them, is by the uneaſineſs of hunger and thirſt, preſently determined to eating and drinking, tho' poſſibly, with great indifferency, what wholeſome food comes in his way. And, on the other ſide, the epicure buckles to ſtudy, when ſhame, or the deſire to recommend himſelf to his miſtreſs, ſhall make him uneaſy in the want of any ſort of knowledge. Thus, how much ſoever men are in earneſt, and conſtant in purſuit of happineſs, yet they may have a clear view of good, great and confeſſed good, without being concerned for it, or moved by it, if they think they can make up their happineſs without it. Tho' as to pain, that they are always concerned for; they can feel no uneaſineſs without being moved. And, therefore, being uneaſy in the want of whatever is judged neceſſary to their happineſs, as ſoon as any good appears to make a part of their portion of happineſs, they begin to deſire it.

Why the greateſt good is not always deſired.

§ 44. This, I think, any one may obſerve in himſelf, and others, that the greater viſible good does not always raiſe men's deſires, in proportion to the greatneſs, it appears, and is acknowledged to have: tho' every little trouble moves us, and ſets us on work to get rid of it. The reaſon whereof is evident from the nature of our happineſs and miſery itſelf. All preſent pain, whatever it be, makes a part of our preſent miſery: but all abſent good does not at any time make a neceſſary part of our preſent happineſs, nor the abſence of it make a part of our miſery. If it did, we ſhould be conſtantly and infinitely miſerable; there being infinite degrees of happineſs, which are not in our poſſeſſion. All uneaſineſs, therefore, being removed; a moderate portion of good ſerves at preſent to content men; and ſome few degrees of pleaſure, in a ſucceſſion of ordinary enjoyments, make up a happineſs, wherein they can be ſatisfy'd. If this were not ſo, there could be no room for thoſe indifferent and viſibly trifling actions, to which our wills are ſo often determined, and wherein we voluntarily waſte ſo much of our lives; which remiſſneſs could by no means conſiſt with a conſtant determination of will, or deſire, to the greateſt apparent good. That this is ſo, I think few people need go far from home to be convinced. And indeed, in this life, there are not many, whoſe happineſs reaches ſo far, as to afford them a conſtant train of moderate, mean pleaſures, without any mixture of uneaſineſs; and yet they could be content to ſtay here for ever: tho' they cannot deny, but that it is poſſible there may be a ſtate of eternal durable joys, after this life, far ſurpaſſing all the good that is to be found here. Nay, they cannot but ſee, that it is more poſſible than the attainment and continuation of that pittance of honour, riches or pleaſure, which they purſue, and for which they neglect that eternal ſtate: but yet, in full view of this difference, ſatisfy'd of the poſſibility of a perfect, ſecure, and laſting happineſs in a future ſtate, and under a clear conviction, that it is not to be had here, while they bound their happineſs within ſome little enjoyment, or aim of this life, and exclude the joys of heaven from making any neceſſary part of it; their deſires are not moved by this greater apparent good, nor their wills determined to any action, or endeavour for its attainment.

Why, not being deſired, it moves not the will.

§ 45. The ordinary neceſſities of our lives fill a great part of them with the uneaſineſs of hunger, thriſt, heat, cold, wearineſs with labour, and ſleepineſs, in their conſtant returns, &c. To which, if, beſides accidental harms, we add the fantaſtical uneaſineſs (as itch after honour, power, or riches, &c.) which acquired habits, by faſhion, example, and education, have ſettled in us; and a thouſand other irregular deſires, which cuſtom has made natural to us; we ſhall find that a very little part of our life is ſo vacant from theſe uneaſineſſes, as to leave us free to the attraction of remoter, abſent good. We are ſeldom at eaſe, and free enough from the ſolicitation of our natural, or adopted deſires; but a conſtant ſucceſſion of uneaſineſſes, out of that ſtock, which natural wants, or acquired habits, have heaped up, take the will in their turns: and no ſooner is one action diſpatched, which, by ſuch a determination of the will, we are ſet upon, but another uneaſineſs is ready to ſet us on work. For the removing of the pains we feel, and are at preſent preſſed with, being the getting out of miſery, and conſequently the firſt thing to be done, in order to happineſs, abſent good, tho' thought on, confeſs'd, and appearing to be good, not making any part of this unhappineſs in its abſence, is juſtled out, to make way for the removal of thoſe uneaſineſſes we feel: till due and repeated contemplation has brought it nearer to our mind, given ſome reliſh of it, and raiſed in us ſome deſire: which then, beginning to make a part of our preſent uneaſineſs, ſtands upon fair terms with the reſt, to be ſatisfy'd; and ſo, according to its greatneſs and preſſure, comes in its turn to determine the will.

Due conſideration raiſes deſire.

§ 46. And thus, by a due conſideration, and examining any good propoſed, it is in our power to raiſe our deſires, in a due proportion to the value of that good, whereby, in its turn and place, it may come to work upon the will, and be purſu'd. For good, tho' appearing, and allowed ever ſo great, yet till it has rais'd deſires in our minds, and thereby made us uneaſy in its want, it reaches not our wills; we are not within the ſphere of its activity; our wills being under the determination only of thoſe uneaſineſſes, which are preſent to us, which (whilſt we have any) are always ſoliciting, and ready at hand to give the will its next determination; the balancing, when there is any in the mind, being only which deſire ſhall be next ſatisfy'd, which uneaſineſs firſt removed. Whereby it comes to paſs, that as long as any uneaſineſs, any deſire remains in our mind, there is no room for good, barely as ſuch, to come at the will, or at all to determine it. Becauſe, as has been ſaid, the firſt ſtep, in our endeavours after happineſs, being to get wholly out of the confines of miſery, and to feel no part of it, the will can be at leiſure for nothing elſe, till every uneaſineſs we feel, be perfectly removed: which, in the multitude of wants and deſires, we are beſet with in this imperfect ſtate, we are not like to be ever freed from in this world.

The power, to ſuſpend the proſecution of any deſire, makes way for conſideration.

§ 47. There being in us a great many uneaſineſſes, always ſoliciting, and ready to determine the will, it is natural, as I have ſaid, that the greateſt and moſt preſſing ſhould determine the will to the next action; and ſo it does, for the moſt part, but not always. For the mind having, in moſt caſes, as is evident in experience, a power to ſuſpend the execution and ſatisfaction of any of its deſires, and ſo all, one after another; is at liberty to conſider the objects of them, examine them on all ſides, and weigh them with others. In this lies the liberty man has; and from the not uſing of it right, comes all that variety of miſtakes, errors, and faults, which we run into in the conduct of our lives, and our endeavours after happineſs; whilſt we precipitate the determination of our wills, and engage too ſoon before due examination. To prevent this, we have a power to ſuſpend the proſecution of this, or that deſire, as every one daily may experiment in himſelf. This ſeems to me the ſource of all liberty; in this ſeems to conſiſt that which is (as I think improperly) called free-will. For, during this ſuſpenſion of any deſire, before the will be determined to action, and the action (which follows that determination) done, we have an opportunity to examine, view, and judge of the good, or evil, of what we are going to do; and when, upon due examination, we have judged, we have done our duty, all that we can, or ought to do, in purſuit of our happineſs; and it is not a fault, but a perfection of our nature, to deſire, will, and act, according to the laſt reſult of a fair examination.

To be determined by our own judgment, is no reſtraint to liberty.

§ 48. This is ſo far from being a reſtraint or diminution of freedom, that it is the very improvement and benefit of it; it is not an abridgment, it is the end and uſe of our liberty: and the farther we are removed from ſuch a determination, the nearer we are to miſery and ſlavery. A perfect indifferency in the mind, not determinable by its laſt judgment of the good, or evil, that is thought to attend its choice, would be ſo far from being an advantage and excellency of an intellectual nature, that it would be as great an imperfection, as the want of indifferency to act, or not to act, till determined by the will, would be an imperfection on the other ſide. A man is at liberty to lift up his hand to his head, or let it reſt quiet: he is perfectly indifferent in either; and it would be an imperfection in him, if he wanted that power, if he were deprived of that indifferency. But it would be as great an imperfection, if he had the ſame indifferency whether he would prefer the lifting up his hand, or its remaining in reſt, when it would ſave his head, or eyes, from a blow he ſees coming: it is as much a perfection, that deſire, or the power of preferring, ſhould be determined by good, as that the power of acting ſhould be determined by the will; and the certainer ſuch determination is, the greater is the perfection. Nay, were we determined by any thing, but the laſt reſult of our own minds, judging of the good or evil of any action, we were not free. The very end of our freedom being, that we may attain the good we chuſe. And therefore, every man is put under a neceſſity, by his conſtitution, as an intelligent being, to be determined in willing, by his own thought and judgment, what is beſt for him to do: elſe he would be under the determination of ſome other than himſelf, which is want of liberty. And to deny that a man's will, in every determination, follows his own judgment, is to ſay, that a man wills and acts for an end that he would not have, at the time that he wills and acts for it. For, if he prefers it in his preſent thoughts before any other, it's plain he then thinks better of it, and would have it before any other; unleſs he can have, and not have it; will and not will at the ſame time; a contradiction too manifeſt to be admitted!

The freeſt agents are ſo determined.

§ 49. If we look upon thoſe ſuperior beings above us, who enjoy perfect happineſs, we ſhall have reaſon to judge that they are more ſteadily determined in their choice of good than we; and yet we have no reaſon to think they are leſs happy, or leſs free than we are. And if it were fit, for ſuch poor finite creatures as we are, to pronounce what infinite wiſdom and goodneſs could do, I think we might ſay, that God himſelf cannot chuſe what is not good; the freedom of the Almighty hinders not his being determined by what is beſt.

A conſtant determination to a purſuit of hap-

§ 50. But, to give a right view of this miſtaken part of liberty, let me aſk, "would any one be a changeling, becauſe he is leſs determined by wiſe conſiderations than a wiſe man? Is it worth the name of freedom, to be at liberty pineſs no abridgment of liberty.

“ to play the fool, and draw ſhame and miſery upon a man's ſelf?” If to break looſe from the conduct of reaſon, and to want that reſtraint of examination and judgment, which keeps us from chuſing, or doing the worſe, be liberty, true liberty, madmen and fools are the only freemen: but yet, I think, no body would chuſe to be mad for the ſake of ſuch liberty, but he that is mad already. The conſtant deſire of happineſs, and the conſtraint it puts upon us to act for it, no body, I think, accounts an abridgment of liberty, or at leaſt an abridgment of liberty to be complained of. God Almighty himſelf is under the neceſſity of being happy; and the more any intelligent being is ſo, the nearer is its approach to infinite perfection and happineſs. That in this ſtate of ignorance we ſhort-ſighted creatures might not miſtake true felicity, we are endowed with a power to ſuſpend any particular deſire, and keep it from determining the will, and engaging us in action. This is ſtanding ſtill, where we are not ſufficiently aſſured of the way: examination, is conſulting a guide. The determination of the will upon enquiry, is following the direction of that guide: and he, that has a power to act or not to act, according as ſuch determination directs, is a free agent; ſuch determination abridges not that power wherein liberty conſiſts. He that has his chains knocked off, and the priſon-doors ſet open to him, is perfectly at liberty, becauſe he may either go or ſtay, as he beſt likes; tho' his preference be determined to ſtay, by the darkneſs of the night, or illneſs of the weather, or want of other lodging. He ceaſes not to be free, tho' the deſire of ſome convenience to be had there abſolutely determines his preference, and makes him ſtay in his priſon.

The neceſſity of purſuing true happineſs, the foundation of all liberty.

§ 51. As therefore, the higheſt perfection of intellectual nature lies in a careful and conſtant purſuit of true and ſolid happineſs; ſo the care of ourſelves, that we miſtake not imaginary for real happineſs, is the neceſſary foundation of our liberty. The ſtronger ties we have to an unalterable purſuit of happineſs in general, which is our greateſt good, and which, as ſuch, our deſires always follow, the more are we free from any neceſſary determination of our will to any particular action, and from a neceſſary compliance with our deſire, ſet upon any particular, and then appearing, preferable good, till we have duly examined, whether it has a tendency to, or be inconſiſtent with our real happineſs: and therefore, till we are as much informed upon this enquiry as the weight of the matter, and the nature of the caſe demands; we are, by the neceſſity of preferring and purſuing true happineſs as our greateſt good, obliged to ſuſpend the ſatisfaction of our deſire, in particular caſes.

The reaſon of it.

§ 52. This is the hinge, on which turns the liberty of intellectual beings, in their conſtant endeavours after, and ſteady proſecution of true felicity, that they can ſuſpend this proſecution, in particular caſes, till they have looked before them, and informed themſelves, whether that particular thing, which is then propoſed, or deſired, lie in the way to their main end, and make a real part of that which is their greateſt good: for the inclination and tendency of their nature to happineſs, is an obligation and motive to them, to take care not to miſtake or miſs it; and ſo neceſſarily puts them upon caution, deliberation, and warineſs, in the direction of their particular actions, which are the means to obtain it. Whatever neceſſity determines to the purſuit of real bliſs, the ſame neceſſity, with the ſame force, eſtabliſhes ſuſpence, deliberation, and ſcrutiny of each ſucceſſive deſire, whether the ſatisfaction of it does not interfere with our true happineſs, and miſlead us from it. This, as ſeems to me, is the great privilege of finite, intellectual beings; and I deſire it may be well conſidered, whether the great inlet and exerciſe of all the liberty men have, are capable of, or can be uſeful to them, and that whereon depends the turn of their actions, does not lie in this, that they can ſuſpend their deſires, and ſtop them from determining their wills to any action, till they have duly and fairly examined the good and evil of it, as far forth as the weight of the thing requires. This we are able to do; and when we have done it, we have done our duty, and all that is in our power, and indeed all that needs. For ſince the will ſuppoſes knowledge, to guide its choice, all that we can do, is to hold our wills undetermined, till we have examined the good, and evil, of what we deſire. What follows, after that, follows in a chain of conſequences linked one to another, all depending on the laſt determination of the judgment; which, whether it ſhall be, upon a haſty and precipitate view, or upon a due and mature examination, is in our power: experience ſhewing us, that, in moſt caſes, we are able to ſuſpend the preſent ſatiſfaction of any deſire.

Government of our paſſions, the right improvement of liberty.

§ 53. But if any extreme diſturbance (as ſometimes it happens) poſſeſſes our whole mind, as when the pain of the rack, an impetuous uneaſineſs, as of love, anger, or any other violent paſſion, running away with us, allows us not the liberty of thought, and we are not maſters enough of our own minds, to conſider thoroughly, and examine fairly; God, who knows our frailty, pities our weakneſs, and requires of us no more than we are able to do, and ſees what was, and what was not in our power, will judge as a kind and merciful father. But the forbearance of a too haſty compliance with our deſires, the moderation and reſtraint of our paſſions, ſo that our underſtandings may be free to examine, and reaſon unbiaſſed give its judgment, being that, whereon a right direction of our conduct to true happineſs depends; it is in this we ſhould employ our chief care and endeavours. In this we ſhould take pains to ſuit the reliſh of our minds to the true, intrinſick good, or ill, that is in things, and not permit an allowed or ſuppoſed poſſible great and weighty good to ſlip out of our thoughts, without leaving any reliſh, any deſire of itſelf there, till by a due conſideration of its true worth, we have formed appetites in our minds ſuitable to it, and made ourſelves uneaſy in the want of it, or in the fear of loſing it. And how much this is in every one's power, by making reſolutions to himſelf, ſuch as he may keep, is eaſy for every one to try. Nor let any one ſay, he cannot govern his paſſions, nor hinder them from breaking out, and carrying him into action; for what he can do before a prince, or a great man, he can do alone, or in the preſence of God, if he will.

How men come to purſue different counſels.

§ 54. From what has been ſaid, it is eaſy to give account, how it comes to paſs, that tho' all men deſire happineſs, yet their wills carry them ſo contrarily, and conſequently ſome of them to what is evil. And to this I ſay, that the various and contrary choices, that men make in the world, do not argue that they do not all purſue good; but that the ſame thing is not good to every man alike. This variety of purſuits ſhews, that every one does not place his happineſs in the ſame thing, or chuſe the ſame way to it. Were all the concerns of man terminated in this life, why one followed ſtudy and knowledge, and another hawking and hunting; why one choſe luxury and debauchery, and another ſobriety and riches; would not be, becauſe every one of theſe did not aim at his own happineſs, but becauſe their happineſs was placed in different things. And therefore it was a right anſwer of the phyſician to his patient that had ſore eyes: if you have more pleaſure in the taſte of wine than in the uſe of your ſight, wine is good for you; but if the pleaſure of ſeeing be greater to you than that of drinking, wine is naught.

§ 55. The mind has a different reliſh, as well as the palate: and you will as fruitleſsly endeavour to delight all men with riches, or glory (which yet ſome men place their happineſs in) as you would to ſatiſfy all men's hunger with cheeſe, or lobſters; which, tho' very agreeable and delicious fare to ſome, are to others extremely nauſeous and offenſive: and many people would with reaſon prefer the griping of an hungry belly to thoſe diſhes which are a feaſt to others. Hence it was, I think, that the philoſophers of old did in vain enquire whether ſummum bonum conſiſted in riches, or bodily delights, or virtue, or contemplation. And they might have as reaſonably diſputed, whether the beſt reliſh were to be found in apples, plumbs, or nuts; and have divided themſelves into ſects upon it. For as pleaſant taſtes depend not on the things themſelves, but their agreeableneſs to this or that particular palate, wherein there is great variety; ſo the greateſt happineſs conſiſts in the having thoſe things, which produce the greateſt pleaſure, and in the abſence of thoſe which cauſe any diſturbance, any pain. Now theſe, to different men, are very different things. If, therefore, men in this life only have hope, if in this life they can only enjoy, it is not ſtrange, nor unreaſonable, that they ſhould ſeek their happineſs, by avoiding all things that diſeaſe them here, and by purſuing all that delight them; wherein it will be no wonder to find variety, and difference. For if there be no proſpect beyond the grave, the inference is certainly right, let us eat and drink, let us enjoy what we delight in, for to-morrow we ſhall die. This, I think, may ſerve to ſhew us the reaſon, why, tho' all men's deſires tend to happineſs, yet they are not moved by the ſame object. Men may chuſe different things, and yet all chuſe right; ſuppoſing them only, like a company of poor inſects, whereof ſome are bees, delighted with flowers and their ſweetneſs; others beetles, delighted with other kinds of viands; which, having enjoyed for a ſeaſon, they ſhould ceaſe to be, and exiſt no more for ever.

How men come to chuſe ill.

§ 56. THESE things duly weighed, will give us, as I think, a clear view into the ſtate of human liberty. Liberty, it is plain, conſiſts in a power to do, or not to do; to do, or forbear doing, as we will. This cannot be denied. But this ſeeming to comprehend only the actions of a man conſecutive to volition, it is farther enquired, "whether he be at liberty to will, or no." And to this it has been anſwered, that in moſt caſes a man is not at liberty to forbear the act of volition; he muſt exert an act of his will, whereby the action propoſed is made to exiſt, or not to exiſt. But yet there is a caſe wherein a man is at liberty in reſpect of willing, and that is the chuſing of a remote good as an end to be purſued. Here a man may ſuſpend the act of his choice from being determined for, or againſt, the thing propoſed, till he has examined whether it be really of a nature, in itſelf and conſequences, to make him happy, or no. For, when he has once choſen it, and thereby it is become a part of his happineſs, it raiſes deſire, and that proportionably gives him uneaſineſs, which determines his will, and ſets him at work in purſuit of his choice, on all occaſions that offer. And here we may ſee how it comes to paſs, that a man may juſtly incur puniſhment, tho' it be certain that in all the particular actions that he wills, he does, and neceſſarily does will that, which he then judges to be good. For, tho' his will be always determined by that, which is judged good by his underſtanding, yet it excuſes him not: becauſe, by a too haſty choice of his own making, he has impoſed on himſelf wrong meaſures of good and evil; which, however falſe and fallacious, have the ſame influence on all his future conduct, as if they were true and right. He has vitiated his own palate, and muſt be anſwerable to himſelf for the ſickneſs and death that follows from it. The eternal law and nature of things muſt not be altered, to comply with his ill-ordered choice. If the neglect, or abuſe, of the liberty he had, to examine what would really and truly make for his happineſs, miſleads him, the miſcarriages, that follow on it, muſt be imputed to his own election. He had a power to ſuſpend his determination: it was given him, that he might examine, and take care of his own happineſs, and look that he were not deceived. And he could never judge, that it was better to be deceived, than not, in a matter of ſo great and near concernment.

WHAT has been ſaid, may alſo diſcover to us the reaſon why men in this world prefer different things, and purſue happineſs by contrary courſes. But yet, ſince men are always conſtant, and in earneſt, in matters of happineſs and miſery, the queſtion ſtill remains, how men come often to prefer the worſe to the better; and to chuſe that, which, by their own confeſſion, has made them miſerable?

§ 57. To account for the various and contrary ways men take, tho' all aim at being happy, we muſt conſider whence the various uneaſineſſes, that determine the will in the preference of each voluntary action, have their riſe.

From bodily pains.

1. Some of them come from cauſes not in our power; ſuch as are often the pains of the body from want, diſeaſe, or outward injuries, as the rack, &c. which, when preſent and violent, operate for the moſt part forcibly on the will, and turn the courſes of men's lives from virtue, piety, and religion, and what before they judged to lead to happineſs; every one not endeavouring, or, thro' diſuſe, not being able, by the contemplation of remote and future good, to raiſe in himſelf deſires of them, ſtrong enough to counter-ballance the uneaſineſs he feels in thoſe bodily torments, and to keep his will ſteady in the choice of thoſe actions which lead to future happineſs. A neighbour country has been of late a tragical

theatre, from which we might fetch inſtances, if there needed any, and the world did not, in all countries and ages, furniſh examples enough to confirm that received obſervation, "neceſſitas cogit ad turpia"; and therefore there is great reaſon for us to pray, "lead us not into temptation."

From wrong deſires ariſing from wrong judgment.

2. Other uneaſineſſes ariſe from our deſires of abſent good; which deſires always bear proportion to, and depend on the judgment we make, and the reliſh we have of any abſent good: in both which we are apt to be variouſly miſled, and that by our own fault.

Our judgment of preſent good, or evil, always right.

§ 58. In the firſt place, I ſhall conſider the wrong judgments men make of future good and evil, whereby their deſires are miſled. For, as to preſent happineſs and miſery, when that alone comes in conſideration, and the conſequences are quite removed, a man never chuſes amiſs; he knows what beſt pleaſes him, and that he actually prefers. Things in their preſent enjoyment are what they ſeem; the apparent and real good are, in this caſe, always the ſame. For the pain, or pleaſure, being juſt ſo great, and no greater than it is felt, the preſent good, or evil, is really ſo much as it appears. And, therefore, were every action of our's concluded within itſelf, and drew no conſequences after it, we ſhould, undoubtedly, never err in our choice of good; we ſhould always infallibly prefer the beſt. Were the pains of honeſt induſtry, and of ſtarving with hunger and cold, ſet together before us, no body would be in doubt which to chuſe: were the ſatisfaction of a luſt, and the joys of heaven, offered at once to any one's preſent poſſeſſion, he would not ballance, or err in the determination of his choice.

§ 59. But ſince our voluntary actions carry not all the happineſs and miſery, that depend on them, along with them, in their preſent performance, but are the precedent cauſes of good and evil, which they draw after them, and bring upon us, when they themſelves are paſſed and ceaſe to be; our deſires look beyond our preſent enjoyments, and carry the mind out to abſent good, according to the neceſſity which we think there is of it, to the making, or increaſe, of our happineſs. It is our opinion of ſuch a neceſſity, that gives it its attraction: without that, we are not moved by abſent good. For in this narrow ſcantling of capacity, which we are accuſtomed to, and ſenſible of here, wherein we enjoy but one pleaſure at once, which, when all uneaſineſs is away, is, whilſt it laſts, ſufficient to make us think our ſelves happy; it is not all remote, and even apparent good, that affects us. Becauſe the indolency and enjoyment we have, ſufficing for our preſent happineſs, we deſire not to venture the change; ſince we judge that we are happy already, being content, and that is enough. For who is content is happy. But as ſoon as any new uneaſineſs comes, this happineſs is diſturbed, and we are ſet a-freſh on work in the purſuit of happineſs.

From a wrong judgment of what makes a neceſſary part of their happineſs.

§ 60. Their aptneſs, therefore, to conclude, that they can be happy without it, is one great occaſion that men often are not raiſed to the deſire of the greateſt, abſent good. For whilſt ſuch thoughts poſſeſs them, the joys of a future ſtate move them not; they have little concern, or uneaſineſs about them; and the will, free from the determination of ſuch deſires, is left to the purſuit of nearer ſatisfactions, and to the removal of thoſe uneaſineſſes, which it then feels, in its want of, and longings after them. Change but a man's view of theſe things; let him ſee, that virtue and religion are neceſſary to his happineſs; let him look into the future ſtate of bliſs, or miſery, and ſee there God, the righteous judge, ready to "render to every man according to his deeds; to them who, by patient continuance in well-doing, ſeek for glory, and honour, and immortality, eternal life; but unto every ſoul that doth evil, indignation and wrath, tribulation and anguiſh:" to him, I ſay, who hath a proſpect of the different ſtate of perfect happineſs, or miſery, that attends all men after this life, depending on their behaviour here, the meaſures of good and evil, that govern his choice, are mightily changed. For ſince nothing of pleaſure and pain, in this life, can bear any proportion to endleſs happineſs, or exquiſite miſery of an immortal ſoul hereafter; actions, in his power, will have their preference, not according to the tranſient pleaſure, or pain, that accompanies, or follows them, here, but as they ſerve to ſecure that perfect, durable happineſs hereafter.

§ 61. But

A more particular account of wrong judgments.

§ 61. BUT to account more particularly for the miſery, that men often bring on themſelves, notwithſtanding that they do all in earneſt purſue happineſs, we muſt conſider how things come to be repreſented to our deſires, under deceitful appearances: and that is by the judgment, pronouncing wrongly concerning them. To ſee how far this reaches, and what are the cauſes of wrong judgment, we muſt remember that things are judged good, or bad, in a double ſenſe.

FIRST, That which is properly good, or bad, is nothing but barely pleaſure, or pain.

SECONDLY, But becauſe not only preſent pleaſure and pain, but that alſo which is apt, by its efficacy or conſequences, to bring it upon us at a diſtance, is a proper object of our deſires, and apt to move a creature that has foreſight; therefore things alſo that draw after them pleaſure and pain, are conſidered as good and evil.

§ 62. THE wrong judgment that miſleads us, and makes the will often faſten on the worſe ſide, lies in miſreporting upon the various compariſons of theſe. The wrong judgment I am here ſpeaking of, is not what one man may think of the determination of another, but what every man himſelf muſt confeſs to be wrong. For ſince I lay it for a certain ground, that every intelligent being really ſeeks happineſs, which conſiſts in the enjoyment of pleaſure, without any conſiderable mixture of uneaſineſs; it is impoſſible any one ſhould willingly put into his own draught any bitter ingredient, or leave out any thing in his power, that would tend to his ſatisfaction, and the compleating of his happineſs, but only by wrong judgment. I ſhall not here ſpeak of that miſtake, which is the conſequence of invincible error, which ſcarce deſerves the name of wrong judgment; but of that wrong judgment, which every man himſelf muſt confeſs to be ſo.

In comparing preſent and future.

§ 63. I. THEREFORE as to preſent pleaſure and pain, the mind, as has been ſaid, never miſtakes that which is really good, or evil; that which is the greater pleaſure, or the greater pain, is really juſt as it appears. But tho' preſent pleaſure and pain ſhew their difference and degrees ſo plainly, as not to leave room for miſtake; yet, when we compare preſent pleaſure, or pain, with future, (which is uſually the caſe in the moſt important determinations of the will) we often make wrong judgments of them, taking our meaſures of them in different poſitions of diſtance. Objects, near our view, are apt to be thought greater than thoſe of a larger ſize, that are more remote: and ſo it is with pleaſures and pains; the preſent is apt to carry it, and thoſe at a diſtance have the diſadvantage in the compariſon. Thus moſt men, like ſpend-thrift heirs, are apt to judge a little in hand better than a great deal to come; and ſo for ſmall matters in poſſeſſion, part with great ones in reverſion. But that this is a wrong judgment, every one muſt allow, let his pleaſure conſiſt in whatever it will: ſince that which is future, will certainly come to be preſent; and then having the ſame advantage of nearneſs, will ſhew itſelf in its full dimenſions, and diſcover his wilful miſtake, who judged of it by unequal meaſures. Were the pleaſure of drinking accompanied, the very moment a man takes off his glaſs, with that ſick ſtomach and aking head, which, in ſome men, are ſure to follow not many hours after; I think no body, whatever pleaſure he had in his cups, would, on the conditions, ever let wine touch his lips; which yet he daily ſwallows, and the evil ſide comes to be choſen only by the fallacy of a little difference in time. But, if pleaſure, or pain, can be ſo leſſened only by a few hours removal, how much more will it be ſo by a farther diſtance, to a man that will not by a right judgment do what time will, i. e. bring it home upon himſelf, and conſider it as preſent, and there take its true dimenſions? This is the way we uſually impoſe on ourſelves, in reſpect of bare pleaſure and pain, or the true degrees of happineſs, or miſery: the future loſes its juſt proportion, and what is preſent obtains the preference as the greater. I mention not here the wrong judgment, whereby the abſent are not only leſſened, but reduced to perfect nothing; when men enjoy what they can at preſent, and make ſure of that, concluding amiſs, that no evil will thence follow. For that lies not in comparing the greatneſs of future good and evil, which is that we are here ſpeaking of; but in another ſort of wrong judgment, which is concerning good, or evil, as it is conſidered to be the cauſe and procurement of pleaſure, or pain, that will follow from it.

Cauſes of this.

§ 64. THE cauſe of our judging amiſs, when we compare our preſent pleaſure, or pain, with future, ſeems to me to be the weak and narrow conſtitution of our minds. We cannot well enjoy two pleaſures at once, much leſs any pleaſure almoſt, whilſt pain poſſeſſes us. The preſent pleaſure, if it be not very languid, and almoſt none at all, fills our narrow ſouls, and ſo takes up the whole mind, that it ſcarce leaves any thought of things abſent: or, if among our pleaſures, there are ſome which are not ſtrong enough to exclude the conſideration of things at a diſtance; yet we have ſo great an abhorrence of pain, that a little of it extinguiſhes all our pleaſures: a little bitter mingled in our cup, leaves no reliſh of the ſweet. Hence it comes, that at any rate we deſire to be rid of the preſent evil, which we are apt to think nothing abſent can equal; becauſe, under the preſent pain, we find not ourſelves capable of any the leaſt degree of happineſs. Men's daily complaints are a loud proof of this: the pain that any one actually feels, is ſtill of all other the worſt; and it is with anguiſh they cry out, “any rather than this; nothing can be ſo intolerable as what I now ſuffer.” And, therefore, our whole endeavours and thoughts are intent to get rid of the preſent evil, before all things, as the firſt neceſſary condition to our happineſs, let what will follow. Nothing, as we paſſionately think, can exceed, or almoſt equal, the uneaſineſs that ſits ſo heavy upon us. And becauſe the abſtinence from a preſent pleaſure, that offers itſelf, is a pain, nay, oftentimes, a very great one, the deſire being inflamed by a near and tempting object; it is no wonder that that operates after the ſame manner pain does, and leſſens in our thoughts what is future; and ſo forces us, as it were, blindfold into its embraces.

§ 65. ADD to this, that abſent good, or which is the ſame thing, future pleaſure, eſpecially if of a ſort we are unacquainted with, ſeldom is able to counterballance any uneaſineſs, either of pain, or deſire, which is preſent. For its greatneſs being no more, than what ſhall be really taſted when enjoyed, men are apt enough to leſſen that, to make it give place to any preſent deſire; and conclude with themſelves, that, when it comes to trial, it may poſſibly not anſwer the report, or opinion, that generally paſſes of it; they having often found, that not only what others have magnified, but even what they themſelves have enjoyed, with great pleaſure and delight, at one time, has proved inſipid, or nauſeous, at another; and, therefore, they ſee nothing in it, for which they ſhould forego a preſent enjoyment. But that this is a falſe way of judging, when applied to the happineſs of another life, they muſt confeſs; unleſs they will ſay, “God cannot make thoſe happy he deſigns to be ſo.” For that being intended for a ſtate of happineſs, it muſt certainly be agreeable to every one's wiſh and deſire: could we ſuppoſe their reliſhes as different there, as they are here, yet the manna in heaven will ſuit every one's palate. Thus much of the wrong judgment we make of preſent pleaſure, and pain, when they are compared together, and ſo the abſent conſidered as future.

In conſidering conſequences of actions.

§ 66. II. As to things good, or bad, in their conſequences, and by the aptneſs is in them to procure us good or evil, in the future, we judge amiſs ſeveral ways.

1. WHEN we judge that ſo much evil does not really depend on them, as in truth there does.

2. WHEN we judge, that tho' the conſequence be of that moment, yet it is not of that certainty, but that it may otherwiſe fall out, or elſe by ſome means be avoided, as by induſtry, addreſs, change, repentance, &c. That theſe are wrong ways of judging, were eaſy to ſhew in every particular, if I would examine them at large ſingly: but I ſhall only mention this in general, viz. that it is a very wrong and irrational way of proceeding, to venture a greater good for a leſs, upon uncertain gueſſes, and before a due examination be made proportionable to the weightineſs of the matter, and the concernment it is to us not to miſtake. This, I think, every one muſt confeſs, eſpecially if he conſiders the uſual cauſes of this wrong judgment, whereof theſe following are ſome.

Cauſes of this.

§ 67. I. IGNORANCE: he that judges without informing himſelf to the utmoſt that he is capable, cannot acquit himſelf of judging amiſs.

II. Inadvertency: when a man overlooks even that which he does know. This is an affected and preſent ignorance, which miſleads our judgments, as much as the other. Judging is as it were ballancing an account, and determining on which ſide the odds lie. If therefore, either ſide be huddled up in haſte, and ſeveral of the ſums, that ſhould have gone into the reckoning, be overlooked and left out, this precipitancy cauſes as wrong a judgment, as if it were a perfect ignorance. That, which moſt commonly cauſes this, is the prevalency of ſome preſent pleaſure, or pain, heightened by our feeble, paſſionate nature, moſt ſtrongly wrought on by what is preſent. To check this precipitancy, our underſtanding and reaſon was given us, if we will make a right uſe of it, to ſearch and ſee, and then judge thereupon. Without liberty the underſtanding would be to no purpoſe: and without underſtanding, liberty (if it could be) would ſignify nothing. If a man ſees what would do him good, or harm, what would make him happy, or miſerable, without being able to move himſelf one ſtep towards, or from it, what is he the better for ſeeing? And he that is at liberty to ramble in perfect darkneſs, what is his liberty better, than if he were driven up and down, as a bubble, by the force of the wind? The being acted by a blind impulſe from without, or from within, is little odds. The firſt therefore, and great uſe of liberty, is to hinder blind precipitancy; the principal exerciſe of freedom is to ſtand ſtill, open the eyes, look about, and take a view of the conſequence of what we are going to do, as much as the weight of the matter requires. How much ſloth and negligence, heat and paſſion, the prevalency of faſhion, or acquired indiſpoſitions, do ſeverally contribute on occaſion to theſe wrong judgments, I ſhall not here farther enquire. I ſhall only add one other falſe judgment, which I think neceſſary to mention, becauſe perhaps it is little taken notice of, tho' of great influence.

Wrong judgment of what is neceſſary to our happineſs.

§ 68. All men deſire happineſs, that's paſt doubt; but, as has been already obſerved, when they are rid of pain, they are apt to take up with any pleaſure at hand, or that cuſtom has endeared to them, to reſt ſatisfy'd in that; and ſo being happy, till ſome new deſire by making them uneaſy, diſturbs that happineſs, and ſhews them that they are not ſo, they look no farther; nor is the will determined to any action, in purſuit of any other known, or apparent good. For ſince we find, that we cannot enjoy all ſorts of good, but one excludes another; we do not fix our deſires on every apparent, greater good, unleſs it be judged to be neceſſary to our happineſs; if we think we can be happy without it, it moves us not. This is another occaſion to men of judging wrong, when they take not that to be neceſſary to their happineſs, which really is ſo. This miſtake miſleads us, both in the choice of the good we aim at, and very often in the means to it, when it is a remote good. But which way ever it be, either by placing it where really it is not, or by neglecting the means as not neceſſary to it; when a man miſſes his great end, happineſs, he will acknowledge he judged not right. That which contributes to this miſtake, is the real or ſuppoſed unpleaſantneſs of the actions, which are the way to this end; it ſeeming ſo prepoſterous a thing to men, to make themſelves unhappy in order to happineſs, that they do not eaſily bring themſelves to it.

We can change the agreeableneſs, or diſagreeableneſs, in things.

§ 69. The laſt enquiry, therefore, concerning this matter is, "whether it be " in a man's power to change the pleaſantneſs and unpleaſantneſs that accompanies " any ſort of action?" And as to that, it is plain, in many caſes, he can. Men may, and ſhould correct their palates, and give a reliſh to what either has, or they ſuppoſe has none. The reliſh of the mind is as various as that of the body, and like that too may be altered; and it is a miſtake to think, that men cannot change the diſpleaſingneſs, or indifferency, that is in actions, into pleaſure and deſire, if they will do but what is in their power. A due conſideration will do it in ſome caſes; and practice, application, and cuſtom in moſt. Bread, or tobacco, may be neglected, where they are ſhewn to be uſeful to health, becauſe of an indifferency, or diſreliſh to them; reaſon and conſideration at firſt recommends, and begins their trial, and uſe finds, or cuſtom makes them pleaſant. That this is ſo in virtue too, is very certain. Actions are pleaſing, or diſpleaſing, either in themſelves, or conſidered as a means to a greater and more deſirable end. The eating of a well-ſeaſoned diſh, ſuited to a man's palate, may move the mind, by the delight itſelf that accompanies the eating, without reference to any other end: to which the conſideration of the pleaſure there is in health and ſtrength (to which that meat is ſubſervient) may add a new guſto, able to make us ſwallow an ill-reliſhed potion. In the latter of theſe, any action is rendered more or leſs pleaſing, only by the contemplation of the end, and the being more or leſs perſuaded of its tendency to it, or neceſſary connection with it: but the pleaſure of the action itſelf is beſt acquired, or increaſed, by uſe and practice. Trials often reconcile us to that, which at a diſtance we looked on with averſion; and by repetitions wear us into a liking of what poſſibly, in the firſt eſſay, diſpleaſed us. Habits have powerful charms, and put ſo ſtrong attractions of eaſineſs and pleaſure, into what we accuſtom ourſelves to, that we cannot forbear to do, or at leaſt be eaſy in the omiſſion of actions, which habitual practice has ſuited, and thereby recommends to us. Tho' this be very viſible, and every one's experience ſhews him he can do ſo: yet it is a part in the conduct of men, towards their happineſs, neglected to a degree, that it will be poſſibly entertained as a paradox, if it be ſaid, that men can make things, or actions, more or leſs pleaſing to themſelves; and thereby remedy that, to which one may juſtly impute a great deal of their wandring. Faſhion and the common opinion having ſettled wrong notions, and education and cuſtom ill habits, the juſt values of things are miſplaced, and the palates of men corrupted. Pains ſhould be taken to rectify theſe; and contrary habits change our pleaſures, and give a reliſh to that which is neceſſary, or conducive to our happineſs. This every one muſt confeſs he can do, and when happineſs is loſt, and miſery overtakes him, he will confeſs he did amiſs in neglecting it, and condemn himſelf for it: and I aſk every one, whether he has not often done ſo?

Preference of vice to virtue, a manifeſt wrong judgment.

§ 70. I SHALL not now enlarge any farther, on the wrong judgments and neglect of what is in their power, whereby men miſlead themſelves. This would make a volume, and is not my buſineſs. But whatever falſe notions, or ſhameful neglect of what is in their power, may put men out of their way to happineſs, and diſtract them, as we ſee, into ſo different courſes of life, this yet is certain, that morality, eſtabliſhed upon its true foundations, cannot but determine the choice, in any one that will but conſider: and he, that will not be ſo far a rational creature as to reflect ſeriouſly upon infinite happineſs and miſery, muſt needs condemn himſelf, as not making that uſe of his underſtanding he ſhould. The rewards and puniſhments of another life, which the Almighty has eſtabliſhed, as the enforcements of his law, are of weight enough to determine the choice, againſt whatever pleaſure or pain this life can ſhew, when the eternal ſtate is conſidered, but in its bare poſſibility, which no body can make any doubt of. He, that will allow exquiſite and endleſs happineſs to be but the poſſible conſequence of a good life here, and the contrary ſtate the poſſible reward of a bad one: muſt own himſelf to judge very much amiſs, if he does not conclude, that a virtuous life, with the certain expectation of everlaſting bliſs which may come, is to be preferred to a vicious one, with the fear of that dreadful ſtate of miſery, which it is very poſſible may overtake the guilty; or at beſt the terrible, uncertain hope of annihilation. This is evidently ſo, tho' the virtuous life here had nothing but pain, and the vicious continual pleaſure: which yet is, for the moſt part, quite otherwiſe, and wicked men have not much the odds to brag of, even in their preſent poſſeſſion; nay, all things rightly conſidered, have, I think, even the worſt part here. But, when infinite happineſs is put in one ſcale againſt infinite miſery in the other; if the worſt that comes to the pious man, if he miſtakes, be the beſt that the wicked can attain to, if he be in the right, who can, without madneſs run the venture? Who in his wits would chooſe to come within a poſſibility of infinite miſery, which if he miſs, there is yet nothing to be got by that hazard? Whereas, on the other ſide, the ſober man ventures nothing againſt infinite happineſs to be got, if his expectation comes to paſs. If the good man be in the right, he is eternally happy; if he miſtakes, he is not miſerable, he feels nothing. On the other ſide, if the wicked be in the right, he is not happy; if he miſtakes, he is infinitely miſerable. Muſt it not be a moſt manifeſt wrong judgment, that does not preſently ſee, to which ſide, in this caſe, the preference is to be given? I have forborn to mention any thing of the certainty, or probability, of a future ſtate, deſigning here to ſhew the wrong judgment that any one muſt allow he makes, upon his own principles, laid how he pleaſes, who prefers the ſhort pleaſures of a vicious life upon any conſideration, whilſt he knows, and cannot but be certain, that a future life is at leaſt poſſible.

Recapitulation.

§ 71. To conclude this enquiry into human liberty, which as it ſtood before, I myſelf from the beginning fearing, and a very judicious friend of mine, ſince the publication, ſuſpecting to have ſome miſtake in it, tho' he could not particularly ſhew it me, I was put upon a ſtricter review of this chapter. Wherein lighting upon a very eaſy and ſcarce obſervable ſlip I have made, in putting one ſeemingly indifferent word for another, that diſcovery opened to me this preſent view, which here, in this ſecond edition, I ſubmit to the learned world, and which in ſhort is this: "Liberty is a power to act or not to act, according as the mind directs." A power to direct the operative faculties to motion, or reſt, in particular inſtances, is that which we call the will. That, which in the train of our voluntary actions determines the will to any change of operation, is ſome preſent uneaſineſs; which is, or at leaſt is always accompany'd with, that of deſire. Deſire is always moved by evil, to fly it; becauſe a total freedom from pain always makes a neceſſary part of our happineſs: but every good, nay, every greater good, does not conſtantly move deſire, becauſe it may not make, or may not be taken to make any neceſſary part of our happineſs. For all that we deſire, is only to be happy. But tho' this general deſire of happineſs operates conſtantly and invariably, yet the ſatisfaction of any particular deſire can be ſuſpended from determining the will to any ſubſervient action, till we have maturely examined, whether the particular apparent good, which we then deſire, makes a part of our real happineſs, or be conſiſtent or inconſiſtent with it. The reſult of our judgment, upon that examination, is what ultimately determines the man, who could not be free, if his will were determined by any thing but his own deſire, guided by his own judgment. I know that liberty, by ſome, is placed in an indifferency of the man, antecedent to the determination of his will. I wiſh they, who lay ſo much ſtreſs on ſuch an antecedent indifferency, as they call it, had told us plainly, whether this ſuppoſed indifferency be antecedent to the thought and judgment of the underſtanding, as well as to the decree of the will. For it is pretty hard to ſtate it between them, i. e. immediately after the judgment of the underſtanding, and before the determination of the will, becauſe the determination of the will immediately follows the judgment of the underſtanding: and to place liberty in an indifferency, antecedent to the thought and judgment of the underſtanding, ſeems to me to place liberty in a ſtate of darkneſs, wherein we can neither ſee, nor ſay, any thing of it; at leaſt it places it in a ſubject, incapable of it, no agent being allowed capable of liberty, but in conſequence of thought and judgment. I am not nice about phraſes, and therefore, conſent to ſay, with thoſe that love to ſpeak ſo, that liberty is placed in indifferency: but it is an indifferency, which remains after the judgment of the underſtanding; yea, even after the determination of the will: and that is an indifferency not of the man (for after he has once judged which is beſt, viz. to do or forbear, he is no longer indifferent) but an indifferency of the operative powers of the man, which remaining equally able to operate, or to forbear operating after, as before the decree of the will, are in a ſtate, which, if one pleaſes, may be called indifferency; and as far as this indifferency reaches, a man is free, and no farther: v. g. I have the ability to move my hand, or to let it reſt, that operative power is indifferent to move, or not to move my hand: I am then in that reſpect perfectly free. My will determines that operative power to reſt, I am yet free, becauſe the indifferency of that my operative power to act, or not to act, ſtill remains; the power of moving my hand is not at all impaired by the determination of my will, which at preſent orders reſt; the indifferency of that power to act, or not to act, is juſt as it was before, as will appear, if the will puts it to the trial, by ordering the contrary. But if, during the reſt of my hand, it be ſeized by a ſudden palſy, the indifferency of that operative power is gone, and with it my liberty; I have no longer freedom in that reſpect, but am under a neceſſity of letting my hand reſt. On the other ſide, if my hand be put into motion, by a convulſion, the indifferency of that operative faculty is taken away by that motion, and my liberty in that caſe is loſt: for I am under a neceſſity of having my hand move. I have added this, to ſhew in what ſort of indifferency, liberty ſeems to me to conſiſt, and not in any other, real or imaginary.

§ 72. True notions concerning the nature and extent of liberty, are of ſo great importance, that I hope I ſhall be pardoned this digreſſion, which my attempt to explain it, has led me into. The ideas of will, volition, liberty, and neceſſity, in this chapter of power, came naturally in my way. In a former edition of this treatiſe I gave an account of my thoughts concerning them, according to the light I then had: and now, as a lover of truth, and not a worſhipper of my own doctrines, I own ſome change of my opinion, which, I think, I have diſcovered ground for. In what I firſt writ, I with an unbiaſſed indifferency followed truth, whither I thought ſhe led me. But neither being ſo vain as to fancy infallibility, nor ſo diſingenuous as to diſſemble my miſtakes, for fear of blemiſhing my reputation, I have, with the ſame ſincere deſign, for truth only, not been aſhamed to publiſh what a ſeverer enquiry has ſuggeſted. It is not impoſſible but that ſome may think my former notions right, and ſome (as I have already found) theſe latter, and ſome neither. I ſhall not at all wonder at this variety in men's opinions; impartial deductions of reaſon in controverted points being ſo very rare, and exact ones in abſtract notions not ſo very eaſy, eſpecially if of any length. And, therefore, I ſhould think myſelf not a little beholden to any one, who would, upon theſe, or any other grounds, fairly clear this ſubject of liberty from any difficulties, that may yet remain.

Before I cloſe this chapter, it may, perhaps, be to our purpoſe, and help to give us clearer conceptions about power, if we make our thoughts take a little more exact ſurvey of action. I have ſaid above, that we have ideas but of two ſorts of action, viz. motion and thinking. Theſe, in truth, tho' called and counted actions, yet, if nearly conſidered, will not be found to be always perfectly ſo. For, if I miſtake not, there are inſtances of both kinds, which, upon due conſideration, will be found rather paſſions than actions, and conſequently ſo far the effects barely of paſſive powers in thoſe ſubjects, which, yet, on their account, are thought agents. For, in theſe inſtances, the ſubſtance that hath motion, or thought, receives the impreſſion, whereby it is put into that action purely from without, and ſo acts merely by the capacity it has to receive ſuch an impreſſion from ſome external agent: and ſuch a power is not properly an active power, but a mere paſſive capacity in the ſubject. Sometimes the ſubſtance, or agent, puts itſelf into action by is own power, and this is properly active power. Whatſoever modification a ſubſtance has, whereby it produces any effect, that is called action, v. g. a ſolid ſubſtance, by motion, operates on, or alters the ſenſible ideas of another ſubſtance, and therefore, this modification of motion we call action. But yet this motion in that ſolid ſubſtance is, when rightly conſidered, but a paſſion, if it received it only from ſome external agent. So that the active power of motion is in no ſubſtance, which cannot begin motion in it ſelf, or in another ſubſtance, when at reſt. So likewiſe in thinking, a power to receive ideas, or thoughts, from the operation of any external ſubſtance, is called a power of thinking: but this is but a paſſive power, or capacity. But to be able to bring into view ideas, out of ſight, at one's own choice, and to compare which of them one thinks fit, this is an active power. This reflection may be of ſome uſe to preſerve us from miſtakes about powers and actions, which grammar, and the common frame of languages may be apt to lead us into; ſince what is ſignified by verbs that grammarians call active, does not always ſignify action: v. g. this propoſition, I ſee the moon, or a ſtar, or I feel the heat of the ſun, tho' expreſſed by a verb active, does not ſignify any action in me, whereby I operate on thoſe ſubſtances; but the reception of the ideas of light, roundneſs, and heat, wherein I am not active, but barely paſſive, and cannot in that poſition of my eyes, or body, avoid receiving them. But when I turn my eyes another way, or remove my body out of the ſun-beams, I am properly active; becauſe of my own choice, by a power within myſelf, I put myſelf into that motion. Such an action is the product of active power.

§ 73. AND thus I have, in a ſhort draught, given a view of our original ideas, from whence all the reſt are derived, and of which they are made up; which, if I would conſider, as a philoſopher, and examine on what cauſes they depend, and of what they are made, I believe they all might be reduced to theſe very few primary and original ones, viz. Extenſion, Solidity, Mobility, or the power of being moved; which by our ſenſes we receive from body: Perceptivity, or the power of perception, or thinking; Motivity, or the power of moving; which, by reflection, we receive from our minds. I crave leave to make uſe of theſe two new words, to avoid the danger of being miſtaken in the uſe of thoſe which are equivocal. To which if we add, Exiſtence, Duration, Number; which belong both to one and the other; we have, perhaps, all the original ideas, on which the reſt depend. For by theſe, I imagine, might be explained the nature of colours, ſounds, taſtes, ſmells, and all other ideas we have, if we had but faculties acute enough to perceive the ſeverally modified extenſions, and motions of theſe minute bodies, which produce thoſe ſeveral ſenſations in us. But my preſent purpoſe being only to enquire into the knowledge the mind has of things, by thoſe ideas and appearances, which God has fitted it to receive from them, and how the mind comes by that knowledge, rather than into their cauſes, or manner of production; I ſhall not, contrary to the deſign of this eſſay, ſet myſelf to enquire philoſophically into the peculiar conſtitution of bodies, and the configuration of parts, whereby they have the power to produce in us the ideas of their ſenſible qualities: I ſhall not enter any farther into that diſquiſition, it ſufficing to my purpoſe to obſerve, that gold, or ſaffron, has a power to produce in us the idea of yellow; and ſnow, or milk, the idea of white; which we can only have by our ſight, without examining the texture of the parts of thoſe bodies, or the particular figures, or motion, of the particles, which rebound from them, to cauſe in us that particular ſenſation: tho', when we go beyond the bare ideas in our minds, and would enquire into their cauſes, we cannot conceive any thing elſe, to be in any ſenſible object, whereby it produces different ideas in us, but the different bulk, figure, number, texture, and motion of its inſenſible parts.

CHAP. XXII.

Of mixed modes.

CHAP. XXII.

Mixed modes, what.

§ 1. HAVING treated of ſimple modes in the foregoing chapters, and given ſeveral inſtances of ſome of the moſt conſiderable of them, to ſhew what they are, and how we come by them; we are now in the next place to conſider thoſe we call mixed modes: ſuch are the complex ideas we mark by the names Obligation, Drunkenneſs, a Lye, &c. which, conſiſting of ſeveral combinations of ſimple ideas of different kinds, I have called mixed modes, to diſtinguiſh them from the more ſimple modes, which conſiſt only of ſimple ideas of the ſame kind. Theſe mixed modes, being alſo ſuch combinations of ſimple ideas, as are not looked upon to be characteriſtical marks of any real beings that have a ſteady exiſtence, but ſcattered and independent ideas put together by the mind, are thereby diſtinguiſhed from the complex ideas of ſubſtances.

Made by the mind.

§ 2. THAT the mind, in reſpect of its ſimple ideas, is wholly paſſive, and receives them all from the exiſtence and operations of things, ſuch as ſenſation, or reflection, offers them, without being able to make any one idea, experience ſhews us: but, if we attentively conſider theſe ideas I call mixed modes, we are now ſpeaking of, we ſhall find their original quite different. The mind often exerciſes an active power in making theſe ſeveral combinations: For it being once furniſhed with ſimple ideas, it can put them together in ſeveral compoſitions, and ſo make variety of complex ideas, without examining whether they exiſt ſo together in nature. And hence, I think, it is that theſe ideas are called notions, as if they had their original and conſtant exiſtence, more in the thoughts of men, than in the reality of things; and to form ſuch ideas, it ſufficed, that the mind puts the parts of them together, and that they were conſiſtent in the underſtanding, without conſidering whether they had any real being: tho' I do not deny, but ſeveral of them might be taken from obſervation, and the exiſtence of ſeveral ſimple ideas ſo combined, as they are put together in the underſtanding. For the man, who firſt framed the idea of hypocriſy, might have either taken it at firſt from the obſervation of one, who made ſhew of good qualities which he had not, or elſe framed that idea in his mind, without having any ſuch pattern to faſhion it by: For it is evident, that in the beginning of languages and ſocieties of men, ſeveral of thoſe complex ideas, which were conſequent to the conſtitutions eſtabliſhed amongſt them, muſt needs have been in the minds of men, before they exiſted any where elſe; and that many names, that ſtood for ſuch complex ideas, were in uſe, and ſo thoſe ideas framed, before the combinations they ſtood for, ever exiſted.

Sometimes got by the explication of their names.

§ 3. Indeed, now that languages are made, and abound with words, ſtanding for ſuch combinations, an uſual way of getting theſe complex ideas, is by the explication of thoſe terms that ſtand for them. For, conſiſting of a company of ſimple ideas combined, they may by words, ſtanding for thoſe ſimple ideas, be repreſented to the mind of one who underſtands thoſe words, tho' that complex combination of ſimple ideas were never offered to his mind, by the real exiſtence of things. Thus a man may come to have the idea of ſacrilege, or murder, by enumerating to him the ſimple ideas, which theſe words ſtand for, without ever ſeeing either of them committed.

The name ties the parts of mixed modes into one idea.

§ 4. Every mixed mode, conſiſting of many diſtinct ſimple ideas, it ſeems reaſonable to enquire, "whence it has its unity, and how ſuch a preciſe multitude comes to make but one idea, ſince that combination does not always exiſt together in nature?" To which I anſwer, it is plain it has its unity from an act of the mind, combining thoſe ſeveral ſimple ideas together, and conſidering them as one complex one, conſiſting of thoſe parts; and the mark of this union, or that which is looked on generally to compleat it, is one name given to that combination. For it is by their names, that men commonly regulate their account of their diſtinct ſpecies of mixed modes, ſeldom allowing, or conſidering, any number of ſimple ideas, to make one complex one, but ſuch collections as there be names for. Thus, tho' the killing of an old man be as fit in nature to be united into one complex idea, as the killing a man's father; yet there being no name ſtanding preciſely for the one, as there is the name of parricide to mark the other, it is not taken for a particular complex idea, nor a diſtinct ſpecies of actions from that of killing a young man, or any other man.

The cauſe of making mixed modes.

§ 5. If we ſhould enquire a little farther, to ſee what it is that occaſions men to make ſeveral combinations of ſimple ideas into diſtinct, and, as it were, ſettled modes, and neglect others which, in the nature of things themſelves, have as much an aptneſs to be combined and make diſtinct ideas, we ſhall find the reaſon of it to be the end of language; which being to mark, or communicate men's thoughts to one another, with all the diſpatch that may be, they uſually make ſuch collections of ideas into complex modes, and affix names to them, as they have frequent uſe of, in their way of living, and converſation; leaving others, which they have but ſeldom an occaſion to mention, looſe and without names that tie them together; they rather chuſing to enumerate (when they have need) ſuch ideas as make them up, by the particular names that ſtand for them, than to trouble their memories, by multiplying of complex ideas with names to them, which they ſhall ſeldom, or never, have any occaſion to make uſe of.

Why words in one language, have none anſwering in

§ 6. This ſhews us how it comes to paſs, that there are in every language many particular words, which cannot be rendered by any one ſingle word of another. For the ſeveral faſhions, cuſtoms and manners of one nation, making ſeveral combinations of ideas familiar and neceſſary in one, which another people have never had occaſion to make, or, perhaps, ſo much as taken notice of; names come of courſe to be annexed to them, to avoid long periphraſes in things of daily converſation, and ſo they become ſo many diſtinct complex ideas in their minds. Thus ὀστρακισμὸς amongſt the Greeks, and proſcriptio amongſt the Romans, were words, which other languages had no names that exactly anſwered; becauſe they ſtood for complex ideas, which were not in the minds of the men of other nations. Where there was no ſuch cuſtom, there was no notion of any ſuch actions; no uſe of ſuch combinations of ideas as were united, and, as it were, tied together by thoſe terms: and, therefore, in other countries there were no names for them.

And languages change.

§ 7. HENCE, alſo, we may ſee the reaſon why languages conſtantly change, take up new, and lay by old terms; becauſe change of cuſtoms and opinions bringing with it new combinations of ideas, which it is neceſſary frequently to think on, and talk about, new names, to avoid long deſcriptions, are annexed to them, and ſo they become new ſpecies of complex modes. What a number of different ideas are by this means wrapped up in one ſhort ſound, and how much of our time and breath is thereby ſaved, any one will ſee, who will but take the pains to enumerate all the ideas that either reprieve, or appeal, ſtands for; and inſtead of either of thoſe names, uſe a periphraſis, to make any one underſtand their meaning.

Mixed modes, where they exiſt.

§ 8. THO' I ſhall have occaſion to conſider this more at large, when I come to treat of words and their uſe; yet I could not avoid to take thus much notice here of the names of mixed modes; which being fleeting, and tranſient combinations of ſimple ideas, which have but a ſhort exiſtence any where, but in the minds of men, and there too have no longer any exiſtence, than whilſt they are thought on, have not ſo much any where the appearance of a conſtant and laſting exiſtence, as in their names: which are therefore, in theſe ſort of ideas, very apt to be taken for the ideas themſelves. For, if we ſhould enquire where the idea of a triumph, or apotheoſis, exiſts, it is evident they could neither of them exiſt altogether any where in the things themſelves, being actions that required time to their performance, and ſo could never all exiſt together: and as to the minds of men, where the ideas of theſe actions are ſuppoſed to be lodged, they have there too a very uncertain exiſtence; and, therefore, we are apt to annex them to the names that excite them in us.

How we get the ideas of mixed modes.

§ 9. THERE are, therefore, three ways whereby we get the complex ideas of mixed modes. 1. By experience and obſervation of things themſelves. Thus by ſeeing two men wreſtle, or fence, we get the idea of wreſtling, or fencing. 2. By invention, or voluntary putting together of ſeveral ſimple ideas in our own minds: ſo he that firſt invented printing, or etching, had an idea of it in his mind, before it ever exiſted. 3. Which is the moſt uſual way, by explaining the names of actions we never ſaw, or notions we cannot ſee; and by enumerating, and thereby, as it were, ſetting before our imaginations all thoſe ideas, which go to the making them up, and are the conſtituent parts of them. For, having by ſenſation and reflection ſtored our minds with ſimple ideas, and by uſe got the names that ſtand for them, we can by thoſe names repreſent to another any complex idea we would have him conceive, ſo that it has in it no ſimple ideas but what he knows, and has with us the ſame name for. For all our complex ideas are ultimately reſolvable into ſimple ideas, of which they are compounded and originally made up, tho', perhaps, their immediate ingredients, as I may ſo ſay, are alſo complex ideas. Thus the mixed mode, which the word lie ſtands for, is made of theſe ſimple ideas: 1. Articulate ſounds. 2. Certain ideas in the mind of the ſpeaker. 3. Thoſe words the ſigns of thoſe ideas. 4 Thoſe ſigns put together by affirmation, or negation, otherwiſe than the ideas they ſtand for, are in the mind of the ſpeaker. I think, I need not go any farther in the analyſis of that complex idea, we call a lie: What I have ſaid, is enough to ſhew, that it is made up of ſimple ideas: and it could not be but an offenſive tediousneſs to my reader, to trouble him with a more minute enumeration of every particular ſimple idea, that goes to this complex one; which, from what has been ſaid, he cannot but be able to make out to himſelf. The ſame may be done in all our complex ideas whatſoever; which, however compounded and decompounded, may, at laſt, be reſolved into ſimple ideas, which are all the materials of knowledge, or thought, we have, or can have. Nor ſhall we have reaſon to fear that the mind is hereby ſtinted to too ſcanty a number of ideas, if we conſider what an inexhauſtible ſtock of ſimple modes, number and figure alone affords us. How far then mixed modes, which admit of the various combinations of different ſimple ideas, and their infinite modes, are from being few and ſcanty, we may eaſily imagine. So that before we have done, we ſhall ſee that nobody need be afraid, he ſhall not have ſcope and compaſs enough for his thoughts to range in, tho' they be, as I pretend, confined only to ſimple ideas, received from ſenſation or reflection, and their ſeveral combinations.

Motion, thinking, and power, have been moſt modified.

§ 10. It is worth our obſerving, which of all our ſimple ideas have been moſt modified, and had moſt mixed modes made out of them, with names given to them: and thoſe have been theſe three; thinking and motion (which are the two ideas which comprehend in them all action) and power, from whence theſe actions are conceived to flow. Theſe ſimple ideas, I ſay, of thinking, motion, and power, have been thoſe which have been moſt modified, and out of whoſe modifications have been made moſt complex modes, with names to them. For action being the great buſineſs of mankind, and the whole matter about which all laws are converſant, it is no wonder that the ſeveral modes of thinking and motion ſhould be taken notice of, the ideas of them obſerved, and laid up in the memory, and have names aſſigned to them; without which, laws could be but ill made, or vice and diſorder repreſſed. Nor could any communication be well had amongſt men, without ſuch complex ideas, with names to them: and, therefore, men have ſettled names, and ſuppoſed ſettled ideas, in their minds, of modes of actions diſtinguiſhed by their cauſes, means, objects, ends, inſtruments, time, place, and other circumſtances; and alſo of their powers fitted for thoſe actions: v. g. boldneſs is the power to ſpeak or do what we intend, before others, without fear, or diſorder; and the Greeks call the confidence of ſpeaking, by a peculiar name, παῤῥησία: which power, or ability in man, of doing any thing, when it has been acquired by frequent doing the ſame thing, is that idea we name habit; when it is forward, and ready upon every occaſion to break into action, we call it diſpoſition. Thus teſtineſs is a diſpoſition, or aptneſs, to be angry.

To conclude: Let us examine any modes of action, v. g. conſideration and aſſent, which are actions of the mind: running and ſpeaking, which are actions of the body: revenge and murder, which are actions of both together: and we ſhall find them but ſo many collections of ſimple ideas, which, together, make up the complex ones ſignified by thoſe names.

Several words ſeeming to ſignify action, ſignify but the effect.

§ 11. Power being the ſource, from whence all action proceeds, the ſubſtances wherein theſe powers are, when they exert this power into act, are called cauſes; and the ſubſtances which thereupon are produced, or the ſimple ideas, which are introduced into any ſubject, by the exerting of that power, are called effects. The efficacy, whereby the new ſubſtance, or idea, is produced, is called, in the ſubject exerting that power, action; but in the ſubject, wherein any ſimple idea is changed, or produced, it is called paſſion: which efficacy, however various, and the effects almoſt infinite, yet we can, I think, conceive it, in intellectual agents, to be nothing elſe but modes of thinking and willing; in corporeal agents, nothing elſe but modifications of motion. I ſay, I think, we cannot conceive it to be any other but theſe two: for whatever ſort of action, beſides theſe, produces any effects, I confeſs myſelf to have no notion, nor idea of; and ſo it is quite remote from my thoughts, apprehenſions, and knowledge: and as much in the dark to me as five other ſenſes, or as the ideas of colours to a blind man: and, therefore, many words, which ſeem to expreſs ſome action, ſignify nothing of the action, or modus operandi, at all, but barely the effect, with ſome circumſtances of the ſubject wrought on, or cauſe operating; v. g. creation, annihilation, contain in them no idea of the action, or manner, whereby they are produced, but barely of the cauſe, and the thing done. And when a countryman ſays the cold freezes water, tho' the word freezing ſeems to import ſome action, yet truly it ſignifies nothing but the effect, viz. that water, that was before fluid, is become hard and conſiſtent, without containing any ideas of the action whereby it is done.

Mixed modes, made alſo of other ideas.

§ 12. I THINK I ſhall not need to remark here, that tho' power and action make the greateſt part of mixed modes, marked by names, and familiar in the minds and mouths of men; yet other ſimple ideas, and their ſeveral combinations, are not excluded: much leſs, I think, will it be neceſſary for me to enumerate all the mixed modes, which have been ſettled, with names to them. That would be to make a dictionary of the greateſt part of the words made uſe of in divinity, ethicks, law and politicks, and ſeveral other ſciences. All that is requiſite to my preſent deſign, is, to ſhew what ſort of ideas thoſe are, which I call mixed modes, how the mind comes by them, and that they are compoſitions, made up of ſimple ideas, got from ſenſation and reflection; which, I ſuppoſe, I have done.

CHAP. XXIII.

Of our complex ideas of ſubſtances.

CHAP. XXIII.

Ideas of ſubſtances, how made.

§ 1. THE mind being, as I have declared, furniſhed with a great number of the ſimple ideas, conveyed in by the ſenſes, as they are found in exterior things, or, by reflection, on its own operations, takes notice alſo, that a certain number of theſe ſimple ideas go conſtantly together; which being preſumed to belong to one thing, and words being ſuited to common apprehenſions, and made uſe of for quick diſpatch, are called, ſo united in one ſubject, by one name; which, by inadvertency, we are apt afterwards to talk of, and conſider as one ſimple idea, which, indeed, is a complication of many ideas together: becauſe, as I have ſaid, not imagining how theſe ſimple ideas can ſubſiſt by themſelves, we accuſtom ourſelves to ſuppoſe ſome ſubſtratum, wherein they do ſubſiſt, and from which they do reſult; which, therefore, we call ſubſtance.

Our idea of ſubſtance in general.

§ 2. So that if any one will examine himſelf concerning his notion of pure ſubſtance in general, he will find he has no other idea of it at all, but only a ſuppoſition of he knows not what ſupport of ſuch qualities, which are capable of producing ſimple ideas in us; which qualities are commonly called accidents. If any one ſhould be aſked, "what is the ſubject, wherein colour, or weight inheres?" he would have nothing to ſay, but the ſolid, extended parts: and if he were demanded, "what is it that ſolidity and extenſion inhere in?" he would not be in a much better caſe than the Indian before-mentioned, who ſaying, that the world was ſupported by a great elephant, was aſked, "what the elephant reſted on?" to which his anſwer was, "a great tortoiſe." But being again preſſed to know, "what gave ſupport to the broad-backed tortoiſe?" replied, "ſomething, he knew not what." And thus here, as in all other caſes, where we uſe words without having clear and diſtinct ideas, we talk like children; who being queſtioned, what ſuch a thing is, which they know not, readily give this ſatisfactory anſwer, that it is ſomething: which in truth ſignifies no more, when ſo uſed, either by children, or men, but that they know not what; and that the thing they pretend to know and talk of, is what they have no diſtinct idea of at all, and ſo are perfectly ignorant of it, and in the dark. The idea then we have, to which we give the general name ſubſtance, being nothing but the ſuppoſed, but unknown ſupport of thoſe qualities we find exiſting, which we imagine cannot ſubſiſt "ſine re ſubſtante," without ſomething to ſupport them, we call that ſupport, ſubſtantia; which, according to the true import of the word, is in plain Engliſh, ſtanding under, or upholding.

Of the ſorts of ſubſtances.

§ 3. AN obſcure and relative idea of ſubſtance, in general, being thus made, we come to have the ideas of particular ſorts of ſubſtances, by collecting ſuch combinations of ſimple ideas, as are by experience and obſervation of men's ſenſes taken notice of, to exiſt together, and are, therefore, ſuppoſed to flow from the particular, internal conſtitution, or unknown eſſence of that ſubſtance. Thus we come to have the ideas of a man, horſe, gold, water, &c. of which ſubſtances, whether any one has any other clear idea, farther than of certain ſimple ideas co-exiſting together, I appeal to every one's own experience. It is the ordinary qualities obſervable in iron, or a diamond, put together, that make the true complex idea of thoſe ſubſtances, which a ſmith, or a jeweller, commonly knows better than a philoſopher; who, whatever ſubſtantial forms he may talk of, has no other idea of thoſe ſubſtances, than what is framed by a collection of thoſe ſimple ideas, which are to be found in them: only we muſt take notice, that our complex ideas of ſubſtances, beſides all thoſe ſimple ideas they are made up of, have always the confuſed idea of ſomething to which they belong, and in which they ſubſiſt. And therefore, when we ſpeak of any ſort of ſubſtance, we ſay, it is a thing having ſuch or ſuch qualities; as body is a thing that is extended, figured, and capable of motion; ſpirit, a thing capable of thinking; and ſo hardneſs, friability, and power to draw iron, we ſay, are qualities to be found in a loadſtone. Theſe, and the like faſhions of ſpeaking, intimate, that the ſubſtance is ſuppoſed always ſomething beſides the extenſion, figure, ſolidity, motion, thinking, or other obſervable ideas, tho' we know not what it is.

No clear idea of ſubſtance in general.

§ 4. Hence, when we talk, or think, of any particular ſort of corporeal ſubſtances, as horſe, ſtone, &c. tho' the idea we have of either of them, be but the complication, or collection of thoſe ſeveral ſimple ideas of ſenſible qualities, which we uſe to find united in the thing called horſe or ſtone; yet, becauſe we cannot conceive how they ſhould ſubſiſt alone, nor one in another, we ſuppoſe them exiſting in, and ſupported by ſome common ſubject; which ſupport we denote by the name ſubſtance, tho' it be certain we have no clear, or diſtinct idea of that thing we ſuppoſe a ſupport.

As clear an idea of ſpirit as body.

§ 5. The ſame happens concerning the operations of the mind, viz. thinking, reaſoning, fearing, &c. which we concluding not to ſubſiſt of themſelves, nor apprehending how they can belong to body, or be produced by it, we are apt to think theſe the actions of ſome other ſubſtance, which we call ſpirit: whereby yet it is evident, that having no other idea, or notion of matter, but ſomething, wherein thoſe many ſenſible qualities which affect our ſenſes, do ſubſiſt; by ſuppoſing a ſubſtance, wherein thinking, knowing, doubting, and a power of moving, &c. do ſubſiſt, we have as clear a notion of the ſubſtance of ſpirit, as we have of body: the one being ſuppoſed to be (without knowing what it is) the ſubſtratum to thoſe ſimple ideas we have from without; and the other ſuppoſed (with a like ignorance of what it is) to be the ſubſtratum to thoſe operations, we experiment in ourſelves within. It is plain then, that the idea of corporeal ſubſtance in matter, is as remote from our conceptions and apprehenſions, as that of ſpiritual ſubſtance, or ſpirit: and therefore from our not having any notion of the ſubſtance of ſpirit, we can no more conclude it non-exiſtence, than we can, for the ſame reaſon, deny the exiſtence of body; it being as rational to affirm there is no body, becauſe we have no clear and diſtinct idea of the ſubſtance of matter; as to ſay there is no ſpirit, becauſe we have no clear and diſtinct idea of the ſubſtance of a ſpirit.

Of the ſorts of ſubſtances.

§ 6. Whatever, therefore, be the ſecret, abſtract nature of ſubſtance in general, all the ideas we have of particular diſtinct ſorts of ſubſtances, are nothing but ſeveral combinations of ſimple ideas, co-exiſting in ſuch, tho' unknown, cauſe of their union, as makes the whole ſubſiſt of itſelf. It is by ſuch combinations of ſimple ideas, and nothing elſe, that we repreſent particular ſorts of ſubſtances to ourſelves; ſuch are the ideas we have of their ſeveral ſpecies in our minds; and ſuch only do we, by their ſpecifick names, ſignify to others, v. g. man, horſe, ſun, water, iron: upon hearing which words, every one who underſtands the language, frames in his mind a combination of thoſe ſeveral ſimple ideas, which he has uſually obſerved, or fancied to exiſt together under that denomination; all which he ſuppoſes to reſt in, and be as it were adherent to that unknown common ſubject, which inheres not in any thing elſe. Tho' in the mean time it be manifeſt, and every one upon enquiry into his own thoughts will find, that he has no other idea of any ſubſtance, v. g. let it be gold, horſe, iron, man, vitriol, bread, but what he has barely of thoſe ſenſible qualities, which he ſuppoſes to inhere, with a ſuppoſition of ſuch a ſubſtratum, as gives as it were a ſupport to thoſe qualities, or ſimple ideas, which he has obſerved to exiſt united together. Thus the idea of the ſun, what is it but an aggregate of thoſe ſeveral ſimple ideas, bright, hot, roundiſh, having a conſtant regular motion, at a certain diſtance from us, and perhaps ſome other? As he who thinks and diſcourſes of the ſun, has been more or leſs accurate in obſerving thoſe ſenſible qualities, ideas, or properties, which are in that thing which he calls the ſun.

Power, a great part of our complex ideas of ſubſtances.

§ 7. For he has the perfecteſt idea of any of the particular ſorts of ſubſtances, who has gathered and put together moſt of thoſe ſimple ideas, which do exiſt in it, among which are to be reckoned its active powers, and paſſive capacities; which tho' not ſimple ideas, yet in this reſpect, for brevity ſake, may conveniently enough be reckoned amongſt them. Thus the power of drawing iron, is one of the ideas of the complex one of that ſubſtance we call a load-ſtone; and a power to be ſo drawn, is a part of the complex one we call iron: which powers paſs for inherent qualities in thoſe ſubjects. Becauſe every ſubſtance being as apt, by the powers we obſerve in it, to change ſome ſenſible qualities in other ſubjects, as it is to produce in us thoſe ſimple ideas which we receive immediately from it, does by thoſe new ſenſible qualities, introduced into other ſubjects, diſcover to us thoſe powers, which do thereby mediately affect our ſenſes, as regularly as its ſenſible qualities do it immediately: v. g. we immediately, by our ſenſes, perceive in fire its heat and colour; which are, if rightly conſidered, nothing but powers in it to produce thoſe ideas in us: we alſo, by our ſenſes, perceive the colour and brittleneſs of charcoal, whereby we come by the knowledge of another power in fire, which it has to change the colour and conſiſtency of wood. By the former, fire immediately, by the latter, it mediately diſcovers to us theſe ſeveral powers, which, therefore, we look upon to be a part of the qualities of fire, and ſo make them a part of the complex ideas of it. For all thoſe powers, that we take cognizance of, terminating only in the alteration of ſome ſenſible qualities in thoſe ſubjects, on which they operate, and ſo making them exhibit to us new ſenſible ideas; therefore it is, that I have reckoned theſe powers amongſt the ſimple ideas, which make the complex ones of the ſorts of ſubſtances: tho' theſe powers, conſidered in themſelves, are truly complex ideas. And, in this looſer ſenſe, I crave leave to be underſtood, when I name any of theſe potentialities amongſt the ſimple ideas, which we recollect in our minds, when we think of particular ſubſtances. For the powers that are ſeverally in them, are neceſſary to be conſidered, if we will have true diſtinct notions of the ſeveral ſorts of ſubſtances.

And why.

§ 8. Nor are we to wonder, that powers make a great part of our complex ideas of ſubſtances; ſince their ſecondary qualities are thoſe, which in moſt of them ſerve principally to diſtinguiſh ſubſtances one from another, and commonly make a conſiderable part of the complex idea of the ſeveral ſorts of them. For our ſenſes failing us, in the diſcovery of the bulk, texture, and figure of the minute parts of bodies, on which their real conſtitutions and differences depend, we are fain to make uſe of their ſecondary qualities, as the characteriſtical notes and marks, whereby to frame ideas of them in our minds, and diſtinguiſh them one from another. All which ſecondary qualities, as has been ſhewn, are nothing but bare powers. For the colour and taſte of opium are, as well as its ſoporifick, or anodyne virtues, mere powers depending on its primary qualities, whereby it is fitted to produce different operations on different parts of our bodies.

Three ſorts of ideas make our complex ones of ſubſtances.

§ 9. The ideas that make our complex ones of corporeal ſubſtances, are of theſe three ſorts. Firſt, the ideas of the primary qualities of things, which are diſcovered by our ſenſes, and are in them, even when we perceive them not; ſuch are the bulk, figure, number, ſituation, and motion of the parts of bodies, which are really in them, whether we take notice of them or no. Secondly, the ſenſible, ſecondary qualities, which depending on theſe, are nothing but the powers thoſe ſubſtances have to produce ſeveral ideas in us by our ſenſes; which ideas are not in the things themſelves, otherwiſe than as any thing is in its cauſe.

Thirdly, the aptneſs we conſider in any ſubſtance to give, or receive, ſuch alterations of primary qualities, as that the ſubſtance ſo altered, ſhould produce in us different ideas from what it did before; theſe are called active and paſſive powers: all which powers, as far as we have any notice or notion of them, terminate only in ſenſible, ſimple ideas. For, whatever alteration a loadſtone has the power to make in the minute particles of iron, we ſhould have no notion of any power it had at all to operate on iron, did not its ſenſible motion diſcover it: and I doubt not, but there are a thouſand changes, that bodies we daily handle have a power to cauſe in one another, which we never ſuſpect, becauſe they never appear in ſenſible effects.

Powers make a great part of our complex ideas of ſubſtances.

§ 10. Powers therefore juſtly make a great part of our complex ideas of ſubſtances. He that will examine his complex idea of gold, will find ſeveral of its ideas, that make it up, to be only powers: as the power of being melted, but of not ſpending itſelf in the fire; of being diſſolved in aqua regia; are ideas as neceſſary to make up our complex idea of gold, as its colour and weight: which, if duly conſidered, are alſo nothing but different powers. For to ſpeak truly, yellowneſs is not actually in gold, but is a power in gold, to produce that idea in us by our eyes, when placed in a due light: and the heat, which we cannot leave out of our idea of the ſun, is no more really in the ſun, than the white colour it introduces into wax. Theſe are both equally powers in the ſun, operating, by the motion and figure of its inſenſible parts, ſo on a man, as to make him have the idea of heat: and ſo on wax, as to make it capable to produce in a man the idea of white.

The now ſecondary qualities of bodies would diſappear, if we could diſcover the primary ones of their minute parts.

§ 11. Had we ſenſes acute enough to diſcern the minute particles of bodies, and the real conſtitution, on which their ſenſible qualities depend, I doubt not but they would produce quite different ideas in us; and that which is now the yellow colour of gold, would then diſappear, and inſtead of it we ſhould ſee an admirable texture of parts of a certain ſize and figure. This microſcopes plainly diſcover to us; for what to our naked eyes produces a certain colour, is, by thus augmenting the acuteneſs of our ſenſes, diſcovered to be quite a different thing; and the thus altering, as it were the proportion of the bulk of the minute parts of a coloured object to our uſual ſight, produces different ideas from what it did before. Thus ſand, or pounded glaſs, which is opake, and white to the naked eye, is pellucid in a microſcope; and a hair, ſeen this way, loſes its former colour, and is in a great meaſure pellucid, with a mixture of ſome bright ſparkling colours, ſuch as appear from the refraction of diamonds, and other pellucid bodies. Blood to the naked eye appears all red; but by a good microſcope, wherein its leſſer parts appear, ſhews only ſome few globules of red, ſwimming in a pellucid liquor: and how theſe red globules would appear, if glaſſes could be found that yet could magnify them a thouſand, or ten thouſand times more, is uncertain.

Our faculties of diſcovery ſuited to our ſtate.

§ 12. The infinitely wiſe contriver of us, and all things about us, hath fitted our ſenſes, faculties, and organs, to the conveniencies of life, and the buſineſs we have to do here. We are able, by our ſenſes, to know and diſtinguiſh things; and to examine them ſo far, as to apply them to our uſes, and ſeveral ways to accommodate the exigencies of this life. We have inſight enough into their admirable contrivances and wonderful effects, to admire and magnify the wiſdom, power, and goodneſs of their author. Such a knowledge as this, which is ſuited to our preſent condition, we want not faculties to attain. But it appears not, that God intended we ſhould have a perfect, clear, and adequate knowledge of them: that perhaps is not in the comprehenſion of any finite being. We are furniſhed with faculties (dull and weak as they are) to diſcover enough in the creatures to lead us to the knowledge of the creator, and the knowledge of our duty; and we are fitted well enough with abilities, to provide for the conveniencies of living: theſe are our buſineſs in this world. But were our ſenſes altered, and made much quicker and acuter, the appearance and outward ſcheme of things would have quite another face to us; and I am apt to think, would be inconſiſtent with our being, or at leaſt well-being in this part of the univerſe, which we inhabit. He that conſiders how little our conſtitution is able to bear a remove into parts of this air, not much higher than that we commonly breathe in, will have reaſon to be ſatisfied, that in this globe of earth, allotted for our manſion, the all-wiſe architect has ſuited our organs, and the bodies that are to affect them, one to another. If our ſenſe of hearing were but a thouſand times quicker than it is, how would a perpetual noiſe diſtract us? And we ſhould in the quieteſt retirement be leſs able to ſleep, or meditate, than in the middle of a ſea-fight. Nay, if that moſt inſtructive of our ſenſes, ſeeing, were in any man a thouſand, or a hundred thouſand times more acute, than it is now by the beſt microſcope, things ſeveral millions of times leſs than the ſmalleſt object of his ſight now, would then be viſible to his naked eyes, and ſo he would come nearer the diſcovery of the texture and motion of the minute parts of corporeal things; and in many of them, probably get ideas of their internal conſtitutions. But then he would be in a quite different world from other people: nothing would appear the ſame to him, and others; the viſible ideas of every thing would be different. So that I doubt, whether he and the reſt of men could diſcourſe concerning the objects of ſight, or have any communication about colours, their appearances being ſo wholly different. And perhaps ſuch a quickneſs and tenderneſs of ſight could not endure bright ſun-ſhine, or ſo much as open day-light; nor take in but a very ſmall part of any object at once, and that too only at a very near diſtance. And if, by the help of ſuch microſcopical eyes (if I may ſo call them) a man could penetrate farther, than ordinary, into the ſecret compoſition and radical texture of bodies, he would not make any great advantage by the change, if ſuch an acute ſight would not ſerve to conduct him to the market and exchange: if he could not ſee things he was to avoid, at a convenient diſtance, nor diſtinguiſh things he had to do with, by thoſe ſenſible qualities others do. He that was ſharp-ſighted enough to ſee the configuration of the minute particles of the ſpring of a clock, and obſerve upon what peculiar ſtructure and impulſe its elaſtick motion depends, would no doubt diſcover ſomething very admirable; but if eyes ſo framed could not view at once the hand, and the characters of the hour-plate, and thereby at a diſtance ſee what a-clock it was, their owner could not be much benefited by that acuteneſs; which, whilſt it diſcovered the ſecret contrivance of the parts of the machine, made him loſe its uſe.

Conjecture about ſpirits.

§ 13. And here give me leave to propoſe an extravagant conjecture of mine, viz. that ſince we have ſome reaſon (if there be any credit to be given to the report of things, that our philoſophy cannot account for) to imagine, that ſpirits can aſſume to themſelves bodies of different bulk, figure and conformation of parts; whether one great advantage ſome of them have over us, may not lie in this, that they can ſo frame and ſhape to themſelves organs of ſenſation or perception, as to ſuit them to their preſent deſign, and the circumſtances of the object they would conſider. For how much would that man exceed all others in knowledge, who had but the faculty ſo to alter the ſtructure of his eyes, that one ſenſe, as to make it capable of all the ſeveral degrees of viſion, which the aſſiſtance of glaſſes (caſually at firſt light on) has taught us to conceive? What wonders would he diſcover, who could ſo fit his eyes to all ſorts of objects, as to ſee when he pleaſed, the figure and motion of the minute particles in the blood, and other juices of animals, as diſtinctly as he does, at other times, the ſhape and motion of the animals themſelves? But to us in our preſent ſtate, unalterable organs ſo contrived as to diſcover the figure and motion of the minute parts of bodies, whereon depend thoſe ſenſible qualities we now obſerve in them, would perhaps be of no advantage. God has, no doubt, made them ſo, as is beſt for us in our preſent condition. He hath fitted us for the neighbourhood of the bodies that ſurround us, and we have to do with: and tho' we cannot, by the faculties we have, attain to a perfect knowledge of things, yet they will ſerve us well enough for thoſe ends above-mentioned, which are our great concernment. I beg my reader's pardon, for laying before him ſo wild a fancy, concerning the ways of perception in beings above us: but how extravagant ſoever it be, I doubt whether we can imagine any thing about the knowledge of angels, but after this manner, ſome way or other, in proportion to what we find and obſerve in ourſelves. And tho' we cannot but allow, that the infinite power and wiſdom of God may frame creatures, with a thouſand other faculties and ways of perceiving things without them, than what we have; yet our thoughts can go no farther than our own: ſo impoſſible it is for us to enlarge our very gueſſes beyond the ideas received from our own ſenſation and reflection. The ſuppoſition at leaſt, that angels do ſometimes aſſume bodies, need not ſtartle us; ſince ſome of the moſt antient and moſt learned fathers of the church ſeemed to believe, that they had bodies: and this is certain, that their ſtate and way of exiſtence is unknown to us.

Complex ideas of ſubſtances.

§ 14. But to return to the matter in hand: the ideas we have of ſubſtances, and the ways we come by them; I ſay, our ſpecifick ideas of ſubſtances are nothing elſe but a collection of a certain number of ſimple ideas, conſidered as united in one thing. Theſe ideas of ſuſtances, tho' they are commonly called ſimple apprehenſions, and the names of them ſimple terms; yet in effect are complex and compounded. Thus the idea, which an Engliſhman ſignifies by the name ſwan, is white colour, long neck, red beak, black legs, and whole feet, and all theſe of a certain ſize, with a power of ſwimming in the water, and making a certain kind of noiſe; and perhaps, to a man, who has long obſerved thoſe kind of birds, ſome other properties, which all terminate in ſenſible, ſimple ideas, all united in one common ſubject.

Idea of ſpiritual ſubſtances, as clear as of bodily ſubſtances.

§ 15. Besides the complex ideas we have of material, ſenſible ſubſtances, of which I have laſt ſpoken, by the ſimple ideas we have taken from thoſe operations of our own minds, which we experiment daily in ourſelves, as thinking, underſtanding, willing, knowing, and power of beginning motion, &c. co-exiſting in ſome ſubſtance; we are able to frame the complex idea of an immaterial ſpirit. And thus, by putting together the ideas of thinking, perceiving, liberty and power of moving themſelves, and other things, we have as clear a perception and notion of immaterial ſubſtances, as we have of material. For putting together the ideas of thinking and willing, or the power of moving or quieting corporeal motion, joined to ſubſtance, of which we have no diſtinct idea, we have the idea of an immaterial ſpirit; and by putting together the ideas of coherent, ſolid parts, and a power of being moved, joined with ſubſtance, of which likewiſe we have no poſitive idea, we have the idea of matter. The one is as clear and diſtinct an idea as the other: the idea of thinking, and moving a body, being as clear and diſtinct ideas, as the ideas of extenſion, ſolidity, and being moved. For our idea of ſubſtance is equally obſcure, or none at all in both; it is but a ſuppoſed I know not what, to ſupport thoſe ideas we call accidents. It is for want of reflection that we are apt to think, that our ſenſes ſhew us nothing but material things. Every act of ſenſation, when duly conſidered, gives us an equal view of both parts of nature, the corporeal and ſpiritual. For, whilſt I know, by ſeeing or hearing, &c. that there is ſome corporeal being without me, the object of that ſenſation; I do more certainly know, that there is ſome ſpiritual being within me that ſees and hears. This, I muſt be convinced, cannot be the action of bare inſenſible matter; nor ever could be, without an immaterial, thinking being.

No idea of abſtract ſubſtance.

§ 16. By the complex idea of extended, figured, coloured, and all other ſenſible qualities, which is all that we know of it, we are as far from the idea of the ſubſtance of body, as if we knew nothing at all: nor after all the acquaintance and familiarity, which we imagine we have with matter, and the many qualities men aſſure themſelves they perceive, and know in bodies, will it perhaps upon examination be found that they have any more, or clearer, primary ideas belonging to body, than they have belonging to immaterial ſpirit.

The coheſion of ſolid parts and impulſe, the primary ideas of body.

§ 17. The primary ideas we have peculiar to body, as contra-diſtinguiſhed to ſpirit, are the coheſion of ſolid, and conſequently ſeparable, parts, and a power of communicating motion by impulſe. Theſe, I think, are the original ideas proper and peculiar to body; for figure is but the conſequence of finite extenſion.

Thinking and motivity the primary ideas of ſpirit.

§ 18. The ideas we have belonging, and peculiar to ſpirit, are thinking and will, or a power of putting body into motion by thought, and, which is conſequent to it, liberty. For as body cannot but communicate its motion by impulſe to another body, which it meets with at reſt; ſo the mind can put bodies into motion, or forbear to do ſo, as it pleaſes. The ideas of exiſtence, duration, and mobility, are common to them both.

Spirits capable of motion.

§ 19. There is no reaſon why it ſhould be thought ſtrange, that I make mobility belong to ſpirit: for having no other idea of motion, but change of diſtance with other beings that are conſidered as at reſt; and finding, that ſpirits, as well as bodies, cannot operate but where they are, and that ſpirits do operate at ſeveral times in ſeveral places, I cannot but attribute change of place to all finite ſpirits; (for of the infinite ſpirit I ſpeak not here.) For my ſoul, being a real being as well as my body, is certainly as capable of changing diſtance with any other body, or being, as body itſelf; and ſo is capable of motion. And if a mathematician can conſider a certain diſtance, or a change of that diſtance between two points; one may certainly conceive a diſtance, and a change of diſtance between two ſpirits: and ſo conceive their motion, their approach, or removal, one from another.

§ 20. Every one finds in himſelf, that his ſoul can think, will, and operate on his body in the place where that is; but cannot operate on a body, or in a place an hundred miles diſtant from it. No body can imagine, that his ſoul can think, or move a body at Oxford, whilſt he is at London; and cannot but know, that being united to his body, it conſtantly changes place all the whole journey between Oxford and London, as the coach, or horſe, does that carries him, and, I think, may be ſaid to be truly all that while in motion: or, if that will not be allowed to afford us a clear idea enough of its motion, its being ſeparated from the body in death, I think, will; for to conſider it as going out of the body, or leaving it, and yet to have no idea of its motion, ſeems to me impoſſible.

§ 21. If it be ſaid by any one, that it cannot change place, becauſe it hath none, for ſpirits are not in loco, but ubi; I ſuppoſe that way of talking will not now be of much weight to many, in an age that is not much diſpoſed to admire, or ſuffer themſelves to be deceived by ſuch unintelligible ways of ſpeaking. But if any one thinks there is any ſenſe in that diſtinction, and that it is applicable to our preſent purpoſe, I deſire him to put it into intelligible Engliſh; and then from thence draw a reaſon to ſhew, that immaterial ſpirits are not capable of motion. Indeed motion cannot be attributed to God; not becauſe he is an immaterial, but becauſe he is an infinite ſpirit.

Idea of ſoul and body compared.

§ 22. Let us compare then our complex idea of an immaterial ſpirit with our complex idea of body, and ſee whether there be any more obſcurity in one than in the other, and in which moſt. Our idea of body, as I think, is an extended, ſolid ſubſtance, capable of communicating motion by impulſe: and our idea of ſoul, as an immaterial ſpirit, is of a ſubſtance that thinks, and has a power of exciting motion in body, by willing or thought. Theſe, I think, are our complex ideas of ſoul and body, as contra-diſtinguiſhed; and now let us examine which has moſt obſcurity in it, and difficulty to be apprehended. I know, that people, whoſe thoughts are immerſed in matter, and have ſo ſubjected their minds to their ſenſes, that they ſeldom reflect on any thing beyond them, are apt to ſay, they cannot comprehend a thinking thing, which perhaps is true: but I affirm, when they conſider it well, they can no more comprehend an extended thing.

Coheſion of ſolid parts in body, as hard to be conceived, as thinking in a ſoul.

§ 23. If any one ſay, he knows not what it is thinks in him: he means, he knows not what the ſubſtance is of that thinking thing: no more, ſay I, knows he what the ſubſtance is of that ſolid thing. Farther, if he ſays he knows not how he thinks; I anſwer, neither knows he how he is extended; how the ſolid parts of body are united, or cohere together to make extenſion. For, tho' the preſſure of the particles of air may account for the coheſion of ſeveral parts of matter, that are groſſer than the particles of air, and have pores leſs than the corpuſcles of air; yet the weight, or preſſure of the air, will not explain, nor can be a cauſe of the coherence of the particles of air themſelves. And if the preſſure of the æther, or any ſubtiler matter than the air, may unite, and hold faſt together the parts of a particle of air, as well as other bodies;

yet it cannot make bonds for itſelf, and hold together the parts, that make up every the leaſt corpuſcle of that materia ſubtilis. So that that hypotheſis, how ingeniouſly ſoever explained, by ſhewing, that the parts of ſenſible bodies are held together by the preſſure of other external, inſenſible bodies, reaches not the parts of the æther itſelf: and by how much the more evident it proves, that the parts of other bodies are held together by the external preſſure of the æther, and can have no other conceivable cauſe of their coheſion and union, by ſo much the more it leaves us in the dark concerning the coheſion of the parts of the corpuſcles of the æther itſelf; which we can neither conceive without parts, they being bodies, and diviſible; nor yet how their parts cohere, they wanting that cauſe of coheſion, which is given of the coheſion of the parts of all other bodies.

§ 24. But in truth the preſſure of any ambient fluid, how great ſoever, can be no intelligible cauſe of the coheſion of the ſolid parts of matter. For, tho' ſuch a preſſure may hinder the avulſion of two poliſhed ſuperficies one from another, in a line perpendicular to them, as in the experiment of two poliſhed marbles; yet it can never, in the leaſt, hinder the ſeparation by a motion, in a line parallel to thoſe ſurfaces. Becauſe the ambient fluid, having a full liberty to ſucceed in each point of ſpace, deſerted by a lateral motion, reſiſts ſuch a motion of bodies ſo joined, no more than it would reſiſt the motion of that body, were it on all ſides invironed by that fluid, and touched no other body: and therefore, if there were no other cauſe of coheſion, all parts of bodies muſt be eaſily ſeparable by ſuch a lateral, ſliding motion. For, if the preſſure of the æther be the adequate cauſe of coheſion, wherever that cauſe operates not, there can be no coheſion. And ſince it cannot operate againſt ſuch a lateral ſeparation, (as has been ſhewn) therefore in every imaginary plain, interſecting any maſs of matter, there could be no more coheſion, than of two poliſhed ſurfaces, which will always, notwithſtanding any imaginable preſſure of a fluid, eaſily ſlide one from another. So that perhaps, how clear an idea ſoever we think we have of the extenſion of body, which is nothing but the coheſion of ſolid parts, he that ſhall well conſider it in his mind, may have reaſon to conclude, that it is as eaſy for him to have a clear idea, how the ſoul thinks, as how body is extended. For ſince body is no farther, nor otherwiſe extended, than by the union and coheſion of its ſolid parts, we ſhall very ill comprehend the extenſion of body, without underſtanding wherein conſiſts the union and coheſion of its parts; which ſeems to me as incomprehenſible, as the manner of thinking, and how it is performed.

§ 25. I allow it is uſual for moſt people to wonder, how any one ſhould find a difficulty in what they think they every day obſerve. Do we not ſee, will they be ready to ſay, the parts of bodies ſtick firmly together? is there any thing more common? and what doubt can there be made of it? And the like, I ſay, concerning thinking, and voluntary motion: Do we not every moment experiment it in ourſelves; and therefore can it be doubted? The matter of fact is clear, I confeſs; but when we would a little nearer look into it, and conſider how it is done, there I think we are at a loſs, both in the one, and the other; and can as little underſtand how the parts of body cohere, as how we ourſelves perceive, or move. I would have any one intelligibly explain to me, how the parts of gold, or braſs, (that but now in fuſion were as looſe from one another, as the particles of water, or the ſands of an hour-glaſs) come in a few moments to be ſo united, and adhere ſo ſtrongly one to another, that the utmoſt force of men's arms cannot ſeparate them: a conſidering man will, I ſuppoſe, be here at a loſs, to ſatisfy his own, or another man's underſtanding.

§ 26. The little bodies, that compoſe that fluid we call water, are ſo extremely ſmall, that I have never heard of any one, who by a microſcope (and yet I have heard of ſome that have magnified to ten thouſand; nay, to much above a hundred thouſand times) pretended to perceive their diſtinct bulk, figure, or motion: and the particles of water are alſo ſo perfectly looſe one from another, that the leaſt force ſenſibly ſeparates them. Nay, if we conſider their perpetual motion, we muſt allow them to have no coheſion one with another; and yet let but a ſharp cold come, and they unite, they conſolidate, theſe little atoms cohere, and are not, without great force, ſeparable. He that could find the bonds that tie theſe heaps of looſe little bodies together ſo firmly; he that could make known the cement, that makes them ſtick ſo faſt one to another, would diſcover a great, and yet unknown ſecret: and yet, when that was done, would he be far enough from making the extenſion of body (which is the coheſion of its ſolid parts) intelligible, till he could ſhew wherein conſiſted the union, or conſolidation of the parts of thoſe bonds, or of that cement, or of the leaſt particle of matter that exiſts. Whereby it appears, that this primary and ſuppoſed obvious quality of body, will be found, when examined, to be as incomprehenſible, as any thing belonging to our minds, and a ſolid, extended ſubſtance as hard to be conceived, as a thinking, immaterial one, whatever difficulties ſome would raiſe againſt it.

§ 27. FOR, to extend our thoughts a little farther, that preſſure, which is brought to explain the coheſion of bodies, is as unintelligible as the coheſion itſelf. For, if matter be conſidered, as no doubt it is, finite, let any one ſend his contemplation to the extremities of the univerſe, and there ſee what conceivable hoops, what bond he can imagine to hold this maſs of matter in ſo cloſe a preſſure together; from whence ſteel has its firmneſs, and the parts of a diamond their hardneſs and indiſſolubility. If matter be finite, it muſt have its extremes; and there muſt be ſomething to hinder it from ſcattering aſunder. If, to avoid this difficulty, any one will throw himſelf into the ſuppoſition and abyſs of infinite matter, let him conſider what light he thereby brings to the coheſion of body, and whether he be ever the nearer making it intelligible, by reſolving it into a ſuppoſition, the moſt abſurd and moſt incomprehenſible of all other: ſo far is our extenſion of body (which is nothing but the coheſion of ſolid parts) from being clearer, or more diſtinct, when we would enquire into the nature, cauſe, or manner, of it, than the idea of thinking.

Communication of motion by impulſe, or by thought, equally intelligible.

§ 28. ANOTHER idea we have of body, is the power of communication of motion by impulſe; and of our ſouls, the power of exciting motion by thought. Theſe ideas, the one of body, the other of our minds, every day's experience clearly furniſhes us with: but, if here again we enquire how this is done, we are equally in the dark. For in the communication of motion by impulſe, wherein as much motion is loſt to one body, as is got to the other, which is the ordinarieſt caſe, we can have no other conception, but of the paſſing of motion out of one body into another; which, I think, is as obſcure and unconceivable, as how our minds move, or ſtop our bodies by thought; which we every moment find they do. The increaſe of motion by impulſe, which is obſerved, or believed ſometimes to happen, is yet harder to be underſtood. We have by daily experience, clear evidence of motion, produced both by impulſe and by thought; but the manner how, hardly comes within our comprehenſion; we are equally at a loſs in both. So that however we conſider motion, and its communication, either from body or ſpirit, the idea which belongs to ſpirit, is at leaſt as clear, as that which belongs to body. And if we conſider the active power of moving, or as I may call it, motivity, it is much clearer in ſpirit than body; ſince two bodies, placed by one another at reſt, will never afford us the idea of a power in the one to move the other, but by a borrowed motion: whereas the mind, every day, affords us ideas of an active power of moving of bodies; and therefore it is worth our conſideration, whether active power be not the proper attribute of ſpirits, and paſſive power of matter. Hence may be conjectured, that created ſpirits are not totally ſeparate from matter, becauſe they are both active and paſſive. Pure ſpirit, viz. God, is only active; pure matter is only paſſive; thoſe beings that are both active and paſſive, we may judge to partake of both. But, be that as it will, I think, we have as many, and as clear ideas belonging to ſpirit, as we have belonging to body, the ſubſtance of each being equally unknown to us, and the idea of thinking in ſpirit, as clear as of extenſion in body; and the communication of motion by thought, which we attribute to ſpirit, is as evident as that by impulſe, which we aſcribe to body. Conſtant experience makes us ſenſible of both of theſe, tho' our narrow underſtandings can comprehend neither. For, when the mind would look beyond thoſe original ideas we have from ſenſation, or reflection, and penetrate into their cauſes, and manner of production, we find ſtill it diſcovers nothing, but its own ſhort-ſightedneſs.

§ 29. To conclude, ſenſation convinces us, that there are ſolid, extended ſubſtances; and reflection, that there are thinking ones: experience aſſures us of the exiſtence of ſuch beings; and that the one hath a power to move body by impulſe, the other by thought; this we cannot doubt of. Experience, I ſay, every moment furniſhes us with the clear ideas, both of the one and the other. But beyond theſe ideas, as received from their proper ſources, our faculties will not reach. If we would enquire farther into their nature, cauſes, and manner, we perceive not the nature of extenſion clearer than we do of thinking. If we would explain them any farther, one is as eaſy as the other; and there is no more difficulty to conceive how a ſubſtance we know not, ſhould by thought ſet body into motion, than how a ſubſtance we know not, ſhould by impulſe ſet body into motion. So that we are no more able to diſcover wherein the ideas belonging to body conſiſt, than thoſe belonging to ſpirit. From whence it ſeems probable to me, that the ſimple ideas we receive from ſenſation and reflection, are the boundaries of our thoughts, beyond which the mind, whatever efforts it would make, is not able to advance one jot; nor can it make any diſcoveries, when it would pry into the nature and hidden cauſes of thoſe ideas.

Idea of body and ſpirit compared.

§ 30. So that, in ſhort, the idea we have of ſpirit, compared with the idea we have of body, ſtands thus: the ſubſtance of ſpirit is unknown to us; and ſo is the ſubſtance of body equally unknown to us. Two primary qualities, or properties of body, viz. ſolid, coherent parts and impulſe, we have diſtinct, clear ideas of: ſo, likewiſe, we know, and have diſtinct, clear ideas of two primary qualities, or properties, of ſpirit, viz. thinking, and a power of action; i. e. a power of beginning, or ſtopping ſeveral thoughts, or motions. We have alſo the ideas of ſeveral qualities inherent in bodies, and have the clear, diſtinct ideas of them: which qualities are but the various modifications of the extenſion of cohering, ſolid parts, and their motion. We have, likewiſe, the ideas of the ſeveral modes of thinking, viz. believing, doubting, intending, fearing, hoping; all which are but the ſeveral modes of thinking. We have alſo the ideas of willing, and moving the body conſequent to it, and with the body itſelf too: for, as has been ſhewn, ſpirit is capable of motion.

The notion of ſpirit involves no more difficulty in it, than that of body.

§ 31. Lastly, if this notion of immaterial ſpirit may have, perhaps, ſome difficulties in it, not eaſy to be explained, we have, therefore, no more reaſon to deny, or doubt, the exiſtence of ſuch ſpirits, than we have to deny, or doubt, the exiſtence of body; becauſe the notion of body is cumbered with ſome difficulties very hard, and, perhaps, impoſſible to be explained, or underſtood by us. For I would fain have inſtanced any thing in our notion of ſpirit, more perplexed, or nearer a contradiction, than the very notion of body includes in it; the diviſibility in infinitum of any finite extenſion, involving us, whether we grant, or deny it, in conſequences impoſſible to be explicated, or made in our apprehenſions conſiſtent; conſequences, that carry greater difficulty, and more apparent abſurdity, than any thing can follow from the notion of an immaterial, knowing ſubſtance.

We know nothing beyond our ſimple ideas.

§ 32. Which we are not at all to wonder at, ſince we, having but ſome few, ſuperficial ideas of things, diſcovered to us only by the ſenſes, from without, or by the mind, reflecting on what it experiments in itſelf within, have no knowledge beyond that, much leſs of the internal conſtitution, and true nature of things, being deſtitute of faculties to attain it. And, therefore, experimenting and diſcovering in our ſelves knowledge, and the power of voluntary motion, as certainly as we experiment, or diſcover in things without us, the coheſion and ſeparation of ſolid parts, which is the extenſion and motion of bodies; we have as much reaſon to be ſatisfied with our notion of immaterial ſpirit, as with our notion of body, and the exiſtence of the one as well as the other. For it being no more a contradiction that thinking ſhould exiſt, ſeparate and independent from ſolidity, than it is a contradiction that ſolidity ſhould exiſt, ſeparate and independent from thinking, they being both but ſimple ideas, independent one from another; and having as clear and diſtinct ideas in us of thinking, as of ſolidity, I know not why we may not as well allow a thinking thing without ſolidity, i. e. immaterial, to exiſt, as a ſolid thing without thinking, i. e. matter to exiſt; eſpecially ſince it is not harder to conceive how thinking ſhould exiſt without matter, than how matter ſhould think. For whenſoever we would proceed beyond theſe ſimple ideas we have from ſenſation and reflection, and dive farther into the nature of things, we fall preſently into darkneſs and obſcurity, perplexedneſs and difficulties; and can diſcover nothing farther, but our own blindneſs and ignorance. But which ever of theſe complex ideas be cleareſt, that of body or immaterial ſpirit, this is evident, that the ſimple ideas that make them up, are no other than what we have received from ſenſation, or reflection; and ſo is it of all our other ideas of ſubſtances, even of God himſelf.

Idea of God.

§ 33. For, if we examine the idea we have of the incomprehenſible, ſupreme being, we ſhall find, that we come by it the ſame way; and that the complex ideas we have both of God, and ſeparate ſpirits, are made up of the ſimple ideas we receive from reflection; v. g. having from what we experiment in our ſelves got the ideas of exiſtence and duration; of knowledge and power, of pleaſure and happineſs; and of ſeveral other qualities and powers, which it is better to have than to be without: when we would frame an idea, the moſt ſuitable we can, to the ſupreme being, we enlarge every one of theſe with our idea of infinity; and ſo putting them together, make our complex idea of God. For that the mind has ſuch a power of enlarging ſome of its ideas, received from ſenſation and reflection, has been already ſhewn.

§ 34. If I find that I know ſome few things, and ſome of them, or all, perhaps, imperfectly, I can frame an idea of knowing twice as many; which I can double again, as often as I can add to number; and thus enlarge my idea of knowledge, by extending its comprehenſion to all things exiſting, or poſſible. The ſame alſo I can do of knowing them more perfectly; i. e. all their qualities, powers, cauſes, conſequences, and relations, &c. till all be perfectly known, that is in them, or can any way relate to them; and thus frame the idea of infinite, or boundleſs knowledge. The ſame may alſo be done of power, till we come to that we call infinite; and alſo of the duration of exiſtence, without beginning, or end; and ſo frame the idea of an eternal being. The degrees, or extent, wherein we aſcribe exiſtence, power, wiſdom, and all other perfections (which we can have any ideas of) to that ſovereign being, which we call God, being all boundleſs and infinite, we frame the beſt idea of him our minds are capable of: all which is done, I ſay, by enlarging thoſe ſimple ideas we have taken from the operations of our own minds, by reflection; or by our ſenſes, from exteriour things, to that vaſtneſs to which infinity can extend them.

§ 35. For it is infinity, which joined to our ideas of exiſtence, power, knowledge, &c. makes that complex idea, whereby we repreſent to our ſelves the beſt we can, the ſupreme being. For tho' in his own eſſence (which certainly we do not know, not knowing the real eſſence of a pebble, or a fly, or of our own ſelves) God be ſimple and uncompounded; yet I think, I may ſay, we have no other idea of him, but a complex one of exiſtence, knowledge, power, happineſs, &c. infinite and eternal: which are all diſtinct ideas, and ſome of them being relative, are again compounded of others; all which being, as has been ſhewn, originally got from ſenſation and reflection, go to make up the idea, or notion, we have of God.

No idea in our complex one of ſpirits, but thoſe got from ſenſation, or reflection.

§ 36. This farther is to be obſerved, that there is no idea we attribute to God, bating infinity, which is not alſo a part of our complex idea of other ſpirits. Becauſe, being capable of no other ſimple ideas, belonging to any thing but body, but thoſe which by reflection we receive from the operation of our own minds, we can attribute to ſpirits, no other, but what we receive from thence: and all the difference we can put between them, in our contemplation of ſpirits, is only in the ſeveral extents, and degrees, of their knowledge, power, duration, happineſs, &c. For that in our ideas, as well of ſpirits, as of other things, we are reſtrained to thoſe we receive from ſenſation and reflection, is evident from hence; that, in our ideas of ſpirits, how much ſoever advanced in perfection beyond thoſe of bodies, even to that of infinite, we cannot yet have any idea of the manner wherein they diſcover their thoughts one to another: tho' we muſt neceſſarily conclude, that ſeparate ſpirits, which are beings that have perfecter knowledge and greater happineſs than we, muſt needs have alſo a perfecter way of communicating their thoughts than we have, who are fain to make uſe of corporeal ſigns and particular ſounds; which are, therefore, of moſt general uſe, as being the beſt and quickeſt we are capable of. But of immediate communication, having no experiment in our ſelves, and conſequently no notion of it at all, we have no idea how ſpirits, which uſe not words, can with quickneſs, or much leſs, how ſpirits, that have no bodies, can be maſters of their own thoughts, and communicate, or conceal them at pleaſure, tho' we cannot but neceſſarily ſuppoſe they have ſuch a power.

Recapitulation. § 37. And thus we have ſeen, what kind of ideas we have of ſubſtances of all kinds, wherein they conſiſt, and how we come by them. From whence, I think, it is very evident,

First, That all our ideas of the ſeveral ſorts of ſubſtances, are nothing but collections of ſimple ideas, with a ſuppoſition of ſomething to which they belong, and in which they ſubſiſt; tho' of this ſuppoſed ſomething, we have no clear diſtinct idea at all.

Secondly, That all the ſimple ideas, that, thus united in one common ſubſtratum, make up our complex ideas of ſeveral ſorts of ſubſtances, are no other but ſuch as we have received from ſenſation, or reflection. So that even in thoſe, which we think we are moſt intimately acquainted with, and that come neareſt the comprehenſion of our moſt enlarged conceptions, we cannot go beyond thoſe ſimple ideas. And even in thoſe, which ſeem moſt remote from all we have to do with, and do infinitely ſurpaſs any thing we can perceive in our ſelves by reflection, or diſcover by ſenſation in other things, we can attain to nothing but thoſe ſimple ideas, which we originally received from ſenſation, or reflection; as is evident in the complex ideas we have of angels, and particularly of God himſelf.

Thirdly, That moſt of the ſimple ideas, that make up our complex ideas of ſubſtances, when truly conſidered, are only powers, however we are apt to take them for poſitive qualities; v. g. the greateſt part of the ideas, that make our complex idea of gold, are yellowneſs, great weight, ductility, fuſibility, and ſolubility in aq. regia, &c. all united together in an unknown ſubſtratum: all which ideas are nothing elſe but ſo many relations to other ſubſtances, and are not really in the gold, conſidered barely in it ſelf, tho' they depend on thoſe real and primary qualities of its internal conſtitution, whereby it has a fitneſs differently to operate, and be operated on by ſeveral other ſubſtances.

CHAP. XXIV.

Of collective ideas of ſubſtances.

Chap. XXIV. One idea. § 1. BESIDES theſe complex ideas of ſeveral, ſingle ſubſtances, as of man, horſe, gold, violet, apple, &c. the mind hath alſo complex, collective ideas of ſubſtances; which I ſo call, becauſe ſuch ideas are made up of many particular ſubſtances, conſidered together, as united into one idea, and which ſo joined are looked on as one: v. g. the idea of ſuch a collection of men as make an army, tho' conſiſting of a great number of diſtinct ſubſtances, is as much one idea, as the idea of a man: and the great collective idea of all bodies whatſoever, ſignified by the name world, is as much one idea, as the idea of any the leaſt particle of matter in it; it ſufficing to the unity of any idea, that it be conſidered as one repreſentation, or picture, tho' made up of ever ſo many particulars.

CHAP. XXIV.

Made by the power of compoſing in the mind.

§ 2. THESE collective ideas of ſubſtances, the mind makes by its power of compoſition, and uniting ſeverally, either ſimple, or complex ideas into one, as it does by the ſame faculty make the complex ideas of particular ſubſtances, conſiſting of an aggregate of divers, ſimple ideas united in one ſubſtance: and as the mind, by putting together the repeated ideas of unity, makes the collective mode, or complex idea of any number, as a ſcore, or a groſs, &c. ſo by putting together ſeveral particular ſubſtances, it makes collective ideas of ſubſtances, as a troop, an army, a ſwarm, a city, a fleet; each of which every one finds, that he repreſents to his own mind by one idea, in one view; and ſo, under that notion, conſiders thoſe ſeveral things as perfectly one, as one ſhip, or one atom. Nor is it harder to conceive, how an army of ten thouſand men ſhould make one idea, than how a man ſhould make one idea; it being as eaſy to the mind to unite into one the idea of a great number of men, and conſider it as one, as it is to unite into one particular, all the diſtinct ideas that make up the compoſition of a man, and conſider them all together as one.

All artificial things are collective ideas.

§ 3. AMONGST ſuch kind of collective ideas, are to be counted moſt part of artificial things, at leaſt ſuch of them as are made up of diſtinct ſubſtances: and, in truth, if we conſider all theſe collective ideas aright; as army, conſtellation, univerſe, as they are united into ſo many ſingle ideas, they are but the artificial draughts of the mind; bringing things very remote, and independent on one another, into one view, the better to contemplate and diſcourſe of them, united into one conception, and ſignified by one name. For there are no things ſo remote, nor ſo contrary, which the mind cannot, by this art of compoſition, bring into one idea; as is viſible in that ſignified by the name univerſe.

CHAP. XXV.

Of relation.

CHAP. XXV.

Relation, what.

§ 1. BESIDES the ideas, whether ſimple, or complex, that the mind has of things, as they are in themſelves, there are others it gets from their compariſon one with another. The underſtanding, in the conſideration of any thing, is not confined to that preciſe object: it can carry any idea as it were beyond itſelf, or, at leaſt, look beyond it, to ſee how it ſtands in conformity to any other. When the mind ſo conſiders one thing, that it does, as it were, bring it to, and ſet it by another, and carry its view from one to the other: this is, as the words import, relation and reſpect; and the denominations given to poſitive things, intimating that reſpect, and ſerving as marks to lead the thoughts beyond the ſubject itſelf denominated to ſomething diſtinct from it, are what we call relatives; and the things ſo brought together, related. Thus, when the mind conſiders Caius as ſuch a poſitive being, it takes nothing into that idea, but what really exiſts in Caius; v. g. when I conſider him as a man, I have nothing in my mind but the complex idea of the ſpecies, man. So, likewiſe, when I ſay Caius is a white man, I have nothing but the bare conſideration of man, who hath that white colour. But when I give Caius the name, huſband, I intimate ſome other perſon; and when I give him the name, whiter, I intimate ſome other thing: in both caſes my thought is led to ſomething beyond Caius, and there are two things brought into conſideration. And ſince any idea, whether ſimple, or complex, may be the occaſion why the mind thus brings two things together, and, as it were, takes a view of them at once, tho' ſtill conſidered as diſtinct; therefore any of our ideas may be the foundation of relation. As in the above-mentioned inſtance, the contract and ceremony of marriage with Sempronia, is the occaſion of the denomination, or relation of huſband; and the colour white, the occaſion why he is ſaid whiter than free-ſtone.

Relations, without correlative terms, not eaſily perceived.

§ 2. THESE, and the like relations, expreſſed by relative terms, that have others anſwering them, with a reciprocal intimation, as father and ſon, bigger and leſs, cauſe and effect, are very obvious to every one, and every body at firſt ſight perceives the relation. For father and ſon, huſband and wife, and ſuch other correlative terms, ſeem ſo nearly to belong one to another, and through cuſtom do ſo readily chime and anſwer one another in people's memories, that upon the naming of either of them, the thoughts are preſently carried beyond the thing ſo named; and no body overlooks, or doubts of, a relation, where it is ſo plainly intimated. But, where languages have failed to give correlative names, there the relation is not always ſo eaſily taken notice of. Concubine is, no doubt, a relative name, as well as wife: but in languages where this, and the like words, have not a correlative term, there people are not ſo apt to take them to be ſo, as wanting that evident mark of relation which is between correlatives, which ſeem to explain one another, and not to be able to exiſt, but together. Hence it is, that many of thoſe names which, duly conſidered, do include evident relations, have been called external denominations. But all names, that are more than empty ſounds, muſt ſignify ſome idea, which is either in the thing, to which the name is applied; and then it is poſitive, and is looked on as united to, and exiſting in the thing, to which the denomination is given: or elſe it ariſes from the reſpect the mind finds in it to ſomething diſtinct from it, with which it conſiders it; and then it includes a relation.

Some ſeemingly abſolute terms contain relations.

§ 3. Another ſort of relative terms there is, which are not looked on to be either relative, or ſo much as external denominations; which yet, under the form and appearance, of ſignifying ſomething abſolute in the ſubject, do conceal a tacit, tho' leſs obſervable relation. Such are the ſeemingly poſitive terms of old, great, imperfect, &c. whereof I ſhall have occaſion to ſpeak more at large in the following chapters.

Relation different from the things related.

§ 4. This farther may be obſerved, that the ideas of relation may be the ſame in men, who have far different ideas of the things that are related, or that are thus compared; v. g. thoſe who have far different ideas of a man, may yet agree in the notion of a father: which is a notion ſuperinduced to the ſubſtance, or man, and refers only to an act of that thing called man, whereby he contributed to the generation of one of his own kind, let man be what it will.

Change of relation may be, without any change in the ſubject.

§ 5. The nature therefore of relation conſiſts in the referring, or comparing two things, one to another; from which compariſon, one, or both comes to be denominated. And if either of thoſe things be removed, or ceaſe to be, the relation ceaſes, and the denomination conſequent to it, tho' the other receive in itſelf no alteration at all: v. g. Caius, whom I conſider to-day as a father, ceaſes to be ſo to-morrow, only by the death of his ſon, without any alteration made in himſelf. Nay, barely by the mind's changing the object, to which it compares any thing, the ſame thing is capable of having contrary denominations, at the ſame time: v. g. Caius, compared to ſeveral perſons, may truly be ſaid to be older and younger, ſtronger and weaker, &c.

Relation only betwixt two things.

§ 6. Whatsoever doth, or can exiſt, or be conſidered as one thing, is poſitive: and ſo not only ſimple ideas and ſubſtances, but modes alſo, are poſitive beings; tho' the parts, of which they conſiſt, are very often relative one to another; but the whole together, conſidered as one thing, and producing in us the complex idea of one thing; which idea is in our minds, as one picture, tho' an aggregate of divers parts; and, under one name, it is a poſitive, or abſolute thing, or idea. Thus a triangle, tho' the parts thereof compared one to another be relative, yet the idea of the whole is a poſitive, abſolute idea. The ſame may be ſaid of a family, a tune, &c. for there can be no relation, but between two things, conſidered as two things. There muſt always be in relation two ideas, or things, either in themſelves really ſeparate, or conſidered as diſtinct, and then a ground or occaſion for their compariſon.

All things capable of relation.

§ 7. Concerning relation in general theſe things may be conſidered:

First, that there is no one thing, whether ſimple idea, ſubſtance, mode, or relation, or name of either of them, which is not capable of almoſt an infinite number of conſiderations, in reference to other things; and therefore this makes no ſmall part of men's thoughts and words: v. g. one ſingle man may at once be concerned in, and ſuſtain all theſe following relations, and many more, viz. father, brother, ſon, grand-father, grand-ſon, father-in-law, ſon-in-law, huſband, friend, enemy, ſubject, general, judge, patron, client, profeſſor, European, Engliſhman, iſlander, ſervant, maſter, poſſeſſor, captain, ſuperiour, inferiour, bigger, leſs, older, younger, contemporary, like, unlike, &c. to an almoſt infinite number: he being capable of as many relations, as there can be occaſions of comparing him to other things, in any manner of agreement, diſagreement, or reſpect whatſoever. For, as I ſaid, relation is a way of comparing, or conſidering two things together, and giving one, or both of them ſome appellation from that compariſon; and ſometimes giving even the relation itſelf a name.

The ideas of relations, clearer often than of the ſubjects related.

§ 8. Secondly, this farther may be conſidered concerning relation, that tho' it be not contained in the real exiſtence of things, but ſomething extraneous and ſuper-induced; yet the ideas, which relative words ſtand for, are often clearer and more diſtinct, than of thoſe ſubſtances, to which they do belong. The notion we have of a father, or brother, is a great deal clearer and more diſtinct, than that we have of a man; or, if you will, paternity is a thing, whereof it is eaſier to have a clear idea, than of humanity: and I can much eaſier conceive what a friend is, than what God. Becauſe the knowledge of one action, or one ſimple idea, is oftentimes ſufficient to give me the notion of a relation: but to the knowing of any ſubſtantial being, an accurate collection of ſundry ideas is neceſſary. A man, if he compares two things together, can hardly be ſuppoſed not to know what it is, wherein he compares them: ſo that when he compares any things together, he cannot but have a very clear idea of that relation. The ideas then of relations are capable at leaſt of being more perfect and diſtinct in our minds, than thoſe of ſubſtances. Becauſe it is commonly hard to know all the ſimple ideas which are really in any ſubſtance, but for the moſt part eaſy enough to know the ſimple ideas that make up any relation I think on, or have a name for: v. g. comparing two men, in reference to one common parent, it is very eaſy to frame the ideas of brothers, without having yet the perfect idea of a man. For ſignificant, relative words, as well as others, ſtanding only for ideas; and thoſe being all either ſimple, or made up of ſimple ones, it ſuffices for the knowing the preciſe idea the relative term ſtands for, to have a clear conception of that, which is the foundation of the relation; which may be done, without having a perfect and clear idea of the thing it is attributed to. Thus having the notion, that one laid the egg, out of which the other was hatched, I have a clear idea of the relation of dam and chick, between the two caſſiowaries in St. James's park; tho', perhaps, I have but a very obſcure and imperfect idea of thoſe birds themſelves.

Relations all terminate in ſimple ideas.

§ 9. Thirdly, tho' there be a great number of conſiderations, wherein things may be compared one with another, and ſo a multitude of relations; yet they all terminate in, and are concerned about thoſe ſimple ideas, either of ſenſation or reflection: which I think to be the whole materials of all our knowledge. To clear this, I ſhall ſhew it in the moſt conſiderable relations, that we have any notion of, and in ſome that ſeem to be the moſt remote from ſenſe, or reflection; which yet will appear to have their ideas from thence, and leave it paſt doubt, that the notions we have of them, are but certain ſimple ideas, and ſo originally derived from ſenſe, or reflection.

Terms leading the mind beyond the ſubject denominated, are relative.

§ 10. Fourthly, that relation being the conſidering of one thing with another, which is entrinſecal to it, it is evident, that all words, that neceſſarily lead the mind to any other ideas, than are ſuppoſed really to exiſt in that thing, to which the word is applied, are relative words: v. g. a man black, merry, thoughtful, thirſty, angry, extended; theſe, and the like, are all abſolute, becauſe they neither ſignify, nor intimate any thing, but what does, or is ſuppoſed really to exiſt in the man thus denominated: But father, brother, king, huſband, blacker, merrier, &c. are words which, together with the thing they denominate, imply alſo ſomething elſe ſeparate and exteriour to the exiſtence of that thing.

Concluſion.

§ 11. Having laid down theſe premiſes concerning relation in general, I ſhall now proceed to ſhew, in ſome inſtances, how all the ideas we have of relation are made up, as the others are, only of ſimple ideas; and that they all, how refined, or remote from ſenſe ſoever they ſeem, terminate at laſt in ſimple ideas. I ſhall begin with the moſt comprehenſive relation, wherein all things that do, or can exiſt, are concerned; and that is, the relation of cauſe and effect: the idea whereof, how derived from the two fountains of all our knowledge, ſenſation and reflection, I ſhall in the next place conſider.

CHAP. XXVI.

Of cauſe and effect, and other relations.

CHAP. XXVI.

Whence their ideas got.

§ 1. IN the notice, that our ſenſes take, of the conſtant viciſſitude of things, we cannot but obſerve, that ſeveral particular, both qualities and ſubſtances, begin to exiſt; and that they receive this their exiſtence from the due application and operation of ſome other being. From this obſervation, we get our ideas of cauſe and effect. That, which produces any ſimple, or complex idea, we denote by the general name cauſe; and that which is produced, effect. Thus finding that in that ſubſtance, which we call wax, fluidity, which is a ſimple idea, that was not in it before, is conſtantly produced by the application of a certain degree of heat; we call the ſimple idea of heat, in relation to fluidity in wax, the cauſe of it, and fluidity the effect. So alſo finding that the ſubſtance wood, which is a certain collection of ſimple ideas ſo called, by the application of fire, is turned into another ſubſtance called aſhes; i. e. another complex idea, conſiſting of a collection of ſimple ideas, quite different from that complex idea, which we call wood; we conſider fire, in relation to aſhes, as cauſe, and the aſhes as effect. So that whatever is conſidered by us to conduce, or operate to the producing any particular ſimple idea, or collection of ſimple ideas, whether ſubſtance or mode, which did not before exiſt, hath thereby in our minds the relation of a cauſe, and ſo is denominated by us.

Creation, generation, making alteration.

§ 2. HAVING thus, from what our ſenſes are able to diſcover in the operations of bodies on one another, got the notion of cauſe and effect, viz. that a cauſe is that, which makes any other thing, either ſimple idea, ſubſtance, or mode, begin to be; and an effect is that, which had its beginning from ſome other thing: the mind finds no great difficulty to diſtinguiſh the ſeveral originals of things into two ſorts.

FIRST, when the thing is wholly made new, ſo that no part thereof did ever exiſt before; as when a new particle of matter doth begin to exiſt, in rerum natura, which had before no being, and this we call creation.

SECONDLY, when a thing is made up of particles, which did all of them before exiſt, but that very thing ſo conſtituted of pre-exiſting particles, which conſidered all together, make up ſuch a collection of ſimple ideas, had not any exiſtence before; as this man, this egg, roſe or cherry, &c. And this, when referred to a ſubſtance, produced in the ordinary courſe of nature, by an internal principle, but ſet on work by, and received from ſome external agent, or cauſe, and working by inſenſible ways, which we perceive not, we call generation: when the cauſe is extrinſecal, and the effect produced by a ſenſible ſeparation, or juxto-poſition of diſcernible parts, we call it making; and ſuch are all artificial things. When any ſimple idea is produced, which was not in that ſubject before, we call it alteration. Thus a man is generated, a picture made, and either of them altered, when any new ſenſible quality, or ſimple idea is produced in either of them, which was not there before; and the things thus made to exiſt, which are not there before, are effects; and thoſe things, which operated to the exiſtence, cauſes. In which, and all other caſes, we may obſerve, that the notion of cauſe and effect, has its riſe from ideas, received by ſenſation and reflection; and that this relation, how comprehenſive ſoever, terminates at laſt in them. For to have the idea of cauſe and effect, it ſuffices to conſider any ſimple idea, or ſubſtance, as beginning to exiſt by the operation of ſome other, without knowing the manner of that operation.

Relations of time.

§ 3. TIME and place are alſo the foundations of very large relations, and all finite beings, at leaſt, are concerned in them. But having already ſhewn, in another place, how we get theſe ideas, it may ſuffice here to intimate, that moſt of the denominations of things, received from time, are only relations. Thus when any one ſays, that queen Elizabeth lived ſixty-nine, and reigned forty-five years, theſe words import only the relation of that duration to ſome other, and mean no more than this, that the duration of her exiſtence was equal to ſixty-nine, and the duration of her government to forty-five annual revolutions of the ſun; and ſo are all words anſwering, how long? Again, William the conqueror invaded England about the year 1070, which means this; that taking the duration from our Saviour's time till now, for one entire great length of time, it ſhews at what diſtance this invaſion was from the two entremes: and ſo do all words of time, anſwering to the queſtion, when? which ſhew only the diſtance of any point of time, from the period of a longer duration, from which we meaſure, and to which we thereby conſider it as related.

§ 4. There are yet, beſides thoſe, other words of time, that ordinarily are thought to ſtand for poſitive ideas, which yet will, when conſidered, be found to be relative; ſuch as are young, old, &c. which include and intimate the relation any thing has to a certain length of duration, whereof we have the idea in our minds. Thus, having ſettled in our thoughts the idea of the ordinary duration of a man to be ſeventy years, when we ſay a man is young, we mean that his age is yet but a ſmall part of that, which uſually men attain to: and, when we denominate him old, we mean that his duration is run out almoſt to the end of that which men do not uſually exceed. And ſo it is but comparing the particular age, or duration of this, or that man, to the idea of that duration, which we have in our minds, as ordinarily belonging to that ſort of animals: which is plain, in the application of theſe names to other things; for a man is called young at twenty years, and very young at ſeven years old: but yet a horſe we call old at twenty, and a dog at ſeven years; becauſe in each of theſe, we compare their age to different ideas of duration, which are ſettled in our minds, as belonging to theſe ſeveral ſorts of animals, in the ordinary courſe of nature. But the ſun and ſtars, tho' they have out-laſted ſeveral generations of men, we call not old, becauſe we do not know what period God hath ſet to that ſort of beings. This term belonging properly to thoſe things, which we can obſerve, in the ordinary courſe of things, by a natural decay, to come to an end in a certain period of time; and ſo have in our minds, as it were, a ſtandard to which we can compare the ſeveral parts of their duration; and, by the relation they bear thereunto, call them young or old, which we cannot therefore do to a ruby or a diamond, things whoſe uſual periods we know not.

Relations of place and extenſion.

§ 5. The relation alſo that things have to one another, in their places and diſtances, is very obvious to obſerve; as above, below, a mile diſtant from Charing-Croſs, in England, and in London. But as in duration, ſo in extenſion and bulk, there are ſome ideas that are relative, which we ſignify by names that are thought poſitive; as great and little are truly relations. For here alſo having, by obſervation, ſettled in our minds the ideas of the bigneſs of ſeveral ſpecies of things, from thoſe we have been moſt accuſtomed to, we make them as it were the ſtandards, whereby to denominate the bulk of others. Thus we call a great apple, ſuch a one as is bigger than the ordinary ſort of thoſe we have been uſed to; and a little horſe, ſuch a one as comes not up to the ſize of that idea, which we have in our minds to belong ordinarily to horſes: and that will be a great horſe to a Welſhman, which is but a little one to a Fleming; they two having, from the different breed of their countries, taken ſeveral ſized ideas, to which they compare, and in relation to which they denominate their great and their little.

Abſolute terms often ſtand for relations.

§ 6. So, likewiſe, weak and ſtrong are but relative denominations of power, compared to ſome ideas we have, at that time, of greater, or leſs, power. Thus when we ſay a weak man, we mean one that has not ſo much ſtrength, or power, to move, as uſually men have, or uſually thoſe of his ſize have; which is a comparing his ſtrength to the idea we have of the uſual ſtrength of men, or men of ſuch a ſize. The like, when we ſay the creatures are all weak things; weak, there, is but a relative term, ſignifying the diſproportion there is in the power of God and the creatures. And ſo abundance of words, in ordinary ſpeech, ſtand only for relations (and, perhaps, the greateſt part) which, at firſt ſight, ſeem to have no ſuch ſignification: v. g. the ſhip has neceſſary ſtores. Neceſſary and ſtores are both relative words; one having a relation to the accompliſhing the voyage intended, and the other to future uſe. All which relations, how they are confined to, and terminate in, ideas derived from ſenſation or reflection, is too obvious to need any explication.

CHAP. XXVII.

Of identity and diverſity.

Chap. XXVII.

Wherein identity conſiſts.

§ 1. ANOTHER occaſion the mind often takes of comparing, is the very being of things, when conſidering any thing as exiſting at any determined time and place, we compare it with itſelf exiſting at another time, and thereon form the ideas of identity and diverſity. When we ſee any thing to be in any place in any inſtant of time, we are ſure (be it what it will) that it is that very thing, and not another, which at that ſame time exiſts in another place, how like and undiſtinguiſhable ſoever it may be in all other reſpects: and in this conſiſts identity, when the ideas, it is attributed to, vary not at all from what they were that moment, wherein we conſider their former exiſtence, and to which we compare the preſent. For, we never finding, nor conceiving it poſſible, that two things, of the ſame kind, ſhould exiſt in the ſame place at the ſame time, we rightly conclude, that whatever exiſts any where, at any time, excludes all of the ſame kind, and is there itſelf alone. When, therefore, we demand, "whether any thing be the ſame, or no?" it refers always to ſomething that exiſted ſuch a time, in ſuch a place, which it was certain at that inſtant was the ſame with itſelf, and no other. From whence it follows, that one thing cannot have two beginnings of exiſtence, nor two things one beginning; it being impoſſible for two things of the ſame kind to be, or exiſt, in the ſame inſtant, in the very ſame place, or one and the ſame thing in different places. That, therefore, that had one beginning, is the ſame thing; and that, which had a different beginning in time and place from that, is not the ſame, but diverſe. That which has made the difficulty about this relation, has been the little care and attention uſed, in having preciſe notions of the things, to which it is attributed.

Identity of ſubſtances.

§ 2. We have the ideas but of three ſorts of ſubſtances. 1. God. 2. Finite intelligences. 3. Bodies. Firſt, God is without beginning, eternal, unalterable, and every where; and, therefore, concerning his identity, there can be no doubt. Secondly, finite ſpirits having had each its determinate time and place of beginning to exiſt, the relation to that time and place will always determine to each of them its identity, as long as it exiſts. Thirdly, the ſame will hold of every particle of matter, to which no addition, or ſubſtraction, of matter being made, it is the ſame. For tho' theſe three ſorts of ſubſtances, as we term them, do not exclude one another out of the ſame place; yet we cannot conceive but that they muſt neceſſarily each of them exclude any of the ſame kind out of the ſame place: or elſe the notions and names of identity and diverſity would be in vain, and there could be no ſuch diſtinction of ſubſtances, or any thing elſe one from another. For example: could two bodies be in the ſame place, at the ſame time, then thoſe two parcels of matter muſt be one and the ſame, take them great, or little; nay, all bodies muſt be one and the ſame. For by the ſame reaſon that two particles of matter may be in one place, all bodies may be in one place: which, when it can be ſuppoſed, takes away the diſtinction of identity, and diverſity, of one and more, and renders it ridiculous. But it being a contradiction, that two, or more, ſhould be one, identity and diverſity are relations and ways of comparing well founded, and of uſe to the underſtanding. All other things being but modes, or relations, ultimately terminated in ſubſtances, the identity and diverſity of each particular exiſtence of them

Identity of modes.

them too will be, by the ſame way, determined: only as to things, whoſe exiſtence is in ſucceſſion; ſuch as are the actions of finite beings, v. g. motion and thought, both which conſiſt in a continued train of ſucceſſion, concerning their diverſity, there can be no queſtion: becauſe each periſhing the moment it begins, they cannot exiſt in different times, or in different places, as permanent beings can at different times exiſt in diſtant places; and therefore, no motion, or thought, conſidered as at different times, can be the ſame, each part thereof having a different beginning of exiſtence.

Principium individuationis.

§ 3. From what has been ſaid, it is eaſy to diſcover what is ſo much enquired after, the principium individuationis; and that, it is plain, is exiſtence itſelf, which determines a being of any ſort to a particular time and place, incommunicable to two beings of the ſame kind. This, tho' it ſeems eaſier to conceive in ſimple ſubſtances, or modes, yet, when reflected on, is not more difficult in compounded ones, if care be taken to what is is applied: v. g. let us ſuppoſe an atom, i. e. a continued body, under one immutable ſuperficies, exiſting in a determined time and place; it is evident that, conſidered in any inſtant of its exiſtence, it is in that inſtant the ſame with itſelf. For being at that inſtant what it is, and nothing elſe, it is the ſame, and ſo muſt continue, as long as its exiſtence is continued; for ſo long it will be the ſame, and no other. In like manner, if two, or more, atoms be joined together into the ſame maſs, every one of thoſe atoms will be the ſame, by the foregoing rule: and whilſt they exiſt united together, the maſs, conſiſting of the ſame atoms, muſt be the ſame maſs, or the ſame body, let the parts be ever ſo differently jumbled. But, if one of theſe atoms be taken away, or one new one added, it is no longer the ſame maſs, or the ſame body. In the ſtate of living creatures, their identity depends not on a maſs of the ſame particles, but on ſomething elſe. For in them the variation of great parcels of matter alters not the identity: an oak, growing from a plant to a great tree, and then lopped, is ſtill the ſame oak: and a colt grown up to a horſe, ſometimes fat, ſometimes lean, is all the while the ſame horſe: tho', in both theſe caſes, there may be a manifeſt change of the parts; ſo that truly they are not either of them the ſame maſſes of matter, tho' they be truly one of them the ſame oak, and the other the ſame horſe. The reaſon whereof is, that in theſe two caſes, of a maſs of matter, and a living body, identity is not applied to the ſame thing.

Identity of vegetables.

§ 4. We muſt, therefore, conſider wherein an oak differs from a maſs of matter, and that ſeems to me to be in this; that the one is only the coheſion of particles of matter, any how united, the other ſuch a diſpoſition of them as conſtitutes the parts of an oak; and ſuch an organization of thoſe parts, as is fit to receive and diſtribute nouriſhment, ſo as to continue and frame the wood, bark, and leaves, &c. of an oak, in which conſiſts the vegetable life. That being then one plant, which has ſuch an organization of parts in one coherent body, partaking of one common life, it continues to be the ſame plant, as long as it partakes of the ſame life, tho' that life be communicated to new particles of matter, vitally united to the living plant, in a like continued organization, conformable to that ſort of plants. For this organization, being at any one inſtant in any one collection of matter, is in that particular concrete diſtinguiſhed from all other, and is that individual life, which exiſting conſtantly from that moment, both forwards and backwards, in the ſame continuity of inſenſibly ſucceeding parts united to the living body of the plant, it has that identity, which makes the ſame plant, and all the parts of it parts of the ſame plant, during all the time that they exiſt united in that continued organization, which is fit to convey that common life to all the parts ſo united.

Identity of animals.

§ 5. The caſe is not ſo much different in brutes, but that any one may hence ſee what makes an animal, and continues it the ſame. Something we have like this in machines, and may ſerve to illuſtrate it. For example, what is a watch? It is plain, it is nothing but a fit organization, or conſtruction of parts, to a certain end, which, when a ſufficient force is added to it, it is capable to attain. If we would ſuppoſe this machine one continued body, all whoſe organized parts were repaired, increaſed, or diminiſhed, by a conſtant addition, or ſeparation of inſenſible parts, with one common life, we ſhould have ſomething very much like the body of an animal; with this difference, that in an animal the fitneſs of the organization, and the motion wherein life conſiſts, begin together, the motion coming from within; but in machines, the force coming ſenſibly from without, is often away, when the organ is in order, and well fitted to receive it.

Identity of man.

§ 6. This alſo ſhews, wherein the identity of the ſame man conſiſts, viz. in nothing but a participation of the ſame continued life, by conſtantly fleeting particles of matter, in ſucceſſion vitally united to the ſame organized body. He that ſhall place the identity of man in any thing elſe, but like that of other animals in one fitly organized body, taken in any one inſtant, and from thence continued under one organization of life in ſeveral ſucceſſively fleeting particles of matter united to it, will find it hard to make an embryo, one of years, mad and ſober, the ſame man, by any ſuppoſition, that will not make it poſſible for Seth, Iſmael, Socrates, Pilate, St. Auſtin, and Cæſar Borgia, to be the ſame man. For, if the identity of ſoul alone makes the ſame man, and there be nothing in the nature of matter, why the ſame individual ſpirit may not be united to different bodies, it will be poſſible that thoſe men living in diſtant ages, and of different tempers, may have been the ſame man: which way of ſpeaking muſt be, from a very ſtrange uſe of the word man, applied to an idea, out of which body and ſhape is excluded. And that way of ſpeaking would agree yet worſe with the notions of thoſe philoſophers, who allow of tranſmigration, and are of opinion that the ſouls of men may, for their miſcarriages, be detruded into the bodies of beaſts, as fit habitations, with organs ſuited to the ſatisfaction of their brutal inclinations. But yet, I think, no body, could he be ſure that the ſoul of Heliogabalus were in one of his hogs, would yet ſay that hog were a man, or Heliogabalus.

Identity ſuited to the idea.

§ 7. It is not, therefore, unity of ſubſtance, that comprehends all ſorts of identity, or will determine it in every caſe: but to conceive and judge of it aright, we muſt conſider what idea the word it is applied to, ſtands for; it being one thing to be the ſame ſubſtance, another the ſame man, and a third the ſame perſon, if perſon, man, and ſubſtance, are three names, ſtanding for three different ideas; for ſuch as is the idea belonging to that name, ſuch muſt be the identity: which, if it had been a little more carefully attended to, would, poſſibly, have prevented a great deal of that confuſion, which often occurs about this matter, with no ſmall ſeeming difficulties, eſpecially concerning perſonal identity, which, therefore, we ſhall in the next place a little conſider.

Same man.

§ 8. An animal is a living, organized body; and, conſequently, the ſame animal, as we have obſerved, is the ſame continued life, communicated to different particles of matter, as they happen, ſucceſſively, to be united to that organized, living body. And, whatever is talked of other definitions, ingenious obſervation puts it paſt doubt, that the idea in our minds, of which the ſound man, in our mouths is the ſign, is nothing elſe but of an animal of ſuch a certain form: ſince I think, I may be confident, that whoever ſhould ſee a creature of his own ſhape and make, tho' it had no more reaſon all its life than a cat, or a parrot, would call him ſtill a man; or whoever ſhould hear a cat, or a parrot, diſcourſe, reaſon, and philoſophiſe, would call, or think it nothing but a cat, or a parrot; and ſay, the one was a dull, irrational man, and the other a very intelligent, rational parrot. A relation we have in an author of great note is ſufficient to countenance the ſuppoſition of a rational parrot. His words [a] are:

" I had a mind to know, from prince Maurice's own mouth, the account of
" a common, but much credited ſtory, that I had heard ſo often from many
" others, of an old parrot he had in Braſil, during his government there, that
" ſpoke, and aſked, and anſwered common queſtions, like a reaſonable creature:
" ſo that thoſe of his train there generally concluded it to be witchery, or poſ-
" ſeſſion; and one of his chaplains, who lived long afterwards in Holland, would
" never, from that time, endure a parrot, but ſaid, they all had a devil in

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[a] Memoirs of what paſſed in Chriſtendom from 1672 to 1679, p. $^{57}_{392}$.

“ them. I had heard many particulars of this ſtory, and aſſevered by people hard to be diſcredited, which made me aſk prince Maurice, what there was of it? He ſaid, with his uſual plainneſs, and dryneſs in talk, there was ſomething true, but a great deal falſe, of what had been reported. I deſired to know of him, what there was of the firſt? He told me ſhort and coldly, that he had heard of ſuch an old parrot, when he came to Braſil; and tho' he believed nothing of it, and it was a good way off, yet he had ſo much of curioſity as to ſend for it: that it was a very great and a very old one, and when it came firſt into the room where the prince was, with a great many Dutchmen about him, it ſaid preſently, What a company of white men are here? They aſked it what he thought that man was, pointing at the prince? It anſwered, ſome general or other; when they brought it cloſe to him, he aſked it, [b] D'ou venez vous? It anſwered, De Marinnan. The prince, A qui eſtes vous? The parrot, A un Portugais. Prince, Que fais tu la? Parrot, Je garde le poulles. The prince laughed, and ſaid, Vous gardez les poulles? The parrot anſwered, Ouy moy, & je ſçay bien faire; and made the chuck, four or five times, that people uſe to make to chickens when they call them. I ſet down the words of this worthy dialogue in French, juſt as prince Maurice ſaid them to me. I aſked him in what language the parrot ſpoke, and he ſaid, in Braſilian; I aſked whether he underſtood Braſilian, he ſaid, No, but he had taken care to have two interpreters by him, the one a Dutchman that ſpoke Braſilian, and the other a Braſilian that ſpoke Dutch; that he aſked them ſeparately and privately, and both of them agreed in telling him juſt the ſame thing that the parrot ſaid. I could not but tell this odd ſtory, becauſe it is ſo much out of the way, and from the firſt hand, and what may paſs for a good one; for I dare ſay this prince at leaſt believed himſelf in all he told me, having ever paſſed for a very honeſt and pious man. I leave it to naturaliſts to reaſon, and to other men to believe as they pleaſe upon it; however, it is not, perhaps, amiſs to relieve, or enliven, a buſy ſcene ſometimes with ſuch digreſſions, whether to the purpoſe, or no.”

Same man.

I HAVE taken care that the reader ſhould have the ſtory at large, in the author's own words, becauſe he ſeems to me not to have thought it incredible; for it cannot be imagined that ſo able a man as he, who had ſufficiency enough to warrant all the teſtimonies he gives of himſelf, ſhould take ſo much pains, in a place where it had nothing to do, to pin ſo cloſe, not only on a man whom he mentions as his friend, but on a prince, in whom he acknowledges very great honeſty and piety, a ſtory which, if he himſelf thought incredible, he could not but alſo think ridiculous. The prince, it is plain, who vouches this ſtory, and our author, who relates it from him, both of them call this talker a parrot; and I aſk any one elſe, who thinks ſuch a ſtory fit to be told, whether if this parrot, and all of its kind, had always talked, as we have a prince's word for it, as this one did, whether I ſay, they would not have paſſed for a race of rational animals: but yet, whether for all that they would have been allowed to be men, and not parrots? For I preſume it is not the idea of a thinking, or rational being alone that makes the idea of a man, in moſt people's ſenſe, but of a body, ſo and ſo ſhaped, joined to it: and, if that be the idea of a man, the ſame ſucceſſive body not ſhifted all at once, muſt, as well as the ſame immaterial ſpirit, go to the making of the ſame man.

Perſonal identity.

§ 9. THIS being premiſed to find wherein perſonal identity conſiſts, we muſt conſider what perſon ſtands for; which, I think, is a thinking, intelligent being, that has reaſon and reflection, and can conſider itſelf as itſelf, the ſame thinking thing, in different times and places; which it does only by that conſciouſneſs, which is inſeparable from thinking, and, as it ſeems to me, eſſential to it: it being impoſſible for any one to perceive, without perceiving that he does perceive. When we ſee, hear, ſmell, taſte, feel, meditate, or will any thing, we know that we do ſo. Thus it is always as to our preſent ſenſations and perceptions: and by this every one is to himſelf that which he calls ſelf; it not being conſidered in this caſe, whether the ſame ſelf be continued in the ſame, or divers ſubſtances. For, ſince conſciouſneſs always accompanies thinking, and it is that that makes every one to be what he calls ſelf, and thereby diſtinguiſhes himſelf from all other thinking things; in this alone conſiſts perſonal identity, i. e. the ſameneſs of a rational being: and, as far as this conſciouſneſs can be extended backwards, to any paſt action or thought, ſo far reaches the identity of that perſon; it is the ſame ſelf now, it was then; and it is by the ſame ſelf with this preſent one, that now reflects on it, that that action was done.

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[b] Whence come ye? It anſwered, from Marinnan. The prince, To whom do you belong? The parrot, To a Portugueſe. Prince, What do you there? Parrot, I look after the chickens? The prince laughed, and ſaid, You look after the chickens? The parrot anſwered, Yes I, and I know well enough how to do it.

Conſciouſneſs makes perſonal identity.

§ 10. But it is farther enquired, "whether it be the ſame identical ſubſtance?" This few would think they had reaſon to doubt of, if theſe perceptions, with their conſciouſneſs, always remained preſent in the mind, whereby the ſame thinking thing would be always conſciouſly preſent, and, as would be thought, evidently the ſame to itſelf. But that which ſeems to make the difficulty is this, that this conſciouſneſs being interrupted always by forgetfulneſs, there being no moment of our lives, wherein we have the whole train of all our paſt actions before our eyes in one view, but even the beſt memories loſing the ſight of one part, whilſt they are viewing another; and we ſometimes, and that the greateſt part of our lives, not reflecting on our paſt ſelves, being intent on our preſent thoughts, and in ſound ſleep, having no thoughts at all, or at leaſt none with that conſciouſneſs, which remarks our waking thoughts: I ſay, in all theſe caſes, our conſciouſneſs being interrupted, and we loſing the ſight of our paſt ſelves, doubts are raiſed, whether we are the ſame thinking thing, i. e. the ſame ſubſtance or no? which, however reaſonable or unreaſonable, concerns not perſonal identity at all: the queſtion being, what makes the ſame perſon, and not whether it be the ſame identical ſubſtance, which always thinks in the ſame perſon; which in this caſe matters not at all: different ſubſtances by the ſame conſciouſneſs, (where they do partake in it) being united into one perſon, as well as different bodies, by the ſame life, are united into one animal, whoſe identity is preſerved, in that change of ſubſtances, by the unity of one continued life. For, it being the ſame conſciouſneſs that makes a man be himſelf to himſelf, perſonal identity depends on that only, whether it be annexed only to one individual ſubſtance, or can be continued in a ſucceſſion of ſeveral ſubſtances. For, as far as any intelligent being can repeat the idea of any paſt action, with the ſame conſciouſneſs it had of it at firſt, and with the ſame conſciouſneſs it has of any preſent action; ſo far it is the ſame perſonal ſelf. For it is by the conſciouſneſs it has of its preſent thoughts and actions, that it is ſelf to it ſelf now, and ſo will be the ſame ſelf, as far as the ſame conſciouſneſs can extend to actions paſt, or to come; and would be by diſtance of time, or change of ſubſtance, no more two perſons, than a man be two men, by wearing other clothes to-day than he did yeſterday, with a long or ſhort ſleep between; the ſame conſciouſneſs uniting thoſe diſtant actions into the ſame perſon, whatever ſubſtances contributed to their production.

Perſonal identity in change of ſubſtances.

§ 11. That this is ſo, we have ſome kind of evidence in our very bodies, all whoſe particles, whilſt vitally united to this ſame thinking conſcious ſelf, ſo that we feel when they are touched, and are affected by, and conſcious of good, or harm that happens to them, are a part of our ſelves; i. e. of our thinking conſcious ſelf. Thus the limbs of his body is to every one a part of himſelf: he ſympathizes and is concerned for them. Cut off an hand, and thereby ſeparate it from that conſciouſneſs he had of its heat, cold, and other affections, and it is then no longer a part of that, which is himſelf, any more than the remoteſt part of matter. Thus we ſee the ſubſtance, whereof perſonal ſelf conſiſted at one time, may be varied at another, without the change of perſonal identity; there being no queſtion about the ſame perſon, tho' the limbs, which but now were a part of it, be cut off.

Whether in the change of thinking ſubſtances.

§ 12. But the queſtion is, "whether, if the ſame ſubſtance, which thinks, "be changed, it can be the ſame perſon; or remaining the ſame, it can be "different perſons?"

And to this I anſwer, firſt, this can be no queſtion at all to thoſe, who place thought in a purely material, animal conſtitution, void of an immaterial ſubſtance. For whether their ſuppoſition be true or no, it is plain they conceive perſonal identity preſerved in ſomething elſe than identity of ſubſtance: as animal identity is preſerved in identity of life, and not of ſubſtance. And therefore thoſe, who place thinking in an immaterial ſubſtance only, before they can come to deal with theſe men, muſt ſhew why perſonal identity cannot be preſerved in the change of immaterial ſubſtances, or variety of particular immaterial ſubſtances, as well as animal identity is preſerved in the change of material ſubſtances, or variety of particular bodies: unleſs they will ſay, it is one immaterial ſpirit that makes the ſame life in brutes, as it is one immaterial ſpirit that makes the ſame perſon in men; which the Carteſians, at leaſt, will not admit, for fear of making brutes thinking things too.

§ 13. But next, as to the firſt part of the queſtion, "whether if the ſame "thinking ſubſtance (ſuppoſing immaterial ſubſtances only to think) be changed, "it can be the ſame perſon?" I anſwer, that cannot be reſolved, but by thoſe, who know what kind of ſubſtances they are that do think, and whether the conſciouſneſs of paſt actions can be transferred from one thinking ſubſtance to another. I grant, were the ſame conſciouſneſs the ſame individual action, it could not: but it being but a preſent repreſentation of a paſt action, why it may not be poſſible, that that may be repreſented to the mind to have been, which really never was, will remain to be ſhewn. And therefore, how far the conſciouſneſs of paſt actions is annexed to any individual agent, ſo that another cannot poſſibly have it, will be hard for us to determine, till we know what kind of action it is, that cannot be done, without a reflex act of perception accompanying it, and how performed by thinking ſubſtances, who cannot think without being conſcious of it. But that, which we call the ſame conſciouſneſs, not being the ſame individual act, why one intellectual ſubſtance may not have repreſented to it, as done by itſelf, what it never did, and was perhaps done by ſome other agent; why, I ſay, ſuch a repreſentation may not poſſibly be without reality of matter of fact, as well as ſeveral repreſentations in dreams are, which yet whilſt dreaming we take for true, will be difficult to conclude from the nature of things. And that it never is ſo, will by us, till we have clearer views of the nature of thinking ſubſtances, be beſt reſolved into the goodneſs of God, who as far as the happineſs or miſery of any of his ſenſible creatures is concerned in it, will not by a fatal error of theirs transfer, from one to another, that conſciouſneſs, which draws reward or puniſhment with it. How far this may be an argument, againſt thoſe who would place thinking in a ſyſtem of fleeting animal ſpirits, I leave to be conſidered. But yet to return to the queſtion before us, it muſt be allowed, that if the ſame conſciouſneſs (which as has been ſhewn is quite a different thing from the ſame numerical figure, or motion in body) can be transferred from one thinking ſubſtance to another, it will be poſſible that two thinking ſubſtances may make but one perſon. For the ſame conſciouſneſs being preſerved, whether in the ſame or different ſubſtances, the perſonal identity is preſerved.

§ 14. As to the ſecond part of the queſtion, "whether the ſame immaterial "ſubſtance remaining, there may be two diſtinct perſons?" which queſtion ſeems to me to be built on this, whether the ſame immaterial being, being conſcious of the actions of its paſt duration, may be wholly ſtripped of all the conſciouſneſs of its paſt exiſtence, and loſe it beyond the power of ever retrieving again; and ſo as it were beginning a new account from a new period, have a conſciouſneſs that cannot reach beyond this new ſtate? All thoſe, who hold pre-exiſtence, are evidently of this mind, ſince they allow the ſoul to have no remaining conſciouſneſs of what it did in that pre-exiſtent ſtate, either wholly ſeparate from body, or informing any other body; and if they ſhould not, it is plain, experience would be againſt them. So that perſonal identity reaching no farther than conſciouſneſs reaches, a pre-exiſtent ſpirit, not having continued ſo many ages in a ſtate of ſilence, muſt needs make different perſons. Suppoſe a chriſtian Platoniſt, or Pythagorean, ſhould, upon God's having ended all his works of creation the ſeventh day, think his ſoul hath exiſted ever ſince; and ſhould imagine it has revolved in ſeveral human bodies, as I once met with one, who was perſuaded his had been the ſoul of Socrates: (how reaſonably, I will not diſpute; this I know, that in the poſt he filled, which was no inconſiderable one, he paſſed for a rational man, and the preſs has ſhewn that he wanted not parts, or learning) would any one ſay, that he being not conſcious of any of Socrates's actions, or thoughts, could be the ſame perſon with Socrates? Let any one reflect upon himſelf, and conclude that he has in himſelf an immaterial ſpirit, which is that which thinks in him, and in the conſtant change of his body keeps him the ſame; and is that which he calls himſelf: let him alſo ſuppoſe it to be of the ſame ſoul, that was in Neſtor, or Therſites, at the ſiege of Troy, (for ſouls being, as far as we know any thing of them in their nature, indifferent to any parcel of matter, the ſuppoſition has no apparent abſurdity in it) which it may have been, as well as it is now, the ſoul of any other man: but he now having no conſciouſneſs of any of the actions either of Neſtor, or Therſites, does or can he conceive himſelf the ſame perſon with either of them? can he be concerned in either of their actions? attribute them to himſelf, or think them his own, more than the actions of any other man that ever exiſted? So that this conſciouſneſs not reaching to any of the actions of either of thoſe men, he is no more one ſelf with either of them, than if the ſoul, or immaterial ſpirit, that now informs him, had been created, and began to exiſt, when it began to inform his preſent body; tho' it were ever ſo true, that the ſame ſpirit that informed Neſtor's, or Therſites's body, were numerically the ſame that now informs his. For this would no more make him the ſame perſon with Neſtor, than if ſome of the particles of matter, that were once a part of Neſtor, were now a part of this man; the ſame immaterial ſubſtance, without the ſame conſciouſneſs, no more making the ſame perſon, by being united to any body, than the ſame particle of matter, without conſciouſneſs united to any body, makes the ſame perſon. But let him once find himſelf conſcious of any of the actions of Neſtor, he then finds himſelf the ſame perſon with Neſtor.

§ 15. And thus we may be able, without any difficulty, to conceive the ſame perſon at the reſurrection, tho' in a body not exactly in make, or parts the ſame which he had here, the ſame conſciouſneſs going along with the ſoul that inhabits it. But yet the ſoul alone, in the change of bodies, would ſcarce to any one, but to him that makes the ſoul the man, be enough to make the ſame man. For ſhould the ſoul of a prince, carrying with it the conſciouſneſs of the prince's paſt life, enter and inform the body of a cobler, as ſoon as deſerted by his own ſoul, every one ſees he would be the ſame perſon with the prince, accountable only for the prince's actions: but who would ſay it was the ſame man? The body too goes to the making the man, and would, I gueſs, to every body determine the man in this caſe; wherein the ſoul, with all its princely thoughts about it, would not make another man: but he would be the ſame cobler to every one, beſides himſelf. I know that, in the ordinary way of ſpeaking, the ſame perſon, and the ſame man, ſtand for one and the ſame thing. And indeed, every one will always have a liberty to ſpeak as he pleaſes, and to apply what articulate ſounds to what ideas he thinks fit, and change them as often as he pleaſes. But yet, when we will enquire what makes the ſame ſpirit, man, or perſon, we muſt fix the ideas of ſpirit, man, or perſon in our minds; and having reſolved with our ſelves what we mean by them, it will not be hard to determine in either of them, or the like, when it is the ſame, and when not.

Conſciouſneſs makes the ſame perſon.

§ 16. But tho' the ſame immaterial ſubſtance, or ſoul, does not alone, whereever it be, and in whatſoever ſtate, make the ſame man; yet it is plain, conſciouſneſs, as far as ever it can be extended, ſhould it be to ages paſt, unites exiſtences and actions, very remote in time, into the ſame perſon, as well as it does the exiſtences and actions of the immediately preceding moment: ſo that whatever has the conſciouſneſs of preſent and paſt actions, is the ſame perſon to whom they both belong. Had I the ſame conſciouſneſs that I ſaw the ark and Noah's flood, as that I ſaw an overflowing of the Thames laſt winter, or as that I write now; I could no more doubt that I who write this now, that ſaw the

Thames overflowed laſt winter, and that viewed the flood at the general deluge, was the ſame ſelf, place that ſelf in what ſubſtance you pleaſe, than that I who write this am the ſame myſelf now whilſt I write (whether I conſiſt of all the ſame ſubſtance, material or immaterial, or no) that I was yeſterday. For as to this point of being the ſame ſelf, it matters not whether this preſent ſelf be made up of the ſame, or other ſubſtances; I being as much concerned, and as juſtly accountable for any action that was done a thouſand years ſince appropriated to me now by this ſelf-conſciouſneſs, as I am for what I did the laſt moment.

Self depends on conſciouſneſs.

§ 17. Self is that conſcious thinking thing (whatever ſubſtance made up of, whether ſpiritual or material, ſimple or compounded, it matters not) which is ſenſible, or conſcious of pleaſure and pain, capable of happineſs or miſery, and ſo is concerned for itſelf, as far as that conſciouſneſs extends. Thus every one finds, that whilſt comprehended under that conſciouſneſs, the little finger is as much a part of itſelf, as what is moſt ſo. Upon ſeparation of this little finger, ſhould this conſciouſneſs goes along with the little finger, and leave the reſt of the body, it is evident the little finger would be the perſon, the ſame perſon; and ſelf then would have nothing to do with the reſt of the body. As in this caſe it is the conſciouſneſs that goes along with the ſubſtance, when one part is ſeparate from another, which makes the ſame perſon, and conſtitutes this inſeparable ſelf; ſo it is in reference to ſubſtances remote in time. That, with which the conſciouſneſs of this preſent thinking thing can join itſelf, makes the ſame perſon, and is one ſelf with it, and with nothing elſe; and ſo attributes to it ſelf, and owns all the actions of that thing as its own, as far as that conſciouſneſs reaches, and no farther: as every one who reflects, will perceive.

Objects of reward and puniſhment.

§ 18. In this perſonal identity, is founded all the right and juſtice of reward and puniſhment; happineſs and miſery being that for which every one is concerned for himſelf, not mattering what becomes of any ſubſtance, not joined to, or affected with that conſciouſneſs. For as it is evident in the inſtance I gave but now, if the conſciouſneſs went along with the little finger when it was cut off, that would be the ſame ſelf which was concerned for the whole body yeſterday, as making a part of it ſelf, whoſe actions then it cannot but admit as its own now. Tho' if the ſame body ſhould ſtill live, and immediately, from the ſeparation of the little finger, have its own peculiar conſciouſneſs, whereof the little finger knew nothing; it would not at all be concerned for it, as a part of itſelf, or could own any of its actions, or have any of them imputed to him.

§ 19. This may ſhew us wherein perſonal identity conſiſts, not in the identity of ſubſtance, but, as I have ſaid, in the identity of conſciouſneſs; wherein, if Socrates and the preſent mayor of Queenborough agree, they are the ſame perſon: if the ſame Socrates waking and ſleeping do not partake of the ſame conſciouſneſs, Socrates waking and ſleeping is not the ſame perſon. And to puniſh Socrates waking for what ſleeping Socrates thought, and waking Socrates was never conſcious of, would be no more of right, than to puniſh one twin for what his brother-twin did, whereof he knew nothing, becauſe their outſides were ſo like, that they could not be diſtinguiſhed; for ſuch twins have been ſeen.

§ 20. But yet, poſſibly, it will ſtill be objected, ſuppoſe I wholly loſe the memory of ſome parts of my life, beyond a poſſibility of retrieving them, ſo that, perhaps, I ſhall never be conſcious of them again; yet am I not the ſame perſon that did thoſe actions, had thoſe thoughts that I once was conſcious of, tho' I have now forgot them? To which I anſwer, that we muſt here take notice what the word I is applied to: which in this caſe, is the man only. And the ſame man being preſumed to be the ſame perſon, I is eaſily here ſuppoſed to ſtand alſo for the ſame perſon. But if it be poſſible for the ſame man to have diſtinct incommunicable conſciouſneſſes at different times, it is paſt doubt the ſame man would, at different times, make different perſons; which, we ſee, is the ſenſe of mankind, in the ſolemneſt declaration of their opinions, human laws not puniſhing the mad man for the ſober man's actions, nor the ſober man for what the mad man did, thereby making them two perſons: which is ſomewhat

what explained by our way of ſpeaking in Engliſh, when we ſay ſuch an one is not himſelf, or is beſides himſelf; in which phraſes it is inſinuated, as if thoſe who now, or, at leaſt, firſt uſed them, thought that ſelf was changed, the ſelf-ſame perſon was no longer in that man.

Difference between identity of man and perſon.

§ 21. But yet it is hard to conceive that Socrates, the ſame individual man, ſhould be two perſons. To help us a little in this, we muſt conſider what is meant by Socrates, or the ſame individual man.

First, it muſt be either the ſame individual, immaterial, thinking ſubſtance; in ſhort, the ſame numerical ſoul, and nothing elſe.

Secondly, or the ſame animal, without any regard to an immaterial ſoul.

Thirdly, or the ſame immaterial ſpirit, united to the ſame animal.

Now take which of theſe ſuppoſitions you pleaſe, it is impoſſible to make perſonal identity to conſiſt in any thing but conſciouſneſs, or reach any farther than that does.

For, by the firſt of them, it muſt be allowed poſſible, that a man, born of different women, and in diſtant times, may be the ſame man. A way of ſpeaking, which whoever admits, muſt allow it poſſible for the ſame man to be two diſtinct perſons, as any two that have lived in different ages, without the knowledge of one another's thoughts.

By the ſecond and third, Socrates in this life, and after it, cannot be the ſame man any way, but by the ſame conſciouſneſs; and ſo making human identity to conſiſt in the ſame thing, wherein we place perſonal identity, there will be no difficulty to allow the ſame man to be the ſame perſon. But then they, who place human identity in conſciouſneſs only, and not in ſomething elſe, muſt conſider how they will make the infant Socrates the ſame man with Socrates after the reſurrection. But whatſoever to ſome men makes a man, and conſequently the ſame individual man, wherein, perhaps, few are agreed, perſonal identity can by us be placed in nothing but conſciouſneſs (which is that alone which makes what we call ſelf) without involving us in great abſurdities.

§ 22. "But is not a man drunk and ſober the ſame perſon, why elſe is he "puniſhed for the fact he commits when drunk, tho' he be never afterwards "conſcious of it?" Juſt as much the ſame perſon, as a man that walks, and does other things in his ſleep, is the ſame perſon, and is anſwerable for any miſchief he ſhall do in it. Human laws puniſh both, with a juſtice ſuitable to their way of knowledge; becauſe, in theſe caſes, they cannot diſtinguiſh, certainly, what is real, what counterfeit: and ſo the ignorance in drunkenneſs, or ſleep, is not admitted as a plea. For tho' puniſhment be annexed to perſonality, and perſonality to conſciouſneſs, and the drunkard, perhaps, be not conſcious of what he did; yet human judicatures juſtly puniſh him, becauſe the fact is proved againſt him, but want of conſciouſneſs cannot be proved for him. But, in the great day, wherein the ſecrets of all hearts ſhall be laid open, it may be reaſonable to think, no one ſhall be made to anſwer for what he knows nothing of; but ſhall receive his doom, his conſcience accuſing, or excuſing him.

Conſciouſneſs alone makes ſelf.

§ 23. Nothing but conſciouſneſs can unite remote exiſtences into the ſame perſon, the identity of ſubſtance will not do it. For whatever ſubſtance there is, however framed, without conſciouſneſs there is no perſon: and a carcaſe may be a perſon, as well as any ſort of ſubſtance be ſo without conſciouſneſs.

Could we ſuppoſe two diſtinct, incommunicable conſciouſneſſes acting the ſame body, the one conſtantly by day, the other by night; and, on the other ſide, the ſame conſciouſneſs acting by intervals two diſtinct bodies: I aſk, in the firſt caſe, whether the day and the night-man would not be two as diſtinct perſons, as Socrates and Plato? and whether, in the ſecond caſe, there would not be one perſon, in two diſtinct bodies, as much as one man is the ſame in two diſtinct clothings? Nor is it at all material to ſay, that this ſame, and this diſtinct conſciouſneſs, in the caſes above-mentioned, is owing to the ſame and diſtinct immaterial ſubſtances, bringing it with them to thoſe bodies; which, whether true, or no, alters not the caſe; ſince it is evident the perſonal identity would equally be determined by the conſciouſneſs, whether that conſciouſneſs were annexed to ſome individual, immaterial ſubſtance, or no. For granting, that the thinking ſubſtance in man muſt be neceſſarily ſuppoſed immaterial, it is evident, that immaterial, thinking thing may ſometimes part with its paſt conſciouſneſs, and be reſtored to it again, as appears in the forgetfulneſs men often have of their paſt actions; and the mind many times recovers the memory of a paſt conſciouſneſs, which it had loſt for twenty years together. Make theſe intervals of memory and forgetfulneſs to take their turns regularly by day and night, and you have two perſons, with the ſame immaterial ſpirit, as much as in the former inſtance two perſons with the ſame body. So that ſelf is not determined by identity, or diverſity of ſubſtance, which it cannot be ſure of, but only by identity of conſciouſneſs.

§ 24. INDEED it may conceive the ſubſtance, whereof it is now made up, to have exiſted formerly, united in the ſame conſcious being: but, conſciouſneſs removed, that ſubſtance is no more itſelf, or makes no more a part of it, than any other ſubſtance; as is evident in the inſtance we have already given, of a limb cut off, of whoſe heat, or cold, or other affections, having no longer any conſciouſneſs, it is no more of a man's ſelf, than any other matter of the univerſe. In like manner it will be in reference to any immaterial ſubſtance, which is void of that conſciouſneſs, whereby I am myſelf to myſelf: if there be any part of its exiſtence, which I cannot upon recollection join with that preſent conſciouſneſs whereby I am now myſelf, it is in that part of its exiſtence no more myſelf, than any other immaterial being. For whatſoever any ſubſtance has thought, or done, which I cannot recollect, and by my conſciouſneſs make my own thought and action, it will no more belong to me, whether a part of me thought, or did it, than if it had been thought, or done, by any other immaterial being, any where exiſting.

§ 25. I AGREE, the more probable opinion is, that this conſciouſneſs is annexed to, and the affection of one individual, immaterial ſubſtance.

BUT let men, according to their diverſe hypotheſes, reſolve of that as they pleaſe. This every intelligent being, ſenſible of happineſs, or miſery, muſt grant, that there is ſomething that is himſelf, that he is concerned for, and would have happy; that this ſelf has exiſted in a continued duration more than one inſtant, and, therefore, it is poſſible may exiſt, as it has done, months and years to come, without any certain bounds to be ſet to its duration; and may be the ſame ſelf, by the ſame conſciouſneſs, continued on for the future. And thus, by this conſciouſneſs, he finds himſelf to be the ſame ſelf which did ſuch or ſuch an action ſome years ſince, by which he comes to be happy, or miſerable now. In all which account of ſelf, the ſame numerical ſubſtance is not conſidered as making the ſame ſelf; but the ſame continued conſciouſneſs, in which ſeveral ſubſtances may have been united, and again ſeparated from it, which, whilſt they continued in a vital union with that, wherein this conſciouſneſs then reſided, made a part of that ſame ſelf. Thus any part of our bodies, vitally united to that which is conſcious in us, makes a part of ourſelves: but, upon ſeparation from the vital union, by which that conſciouſneſs is communicated, that which a moment ſince was part of ourſelves, is now no more ſo, than a part of another man's ſelf is a part of me; and it is not impoſſible, but in a little time may become a real part of another perſon. And ſo we have the ſame numerical ſubſtance become a part of two different perſons; and the ſame perſon preſerved under the change of various ſubſtances. Could we ſuppoſe any ſpirit wholly ſtripped of all its memory, or conſciouſneſs of paſt actions, as we find our minds always are of a great part of ours, and ſometimes of them all; the union, or ſeparation, of ſuch a ſpiritual ſubſtance would make no variation of perſonal identity, any more than that of any particle of matter does. Any ſubſtance, vitally united to the preſent thinking being, is a part of that very ſame ſelf which now is: any thing united to it by a conſciouſneſs of former actions, makes alſo a part of the ſame ſelf, which is the ſame both then and now.

Perſon, a forenſick term.

§ 26. PERSON, as I take it, is the name for this ſelf. Wherever a man finds what he calls himſelf, there, I think, another may ſay is the ſame perſon.

It is a forenſick term, appropriating actions and their merit; and ſo belongs only to intelligent agents, capable of a law, and happineſs and miſery. This perſonality extends itſelf beyond preſent exiſtence to what is paſt, only by conſciouſneſs, whereby it becomes concerned and accountable, owns and imputes to itſelf paſt actions, juſt upon the ſame ground, and for the ſame reaſon it does the preſent. All which is founded in a concern for happineſs, the unavoidable concomitant of conſciouſneſs; that which is conſcious of pleaſure and pain, deſiring that that ſelf that is conſcious ſhould be happy. And therefore, whatever paſt actions it cannot reconcile, or appropriate, to that preſent ſelf by conſciouſneſs, it can be no more concerned in, than if they had never been done: and to receive pleaſure, or pain, i. e. reward, or puniſhment, on the account of any ſuch action, is all one as to be made happy, or miſerable in its firſt being, without any demerit at all. For, ſuppoſing a man puniſhed now for what he had done in another life, whereof he could be made to have no conſciouſneſs at all, what difference is there between that puniſhment, and being created miſerable? And therefore conformable to this, the apoſtle tells us, that at the great day, when every one ſhall receive according to his doings, the ſecrets of all hearts ſhall be laid open. The ſentence ſhall be juſtified by the conſciouſneſs all perſons ſhall have, that they themſelves, in what bodies ſoever they appear, or what ſubſtances ſoever that conſciouſneſs adheres to, are the ſame, that committed thoſe actions, and deſerve that puniſhment for them.

§ 27. I AM apt enough to think I have, in treating of this ſubject, made ſome ſuppoſitions that will look ſtrange to ſome readers, and, poſſibly, they are ſo in themſelves. But yet, I think, they are ſuch as are pardonable in this ignorance we are in, of the nature of that thinking thing that is in us, and which we look on as ourſelves. Did we know what it was, or how it was tied to a certain ſyſtem of fleeting, animal ſpirits; or whether it could, or could not perform its operations, of thinking and memory, out of a body organized as ours is; and whether it has pleaſed God, that no one ſuch ſpirit ſhall ever be united to any, but one ſuch body, upon the right conſtitution of whoſe organs its memory ſhould depend: we might ſee the abſurdity of ſome of thoſe ſuppoſitions I have made. But taking, as we ordinarily now do, (in the dark, concerning theſe matters) the ſoul of a man, for an immaterial ſubſtance, independent from matter, and indifferent alike to it all, there can, from the nature of things, be no abſurdity at all to ſuppoſe, that the ſame ſoul may, at different times, be united to different bodies, and with them make up, for that time, one man: as well as we ſuppoſe a part of a ſheep's body yeſterday ſhould be a part of a man's body to morrow, and, in that union, make up a vital part of Melibæus himſelf, as well as it did of his ram.

The difficulty from ill uſe of names.

§ 28. To conclude, whatever ſubſtance begins to exiſt, it muſt, during its exiſtence, neceſſarily be the ſame: whatever compoſitions of ſubſtances begin to exiſt during the union of thoſe ſubſtances, the concrete muſt be the ſame: whatſoever mode begins to exiſt, during its exiſtence, it is the ſame: and ſo if the compoſition be of diſtinct ſubſtances and different modes, the ſame rule holds. Whereby it will appear, that the difficulty, or obſcurity, that has been about this matter, rather riſes from the names ill uſed, than from any obſcurity in things themſelves. For, whatever makes the ſpecifick idea, to which the name is applied, if that idea be ſteadily kept to, the diſtinction of any thing into the ſame and divers, will eaſily be conceived, and there can ariſe no doubt about it.

Continued exiſtence makes identity.

§ 29. For, ſuppoſing a rational ſpirit be the idea of a man, it is eaſy to know what is the ſame man, viz. the ſame ſpirit, whether ſeparate, or in a body, will be the ſame man. Suppoſing a rational ſpirit, vitally united to a body of a certain conformation of parts, to make a man, whilſt that rational ſpirit, with that vital conformation of parts, tho' continued in a fleeting, ſucceſſive body, remains, it will be the ſame man. But if, to any one, the idea of a man be but the vital union of parts in a certain ſhape; as long as that vital union and ſhape remains, in a concrete no otherwiſe the ſame, but by a continued ſucceſſion of fleeting particles, it will be the ſame man. For, whatever be the compoſition, whereof

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the complex idea is made, whenever exiſtence makes it one particular thing, under any denomination, the ſame exiſtence continued, preſerves it the ſame individual, under the ſame denomination.

CHAP. XXVIII.

Of other relations.

CHAP. XXVIII.

Proportional

§ 1. BESIDES the before-mentioned occaſions of time, place, and cauſality, of comparing, or referring things one to another, there are, as I have ſaid, infinite others, ſome whereof I ſhall mention.

FIRST, the firſt I ſhall name, is ſome one ſimple idea; which being capable of parts, or degrees, affords an occaſion of comparing the ſubjects, wherein it is, to one another, in reſpect of that ſimple idea, v. g. Whiter, Sweeter, Bigger, Equal, More, &c. Theſe relations, depending on the equality and exceſs of the ſame ſimple idea, in ſeveral ſubjects, may be called, if one will, Proportional; and that theſe are only converſant about thoſe ſimple ideas, received from ſenſation, or reflection, is ſo evident, that nothing need be ſaid to evince it.

Natural.

§ 2. SECONDLY, another occaſion of comparing things together, or conſidering one thing, ſo as to include in that conſideration ſome other thing, is the circumſtances of their origin, or beginning; which being not afterwards to be altered, make the relations depending thereon as laſting as the ſubjects to which they belong; v. g. father and ſon, brothers, couſin-germans, &c. which have their relations by one community of blood, wherein they partake in ſeveral degrees; countrymen, i. e. thoſe who were born in the ſame country, or tract of ground; and theſe I call natural relations: wherein we may obſerve that mankind have fitted their notions and words to the uſe of common life, and not to the truth and extent of things. For it is certain, that in reality the relation is the ſame betwixt the begetter and the begotten, in the ſeveral races of other animals as well as men: but yet it is ſeldom ſaid, this bull is the grandfather of ſuch a calf; or that two pigeons are couſin-germans. It is very convenient, that by diſtinct names theſe relations ſhould be obſerved, and marked out in mankind; there being occaſion, both in laws, and other communications one with another, to mention and take notice of men under theſe relations: from whence alſo ariſe the obligations of ſeveral duties amongſt men. Whereas in brutes, men having very little, or no cauſe to mind theſe relations, they have not thought fit to give them diſtinct and peculiar names. This, by the way, may give us ſome light into the different ſtate and growth of languages; which being ſuited only to the convenience of communication, are proportioned to the notions men have, and the commerce of thoughts familiar amongſt them; and not to the reality, or extent of things, nor to the various reſpects might be found among them, nor the different abſtract conſiderations might be framed about them. Where they had no philoſophical notions, there they had no terms to expreſs them: and it is no wonder men ſhould have framed no names for thoſe things they found no occaſion to diſcourſe of. From whence it is eaſy to imagine, why, as in ſome countries, they may not have ſo much as the name for a horſe; and in others, where they are more careful of the pedigrees of their horſes than of their own, that there they may have not only names for particular horſes, but alſo of their ſeveral relations of kindred one to another.

Inſtituted.

§ 3. THIRDLY, ſometimes the foundation of conſidering things, with reference to one another, is ſome act whereby any one comes by a moral right, power, or obligation to do ſomething. Thus a general is one that hath power to command an army; and an army under a general is a collection of armed men, obliged to obey one man. A citizen, or a burgher, is one who has a right to certain privileges in this, or that place. All this ſort depending upon men's wills, or agreement in ſociety, I call inſtituted, or voluntary; and may be diſtinguiſhed from the natural, in that they are moſt, if not all of them, ſome way or other alterable, and ſeparable from the perſons, to whom they have ſometimes belonged, tho' neither of the ſubſtances ſo related, be deſtroyed. Now, tho' theſe are all reciprocal, as well as the reſt, and contain in them a reference of two things one to the other; yet, becauſe one of the two things often wants a relative name, importing that reference, men uſually take no notice of it, and the relation is commonly overlooked: v. g. a patron and client are eaſily allowed to be relations; but a conſtable or dictator are not ſo readily, at firſt hearing, conſidered as ſuch; becauſe there is no peculiar name for thoſe who are under the command of a dictator, or conſtable, expreſſing a relation to either of them; tho' it be certain, that either of them hath a certain power over ſome others; and ſo is ſo far related to them, as well as a patron is to his client, or general to his army.

Moral.

§ 4. Fourthly, there is another ſort of relation, which is the conformity, or diſagreement, men's voluntary actions have to a rule, to which they are referred, and by which they are judged of: which I think may be called moral relation, as being that, which denominates our moral actions, and deſerves well to be examined; there being no part of knowledge, wherein we ſhould be more careful to get determined ideas, and avoid, as much as may be, obſcurity and confuſion. Human actions, when with their various ends, objects, manners, and circumſtances, they are framed into diſtinct, complex ideas, are, as has been ſhewn, ſo many mixed modes, a great part whereof have names annexed to them. Thus, ſuppoſing gratitude to be a readineſs to acknowledge and return kindneſs received, polygamy to be the having more wives than one at once; when we frame theſe notions thus in our minds, we have there ſo many determined ideas of mixed modes. But this is not all that concerns our actions; it is not enough to have determined ideas of them, and to know what names belong to ſuch and ſuch combinations of ideas. We have a farther and greater concernment, and that is, to know whether ſuch actions ſo made up are morally good or bad.

Moral good and evil.

§ 5. Good and evil, as hath been ſhewn, b. ii. ch. 20. § 2. and ch. 21. § 42. are nothing but pleaſure or pain, or that which occaſions, or procures pleaſure or pain to us. Moral good and evil, then, is only the conformity or diſagreement of our voluntary actions to ſome law, whereby good or evil is drawn on us, by the will and power of the law-maker; which good and evil, pleaſure or pain, attending our obſervance, or breach of the law, by the decree of the law-maker, is that we call reward and puniſhment.

Moral rules.

§ 6. Of theſe moral rules, or laws, to which men generally refer, and by which they judge of the rectitude, or pravity of their actions, there ſeem to me to be three ſorts, with their three different enforcements, or rewards and puniſhments. For ſince it would be utterly in vain to ſuppoſe a rule ſet to the free actions of man, without annexing to it ſome enforcement of good and evil to determine his will, we muſt, wherever we ſuppoſe a law, ſuppoſe alſo ſome reward, or puniſhment, annexed to that law. It would be in vain for one intelligent being to ſet a rule to the actions of another, if he had it not in his power to reward the compliance with, and puniſh deviation from his rule, by ſome good and evil, that is not the natural product and conſequence of the action it ſelf. For that being a natural convenience, or inconvenience, would operate of it ſelf, without a law. This, if I miſtake not, is the true nature of all law, properly ſo called.

Laws.

§ 7. The laws, that men generally refer their actions to, to judge of their rectitude, or obliquity, ſeem to me to be theſe three. 1. The divine law. 2. The civil law. 3. The law of opinion or reputation, if I may ſo call it. By the relation they bear to the firſt of theſe, men judge whether their actions are ſins or duties; by the ſecond, whether they be criminal or innocent; and by the third, whether they be virtues or vices.

Divine law, the meaſure of ſin and duty.

§ 8. First, the divine law, whereby I mean that law, which God has ſet to the actions of men, whether promulgated to them by the light of nature, or the voice of revelation. That God has given a rule, whereby men ſhould govern themſelves, I think there is no body ſo brutiſh as to deny. He has a right to do it, we are his creatures: he has goodneſs and wiſdom to direct our actions to that which is beſt; and he has a power to enforce it by rewards and puniſhments, of infinite weight and duration, in another life; for no body can take us out of his hands. This is the only true touchſtone of moral rectitude, and by comparing them to this law it is, that men judge of the moſt conſiderable moral good or evil of their actions; that is, whether as duties or ſins they are like to procure them happineſs, or miſery, from the hands of the Almighty.

Civil law, the meaſure of crimes and innocence.

§ 9. Secondly, the civil law, the rule ſet by the commonwealth to the actions of thoſe who belong to it, is another rule, to which men refer their actions, to judge whether they be criminal, or no. This law no body overlooks; the rewards and puniſhments, that enforce it, being ready at hand, and ſuitable to the power that makes it, which is the force of the commonwealth, engaged to protect the lives, liberties, and poſſeſſions of thoſe who live according to its laws, and has power to take away life, liberty, or goods from him who diſobeys; which is the puniſhment of offences committed againſt this law.

Philoſophical law, the meaſure of virtue and vice.

§ 10. Thirdly, the law of opinion, or reputation. Virtue and vice are names pretended, and ſuppoſed every where, to ſtand for actions, in their own nature right or wrong; and, as far as they really are ſo applied, they ſo far are co-incident with the divine law above-mentioned. But yet, whatever is pretended, this is viſible, that theſe names virtue and vice, in the particular inſtances of their application, through the ſeveral nations and ſocieties of men in the world, are conſtantly attributed only to ſuch actions, as in each country and ſociety are in reputation, or diſcredit. Nor is it to be thought ſtrange, that men every where ſhould give the name of virtue to thoſe actions, which amongſt them are judged praiſe-worthy; and call that vice, which they account blameable: ſince otherwiſe, they would condemn themſelves, if they ſhould think any thing right, to which they allowed not commendation: any thing wrong, which they let paſs without blame. Thus the meaſure of what is every where called and eſteemed virtue and vice, is this approbation or diſlike, praiſe or blame, which, by a ſecret and tacit conſent, eſtabliſhes itſelf in the ſeveral ſocieties, tribes, and clubs of men in the world; whereby ſeveral actions come to find credit, or diſgrace, amongſt them, according to the judgment, maxims, or faſhions of that place. For, tho' men uniting into politick ſocieties have reſigned up to the publick the diſpoſing of all their force, ſo that they cannot employ it againſt any fellow-citizens, any farther than the law of the country directs; yet they retain ſtill the power of thinking well, or ill, approving or diſapproving of the actions of thoſe whom they live amongſt, and converſe with; and, by this approbation and diſlike, they eſtabliſh amongſt themſelves what they will call virtue and vice.

§ 11. That this is the common meaſure of virtue and vice, will appear to any one who conſiders, that tho' that paſſes for vice in one country, which is counted a virtue, or at leaſt not vice in another; yet every where virtue and praiſe, vice and blame go together. Virtue is every where that, which is thought praiſe-worthy; and nothing elſe but that which has the allowance of publick eſteem, is called virtue [a]. Virtue and praiſe are ſo united, that they are called often

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[a] Our author, in his preface to the fourth edition, taking notice how apt men have been to miſtake him, added what here follows. Of this the ingenious author of the diſcourſe concerning the nature of man, has given me a late inſtance, to mention no other. For the civility of his expreſſions, and the candor that belongs to his order, forbid me to think, that he would have cloſed his preface with an inſinuation, as if in what I had ſaid, book ii. chap. 28. concerning the third rule which men refer their actions to, I went about to make virtue vice, and vice virtue, unleſs he had miſtaken my meaning; which he could not have done, if he had but given himſelf the trouble to conſider, what the argument was I was then upon, and what was the chief deſign of that chapter, plainly enough ſet down in the fourth ſection, and thoſe following. For I was there not laying down moral rules, but ſhewing the original and nature of moral ideas, and enumerating the rules men make uſe of in moral relations, whether thoſe rules were true, or falſe: and purſuant thereunto, I tell what has every where that denomination, which in the language of that place anſwers to virtue and vice in our's, which alters not the nature of things, tho' men do generally judge of, and denominate their actions according to the eſteem and faſhion of the place, or ſect they are of.

If he had been at the pains to reflect on what I had ſaid, b. i. c. 3. § 18. and in this preſent chapter, § 13, 14, 15, and 20. he would have known what I think of the eternal and unalterable nature of right and wrong, and what I call virtue and vice: and, if he had obſerved, that in the place he quotes, I only report, as matter of fact, what others call virtue and vice, he would not have found it liable to any great exception. For, I think, I am not much out in ſaying, that one of the rules, made uſe of in the world, for a ground or meaſure of a moral relation, is that eſteem often by the ſame name. "Sunt ſua præmia laudi," ſays Virgil; and ſo Cicero, "nihil habet natura præſtantius, quam honeſtatem, quam laudem, quam dignitatem, quam decus," which, he tells you, are all names for the ſame thing, Tuſc. lib. ii. This is the language of the heathen philoſophers, who well underſtood wherein the notions of virtue and vice conſiſted. And tho' perhaps by the different temper, education, faſhion, maxims, or intereſt of different ſorts of men, it fell out, that what was thought praiſe-worthy in one place, eſcaped not cenſure in another; and ſo in different ſocieties, virtues and vices were changed; yet, as to the main, they for the moſt part kept the ſame every where. For ſince nothing can be more natural, than to encourage with eſteem and reputation that, wherein every one finds his advantage, and to blame and diſcountenance the contrary; it is no wonder that eſteem and diſcredit, virtue and vice, ſhould in a great meaſure every where correſpond with the unchangeable rule of right or wrong, which the law of God hath eſtabliſhed: there being nothing, that ſo

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and reputation which ſeveral ſorts of actions find variouſly in the ſeveral ſocieties of men, according to which they are called virtues or vices; and whatever authority the learned Mr. Lowde places in his old Engliſh dictionary, I dare ſay it no where tells him (if I ſhould appeal to it) that the ſame action is not in credit, called and counted a virtue in one place, which being in diſrepute, paſſes for and under the name of vice in another. The taking notice that men beſtow the names of virtue and vice according to this rule of reputation, is all I have done, or can be laid to my charge to have done, towards the making vice virtue, and virtue vice. But the good man does well, and as becomes his calling, to be watchful in ſuch points, and to take the alarm, even at expreſſions, which ſtanding alone by themſelves might ſound ill, and be ſuſpected.

It is to this zeal, allowable in his function, that I forgive his citing, as he does, theſe words of mine, in § 11. of this chapter: the exhortations of inſpired teachers have not feared to appeal to common repute; "whatſoever things are lovely, whatſoever things are of good report, if there be any virtue, if there be any praiſe," &c. Phil. iv. 8. without taking notice of thoſe immediately preceding, which introduce them, run thus: whereby, in the corruption of manners, the true boundaries of the law of nature, which ought to be the rule of virtue and vice, were pretty well preſerved; ſo that even the exhortations of inſpired teachers, &c. by which words, and the reſt of that ſection, it is plain that I brought that paſſage of St. Paul, not to prove that the general meaſure of what men call virtue and vice, throughout the world, was the reputation and faſhion of each particular ſociety, within itſelf; but to ſhew that tho' it were ſo, yet, for reaſons I there give, men, in that way of denominating their actions, did not for the moſt part much vary from the law of nature; which is that ſtanding and unalterable rule, by which they ought to judge of the moral rectitude and pravity of their actions, and accordingly denominate them virtues or vices. Had Mr. Lowde conſidered this, he would have found it little to his purpoſe, to have quoted that paſſage in a ſenſe I uſed it not; and would, I imagine, have ſpared the explication he ſubjoins to it, as not very neceſſary. But I hope this ſecond edition will give him ſatisfaction in the point, and that this matter is now ſo expreſſed, as to ſhew him there was no cauſe of ſcruple.

Tho' I am forced to differ from him in thoſe apprehenſions he has expreſſed in the latter end of his preface, concerning what I had ſaid about virtue and vice; yet we are better agreed than he thinks, in what he ſays in his third chapter, p. 78. concerning natural inſcription and innate notions. I ſhall not deny him the privilege he claims, p. 52. to ſtate the queſtion as he pleaſes, eſpecially when he ſtates it ſo, as to leave nothing in it contrary to what I have ſaid. For, according to him, innate notions being conditional things, depending upon the concurrence of ſeveral other circumſtances, in order to the ſoul's exerting them; all that he ſays for innate, imprinted, impreſſed notions (for of innate ideas he ſays nothing at all) amounts at laſt only to this; that there are certain propoſitions, which, tho' the ſoul from the beginning, or when a man is born, does not know, yet by aſſiſtance from the outward ſenſes, and the help of ſome previous cultivation, it may afterwards come certainly to know the truth of: which is no more than what I have affirmed in my firſt book. For I ſuppoſe, by the ſoul's exerting them, he means its beginning to know them, or elſe the ſoul's exerting of notions will be to me a very unintelligible expreſſion; and I think at beſt is a very unfit one in this caſe, it miſleading men's thoughts by an inſinuation, as if theſe notions were in the mind, before the ſoul exerts them, i. e. before they are known: whereas truly before they are known, there is nothing of them in the mind, but a capacity to know them, when the concurrence of thoſe circumſtances, which this ingenious author thinks neceſſary, in order to the ſoul's exerting them, brings them into our knowledge.

P. 52. I find him expreſs it thus: theſe natural notions are not ſo imprinted upon the ſoul as that they naturally and neceſſarily exert themſelves (even in children and ideots) without any aſſiſtance from the outward ſenſes, or without the help of ſome previous cultivation. Here he ſays they exert themſelves, as p. 78. that the ſoul exerts them. When he has explained to himſelf, or others, what he means by the ſoul's exerting innate notions, or their exerting themſelves, and what that previous cultivation and circumſtances, in order to their being exerted, are; he will, I ſuppoſe, find there is ſo little of controverſy between him and me in the point, bating that he calls that exerting of notions, which I in a more vulgar ſtile call knowing, that I have reaſon to think he brought in my name upon this occaſion, only out of the pleaſure he has to ſpeak civilly of me; which I muſt gratefully acknowledge he has done every where he mentions me, not without conferring on me, as ſome others have done, a title I have no right to.

directly and viſibly ſecures and advances the general good of mankind in this world, as obedience to the laws he has ſet them; and nothing that breeds ſuch miſchiefs and confuſion, as the neglect of them. And therefore men, without renouncing all ſenſe and reaſon, and their own intereſt, which they are ſo conſtantly true to, could not generally miſtake, in placing their commendation and blame on that ſide that really deſerved it not. Nay, even thoſe men whoſe practice was otherwiſe, failed not to give their approbation right; few being depraved to that degree, as not to condemn, at leaſt in others, the faults they themſelves were guilty of: whereby, even in the corruption of manners, the true boundaries of the law of nature, which ought to be the rule of virtue and vice, were pretty well preſerved. So that even the exhortations of inſpired teachers have not feared to appeal to common repute: "whatſoever is lovely, whatſoever is of good report, if there be any virtue, if there be any praiſe," &c. Phil. iv. 8.

Its inforcements, commendation and diſcredit.

§ 12. If any one ſhall imagine that I have forgot my own notion of a law, when I make the law, whereby men judge of virtue and vice, to be nothing elſe but the conſent of private men, who have not authority enough to make a law; eſpecially wanting that, which is ſo neceſſary and eſſential to a law, a power to enforce it: I think I may ſay, that he, who imagines commendation and diſgrace not to be ſtrong motives on men, to accommodate themſelves to the opinions and rules of thoſe with whom they converſe, ſeems little ſkilled in the nature, or hiſtory of mankind: the greateſt part whereof he ſhall find to govern themſelves chiefly, if not ſolely, by this law of faſhion; and ſo they do that which keeps them in reputation with their company, little regard the laws of God, or the magiſtrate. The penalties, that attend the breach of God's laws, ſome, nay, perhaps moſt men ſeldom ſeriouſly reflect on; and amongſt thoſe that do, many, whilſt they break the law, entertain thoughts of future reconciliation, and making their peace for ſuch breaches. And, as to the puniſhments due from the laws of the commonwealth, they frequently flatter themſelves with the hopes of impunity. But no man eſcapes the puniſhment of their cenſure and diſlike, who offends againſt the faſhion and opinion of the company he keeps, and would recommend himſelf to. Nor is there one of ten thouſand, who is ſtiff and inſenſible enough to bear up under the conſtant diſlike and condemnation of his own club. He muſt be of a ſtrange and unuſual conſtitution, who can content himſelf to live in conſtant diſgrace and diſrepute with his own particular ſociety. Solitude many men have ſought, and been reconciled to: but no body, that has the leaſt thought, or ſenſe, of a man about him, can live in ſociety under the conſtant diſlike and ill opinion of his familiars, and thoſe he converſes with. This is a burden too heavy for human ſufferance: and he muſt be made up of irreconcilable contradictions, who can take pleaſure in company, and yet be inſenſible of contempt and diſgrace from his companions.

Theſe three laws the rules of moral good and evil.

§ 13. These three then, firſt, the law of God; ſecondly, the law of politick ſocieties; thirdly, the law of faſhion, or private cenſure, are thoſe to which men variouſly compare their actions: and it is by their conformity to one of theſe laws that they take their meaſures, when they would judge of their moral rectitude, and denominate their actions good or bad.

Morality is the relation of actions to theſe rules.

§ 14. Whether the rule, to which, as to a touchſtone, we bring our voluntary actions, to examine them by, and try their goodneſs, and accordingly to name them; which is, as it were, the mark of the value we ſet upon them: whether, I ſay, we take that rule from the faſhion of the country, or the will of a law-maker, the mind is eaſily able to obſerve the relation any action hath to it, and to judge whether the action agrees, or diſagrees with the rule; and ſo hath a notion of moral goodneſs or evil, which is either conformity or not conformity of any action to that rule: and therefore is often called moral rectitude. This rule being nothing but a collection of ſeveral ſimple ideas, the conformity thereto is but ſo ordering the action, that the ſimple ideas, belonging to it, may correſpond to thoſe which the law requires. And thus we ſee how moral beings and notions are founded on, and terminated in theſe ſimple ideas, we have received from ſenſation and reflection. For example, let us conſider the complex idea we ſignify by the word murder; and when we have taken it aſunder, and examined all the particulars, we ſhall find them to amount to a collection of ſimple ideas derived from reflection, or ſenſation, viz. firſt, from reflection on the operations of our own minds, we have the ideas of willing, conſidering, purpoſing before-hand, malice, or wiſhing ill to another; and alſo of life, or perception, and ſelf-motion. Secondly, from ſenſation we have the collection of thoſe ſimple, ſenſible ideas, which are to be found in a man, and of ſome action, whereby we put an end to perception and motion in the man; all which ſimple ideas are comprehended in the word murder. This collection of ſimple ideas being found by me to agree, or diſagree with the eſteem of the country I have been bred in, and to be held by moſt men there worthy praiſe or blame, I call the action virtuous or vicious: if I have the will of a ſupreme inviſible law-maker for my rule; then, as I ſuppoſed the action commanded, or forbidden by God, I call it good, or evil, ſin, or duty: and, if I compare it to the civil law, the rule made by the legiſlative power of the country, I call it lawful, or unlawful, a crime, or no crime. So that, whenſoever we take the rule of moral actions, or by what ſtandard ſoever we frame in our minds the ideas of virtues, or vices, they conſiſt only, and are made up of collections, of ſimple ideas, which we originally received from ſenſe, or reflection; and their rectitude, or obliquity, conſiſts in the agreement, or diſagreement, with thoſe patterns preſcribed by ſome law.

§ 15. To conceive rightly of moral actions, we muſt take notice of them under this two-fold conſideration. Firſt, as they are in themſelves each made up of ſuch a collection of ſimple ideas. Thus drunkenneſs, or lying, ſignify ſuch or ſuch a collection of ſimple ideas, which I call mixed modes: and in this ſenſe they are as much poſitive, abſolute ideas, as the drinking of a horſe, or ſpeaking of a parrot. Secondly, our actions are conſidered as good, bad, or indifferent; and in this reſpect they are relative, it being their conformity to, or diſagreement with ſome rule, that makes them to be regular, or irregular, good, or bad: and ſo, as far as they are compared with a rule, and thereupon denominated, they come under relation. Thus the challenging and fighting with a man, as it is a certain, poſitive mode, or particular ſort of action, by particular ideas, diſtinguiſhed from all others, is called duelling: which, when conſidered, in relation to the law of God, will deſerve the name ſin; to the law of faſhion, in ſome countries, valour and virtue; and to the municipal laws of ſome governments, a capital crime. In this caſe, when the poſitive mode has one name, and another name as it ſtands in relation to the law, the diſtinction may as eaſily be obſerved, as it is in ſubſtances, where one name, v. g. Man, is uſed to ſignify the thing; another, v. g. Father, to ſignify the relation.

The denominations of actions often miſlead us.

§ 16. But, becauſe very frequently the poſitive idea of the action, and its moral relation, are comprehended together under one name, and the ſame word made uſe of to expreſs both the mode, or action, and its moral rectitude, or obliquity; therefore the relation itſelf is leſs taken notice of, and there is often no diſtinction made between the poſitive idea of the action, and the reference it has to a rule. By which confuſion of theſe two diſtinct conſiderations under one term, thoſe who yield too eaſily to the impreſſions of ſounds, and are forward to take names for things, are often miſled in their judgment of actions. Thus the taking from another what is his, without his knowledge, or allowance, is properly called ſtealing; but that name, being commonly underſtood to ſignify alſo the moral pravity of the action, and to denote its contrariety to the law, men are apt to condemn, whatever they hear called ſtealing, as an ill action, diſagreeing with the rule of right. And yet the private taking away his ſword from a madman, to prevent his doing miſchief, tho' it be properly denominated ſtealing, as the name of ſuch a mixed mode; yet when compared to the law of God, and conſidered in its relation to that ſupreme rule, it is no ſin, or tranſgreſſion, tho' the name, ſtealing, ordinarily carries ſuch an intimation with it.

Relations innumerable.

§ 17. And thus much for the relation of human actions to a law, which, therefore, I call moral relations.

It would make a volume to go over all ſorts of relations; it is not, therefore, to be expected, that I ſhould here mention them all. It ſuffices to our preſent purpoſe, to ſhew by theſe, what the ideas are we have of this comprehenſive conſideration, called relation: which is ſo various, and the occaſions of it ſo many (as many as there can be of comparing things one to another) that it is not very eaſy to reduce it to rules, or under juſt heads. Thoſe I have mentioned, I think, are ſome of the moſt conſiderable, and ſuch as may ſerve to let us ſee, from whence we get our ideas of relations, and wherein they are founded. But before I quit this argument, from what has been ſaid, give me leave to obſerve;

All relations terminate in ſimple ideas.

§ 18. First, that it is evident, that all relation terminates in, and is ultimately founded on thoſe ſimple ideas, we have got from ſenſation, or reflection: ſo that all we have in our thoughts our ſelves (if we think of any thing, or have any meaning) or would ſignify to others, when we uſe words ſtanding for relations, is nothing but ſome ſimple ideas, or collections of ſimple ideas, compared one with another. This is ſo manifeſt in that ſort called proportional, that nothing can be more: for when a man ſays, "honey is ſweeter than wax," it is plain that his thoughts, in this relation, terminate in this ſimple idea, ſweetneſs, which is equally true of all the reſt; tho' where they are compounded, or decompounded, the ſimple ideas they are made up of, are, perhaps, ſeldom taken notice of. v. g. when the word, father, is mentioned; firſt, there is meant that particular ſpecies, or collective idea, ſignified, by the word man. Secondly, thoſe ſenſible, ſimple ideas, ſignified by the word generation. And, Thirdly, the effects of it, and all the ſimple ideas ſignified by the word child. So the word friend, being taken for a man, who loves, and is ready to do good to another, has all theſe following ideas to the making of it up: Firſt, all the ſimple ideas, comprehended in the word man, or intelligent being. Secondly, the idea of love. Thirdly, the idea of readineſs, or diſpoſition. Fourthly, the idea of action, which is any kind of thought, or motion. Fifthly, the idea of good, which ſignifies any thing that may advance his happineſs, and terminates at laſt, if examined, in particular ſimple ideas; of which the word good in general ſignifies any one, but if removed from all ſimple ideas quite, it ſignifies nothing at all. And thus, alſo, all moral words terminate at laſt, tho', perhaps, more remotely, in a collection of ſimple ideas: the immediate ſignification of relative words, being very often other ſuppoſed, known relations; which, if traced one to another, ſtill end in ſimple ideas.

We have ordinarily as clear (or clearer) a notion of the relation, as of its foundation.

§ 19. Secondly, that in relations, we have, for the moſt part, if not always, as clear a notion of the relation, as we have of thoſe ſimple ideas, wherein it is founded. Agreement, or diſagreement, whereon relation depends, being things whereof we have commonly as clear ideas, as of any other whatſoever; it being but the diſtinguiſhing ſimple ideas, or their degrees one from another, without which we could have no diſtinct knowledge at all. For if I have a clear idea of ſweetneſs, light, or extenſion, I have too, of equal, or more or leſs of each of theſe: if I know what it is for one man to be born of a woman, viz. Sempronia, I know what it is for another man to be born of the ſame woman, Sempronia; and ſo have as clear a notion of brothers, as of births, and, perhaps, clearer. For if I believed that Sempronia dug Titus out of the parſley-bed (as they uſe to tell children) and thereby became his mother; and that afterwards, in the ſame manner, ſhe dug Caius out of the parſley-bed; I had as clear a notion of the relation of brothers between them, as if I had all the ſkill of a midwife: the notion that the ſame woman contributed, as mother, equally to their births (tho' I were ignorant, or miſtaken in the manner of it) being that, on which I grounded the relation, and that they agreed in that circumſtance of birth, let it be what it will. The comparing them then, in their deſcent from the ſame perſon, without knowing the particular circumſtances of that deſcent, is enough to found my notion of their having, or not having the relation of brothers. But tho' the ideas of particular relations are capable of being as clear and diſtinct in the minds of thoſe, who will duly conſider them, as thoſe of mixed modes, and more determinate than thoſe of ſubſtances; yet the names belonging to relation, are often of as doubtful and uncertain ſignification, as thoſe of ſubſtances, or mixed modes, and much more than thoſe of ſimple ideas; becauſe relative words, being the marks of this compariſon, which is made only by men's thoughts, and is an idea only in men's minds, men frequently apply them to different compariſons of things, according to their own imaginations, which do not always correſpond with thoſe of others, uſing the ſame names.

The notion of the relation is the ſame, whether the rule, any action is compared to, be true, or falſe.

§ 20. Thirdly, that in theſe I call moral relations, I have a true notion of relation, by comparing the action with the rule, whether the rule be true or falſe. For if I meaſure any thing by a yard, I know, whether the thing I meaſure, be longer, or ſhorter, than that ſuppoſed yard; tho', perhaps, the yard I meaſure by, be not exactly the ſtandard; which, indeed, is another inquiry. For tho' the rule be erroneous, and I miſtaken in it; yet the agreement, or diſagreement, obſervable in that which I compare with it, makes me perceive the relation. Tho' meaſuring by a wrong rule, I ſhall thereby be brought to judge amiſs of its moral rectitude, becauſe I have tried it, by that which is not the true rule; but I am not miſtaken in the relation, which that action bears to that rule I compare it to, which is agreement, or diſagreement.

CHAP. XXIX.

Of clear and obſcure, diſtinct and confuſed ideas.

CHAP. XXIX.

Ideas, ſome clear and diſtinct, others obſcure and confuſed.

§ 1. HAVING ſhewn the original of our ideas, and taken a view of their ſeveral ſorts; conſidered the difference between the ſimple and the complex, and obſerved how the complex ones are divided into thoſe of modes, ſubſtances, and relations; all which, I think, is neceſſary to be done by any one, who would acquaint himſelf thoroughly with the progreſs of the mind in its apprehenſion and knowledge of things: it will, perhaps, be thought I have dwelt long enough upon the examination of ideas. I muſt, nevertheleſs, crave leave to offer ſome few other conſiderations concerning them. The firſt is, that ſome are clear, and others obſcure; ſome diſtinct, and others confuſed.

Clear and obſcure, explained by ſight.

§ 2. The perception of the mind being moſt aptly explained by words relating to the ſight, we ſhall beſt underſtand what is meant by clear and obſcure in our ideas, by reflecting on what we call clear and obſcure in the objects of ſight. Light being that which diſcovers to us viſible objects, we give the name of obſcure to that which is not placed in a light ſufficient to diſcover minutely to us the figure and colours which are obſervable in it, and which, in a better light, would be diſcernible. In like manner our ſimple ideas are clear, when they are ſuch as the objects themſelves, from whence they were taken, did, or might, in a well-ordered ſenſation, or perception, preſent them. Whilſt the memory retains them thus, and can produce them to the mind, whenever it has occaſion to conſider them, they are clear ideas. So far as they either want any thing of the original exactneſs, or have loſt any of their firſt freſhneſs, and are, as it were, faded, or tarniſhed by time, ſo far are they obſcure. Complex ideas, as they are made up of ſimple ones, ſo they are clear, when the ideas that go to their compoſition are clear; and the number and order of thoſe ſimple ideas, that are the ingredients of any complex one, is determinate and certain.

Cauſes of obſcurity.

§ 3. The cauſes of obſcurity in ſimple ideas, ſeem to be either dull organs, or very ſlight and tranſient impreſſions, made by the objects, or elſe a weakneſs in the memory, not able to retain them as received. For, to return again to viſible objects, to help us to apprehend this matter; if the organs, or faculties of perception, like wax over-hardened with cold, will not receive the impreſſion of the ſeal, from the uſual impulſe wont to imprint it; or, like wax of a temper too ſoft, will not hold it well, when well imprinted; or elſe ſuppoſing the wax of a temper fit, but the ſeal not applied with a ſufficient force to make a clear impreſſion: in any of theſe caſes, the print left by the ſeal will be obſcure. This, I ſuppoſe, needs no application to make it plainer.

§ 4. As

Diſtinct and confuſed, what.

§ 4. As a clear idea is that, whereof the mind has ſuch a full and evident perception, as it does receive from an outward object, operating duly on a well-diſpoſed organ; ſo a diſtinct idea is that, wherein the mind perceives a difference from all other; and a confuſed idea is ſuch an one, as is not ſufficiently diſtinguiſhable from another, from which it ought to be different.

Objection.

§ 5. If no idea be confuſed, but ſuch as is not ſufficiently diſtinguiſhable from another, from which it ſhould be different; it will be hard, may any one ſay, to find any where a confuſed idea. For let any idea be as it will, it can be no other but ſuch as the mind perceives it to be; and that very perception ſufficiently diſtinguiſhes it from all other ideas, which cannot be other, i. e. different, without being perceived to be ſo. No idea, therefore, can be undiſtinguiſhable from another, from which it ought to be different, unleſs you would have it different from itſelf: for from all other it is evidently different.

Confuſion of ideas, is in reference to their names.

§ 6. To remove this difficulty, and to help us to conceive aright what it is, that makes the confuſion, ideas are at any time chargeable with, we muſt conſider, that things, ranked under diſtinct names, are ſuppoſed different enough to be diſtinguiſhed, that ſo each ſort, by its peculiar name, may be marked, and diſcourſed of apart, upon any occaſion: and there is nothing more evident, than that the greateſt part of different names are ſuppoſed to ſtand for different things. Now, every idea a man has, being viſibly what it is, and diſtinct from all other ideas but itſelf; that which makes it confuſed is, when it is ſuch, that it may as well be called by another name, as that which it is expreſſed by: the difference, which keeps the things (to be ranked under thoſe two different names) diſtinct, and makes ſome of them belong rather to the one, and ſome of them to the other of thoſe names, being left out; and ſo the diſtinction which was intended to be kept up by thoſe different names, is quite loſt.

Defaults, which make confuſion.

§ 7. The defaults, which uſually occaſion this confuſion, I think, are chiefly theſe following:

Firſt, complex ideas, made up of too few ſimple ones.

First, when any complex idea (for it is complex ideas, that are moſt liable to confuſion) is made up of too ſmall a number of ſimple ideas, and ſuch only as are common to other things, whereby the differences that make it deſerve a different name, are left out. Thus he, that has an idea, made up of barely the ſimple ones of a beaſt with ſpots, has but a confuſed idea of a leopard; it not being thereby ſufficiently diſtinguiſhed from a lynx, and ſeveral other ſorts of beaſts that are ſpotted. So that ſuch an idea, tho' it hath the peculiar name leopard, is not diſtinguiſhable from thoſe deſigned by the name lynx, or panther, and may as well come under the name lynx, as leopard. How much the cuſtom of defining of words by general terms, contributes to make the ideas, we would expreſs by them, confuſed and undetermined, I leave others to conſider. This is evident, that confuſed ideas are ſuch, as render the uſe of words uncertain, and take away the benefit of diſtinct names. When the ideas, for which we uſe different terms, have not a difference, anſwerable to their diſtinct names, and ſo cannot be diſtinguiſhed by them, there it is that they are truly confuſed.

Secondly, or its ſimple ones jumbled diſorderly together.

§ 8. Secondly, another default, which makes our ideas confuſed, is when tho' the particulars, that make up any idea, are in number enow; yet they are ſo jumbled together, that it is not eaſily diſcernible, whether it more belongs to the name that is given it than to any other. There is nothing properer to make us conceive this confuſion, than a ſort of pictures, uſually ſhewn as ſurpriſing pieces of art, wherein the colours, as they are laid by the pencil, on the table itſelf, mark out very odd and unuſual figures, and have no diſcernible order in their poſition. This draught, thus made up of parts, wherein no ſymmetry nor order appears, is in itſelf no more a confuſed thing, than the picture of a cloudy ſky; wherein, tho' there be as little order of colours, or figures, to be found, yet no body thinks it a confuſed picture. What is it then, that makes it be thought confuſed, ſince the want of ſymmetry does not? as it is plain it does not; for another draught made, barely in imitation of this, could not be called confuſed. I anſwer, that, which makes it be thought confuſed, is the applying it to ſome name, to which it does no more diſcernibly belong, than to ſome other; v. g. when it is ſaid to be the picture of a man, or Cæſar, then any one with reaſon counts it confuſed: becauſe it is not diſcernible, in that ſtate, to belong more to the name man, or Cæſar, than to the name baboon, or Pompey: which are ſuppoſed to ſtand for different ideas from thoſe ſignified by man, or Cæſar. But, when a cylindrical mirrour, placed right, hath reduced thoſe irregular lines, on the table, into their due order and proportion, then the confuſion ceaſes, and the eye preſently ſees that it is a man, or Cæſar, i. e. that it belongs to thoſe names; and that it is ſufficiently diſtinguiſhable from a baboon, or Pompey, i. e. from the ideas ſignified by thoſe names. Juſt thus it is with our ideas, which are as it were the pictures of things. No one of theſe mental draughts, however the parts are put together, can be called confuſed (for they are plainly diſcernible as they are) till it be ranked under ſome ordinary name, to which it cannot be diſcerned to belong, any more than it does to ſome other name of an allowed different ſignification.

Thirdly, or are mutable and undetermined.

§ 9. Thirdly, a third defect, that frequently gives the name of confuſed to our ideas, is, when any one of them is uncertain and undetermined. Thus we may obſerve men, who, not forbearing to uſe the ordinary words of their language, till they have learned their preciſe ſignification, change the idea they make this or that term ſtand for, almoſt as often as they uſe it. He that does this, out of uncertainty of what he ſhould leave out, or put into his idea of church, or idolatry, every time he thinks of either, and holds not ſteady to any one preciſe combination of ideas, that makes it up, is ſaid to have a confuſed idea of idolatry, or the church: tho' this be ſtill for the ſame reaſon that the former, viz. becauſe a mutable idea, (if we will allow it to be one idea) cannot belong to one name, rather than another; and ſo loſes the diſtinction that diſtinct names are deſigned for.

Confuſion, without reference to names, hardly conceivable.

§ 10. By what has been ſaid, we may obſerve how much names, as ſuppoſed, ſteady ſigns of things, and by their difference to ſtand for, and keep things diſtinct that in themſelves are different, are the occaſion of denominating ideas diſtinct, or confuſed, by a ſecret and unobſerved reference the mind makes, of its ideas to ſuch names. This, perhaps, will be fuller underſtood, after what I ſay of words, in the third book, has been read and conſidered. But, without taking notice of ſuch a reference of ideas, to diſtinct names, as the ſigns of diſtinct things, it will be hard to ſay, what a confuſed idea is. And, therefore, when a man deſigns, by any name, a ſort of things, or any one particular thing, diſtinct from all others; the complex idea he annexes to that name, is the more diſtinct, the more particular the ideas are, and the greater and more determinate the number and order of them is, whereof it is made up. For the more it has of theſe, the more has it ſtill of the perceivable differences, whereby it is kept ſeparate and diſtinct from all ideas, belonging to other names, even thoſe that approach neareſt to it, and thereby all confuſion with them is avoided.

Confuſion concerns always two ideas.

§ 11. Confusion, making it a difficulty to ſeparate two things, that ſhould be ſeparated, concerns always two ideas; and thoſe moſt, which moſt approach one another. Whenever, therefore, we ſuſpect any idea to be confuſed, we muſt examine what other is in danger to be confounded with, or which it cannot eaſily be ſeparated from: and that will always be found an idea, belonging to another name, and ſo ſhould be a different thing, from which yet it is not ſufficiently diſtinct, being either the ſame with it, or making a part of it, or at leaſt as properly called by that name, as the other it is ranked under; and ſo keeps not that difference from that other idea, which the different names import.

Cauſes of confuſion.

§ 12. This, I think, is the confuſion proper to ideas, which ſtill carries with it a ſecret reference to names. At leaſt, if there be any other confuſion of ideas, this is that which moſt of all diſorders men's thoughts and diſcourſes: ideas, as ranked under names, being thoſe, that for the moſt part men reaſon of within themſelves, and always thoſe, which they commune about with others. And, therefore, where there are ſuppoſed two different ideas, marked by two different names, which are not as diſtinguiſhable, as the ſounds that ſtand for them, there never fails to be confuſion: and, where any ideas, are diſtinct, as the ideas of thoſe two ſounds they are marked by, there can be between them no confuſion. The way to prevent it, is to collect and unite into our complex idea, as preciſely as is poſſible, all thoſe ingredients, whereby it is differenced from others; and to them, ſo united, in a determinate number and order, apply ſteadily the ſame name. But this neither accommodating men's eaſe, or vanity, or ſerving any deſign but that of naked truth, which is not always the thing aimed at, ſuch exactneſs is rather to be wiſhed, than hoped for. And, ſince the looſe application of names to undetermined, variable, and almoſt no ideas, ſerves both to cover our own ignorance, as well as to perplex and confound others, which goes for learning and ſuperiority in knowledge, it is no wonder, that moſt men ſhould uſe it themſelves, whilſt they complain of it in others. Tho' I think no ſmall part of the confuſion, to be found in the notions of men, might by care and ingenuity be avoided, yet I am far from concluding it every where wilful. Some ideas are ſo complex, and made up of ſo many parts, that the memory does not eaſily retain the very ſame preciſe combination of ſimple ideas, under one name; much leſs are we able conſtantly to divine, for what preciſe complex idea ſuch a name ſtands, in another man's uſe of it. From the firſt of theſe, follows confuſion in a man's own reaſonings and opinions, within himſelf; from the latter, frequent confuſion in diſcourſing and arguing with others. But, having more at large treated of words, their defects and abuſes, in the following book, I ſhall here ſay no more of it.

Complex ideas may be diſtinct in one part, and confuſed in another.

§ 13. Our complex ideas, being made up of collections, and ſo variety of ſimple ones, may accordingly be very clear and diſtinct in one part, and very obſcure and confuſed in another. In a man, who ſpeaks of a chiliaedron, or a body of a thouſand ſides, the idea of the figure may be very confuſed, tho' that of the number be very diſtinct; ſo that, he being able to diſcourſe and demonſtrate concerning that part of his complex idea, which depends upon the number of a thouſand, he is apt to think he has a diſtinct idea of a chiliaedron; though it be plain, he has no preciſe idea of its figure, ſo as to diſtinguiſh it by that, from one that has but nine hundred, ninety-nine ſides: the not obſerving whereof, cauſes no ſmall error in men's thoughts, and confuſion in their diſcourſes.

This, if not heeded, cauſes confuſion in our arguings.

§ 14. He that thinks he has a diſtinct idea of the figure of a chiliaedron, let him for trial-ſake, take another parcel of the ſame uniform matter, viz. gold, or wax, of an equal bulk, and make it into a figure of nine hundred, ninety-nine ſides; he will, I doubt not, be able to diſtinguiſh theſe two ideas one from another, by the number of ſides: and reaſon and argue diſtinctly about them, whilſt he keeps his thoughts and reaſoning to that part only of theſe ideas, which is contained in their numbers; as that the ſides of the one could be divided into two equal numbers, and of the other not, &c. But, when he goes about to diſtinguiſh them by their figure, he will there be preſently at a loſs, and not be able, I think, to frame in his mind two ideas, one of them diſtinct from the other, by the bare figure of theſe two pieces of gold; as he could, if the ſame parcels of gold were made one into a cube, the other a figure of five ſides. In which incompleat ideas, we are very apt to impoſe on ourſelves, and wrangle with others, eſpecially, where they have particular and familiar names. For, being ſatisfied in that part of the idea, which we have clear; and the name which is familiar to us, being applied to the whole, containing that part alſo which is imperfect and obſcure; we are apt to uſe it for that confuſed part, and draw deductions from it, in the obſcure part of its ſignification, as confidently as we do from the other.

Inſtance in eternity.

§ 15. Having frequently in our mouths the name eternity, we are apt to think we have a poſitive, comprehenſive idea of it, which is as much as to ſay, that there is no part of that duration, which is not clearly contained in our idea. 'Tis true, that he that thinks ſo, may have a clear idea of duration; he may alſo have a very clear idea of a very great length of duration; he may alſo have a clear idea of the compariſon of that great one with ſtill a greater: but it not being poſſible for him to include in his idea of any duration, let it be as great as it will, the whole extent together of a duration, where he ſuppoſes no end, that part of his idea, which is ſtill beyond the bounds of that large duration, he repreſents to his own thoughts, is very obſcure and undetermined.

And hence it is, that in diſputes and reaſonings concerning eternity, or any other infinite, we are apt to blunder, and involve ourſelves in manifeſt abſurdities.

Diviſibility of matter.

§ 16. In matter we have no clear ideas of the ſmallneſs of parts, much beyond the ſmalleſt that occur to any of our ſenſes: and therefore, when we talk of the diviſibility of matter in infinitum, tho' we have clear ideas of diviſion, and diviſibility, and have alſo clear ideas of parts made out of a whole, by diviſion; yet we have but very obſcure and confuſed ideas of corpuſcles, or minute bodies ſo to be divided, when, by former diviſions, they are reduced to a ſmallneſs much exceeding the perception of any of our ſenſes; and ſo all, that we have clear and diſtinct ideas of, is of what diviſion in general, or abſtractly, is, and the relation of totum and pars: but of the bulk of the body, to be thus infinitely divided, after certain progreſſions, I think, we have no clear nor diſtinct idea at all. For I aſk any one, whether taking the ſmalleſt atom of duſt he ever ſaw, he has any diſtinct idea (bating ſtill the number, which concerns not extenſion) betwixt the 100,000th, and the 1,000,000th part of it? Or if he thinks he can refine his ideas to that degree, without loſing ſight of them, let him add ten cyphers to each of thoſe numbers. Such a degree of ſmallneſs is not unreaſonable to be ſuppoſed, ſince a diviſion carried on ſo far, brings it no nearer the end of infinite diviſion, than the firſt diviſion, into two halfs, does. I muſt confeſs, for my part, I have no clear, diſtinct ideas of the different bulk, or extenſion of thoſe bodies, having but a very obſcure one of either of them. So that, I think, when we talk of diviſion of bodies in infinitum, our idea of their diſtinct bulks, which is the ſubject and foundation of diviſion, comes after a little progreſſion, to be confounded, and almoſt loſt in obſcurity. For that idea, which is to repreſent only bigneſs, muſt be very obſcure and confuſed, which we cannot diſtinguiſh from one ten times as big, but only by number; ſo that we have clear, diſtinct ideas, we may ſay, of ten and one, but no diſtinct ideas of two ſuch extenſions. It is plain from hence, that, when we talk of infinite diviſibility of body, or extenſion, our diſtinct and clear ideas are only of numbers; but the clear, diſtinct ideas of extenſion, after ſome progreſs of diviſion, is quite loſt: and of ſuch minute parts we have no diſtinct ideas at all: but it returns, as all our ideas of infinite do, at laſt to that of number always to be added; but thereby never amounts to any diſtinct idea of actual, infinite parts. We have, it is true, a clear idea of diviſion, as often as we think of it; but thereby we have no more a clear idea of infinite parts, in matter, than we have a clear idea of an infinite number, by being able ſtill to add new numbers to any aſſigned number we have: endleſs diviſibility giving us no more a clear and diſtinct idea of actually infinite parts, than endleſs addibility (if I may ſo ſpeak) gives us a clear and diſtinct idea of an actually infinite number; they both being only in a power ſtill of increaſing the number, be it already as great as it will. So that of what remains to be added (wherein conſiſts the infinity) we have but an obſcure, imperfect, and confuſed idea; from, or about, which we can argue or reaſon with no certainty, or clearneſs, no more than we can in arithmetick, about a number, of which we have no ſuch diſtinct idea, as we have of 4 or 100; but only this relative obſcure one, that compared to any other, it is ſtill bigger: and we have no more a clear, poſitive idea of it, when we ſay, or conceive it is bigger, or more than 400,000,000, than if we ſhould ſay it is bigger than 40, or 4; 400,000,000, having no nearer a proportion to the end of addition, or number, than 4. For he that adds only 4 to 4, and ſo proceeds, ſhall as ſoon come to the end of all addition, as he that adds 400,000,000, to 400,000,000. And ſo likewiſe, in eternity, he that has an idea of but 4 years, has as much a poſitive compleat idea of eternity, as he that has one of 400,000,000 of years: for what remains of eternity, beyond either of theſe two numbers of years, is as clear to the one as the other; i. e. neither of them has any clear, poſitive idea of it at all. For he that adds only 4 years to 4, and ſo on; ſhall as ſoon reach eternity, as he that adds 400,000,000 of years, and ſo on, or if he pleaſe, doubles the increaſe, as often as he will: the remaining abyſs being ſtill as far beyond the end of all theſe progreſſions, as it is from the length of a day, or an hour. For nothing finite bears any proportion to infinite; and therefore our ideas, which are all finite, cannot bear any. Thus it is alſo in our idea of extenſion, when we encreaſe it by addition, as well as when we diminiſh it by diviſion, and would enlarge our thoughts to infinite ſpace. After a few doublings of thoſe ideas of extenſion, which are the largeſt we are accuſtomed to have, we loſe the clear, diſtinct idea of that ſpace: it becomes a confuſedly great one, with a ſurplus of ſtill greater; about which, when we would argue, or reaſon, we ſhall always find ourſelves at a loſs; confuſed ideas in our arguings and deductions from that part of them, which is confuſed, always leading us into confuſion.

CHAP. XXX.

Of real and fantaſtical ideas.

Real ideas are conformable to their archetypes.

§ 1. BESIDES what we have already mentioned concerning ideas, other conſiderations belong to them, in reference to things, from whence they are taken, or which they may be ſuppoſed to repreſent: and thus, I think, they may come under a threefold diſtinction; and are,

FIRST, either real or fantaſtical.
SECONDLY, adequate or inadequate.
THIRDLY, true or falſe.

FIRST, by real ideas, I mean ſuch as have a foundation in nature; ſuch as have a conformity with the real being and exiſtence of things, or with their archetypes. Fantaſtical or chimerical, I call ſuch as have no foundation in nature, nor have any conformity with that reality of being, to which they are tacitly referred as to their archetypes. If we examine the ſeveral ſorts of ideas beforementioned, we ſhall find that,

Simple ideas all real.

§ 2. FIRST, our ſimple ideas are all real, all agree to the reality of things. Not that they are all of them the images or repreſentations, of what does exiſt; the contrary whereof, in all but the primary qualities of bodies, hath been already ſhewn. But tho' whiteneſs and coldneſs are no more in ſnow, than pain is; yet thoſe ideas of whiteneſs and coldneſs, pain, &c. being in us the effects of powers in things without us, ordained by our maker to produce in us ſuch ſenſations; they are real ideas in us, whereby we diſtinguiſh the qualities that are really in things themſelves. For theſe ſeveral appearances being deſigned to be the marks, whereby we are to know and diſtinguiſh things, which we have to do with, our ideas do as well ſerve us to that purpoſe, and are as real, diſtinguiſhing characters, whether they be only conſtant effects, or elſe exact reſemblances of ſomething in the things themſelves; the reality lying in that ſteady correſpondence they have with the diſtinct conſtitutions of real beings. But, whether they anſwer to thoſe conſtitutions, as to cauſes, or patterns, it matters not; it ſuffices that they are conſtantly produced by them. And thus our ſimple ideas are all real and true, becauſe they anſwer and agree to thoſe powers of things, which produce them in our minds, that being all that is requiſite to make them real, and not fictions at pleaſure. For in ſimple ideas (as has been ſhewn) the mind is wholly confined to the operation of things upon it, and can make to itſelf no ſimple idea, more than what it has received.

Complex ideas are voluntary combinations.

§ 3. THO' the mind be wholly paſſive, in reſpect of its ſimple ideas; yet, I think, we may ſay, it is not ſo in reſpect of its complex ideas: for thoſe being combinations of ſimple ideas put together, and united under one general name; it is plain that the mind of man uſes ſome kind of liberty, in forming thoſe complex ideas: how elſe comes it to paſs, that one man's idea of gold, or juſtice, is different from another's? but becauſe he has put in, or left out of his, ſome ſimple idea, which the other has not. The queſtion then is, which of theſe are real, and which barely imaginary combinations? What collections agree to the reality of things, and what not? And to this I ſay, That,

Mixed modes, made of conſiſtent

§ 4. SECONDLY, mixed modes and relations having no other reality but what they have in the minds of men, there is nothing more required to thoſe kind of ideas, are real.

ideas to make them real, but that they be ſo framed, that there be a poſſibility of exiſting, conformable to them. Theſe ideas themſelves being archetypes, cannot differ from their archetypes, and ſo cannot be chimerical, unleſs any one will jumble together in them inconſiſtent ideas. Indeed, as any of them have the names of a known language aſſigned to them, by which he that has them in his mind, would ſignify them to others, ſo bare poſſibility of exiſting is not enough; they muſt have a conformity to the ordinary ſignification of the name that is given them, that they may not be thought fantaſtical; as if a man would give the name of juſtice to that idea which common uſe calls liberality. But this fantaſticalneſs relates more to propriety of ſpeech, than reality of ideas; for a man to be undiſturbed in danger, ſedately to conſider what is fitteſt to be done, and to execute it ſteadily, is a mixed mode, or a complex idea of an action, which may exiſt. But to be undiſturbed in danger, without uſing one's reaſon or induſtry, is what is alſo poſſible to be; and ſo is as real an idea as the other. Tho' the firſt of theſe having the name courage given to it, may, in reſpect of that name, be a right or wrong idea: but the other, whilſt it has not a common received name, of any known language, aſſigned to it, is not capable of any deformity, being made with no reference to any thing but itſelf.

Ideas of ſubſtances are real, when they agree with the exiſtence of things.

§ 5. THIRDLY, our complex ideas of ſubſtances being made all of them in reference to things, exiſting without us, and intended to be repreſentations of ſubſtances, as they really are, are no farther real, than as they are ſuch combinations of ſimple ideas, as are really united, and co-exiſt in things without us. On the contrary, thoſe are fantaſtical, which are made up of ſuch collections of ſimple ideas, as were really never united, never were found together in any ſubſtance; v. g. a rational creature, conſiſting of a horſe's head, joined to a body of human ſhape, or ſuch as the centaurs are deſcribed: or, a body yellow, very malleable, fuſible, and fixed; but lighter than common water: or an uniform, unorganized body, conſiſting, as to ſenſe, all of ſimilar parts, with perception and voluntary motion joined to it. Whether ſuch ſubſtances as theſe can poſſibly exiſt or no, it is probable we do not know: but be that as it will, theſe ideas of ſubſtances being made conformable to no pattern exiſting, that we know, and conſiſting of ſuch collections of ideas, as no ſubſtance ever ſhewed us united together, they ought to paſs with us for barely imaginary; but much more are thoſe complex ideas ſo, which contain in them any inconſiſtency or contradiction of their parts.

CHAP. XXXI.

Of adequate and inadequate ideas.

CHAP. XXXI.

Adequate ideas are ſuch as perfectly repreſent their archetypes.

§ 1. OF our real ideas, ſome are adequate, and ſome are inadequate. Thoſe I call adequate, which perfectly repreſent thoſe archetypes, which the mind ſuppoſes them taken from; which it intends them to ſtand for, and to which it refers them. Inadequate ideas are ſuch, which are but a partial, or incompleat repreſentation of thoſe archetypes, to which they are referred. Upon which account it is plain,

Simple ideas all adequate.

§ 2. FIRST, that all our ſimple ideas are adequate. Becauſe being nothing but the effects of certain powers in things, fitted and ordained by God to produce ſuch ſenſations in us, they cannot but be correſpondent and adequate to thoſe powers: and we are ſure they agree to the reality of things. For if ſugar produce in us the ideas, which we call whiteneſs and ſweetneſs, we are ſure there is a power in ſugar to produce thoſe ideas in our minds, or elſe they could not have been produced by it. And ſo each ſenſation anſwering the power, that operates on any of our ſenſes, the idea ſo produced is a real idea, (and not a fiction of the mind, which has no power to produce any ſimple idea;) and cannot but be adequate, ſince it ought only to anſwer that power: and ſo all ſimple ideas are adequate. It is true, the things producing in us theſe ſimple ideas are but few of them denominated by us, as if they were only the cauſes of them;

but as if thoſe ideas were real beings in them. For, tho' fire be called painful to the touch, whereby is ſignified the power of producing in us the idea of pain, yet it is denominated alſo light and hot; as if light and heat were really ſomething in the fire, more than a power to excite theſe ideas in us; and therefore are called qualities in, or of the fire. But theſe being nothing, in truth, but powers to excite ſuch ideas in us, I muſt, in that ſenſe, be underſtood, when I ſpeak of ſecondary qualities, as being in things; or of their ideas, as being in the objects that excite them in us. Such ways of ſpeaking, though accommodated to the vulgar notions, without which one cannot be well underſtood; yet truly ſignify nothing but thoſe powers which are in things to excite certain ſenſations, or ideas in us: ſince were there no fit organs to receive the impreſſions fire makes on the ſight and touch, nor a mind joined to thoſe organs, to receive the ideas of light and heat, by thoſe impreſſions from the fire, or the ſun, there would yet be no more light, or heat in the world, than there would be pain, if there were no ſenſible creature to feel it, tho' the ſun ſhould continue juſt as it is now, and mount Ætna flame higher than ever it did. Solidity and extenſion, and the termination of it, figure, with motion and reſt, whereof we have the ideas, would be really in the world, as they are, whether there were any ſenſible being to perceive them, or no: and therefore, we have reaſon to look on thoſe as the real modifications of matter, and ſuch as are the exciting cauſes of all our various ſenſations from bodies. But, this being an enquiry not belonging to this place, I ſhall enter no farther into it, but proceed to ſhew what complex ideas are adequate, and what not.

Modes are all adequate.

§ 3. SECONDLY, our complex ideas of modes, being voluntary collections of ſimple ideas, which the mind puts together, without reference to any real archetypes, or ſtanding patterns, exiſting any where, are and cannot but be adequate ideas. Becauſe they not being intended for copies of things really exiſting, but for archetypes made by the mind, to rank and denominate things by, cannot want any thing; they having each of them that combination of ideas, and thereby that perfection, which the mind intended they ſhould: ſo that the mind acquieſces in them, and can find nothing wanting. Thus by having the idea of a figure, with three ſides, meeting in three angles, I have a compleat idea, wherein I require nothing elſe to make it perfect. That the mind is ſatisfied with the perfection of this its idea, is plain, in that it does not conceive, that any underſtanding hath, or can have a more compleat, or perfect idea, of that thing it ſignifies by the word triangle, ſuppoſing it to exiſt, than itſelf has in that complex idea of three ſides, and three angles; in which is contained all that is, or can be eſſential to it, or neceſſary to compleat it, wherever, or however it exiſts. But, in our ideas of ſubſtances, it is otherwiſe. For there, deſiring to copy things as they really do exiſt, and to repreſent to ourſelves that conſtitution, on which all their properties depend, we perceive our ideas attain not that perfection we intend; we find they ſtill want ſomething we ſhould be glad were in them; and ſo are all inadequate. But mixed modes and relations, being archetypes without patterns, and ſo, having nothing to repreſent but themſelves, cannot but be adequate, every thing being ſo to itſelf. He that at firſt put together the idea of danger perceived, abſence of diſorder from fear, ſedate conſideration of what was juſtly to be done, and executing of that, without diſturbance, or being deterred by the danger of it, had certainly in his mind that complex idea, made up of that combination; and intending it to be nothing elſe, but what it is, nor to have in it any other ſimple ideas, but what it hath, it could not alſo but be an adequate idea; and laying this up in his memory, with the name courage annexed to it, to ſignify it to others, and denominate from thence any action he ſhould obſerve to agree with it, had thereby a ſtandard to meaſure and denominate actions by, as they agreed to it. This idea, thus made, and laid up for a pattern, muſt neceſſarily be adequate, being referred to nothing elſe but itſelf, nor made by any other original, but the good liking and will of him that firſt made this combination.

Modes, in reference to ſettled names

§ 4. INDEED another coming after, and in converſation learning from him the word courage, may make an idea, to which he gives that name courage, different may be inadequate.

different from what the firſt author applied it to, and has in his mind, when he uſes it. And in this caſe, if he deſigns that his idea in thinking ſhould be conformable to the other's idea, as the name he uſes in ſpeaking is conformable in ſound to his, from whom he learned it, his idea may be very wrong and inadequate: becauſe in this caſe, making the other man's idea the pattern of his idea in thinking, as the other man's word, or ſound, is the pattern of his in ſpeaking, his idea is ſo far defective and inadequate, as it is diſtant from the archetype and pattern he refers it to, and intends to expreſs and ſignify by the name he uſes for it; which name he would have to be a ſign of the other man's idea (to which, in it's proper uſe, it is primarily annexed) and of his own, as agreeing to it: to which, if his own does not exactly correſpond, it is faulty and inadequate.

§ 5. Therefore theſe complex ideas of modes, when they are referred by the mind, and intended to correſpond to the ideas in the mind of ſome other intelligent being, expreſſed by the names we apply to them, they may be very deficient, wrong and inadequate; becauſe they agree not to that, which the mind deſigns to be their archetype and pattern: in which reſpect only, any idea of modes can be wrong, imperfect or inadequate. And on this account our ideas of mixed modes are the moſt liable to be faulty of any other; but this refers more to proper ſpeaking, than knowing right.

Ideas of ſubſtances, as referred to real eſſences, not adequate.

§ 6. Thirdly, what ideas we have of ſubſtances, I have above ſhewn. Now thoſe ideas have in the mind a double reference: 1. Sometimes they are referred to a ſuppoſed real eſſence of each ſpecies of things. 2. Sometimes they are only deſigned to be pictures and repreſentations, in the mind, of things that do exiſt, by ideas of thoſe qualities that are diſcoverable in them. In both which ways, theſe copies of thoſe originals and archetypes, are imperfect and inadequate.

First, it is uſual for men to make the names of ſubſtances ſtand for things, as ſuppoſed to have certain real eſſences, whereby they are of this, or that ſpecies: and names ſtanding for nothing but the ideas that are in men's minds, they muſt conſequently refer their ideas to ſuch real eſſences, as to their archetypes. That men (eſpecially ſuch as have been bred up in the learning taught in this part of the world) do ſuppoſe certain ſpecifick eſſences of ſubſtances, which each individual, in its ſeveral kinds, is made conformable to, and partakes of; is ſo far from needing proof, that it will be thought ſtrange, if any one ſhould do otherwiſe. And thus they ordinarily apply the ſpecifick names, they rank particular ſubſtances under, to things as diſtinguiſhed by ſuch ſpecifick, real eſſences. Who is there almoſt, who would not take it amiſs, if it ſhould be doubted, whether he called himſelf man, with any other meaning, than as having the real eſſence of a man? and yet, if you demand what thoſe real eſſences are, it is plain men are ignorant, and know them not. From whence it follows, that the ideas they have in their minds, being referred to real eſſences, as to archetypes which are unknown, muſt be ſo far from being adequate, that they cannot be ſuppoſed to be any repreſentation of them at all. The complex ideas we have of ſubſtances, are, as it has been ſhewn, certain collections of ſimple ideas, that have been obſerved, or ſuppoſed conſtantly to exiſt together. But ſuch a complex idea cannot be the real eſſence of any ſubſtance; for then the properties we diſcover in that body, would depend on that complex idea, and be deducible from it, and their neceſſary connection with it be known; as all properties of a triangle depend on, and as far as they are diſcoverable, are deducible from the complex idea of three lines, including a ſpace. But it is plain, that in our complex ideas of ſubſtances, are not contained ſuch ideas, on which all the other qualities, that are to be found in them, do depend. The common idea men have of iron, is a body of a certain colour, weight and hardneſs; and a property that they look on, as belonging to it, is malleableneſs. But yet this property has no neceſſary connection with that complex idea, or any part of it: and there is no more reaſon to think that malleableneſs depends on that colour, weight and hardneſs, than that that colour, or that weight, depends on its malleableneſs. And yet, tho' we know nothing of theſe real eſſences, there is nothing more ordinary, than that men ſhould attribute the ſorts of things to ſuch eſſences. The particular parcel of matter, which makes the ring I have on my finger, is forwardly, by moſt men, ſuppoſed to have a real eſſence, whereby it is gold; and from whence thoſe qualities flow, which I find in it, viz. its peculiar colour, weight, hardneſs, fuſibility, fixedneſs, and change of colour upon a ſlight touch of mercury, &c. This eſſence, from which all theſe properties flow, when I enquire into it, and ſearch after it, I plainly perceive I cannot diſcover; the fartheſt I can go, is only to preſume, that it being nothing but body, its real eſſence, or internal conſtitution, on which theſe qualities depend, can be nothing but the figure, ſize, and connection of its ſolid parts; of neither of which, having any diſtinct perception at all, can I have any idea of its eſſence, which is the cauſe that it has that particular, ſhining yellowneſs, a greater weight than any thing I know, of the ſame bulk, and a fitneſs to have its colour changed by the touch of quick-ſilver. If any one will ſay, that the real eſſence and internal conſtitution, on which theſe properties depend, is not the figure, ſize, and arrangement, or connection, of its ſolid parts, but ſomething elſe, called its particular form; I am farther from having any idea of its real eſſence, than I was before; for I have an idea of figure, ſize, and ſituation of ſolid parts in general, tho' I have none of the particular figure, ſize, or putting together of parts, whereby the qualities above-mentioned are produced; which qualities I find in that particular parcel of matter that is on my finger, and not in another parcel of matter, with which I cut the pen I write with. But when I am told, that ſomething, beſides the figure, ſize, and poſture of the ſolid parts of that body, is its eſſence, ſomething called, ſubſtantial form; of that, I confeſs, I have no idea at all, but only of the ſound, form, which is far enough from an idea of its real eſſence, or conſtitution. The like ignorance, as I have of the real eſſence of this particular ſubſtance, I have alſo of the real eſſence of all other natural ones: of which eſſences, I confeſs, I have no diſtinct ideas at all; and I am apt to ſuppoſe others, when they examine their own knowledge, will find in themſelves, in this one point, the ſame ſort of ignorance.

§ 7. Now then, when men apply to this particular parcel of matter on my finger, a general name, already in uſe, and denominate it gold, do they not ordinarily, or are they not underſtood to give it that name, as belonging to a particular ſpecies of bodies, having a real internal eſſence; by having of which eſſence, this particular ſubſtance comes to be of that ſpecies, and to be called by that name? If it be ſo, as it is plain it is, the name, by which things are marked, as having that eſſence, muſt be referred primarily to that eſſence; and conſequently the idea, to which that name is given, muſt be referred alſo to that eſſence, and be intended to repreſent it. Which eſſence, ſince they, who ſo uſe the names, know not, their ideas of ſubſtances muſt be all inadequate in that reſpect, as not containing in them that real eſſence, which the mind intends they ſhould.

Ideas of ſubſtances, as collections of their qualities, are all inadequate.

§ 8. SECONDLY, thoſe who, neglecting that uſeleſs ſuppoſition of unknown real eſſences, whereby they are diſtinguiſhed, endeavour to copy the ſubſtances that exiſt in the world, by putting together the ideas of thoſe ſenſible qualities, which are found co-exiſting in them, tho' they come much nearer a likeneſs of them, than thoſe, who imagine they know not what, real, ſpecifick eſſences; yet they arrive not at perfectly adequate ideas of thoſe ſubſtances, they would thus copy into their minds; nor do thoſe copies exactly and fully contain all that is to be found in their archetypes. Becauſe thoſe qualities, and powers of ſubſtances, whereof we make their complex ideas, are ſo many and various, that no man's complex idea contains them all. That our abſtract ideas of ſubſtances do not contain in them all the ſimple ideas, that are united in the things themſelves, is evident, in that men do rarely put into their complex idea of any ſubſtance, all the ſimple ideas they do know to exiſt in it. Becauſe, endeavouring to make the ſignification of their ſpecifick names as clear, and as little cumberſom as they can, they make their ſpecifick ideas of the ſorts of ſubſtances, for the moſt part, of a few of thoſe ſimple ideas, which are to be found in them: but theſe, having no original precedency, or right to be put in, and make the ſpecifick idea, more than others that are left out, it is plain that both theſe ways our ideas of ſubſtances are deficient and inadequate. The ſimple ideas, whereof we make our complex ones of ſubſtances, are all of them (bating only the figure and bulk of ſome ſorts) powers, which being relations to other ſubſtances, we can never be ſure that we know all the powers that are in any one body, till we have tried what changes it is fitted to give to, or receive, from other ſubſtances, in their ſeveral ways of application: which being impoſſible to be tried upon any one body, much leſs upon all, it is impoſſible we ſhould have adequate ideas of any ſubſtance, made up of a collection of all its properties.

§ 9. Whosoever firſt lit on a parcel of that ſort of ſubſtance, we denote by the word gold, could not rationally take the bulk and figure he obſerved in that lump, to depend on its real eſſence, or internal conſtitution. Therefore, thoſe never went into his idea of that ſpecies of body; but its peculiar colour, perhaps, and weight, were the firſt he abſtracted from it, to make the complex idea of that ſpecies. Which both are but powers: the one to affect our eyes after ſuch a manner, and to produce in us that idea we call yellow; and the other to force upwards any other body of equal bulk, they being put into a pair of equal ſcales, one againſt another. Another, perhaps, added to theſe the ideas of fuſibility and fixedneſs, two other paſſive powers, in relation to the operation of fire upon it; another, its ductility and ſolubility in aq. regia, two other powers relating to the operation of other bodies, in changing its outward figure, or ſeparation of it into inſenſible parts. Theſe, or part of theſe, put together, uſually make the complex idea in men's minds, of that ſort of body we call gold.

§ 10. But no one, who hath conſidered the properties of bodies in general, or this ſort in particular, can doubt that this called gold has infinite other properties, not contained in that complex idea. Some, who have examined this ſpecies more accurately, could, I believe, enumerate ten times as many properties in gold, all of them as inſeparable from its internal conſtitution, as its colour, or weight: and, it is probable, if any one knew all the properties, that are by divers men known of this metal, there would an hundred times as many ideas go to the complex idea of gold, as any one man yet has in his: and yet, perhaps, that not be the thouſandth part of what is to be diſcovered in it. The changes, which that one body is apt to receive, and make in other bodies, upon a due application, exceeding far, not only what we know, but what we are apt to imagine. Which will not appear ſo much a paradox to any one, who will but conſider how far men are yet from knowing all the properties of that one, no very compound figure, a triangle; tho' it be no ſmall number, that are already by mathematicians diſcovered of it.

Ideas of ſubſtances, as collections of their qualities, are all inadequate.

§ 11. So that all our complex ideas of ſubſtances are imperfect and inadequate. Which would be ſo alſo in mathematical figures, if we were to have our complex ideas of them, only by collecting their properties in reference to other figures. How uncertain and imperfect would our ideas be of an ellipſis, if we had no other idea of it, but ſome few of its properties? Whereas, having in our plain idea the whole eſſence of that figure, we from thence diſcover thoſe properties, and demonſtratively ſee how they flow, and are inſeparable from it.

Simple ideas ἔκτυπα, and adequate.

§ 12. Thus the mind has three ſorts of abſtract ideas, or nominal eſſences:

First, ſimple ideas, which are ἔκτυπα, or copies; but yet certainly adequate. Becauſe, being intended to expreſs nothing but the power in things to produce in the mind ſuch a ſenſation, that ſenſation, when it is produced, cannot but be the effect of that power. So the paper I write on, having the power, in the light (I ſpeak according to the common notion of light) to produce in me the ſenſation, which I call white, it cannot but be the effect of ſuch a power, in ſomething without the mind; ſince the mind has not the power to produce any ſuch idea in itſelf, and being meant for nothing elſe, but the effect of ſuch a power, that ſimple idea is real and adequate: the ſenſation of white, in my mind, being the effect of that power, which is in the paper to produce it, is perfectly adequade to that power; or elſe, that power would produce a different idea.

Idea of ſubſtances are

§ 13. Secondly, the complex ideas of ſubſtances are ectypes, copies too; but not perfect ones, not adequate: which is very evident to the mind, in that

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ἔκτυπα, inadequate.

it plainly perceives that, whatever collection of ſimple ideas it makes of any ſubſtance that exiſts, it cannot be ſure that it exactly anſwers all that are in that ſubſtance: ſince, not having tried all the operations, of all other ſubſtances upon it, and found all the alterations it would receive from, or cauſe in other ſubſtances, it cannot have an exact, adequate collection of all its active and paſſive capacities: and ſo not have an adequate, complex idea of the powers of any ſubſtance exiſting, and its relations, which is that ſort of complex idea of ſubſtances we have. And, after all, if we could have, and actually had in our complex idea, an exact collection of all the ſecondary qualities, or powers of any ſubſtance, we ſhould not yet thereby have an idea of the eſſence of that thing. For ſince the powers, or qualities, that are obſervable by us, are not the real eſſence of that ſubſtance, but depend on it, and flow from it, any collection whatſoever of theſe qualities, cannot be the real eſſence of that thing. Whereby it is plain, that our ideas of ſubſtances are not adequate; are not what the mind intends them to be. Beſides, a man has no idea of ſubſtance in general, nor knows what ſubſtance is in itſelf.

Ideas of modes and relations are archetypes, and cannot but be adequate.

§ 14. THIRDLY, Complex ideas of modes and relations, are originals, and archetypes; are not copies, nor made after the pattern of any real exiſtence, to which the mind intends them to be conformable, and exactly to anſwer. Theſe being ſuch collections of ſimple ideas, that the mind itſelf puts together, and ſuch collections, that each of them contains in it preciſely all that the mind intends it ſhould, they are archetypes and eſſences of modes that may exiſt, and ſo are deſigned only for, and belong only to ſuch modes, as when they do exiſt, have an exact conformity with thoſe complex ideas. The ideas, therefore, of modes and relations cannot but be adequate.

CHAP. XXXII.

Of true and falſe ideas.

CHAP. XXXII.

Truth and falſhood properly belong to propoſitions.

§ 1. THO' truth and falſhood belong, in propriety of ſpeech, only to propoſitions; yet ideas are oftentimes termed true, or falſe, (as what words are there, that are not uſed with great latitude, and with ſome deviation from their ſtrict and proper ſignifications?) tho', I think, that when ideas themſelves are termed true, or falſe, there is ſtill ſome ſecret, or tacit propoſition, which is the foundation of that denomination: as we ſhall ſee, if we examine the particular occaſions, wherein they come to be called true, or falſe. In all which, we ſhall find ſome kind of affirmation, or negation, which is the reaſon of that denomination. For our ideas, being nothing but bare appearances, or perceptions in our minds, cannot properly and ſimply in themſelves be ſaid to be true, or falſe, no more than a ſingle name of any thing can be ſaid to be true, or falſe.

Metaphyſical truth contains a tacit propoſition.

§ 2. INDEED both ideas and words may be ſaid to be true in a metaphyſical ſenſe of the word truth, as all other things, that any way exiſt, are ſaid to be true; i. e. really to be ſuch as they exiſt. Tho' in things called true, even in that ſenſe, there is, perhaps, a ſecret reference to our ideas, looked upon as the ſtandards of that truth, which amounts to a mental propoſition, tho' it be uſually not taken notice of.

No idea, as an appearance in the mind, true, or falſe.

§ 3. BUT it is not in that metaphyſical ſenſe of truth, which we enquire here, when we examine whether our ideas are capable of being true, or falſe; but in the more ordinary acceptation of thoſe words: and ſo I ſay, that the ideas in our minds being only ſo many perceptions, or appearances there, none of them are falſe; the idea of a centaur having no more falſhood in it, when it appears in our minds, than the name centaur has falſhood in it, when it is pronounced by our mouths, or written on paper. For truth, or falſhood, lying always in ſome affirmation, or negation, mental, or verbal, our ideas are not capable, any of them, of being falſe, till the mind paſſes ſome judgment on them; that is, affirms, or denies, ſomething of them.

Ideas, referred to any thing, may

§ 4. WHENEVER the mind refers any of its ideas to any thing extraneous to them, they are then capable to be called true, or falſe. Becauſe the mind, in be true, or falſe.

ſuch a reference, makes a tacit ſuppoſition of their conformity to that thing; which ſuppoſition, as it happens to be true, or falſe, ſo the ideas themſelves come to be denominated. The moſt uſual caſes, wherein this happens, are theſe following:

Other men's ideas, real exiſtence, and ſuppoſed real eſſences, are what men uſually refer their ideas to.

§ 5. First, when the mind ſuppoſes any idea it has, conformable to that in other men's minds, called by the ſame common name; v. g. when the mind intends, or judges its ideas of juſtice, temperance, religion, to be the ſame with what other men give thoſe names to.

Secondly, when the mind ſuppoſes any idea it has in itſelf, to be conformable to ſome real exiſtence. Thus the two ideas, of a man and a centaur, ſuppoſed to be the ideas of real ſubſtances, are the one true, and the other falſe; the one having a conformity to what has really exiſted, the other not.

Thirdly, when the mind refers any of its ideas to that real conſtitution and eſſence of any thing, whereon all its properties depend; and thus the greateſt part, if not all our ideas of ſubſtances are falſe.

The cauſe of ſuch references.

§ 6. These ſuppoſitions the mind is very apt tacitly to make, concerning its own ideas. But yet, if we will examine it, we ſhall find it is chiefly, if not only, concerning its abſtract, complex ideas. For the natural tendency of the mind being towards knowledge: and finding that, if it ſhould proceed by, and dwell upon only particular things, its progreſs would be very ſlow, and its work endleſs: therefore, to ſhorten its way to knowledge, and make each perception more comprehenſive; the firſt thing it does, as the foundation of the eaſier enlarging its knowledge, either by contemplation of the things themſelves, that it would know, or conference with others about them, is to bind them into bundles, and rank them ſo into ſorts, that what knowledge it gets of any of them, it may thereby, with aſſurance, extend to all of that ſort; and ſo advance by larger ſteps in that, which is its great buſineſs, knowledge. This, as I have elſewhere ſhewed, is the reaſon why we collect things under comprehenſive ideas, with names annexed to them, into genera and ſpecies, i. e. into kinds and ſorts.

§ 7. If, therefore, we will warily attend to the motions of the mind, and obſerve what courſe it uſually takes, in its way to knowledge; we ſhall, I think, find that the mind, having got any idea, which it thinks it may have uſe of, either in contemplation, or diſcourſe, the firſt thing it does, is to abſtract it, and then get a name to it; and ſo lay it up in its ſtore-houſe, the memory, as containing the eſſence of a ſort of things, of which that name is always to be the mark. Hence it is, that we may often obſerve, that when any one ſees a new thing of a kind, that he knows not, he preſently aſks what it is, meaning by that enquiry nothing but the name. As if the name carried with it the knowledge of the ſpecies, or the eſſence of it: whereof it is, indeed, uſed as the mark, and is generally ſuppoſed annexed to it.

Cauſe of ſuch references.

§ 8. But this abſtract idea, being ſomething in the mind between the thing that exiſts, and the name that is given it; it is in our ideas, that both the rightneſs of our knowledge, and the propriety or intelligibleneſs of our ſpeaking, conſiſts. And hence it is, that men are ſo forward to ſuppoſe, that the abſtract ideas they have in their minds, are ſuch as agree to the things exiſting without them, to which they are referred; and are the ſame alſo, to which the names they give them, do by the uſe and propriety of that language belong. For, without this double conformity of their ideas, they find they ſhould both think amiſs of things in themſelves, and talk of them unintelligibly to others.

Simple ideas may be falſe, in reference to others of the ſame name, but are leaſt liable to be ſo.

§ 9. First then, I ſay, that when the truth of our ideas is judged of, by the conformity they have to the ideas which other men have, and commonly ſignify by the ſame name, they may be any of them falſe. But yet ſimple ideas are leaſt of all liable to be ſo miſtaken; becauſe a man, by his ſenſes, and every day's obſervation, may eaſily ſatisfy himſelf, what the ſimple ideas are, which their ſeveral names, that are in common uſe, ſtand for; they being but few in number, and ſuch, as if he doubts or miſtakes in, he may eaſily rectify, by the objects they are to be found in. Therefore it is ſeldom, that any one miſtakes, in his names of ſimple ideas; or applies the name red, to the idea green; or the name ſweet, to the idea bitter: much leſs are men apt to confound the names of ideas, belonging to different ſenſes; and call a colour by the name of a taſte, &c. whereby it is evident, that the ſimple ideas, they call by any name, are commonly the ſame that others have, and mean when they uſe the ſame names.

Ideas of mixed modes moſt liable to be falſe, in this ſenſe.

§ 10. COMPLEX ideas are much more liable to be falſe, in this reſpect; and the complex ideas of mixed modes, much more than thoſe of ſubſtances: becauſe in ſubſtances (eſpecially thoſe, which the common and unborrowed names of any language are applied to) ſome remarkable, ſenſible qualities, ſerving ordinarily to diſtinguiſh one ſort from another, eaſily preſerve thoſe, who take any care in the uſe of their words, from applying them to ſorts of ſubſtances, to which they do not at all belong. But in mixed modes, we are much more uncertain; it being not ſo eaſy to determine of ſeveral actions, whether they are to be called juſtice or cruelty, liberality or prodigality. And ſo, in referring our ideas to thoſe of other men, called by the ſame names, ours may be falſe; and the idea in our minds, which we expreſs by the word juſtice, may perhaps be that, which ought to have another name.

Or at leaſt to be thought falſe.

§ 11. BUT whether or no, our ideas of mixed modes are more liable, than any ſort, to be different from thoſe of other men, which are marked by the ſame names; this at leaſt is certain, that this ſort of falſhood is much more familiarly attributed to our ideas of mixed modes, than to any other. When a man is thought to have a falſe idea of juſtice or gratitude, or glory, it is for no other reaſon, but that his agrees not with the ideas, which each of thoſe names are the ſigns of in other men.

And why.

§ 12. THE reaſon whereof ſeems to me to be this, that the abſtract ideas of mixed modes, being men's voluntary combinations of ſuch a preciſe collection of ſimple ideas; and ſo the eſſence of each ſpecies being made by men alone, whereof we have no other ſenſible ſtandard, exiſting any where, but the name itſelf, or the definition of that name: we have nothing elſe to refer theſe our ideas of mixed modes to, as a ſtandard, to which we would conform them, but the ideas of thoſe who are thought to uſe thoſe names in their moſt proper ſignifications; and ſo, as our ideas conform or differ from them, they paſs for true or falſe. And thus much concerning the truth and falſhood of our ideas, in reference to their names.

As referred to real exiſtences, none of our ideas can be falſe, but thoſe of ſubſtances.

§ 13. SECONDLY, as to the truth and falſhood of our ideas, in reference to the real exiſtence of things, when that is made the ſtandard of their truth, none of them can be termed falſe, but only our complex ideas of ſubſtances.

Firſt, ſimple ideas in this ſenſe not falſe, and why.

§ 14. FIRST, our ſimple ideas being barely ſuch perceptions as God has fitted us to receive, and given power to external objects to produce in us, by eſtabliſhed laws and ways, ſuitable to his wiſdom and goodneſs, tho' incomprehenſible to us, their truth conſiſts in nothing elſe but in ſuch appearances as are produced in us, and muſt be ſuitable to thoſe powers he has placed in external objects, or elſe they could not be produced in us: and thus anſwering thoſe powers, they are what they ſhould be, true ideas. Nor do they become liable to any imputation of falſhood, if the mind (as in moſt men I believe it does) judges theſe ideas to be in the things themſelves. For God, in his wiſdom, having ſet them as marks of diſtinction in things, whereby we may be able to diſcern one thing from another, and ſo chuſe any of them for our uſes, as we have occaſion; it alters not the nature of our ſimple idea, whether we think that the idea of blue be in the violet itſelf, or in our mind only; and only the power of producing it by the texture of its parts, reflecting the particles of light, after a certain manner, to be in the violet itſelf. For that texture in the object, by a regular and conſtant operation, producing the ſame idea of blue in us, it ſerves us to diſtinguiſh, by our eyes, that from any other thing, whether that diſtinguiſhing mark, as it is really in the violet, be only a peculiar texture of parts, or elſe that very colour, the idea whereof (which is in us) is the exact reſemblance. And it is equally from that appearance to be denominated blue, whether it be that real colour, or only a peculiar texture in it, that cauſes in us that idea: ſince the name blue notes properly nothing, but that mark of diſtinction that is in a violet, diſcernible only by our eyes, whatever it conſiſts in, that being beyond our capacities diſtinctly to know, and perhaps would be of leſs uſe to us, if we had faculties to diſcern.

Tho' one man's idea of blue ſhould be different from another's.

§ 15. Neither would it carry any imputation of falſhood to our ſimple ideas, if, by the different ſtructure of our organs, it were ſo ordered, that the ſame object ſhould produce in ſeveral men's minds different ideas at the ſame time; v. g. if the idea, that a violet produced in one man's mind by his eyes, were the ſame that a marigold produced in another man's, and vice verſa. For ſince this could never be known, becauſe one man's mind could not paſs into another man's body, to perceive what appearances were produced by thoſe organs; neither the ideas hereby, nor the names would be at all confounded, or any falſhood be in either. For all things that had the texture of a violet, producing conſtantly the idea which he called blue; and thoſe which had the texture of a marigold, producing conſtantly the idea which he has conſtantly called yellow; whatever thoſe appearances were in his mind, he would be able as regularly to diſtinguiſh things for his uſe, by thoſe appearances, and underſtand and ſignify thoſe diſtinctions, marked by the names blue and yellow, as if the appearances, or ideas in his mind, received from thoſe two flowers, were exactly the ſame with the ideas in other men's minds. I am nevertheleſs very apt to think, that the ſenſible ideas, produced by any object, in different men's minds, are moſt commonly very near and undiſcernibly alike. For which opinion, I think, there might be many reaſons offered: but that being beſides my preſent buſineſs, I ſhall not trouble my reader with them; but only mind him, that the contrary ſuppoſition, if it could be proved, is of little uſe, either for the improvement of our knowledge, or conveniency of life; and ſo we need not trouble ourſelves to examine it.

Firſt, ſimple ideas in this ſenſe not falſe, and why.

§ 16. From what has been ſaid concerning our ſimple ideas, I think it evident that our ſimple ideas can none of them be falſe, in reſpect of things exiſting without us. For the truth of theſe appearances, or perceptions in our minds, conſiſting, as has been ſaid, only in their being anſwerable to the powers in external objects, to produce by our ſenſes ſuch appearances in us; and each of them being in the mind, ſuch as it is, ſuitable to the power that produced it, and which alone it repreſents; it cannot upon that account, or as referred to ſuch a pattern, be falſe. Blue and yellow, bitter or ſweet, can never be falſe ideas; theſe perceptions in the mind are juſt ſuch as they are there, anſwering the powers appointed by God to produce them; and ſo are truly what they are and are intended to be. Indeed the names may be miſapplied; but that in this reſpect makes no falſhood in the ideas: as if a man ignorant in the Engliſh tongue ſhould call purple, ſcarlet.

Secondly, modes not falſe.

§ 17. Secondly, neither can our complex ideas of modes, in reference to the eſſence of any thing really exiſting, be falſe. Becauſe whatever complex idea I have of any mode, it hath no reference to any pattern exiſting, and made by nature: it is not ſuppoſed to contain in it any other ideas than what it hath; nor to repreſent any thing but ſuch a complication of ideas as it does. Thus when I have the idea of ſuch an action of a man, who forbears to afford himſelf ſuch meat, drink, and clothing, and other conveniencies of life as his riches and eſtate will be ſufficient to ſupply, and his ſtation, requires, I have no falſe idea; but ſuch an one as repreſents an action, either as I find, or imagine it; and ſo is capable of neither truth or falſhood. But when I give the name frugality, or virtue to this action, then it may be called a falſe idea, if thereby it be ſuppoſed to agree with that idea, to which, in propriety of ſpeech, the name of frugality doth belong; or to be conformable to that law, which is the ſtandard of virtue and vice.

Thirdly, ideas of ſubſtances, when falſe.

§ 18. Thirdly, our complex ideas of ſubſtances, being all referred to patterns in things themſelves, may be falſe. That they are all falſe, when looked upon as the repreſentations of the unknown eſſences of things, is ſo evident, that there needs nothing to be ſaid of it. I ſhall therefore paſs over that chimerical ſuppoſition, and conſider them as collections of ſimple ideas in the mind, taken from combinations of ſimple ideas, exiſting together conſtantly in things, of which patterns they are the ſuppoſed copies: and in this reference of them, to the exiſtence of things, they are falſe ideas. 1. When they put together ſimple ideas, which in the real exiſtence of things have no union; as when to the ſhape and ſize, that exiſt together in a horſe, is joined in the ſame complex idea, the power of barking like a dog: which three ideas, however put together into one in the mind, were never united in nature; and this therefore may be called a falſe idea of an horſe. 2. Ideas of ſubſtances are, in this reſpect, alſo falſe, when from any collection of ſimple ideas, that do always exiſt together, there is ſeparated, by a direct negation, any other ſimple idea, which is conſtantly joined with them. Thus, if to extenſion, ſolidity, fuſibility, the peculiar weightineſs, and yellow colour of gold, any one join in his thoughts the negation of a greater degree of fixedneſs than is in lead or copper, he may be ſaid to have a falſe, complex idea, as well as when he joins, to thoſe other ſimple ones, the idea of perfect, abſolute fixedneſs. For either way, the complex idea of gold, being made up of ſuch ſimple ones as have no union in nature, may be termed falſe. But, if he leave out of this his complex idea, that of fixedneſs quite, without either actually joining to, or ſeparating of it from the reſt in his mind, it is, I think, to be looked on as an inadequate and imperfect idea rather than a falſe one; ſince, tho' it contains not all the ſimple ideas that are united in nature, yet it puts none together but what do really exiſt together.

Truth or falſhood always ſuppoſes affirmation or negation.

§ 19. THO', in compliance with the ordinary way of ſpeaking, I have ſhewed in what ſenſe, and upon what ground our ideas may be ſometimes called true or falſe; yet if we will look a little nearer into the matter, in all caſes, where any idea is called true or falſe, it is from ſome judgment that the mind makes, or is ſuppoſed to make, that is true or falſe. For truth or falſhood, being never without ſome affirmation or negation, expreſs or tacit, it is not to be found but where ſigns are joined or ſeparated, according to the agreement or diſagreement of the things they ſtand for. The ſigns we chiefly uſe are either ideas, or words, wherewith we make either mental or verbal propoſitions. Truth lies in ſo joining, or ſeparating theſe repreſentatives, as the things, they ſtand for, do in themſelves agree or diſagree; and falſhood in the contrary, as ſhall be more fully ſhewed hereafter.

Ideas, in themſelves, neither true nor falſe.

§ 20. ANY idea then, which we have in our minds whether conformable, or not, to the exiſtence of things, or to any ideas in the minds of other men, cannot properly for this alone be called falſe. For theſe repreſentations, if they have nothing in them, but what is really exiſting in things without, cannot be thought falſe, being exact repreſentations of ſomething: nor yet, if they have any thing in them differing from the reality of things, can they properly be ſaid to be falſe repreſentations, or ideas of things they do not repreſent, but the miſtake and falſhood is,

But are falſe, 1. When judged agreeable to another man's idea, without being ſo.

§ 21. FIRST, when the mind, having any idea, it judges and concludes it the ſame that is in other men's minds, ſignified by the ſame name; or that it is conformable to the ordinary, received ſignification, or definition of that word, when indeed it is not: which is the moſt uſual miſtake in mixed modes, tho' other ideas alſo are liable to it.

2. When judged to agree to real exiſtence, when they do not.

§ 22. SECONDLY, when it having a complex idea, made up of ſuch a collection of ſimple ones, as nature never puts together, it judges it to agree to a ſpecies of creatures, really exiſting; as when it joins the weight of tin, to the colour, fuſibility, and fixedneſs of gold.

3. When judged adequate without being ſo.

§ 23. THIRDLY, when, in its complex idea, it has united a certain number of ſimple ideas, that do really exiſt together in ſome ſort of creatures, but has alſo left out others, as much inſeparable, it judges this to be a perfect, compleat idea of a ſort of things, which really it is not; v. g. having joined the ideas of ſubſtance, yellow, malleable, moſt heavy, and fuſible, it takes that complex idea to be the compleat idea of gold, when yet its peculiar fixedneſs and ſolubility in aqua regia are as inſeparable from thoſe other ideas, or qualities of that body, as they are one from another.

4. When judged to repreſent the real eſſence.

§ 24. FOURTHLY, the miſtake is yet greater, when I judge that this complex idea, contains in it the real eſſence of any body exiſting; when at leaſt it contains but ſome few of thoſe properties, which flow from its real eſſence and conſtitution. I ſay, only ſome few of thoſe properties; for thoſe properties conſiſting moſtly in the active and paſſive powers it has, in reference to other things, all that are vulgarly known of any one body, and of which the complex idea of that kind of things is uſually made, are but a very few, in compariſon of what a man, that has ſeveral ways tried and examined it, knows of that one ſort of things; and all that the moſt expert man knows, are but few, in compariſon of what are really in that body, and depend on its internal, or eſſential conſtitution. The eſſence of a triangle lies in a very little compaſs, conſiſts in a very few ideas; three lines, including a ſpace, make up that eſſence: but the properties, that flow from this eſſence, are more than can be eaſily known, or enumerated. So I imagine it is in ſubſtances, their real eſſences lie in a little compaſs; tho' the properties flowing from that internal conſtitution are endleſs.

Ideas, when falſe.

§ 25. To conclude, a man having no notion of any thing without him, but by the idea he has of it in his mind (which idea he has a power to call by what name he pleaſes) he may, indeed, make an idea neither anſwering the reaſon of things, nor agreeing to the ideas commonly ſignified by other people's words; but cannot make a wrong, or falſe idea of a thing, which is no otherwiſe known to him, but by the idea he has of it: v. g. when I frame an idea of the legs, arms, and body of a man, and join to this a horſe's head and neck, I do not make a falſe idea of any thing; becauſe it repreſents nothing without me. But when I call it a man or Tartar, and imagine it either to repreſent ſome real being without me, or to be the ſame idea that others call by the ſame name; in either of theſe caſes I may err. And upon this account it is, that it comes to be termed a falſe idea; tho' indeed the falſhood lies not in the idea, but in that tacit, mental propoſition, wherein a conformity and reſemblance is attributed to it, which it has not. But yet, if having framed ſuch an idea in my mind, without thinking either that exiſtence, or the name man, or Tartar, belongs to it, I will call it man, or Tartar, I may be juſtly thought fantaſtical in the naming, but not erroneous in my judgment; nor the idea any way falſe.

More properly to be called right, or wrong.

§ 26. Upon the whole matter, I think, that our ideas, as they are conſidered by the mind, either in reference to the proper ſignification of their names, or in reference to the reality of things, may very fitly be called right, or wrong ideas, according as they agree, or diſagree, to thoſe patterns to which they are referred. But if any one had rather call them true, or falſe, it is fit he uſe a liberty, which every one has, to call things by thoſe names he thinks beſt; though in propriety of ſpeech, truth or falſhood, will, I think, ſcarce agree to them, but as they, ſome way or other, virtually contain in them ſome mental propoſition. The ideas, that are in a man's mind, ſimply conſidered, cannot be wrong, unleſs complex ones, wherein inconſiſtent parts are jumbled together. All other ideas are in themſelves right, and the knowledge about them right and true knowledge: but when we come to refer them to any thing, as to their patterns and archetypes, then they are capable of being wrong, as far as they diſagree with ſuch archetypes.

CHAP. XXXIII.

Of the aſſociation of ideas.

Chap. XXXIII.

Something unreaſonable in moſt men.

§ 1. THERE is ſcarce any one that does not obſerve ſomething that ſeems odd to him, and is in itſelf really extravagant in the opinions, reaſonings, and actions of other men. The leaſt flaw of this kind, if at all different from his own, every one is quick-ſighted enough to eſpy in another, and will, by the authority of reaſon, forwardly condemn, tho' he be guilty of much greater unreaſonableneſs in his own tenets and conduct, which he never perceives, and will very hardly, if at all, be convinced of.

Nor wholly from ſelf-love.

§ 2. THIS proceeds not wholly from ſelf-love, tho' that has oſten a great hand in it. Men of fair minds, and not given up to the over-weening of ſelf-flattery, are frequently guilty of it: and in many caſes, one with amazement hears the arguings, and is aſtoniſhed at the obſtinacy of a worthy man, who yields not to the evidence of reaſon, tho' laid before him as clear as day-light.

Not from education.

§ 3. THIS ſort of unreaſonableneſs is uſually imputed to education and prejudice, and for the moſt part truly enough, tho' that reaches not the bottom of the diſeaſe, nor ſhews diſtinctly enough whence it riſes, or wherein it lies. Education is often rightly aſſigned for the cauſe, and prejudice is a good general name for the thing itſelf: but yet, I think, he ought to look a little farther, who would trace this ſort of madneſs to the root it ſprings from, and ſo explain it, as to ſhew, whence this flaw has its original, in very ſober and rational minds, and wherein it conſiſts.

A degree of madneſs.

§ 4. I SHALL be pardoned for calling it by ſo harſh a name as madneſs, when it is conſidered, that oppoſition to reaſon deſerves that name, and is really madneſs; and there is ſcarce a man ſo free from it, but that, if he ſhould always, on all occaſions, argue, or do, as in ſome caſes he conſtantly does, would not be thought fitter for Bedlam, than civil converſation. I do not here mean when he is under the power of an unruly paſſion, but in the ſteady, calm courſe of his life. That which will yet more apologize for this harſh name, and ungrateful imputation on the greateſt part of mankind, is that enquiring a little by the by into the nature of madneſs, B. ii. c. xi. § 13. I found it to ſpring from the very ſame root, and depend on the very ſame cauſe, we are here ſpeaking of. This conſideration of the thing itſelf, at a time when I thought not the leaſt on the ſubject, which I am now treating of, ſuggeſted it to me. And if this be a weakneſs, to which all men are ſo liable; if this be a taint, which ſo univerſally infects mankind, the greater care ſhould be taken to lay it open, under its due name, thereby to excite the greater care in its prevention and cure.

From a wrong connection of ideas.

§ 5. SOME of our ideas have a natural correſpondence and connection one with another: it is the office and excellency of our reaſon to trace theſe, and hold them together, in that union and correſpondence, which is founded in their peculiar beings. Beſides this, there is another connection of ideas wholly owing to chance, or cuſtom: ideas that in themſelves are not at all of kin, come to be ſo united in ſome men's minds, that it is very hard to ſeparate them, they always keep in company, and the one no ſooner at any time comes into the underſtanding, but its aſſociate appears with it; and if they are more than two, which are thus united, the whole gang, always inſeparable, ſhew themſelves together.

This connection, how made.

§ 6. THIS ſtrong combination of ideas, not allied by nature, the mind makes in itſelf, either voluntarily, or by chance; and hence it comes in different men to be very different, according to their different inclinations, education, intereſts, &c. Cuſtom ſettles habits of thinking in the underſtanding, as well as of determining in the will, and of motions in the body; all which ſeems to be but trains of motion in the animal ſpirits, which once ſet a going, continue in the ſame ſteps they have been uſed to; which, by often treading, are worn into a ſmooth path, and the motion in it becomes eaſy, and, as it were, natural. As far as we can comprehend thinking, thus ideas ſeem to be produced in our minds; or if they are not, this may ſerve to explain their following one another, in an habitual train, when once they are put into that track, as well as it does to explain ſuch motions of the body. A muſician uſed to any tune, will find, that let it but once begin in his head, the ideas of the ſeveral notes of it will follow one another, orderly in his underſtanding, without any care or attention, as regularly as his fingers move orderly over the keys of the organ to play out the tune he has begun, tho' his unattentive thoughts be elſewhere a wandring. Whether the natural cauſe of theſe ideas, as well as of that regular dancing of his fingers, be the motion of his animal ſpirits, I will not determine, how probable ſoever, by this inſtance, it appears to be ſo: but this may help us a little to conceive of intellectual habits, and of the tying together of ideas.

Some antipathies, an effect of it.

§ 7. That there are ſuch aſſociations of them, made by cuſtom in the minds of moſt men, I think no body will queſtion, who has well conſidered himſelf, or others; and to this, perhaps, might be juſtly attributed moſt of the ſympathies and antipathies obſervable in men, which work as ſtrongly, and produce as regular effects, as if they were natural, and are therefore called ſo, tho' they at firſt had no other original but the accidental connection of two ideas, which either the ſtrength of the firſt impreſſion, or future indulgence ſo united, that they always afterwards kept company together in that man's mind, as if they were but one idea. I ſay moſt of the antipathies, I do not ſay all, for ſome of them are truly natural, depend upon our original conſtitution, and are born with us; but a great part of thoſe, which are counted natural, would have been known to be from unheeded, tho', perhaps, early impreſſions, or wanton fancies at firſt, which would have been acknowledged the original of them, if they had been warily obſerved. A grown perſon ſurſeiting with honey, no ſooner hears the name of it, but his fancy immediately carries ſickneſs and qualms to his ſtomach, and he cannot bear the very idea of it; other ideas of diſlike, and ſickneſs, and vomiting, preſently accompany it, and he is diſturbed, but he knows from whence to date this weakneſs, and can tell how he got this indiſpoſition. Had this happened to him by an over-doſe of honey, when a child, all the ſame effects would have followed, but the cauſe would have been miſtaken, and the antipathy counted natural.

§ 8. I mention this, not out of any great neceſſity there is in this preſent argument, to diſtinguiſh nicely between natural and acquired antipathies; but I take notice of it for another purpoſe, viz. that thoſe who have children, or the charge of their education, would think it worth their while diligently to watch, and carefully to prevent the undue connection of ideas in the minds of young people. This is the time moſt ſuſceptible of laſting impreſſions; and tho' thoſe, relating to the health of the body, are by diſcreet people minded and fenced againſt; yet I am apt to doubt, that thoſe, which relate more peculiarly to the mind, and terminate in the underſtanding, or paſſions, have been much leſs heeded than the thing deſerves: nay, thoſe relating purely to the undeſtanding, have, as I ſuſpect, been by moſt men wholly overlooked.

A great cauſe of errors.

§ 9. This wrong connection in our minds, of ideas, in themſelves, looſe and independent one of another, has ſuch an influence, and is of ſo great force to ſet us awry in our actions, as well moral as natural, paſſions, reaſonings and notions themſelves, that, perhaps, there is not any one thing, that deſerves more to be looked after.

Inſtances.

§ 10. The ideas of goblins and ſprights, have really no more to do with darkneſs, than light; yet let but a fooliſh maid inculcate theſe often on the mind of a child, and raiſe them there together, poſſibly he ſhall never be able to ſeparate them again ſo long as he lives: but darkneſs ſhall ever afterwards bring with it thoſe frightful ideas, and they ſhall be ſo joined, that he can no more bear the one than the other.

§ 11. A man receives a ſenſible injury from another, thinks on the man and that action over and over; and by ruminating on them ſtrongly, or much in his mind, ſo cements thoſe two ideas together, that he makes them almoſt one; never thinks on the man, but the pain and diſpleaſure, he ſuffered, comes into his mind with it, ſo that he ſcarce diſtinguiſhes them, but has as much an averſion for the one as the other. Thus hatreds are often begotten, from ſlight and almoſt innocent occaſions, and quarrels propagated and continued in the world.

§ 12. A man has ſuffered pain, or ſickneſs, in any place, he ſaw his friend die in ſuch a room; tho' theſe have in nature nothing to do one with another, yet, when the idea of the place occurs to his mind, it brings (the impreſſion being once made) that of the pain and diſpleaſure with it; he confounds them in his mind, and can as little bear the one as the other.

Why time cures ſome diſorders in the mind, which reaſon cannot.

§ 13. When this combination is ſettled, and while it laſts, it is not in the power of reaſon to help us, and relieve us from the effects of it. Ideas in our minds, when they are there, will operate according to their natures and circumſtances; and here we ſee the cauſe why time cures certain affections, which

reaſon,

reaſon, tho' in the right, and allowed to be ſo, has not power over, nor is able againſt them to prevail with thoſe, who are apt to hearken to it in other caſes. The death of a child, that was the daily delight of his mother's eyes, and joy of her ſoul, rends from her heart the whole comfort of her life, and gives her all the torment imaginable: uſe the conſolations of reaſon in this caſe, and you were as good preach eaſe to one on the rack, and hope to allay, by rational diſcourſes, the pain of his joints tearing aſunder. Till time has, by diſuſe, ſeparated the ſenſe of that enjoyment, and its loſs, from the idea of the child returning to her memory, all repreſentations, tho' ever ſo reaſonable, are in vain; and therefore ſome, in whom the union between theſe ideas is never diſſolved, ſpend their lives in mourning, and carry an incurable ſorrow to their graves.

Farther inſtances of the effects of the aſſociation of ideas.

§ 14. A FRIEND of mine knew one perfectly cured of madneſs by a very harſh and offenſive operation. The gentleman, who was thus recovered, with great ſenſe of gratitude and acknowledgment, owned the cure all his life after, as the greateſt obligation he could have received; but, whatever gratitude and reaſon ſuggeſted to him, he could never bear the ſight of the operator: that image brought back with it the idea of that agony, which he ſuffered from his hands, which was too mighty and intolerable for him to endure.

§ 15. MANY children imputing the pain, they endure at ſchool, to their books they were corrected for, ſo join thoſe ideas together, that a book becomes their averſion, and they are never reconciled to the ſtudy and uſe of them all their lives after; and thus reading becomes a torment to them, which otherwiſe, poſſibly, they might have made the great pleaſure of their lives. There are rooms convenient enough, that ſome men cannot ſtudy in, and faſhions of veſſels, which, tho' ever ſo clean and commodious, they cannot drink out of, and that, by reaſon of ſome accidental ideas which are annexed to them, and make them offenſive: and who is there that hath not obſerved ſome man to flag at the appearance, or in the company of ſome certain perſon, not otherwiſe ſuperior to him, but becauſe having once, on ſome occaſion, got the aſcendant, the idea of authority and diſtance goes along with that of the perſon, and he, that has been thus ſubjected, is not able to ſeparate them?

§ 16. INSTANCES of this kind are ſo plentiful every where, that, if I add one more, it is only for the pleaſant oddneſs of it. It is of a young gentleman, who having learnt to dance, and that to great perfection, there happened to ſtand an old trunk in the room, where he learnt. The idea of this remarkable piece of houſhold ſtuff, had ſo mixed itſelf with the turns and ſteps of all his dances, that, tho' in that chamber he could dance excellently well, yet it was only whilſt that trunk was there; nor could he perform well in any other place, unleſs that, or ſome ſuch other trunk, had its due poſition in the room. If this ſtory ſhall be ſuſpected to be dreſſed up with ſome comical circumſtances, a little beyond preciſe nature; I anſwer for my ſelf, that I had it ſome years ſince from a very ſober and worthy man, upon his own knowledge, as I report it; and I dare ſay, there are very few inquiſitive perſons, who read this, who have not met with accounts, if not examples of this nature, that may parallel, or, at leaſt, juſtify this.

Its influence on intellectual habits.

§ 17. INTELLECTUAL habits and defects this way contracted, are not leſs frequent and powerful, tho' leſs obſerved. Let the ideas of being and matter be ſtrongly joined, either by education, or much thought, whilſt theſe are ſtill combined in the mind, what notions, what reaſonings, will there be about ſeparate ſpirits? Let cuſtom, from the very childhood, have joined figure and ſhape to the idea of God, and what abſurdities will that mind be liable to about the deity?

LET the idea of infallibility be inſeparably joined to any perſon, and theſe two conſtantly together poſſeſs the mind; and then one body, in two places at once, ſhall, unexamined, be ſwallowed for a certain truth, by an implicit faith, whenever that imagined, infallible perſon dictates, and demands aſſent without inquiry.

Obſervable in different ſects.

§ 18. SOME ſuch wrong and unnatural combinations of ideas will be found to eſtabliſh the irreconcileable oppoſition between different ſects of philoſophy and religion; for we cannot imagine every one of their followers to impoſe wilfully on himſelf, and knowingly refuſe truth, offered by plain reaſon. Intereſt, tho' it does a great deal in the caſe, yet cannot be thought to work whole ſocieties of men to ſo univerſal a perverſeneſs, as that every one of them, to a man, ſhould knowingly maintain falſhood: ſome, at leaſt, muſt be allowed to do what all pretend to, i. e. to purſue truth ſincerely; and, therefore, there muſt be ſomething that blinds their underſtandings, and makes them not ſee the falſhood of what they embrace for real truth. That, which thus captivates their reaſons, and leads men of ſincerity, blindfold from common ſenſe, will, when examined, be found to be, what we are ſpeaking of: ſome independent ideas, of no alliance to one another, are, by education, cuſtom, and the conſtant din of their party, ſo coupled in their minds, that they always appear there together; and they can no more ſeparate them in their thoughts, than if they were but one idea, and they operate as if they were ſo. This gives ſenſe to jargon, demonſtration to abſurdities, and conſiſtency to nonſenſe, and is the foundation of the greateſt, I had almoſt ſaid, of all the errors in the world; or, if it does not reach ſo far, it is at leaſt the moſt dangerous one, ſince ſo far as it obtains, it hinders men from ſeeing and examining. When two things in themſelves disjoined, appear to the ſight conſtantly united; if the eye ſees theſe things riveted, which are looſe, where will you begin to rectify the miſtakes that follow in two ideas, that they have been accuſtomed ſo to join in their minds, as to ſubſtitute one for the other, and, as I am apt to think, often, without perceiving it themſelves? This, whilſt they are under the deceit of it, makes them uncapable of conviction, and they applaud themſelves as zealous champions for truth, when, indeed, they are contending for error; and the confuſion of two different ideas, which a cuſtomary connection of them in their minds hath to them made in effect but one, fills their heads with falſe views, and their reaſonings with falſe conſequences.

Concluſion.

§ 19. HAVING thus given an account of the original, ſorts and extent of our ideas, with ſeveral other conſiderations, about theſe (I know not whether I may ſay) inſtruments, or materials of our knowledge; the method I at firſt propoſed to myſelf, would now require, that I ſhould immediately proceed to ſhew what uſe the underſtanding makes of them, and what knowledge we have by them. This was that which, in the firſt general view I had of this ſubject, was all that I thought I ſhould have to do: but upon a nearer approach, I find that there is ſo cloſe a connection between ideas and words; and our abſtract ideas, and general words have ſo conſtant a relation one to another, that it is impoſſible to ſpeak clearly and diſtinctly of our knowledge, which all conſiſts in propoſitions, without conſidering, firſt, the nature, uſe and ſignification of language; which therefore muſt be the buſineſs of the next book.

BOOK III.

CHAP. I.

Of words, or language in general.

CHAP. I.

Man fitted to form articulate ſounds.

§ 1. GOD, having deſigned man for a ſociable creature, made him not only with an inclination, and under a neceſſity to have fellowſhip with thoſe of his own kind; but furniſhed him alſo with language, which was to be the great inſtrument and common tie of ſociety. Man, therefore, had by nature his organs ſo faſhioned, as to be fit to frame articulate ſounds, which we call words. But this was not enough to produce language; for parrots, and ſeveral other birds, will be taught to make articulate ſounds, diſtinct enough, which yet, by no means, are capable of language.

To make them ſigns of ideas.

§ 2. BESIDES articulate ſounds therefore, it was farther neceſſary, that he ſhould be able to uſe theſe ſounds as ſigns of internal conceptions; and to make them ſtand as marks for the ideas, within his own mind, whereby they might be made known to others, and the thoughts of men's minds be conveyed from one to another.

To make general ſigns.

§ 3. BUT neither was this ſufficient to make words ſo uſeful, as they ought to be. It is not enough for the perfection of language, that ſounds can be made ſigns of ideas, unleſs thoſe ſigns can be ſo made uſe of, as to comprehend ſeveral particular things: for the multiplication of words would have perplexed their uſe, had every particular thing need of a diſtinct name, to be ſignified by. To remedy this inconvenience, language had yet a farther improvement, in the uſe of general terms, whereby one word was made to mark a multitude of particular exiſtences: which advantageous uſe of ſounds was obtained only, by the difference of the ideas, they were made ſigns of; thoſe names becoming general, which are made to ſtand for general ideas, and thoſe remaining particular, where the ideas, they are uſed for, are particular.

§ 4. BESIDES theſe names, which ſtand for ideas, there be other words which men make uſe of, not to ſignify any idea, but the want, or abſence of ſome ideas, ſimple or complex, or all ideas together; ſuch as are nihil in Latin, and in Engliſh, ignorance and barrenneſs. All which negative, or privative words, cannot be ſaid properly to belong to, or ſignify, no ideas: for then they would be perfectly inſignificant ſounds; but they relate to poſitive ideas, and ſignify their abſence.

Words, ultimately derived from ſuch as ſignify ſenſible ideas.

§ 5. IT may alſo lead us a little towards the original of all our notions and knowledge, if we remark, how great a dependence our words have on common, ſenſible ideas; and how thoſe, which are made uſe of, to ſtand for actions and notions, quite removed from ſenſe, have their riſe from thence, and from obvious, ſenſible ideas are transferred to more abſtruſe ſignifications, and made to ſtand for ideas, that come not under the cognizance of our ſenſes; v. g. to imagine, apprehend, comprehend, adhere, conceive, inſtil, diſguſt, diſturbance, tranquillity, &c. are all words taken from the operations of ſenſible things, and applied to certain modes of thinking. Spirit, in its primary ſignification, is breath; angel, a meſſenger: and I doubt not, but, if we could trace them to their ſources, we ſhould find, in all languages, the names, which ſtand for things, that fall not under our ſenſes, to have had their firſt riſe from ſenſible ideas. By which we may give ſome kind of gueſs, what kind of notions they were, and whence derived, which filled their minds, who were the firſt beginners of languages; and how nature, even in the naming of things, unawares ſuggeſted to men the originals and principles of all their knowledge: whilſt, to give names, that might make known to others, any operations they felt in themſelves, or any other ideas, that came not under their ſenſes, they were fain to borrow words from ordinary, known ideas of ſenſation, by that means to make others the more eaſily to conceive thoſe operations, they experimented in themſelves, which made no outward ſenſible appearances: and then when they had got known and agreed names, to ſignify thoſe internal operations of their own minds, they were ſufficiently furniſhed to make known by words all their other ideas; ſince they could conſiſt of nothing, but either of outward, ſenſible perceptions, or of the inward operations of their minds about them: we having, as has been proved, no ideas at all, but what originally come either from ſenſible objects without, or what we feel within ourſelves, from the inward workings of our own ſpirits, of which we are conſcious to ourſelves within.

Diſtribution

§ 6. BUT to underſtand better the uſe and force of language, as ſubſervient to inſtruction and knowledge, it will be convenient to conſider,

FIRST, to what it is that names, in the uſe of language, are immediately applied.

SECONDLY, ſince all (except proper) names are general, and ſo ſtand not particularly, for this or that ſingle thing, but for ſorts and ranks of things; it will be neceſſary to conſider, in the next place, what the ſorts and kinds, or, if you rather like the Latin names, what the ſpecies and genera of things are; wherein they conſiſt, and how they come to be made. Theſe being (as they ought) well looked into, we ſhall the better come to find the right uſe of words, the natural advantages and defects of language, and the remedies, that ought to be uſed, to avoid the inconveniences of obſcurity, or uncertainty in the ſignification of words, without which it is impoſſible to diſcourſe with any clearneſs, or order, concerning knowledge: which, being converſant about propoſitions, and thoſe moſt commonly univerſal ones, has greater connection with words than perhaps is ſuſpected.

These conſiderations therefore ſhall be the matter of the following chapters.

CHAP. II.

Of the ſignification of words.

Chap. II.

Words are ſenſible ſigns, neceſſary for communication.

§ 1. MAN, tho' he has great variety of thoughts, and ſuch, from which others, as well as himſelf, might receive profit and delight; yet they are all within his own breaſt, inviſible, and hidden from others, nor can of themſelves be made appear. The comfort and advantage of ſociety not being to be had without communication of thoughts, it was neceſſary that man ſhould find out ſome external, ſenſible ſigns, whereby thoſe inviſible ideas, which his thoughts are made up of, might be made known to others. For this purpoſe nothing was ſo fit, either for plenty, or quickneſs, as thoſe articulate ſounds, which with ſo much eaſe and variety he found himſelf able to make. Thus we may conceive how words, which were by nature ſo well adapted to that purpoſe, come to be made uſe of by men, as the ſigns of their ideas; not by any natural connection that there is between particular, articulate ſounds and certain ideas, for then there would be but one language amongſt all men; but by a voluntary impoſition, whereby ſuch a word is made arbitrarily the mark of ſuch an idea. The uſe, then, of words is to be ſenſible marks of ideas; and the ideas they ſtand for, are their proper and immediate ſignification.

Words are the ſenſible ſigns of his ideas, who uſes them

§ 2. The uſe men have of theſe marks, being either to record their own thoughts, for the aſſiſtance of their own memory, or, as it were, to bring out their ideas, and lay them before the view of others; words, in their primary or immediate ſignification, ſtand for nothing, but the ideas in the mind of him that uſes them, how imperfectly ſoever, or careleſly thoſe ideas are collected from things, which they are ſuppoſed to repreſent. When a man ſpeaks to another, it is that he may be underſtood, and the end of ſpeech is, that thoſe ſounds, as marks, may make known his ideas to the hearer. That then which words are the marks of, are the ideas of the ſpeaker: nor can any one apply them, as marks, immediately to any thing elſe, but the ideas, that he himſelf hath. For this would be to make them ſigns of his own conceptions, and yet apply them to other ideas; which would be to make them ſigns, and not ſigns, of his ideas, at the ſame time; and ſo, in effect, to have no ſignification at all. Words being voluntary ſigns, they cannot be voluntary ſigns, impoſed by him on things he knows not. That would be to make them ſigns of nothing, ſounds without ſignification. A man cannot make his words the ſigns either of qualities in things, or of conceptions in the mind of another, whereof he has none in his own. Until he has ſome ideas of his own, he cannot ſuppoſe them to correſpond with the conceptions of another man; nor can he uſe any ſigns for them: for thus they would be the ſigns of he knows not what, which is in truth to be the ſigns of nothing. But, when he repreſents to himſelf other men's ideas by ſome of his own, if he conſent to give them the ſame names that other men do, it is ſtill to his own ideas; to ideas that he has, and not to ideas that he has not.

§ 3. This is ſo neceſſary in the uſe of language, that in this reſpect the knowing and the ignorant, the learned and the unlearned, uſe the words they ſpeak (with any meaning) all alike. They, in every man's mouth, ſtand for the ideas he has, and which he would expreſs by them. A child having taken notice of nothing in the metal he hears called gold, but the bright, ſhining, yellow colour, he applies the word gold only to his own idea of that colour, and nothing elſe; and therefore calls the ſame colour in a peacock's tail, gold. Another, that hath better obſerved, adds to ſhining yellow, great weight: and then the ſound gold, when he uſes it, ſtands for a complex idea of a ſhining, yellow, and very weighty ſubſtance. Another adds to thoſe qualities, fuſibility: and then the word gold to him, ſignifies a body, bright, yellow, fuſible, and very heavy. Another adds malleability: each of theſe uſes equally the word gold, when they have occaſion to expreſs the idea, which they have applied it to: but it is evident, that each can apply it only to his own idea; nor can he make it ſtand as a ſign of ſuch complex ideas as he has not.

Words often ſecretly referred, firſt, to the ideas in other men's minds.

§ 4. BUT tho' words, as they are uſed by men, can properly and immediately ſignify nothing, but the ideas that are in the mind of the ſpeaker; yet they, in their thoughts, give them a ſecret reference to two other things.

FIRST, they ſuppoſe their words to be marks of the ideas in the minds alſo of other men, with whom they communicate: for elſe they ſhould talk in vain, and could not be underſtood, if the ſounds they applied to one idea, were ſuch as by the hearer were applied to another, which is to ſpeak two languages. But in this, men ſtand not uſually to examine, whether the idea they, and thoſe they diſcourſe with, have in their minds, be the ſame: but think it enough that they uſe the word, as they imagine, in the common acceptation of that language: in which they ſuppoſe, that the idea they make it a ſign of, is preciſely the ſame, to which the underſtanding men of that country apply that name.

Secondly, to the reality of things.

§ 5. SECONDLY, becauſe men would not be thought to talk barely of their own imaginations, but of things, as really they are: therefore they often ſuppoſe their words to ſtand alſo for the reality of things. But this relating more particularly to ſubſtances, and their names, as perhaps the former does to ſimple ideas and modes, we ſhall ſpeak of theſe two different ways of applying words, more at large, when we come to treat of the names of mixed modes, and ſubſtances in particular: tho' give me leave here to ſay, that it is a perverting the uſe of words, and brings unavoidable obſcurity and confuſion into their ſignification, whenever we make them ſtand for any thing, but thoſe ideas we have in our own minds.

Words, by uſe, readily excite ideas.

§ 6. CONCERNING words alſo it is farther to be conſidered: firſt, that they being immediately the ſigns of men's ideas, and by that means the inſtruments, whereby men communicate their conceptions, and expreſs to one another thoſe thoughts and imaginations, they have within their own breaſts; there comes, by conſtant uſe, to be ſuch a connection between certain ſounds, and the ideas they ſtand for, that the names heard, almoſt as readily excite certain ideas, as if the objects themſelves, which are apt to produce them, did actually affect the ſenſes. Which is manifeſtly ſo in all obvious, ſenſible qualities; and in all ſubſtances, that frequently and familiarly occur to us.

Words often uſed without ſignification.

§ 7. SECONDLY, that tho' the proper and immediate ſignification of words are ideas, in the mind of the ſpeaker, yet, becauſe by familiar uſe from our cradles we come to learn certain articulate ſounds very perfectly, and have them readily in our tongues, and always at hand in our memories, but yet are not always careful to examine, or ſettle their ſignifications perfectly; it often happens that men, even when they would apply themſelves to an attentive conſideration, do ſet their thoughts more on words, than things. Nay, becauſe words are many of them learned, before the ideas are known, for which they ſtand; therefore ſome, not only children, but men, ſpeak ſeveral words, no otherwiſe than parrots do, only becauſe they have learned them, and have been accuſtomed to thoſe ſounds. But ſo far as words are of uſe and ſignification, ſo far is there a conſtant connection between the ſound and the idea, and a deſignation that the one ſtand for the other; without which application of them they are nothing, but ſo much inſignificant noiſe.

Their ſignification, perfectly arbitrary.

§ 8. WORDS, by long and familiar uſe, as has been ſaid, come to excite in men certain ideas, ſo conſtantly and readily, that they are apt to ſuppoſe a natural connection between them. But that they ſignify only men's peculiar ideas, and that by a perfectly arbitrary impoſition, is evident, in that they often fail to excite in others (even that uſe the ſame language) the ſame ideas we take them to be the ſigns of: and every man has ſo inviolable a liberty, to make words ſtand for what ideas he pleaſes, that no one hath the power to make others have the ſame ideas in their minds, that he has, when they uſe the ſame words that he does. And therefore, the great Auguſtus himſelf, in the poſſeſſion of that power which ruled the world, acknowledged he could not make a new Latin word: which was as much as to ſay, that he could not arbitrarily appoint what idea any ſound ſhould be a ſign of, in the mouths and common language of his ſubjects. It is true, common uſe, by a tacit conſent, appropriates certain ſounds to certain ideas, in all languages, which ſo far limits the ſignification of that ſound, that, unleſs a man applies it to the ſame idea, he does not ſpeak properly: and let me add, that unleſs a man's words excite the ſame ideas in the hearer, which he makes them ſtand for in ſpeaking, he does not ſpeak intelligibly. But, whatever be the conſequence of any man's uſing of words differently, either from their general meaning, or the particular ſenſe of the perſon to whom he addreſſes them, this is certain, their ſignification, in his uſe of them, is limited to his ideas, and they can be ſigns of nothing elſe.

CHAP. III.

Of general terms.

Chap. III.

The greateſt part of words, general.

§ 1. ALL things that exiſt being particulars, it may, perhaps, be thought reaſonable that words, which ought to be conformed to things, ſhould be ſo too; I mean in their ſignification: but yet we find the quite contrary. The far greateſt part of words, that make all languages, are general terms; which has not been the effect of neglect, or chance, but of reaſon and neceſſity.

For every particular thing to have a name, is impoſſible.

§ 2. First, that it is impoſſible that every particular thing ſhould have a diſtinct peculiar name. For the ſignification and uſe of words, depending on that connection, which the mind makes between its ideas and the ſounds it uſes as ſigns of them, it is neceſſary, in the application of names to things, that the mind ſhould have diſtinct ideas of the things, and retain alſo the particular name that belongs to every one, with its peculiar appropriation to that idea. But it is beyond the power of human capacity to frame, and retain diſtinct ideas of all the particular things we meet with: every bird, and beaſt men ſaw, every tree and plant that affected the ſenſes, could not find a place in the moſt capacious underſtanding. If it be looked on as an inſtance of a prodigious memory, that ſome generals have been able to call every ſoldier in their army by his proper name; we may eaſily find a reaſon, why men have never attempted to give names to each ſheep in their flock, or crow that flies over their heads; much leſs to call every leaf of plants, or grain of ſand, that came in their way, by a peculiar name.

And uſeleſs.

§ 3. Secondly, if it were poſſible, it would yet be uſeleſs; becauſe it would not ſerve to the chief end of language. Men would in vain heap up names of particular things, that would not ſerve them to communicate their thoughts. Men learn names, and uſe them in talk with others, only that they may be underſtood: which is then only done, when, by uſe, or conſent, the ſound I make, by the organs of ſpeech, excites in another man's mind, who hears it, the idea I apply it to in mine, when I ſpeak it. This cannot be done by names applied to particular things, whereof I alone having the ideas in my mind, the names of them could not be ſignificant, or intelligible to another, who was not acquainted with all thoſe very particular things, which had fallen under my notice.

§ 4. Thirdly, but yet granting this alſo feaſible (which I think is not) yet a diſtinct name for every particular thing would not be of any great uſe, for the improvement of knowledge: which, tho' founded in particular things, enlarges

larges itſelf by general views; to which, things reduced into ſorts under general names, are properly ſubſervient. Theſe, with the names belonging to them, come within ſome compaſs, and do not multiply every moment, beyond what either the mind can contain, or uſe requires: and therefore, in theſe, men have, for the moſt part, ſtopped; but yet not ſo as to hinder themſelves from diſtinguiſhing particular things, by appropriated names, where convenience demands it. And, therefore, in their own ſpecies, which they have moſt to do with, and wherein they have often occaſion to mention particular perſons, they make uſe of proper names; and there diſtinct individuals have diſtinct denominations.

What things have proper names.

§ 5. Besides perſons, countries alſo, cities, rivers, mountains, and other the like diſtinctions of place, have uſually found peculiar names, and that for the ſame reaſon; they being ſuch, as men have often an occaſion to mark particularly, and, as it were, ſet before others, in their diſcourſes with them. And I doubt not, but if we had reaſon to mention particular horſes, as often as we have to mention particular men, we ſhould have proper names for the one, as familiar as for the other, and Bucephalus would be a word as much in uſe, as Alexander. And therefore we ſee that amongſt jockeys, horſes have their proper names, to be known and diſtinguiſhed by, as commonly as their ſervants; becauſe, amongſt them, there is often occaſion to mention this, or that particular horſe, when he is out of ſight.

How general words are made.

§ 6. The next thing to be conſidered, is, how general words come to be made. For ſince all things that exiſt, are only particulars, how come we by general terms, or where find we thoſe general natures they are ſuppoſed to ſtand for? Words become general, by being made the ſigns of general ideas; and ideas become general, by ſeparating from them the circumſtances of time, and place, and any other ideas, that may determine them to this, or that particular exiſtence. By this way of abſtraction, they are made capable of repreſenting more individuals than one; each of which, having in it a conformity to that abſtract idea, is (as we call it) of that ſort.

§ 7. But to deduce this a little more diſtinctly, it will not, perhaps, be amiſs to trace our notions and names from their beginning, and obſerve by what degrees we proceed, and by what ſteps we enlarge our ideas, from our firſt infancy. There is nothing more evident, than that the ideas of the perſons children converſe with (to inſtance in them alone) are like the perſons themſelves, only particular. The ideas of the nurſe, and the mother, are well framed in their minds; and, like pictures of them there, repreſent only thoſe individuals. The names they firſt gave to them, are confined to theſe individuals; and the names of nurſe and mamma, the child uſes, determine themſelves to thoſe perſons. Afterwards, when time and a larger acquaintance has made them obſerve, that there are a great many other things in the world that in ſome common agreements of ſhape, and ſeveral other qualities, reſemble their father and mother, and thoſe perſons they have been uſed to, they frame an idea, which they find thoſe many particulars do partake in; and to that they give, with others, the name man, for example. And thus they come to have a general name, and a general idea. Wherein they make nothing new, but only leave out of the complex idea, they had of Peter and James, Mary and Jane, that which is peculiar to each, and retain only what is common to them all.

§ 8. By the ſame way, that they come by the general name and idea of man, they eaſily advance to more general names and notions. For obſerving that ſeveral things, that differ from their idea of man, and cannot, therefore, be comprehended under that name, had yet certain qualities, wherein they agree with man, by retaining only thoſe qualities, and uniting them into one idea, they have again another and a more general idea; to which having given a name, they make a term of a more comprehenſive extenſion: which new idea is made, not by any new addition, but only, as before, by leaving out the ſhape, and ſome other properties, ſignified by the name man, and retaining only a body, with life, ſenſe, and ſpontaneous motion, comprehended under the name animal.

General natures are nothing but abſtract ideas.

§ 9. THAT this is the way, whereby men firſt formed general ideas, and general names to them, I think, is ſo evident, that there needs no other proof of it, but the conſidering of a man's ſelf, or others, and the ordinary proceedings of their minds in knowledge: and he that thinks general natures, or notions, are any thing elſe, but ſuch abſtract and partial ideas of more complex ones, taken at firſt from particular exiſtences, will, I fear, be at a loſs where to find them. For let any one reflect, and then tell me, wherein does his idea of man differ from that of Peter and Paul, or his idea of horſe from that of Bucephalus, but in the leaving out ſomething, that is peculiar to each individual, and retaining ſo much of thoſe particular, complex ideas of ſeveral, particular exiſtences, as they are found to agree in? Of the complex ideas, ſignified by the names, man and horſe, leaving out but thoſe particulars wherein they differ, and retaining only thoſe wherein they agree, and of thoſe making a new diſtinct, complex idea, and giving the name animal to it; one has a more general term, that comprehends with man ſeveral other creatures. Leave out of the idea of animal, ſenſe and ſpontaneous motion; and the remaining complex idea, made up of the remaining ſimple ones of body, life, and nouriſhment, becomes a more general one, under the more comprehenſive term vivens. And, not to dwell longer upon this particular, ſo evident in itſelf, by the ſame way the mind proceeds to body, ſubſtance, and, at laſt, to being, thing, and ſuch univerſal terms, which ſtand for any of our ideas whatſoever. To conclude, this whole myſtery of genera and ſpecies, which make ſuch a noiſe in the ſchools, and are with juſtice ſo little regarded out of them, is nothing elſe but abſtract ideas, more, or leſs, comprehenſive, with names annexed to them. In all which, this is conſtant and unvariable, that every more general term ſtands for ſuch an idea, as is but a part of any of thoſe contained under it.

Why the genus is ordinarily made uſe of, in definitions

§ 10. THIS may ſhew us the reaſon, why, in defining words, which is nothing but declaring their ſignification, we make uſe of the genus, or next general word that comprehends it. Which is not out of neceſſity, but only to ſave the labour of enumerating the ſeveral, ſimple ideas, which the next general word, or genus, ſtands for; or, perhaps, ſometimes the ſhame of not being able to do it. But tho' defining by genus and differentia (I crave leave to uſe theſe terms of art, tho' originally latin, ſince they moſt properly ſuit thoſe notions they are applied to) I ſay, tho' defining by the genus be the ſhorteſt way, yet, I think, it may be doubted whether it be the beſt. This I am ſure, it is not the only, and ſo not abſolutely neceſſary. For, definition being nothing but making another underſtand by words, what idea the term defined ſtands for, a definition is beſt made by enumerating thoſe ſimple ideas, that are combined in the ſignification of the term defined; and if, inſtead of ſuch an enumeration, men have accuſtomed themſelves to uſe the next general term; it has not been out of neceſſity, or for greater clearneſs, but for quickneſs and diſpatch ſake. For, I think, that to one, who deſired to know what ideas the word man ſtood for, if it ſhould be ſaid, that man was a ſolid, extended ſubſtance, having life, ſenſe, ſpontaneous motion, and the faculty of reaſoning; I doubt not but the meaning of the term man, would be as well underſtood, and the idea it ſtands for be, at leaſt, as clearly made known, as when it is defined to be a rational animal: which by the ſeveral definitions of animal, vivens, and corpus, reſolves itſelf into thoſe enumerated ideas. I have, in explaining the term man, followed here the ordinary definition of the ſchools: which tho', perhaps, not the moſt exact, yet ſerves well enough to my preſent purpoſe. And one may, in this inſtance, ſee what gave occaſion to the rule, that a definition muſt conſiſt of genus and differentia: and it ſuffices to ſhew us the little neceſſity there is of ſuch a rule, or advantage in the ſtrict obſerving of it. For definitions, as has been ſaid, being only the explaining of one word, by ſeveral others, ſo that the meaning, or idea, it ſtands for, may be certainly known; languages are not always ſo made, according to the rules of logick, that every term can have its ſignification, exactly and clearly expreſſed by two others. Experience ſufficiently ſatisfies us to the contrary; or elſe thoſe, who have made this rule, have done ill, that they have given us ſo few definitions conformable to it. But of definitions, more in the next chapter.

§ 11. To

General and univerſal are creatures of the underſtanding.

§ 11. To return to general words, it is plain, by what has been ſaid, that general and univerſal belong not to the real exiſtence of things: but are the invention and creatures of the underſtanding, made by it for its own uſe, and concern only ſigns, whether words, or ideas. Words are general, as has been ſaid, when uſed for ſigns of general ideas, and ſo are applicable indifferently to many particular things; and ideas are general, when they are ſet up as the repreſentatives of many particular things: but univerſality belongs not to things themſelves, which are all of them particular in their exiſtence; even thoſe words and ideas, which in their ſignification are general. When, therefore, we quit particulars, the generals that reſt are only creatures of our own making; their general nature being nothing but the capacity they are put into by the underſtanding, of ſignifying, or repreſenting, many particulars. For the ſignification they have, is nothing but a relation, that by the mind of man is added to them.

Abſtract ideas are the eſſences of the genera and ſpecies.

§ 12. THE next thing, therefore, to be conſidered, is, what kind of ſignification it is, that general words have. For as it is evident, that they do not ſignify barely one particular thing; for then they would not be general terms, but proper names: ſo on the other ſide it is as evident, they do not ſignify a plurality; for man and men would then ſignify the ſame, and the diſtinction of numbers (as the grammarians call them) would be ſuperfluous and uſeleſs. That then, which general words ſignify, is a ſort of things; and each of them does that, by being a ſign of an abſtract idea in the mind, to which idea, as things exiſting are found to agree, ſo they come to be ranked under that name; or, which is all one, be of that ſort. Whereby it is evident, that the eſſences of the ſorts, or (if the Latin word pleaſes better) ſpecies of things, are nothing elſe but theſe abſtract ideas. For the having the eſſence of any ſpecies, being that which makes any thing to be of that ſpecies, and the conformity to the idea, to which the name is annexed, being that which gives a right to that name; the having the eſſence, and the having that conformity, muſt needs be the ſame thing: ſince to be of any ſpecies, and to have a right to the name of that ſpecies, is all one. As for example, to be a man, or of the ſpecies man, and to have right to the name man, is the ſame thing. Again, to be a man, or of the ſpecies man, and have the eſſence of a man, is the ſame thing. Now, ſince nothing can be a man, or have a right to the name man, but what has a conformity to the abſtract idea the name man ſtands for; nor any thing be a man, or have a right to the ſpecies man, but what has the eſſence of that ſpecies; it follows that the abſtract idea, for which the name ſtands, and the eſſence of the ſpecies is one and the ſame. From whence it is eaſy to obſerve, that the eſſences of the ſorts of things, and conſequently the ſorting of this, is the workmanſhip of the underſtanding, that abſtracts and makes thoſe general ideas.

They are the workmanſhip of the underſtanding, but have their foundation in the ſimilitude of things.

§ 13. I WOULD not here be thought to forget, much leſs to deny, that nature, in the production of things, makes ſeveral of them alike: there is nothing more obvious, eſpecially in the races of animals, and all things propagated by ſeed. But yet, I think, we may ſay the ſorting of them under names is the workmanſhip of the underſtanding, taking occaſion from the ſimilitude it obſerves amongſt them to make abſtract general ideas, and ſet them up in the mind, with names annexed to them, as patterns, or forms (for in that ſenſe the word form has a very proper ſignification) to which as particular things exiſting are found to agree, ſo they come to be of that ſpecies, have that denomination, or are put into that claſſis. For when we ſay, this is a man, that a horſe; this juſtice, that cruelty; this a watch, that a jack; what do we elſe but rank things under different, ſpecifick names, as agreeing to thoſe abſtract ideas, of which we have made thoſe names the ſigns? And what are the eſſences of thoſe ſpecies, ſet out and marked by names, but thoſe abſtract ideas in the mind; which are as it were the bonds between particular things that exiſt, and the names they are to be ranked under? And, when general names have any connection with particular beings, theſe abſtract ideas are the medium that unites them: ſo that the eſſences of ſpecies, as diſtinguiſhed and denominated by us, neither are, nor can be any thing, but thoſe preciſe, abſtract ideas we have in our minds. And therefore, the ſuppoſed real eſſences of ſubſtances, if different from our abſtract ideas, cannot be the eſſences of ſpecies, we rank things into. For two ſpecies may be one as rationally, as two different eſſences be the eſſence of one ſpecies: and I demand what are the alterations may, or may not be, in a horſe, or lead, without making either of them to be of another ſpecies? In determining the ſpecies of things, by our abſtract ideas, this is eaſy to reſolve: but if any one will regulate himſelf herein, by ſuppoſed real eſſences, he will, I ſuppoſe, be at a loſs; and he will never be able to know when any thing preciſely ceaſes to be of the ſpecies of a horſe, or lead.

Each diſtinct, abſtract idea is a diſtinct eſſence.

§ 14. Nor will any wonder, that I ſay theſe eſſences, or abſtract ideas, (which are meaſures of name, and the boundaries of ſpecies) are the workmanſhip of the underſtanding, who conſiders, that, at leaſt, the complex ones are often, in ſeveral men, different collections of ſimple ideas: and therefore, that is covetouſneſs to one man, which is not ſo to another. Nay, even in ſubſtances, where their abſtract ideas ſeem to be taken from the things themſelves, they are not conſtantly the ſame; no not in that ſpecies, which is moſt familiar to us, and with which we have the moſt intimate acquaintance: it having been more than once doubted, whether the fœtus, born of a woman, were a man, even ſo far, as that it hath been debated, whether it were, or were not to be nouriſhed and baptized: which could not be, if the abſtract idea of eſſence, to which the name man belonged, were of nature's making; and were not the uncertain and various collection of ſimple ideas, which the underſtanding puts together, and then abſtracting it, affixed a name to it. So that in truth every diſtinct, abſtract idea is a diſtinct eſſence; and the names, that ſtand for ſuch diſtinct ideas, are the names of things eſſentially different. Thus a circle is as eſſentially different from an oval, as a ſheep from a goat: and rain is as eſſentially different from ſnow, as water from earth; that abſtract idea which is the eſſence of one, being impoſſible to be communicated to the other. And thus any two abſtract ideas, that in any part vary one from another, with two diſtinct names annexed to them, conſtitute two diſtinct ſorts, or, if you pleaſe, ſpecies, as eſſentially different as any two the moſt remote, or oppoſite in the world.

Real and nominal eſſence.

§ 15. But ſince the eſſences of things are thought, by ſome (and not without reaſon) to be wholly unknown; it may not be amiſs to conſider the ſeveral ſignifications of the word eſſence.

First, eſſence may be taken for the being of any thing, whereby it is what it is. And thus the real, internal, but generally in ſubſtances unknown, conſtitution of things, whereon their diſcoverable qualities depend, may be called their eſſence. This is the proper, original ſignification of the word, as is evident from the formation of it; eſſentia, in its primary notation, ſignifying properly being. And in this ſenſe it is ſtill uſed, when we ſpeak of the eſſence of particular things, without giving them any name.

Secondly, the learning and diſputes of the ſchools having been much buſy'd about genus and ſpecies, the word eſſence has almoſt loſt its primary ſignification: and, inſtead of the real conſtitution of things, has been almoſt wholly applied to the artificial conſtitution of genus and ſpecies. It is true, there is ordinarily ſuppoſed a real conſtitution of the ſorts of things; and it is paſt doubt, there muſt be ſome real conſtitution, on which any collection of ſimple ideas, co-exiſting, muſt depend. But it being evident, that things are ranked under names into ſorts or ſpecies, only as they agree to certain abſtract ideas, to which we have annexed thoſe names; the eſſence of each genus, or ſort, comes to be nothing but that abſtract idea, which the general, or ſortal (if I may have leave ſo to call it from ſort, as I do general from genus) name ſtands for. And this we ſhall find to be that, which the word eſſence imports in its moſt familiar uſe. Theſe two ſorts of eſſences, I ſuppoſe, may not unfitly be termed, the one the real, the other the nominal eſſence.

Conſtant connection between the name and nominal eſſence.

§ 16. Between the nominal eſſence, and the name, there is ſo near a connection, that the name of any ſort of things cannot be attributed to any particular being, but what has this eſſence, whereby it anſwers that abſtract idea, whereof that name is the ſign.

Suppoſition, that ſpecies are diſtinguiſhed by their real eſſences, uſeleſs.

§ 17. Concerning the real eſſences of corporeal ſubſtances (to mention thoſe only) there are, if I miſtake not, two opinions. The one is of thoſe, who uſing the word eſſence for they know not what, ſuppoſe a certain number of thoſe eſſences, according to which all natural things are made, and wherein they do exactly every one of them partake, and ſo become of this, or that ſpecies. The other and more rational opinion, is of thoſe, who look on all natural things to have a real, but unknown conſtitution of their inſenſible parts; from which flow thoſe ſenſible qualities, which ſerve us to diſtinguiſh them one from another, according as we have occaſion to rank them into ſorts, under common denominations. The former of theſe opinions, which ſuppoſes theſe eſſences, as a certain number of forms, or molds, wherein all natural things, that exiſt, are caſt, and do equally partake, has, I imagine, very much perplexed the knowledge of natural things. The frequent productions of monſters, in all the ſpecies of animals, and of changelings, and other ſtrange iſſues of human birth, carry with them difficulties, not poſſible to conſiſt with this hypotheſis: ſince it is as impoſſible, that two things, partaking exactly of the ſame real eſſence, ſhould have different properties, as that the two figures, partaking in the ſame real eſſence of a circle, ſhould have different properties. But were there no other reaſon againſt it, yet the ſuppoſition of eſſences that cannot be known, and the making them nevertheleſs to be that, which diſtinguiſhes the ſpecies of things, is ſo wholly uſeleſs, and unſerviceable to any part of our knowledge, that that alone were ſufficient to make us lay it by, and content ourſelves with ſuch eſſences of the ſorts, or ſpecies of things, as come within the reach of our knowledge: which, when ſeriouſly conſidered, will be found, as I have ſaid, to be nothing elſe, but thoſe abſtract, complex ideas, to which we have annexed diſtinct general names.

Real and nominal eſſence, the ſame in ſimple ideas and modes, different in ſubſtances.

§ 18. Essences being thus diſtinguiſhed into nominal and real, we may farther obſerve, that in the ſpecies of ſimple ideas and modes, they are always the ſame; but in ſubſtances always quite different. Thus a figure, including a ſpace between three lines, is the real, as well as nominal, eſſence of a triangle; it being not only the abſtract idea, to which the general name is annexed, but the very eſſentia or being of the thing itſelf, that foundation, from which all its properties flow, and to which they are all inſeparably annexed. But it is far otherwiſe, concerning that parcel of matter, which makes the ring on my finger, wherein theſe two eſſences are apparently different. For it is the real conſtitution of its inſenſible parts, on which depend all thoſe properties of colour, weight, fuſibility, fixedneſs, &c. which makes it to be gold, or gives it a right to that name, which is therefore its nominal eſſence: ſince nothing can be called gold, but what has a conformity of qualities to that abſtract, complex idea, to which that name is annexed. But this diſtinction of eſſences, belonging particularly to ſubſtances, we ſhall, when we come to conſider their names, have an occaſion to treat of more fully.

Eſſences ingenerable and incorruptible.

§ 19. That ſuch abſtract ideas, with names to them, as we have been ſpeaking of, are eſſences, may farther appear, by what we are told concerning eſſences, viz. that they are all ingenerable and incorruptible. Which cannot be true of the real conſtitutions of things, which begin and periſh with them. All things that exiſt, beſides their author, are all liable to change; eſpecially thoſe things we are acquainted with, and have ranked into bands under diſtinct names or enſigns. Thus that, which was graſs to-day, is to-morrow the fleſh of a ſheep; and within few days after, becomes part of a man: in all which, and the like changes, it is evident their real eſſence, i. e. that conſtitution, whereon the properties of theſe ſeveral things depended, is deſtroyed, and periſhes with them. But eſſences being taken for ideas, eſtabliſhed in the mind, with names annexed to them, they are ſuppoſed to remain ſteadily the ſame, whatever mutations the particular ſubſtances are liable to. For whatever becomes of Alexander and Bucephalus, the ideas, to which man and horſe are annexed, are ſuppoſed nevertheleſs to remain the ſame: and ſo the eſſences of thoſe ſpecies are preſerved whole and undeſtroyed, whatever changes happen to any, or all of the individuals of thoſe ſpecies. By this means the eſſence of a ſpecies reſts ſafe and entire, without the exiſtence of ſo much as one individual of that kind. For were there now no circle exiſting, any where in the world, (as perhaps that figure exiſts not any where, exactly marked out) yet the idea annexed to that name would not ceaſe to be what it is; nor ceaſe to be as a pattern to determine which, of the particular figures we meet with, have or have not a right to the name circle, and ſo to ſhew which of them, by having that eſſence, was of that ſpecies. And tho' there neither were, nor had been, in nature ſuch a beaſt as an unicorn, or ſuch a fiſh as a mermaid; yet ſuppoſing thoſe names to ſtand for complex, abſtract ideas, that contained no inconſiſtency in them, the eſſence of a mermaid is as intelligible as that of a man; and the idea of an unicorn as certain, ſteady, and permanent, as that of a horſe. From what has been ſaid it is evident, that the doctrine of the immutability of eſſences proves them abſtract ideas; and is only to be founded on the relation eſtabliſhed between them, and certain ſounds, as ſigns of them; and will always be true, as long as the ſame name can have the ſame ſignification.

Recapitulation.

§ 20. To conclude, this is that which in ſhort I would ſay, viz. that all the great buſineſs of genera and ſpecies, and their eſſences, amount to no more but this, that men, making abſtract ideas, and ſettling them in their minds, with names annexed to them, do thereby enable themſelves to conſider things, and diſcourſe of them, as it were in bundles, for the eaſier and readier improvement and communication of their knowledge; which would advance but ſlowly, were their words and thoughts confined only to particulars.

CHAP. IV.

Of the names of ſimple ideas.

CHAP. IV.

Names of ſimple ideas, modes, and ſubſtances, have each ſomething peculiar.

§ 1. THO' all words, as I have ſhewn, ſignify nothing immediately but the ideas in the mind of the ſpeaker; yet, upon a nearer ſurvey, we ſhall find, that the names of ſimple ideas, mixed modes, (under which I compriſe relations too) and natural ſubſtances, have each of them ſomething peculiar and different from the other. For example:

1. Names of ſimple ideas, and ſubſtances, intimate real exiſtence.

§ 2. FIRST, the names of ſimple ideas and ſubſtances, with the abſtract ideas in the mind, which they immediately ſignify, intimate alſo ſome real exiſtence, from which was derived their original pattern. But the names of mixed modes terminate in the idea that is in the mind, and lead not the thoughts any farther, as we ſhall ſee more at large in the following chapter.

2. Names of ſimple ideas, and modes, ſignify always both real and nominal eſſence.

§ 3. SECONDLY, the names of ſimple ideas, and modes, ſignify always the real, as well as nominal eſſence of their ſpecies. But the names of natural ſubſtances ſignify rarely, if ever, any thing but barely the nominal eſſences of thoſe ſpecies, as we ſhall ſhew in the chapter, that treats of the names of ſubſtances, in particular.

3. Names of ſimple ideas, undefinable.

§ 4. THIRDLY, the names of ſimple ideas are not capable of any definitions; the names of all complex ideas are. It has not, that I know, been yet obſerved by any body, what words are, and what are not capable of being defined; the want whereof is (as I am apt to think) not ſeldom the occaſion of great wrangling and obſcurity in men's diſcourſes, whilſt ſome demand definitions of terms, that cannot be defined: and others think they ought to reſt ſatisfied in an explication, made by a more general word, and its reſtriction, (or to ſpeak in terms of art, by a genus and difference) when even after ſuch definition made, according to rule, thoſe who hear it, have often no more a clear conception of the meaning of the word than they had before. This, at leaſt, I think, that the ſhewing what words are, and what are not capable of definition, and wherein conſiſts a good definition, is not wholly beſides our preſent purpoſe; and, perhaps, will afford ſo much light to the nature of theſe ſigns, and our ideas, as to deſerve a more particular conſideration.

If all were definable, it would be a proceſs in infinitum.

§ 5. I WILL not here trouble myſelf, to prove that all terms are not definable from that progreſs, in infinitum, which it will viſibly lead us into, if we ſhould allow that all names could be defined. For, if the terms of one definition

tion were ſtill to be defined by another, where at laſt ſhould we ſtop? But I ſhall, from the nature of our ideas, and the ſignification of our words, ſhew, why ſome names can, and others cannot be defined, and which they are.

What a definition is.

§ 6. I THINK, it is agreed, that a definition is nothing elſe, but the ſhewing the meaning of one word, by ſeveral other not ſynonymous terms. The meaning of words being only the ideas they are made to ſtand for, by him that uſes them; the meaning of any term is then ſhewed, or the word is defined, when, by other words, the idea it is made the ſign of, and annexed to, in the mind of the ſpeaker, is as it were repreſented, or ſet before the view of another; and thus its ſignification aſcertained: this is the only uſe and end of definitions; and therefore the only meaſure of what is or is not a good definition.

Simple ideas, why undefinable.

§ 7. THIS being premiſed, I ſay, that the names of ſimple ideas, and thoſe only, are incapable of being defined. The reaſon whereof is this, that the ſeveral terms of a definition, ſignifying ſeveral ideas, they can altogether, by no means, repreſent an idea, which has no compoſition at all: and, therefore, a definition, which is properly nothing but the ſhewing the meaning of one word, by ſeveral others, not ſignifying each the ſame thing, can, in the names of ſimple ideas, have no place.

Inſtances; motion.

§ 8. THE not obſerving this difference in our ideas, and their names, has produced that eminent trifling in the ſchools, which is ſo eaſy to be obſerved in the definitions they give us, of ſome few of theſe ſimple ideas. For as to the greateſt part of them, even thoſe maſters of definitions were fain to leave them untouched, merely by the impoſſibility they found in it. What more exquiſite jargon could the wit of man invent, than this definition: "The act of a being in power, as far forth as in power?" which would puzzle any rational man, to whom it was not already known, by its famous abſurdity, to gueſs what word it could ever be ſuppoſed to be the explication of. If Tully aſking a Dutchman what "beweeginge" was, ſhould have received this explication in his own language, that it was, "actus entis in potentia quatenus in potentia;" I aſk whether any one can imagine he could thereby have underſtood what the word "beweeginge" ſignified, or have gueſſed what idea a Dutchman ordinarily had in his mind, and would ſignify to another when he uſed that ſound.

§ 9. NOR have the modern philoſophers, who have endeavoured to throw off the jargon of the ſchools, and ſpeak intelligibly, much better ſucceeded in defining ſimple ideas, whether by explaining their cauſes, or any otherwiſe. The atomiſts, who define motion to be a paſſage from one place to another, what do they more than put one ſynonymous word for another? For what is paſſage, other than motion? And if they were aſked what paſſage was, how would they better define it than by motion? For is it not, at leaſt, as proper and ſignificant to ſay, paſſage is a motion from one place to another, as to ſay, motion is a paſſage, &c. This is to tranſlate, and not to define, when we change two words of the ſame ſignification one for another; which, when one is better underſtood than the other, may ſerve to diſcover what idea the unknown ſtands for; but is very far from a definition, unleſs we will ſay every Engliſh word in the dictionary is the definition of the Latin word it anſwers, and that motion is a definition of motus. Nor will the ſucceſſive application of the parts of the ſuperficies of one body, to thoſe of another, which the Carteſians give us, prove a much better definition of motion, when well examined.

Light.

§ 10. "THE act of perſpicuous, as far forth as perſpicuous," is another peripatetick definition of a ſimple idea; which, tho' not more abſurd than the former of motion, yet betrays its uſeleſſneſs and inſignificancy more plainly, becauſe experience will eaſily convince any one, that it cannot make the meaning of the word light (which it pretends to define) at all underſtood by a blind man; but the definition of motion appears not at firſt ſight ſo uſeleſs, becauſe it ſcapes this way of trial. For this ſimple idea, entring by the touch, as well as ſight, it is impoſſible to ſhew an example of any one, who has no other way to get the idea of motion, but barely by the definition of that name. Thoſe who tell us, that light is a great number of little globules, ſtriking briſkly on the bottom of the eye, ſpeak more intelligibly than the ſchools; but yet theſe words, ever ſo well underſtood, would make the idea, the word light ſtands for, no more known, to a man that underſtands it not before, than if one ſhould tell him, that light was nothing but a company of little tennis balls, which fairies all day long ſtruck with rackets againſt ſome men's foreheads, whilſt they paſſed by others. For granting this explication of the thing to be true; yet the idea of the cauſe of light, if we had it ever ſo exact, would no more give us the idea of light itſelf, as it is ſuch a particular perception in us, than the idea of the figure, and motion of a ſharp piece of ſteel, would give us the idea of that pain, which it is able to cauſe in us. For the cauſe of any ſenſation, and the ſenſation itſelf, in all the ſimple ideas of one ſenſe, are two ideas; and two ideas ſo different and diſtant one from another, that no two can be more ſo. And, therefore, ſhould Des Cartes's globules ſtrike ever ſo long, on the retina of a man, who was blind by a gutta ſerena, he would thereby never have any idea of light, or any thing approaching it, tho' he underſtood what little globules were, and what ſtriking on another body was, ever ſo well. And, therefore, the Carteſians very well diſtinguiſh between that light, which is the cauſe of that ſenſation in us, and the idea, which is produced in us by it, and is that which is properly light.

Simple ideas, why undefinable, farther explained.

§ 11. Simple ideas, as has been ſhewn, are only to be got by thoſe impreſſions, objects themſelves make on our minds, by the proper inlets, appointed to each ſort. If they are not received this way, all the words in the world made uſe of to explain, or define any of their names, will never be able to produce in us the idea it ſtands for. For words being ſounds, can produce in us no other ſimple ideas, than of thoſe very ſounds; nor excite any in us, but by that voluntary connection, which is known to be between them, and thoſe ſimple ideas, which common uſe has made them ſigns of. He that thinks otherwiſe let him try, if any words can give him the taſte of a pine apple, and make him have the true idea of the reliſh of that celebrated, delicious fruit. So far as he is told it has a reſemblance with any taſtes, whereof he has the ideas already in his memory, imprinted there by ſenſible objects, not ſtrangers to his palate, ſo far may he approach that reſemblance in his mind. But this is not giving us that idea by a definition, but exciting in us other ſimple ideas, by their known names; which will be ſtill very different from the true taſte of that fruit itſelf. In light and colours, and all other ſimple ideas, it is the ſame thing; for the ſignification of ſounds is not natural, but only impoſed and arbitrary. And no definition of light, or redneſs, is more fitted, or able to produce either of thoſe ideas in us, than the ſound, light, or red, by itſelf. For to hope to produce an idea of light, or colour, by a ſound however formed, is to expect that ſounds ſhould be viſible, or colours audible, and to make the ears do the office of all the other ſenſes. Which is all one as to ſay, that we might taſte, ſmell, and ſee by the ears; a ſort of philoſophy worthy only of Sancho Pancha, who had the faculty to ſee Dulcinea by hearſay. And, therefore, he that has not before received into his mind, by the proper inlet, the ſimple idea, which any word ſtands for, can never come to know the ſignification of that word by any other words, or ſounds whatſoever, put together, according to any rules of definition. The only way is by applying to his ſenſes the proper object; and ſo producing that idea in him, for which he has learned the name already. A ſtudious, blind man, who had mightily beat his head about viſible objects, and made uſe of the explication of his books and friends, to underſtand thoſe names of light and colours, which often came in his way, bragged one day, that he now underſtood what ſcarlet ſignified. Upon which his friend demanding, what ſcarlet was? the blind man anſwered, It was like the ſound of a trumpet. Juſt ſuch an underſtanding of the name of any other ſimple idea will he have, who hopes to get it only from a definition, or other words made uſe of to explain it.

The contrary ſhewed in complex ideas, by inſtances of a ſtatue, and rainbow.

§ 12. The caſe is quite otherwiſe in complex ideas; which conſiſting of ſeveral ſimple ones, it is in the power of words, ſtanding for the ſeveral ideas that make that compoſition, to imprint complex ideas in the mind, which were never there before, and ſo make their names be underſtood. In ſuch collections of ideas, paſſing under one name, definition, or the teaching the ſignification of one word by ſeveral others, has place, and may make us underſtand the names of things, which never came within the reach of our ſenſes: and frame ideas ſuitable to thoſe in other men's minds, when they uſe thoſe names: provided that none of the terms of the definition ſtand for any ſuch ſimple ideas, which he, to whom the explication is made, has never yet had in his thought. Thus the word ſtatue may be explained to a blind man, by other words, when picture cannot; his ſenſes having given him the idea of figure, but not of colours, which therefore words cannot excite in him. This gained the prize to the painter againſt the ſtatuary; each of which contending for the excellency of his art, and the ſtatuary bragging that his was to be preferred, becauſe it reached farther, and even thoſe who had loſt their eyes, could yet perceive the excellency of it; the painter agreed to refer himſelf to the judgment of a blind man; who being brought where there was a ſtatue made by the one, and a picture drawn by the other, he was firſt led to the ſtatue, in which he traced with his hands all the lineaments of the face and body, and with great admiration applauded the ſkill of the workman. But being led to the picture, and having his hands laid upon it, was told, that now he touched the head, and then the forehead, eyes, noſe, &c. as his hand moved over the parts of the picture on the cloth, without finding any the leaſt diſtinction: whereupon he cried out, that certainly that muſt needs be a very admirable and divine piece of workmanſhip, which could repreſent to them all thoſe parts, where he could neither feel, nor perceive any thing.

§ 13. He that ſhould uſe the word rainbow to one, who knew all thoſe colours, but yet had never ſeen that phænomenon, would, by enumerating the figure, largeneſs, poſition, and order of the colours, ſo well define that word, that it might be perfectly underſtood. But yet that definition, how exact and perfect ſoever, would never make a blind man underſtand it; becauſe ſeveral of the ſimple ideas that make that complex one, being ſuch, as he never received by ſenſation and experience, no words are able to excite them in his mind.

The names of complex ideas, when to be made intelligible by words.

§ 14. Simple ideas, as has been ſhewed, can only be got by experience, from thoſe objects, which are proper to produce in us thoſe perceptions. When, by this means, we have our minds ſtored with them, and know the names for them, then we are in a condition to define, and by definition to underſtand the names of complex ideas, that are made up of them. But when any term ſtands for a ſimple idea, that a man has never yet had in his mind, it is impoſſible by any words to make known its meaning to him. When any term ſtands for an idea a man is acquainted with, but is ignorant that that term is the ſign of it, there another name, of the ſame idea, which he has been accuſtomed to, may make him underſtand its meaning. But in no caſe whatſoever is any name of any ſimple idea, capable of a definition.

4. Names of ſimple ideas, leaſt doubtful.

§ 15. Fourthly, but tho' the names of ſimple ideas have not the help of definition, to determine their ſignification, yet that hinders not, but that they are generally leſs doubtful and uncertain, than thoſe of mixed modes and ſubſtances: becauſe they ſtanding only for one ſimple perception, men, for the moſt part, eaſily and perfectly agree in their ſignification; and there is little room for miſtake and wrangling about their meaning. He that knows once that whiteneſs is the name of that colour, he has obſerved in ſnow, or milk, will not be apt to miſapply that word, as long as he retains that idea; which, when he has quite loſt, he is not apt to miſtake the meaning of it, but perceives he underſtands it not. There is neither a multiplicity of ſimple ideas to be put together, which makes the doubtfulneſs in the names of mixed modes; nor a ſuppoſed, but an unknown, real eſſence, with properties depending thereon, the preciſe number whereof are alſo unknown, which makes the difficulty in the names of ſubſtances. But, on the contrary, in ſimple ideas the whole ſignification of the name is known at once, and conſiſts not of parts, whereof more or leſs being put in, the idea may be varied, and ſo the ſignification of its name be obſcure, or uncertain.

5. Simple ideas have few aſcents in lineâ prædicamentali.

§ 16. Fifthly, this farther may be obſerved concerning ſimple ideas, and their names, that they have but few aſcents in lineâ prædicamentali (as they call it) from the loweſt ſpecies to the ſummum genus. The reaſon whereof is, that the loweſt ſpecies being but one ſimple idea, nothing can be left out of it; that ſo, the difference being taken away, it may agree with ſome other thing in one idea common to them both; which having one name, is the genus of the other two: v. g. there is nothing that can be left out of the idea of white and red, to make them agree in one common appearance, and ſo have one general name; as rationality being left out of the complex idea of man, makes it agree with brute, in the more general idea and name of animal: and therefore when to avoid unpleaſant enumerations, men would comprehend both white and red, and ſeveral other ſuch ſimple ideas, under one general name; they have been fain to do it by a word, which denotes only the way they get into the mind. For when white, red, and yellow are all comprehended under the genus or name colour, it ſignifies no more but ſuch ideas as are produced in the mind only by the ſight, and have entrance only thro' the eyes. And when they would frame yet a more general term, to comprehend both colours and ſounds, and the like ſimple ideas, they do it by a word that ſignifies all ſuch as come into the mind only by one ſenſe: and ſo the general term quality, in its ordinary acceptation, comprehends colours, ſounds, taſtes, ſmells and tangible qualities, with diſtinction from extenſion, number, motion, pleaſure and pain, which make impreſſions on the mind, and introduce their ideas by more ſenſes than one.

6. Names of ſimple ideas ſtand for ideas, not at all arbitrary.

§ 17. Sixthly, the names of ſimple ideas, ſubſtances, and mixed modes, have alſo this difference; that thoſe of mixed modes ſtand for ideas perfectly arbitrary; thoſe of ſubſtances are not perfectly ſo, but refer to a pattern, tho' with ſome latitude; and thoſe of ſimple ideas are perfectly taken from the exiſtence of things, and are not arbitrary at all. Which, what difference it makes in the ſignifications of their names, we ſhall ſee in the following chapters.

The names of ſimple modes differ little from thoſe of ſimple ideas.

CHAP. V.

Of the names of mixed modes and relations.

Chap. V.

They ſtand for abſtract ideas, as other general names.

§ 1. The names of mixed modes being general, they ſtand, as has been ſhewn, for ſorts or ſpecies of things, each of which has its peculiar eſſence. The eſſences of theſe ſpecies alſo, as has been ſhewed, are nothing but the abſtract ideas in the mind, to which the name is annexed. Thus far the names and eſſences of mixed modes, having nothing but what is common to them with other ideas: but if we take a little nearer ſurvey of them, we ſhall find that they have ſomething peculiar, which perhaps may deſerve our attention.

1. The ideas they ſtand for, are made by the underſtanding.

§ 2. The firſt particularity I ſhall obſerve in them, is, that the abſtract ideas, or, if you pleaſe, the eſſences of the ſeveral ſpecies of mixed modes are made by the underſtanding, wherein they differ from thoſe of ſimple ideas: in which ſort, the mind has no power to make any one, but only receives ſuch as are preſented to it, by the real exiſtence of things operating upon it.

2. Made arbitrarily, and without patterns.

§ 3. In the next place, theſe eſſences of the ſpecies of mixed modes, are not only made by the mind, but made very arbitrarily, made without patterns, or reference to any real exiſtence. Wherein they differ from thoſe of ſubſtances, which carry with them the ſuppoſition of ſome real being, from which they are taken, and to which they are conformable. But in its complex ideas of mixed modes, the mind takes a liberty not to follow the exiſtence of things exactly. It unites and retains certain collections, as ſo many diſtinct ſpecifick ideas, whilſt others, that as often occur in nature, and are as plainly ſuggeſted by outward things, paſs neglected, without particular names, or ſpecifications. Nor does the mind, in theſe of mixed modes, as in the complex ideas of ſubſtances, examine them by the real exiſtence of things; or verify them by patterns, containing ſuch peculiar compoſitions in nature. To know whether his idea of adultery, or inceſt, be right, will a man ſeek it any where amongſt things exiſting? Or is it true, becauſe any one has been witneſs to ſuch an action? No: but it ſuffices here, that men have put together ſuch a collection into one complex idea, that makes the archetype and ſpecifick idea, whether ever any ſuch action were committed in rerum natura, or no.

How this is done.

§ 4. To underſtand this aright, we muſt conſider, wherein this making of theſe complex ideas conſiſts; and that is not in the making any new idea, but putting together thoſe, which the mind had before. Wherein the mind does theſe three things: firſt, it chuſes a certain number: ſecondly, it gives them connection, and makes them into one idea: thirdly, it ties them together by a name. If we examine how the mind proceeds in theſe, and what liberty it takes in them, we ſhall eaſily obſerve, how theſe eſſences of the ſpecies of mixed modes are the workmanſhip of the mind, and conſequently, that the ſpecies themſelves are of men's making.

Evidently arbitrary, in that the idea is often before the exiſtence.

§ 5. No body can doubt, but that theſe ideas of mixed modes are made by a voluntary collection of ideas, put together in the mind, independent from any original patterns in nature, who will but reflect, that this ſort of complex ideas may be made, abſtracted, and have names given them, and ſo a ſpecies be conſtituted, before any one individual of that ſpecies ever exiſted. Who can doubt but the ideas of ſacrilege, or adultery, might be framed in the mind of men, and have names given them: and ſo theſe ſpecies of mixed modes be conſtituted, before either of them was ever committed; and might be as well diſcourſed of, and reaſoned about, and as certain truths diſcovered of them, whilſt yet they had no being but in the underſtanding, as well as now, that they have but too frequently a real exiſtence? Whereby it is plain, how much the ſorts of mixed modes are the creatures of the underſtanding, where they have a being as ſubſervient to all the ends of real truth and knowledge, as when they really exiſt: and we cannot doubt but law-makers have often made laws about ſpecies of actions, which were only the creatures of their own underſtandings; beings that had no other exiſtence, but in their own minds. And I think no body can deny, but that the reſurrection was a ſpecies of mixed modes in the mind, before it really exiſted.

Inſtances; murder, inceſt, ſtabbing.

§ 6. To ſee how arbitrarily theſe eſſences of mixed modes are made by the mind, we need but take a view of almoſt any of them. A little looking into them will ſatisfy us, that it is the mind that combines ſeveral, ſcattered, independent ideas into one complex one, and, by the common name it gives them, makes them the eſſence of a certain ſpecies, without regulating itſelf by any connection they have in nature. For what greater connection in nature has the idea of a man, than the idea of a ſheep, with killing; that this is made a particular ſpecies of action, ſignified by the word murder, and the other not? Or, what union is there in nature between the idea of the relation of a father, with killing, than that of a ſon, or neighbour; that thoſe are combined into one complex idea, and thereby made the eſſence of the diſtinct ſpecies parricide, whilſt the other makes no diſtinct ſpecies at all? But tho' they have made killing a man's father, or mother, a diſtinct ſpecies from killing his ſon, or daughter; yet in ſome other caſes, ſon and daughter are taken in too, as well as father and mother; and they are all equally comprehended in the ſame ſpecies, as in that of inceſt. Thus the mind, in mixed modes, arbitrarily unites into complex ideas, ſuch as it finds convenient; whilſt others, that have altogether as much union in nature, are left looſe, and never combined into one idea, becauſe they have no need of one name. It is evident then, that the mind, by its free choice, gives a connection to a certain number of ideas, which in nature have no more union with one another, than others that it leaves out: Why elſe is the part of the weapon, the beginning of the wound is made with, taken notice of, to make the diſtinct ſpecies called ſtabbing, and the figure and matter of the weapon left out? I do not ſay this is done without reaſon, as we ſhall ſee more by and by; but this I ſay, that it is done by the free choice of the mind, purſuing its own ends; and that, therefore, theſe ſpecies of mixed modes are the workmanſhip of the underſtanding: and there is nothing more evident, than that for the moſt part, in the framing theſe ideas, the mind ſearches not its patterns in nature, nor refers the ideas, it makes, to the real exiſtence of things; but puts ſuch together, as may beſt ſerve its own purpoſes without tying itſelf to a preciſe imitation of any thing that really exiſts.

But ſtill ſubſervient to the end of language.

§ 7. But tho' theſe complex ideas, or eſſences of mixed modes, depend on the mind, and are made by it, with great liberty; yet they are not made at random, and jumbled together without any reaſon at all. Tho' theſe complex ideas be not always copied from nature, yet they are always ſuited to the end, for which abſtract ideas are made: and, tho' they be combinations made of ideas, that are looſe enough, and have as little union in themſelves, as ſeveral other to which the mind never gives a connection, that combines them into one idea; yet they are always made for the convenience of communication, which is the chief end of language. The uſe of language is, by ſhort ſounds, to ſignify, with eaſe and diſpatch, general conceptions; wherein not only abundance of particulars may be contained, but alſo a great variety of independent ideas collected into one complex one. In the making, therefore, of the ſpecies of mixed modes, men have had regard only to ſuch combinations, as they had occaſion to mention one to another. Thoſe they have combined into diſtinct, complex ideas, and given names to; whilſt others, that in nature have as near an union, are left looſe and unregarded. For to go no farther than human actions themſelves, if they would make diſtinct, abſtract ideas of all the varieties might be obſerved in them, the number muſt be infinite, and the memory confounded with the plenty, as well as overcharged to little purpoſe. It ſuffices, that men make and name ſo many complex ideas of theſe mixed modes, as they find they have occaſion to have names for, in the ordinary occurence of their affairs. If they join to the idea of killing, the idea of father, or mother, and ſo make a diſtinct ſpecies, from killing a man's ſon, or neighbour, it is becauſe of the different heinouſneſs of the crime, and the diſtinct puniſhment is due to the murdering a man's father and mother, different from what ought to be inflicted on the murder of a ſon or neighbour; and, therefore, they find it neceſſary to mention it by a diſtinct name, which is the end of making that diſtinct combination. But, tho' the ideas of mother and daughter are ſo differently treated, in reference to the idea of killing, that the one is joined with it, to make a diſtinct abſtract idea with a name, and ſo a diſtinct ſpecies, and the other not; yet in reſpect of carnal knowledge, they are both taken in, under inceſt: and that ſtill, for the ſame convenience of expreſſing under one name, and reckoning of one ſpecies, ſuch unclean mixtures, as have a peculiar turpitude beyond others; and this to avoid circumlocutions, and tedious deſcriptions.

Whereof the intranſlatable words of divers languages are a proof.

§ 8. A moderate ſkill in different languages will eaſily ſatisfy one of the truth of this; it being ſo obvious to obſerve great ſtore of words in one language, which have not any that anſwer them in another. Which plainly ſhews, that thoſe of one country, by their cuſtoms and manner of life, have found occaſion to make ſeveral complex ideas, and give names to them, which others never collected into ſpecifick ideas. This could not have happened, if theſe ſpecies were the ſteady workmanſhip of nature, and not collections, made and abſtracted by the mind, in order to naming, and for the convenience of communication. The terms of our law, which are not empty ſounds, will hardly find words, that anſwer them in the Spaniſh, or Italian, no ſcanty languages; much leſs, I think, could any one tranſlate them into the Caribees or Weſtoe tongues; and the Verſura of the Romans, or Corban of the Jews, have no words in other languages to anſwer them; the reaſon whereof is plain, from what has been ſaid. Nay, if we will look a little more nearly into this matter, and exactly compare different languages, we ſhall find, that tho' they have words, which in tranſlations and dictionaries are ſuppoſed to anſwer one another; yet there is ſcarce one of ten amongſt the names of complex ideas, eſpecially of mixed modes, that ſtands for the ſame preciſe idea, which the word does, that in dictionaries it is rendered by. There are no ideas more common, and leſs compounded, than the meaſures of time, extenſion, and weight, and the Latin names, hora, pes, libra, are without difficulty rendered by the Engliſh names, hour, foot, and pound; but yet there is nothing more evident, than that the ideas a Roman annexed to theſe Latin names, were very far different from thoſe, which an Engliſhman expreſſes by thoſe Engliſh ones. And if either of theſe ſhould make uſe of the meaſures, that thoſe of the other language deſigned by their names, he would be quite out in his account. Theſe are too ſenſible proofs to be doubted; and we ſhall find this much more ſo, in the names of more abſtract and compounded ideas, ſuch as are the greateſt part of thoſe, which make up moral diſcourſes: whoſe names, when men come curiouſly to compare with thoſe they are tranſlated into, in other languages, they will find very few of them exactly to correſpond in the whole extent of their ſignifications.

This ſhews ſpecies to be made for communication.

§ 9. THE reaſon, why I take ſo particular notice of this, is, that we may not be miſtaken about genera and ſpecies, and their eſſences, as if they were things regularly and conſtantly made by nature, and had a real exiſtence in things; when they appear, upon a more wary ſurvey, to be nothing elſe but an artifice of the underſtanding, for the eaſier ſignifying ſuch collections of ideas, as it ſhould often have occaſion to communicate, by one general term; under which divers particulars, as far forth as they agreed to that abſtract idea, might be comprehended. And, if the doubtful ſignification of the word, ſpecies, may make it ſound harſh to ſome, that I ſay, "the ſpecies of mixed modes are made by the underſtanding;" yet, I think, it can by no body be denied, that it is the mind makes thoſe abſtract, complex ideas, to which ſpecifick names are given. And if it be true, as it is, that the mind makes the patterns for ſorting and naming of things, I leave it to be conſidered, who makes the boundaries of the ſort of ſpecies; ſince with me, ſpecies and ſort have no other difference, than that of a Latin and Engliſh idiom.

In mixed modes, it is the name that ties the combination together, and makes it a ſpecies.

§ 10. THE near relation that there is between ſpecies, eſſences, and their general name, at leaſt in mixed modes, will farther appear, when we conſider, that it is the name that ſeems to preſerve thoſe eſſences, and give them their laſting duration. For the connection, between the looſe parts of thoſe complex ideas, being made by the mind, this union, which has no particular foundation in nature, would ceaſe again, were there not ſomething, that did as it were hold it together; and keep the parts from ſcattering. Tho', therefore, it be the mind, that makes the collection, it is the name which is as it were the knot that ties them faſt together. What a vaſt variety of different ideas does the word triumphus hold together, and deliver to us as one ſpecies! Had this name been never made, or quite loſt, we might, no doubt, have had deſcriptions of what paſſed in that ſolemnity: but yet, I think, that which holds thoſe different parts together, in the unity of one complex idea, is that very word annexed to it; without which, the ſeveral parts of that would no more be thought to make one thing, than any other ſhew, which having never been made but once, had never been united into one complex idea, under one denomination. How much therefore, in mixed modes, the unity neceſſary to any eſſence depends on the mind, and how much the continuation and fixing of that unity depends on the name in common uſe annexed to it; I leave to be conſidered by thoſe, who look upon eſſences and ſpecies as real, eſtabliſhed things in nature.

§ 11. SUITABLE to this, we find, that men, ſpeaking of mixed modes, ſeldom imagine, or take any other for ſpecies of them, but ſuch as are ſet out by name: becauſe they being of man's making only, in order to naming, no ſuch ſpecies are taken notice of, or ſuppoſed to be, unleſs a name be joined to it, as the ſign of man's having combined into one idea ſeveral looſe ones; and, by that name, giving a laſting union to the parts, which would otherwiſe ceaſe to have any, as ſoon as the mind laid by that abſtract idea, and ceaſed actually to think on it. But, when a name is once annexed to it, wherein the parts of that complex idea have a ſettled and permanent union; then is the eſſence as it were eſtabliſhed, and the ſpecies looked on as compleat. For, to what purpoſe ſhould the memory charge itſelf with ſuch compoſitions, unleſs it were by abſtraction to make them general? And to what purpoſe make them general, unleſs it were that they might have general names, for the convenience of diſcourſe and communication? Thus we ſee, that killing a man with a ſword or a hatchet, are looked on as no diſtinct ſpecies of action: but, if the point of the ſword firſt enter the body, it paſſes for a diſtinct ſpecies, where it has a diſtinct name; as in England, in whoſe language it is called ſtabbing: but in another country, where it has not happened to be ſpecified under a peculiar name, it paſſes not for a diſtinct a diſtinct ſpecies. But in the ſpecies of corporeal ſubſtances, tho' it be the mind that makes the nominal eſſence; yet, ſince thoſe ideas, which are combined in it, are ſuppoſed to have an union in nature, whether the mind joins them or no, therefore thoſe are looked on as diſtinct ſpecies, without any operation of the mind, either abſtracting, or giving a name to that complex idea.

For the originals of mixed modes, we look no farther than the mind, which alſo ſhews them to be the workmanſhip of the underſtanding.

§ 12. Conformable alſo to what has been ſaid, concerning the eſſences of the ſpecies of mixed modes, that they are the creatures of the underſtanding, rather than the works of nature: conformable, I ſay, to this, we find that their names lead our thoughts to the mind, and no farther. When we ſpeak of juſtice, or gratitude, we frame to ourſelves no imagination of any thing exiſting, which we would conceive; but our thoughts terminate in the abſtract ideas of thoſe virtues, and look no farthe: as they do, when we ſpeak of a horſe, or iron, whoſe ſpecifick ideas we conſider not, as barely in the mind, but as in things themſelves, which afford the original patterns of thoſe ideas. But in mixed modes, at leaſt the moſt conſiderable parts of them, which are moral beings, we conſider the original patterns as being in the mind; and to thoſe we refer for the diſtinguiſhing of particular beings under names. And hence I think it is, that theſe eſſences, of the ſpecies of mixed modes, are, by a more particular name, called notions; as by a particular right, appertaining to the underſtanding.

Their being made by the underſtanding, without patterns, ſhews the reaſon why they are ſo compounded.

§ 13. Hence, likewiſe, we may learn, why the complex ideas of mixed modes are commonly more compounded and decompounded, than thoſe of natural ſubſtances. Becauſe they being the workmanſhip of the underſtanding, purſuing only its own ends, and the conveniency of expreſſing in ſhort thoſe ideas, it would make known to another, does, with great liberty, unite often into one abſtract idea, things, that in their nature have no coherence; and ſo, under one term, bundle together a great variety of compounded and decompounded ideas. Thus the name of proceſſion, what a great mixture of independent ideas of perſons, habits, tapers, orders, motions, ſounds, does it contain in that complex one, which the mind of man has arbitrarily put together, to expreſs by that one name? Whereas the complex ideas of the ſorts of ſubſtances are uſually made up of only a ſmall number of ſimple ones; and in the ſpecies of animals, theſe two, viz. ſhape and voice, commonly make the whole nominal eſſence.

Names of mixed modes ſtand always for their real eſſences.

§ 14. Another thing we may obſerve, from what has been ſaid, is, that the names of mixed modes always ſignify (when they have any determined ſignification) the real eſſences of their ſpecies. For theſe abſtract ideas being the workmanſhip of the mind, and not referred to the real exiſtence of things, there is no ſuppoſition of any thing more ſignified by that name, but barely that complex idea, the mind itſelf has formed, which is all it would have expreſſed by it; and is that, on which all the properties of the ſpecies depend, and from which alone they all flow: and ſo in theſe the real and nominal eſſence is the ſame; which of what concernment it is to the certain knowledge of general truth we ſhall ſee hereafter.

Why their names are uſually got before their ideas.

§ 15. This alſo may ſhew us the reaſon, why, for the moſt part, the names of mixed modes are got, before the ideas they ſtand for, are perfectly known. Becauſe there being no ſpecies of theſe ordinarily taken notice of, but what have names, and thoſe ſpecies, or rather their eſſences, being abſtract, complex ideas, made arbitrarily by the mind, it is convenient, if not neceſſary, to know the names, before one endeavour to frame theſe complex ideas: unleſs a man will fill his head with a company of abſtract, complex ideas, which others having no names for, he has nothing to do with, but to lay by and forget again. I confeſs, that in the beginning of languages, it was neceſſary to have the idea, before one gave it the name: and ſo it is ſtill, where making a new complex idea, one alſo, by giving it a new name, makes a new word. But this concerns not languages made, which have generally pretty well provided for ideas, which men have frequent occaſion to have and communicate: and in ſuch, I aſk, whether it be not the ordinary method, that children learn the names of mixed modes, before they have their ideas? What one of a thouſand ever frames the abſtract idea of glory and ambition, before he has heard the name of them? In ſimple

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ideas of ſubſtances, I grant it is otherwiſe; which being ſuch ideas as have a real exiſtence and union in nature, the ideas, or names, are got one before the other, as it happens.

Reaſon of my being ſo large on this ſubject.

§ 16. What has been ſaid here of mixed modes, is with very little difference applicable alſo to relations; which, ſince every man himſelf may obſerve, I may ſpare myſelf the pains to enlarge on: eſpecially, ſince what I have here ſaid, concerning words, in this third book, will poſſibly be thought by ſome to be much more, than what ſo ſlight a ſubject required. I allow it might be brought into a narrower compaſs: but I was willing to ſtay my reader on an argument, that appears to me new, and a little out of the way, (I am ſure it is one I thought not of, when I began to write) that by ſearching it to the bottom, and turning it on every ſide, ſome part or other might meet with every one's thoughts, and give occaſion to the moſt averſe, or negligent, to reflect on a general miſcarriage; which, tho' of great conſequence, is little taken notice of. When it is conſidered what a pudder is made about eſſences, and how much all ſorts of knowledge, diſcourſe, and converſation are peſtered and diſordered by the careleſs and confuſed uſe and application of words, it will, perhaps, be thought worth while thorowly to lay it open. And I ſhall be pardoned, if I have dwelt long on an argument, which, I think, therefore, needs to be inculcated; becauſe the faults, men are uſually guilty of, in this kind, are not only the greateſt hindrances of true knowledge, but are ſo well thought of, as to paſs for it. Men would often ſee, what a ſmall pittance of reaſon and truth, or, poſſibly, none at all, is mixed with thoſe huffing opinions they are ſwelled with; if they would but look beyond faſhionable ſounds, and obſerve what ideas are, or are not comprehended under thoſe words, with which they are ſo armed at all points, and with which they ſo confidently lay about them. I ſhall imagine I have done ſome ſervice to truth, peace, and learning, if, by any enlargement on this ſubject, I can make men reflect on their own uſe of language; and give them reaſon to ſuſpect, that, ſince it is frequent for others, it may alſo be poſſible for them, to have ſometimes very good and approved words, in their mouths and writings, with very uncertain, little, or no ſignification. And therefore, it is not unreaſonable for them to be wary herein themſelves, and not to be unwilling to have them examined by others. With this deſign, therefore, I ſhall go on with what I have farther to ſay concerning this matter.

CHAP. VI.

Of the names of ſubſtances.

CHAP. VI.

The common names of ſubſtances ſtand for ſorts.

§ 1. THE common names of ſubſtances, as well as other general terms, ſtand for ſorts; which is nothing elſe, but the being made ſigns of ſuch complex ideas, wherein ſeveral particular ſubſtances do, or might agree, by virtue of which they are capable of being comprehended in one common conception, and ſignified by one name. I ſay, do, or might agree: for tho' there be but one ſun exiſting in the world, yet the idea of it being abſtracted, ſo that more ſubſtances (if there were ſeveral) might each agree in it; it is as much a ſort, as if there were as many ſuns as there are ſtars. They want not their reaſons, who think there are, and that each fixed ſtar would anſwer the idea the name ſun ſtands for, to one who were placed in a due diſtance; which, by the way, may ſhew us how much the ſorts, or, if you pleaſe, genera and ſpecies of things (for thoſe Latin terms ſignify to me no more, than the Engliſh word ſort) depend on ſuch collections of ideas, as men have made, and not on the real nature of things; ſince it is not impoſſible, but that, in propriety of ſpeech, that might be a ſun to one, which is a ſtar to another.

The eſſence of each ſort is the abſtract idea.

§ 2. The meaſure and boundary of each ſort, or ſpecies, whereby it is conſtituted that particular ſort, and diſtinguiſhed from others, is that we call its eſſence, which is nothing but that abſtract idea to which the name is annexed: ſo that every thing, contained in that idea, is eſſential to that ſort. This, tho' it be all the eſſence of natural ſubſtances that we know, or by which we diſtinguiſh them into ſorts; yet I call it by a peculiar name, the nominal eſſence, to diſtinguiſh it from that real conſtitution of ſubſtances, upon which depends this nominal eſſence, and all the properties of that ſort; which, therefore, as has been ſaid, may be called the real eſſence: v. g. the nominal eſſence of gold is that complex idea, the word gold ſtands for, let it be, for inſtance, a body yellow, of a certain weight, malleable, fuſible and fixed. But the real eſſence is the conſtitution of the inſenſible parts of that body, on which thoſe qualities, and all the other properties of gold depend. How far theſe two are different, tho' they are both called eſſence, is obvious at firſt ſight to diſcover.

The nominal and real eſſence different.

§ 3. For tho', perhaps, voluntary motion, with ſenſe and reaſon, joined to a body of a certain ſhape, be the complex idea to which I, and others, annex the name man, and ſo be the nominal eſſence of the ſpecies ſo called; yet no body will ſay that that complex idea is the real eſſence, and ſource of all thoſe operations, which are to be found in any individual of that ſort. The foundation of all thoſe qualities, which are the ingredients of our complex idea, is ſomething quite different: and had we ſuch a knowledge of that conſtitution of man, from which his faculties of moving, ſenſation, and reaſoning, and other powers flow; and on which his ſo regular ſhape depends, as it is poſſible angels have, and it is certain, his maker has: we ſhould have a quite other idea of his eſſence, than what now is contained in our definition of that ſpecies, be it what it will: and our idea of any individual man would be as far different from what it now is, as is his who knows all the ſprings, and wheels, and other contrivances within, of the famous clock at Straſburg, from that which a gazing countryman has of it, who barely ſees the motion of the hand, and hears the clock ſtrike, and obſerves only ſome of the outward appearances.

Nothing eſſential to individuals.

§ 4. That eſſence, in the ordinary uſe of the word, relates to ſorts; and that it is conſidered in particular beings, no farther than as they are ranked into ſorts, appears from hence: that take but away the abſtract ideas, by which we ſort individuals, and rank them under common names, and then the thought of any thing eſſential to any of them, inſtantly vaniſhes; we have no notion of the one without the other; which plainly ſhews their relation. It is neceſſary for me to be as I am; God and nature has made me ſo: but there is nothing I have, is eſſential to me. An accident, or diſeaſe, may very much alter my colour, or ſhape; a fever, or fall, may take away my reaſon, or memory, or both; and an apoplexy leave neither ſenſe, nor underſtanding, no nor life. Other creatures of my ſhape may be made with more, and better, or fewer, and worſe faculties than I have: and others may have reaſon and ſenſe, in a ſhape and body very different from mine. None of theſe are eſſential to the one, or the other, or to any individual whatſoever, till the mind refers it to ſome ſort, or ſpecies, of things; and then preſently, according to the abſtract idea of that ſort, ſomething is found eſſential. Let any one examine his own thoughts, and he will find that as ſoon as he ſuppoſes, or ſpeaks of eſſential, the conſideration of ſome ſpecies, or the complex idea, ſignified by ſome general name, comes into his mind: and it is in reference to that, that this or that quality is ſaid to be eſſential. So that if it be aſked, whether it be eſſential to me, or any other particular, corporeal being, to have reaſon? I ſay no; no more than it is eſſential to this white thing I write on, to have words in it. But if that particular being be to be counted of the ſort man, and to have the name man given it, then reaſon is eſſential to it, ſuppoſing reaſon to be a part of the complex idea, the name man ſtands for: as it is eſſential to this thing I write on to contain words, if I will give it the name treatiſe, and rank it under that ſpecies. So that eſſential, and not eſſential, relate only to our abſtract ideas, and the names annexed to them; which amounts to no more but this, that whatever particular thing has not in it thoſe qualities, which are contained in the abſtract idea, which any general term ſtands for, cannot be ranked under that ſpecies, nor be called by that name, ſince that abſtract idea is the very eſſence of that ſpecies.

§ 5. Thus, if the idea of body, with ſome people, be bare extenſion, or ſpace, then ſolidity is not eſſential to body: if others make the idea, to which they give the name body, to be ſolidity and extenſion, then ſolidity is eſſential to body. That therefore, and that alone is conſidered as eſſential, which makes a part of the complex idea, the name of a ſort ſtands for, without which no particular thing can be reckoned of that ſort, nor be entitled to that name. Should there be found a parcel of matter, that had all the other qualities that are in iron, but wanted obedience to the load-ſtone; and would neither be drawn by it, nor receive direction from it, would any one queſtion, whether it wanted any thing eſſential? It would be abſurd to aſk, whether a thing, really exiſting, wanted any thing eſſential to it. Or could it be demanded, whether this made an eſſential, or ſpecifick difference, or no; ſince we have no other meaſure of eſſential or ſpecifick, but our abſtract ideas? And to talk of ſpecifick differences in nature, without reference to general ideas and names, is to talk unintelligibly. For I would aſk any one, what is ſufficient to make an eſſential difference in nature, between any two particular beings, without any regard had to ſome abſtract idea, which is looked upon as the eſſence and ſtandard of a ſpecies? All ſuch patterns and ſtandards, being quite laid aſide, particular beings, conſidered barely in themſelves, will be found to have all their qualities equally eſſential; and every thing in each individual, will be eſſential to it, or, which is more, nothing at all. For tho' it may be reaſonable to aſk, whether obeying the magnet be eſſential to iron? yet, I think, it is very improper and inſignificant to aſk, whether it be eſſential to the particular parcel of matter, I cut my pen with, without conſidering it under the name iron, or as being of a certain ſpecies? And if, as has been ſaid, our abſtract ideas, which have names annexed to them, are the boundaries of ſpecies, nothing can be eſſential but what is contained in thoſe ideas.

§ 6. It is true, I have often mentioned a real eſſence, diſtinct in ſubſtances from thoſe abſtract ideas of them, which I call their nominal eſſence. By this real eſſence I mean that real conſtitution of any thing, which is the foundation of all thoſe properties, that are combined in, and are conſtantly found to coexiſt with, the nominal eſſence; that particular conſtitution, which every thing has within itſelf, without any relation to any thing without it. But eſſence, even in this ſenſe, relates to a ſort, and ſuppoſes a ſpecies: for being that real conſtitution, on which the properties depend, it neceſſarily ſuppoſes a ſort of things, properties belonging only to ſpecies, and not to individuals: v. g. ſuppoſing the nominal eſſence of gold to be body of ſuch a peculiar colour and weight, with malleability and fuſibility, the real eſſence is that conſtitution of the parts of matter, on which theſe qualities, and their union, depend; and is alſo the foundation of its ſolubility in aqua regia, and other properties accompanying that complex idea. Here are eſſences and properties, but all upon ſuppoſition of a ſort, or general abſtract idea, which is conſidered as immutable: but there is no individual parcel of matter, to which any of theſe qualities are ſo annexed, as to be eſſential to it, or inſeparable from it, that which is eſſential belongs to it as a condition, whereby it is of this, or that ſort: but take away the conſideration of its being ranked, under the name of ſome abſtract idea, and then there is nothing neceſſary to it, nothing inſeparable from it. Indeed, as to the real eſſences of ſubſtances, we only ſuppoſe their being, without preciſely knowing what they are, but that, which annexes them ſtill to the ſpecies, is the nominal eſſence, of which they are the ſuppoſed foundation and cauſe.

The nominal eſſence bounds the ſpecies.

§ 7. The next thing to be conſidered, is, by which of thoſe eſſences it is that ſubſtances are determined into ſorts, or ſpecies; and that, it is evident, is by the nominal eſſence. For it is that alone that the name, which is the mark of the ſort, ſignifies. It is impoſſible, therefore, that any thing ſhould determine the ſorts of things, which we rank under general names, but that idea, which that name is deſigned as a mark for; which is that, as has been ſhewn, which we call the nominal eſſence. Why do we ſay, this is a horſe, and that a mule; this is an animal, that an herb? How comes any particular thing to be of this, or that ſort, but becauſe it has that nominal eſſence, or, which is all one, agrees to that abſtract idea that name is annexed to? And I deſire any one but to reflect on his own thoughts, when he hears, or ſpeaks any of thoſe, or other names of ſubſtances, to know what ſort of eſſences they ſtand for.

§ 8.

§ 8. And that the ſpecies of things to us are nothing, but the ranking them under diſtinct names, according to the complex ideas in us; and not according to preciſe, diſtinct, real eſſences in them, is plain from hence, that we find many of the individuals, that are ranked into one ſort, called by one common name, and ſo received as being of one ſpecies, have yet qualities depending on their real conſtitutions, as far different one from another, as from others, from which they are accounted to differ ſpecifically. This, as it is eaſy to be obſerved by all who have to do with natural bodies, ſo chymiſts eſpecially are often, by ſad experience, convinced of it, when they, ſometimes in vain, ſeek for the ſame qualities in one parcel of ſulphur, antimony or vitriol, which they have found in others. For tho' they are bodies of the ſame ſpecies, having the ſame nominal eſſence, under the ſame name; yet do they often, upon ſevere ways of examination, betray qualities ſo different one from another, as to fruſtrate the expectation and labour of very wary chymiſts. But, if things were diſtinguiſhed into ſpecies, according to their real eſſences, it would be as impoſſible to find different properties, in any two individual ſubſtances of the ſame ſpecies, as it is to find different properties in two circles, or two equilateral triangles. That is properly the eſſence to us, which determines every particular to this, or that claſſis; or, which is the ſame thing, to this or that general name: and what can that be elſe, but that abſtract idea, to which that name is annexed? and ſo has, in truth, a reference, not ſo much to the being of particular things, as to their general denominations.

Not the real eſſence, which we know not.

§ 9. Nor, indeed, can we rank, and ſort things, and conſequently (which is the end of ſorting) denominate them by their real eſſences, becauſe we know them not. Our faculties carry us no farther towards the knowledge and diſtinction of ſubſtances, than a collection of thoſe ſenſible ideas, which we obſerve in them; which however made with the greateſt diligence and exactneſs we are capable of, yet is more remote from the true, internal conſtitution, from which thoſe qualities flow, than, as I ſaid, a countryman's idea is from the inward contrivance of that famous clock at Straſburgh, whereof he only ſees the outward figure and motions. There is not ſo contemptible a plant, or animal, that does not confound the moſt inlarged underſtanding. Though the familiar uſe of things about us, take off our wonder; yet it cures not our ignorance. When we come to examine the ſtones we tread on, or the iron we daily handle, we preſently find we know not their make, and can give no reaſon of the different qualities we find in them. It is evident the internal conſtitution, whereon their properties depend, is unknown to us. For to go no farther than the groſſeſt and moſt obvious we can imagine amongſt them, what is that texture of parts, that real eſſence, that makes lead and antimony fuſible; wood and ſtones not? What makes lead and iron malleable; antimony and ſtones not? And yet how infinitely theſe come ſhort of the fine contrivances, and unconceivable real eſſences of plants or animals, every one knows. The workmanſhip of the all-wiſe and powerful God, in the great fabrick of the univerſe, and every part thereof, farther exceeds the capacity and comprehenſion of the moſt inquiſitive and intelligent man, than the beſt contrivance of the moſt ingenious man doth the conceptions of the moſt ignorant of rational creatures. Therefore we in vain pretend to range things into ſorts, and diſpoſe them into certain claſſes, under names, by their real eſſences, that are ſo far from our diſcovery, or comprehenſion. A blind man may as ſoon ſort things by their colours, and he that has loſt his ſmell, as well diſtinguiſh a lilly and a roſe, by their odours, as by thoſe internal conſtitutions which he knows not. He that thinks he can diſtinguiſh ſheep and goats by their real eſſences, that are unknown to him, may be pleaſed to try his ſkill in thoſe ſpecies, called caſſiowary and querechinchio; and by their internal real eſſences determine the boundaries of theſe ſpecies, without knowing the complex idea of ſenſible qualities, that each of thoſe names ſtand for, in the countries where thoſe animals are to be found.

Not ſubſtantial forms, which we know leſs.

§ 10. Those, therefore, who have been taught, that the ſeveral ſpecies of ſubſtances had their diſtinct, internal, ſubſtantial forms; and that it was thoſe forms, which made the diſtinction of ſubſtances into their true ſpecies and genera, were led yet farther out of the way by having their minds ſet upon fruitleſs enquiries after ſubſtantial forms, wholly unintelligible, and whereof we have ſcarce ſo much as any obſcure, or confuſed conception in general.

That the nominal eſſence is that whereby we diſtinguiſh ſpecies, farther evident from ſpirits.

§ 11. THAT our ranking and diſtinguiſhing natural ſubſtances into ſpecies, conſiſts in the nominal eſſences the mind makes, and not in the real eſſences to be found in the things themſelves, is farther evident from our ideas of ſpirits. For the mind getting, only by reflecting on its own operations, thoſe ſimple ideas which it attributes to ſpirits, it hath, or can have no other notion of ſpirit, but by attributing all thoſe operations, it finds in itſelf, to a ſort of beings, without conſideration of matter. And even the moſt advanced notion we have of God, is but attributing the ſame ſimple ideas, which we have got from reflection on what we find in ourſelves, and which we conceive to have more perfection in them, than would be in their abſence; attributing, I ſay, thoſe ſimple ideas to him in an unlimitted degree. Thus having got, from reflecting on our ſelves, the idea of exiſtence, knowledge, power and pleaſure, each of which we find it better to have than to want; and the more we have of each, the better; joining all theſe together, with infinity to each of them, we have the complex idea of an eternal, omniſcient, omnipotent, infinitely wiſe and happy being. And tho' we are told, that there are different ſpecies of angels; yet we know not how to frame diſtinct, ſpecifick ideas of them: not out of any conceit that the exiſtence of more ſpecies, than one, of ſpirits is impoſſible, but becauſe having no more ſimple ideas (nor being able to frame more) applicable to ſuch beings, but only thoſe few taken from ourſelves, and from the actions of our own minds in thinking, and being delighted, and moving ſeveral parts of our bodies, we can no otherwiſe diſtinguiſh in our conceptions the ſeveral ſpecies of ſpirits, one from another, but by attributing thoſe operations and powers, we find in our ſelves, to them in a higher, or lower degree; and ſo have no very diſtinct ſpecifick ideas of ſpirits, except only of God, to whom we attribute both duration, and all thoſe other ideas with infinity; to the other ſpirits, with limitation. Nor, as I humbly conceive, do we, between God and them in our ideas, put any difference, by any number of ſimple ideas, which we have of one, and not of the other, but only that of infinity. All the particular ideas of exiſtence, knowledge, will, power, and motion, &c. being ideas derived from the operations of our minds, we attribute all of them to all ſorts of ſpirits, with the difference only of degrees, to the utmoſt we can imagine, even infinity, when we would frame, as well as we can, an idea of the firſt being; who yet, it is certain, is infinitely more remote in the real excellency of his nature, from the higheſt and perfecteſt of all created beings, than the greateſt man, nay, pureſt ſeraph, is from the moſt contemptible part of matter; and conſequently muſt infinitely exceed what our narrow underſtandings can conceive of him.

Whereof there are, probably, numberleſs ſpecies.

§ 12. IT is not impoſſible to conceive, nor repugnant to reaſon, that there may be many ſpecies of ſpirits, as much ſeparated and diverſified one from another by diſtinct properties, whereof we have no ideas, as the ſpecies of ſenſible things are diſtinguiſhed one from another by qualities, which we know and obſerve in them. That there ſhould be more ſpecies of intelligent creatures above us, than there are of ſenſible and material below us, is probable to me from hence, that in all the viſible, corporeal world, we ſee no chaſms, or gaps. All quite down from us, the deſcent is by eaſy ſteps, and a continued ſeries of things, that in each remove differ very little one from the other. There are fiſhes that have wings, that are not ſtrangers to the airy region; and there are ſome birds that are inhabitants of the water, whoſe blood is cold as fiſhes, and their fleſh is ſo like in taſte, that the ſcrupulous are allowed them on fiſh-days. There are animals ſo near of kin both to birds and beaſts, that they are in the middle between both: amphibious animals link the terreſtrial and aquatick together; ſeals live at land and at ſea, and porpoiſes have the warm blood and entrails of a hog, not to mention what is confidently reported of mermaids, or ſea-men. There are ſome brutes, that ſeem to have as much knowledge and reaſon, as ſome that are called men; and the animal and vegetable kingdoms are ſo nearly joined, that if you will take the loweſt of one, and the higheſt of the other, there will ſcarce be perceived any great difference between them; and ſo on, till we come to the loweſt and the moſt inorganical parts of matter, we ſhall find every where, that the ſeveral ſpecies are linked together, and differ but in almoſt inſenſible degrees. And, when we conſider the infinite power and wiſdom of the maker, we have reaſon to think that it is ſuitable to the magnificent harmony of the univerſe, and the great deſign and infinite goodneſs of the architect, that the ſpecies of creatures ſhould alſo, by gentle degrees, aſcend upward from us toward his infinite perfection, as we ſee they gradually deſcend from us downwards: which, if it be probable, we have reaſon then to be perſuaded, that there are far more ſpecies of creatures above us, than there are beneath; we being in degrees of perfection, much more remote from the infinite being of God, than we are from the loweſt ſtate of being, and that which approaches neareſt to nothing. And yet of all thoſe diſtinct ſpecies, for the reaſons above ſaid, we have no clear diſtinct ideas.

The nominal eſſence that of the ſpecies proved from water and ice.

§ 13. But to return to the ſpecies of corporeal ſubſtances. If I ſhould aſk any one, whether ice and water were two diſtinct ſpecies of things, I doubt not but I ſhould be anſwered in the affirmative: and it cannot be denied, but he that ſays they are two diſtinct ſpecies, is in the right. But if an Engliſhman, bred in Jamaica, who perhaps had never ſeen nor heard of ice, coming into England in the winter, find the water, he put in his baſon at night, in a great part frozen in the morning, and not knowing any peculiar name it had, ſhould call it hardened water: I aſk, whether this would be a new ſpecies to him different from water? And, I think, it would be anſwered here, it would not be to him a new ſpecies, no more than congealed gelly, when it is cold, is a diſtinct ſpecies from the ſame gelly fluid and warm; or than liquid gold, in the furnace, is a diſtinct ſpecies from hard gold in the hands of a workman. And if this be ſo, it is plain, that our diſtinct ſpecies are nothing but diſtinct, complex ideas, with diſtinct names annexed to them. It is true, every ſubſtance, that exiſts, has its peculiar conſtitution, whereon depend thoſe ſenſible qualities and powers we obſerve in it; but the ranking of things into ſpecies, which is nothing but ſorting them under ſeveral titles, is done by us according to the ideas that we have of them: which tho' ſufficient to diſtinguiſh them by names, ſo that we may be able to diſcourſe of them, when we have them not preſent before us; yet if we ſuppoſe it to be done by their real, internal conſtitutions, and that things exiſting are diſtinguiſhed by nature into ſpecies, by real eſſences, according as we diſtinguiſh them into ſpecies by names, we ſhall be liable to great miſtakes.

Difficulties againſt a certain number of real eſſences.

§ 14. To diſtinguiſh ſubſtantial beings into ſpecies, according to the uſual ſuppoſition, that there are certain preciſe eſſences, or forms of things, whereby all the individuals exiſting, are by nature diſtinguiſhed into ſpecies, theſe things are neceſſary:

§ 15. First, to be aſſured that nature, in the production of things, always deſigns them to partake of certain, regulated, eſtabliſhed eſſences, which are to be the models of all things to be produced. This, in that crude ſenſe it is uſually propoſed, would need ſome better explication, before it can fully be aſſented to.

§ 16. Secondly, it would be neceſſary to know whether nature always attains that eſſence it deſigns in the production of things. The irregular and monſtrous births, that in divers ſorts of animals have been obſerved, will always give us reaſon to doubt of one, or both of theſe.

§ 17. Thirdly, it ought to be determined whether thoſe we call monſters be really a diſtinct ſpecies, according to the ſcholaſtick notion of the word ſpecies; ſince it is certain, that every thing, that exiſts, has its particular conſtitution: and yet we find that ſome of theſe monſtrous productions have few, or none of thoſe qualities, which are ſuppoſed to reſult from, and accompany the eſſence of that ſpecies, from whence they derived their originals, and to which, by their deſcent, they ſeem to belong.

§ 18. Fourthly, the real eſſences of thoſe things, which we diſtinguiſh into ſpecies, and as ſo diſtinguiſhed we name, ought to be known; i. e. we ought to have ideas of them. But ſince we are ignorant in theſe four points, the ſuppoſed real eſſences of things ſtand us not in ſtead for the diſtinguiſhing ſubſtances into ſpecies.

Our nominal eſſences of ſubſtances, not perfect collections of properties.

§ 19. FIFTHLY, the only imaginable help in this caſe would be, that having framed perfect, complex ideas of the properties of things, flowing from their different, real eſſences, we ſhould thereby diſtinguiſh them into ſpecies. But neither can this be done; for being ignorant of the real eſſence itſelf, it is impoſſible to know all thoſe properties that flow from it, and are ſo annexed to it, that any one of them being away, we may certainly conclude, that that eſſence is not there, and ſo the thing is not of that ſpecies. We can never know what are the preciſe number of properties, depending on the real eſſence of gold, any one of which failing, the real eſſence of gold, and conſequently gold, would not be there, unleſs we knew the real eſſence of gold itſelf, and by that determined that ſpecies. By the word gold here, I muſt be underſtood to deſign a particular piece of matter; v. g. the laſt guinea that was coined. For if it ſhould ſtand here in its ordinary ſignification for that complex idea, which I or any one elſe calls gold; i. e. for the nominal eſſence of gold, it would be jargon: ſo hard is it to ſhew the various meaning and imperfection of words, when we have nothing elſe but words to do it by.

§ 20. BY all which it is clear, that our diſtinguiſhing ſubſtances into ſpecies by names, is not at all founded on their real eſſences; nor can we pretend to range and determine them exactly into ſpecies, according to the internal, eſſential differences.

But ſuch a collection as our name ſtands for.

§ 21. BUT ſince, as has been remarked, we have need of general words, tho' we know not the real eſſences of things; all we can do is to collect ſuch a number of ſimple ideas, as by examination we find to be united together in things exiſting, and thereof to make one complex idea. Which, tho' it be not the real eſſence of any ſubſtance that exiſts, is yet, the ſpecifick eſſence, to which our name belongs, and is convertible with it; by which we may at leaſt try the truth of theſe nominal eſſences. For example, there be that ſay, that the eſſence of body is extenſion: if it be ſo, we can never miſtake in putting the eſſence of any thing for the thing itſelf. Let us then in diſcourſe put extenſion for body; and when we would ſay that body moves, let us ſay that extenſion moves, and ſee how it will look. He that ſhould ſay that one extenſion by impulſe moves another extenſion, would, by the bare expreſſion, ſufficiently ſhew the abſurdity of ſuch a notion. The eſſence of any thing, in reſpect of us, is the whole complex idea, comprehended and marked by that name; and in ſubſtances, beſides the ſeveral diſtinct, ſimple ideas that make them up, the confuſed one of ſubſtance, or of an unknown ſupport and cauſe of their union, is always a part: and, therefore, the eſſence of body is not bare extenſion, but an extended, ſolid thing: and ſo to ſay an extended, ſolid thing moves or impels another, is all one, and as intelligible, as to ſay, body moves or impels. Likewiſe to ſay, that a rational animal is capable of converſation, is all one as to ſay a man. But no one will ſay, that rationality is capable of converſation, becauſe it makes not the whole eſſence, to which we give the name man.

Our abſtract ideas are to us the meaſures of ſpecies; inſtance in that of man.

§ 22. THERE are creatures in the world, that have ſhapes like ours, but are hairy, and want language and reaſon. There are naturals amongſt us, that have perfectly our ſhape, but want reaſon, and ſome of them language too. There are creatures, as it is ſaid ("ſit fides penes authorem", but there appears no contradiction that there ſhould be ſuch) that with language, and reaſon, and a ſhape in other things agreeing with ours, have hairy tails; others where the males have no beards, and others where the females have. If it be aſked, whether theſe be all men or no, all of human ſpecies; it is plain, the queſtion refers only to the nominal eſſence: for thoſe of them, to whom the definition of the word man, or the complex idea ſignified by that name, agrees, are men, and the other not. But, if the inquiry be made, concerning the ſuppoſed real eſſence, and whether the internal conſtitution and frame of theſe ſeveral creatures be ſpecifically different, it is wholly impoſſible for us to anſwer, no part of that going into our ſpecifick idea; only we have reaſon to think, that where the faculties, or outward frame, ſo much differs, the internal conſtitution is not exactly the ſame. But what difference in the internal, real conſtitution makes a ſpecifick difference, it is in vain to enquire; whilſt our meaſures of ſpecies be, as they are, only our abſtract ideas, which we know; and not that internal conſtitution, which makes no part of them. Shall the difference of hair only on the ſkin, be a mark of a different, internal, ſpecifick conſtitution between a changeling and a drill, when they agree in ſhape, and want of reaſon and ſpeech? And ſhall not the want of reaſon and ſpeech be a ſign to us of different real conſtitutions and ſpecies between a changeling and a reaſonable man? And ſo of the reſt, if we pretend that the diſtinction of ſpecies, or ſorts, is fixedly eſtabliſhed by the real frame and ſecret conſtitutions of things.

Species, not diſtinguiſhed by generation.

§ 23. Nor let any one ſay, that the power of propagation in animals, by the mixture of male and female, and in plants, by ſeeds, keeps the ſuppoſed, real ſpecies diſtinct and entire. For, granting this to be true, it would help us in the diſtinction of the ſpecies of things no farther than the tribes of animals and vegetables. What muſt we do for the reſt? But in thoſe too it is not ſufficient: for if hiſtory lie not, women have conceived by drills; and what real ſpecies, by that meaſure, ſuch a production will be in nature, will be a new queſtion: and we have reaſon to think this is not impoſſible, ſince mules and jumarts, the one from the mixture of an aſs and a mare, the other from the mixture of a bull and a mare, are ſo frequent in the world. I once ſaw a creature that was the iſſue of a cat and a rat, and had the plain marks of both about it; wherein nature appeared to have followed the pattern of neither ſort alone, but to have jumbled them both together. To which, he that ſhall add the monſtrous productions, that are ſo frequently to be met with in nature, will find it hard, even in the race of animals, to determine, by the pedigree, of what ſpecies every animal's iſſue is; and be at a loſs about the real eſſence, which he thinks certainly conveyed by generation, and has alone a right to the ſpecifick name. But farther, if the ſpecies of animals and plants are to be diſtinguiſhed only by propagation, muſt I go to the Indies to ſee the ſire and dam of the one, and the plant from which the ſeed was gathered, that produced the other, to know whether this be a tyger, or that tea?

Not by ſubſtantial forms.

§ 24. Upon the whole matter, it is evident, that it is their own collections of ſenſible qualities, that men make the eſſences of their ſeveral ſorts of ſubſtances; and that their real, internal ſtructures are not conſidered, by the greateſt part of men, in the ſorting them. Much leſs were any ſubſtantial forms ever thought on by any, but thoſe, who have in this one part of the world learned the language of the ſchools: and yet thoſe ignorant men, who pretend not any inſight into the real eſſences, nor trouble themſelves about ſubſtantial forms, but are content with knowing things one from another, by their ſenſible qualities, are often better acquainted with their differences, can more nicely diſtinguiſh them from their uſes, and better know what they may expect from each, than thoſe learned, quickſighted men, who look ſo deep into them, and talk ſo confidently of ſomething more hidden and eſſential.

The ſpecifick eſſences are made by the mind.

§ 25. But, ſuppoſing that the real eſſence of ſubſtances were diſcoverable, by thoſe that would ſeverely apply themſelves to that enquiry, yet we could not reaſonably think, that the ranking of things under general names, was regulated by thoſe internal, real conſtitutions, or any thing elſe, but their obvious appearances: ſince languages, in all countries, have been eſtabliſhed long before ſciences. So that they have not been philoſophers, or logicians, or ſuch who have troubled themſelves about forms and eſſences, that have made the general names, that are in uſe amongſt the ſeveral nations of men: but thoſe more or leſs comprehenſive terms have, for the moſt part, in all languages, received their birth and ſignification from ignorant and illiterate people, who ſorted and denominated things by thoſe ſenſible qualities they found in them; thereby to ſignify them, when abſent, to others, whether they had an occaſion to mention a ſort, or a particular thing.

Therefore very various and uncertain.

§ 26. Since then it is evident, that we ſort and name ſubſtances, by their nominal, and not by their real eſſences; the next thing to be conſidered is, how and by whom theſe eſſences come to be made. As to the latter, it is evident they

they are made by the mind, and not by nature: for were they nature's workmanſhip, they could not be ſo various and different in ſeveral men, as experience tells us they are. For if we will examine it, we ſhall not find the nominal eſſence, of any one ſpecies of ſubſtances, in all men the ſame; no not of that, which of all others we are the moſt intimately acquainted with. It could not poſſibly be, that the abſtract idea, to which the name man is given, ſhould be different in ſeveral men, if it were of nature's making; and that to one it ſhould be " animal rationale", and to another " animal implume, bipes, latis unguibus." He that annexes the name man, to a complex idea, made up of ſenſe and ſpontaneous motion, joined to a body of ſuch a ſhape, has thereby one eſſence of the ſpecies man; and he that, upon farther examination, adds rationality, has another eſſence of the ſpecies he calls man: by which means, the ſame individual will be a true man to the one, which is not ſo to the other. I think, there is ſcarce any one will allow this upright figure, ſo well known, to be the eſſential difference of the ſpecies, man; and yet, how far men determine of the ſorts of animals rather by their ſhape, than deſcent, is very viſible: ſince it has been more than once debated, whether ſeveral human fœtus's ſhould be preſerved, or received to baptiſm, or no, only becauſe of the difference of their outward configuration from the ordinary make of children, without knowing whether they were not as capable of reaſon, as infants caſt in another mold: ſome whereof, tho' of an approved ſhape, are never capable of as much appearance of reaſon, all their lives, as is to be found in an ape, or an elephant; and never give any ſigns of being acted by a rational ſoul. Whereby it is evident, that the outward figure, which only was found wanting, and not the faculty of reaſon, which no body could know would be wanting in its due ſeaſon, was made eſſential to the human ſpecies: the learned divine and lawyer, muſt, on ſuch occaſions, renounce his ſacred definition of " animal rationale", and ſubſtitute ſome other eſſence of the human ſpecies. Monſieur Menage furniſhes us with an example, worth the taking notice of on this occaſion. When the abbot of St. Martin, ſays he, was born, he had ſo little of the figure of a man, that it beſpoke him rather a monſter. It was for ſometime under deliberation, whether he ſhould be baptized, or no? However, he was baptized, and declared a man proviſionally (till time ſhould ſhew what he would prove.) Nature had moulded him ſo untowardly, that he was called all his life the abbot Malotrue, i. e. ill-ſhaped. He was of Caen. Menagiana $\frac{278}{430}$. This child, we ſee, was very near being excluded out of the ſpecies of man barely by his ſhape. He eſcaped very narrowly as he was, and it is certain a figure a little more oddly turned had caſt him, and he had been executed, as a thing not to be allowed to paſs for a man. And yet there can be no reaſon given, why, if the lineaments of his face had been a little altered, a rational ſoul could not have been lodged in him; why a viſage ſomewhat longer, or a noſe flatter, or a wider mouth, could not have conſiſted, as well as the reſt of his ill figure, with ſuch a ſoul, ſuch parts, as made him, disfigured as he was, capable to be a dignitary in the church.

§ 27. WHEREIN then, would I gladly know, conſiſts the preciſe and unmovable boundaries of that ſpecies? It is plain, if we examine, there is no ſuch thing made by nature, and eſtabliſhed by her amongſt men. The real eſſence of that, or any other ſort of ſubſtances, it is evident we know not; and therefore are ſo undetermined in our nominal eſſence, which we make ourſelves, that if ſeveral men were to be aſked, concerning ſome oddly-ſhaped fœtus, as ſoon as born, whether it were a man, or no? it is paſt doubt, one ſhould meet with different anſwers: which could not happen, if the nominal eſſences, whereby we limit and diſtinguiſh the ſpecies of ſubſtances, were not made by man, with ſome liberty; but were exactly copied from preciſe boundaries, ſet by nature, whereby it diſtinguiſhed all ſubſtances into certain ſpecies. Who would undertake to reſolve, what ſpecies that monſter was of, which is mentioned by Licetus, lib. 1. c. 3. with a man's head and hog's body? Or thoſe other, which to the bodies of men had the heads of beaſts, as dogs, horſes, &c. If any of theſe creatures had lived, and could have ſpoke, it would have increaſed the difficulty. Had the upper part, to the middle, been of human ſhape; and all below ſwine;

had it been murder to deſtroy it? or muſt the biſhop have been conſulted, whether it were man enough to be admitted to the font, or no? as, I have been told, it happened in France ſome years ſince, in ſomewhat a like caſe. So uncertain are the boundaries of ſpecies of animals to us, who have no other meaſures than the complex ideas of our own collecting: and ſo far are we from certainly knowing what a man is; tho', perhaps, it will be judged great ignorance to make any doubt about it. And yet, I think, I may ſay, that the certain boundaries of that ſpecies are ſo far from being determined, and the preciſe number of ſimple ideas, which make the nominal eſſence, ſo far from being ſettled and perfectly known, that very material doubts may ſtill ariſe about it. And, I imagine, none of the definitions of the word man, which we yet have, nor deſcriptions of that ſort of animal, are ſo perfect and exact, as to ſatisfy a conſiderate, inquiſitive perſon, much leſs to obtain a general conſent, and to be that, which men would every where ſtick by, in the deciſion of caſes, and determining of life and death, baptiſm, or no baptiſm, in productions that might happen.

But not ſo arbitrary, as mixed modes.

§ 28. But, tho' theſe nominal eſſences of ſubſtances are made by the mind, they are not yet made ſo arbitrarily as thoſe of mixed modes. To the making of any nominal eſſence, it is neceſſary, Firſt, that the ideas whereof it conſiſts, have ſuch an union as to make but one idea, how compounded ſoever. Secondly, that the particular ideas ſo united be exactly the ſame, neither more nor leſs. For if two abſtract, complex ideas differ either in number, or ſorts, of their component parts, they make two different, and not one and the ſame eſſence. In the firſt of theſe, the mind, in making its complex ideas of ſubſtances, only follows nature; and puts none together, which are not ſuppoſed to have an union in nature. No body joins the voice of a ſheep, with the ſhape of a horſe; nor the colour of lead, with the weight and fixedneſs of gold, to be the complex ideas of any real ſubſtances: unleſs he has a mind to fill his head with chimera's, and his diſcourſe with unintelligible words. Men, obſerving certain qualities always joined and exiſting together, therein copied nature; and of ideas ſo united, made their complex ones of ſubſtances. For, tho' men may make what complex ideas they pleaſe, and give what names to them they will; yet, if they will be underſtood, when they ſpeak of things really exiſting, they muſt in ſome degree conform their ideas to the things they would ſpeak of: or elſe men's language will be like that of Babel; and every man's words, being intelligible only to himſelf, would no longer ſerve to converſation, and the ordinary affairs of life, if the ideas they ſtand for, be not ſome way anſwering the common appearances and agreement of ſubſtances, as they really exiſt.

Tho' very imperfect.

§ 29. Secondly, tho' the mind of man, in making its complex ideas of ſubſtances, never puts any together, that do not really, or are not ſuppoſed, to coexiſt; and ſo it truly borrows that union from nature: yet the number it combines, depends upon the various care, induſtry, or fancy, of him that makes it. Men generally content themſelves with ſome few, ſenſible, obvious qualities; and often, if not always, leave out others as material, and as firmly united, as thoſe that they take. Of ſenſible ſubſtances there are two ſorts; one of organized bodies, which are propagated by ſeed; and in theſe, the ſhape is that, which to us is the leading quality, and moſt characteriſtical part that determines the ſpecies. And, therefore, in vegetables and animals, an extended, ſolid ſubſtance, of ſuch a certain figure, uſually ſerves the turn. For, however ſome men ſeem to prize their definition of animal rationale, yet ſhould there a creature be found, that had language and reaſon, but partook not of the uſual ſhape of a man, I believe it would hardly paſs for a man, how much ſoever it were animal rationale. And if Balaam's aſs had, all his life, diſcourſed as rationally as he did once with his maſter, I doubt yet, whether any one would have thought him worthy the name man, or allowed him to be of the ſame ſpecies with himſelf. As in vegetables and animals it is the ſhape, ſo in moſt other bodies, not propagated by ſeed, it is the colour we moſt fix on, and are moſt led by. Thus, where we find the colour of gold, we are apt to imagine all the other qualities, comprehended in our complex idea, to be there alſo: and we commonly take theſe two obvious qualities, viz. ſhape and colour, for ſo preſumptive ideas of ſeveral ſpecies, that, in a gold picture, we readily ſay this is a lion, and that a roſe; this is a gold, and that a ſilver goblet, only by the different figures and colours repreſented to the eye by the pencil.

Which yet ſerve for common converſe.

§ 30. BUT, tho' this ſerves well enough for groſs and confuſed conceptions, and unaccurate ways of talking and thinking; yet men are far enough from having agreed on the preciſe number of ſimple ideas, or qualities, belonging to any ſort of things, ſignified by its name. Nor is it a wonder, ſince it requires much time, pains, and ſkill, ſtrict enquiry, and long examination, to find out what, and how many, thoſe ſimple ideas are, which are conſtantly and inſeparably united in nature, and are always to be found together in the ſame ſubject. Moſt men, wanting either time, inclination, or induſtry enough for this, even to ſome tolerable degree, content themſelves with ſome few obvious and outward appearances of things, thereby readily to diſtinguiſh and ſort them for the common affairs of life: and ſo, without farther examination, give them names, or take up the names already in uſe. Which, tho' in common converſation they paſs well enough for the ſigns of ſome few, obvious qualities, co-exiſting, are yet far enough from comprehending, in a ſettled ſignification, a preciſe number of ſimple ideas; much leſs all thoſe, which are united in nature. He that ſhall conſider, after ſo much ſtir about genus and ſpecies, and ſuch a deal of talk of ſpecifick differences, how few words we have yet ſettled definitions of, may with reaſon imagine that thoſe forms, which there hath been ſo much noiſe made about, are only chimera's, which give us no light into the ſpecifick natures of things. And he, that ſhall conſider, how far the names of ſubſtances are from having ſignifications, wherein all who uſe them do agree, will have reaſon to conclude, that tho' the nominal eſſences of ſubſtances are all ſuppoſed to be copied from nature, yet they are all, or moſt of them, very imperfect. Since the compoſition of thoſe complex ideas are, in ſeveral men, very different: and therefore, that theſe boundaries of ſpecies are as men, and not as nature makes them, if at leaſt there are in nature any ſuch prefixed bounds. It is true, that many particular ſubſtances are ſo made by nature, that they have agreement and likeneſs one with another, and ſo afford a foundation of being ranked into ſorts. But the ſorting of things by us, or the making of determinate ſpecies, being in order to naming and comprehending them under general terms, I cannot ſee how it can be properly ſaid, that nature ſets the boundaries of the ſpecies of things: or if it be ſo, our boundaries of ſpecies are not exactly conformable to thoſe in nature. For we, having need of general names for preſent uſe, ſtay not for a perfect diſcovery of all thoſe qualities, which would beſt ſhew us their moſt material differences and agreements: but we ourſelves divide them, by certain, obvious appearances, into ſpecies, that we may the eaſier, under general names, communicate our thoughts about them. For having no other knowledge of any ſubſtance, but of the ſimple ideas that are united in it; and obſerving ſeveral particular things to agree with others, in ſeveral of thoſe ſimple ideas, we make that collection our ſpecifick idea, and give it a general name; that, in recording our own thoughts, and in our diſcourſe with others, we may in one ſhort word deſign all the individuals, that agree in that complex idea, without enumerating the ſimple ideas that make it up; and ſo not waſte our time and breath in tedious deſcriptions: which we ſee they are fain to do, who would diſcourſe of any new ſort of things, they have not yet a name for.

Eſſences of ſpecies, under the ſame name, very different.

§ 31. BUT, however theſe ſpecies of ſubſtances paſs well enough in ordinary converſation, it is plain that this complex idea, wherein they obſerve ſeveral individuals to agree, is by different men made very differently; by ſome more, and others leſs accurately. In ſome, this complex idea contains a greater, and in others a ſmaller number of qualities; and ſo is apparently ſuch as the mind makes it. The yellow, ſhining colour makes gold to children: others add weight, malleableneſs, and fuſibility; and others yet other qualities, which they find joined with that yellow colour, as conſtantly as its weight and fuſibility: for in all theſe and the like qualities, one has as good a right to be put into the complex idea of that ſubſtance, wherein they are all joined, as another. And therefore, different men leaving out, or putting in, ſeveral ſimple ideas, which others do not, according to their various examination, ſkill, or obſervation of that ſubject, have different eſſences of gold, which muſt, therefore, be of their own, and not of nature's making.

The more general our ideas are, the more incompleat and partial they are.

§ 32. If the number of ſimple ideas, that make the nominal eſſence of the loweſt ſpecies, or firſt ſorting of individuals, depends on the mind of man, variouſly collecting them, it is much more evident that they do ſo, in the more comprehenſive claſſis, which by the maſters of logick are called genera. Theſe are complex ideas deſignedly imperfect; and it is viſible at firſt ſight, that ſeveral of thoſe qualities, that are to be found in the things themſelves, are purpoſely left out of generical ideas. For as the mind, to make general ideas, comprehending ſeveral particulars, leaves out thoſe of time, and place, and ſuch other, that make them incommunicable to more than one individual; ſo to make other yet more general ideas, that may comprehend different ſorts, it leaves out thoſe qualities that diſtinguiſh them, and puts into its new collection, only ſuch ideas as are common to ſeveral ſorts. The ſame convenience, that made men expreſs ſeveral parcels of yellow matter, coming from Guinea and Peru, under one name, ſets them alſo upon making of one name, that may comprehend both gold and ſilver, and ſome other bodies of different ſorts. This is done, by leaving out thoſe qualities which are peculiar to each ſort; and retaining a complex idea, made up of thoſe that are common to them all. To which the name metal being annexed, there is a genus conſtituted; the eſſence whereof being that abſtract idea, containing only malleableneſs and fuſibility, with certain degrees of weight and fixedneſs, wherein ſome bodies of ſeveral kinds agree, leaves out the colour, and other qualities peculiar to gold and ſilver, and the other ſorts, comprehended under the name metal; whereby it is plain, that men follow not exactly the patterns ſet them by nature, when they make their general ideas of ſubſtances; ſince there is no body to be found, which has barely malleableneſs and fuſibility in it, without other qualities, as inſeparable as thoſe. But men, in making their general ideas, ſeeking more the convenience of language and quick diſpatch, by ſhort and comprehenſive ſigns, than the true and preciſe nature of things as they exiſt, have, in the framing their abſtract ideas, chiefly purſued that end, which was to be furniſhed with ſtore of general and variouſly comprehenſive names. So that, in this whole buſineſs of genera and ſpecies, the genus, or more comprehenſive, is but a partial conception of what is in the ſpecies, and the ſpecies but a partial idea of what is to be found in each individual. If therefore any one will think, that a man, and a horſe, and an animal, and a plant, &c. are diſtinguiſhed by real eſſences, made by nature, he muſt think nature to be very liberal of theſe real eſſences, making one for body, another for an animal, and another for a horſe; and all theſe eſſences liberally beſtowed upon Bucephalus. But if we would rightly conſider what is done, in all theſe genera and ſpecies, or ſorts, we ſhould find, that there is no new thing made, but only more or leſs comprehenſive ſigns, whereby we may be enabled to expreſs, in a few ſyllables, great numbers of particular things, as they agree in more or leſs general conceptions, which we have framed to that purpoſe. In all which we may obſerve, that the more general term is always the name of a leſs complex idea; and that each genus is but a partial conception of the ſpecies comprehended under it. So that if theſe abſtract, general ideas be thought to be compleat, it can only be in reſpect of a certain, eſtabliſhed relation between them and certain names, which are made uſe of to ſignify them; and not in reſpect of any thing exiſting, as made by nature.

This, all accommodated to the end of ſpeech.

§ 33. This is adjuſted to the true end of ſpeech, which is to be the eaſieſt and ſhorteſt way of communicating our notions. For thus he, that would diſcourſe of things, as they agreed in the complex idea, of extenſion and ſolidity, needed but uſe the word body, to denote all ſuch. He that to theſe would join others, ſignified by the words life, ſenſe, and ſpontaneous motion, needed but uſe the word animal, to ſignify all which partook of thoſe ideas; and he that had made a complex idea of a body, with life, ſenſe, and motion, with the faculty of reaſoning, and a certain ſhape joined to it, needed but uſe the ſhort monoſyllable man, to expreſs all particulars that correſpond to that complex idea.

This is the proper buſineſs of genus and ſpecies: and this men do, without any conſideration of real eſſences, or ſubſtantial forms, which come not within the reach of our knowledge, when we think of thoſe things; nor within the ſignification of our words, when we diſcourſe with others.

Inſtance in caſſuaris.

§ 14. WERE I to talk with any one, of a ſort of birds I lately ſaw in St. James's park, about three or four foot high, with a covering of ſomething, between feathers and hair, of a dark, brown colour, without wings, but in the place thereof, two or three little branches coming down like ſprigs of Spaniſh broom, long great legs, with feet only of three claws, and without a tail; I muſt make this deſcription of it, and ſo may make others underſtand me: but when I am told, that the name of it is caſſuaris, I may then uſe that word to ſtand in diſcourſe for all my complex idea, mentioned in that deſcription; tho' by that word, which is now become a ſpecifick name, I know no more of the real eſſence, or conſtitution, of that ſort of animals, than I did before; and knew probably as much of the nature of that ſpecies of birds, before I learned the name, as many Engliſhmen do of ſwans, or herons, which are ſpecifick names, very well known, of ſorts of birds common in England.

Men determine the ſorts; inſtance, gold.

§ 35. FROM what has been ſaid, it is evident, that men make ſorts of things. For it being different eſſences alone, that make different ſpecies, it is plain that they who make thoſe abſtract ideas, which are the nominal eſſences, do thereby make the ſpecies, or ſort. Should there be a body found, having all the other qualities of gold, except malleableneſs, it would no doubt be made a queſtion, whether it were gold, or no, i. e. whether it were of that ſpecies. This could be determined only by that abſtract idea, to which every one annexed the name gold: ſo that it would be true gold to him, and belong to that ſpecies, who included not malleableneſs in his nominal eſſence, ſignified by the ſound gold; and on the other ſide, it would not be true gold, or of that ſpecies to him, who included malleableneſs in his ſpecifick idea. And who, I pray, is it that makes theſe diverſe ſpecies, even under one and the ſame name, but men, that make two different abſtract ideas, conſiſting not exactly of the ſame collection of qualities? Nor is it a mere ſuppoſition to imagine, that a body may exiſt, wherein the other obvious qualities of gold may be, without malleableneſs; ſince it is certain that gold itſelf, will be ſometimes ſo eager (as artiſts call it) that it will as little endure the hammer as glaſs itſelf. What we have ſaid, of the putting in, or leaving malleableneſs out of, the complex idea, the name gold is by any one annexed to, may be ſaid of its peculiar weight, fixedneſs, and ſeveral other the like qualities: for whatſoever is left out, or put in, it is ſtill the complex idea, to which that name is annexed, that makes the ſpecies; and, as any particular parcel of matter anſwers that idea, ſo the name of the ſort belongs truly to it; and it is of that ſpecies. And thus any thing is true gold, perfect metal. All which determination of the ſpecies, it is plain, depends on the underſtanding of man, making this or that complex idea.

Nature makes the ſimilitude.

§ 36. THIS then, in ſhort, is the caſe: nature makes many particular things, which do agree one with another, in many ſenſible qualities, and, probably too, in their internal frame and conſtitution: but it is not this real eſſence, that diſtinguiſhes them into ſpecies; it is men, who taking occaſion from the qualities they find united in them, and wherein they obſerve often ſeveral individuals to agree, range them into ſorts, in order to their naming, for the convenience of comprehenſive ſigns; under which individuals, according to their conformity to this or that abſtract idea, come to be ranked, as under enſigns; ſo that this is of the blue, that the red regiment; this is a man, that a drill: and in this, I think, conſiſts the whole buſineſs of genus and ſpecies.

And continues it in the races of things.

§ 37. I DO not deny but nature, in the conſtant production of particular beings, makes them not always new and various, but very much alike and of kin one to another: but I think it nevertheleſs true, that the boundaries of the ſpecies, whereby men ſort them, are made by men: ſince the eſſences of the ſpecies, diſtinguiſhed by different names, are, as has been proved, of man's making, and ſeldom adequate to the internal nature of the things, they are taken from.

So that we may truly ſay, ſuch a manner of ſorting of things is the workmanſhip of men.

Each abſtract idea is an eſſence.

§ 38. One thing, I doubt not but will ſeem very ſtrange in this doctrine; which is, that from what has been ſaid it will follow, that each abſtract idea, with a name to it, makes a diſtinct ſpecies. But who can help it, if truth will have it ſo? For ſo it muſt remain, till ſome body can ſhew us the ſpecies of things, limited and diſtinguiſhed by ſomething elſe; and let us ſee, that general terms ſignify not our abſtract ideas, but ſomething different from them. I would fain know, why a ſhock and a hound are not as diſtinct ſpecies, as a ſpaniel and an elephant. We have no other idea of the different eſſence of an elephant and a ſpaniel, than we have of the different eſſence of a ſhock and a hound; all the eſſential difference whereby we know and diſtinguiſh them one from another, conſiſting only in the different collection of ſimple ideas, to which we have given thoſe different names.

Genera and ſpecies are in order to naming.

§ 39. How much the making of ſpecies and genera is in order to general names, and how much general names are neceſſary, if not to the being, yet at leaſt to the compleating of a ſpecies, and making it paſs for ſuch, will appear, beſides what has been ſaid above, concerning ice and water, in a very familiar example. A ſilent and a ſtriking watch are but one ſpecies to thoſe, who have but one name for them: but he that has the name watch for one, and clock for the other, and diſtinct, complex ideas, to which thoſe names belong, to him they are different ſpecies. It will be ſaid, perhaps, that the inward contrivance and conſtitution is different between theſe two, which the watch-maker has a clear idea of. And yet, it is plain, they are but one ſpecies to him, when he has but one name for them. For what is ſufficient in the inward contrivance to make a new ſpecies? There are ſome watches, that are made with four wheels, others with five: is this a ſpecifick difference to the workman? Some have ſtrings and phyſies, and others none; ſome have the ballance looſe, and others regulated by a ſpiral ſpring, and others by hogs-briſtles: are any, or all, of theſe enough to make a ſpecifick difference to the workman, that knows each of theſe, and ſeveral other different contrivances, in the internal conſtitutions of watches? It is certain each of theſe hath a real difference from the reſt; but whether it be an eſſential, a ſpecifick difference or no, relates only to the complex idea, to which the name watch is given: as long as they all agree in the idea, which that name ſtands for, and that name does not, as a generical name, comprehend different ſpecies under it, they are not eſſentially, nor ſpecifically different. But, if any one will make minuter diviſions, from differences that he knows in the internal frame of watches, and to ſuch, preciſe, complex ideas, give names, that ſhall prevail: they will then be new ſpecies to them, who have thoſe ideas, with names to them; and can, by thoſe differences, diſtinguiſh watches into theſe ſeveral ſorts, and then watch will be a generical name. But yet, they would be no diſtinct ſpecies to men, ignorant of clock-work and the inward contrivances of watches, who had no other idea but the outward ſhape and bulk, with the marking of the hours by the hand. For to them, all thoſe other names would be but ſynonymous terms for the ſame idea, and ſignify no more, nor no other thing but a watch. Juſt thus, I think, it is in natural things. No body will doubt that the wheels or ſprings (if I may ſo ſay) within, are different, in a rational man and a changeling, no more than that there is a difference in the frame between a drill and a changeling. But whether one or both theſe differences be eſſential, or ſpecifical, is only to be known to us, by their agreement or diſagreement with the complex idea, that the name man ſtands for: for by that alone can be determined, whether one, or both, or neither of thoſe be a man, or no.

Species of artificial things leſs confuſed than natural.

§ 40. From what has been before ſaid, we may ſee the reaſon why, in the ſpecies of artificial things, there is generally leſs confuſion and uncertainty, than in natural. Becauſe an artificial thing, being a production of a man, which the artificer deſigned, and therefore well knows the idea of, the name of it is ſuppoſed to ſtand for no other idea, nor to import any other eſſence, than what is certainly to be known, and eaſy enough to be apprehended. For the idea, or eſſence, of the ſeveral ſorts of artificial things, conſiſting, for the moſt part, in nothing but the determinate figure of ſenſible parts; and ſometimes motion depending thereon, which the artificer faſhions in matter, ſuch as he finds for his turn; it is not beyond the reach of our faculties to attain a certain idea thereof, and ſo ſettle the ſignification of the names, whereby the ſpecies of artificial things are diſtinguiſhed with leſs doubt, obſcurity and equivocation, than we can in things natural, whoſe differences and operations depend upon contrivances beyond the reach of our diſcoveries.

Artificial things of diſtinct ſpecies.

§ 41. I MUST be excuſed here, if I think artificial things are of diſtinct ſpecies, as well as natural: ſince I find they are as plainly and orderly ranked into ſorts, by different, abſtract ideas, with the general names annexed to them, as diſtinct one from another, as thoſe of natural ſubſtances. For, why ſhould we not think a watch and piſtol, as diſtinct ſpecies one from another, as a horſe and a dog, they being expreſſed in our minds by diſtinct ideas, and to others by diſtinct appellations?

Subſtances alone have proper names.

§ 42. THIS is farther to be obſerved concerning ſubſtances, that they alone, of all our ſeveral ſorts of ideas, have particular, or proper names, whereby one only particular thing is ſignified. Becauſe, in ſimple ideas, modes, and relations, it ſeldom happens that men have occaſion to mention often this, or that particular, when it is abſent. Beſides, the greateſt part of mixed modes, being actions, which periſh in their birth, are not capable of a laſting duration, as ſubſtances, which are the actors; and wherein the ſimple ideas, that make up the complex ideas, deſigned by the name, have a laſting union.

Difficulty to treat of words, with words.

§ 43. I MUST beg pardon of my reader, for having dwelt ſo long upon this ſubject, and perhaps with ſome obſcurity. But I deſire it may be conſidered how difficult it is to lead another, by words, into the thoughts of things, ſtripped of thoſe ſpecifick differences we give them: which things, if I name not, I ſay nothing; and if I do name them, I thereby rank them into ſome ſort or other, and ſuggeſt to the mind the uſual, abſtract idea of that ſpecies, and ſo croſs my purpoſe. For to talk of a man, and to lay by, at the ſame time, the ordinary ſignification of the name man, which is our complex idea, uſually annexed to it; and bid the reader conſider man, as he is in himſelf, and as he is really diſtinguiſhed from others, in his internal conſtitution, or real eſſence, that is, by ſomething, he knows not what, looks like trifling: and yet thus one muſt do, who would ſpeak of the ſuppoſed, real eſſences and ſpecies of things, as thought to be made by nature, if it be but only to make it underſtood, that there is no ſuch thing ſignified by the general names, which ſubſtances are called by. But becauſe it is difficult, by known familiar names, to do this, give me leave to endeavour, by an example, to make the different conſideration, the mind has of ſpecifick names and ideas, a little more clear; and to ſhew how the complex ideas of modes are referred, ſometimes to archetypes in the minds of other intelligent beings; or, which is the ſame, to the ſignification annexed by others to their received names; and ſometimes to no archetypes at all. Give me leave alſo to ſhew how the mind always refers its ideas of ſubſtances, either to the ſubſtances themſelves, or to the ſignification of their names as to the archetypes; and alſo to make plain the nature of ſpecies, or ſorting of things, as apprehended, and made uſe of by us; and of the eſſences belonging to thoſe ſpecies, which is perhaps of more moment, to diſcover the extent and certainty of our knowledge, than we at firſt imagine.

Inſtance of mixed modes, in Kinneah and Niouph.

§ 44. LET us ſuppoſe Adam in the ſtate of a grown man, with a good underſtanding, but in a ſtrange country, with all things new and unknown about him; and no other faculties, to attain the knowledge of them, but what one of this age has now. He obſerves Lamech more melancholy than uſual, and imagines it to be from a ſuſpicion he has of his wife Adah (whom he moſt ardently loved) that ſhe had too much kindneſs for another man. Adam diſcourſes theſe his thoughts to Eve, and deſires her to take care that Adah commit not folly: and, in theſe diſcourſes with Eve, he makes uſe of theſe two new words, Kinneah and Niouph. In time Adam's miſtake appears, for he finds Lamech's trouble proceeded from having killed a man: but yet the two names, Kinneah and Niouph; the one ſtanding for ſuſpicion, in a huſband, of his wife's diſloyalty to him, and the other for the act of committing diſloyalty, loſt not their diſtinct ſignifications. It is plain then, that here were two diſtinct, complex ideas of mixed modes, with names to them, two diſtinct ſpecies of actions, eſſentially different; I aſk wherein conſiſted the eſſences of theſe two diſtinct ſpecies of actions? and it is plain, it conſiſted in a preciſe combination of ſimple ideas, different in one from the other. I aſk, whether the complex idea in Adam's mind, which he called Kinneah, were adequate or no? And it is plain it was; for it being a combination of ſimple ideas, which he, without any regard to any archetype, without reſpect to any thing as a pattern, voluntarily put together, abſtracted and gave the name Kinneah to, to expreſs in ſhort to others, by that one ſound, all the ſimple ideas contained and united in that complex one; it muſt neceſſarily follow, that it was an adequate idea. His own choice having made that combination, it had all in it he intended it ſhould, and ſo could not but be perfect, could not but be adequate, it being referred to no other archetype, which it was ſuppoſed to repreſent.

§ 45. THESE words, Kinneah and Niouph, by degrees grew into common uſe; and then the caſe was ſomewhat altered. Adam's children had the ſame faculties, and thereby the ſame power that he had, to make what complex ideas of mixed modes they pleaſed, in their own minds, to abſtract them, and make what ſounds they pleaſed the ſigns of them: but the uſe of names being to make our ideas within us known to others, that cannot be done, but when the ſame ſign ſtands for the ſame idea in two, who would communicate their thoughts, and diſcourſe together. Thoſe therefore of Adam's children, that found theſe two words, Kinneah and Niouph, in familiar uſe, could not take them for inſignificant ſounds; but muſt needs conclude, they ſtood for ſomething, for certain ideas, abſtract ideas, they being general names, which abſtract ideas were the eſſences of the ſpecies diſtinguiſhed by thoſe names. If, therefore, they would uſe theſe words, as names of ſpecies, already eſtabliſhed and agreed on, they were obliged to conform the ideas in their minds, ſignified by theſe names, to the ideas, that they ſtood for in other men's minds, as to their patterns and archetypes; and then indeed, their ideas of theſe complex modes were liable to be inadequate, as being very apt (eſpecially thoſe that conſiſted of combinations of many ſimple ideas) not to be exactly conformable to the ideas in other men's minds, uſing the ſame names: tho' for this there be uſually a remedy at hand, which is to aſk the meaning of any word we underſtand not, of him that uſes it: it being as impoſſible to know certainly what the words jealouſy and adultery (which I think anſwer קנאה and נאוף) ſtand for, in another man's mind, with whom I would diſcourſe about them; as it was impoſſible, in the beginning of language, to know what Kinneah and Niouph ſtood for, in another man's mind, without explication, they being voluntary ſigns in every one.

Inſtance of ſubſtances in Zahab.

§ 46. LET us now alſo conſider, after the ſame manner, the names of ſubſtances in their firſt application. One of Adam's children, roving in the mountains, lights on a glittering ſubſtance, which pleaſes his eye; home he carries it to Adam, who, upon conſideration of it, finds it to be hard, to have a bright, yellow colour, and exceeding great weight. Theſe, perhaps at firſt, are all the qualities he takes notice of in it: and abſtracting this complex idea, conſiſting of a ſubſtance, having that peculiar bright yellowneſs, and a weight very great in proportion to its bulk, he gives it the name Zahab, to denominate and mark all ſubſtances, that have theſe ſenſible qualities in them. It is evident now that, in this caſe, Adam acts quite differently from what he did before, in forming thoſe ideas of mixed modes, to which he gave the name Kinneah and Niouph. For there he put ideas together, only by his own imagination, not taken from the exiſtence of any thing; and to them he gave names, to denominate all things that ſhould happen to agree to thoſe his abſtract ideas, without conſidering whether any ſuch thing, did exiſt, or no: the ſtandard there was of his own making. But, in the forming his idea of this new ſubſtance, he takes the quite contrary courſe; here he has a ſtandard made by nature; and therefore, being to repreſent that to himſelf, by the idea he has of it, even when it is abſent, he puts in no ſimple idea into his complex one, but what he has the perception of, from the thing itſelf. He takes care that his idea be conformable to this archetype, and intends the name ſhould ſtand for an idea ſo conformable.

§ 47. This piece of matter, thus denominated Zahab by Adam, being quite different from any he had ſeen before, no body, I think, will deny to be a diſtinct ſpecies, and to have its peculiar eſſence; and that the name Zahab is the mark of the ſpecies, and a name belonging to all things, partaking in that eſſence. But here it is plain, the eſſence, Adam made the name Zahab ſtand for, was nothing but a body hard, ſhining, yellow, and very heavy. But the inquiſitive mind of man, not content with the knowledge of theſe, as I may ſay, ſuperficial qualities, puts Adam on farther examination of this matter. He therefore knocks and beats it with flints, to ſee what was diſcoverable in the inſide: he finds it yield to blows, but not eaſily ſeparate into pieces: he finds it will bend without breaking. Is not now ductility to be added to his former idea, and made part of the eſſence of the ſpecies, that name Zahab ſtands for? Farther trials diſcover fuſibility and fixedneſs. Are not they alſo, by the ſame reaſon, that any of the others were, to be put into the complex idea, ſignified by the name Zahab? If not, what reaſon will there be ſhewn more for the one than the other? If theſe muſt, then all the other properties, which any farther trials ſhall diſcover in this matter, ought by the ſame reaſon to make a part of the ingredients of the complex idea, which the name Zahab ſtands for, and ſo be the eſſences of the ſpecies, marked by that name. Which properties, becauſe they are endleſs, it is plain, that the idea made, after this faſhion, by this archetype, will be always inadequate.

Their ideas imperfect, and therefore various.

§ 48. But this is not all, it would alſo follow, that the names of ſubſtances would not only have (as in truth they have) but would alſo be ſuppoſed to have different ſignifications, as uſed by different men, which would very much cumber the uſe of language. For if every diſtinct quality, that were diſcovered in any matter by any one, were ſuppoſed to make a neceſſary part of the complex idea, ſignified by the common name given it, it muſt follow, that men muſt ſuppoſe the ſame word to ſignify different things in different men; ſince they cannot doubt but different men may have diſcovered ſeveral qualities in ſubſtances of the ſame denomination, which others know nothing of.

Therefore to fix their ſpecies, a real eſſence is ſuppoſed.

§ 49. To avoid this, therefore, they have ſuppoſed a real eſſence belonging to every ſpecies, from which theſe properties all flow, and would have their name of the ſpecies ſtand for that. But they not having any idea of that real eſſence in ſubſtances, and their words ſignifying nothing but the ideas they have, that which is done by this attempt, is only to put the name, or ſound, in the place and ſtead of the thing having that real eſſence, without knowing what the real eſſence is; and this is that which men do, when they ſpeak of ſpecies of things, as ſuppoſing them made by nature, and diſtinguiſhed by real eſſences.

Which ſuppoſition is of no uſe.

§ 50. For let us conſider, when we affirm, that all gold is fixed, either it means that fixedneſs is a part of the definition, part of the nominal eſſence the word gold ſtands for; and ſo this affirmation, all gold is fixed, contains nothing but the ſignification of the term gold. Or elſe it means, that fixedneſs not being a part of the definition of the word gold, is a property of that ſubſtance itſelf: in which caſe, it is plain, that the word gold ſtands in the place of a ſubſtance having the real eſſence of a ſpecies of things, made by nature. In which way of ſubſtitution, it has ſo confuſed and uncertain a ſignification, that, tho' this propoſition, gold is fixed, be in that ſenſe an affirmation of ſomething real, yet it is a truth will always fail us in its particular application, and ſo is of no real uſe, nor certainty. For let it be never ſo true, that all gold, i. e. all that has the real eſſence of gold, is fixed, what ſerves this for, whilſt we know not in this ſenſe what is, or is not gold? For, if we know not the real eſſence of gold, it is impoſſible, we ſhould know what parcel of matter has that eſſence, and ſo whether it be true gold or no.

Concluſion.

§ 51. To conclude: what liberty Adam had at firſt to make any complex ideas of mixed modes, by no other pattern but by his own thoughts, the ſame have all men ever ſince had. And the ſame neceſſity of conforming his ideas of ſubſtances to things without him, as to archetypes made by nature, that Adam was under, if he would not wilfully impoſe upon himſelf, the ſame are all men ever ſince under too. The ſame liberty alſo that Adam had of affixing any new name to any idea, the ſame has any one ſtill (eſpecially the beginners of languages, if we can imagine any ſuch) but only with this difference, that in places, where men in ſociety have already eſtabliſhed a language amongſt them, the ſignifications of words are very warily and ſparingly to be altered; becauſe, men being furniſhed already with names for their ideas, and common uſe having appropriated known names to certain ideas, an affected miſapplication of them cannot but be very ridiculous. He that has new notions, will, perhaps, venture ſometimes on the coining new terms to expreſs them: but men think it a boldneſs, and it is uncertain whether common uſe will ever make them paſs for current. But in communication with others, it is neceſſary, that we conform the ideas we make the vulgar words of any language ſtand for, to their known proper ſignifications (which I have explained at large already) or elſe to make known that new ſignification, we apply them to.

CHAP. VII.

Of particles.

Chap. VII.

Particles connect parts, or whole ſentences together.

§ 1. BESIDES words, which are names of ideas in the mind, there are a great many others that are made uſe of, to ſignify the connection that the mind gives to ideas, or propoſitions, one with another. The mind, in communicating its thoughts to others, does not only need ſigns of the ideas it has then before it, but others alſo, to ſhew or intimate ſome particular action of its own, at that time, relating to thoſe ideas. This it does ſeveral ways; as is, and is not, are the general marks of the mind, affirming or denying. But beſides affirmation or negation, without which there is in words no truth or falſehood, the mind does, in declaring its ſentiments to others, connect not only the parts of propoſitions, but whole ſentences one to another, with their ſeveral relations and dependencies, to make a coherent diſcourſe.

In them conſiſts the art of well ſpeaking.

§ 2. The words whereby it ſignifies what connection it gives to the ſeveral affirmations and negations, that it unites in one continued reaſoning, or narration, are generally called particles; and it is in the right uſe of theſe that more particularly conſiſts the clearneſs and beauty of a good ſtile. To think well, it is not enough that a man has ideas clear and diſtinct in his thoughts, nor that he obſerves the agreement, or diſagreement of ſome of them; but he muſt think in train, and obſerve the dependence of his thoughts and reaſonings one upon another. And to expreſs well ſuch methodical and rational thoughts, he muſt have words to ſhew what connection, reſtriction, diſtinction, oppoſition, emphaſis, &c. he gives to each reſpective part of his diſcourſe. To miſtake in any of theſe, is to puzzle, inſtead of informing his hearer; and therefore it is that thoſe words, which are not truly by themſelves the names of any ideas, are of ſuch conſtant and indiſpenſible uſe in language, and do much contribute to men's well expreſſing themſelves.

They ſhew what relation the mind gives to its own thoughts.

§ 3. This part of grammar has been perhaps as much neglected, as ſome others over-diligently cultivated. It is eaſy for men to write, one after another, of caſes and genders, moods and tenſes, gerunds and ſupines. In theſe and the like, there has been great diligence uſed; and particles themſelves, in ſome languages, have been, with great ſhew of exactneſs, ranked in their ſeveral orders. But, tho' prepoſitions and conjunctions, &c. are names well known in grammar, and the particles contained under them carefully ranked into their diſtinct ſubdiviſions; yet, he who would ſhew the right uſe of particles, and what ſignificancy and force they have, muſt take a little more pains, enter into his own thoughts, and obſerve nicely the ſeveral poſtures of his mind in diſcourſing.

§ 4. Neither is it enough, for the explaining of theſe words, to render them, as is uſual in dictionaries, by words of another tongue, which come nearest to their ſignification; for what is meant by them, is commonly as hard to be underſtood in one, as another language. They are all marks of ſome action or intimation of the mind; and therefore to underſtand them rightly, the ſeveral views, poſtures, ſtands, turns, limitations and exceptions, and ſeveral other thoughts of the mind, for which we have either none, or very deficient names, are diligently to be ſtudied. Of theſe there are a great variety, much exceeding the number of particles, that moſt languages have to expreſs them by; and therefore it is not to be wondered, that moſt of theſe particles have divers, and ſometimes almoſt oppoſite ſignifications. In the Hebrew tongue there is a particle conſiſting but of one ſingle letter, of which there are reckoned up, as I remember, ſeventy, I am ſure above fifty ſeveral ſignifications.

Inſtance in But.

§ 5. BUT is a particle, none more familiar in our language; and he that ſays it is a diſcretive conjunction, and that it anſwers ſed in Latin, or mais in French, thinks he has ſufficiently explained it. But it ſeems to me to intimate ſeveral relations, the mind gives to the ſeveral propoſitions, or part of them, which it joins by this monoſyllable.

FIRST, but to ſay no more: here it intimates a ſtop of the mind in the courſe it was going, before it came to the end of it.

SECONDLY, I ſaw but two plants: here it ſhews, that the mind limits the ſenſe to what is expreſſed, with a negation of all other.

THIRDLY, you pray; but it is not that God would bring you to the true religion,

FOURTHLY, but that he would confirm you in your own. The firſt of theſe Buts intimates a ſuppoſition in the mind of ſomething otherwiſe than it ſhould be; the latter ſhews, that the mind makes a direct oppoſition between that, and what goes before it.

FIFTHLY, all animals have ſenſe; but a dog is an animal: here it ſignifies little more, but that the latter propoſition is joined to the former, as the minor of a ſyllogiſm.

This matter but lightly touched here.

§ 6. To theſe, I doubt not, might be added a great many other ſignifications of this particle, if it were my buſineſs to examine it in its full latitude, and conſider it in all the places it is to be found, which if one ſhould do, I doubt, whether, in all thoſe manners it is made uſe of, it would deſerve the title of diſcretive, which grammarians give to it. But I intend not here a full explication of this ſort of ſigns. The inſtances I have given, in this one, may give occaſion to reflect upon their uſe and force in language, and lead us into the contemplation of ſeveral actions of our minds in diſcourſing, which it has found a way to intimate to others, by theſe particles; ſome whereof conſtantly, and others in certain conſtructions, have the ſenſe of a whole ſentence contained in them.

CHAP. VIII.

Of abſtract and concrete terms.

Abſtract terms, not predicable one of another, and why.

§ 1. THE ordinary words of language, and our common uſe of them, would have given us light into the nature of our ideas, if they had been but conſidered with attention. The mind, as has been ſhewn, has a power to abſtract its ideas, and ſo they become eſſences, general eſſences, whereby the ſorts of things are diſtinguiſhed. Now, each abſtract idea being diſtinct, ſo that of any two, the one can never be the other, the mind will, by its intuitive knowledge, perceive their difference; and therefore in propoſitions, no two whole ideas can ever be affirmed one of another. This we ſee in the common uſe of language, which permits not any two abſtract words, or names of abſtract ideas, to be affirmed one of another. For how near of kin ſoever they may ſeem to be, and how certain ſoever it is, that man is an animal, or rational, or white, yet every one at firſt hearing perceives the falſehood of theſe propoſitions; humanity is animality, or rationality, or whiteneſs: and this is as evident, as any of the moſt allowed maxims. All our affirmations then are only inconcrete, which is the affirming, not one abſtract idea to be another, but one abſtract idea to be joined to another; which abſtract ideas, in ſubſtances, may be of any ſort; in all the reſt, are little elſe but of relations; and in ſubſtances the moſt frequent are of powers: v. g. a man is white, ſignifies that the thing, that has the eſſence of a man, has alſo in it the eſſence of whiteneſs, which is nothing, but a power to produce the idea of whiteneſs in one, whoſe eyes can diſcover ordinary objects; or a man is rational, ſignifies that the ſame thing that hath the eſſence of a man, hath alſo in it the eſſence of rationality, i. e. a power of reaſoning.

They ſhew the difference of our ideas.

§ 2. This diſtinction of names ſhews us alſo the difference of our ideas: for, if we obſerve them, we ſhall find, that our ſimple ideas have all abſtract, as well as concrete names; the one whereof is (to ſpeak the language of grammarians) a ſubſtantive, the other an adjective; as whiteneſs, white; ſweetneſs, ſweet. The like alſo holds in our ideas of modes and relations; as juſtice, juſt; equality, equal; only with this difference, that ſome of the concrete names of relations, amongſt men chiefly, are ſubſtantives; as paternitas pater; whereof it were eaſy to render a reaſon. But, as to our ideas of ſubſtances, we have very few, or no abſtract name at all. For, tho' the ſchools have introduced animalitas, humanitas, corporietas, and ſome others; yet they hold no proportion with that infinite number of names of ſubſtances, to which they never were ridiculous enough to attempt the coining of abſtract ones: and thoſe few that the ſchools forged, and put into the mouths of their ſcholars, could never yet get admittance into common uſe, or obtain the licence of publick approbation. Which ſeems to me at leaſt to intimate the confeſſion of all mankind, that they have no ideas of the real eſſences of ſubſtances, ſince they have not names for ſuch ideas: which no doubt they would have had, had not their conſciouſneſs to themſelves, of their ignorance of them, kept them from ſo idle an attempt. And therefore, tho' they had ideas enough to diſtinguiſh gold from a ſtone, and metal from wood; yet they but timorouſly ventured on ſuch terms, as aurietas, and ſaxietas, metallietas and lignietas, or the like names, which ſhould pretend to ſignify the real eſſences of thoſe ſubſtances, whereof they knew they had no ideas. And indeed it was only the doctrine of ſubſtantial forms, and the confidence of miſtaken pretenders to a knowledge they had not, which firſt coined, and then introduced animalitas, and humanitas, and the like; which yet went very little farther than their own ſchools, and could never get to be current amongſt underſtanding men. Indeed, humanitas was a word familiar amongſt the Romans, but in a far different ſenſe, and ſtood not for the abſtract eſſence of any ſubſtance; but was the abſtracted name of a mode, and its concrete humanus, not homo.

CHAP. IX.

Of the imperfection of words.

Chap. IX.

Words are uſed for recording and communicating our thoughts.

§ 1. FROM what has been ſaid in the foregoing chapters, it is eaſy to perceive what imperfection there is in language, and how the very nature of words makes it almoſt unavoidable for many of them to be doubtful and uncertain in their ſignifications. To examine the perfection or imperfection of words, it is neceſſary firſt to conſider their uſe and end: for, as they are more or leſs fitted to attain that, ſo are they more or leſs perfect. We have, in the former part of this diſcourſe, often upon occaſion mentioned a double uſe of words.

First, one for the recording of our own thoughts.

Secondly, the other for the communicating of our thoughts to others.

Any words will ſerve for recording.

§ 2. As to the firſt of theſe, for the recording our own thoughts, for that help of our own memories, whereby, as it were, we talk to ourſelves, any words will ſerve the turn. For, ſince ſounds are voluntary and indifferent ſigns of any ideas, a man may uſe what words he pleaſes, to ſignify his own ideas to himſelf: and there will be no imperfection in them, if he conſtantly uſe the ſame ſign for the ſame idea; for then he cannot fail of having his meaning underſtood, wherein conſiſts the right uſe and perfection of language.

Communication by words, civil or philoſophical.

§ 3. SECONDLY, as to communication of words, that too has a double uſe.

I. CIVIL.

II. PHILOSOPHICAL.

FIRST, by their civil uſe, I mean ſuch a communication of thoughts and ideas by words, as may ſerve for the upholding common converſation and commerce, about the ordinary affairs and conveniences of civil life, in the ſocieties of men one amongſt another.

SECONDLY, by the philoſophical uſe of words, I mean ſuch an uſe of them, as may ſerve to convey the preciſe notions of things, and to expreſs, in general propoſitions, certain and undoubted truths, which the mind may reſt upon, and be ſatisfied with, in its ſearch after true knowledge. Theſe two uſes are very diſtinct; and a great deal leſs exactneſs will ſerve in the one than in the other, as we ſhall ſee in what follows.

The imperfection of words, is the doubtfulneſs of their ſignification.

§ 4. THE chief end of language, in communication, being to be underſtood, words ſerve not well for that end, neither in civil nor philoſophical diſcourſe, when any word does not excite in the hearer the ſame idea which it ſtands for in the mind of the ſpeaker. Now ſince ſounds have no natural connection with our ideas, but have all their ſignification from the arbitrary impoſition of men, the doubtfulneſs and uncertainty of their ſignification, which is the imperfection we here are ſpeaking of, has its cauſe more in the ideas they ſtand for, than in any incapacity there is in one ſound, more than in another, to ſignify any idea: for in that regard they are all equally perfect.

THAT then which makes doubtfulneſs and uncertainty in the ſignification of ſome more than other words, is the difference of ideas they ſtand for.

Cauſes of their imperfection.

§ 5. WORDS having naturally no ſignification, the idea, which each ſtands for, muſt be learned and retained by thoſe, who would exchange thoughts, and hold intelligible diſcourſe with others, in any language. But this is hardeſt to be done, where,

FIRST, the ideas, they ſtand for, are very complex, and made up of a great number of ideas put together.

SECONDLY, where the ideas, they ſtand for, have no certain connection in nature; and ſo no ſettled ſtandard, any where in nature exiſting, to rectify and adjuſt them by.

THIRDLY, where the ſignification of the word is referred to a ſtandard, which ſtandard is not eaſy to be known.

FOURTHLY, where the ſignification of the word, and the real eſſence of the thing, are not exactly the ſame.

THESE are difficulties that attend the ſignification of ſeveral words, that are intelligible. Thoſe, which are not intelligible at all, ſuch as names ſtanding for any ſimple ideas, which another has not organs, or faculties to attain; as the names of colours to a blind man, or ſounds to a deaf man; need not here be mentioned.

IN all theſe caſes we ſhall find an imperfection in words, which I ſhall more at large explain, in their particular application to our ſeveral ſorts of ideas: for if we examine them, we ſhall find that the names of mixed modes are moſt liable to doubtfulneſs and imperfection, for the two firſt of theſe reaſons; and the names of ſubſtances chiefly for the two latter.

§ 6. FIRST, the names of mixed modes are many of them liable to great uncertainty and obſcurity in their ſignification.

The names of mixed modes doubtful. Firſt, becauſe the ideas, they ſtand for, are ſo complex.

I. BECAUSE of that great compoſition, theſe complex ideas are often made up of. To make words ſerviceable, to the end of communication, it is neceſſary (as has been ſaid) that they excite in the hearer exactly the ſame idea, they ſtand for in the mind of the ſpeaker. Without this, men fill one another's heads with noiſe and ſounds; but convey not thereby their thoughts, and lay not before one another their ideas, which is the end of diſcourſe and language. But, when a word ſtands for a very complex idea, that is compounded and decompounded, it is not eaſy for men to form and retain that idea ſo exactly, as to make the name, in common uſe, ſtand for the ſame preciſe idea, without any the leaſt variation. Hence it comes to paſs, that men's names of very compound ideas, ſuch as for the moſt part are moral words, have ſeldom, in two different men, the ſame preciſe ſignification; ſince one man's complex idea ſeldom agrees with another's, and often differs from his own, from that which he had yeſterday, or will have to-morrow.

Secondly, becauſe they have no ſtandards.

§ 7. II. Because the names of mixed modes, for the moſt part, want ſtandards in nature, whereby men may rectify and adjuſt their ſignification; therefore they are very various and doubtful. They are aſſemblages of ideas, put together at the pleaſure of the mind, purſuing its own ends of diſcourſe, and ſuited to its own notions; whereby it deſigns not to copy any thing really exiſting, but to denominate and rank things, as they come to agree, with thoſe archetypes or forms it has made. He that firſt brought the word ſham, wheedle, or banter in uſe, put together, as he thought fit, thoſe ideas he made it ſtand for: And, as it is with any new names of modes, that are now brought into any language; ſo was it with the old ones, when they were firſt made uſe of. Names, therefore, that ſtand for collections of ideas, which the mind makes at pleaſure, muſt needs be of doubtful ſignification, when ſuch collections are no where to be found conſtantly united in nature, nor any patterns to be ſhewn, whereby men may adjuſt them. What the word murder, or ſacrilege, &c. ſignifies, can never be known from things themſelves: there be many of the parts of thoſe complex ideas, which are not viſible in the action itſelf: the intention of the mind, or the relation of holy things, which make a part of murder, or ſacrilege, have no neceſſary connection with the outward and viſible action of him that commits either: and the pulling the trigger of the gun, with which the murder is committed, and is all the action that perhaps is viſible, has no natural connection with thoſe other ideas, that make up the complex one, named murder. They have their union and combination only from the underſtanding, which unites them under one name: but uniting them without any rule or pattern, it cannot be but that the ſignification of the name, that ſtands for ſuch voluntary collections, ſhould be often various in the minds of different men, who have ſcarce any ſtanding rule to regulate themſelves and their notions by, in ſuch arbitrary ideas.

Propriety not a ſufficient remedy.

§ 8. It is true, common uſe, that is the rule of propriety, may be ſuppoſed here to afford ſome aid, to ſettle the ſignification of language; and it cannot be denied, but that in ſome meaſure it does. Common uſe regulates the meaning of words pretty well for common converſation; but no body having an authority to eſtabliſh the preciſe ſignification of words, nor determine to what ideas any one ſhall annex them, common uſe is not ſufficient to adjuſt them to philoſophical diſcourſes; there being ſcarce any name of any very complex idea (to ſay nothing of others) which in common uſe has not a great latitude, and which, keeping within the bounds of propriety, may not be made the ſign of far different ideas. Beſides, the rule and meaſure of propriety itſelf being no where eſtabliſhed, it is often matter of diſpute, whether this or that way of uſing a word, be propriety of ſpeech, or no. From all which it is evident, that the names of ſuch kind of very complex ideas are naturally liable to this imperfection, to be of doubtful and uncertain ſignification; and even in men, that have a mind to underſtand one another, do not always ſtand for the ſame idea in ſpeaker and hearer. Tho' the names glory and gratitude be the ſame in every man's mouth, thro' a whole country; yet the complex, collective idea, which every one thinks on, or intends by that name, is apparently very different in men uſing the ſame language.

The way of learning theſe names contributes alſo to their doubtfulneſs.

§ 9. The way alſo, wherein the names of mixed modes are ordinarily learned, does not a little contribute to the doubtfulneſs of their ſignification. For if we will obſerve how children learn languages, we ſhall find that to make them underſtand what the names of ſimple ideas, or ſubſtances, ſtands for, people ordinarily ſhew them the thing, whereof they would have them have the idea; and then repeat to them the name that ſtands for it, as white, ſweet, milk, ſugar, cat, dog. But as for mixed modes, eſpecially the moſt material of them, moral words, the ſounds are uſually learned firſt; and then to know what complex ideas they ſtand for, they are either beholden to the explication of others, or (which happens for the moſt part) are left to their own obſervation and induſtry; which being little laid out in the ſearch of the true and preciſe meaning of names, theſe moral words are in moſt men's mouths little more than bare ſounds; or, when they have any, it is for the moſt part but a very looſe and undetermined, and conſequently obſcure and confuſed ſignification. And even thoſe themſelves, who have with more attention ſettled their notions, do yet hardly avoid the inconvenience, to have them ſtand for complex ideas, different from thoſe which other, even intelligent and ſtudious men, make them the ſigns of. Where ſhall one find any, either controverſial debate, or familiar diſcourſe, concerning honour, faith, grace, religion, church, &c. wherein it is not eaſy to obſerve the different notions men have of them? which is nothing but this, that they are not agreed in the ſignification of thoſe words, nor have in their minds the ſame complex ideas, which they make them ſtand for: and ſo all the conteſts, that follow thereupon, are only about the meaning of a ſound. And hence we ſee, that in the interpretation of laws, whether divine or human, there is no end; comments beget comments, and explications make new matter for explications: and of limiting, diſtinguiſhing, varying the ſignification of theſe moral words, there is no end. Theſe ideas of men's making, are, by men, ſtill having the ſame power, multiplied in infinitum. Many a man, who was pretty well ſatisfied of the meaning of a text of ſcripture, or clauſe in the code, at firſt reading, has by conſulting commentators quite loſt the ſenſe of it, and by thoſe elucidations given riſe, or increaſe to his doubts, and drawn obſcurity upon the place. I ſay not this, that I think commentaries needleſs; but to ſhew how uncertain the names of mixed modes naturally are, even in the mouths of thoſe, who had both the intention and the faculty of ſpeaking, as clearly as language was capable to expreſs their thoughts.

Hence unavoidable obſcurity in antient authors.

§ 10. WHAT obſcurity this has unavoidably brought upon the writings of men, who have lived in remote ages and different countries, it will be needleſs to take notice; ſince the numerous volumes of learned men, employing their thoughts that way, are proofs more than enough to ſhew what attention, ſtudy, ſagacity, and reaſoning are required, to find out the true meaning of antient authors. But there being no writings we have any great concernment to be very ſolicitous about the meaning of, but thoſe that contain either truths we are required to believe, or laws we are to obey, and draw inconveniences on us, when we miſtake or tranſgreſs, we may be leſs anxious about the ſenſe of other authors; who writing but their own opinions, we are under no greater neceſſity to know them, than they to know ours. Our good or evil depending not on their decrees, we may ſafely be ignorant of their notions: and therefore, in the reading of them, if they do not uſe their words with a due clearneſs and perſpicuity, we may lay them aſide, and, without any injury done them, reſolve thus with ourſelves.

"Si non vis intelligi, debes negligi."

Names of ſubſtances of doubtful ſignification.

§ 11. IF the ſignification of the names of mixed modes be uncertain, becauſe there are no real ſtandards exiſting in nature, to which thoſe ideas are referred, and by which they may be adjuſted, the names of ſubſtances are of a doubtful ſignification, for a contrary reaſon, viz. becauſe the ideas they ſtand for are ſuppoſed conformable to the reality of things, and are referred to ſtandards made by nature. In our ideas of ſubſtances we have not the liberty, as in mixed modes, to frame what combinations we think fit, to be the characteriſtical notes to rank and denominate things by. In theſe we muſt follow nature, ſuit our complex ideas to real exiſtences, and regulate the ſignification of their names by the things themſelves, if we will have our names to be the ſigns of them, and ſtand for them. Here, it is true, we have patterns to follow; but patterns that will make the ſignification of their names very uncertain; for names muſt be of a very unſteady and various meaning, if the ideas, they ſtand for, be referred to ſtandards without us, that either cannot be known at all, or can be known but imperfectly and uncertainly.

Names of ſubſtances referred, 1. To real eſſences that cannot be known.

§ 12. The names of ſubſtances have, as has been ſhewed, a double reference in their ordinary uſe.

First, ſometimes they are made to ſtand for, and ſo their ſignification is ſuppoſed to agree to, the real conſtitution of things, from which all their properties flow, and in which they all center. But this real conſtitution, or (as it is apt to be called) eſſence, being utterly unknown to us, any ſound that is put to ſtand for it, muſt be very uncertain in its application; and it will be impoſſible to know what things are, or ought to be called an horſe, or antimony, when thoſe words are put for real eſſences, that we have no ideas of at all. And therefore, in this ſuppoſition, the names of ſubſtances being referred to ſtandards that cannot be known, their ſignifications can never be adjuſted and eſtabliſhed by thoſe ſtandards.

2. To co-exiſting qualities, which are known but imperfectly.

§ 13. Secondly, the ſimple ideas that are found to co-exiſt in ſubſtances being that which their names immediately ſignify, theſe, as united in the ſeveral ſorts of things, are the proper ſtandards to which their names are referred, and by which their ſignifications may beſt be rectified. But neither will theſe archetypes ſo well ſerve to this purpoſe, as to leave theſe names without very various and uncertain ſignifications. Becauſe theſe ſimple ideas that co-exiſt, and are united in the ſame ſubject, being very numerous, and having all an equal right to go into the complex, ſpecifick idea, which the ſpecifick name is to ſtand for, men, tho' they propoſe to themſelves the very ſame ſubject to conſider, yet frame very different ideas about it; and ſo the name, they uſe for it, unavoidably comes to have, in ſeveral men, very different ſignifications. The ſimple qualities, which make up the complex ideas, being moſt of them powers, in relation to changes, which they are apt to make in, or receive from other bodies, are almoſt infinite. He that ſhall but obſerve what a great variety of alterations, any one of the baſer metals is apt to receive, from the different application only of fire; and how much a greater number of changes any of them will receive, in the hands of a chymiſt, by the application of other bodies, will not think it ſtrange, that I count the properties of any ſort of bodies not eaſy to be collected, and compleatly known, by the ways of enquiry, which our faculties are capable of. They being, therefore, at leaſt ſo many, that no man can know the preciſe and definite number, they are differently diſcovered by different men, according to their various ſkill, attention, and ways of handling; who therefore cannot chuſe but have different ideas of the ſame ſubſtance, and therefore, make the ſignification of its common name very various and uncertain. For the complex ideas of ſubſtances, being made up of ſuch ſimple ones as are ſuppoſed to co-exiſt in nature, every one has a right to put into his complex idea, thoſe qualities he has found to be united together. For tho' in the ſubſtance, gold, one ſatisfies himſelf with colour and weight, yet another thinks ſolubility in aqua regia as neceſſary to be joined with that colour, in his idea of gold, as any one does its fuſibility; ſolubility in aqua regia being a quality as conſtantly joined with its colour and weight, as fuſibility, or any other; others put in its ductility, or fixedneſs, &c. as they have been taught by tradition, or experience. Who of all theſe has eſtabliſhed the right ſignification of the word gold? or who ſhall be the judge to determine? Each has his ſtandard in nature, which he appeals to, and with reaſon thinks, he has the ſame right to put into his complex idea, ſignified by the word gold, thoſe qualities, which upon trial he had found united; as another, who has not ſo well examined, has to leave them out; or a third, who has made other trials, has to put in others. For the union in nature of theſe qualities being the true ground of their union in one complex idea, who can ſay, one of them has more reaſon to be put in, or left out, than another? From whence it will always unavoidably follow, that the complex ideas of ſubſtances, in men uſing the ſame name for them, will be very various; and ſo the ſignifications of thoſe names very uncertain.

3. To co-exiſting qualities, which are known but imperfectly.

§ 14. Besides, there is ſcarce any particular thing exiſting, which, in ſome of its ſimple ideas, does not communicate with a greater, and in others with a leſs number of particular beings: who ſhall determine in this caſe, which are thoſe that are to make up the preciſe collection, that is to be ſignified by the ſpecifick name; or can with any juſt authority preſcribe, which obvious, or common qualities are to be left out; or which more ſecret, or more particular, are to be put into the ſignification of the name of any ſubſtance? All which, together, ſeldom or never fail to produce that various and doubtful ſignification in the names of ſubſtances, which cauſes ſuch uncertainty, diſputes, or miſtakes, when we come to a philoſophical uſe of them.

With this imperfection they may ſerve for civil, but not well for philoſophical uſe.

§ 15. It is true, as to civil and common converſation, the general names of ſubſtances, regulated in their ordinary ſignification, by ſome obvious qualities (as by the ſhape, and figure, in things of known, ſeminal propagation, and in other ſubſtances, for the moſt part by colour, joined with ſome other ſenſible qualities) do well enough to deſign the things men would be underſtood to ſpeak of: and ſo they uſually conceive well enough the ſubſtances, meant by the word gold, or apple, to diſtinguiſh the one from the other. But in philoſophical enquiries and debates, where general truths are to be eſtabliſhed, and conſequences drawn from poſitions laid down; there the preciſe ſignification of the names of ſubſtances will be found, not only not to be well eſtabliſhed, but alſo very hard to be ſo. For example, he that ſhall make malleableneſs, or a certain degree of fixedneſs, a part of his complex idea of gold, may make propoſitions concerning gold, and draw conſequences from them, that will truly and clearly follow from gold taken in ſuch a ſignification: but yet ſuch as another man can never be forced to admit, nor be convinced of their truth, who makes not malleableneſs, or the ſame degree of fixedneſs, part of that complex idea, that the name gold, in his uſe of it, ſtands for.

Inſtance, liquor of nerves.

§ 16. This is a natural, and almoſt unavoidable imperfection in almoſt all the names of ſubſtances, in all languages whatſoever, which men will eaſily find, when once paſſing from confuſed, or looſe notions, they come to more ſtrict and cloſe enquiries. For then they will be convinced how doubtful and obſcure thoſe words are in their ſignification, which in ordinary uſe appeared very clear and determined. I was once in a meeting of very learned and ingenious phyſicians, where by chance there aroſe a queſtion, "whether any liquor paſſed "thro' the filaments of the nerves?" The debate having been managed a good while by variety of arguments on both ſides, I (who had been uſed to ſuſpect, that the greateſt part of diſputes were more about the ſignification of words, than a real difference in the conception of things) deſired, that before they went any farther on in this diſpute, they would firſt examine, and eſtabliſh among them, what the word liquor ſignified. They at firſt were a little ſurpriſed at the propoſal; and had they been perſons leſs ingenious, they might, perhaps, have taken it for a very frivolous, or extravagant one: ſince there was no one there, that thought not himſelf to underſtand very perfectly what the word liquor ſtood for; which I think too none of the moſt perplexed names of ſubſtances. However, they were pleaſed to comply with my motion, and upon examination found, that the ſignification of that word was not ſo ſettled and certain, as they had all imagined; but that each of them made it a ſign of a different, complex idea. This made them perceive, that the main of their diſpute was about the ſignification of that term; and that they differed very little in their opinions, concerning ſome fluid and ſubtile matter, paſſing thro' the conduits of the nerves; tho' it was not ſo eaſy to agree, whether it was to be called liquor, or no; a thing which, when conſidered, they thought it not worth the contending about.

Inſtance, gold.

§ 17. How much this is the caſe, in the greateſt part of diſputes, that men are engaged ſo hotly in, I ſhall, perhaps, have an occaſion in another place to take notice. Let us only here conſider a little more exactly the forementioned inſtance of the word, gold, and we ſhall ſee how hard it is preciſely to determine its ſignification. I think all agree to make it ſtand for a body of a certain yellow, ſhining colour; which being the idea, to which children have annexed that name, the ſhining, yellow part of a peacock's tail is properly to them gold. Others, finding fuſibility joined with that yellow colour, in certain parcels of matter, make of that combination a complex idea, to which they give the name gold, to denote a ſort of ſubſtances; and ſo exclude from being gold all ſuch yellow, ſhining bodies, as by fire will be reduced to aſhes; and admit to be of that ſpecies, or to be comprehended under that name gold, only ſuch ſubſtances, as having that ſhining, yellow colour, will by fire be reduced to fuſion, and not to aſhes. Another, by the ſame reaſon, adds the weight, which, being a quality as ſtraitly joined with that colour, as its fuſibility, he thinks, has the ſame reaſon to be joined in its idea, and to be ſignified by its name: and therefore, the other made up of body of ſuch a colour and fuſibility, to be imperfect; and ſo on of all the reſt: wherein no one can ſhew a reaſon, why ſome of the inſeparable qualities, that are always united in nature, ſhould be put into the nominal eſſence, and others left out: or why the word gold, ſignifying that ſort of body, the ring on his finger is made of, ſhould determine that ſort rather by its colour, weight, and fuſibility, than by its colour, weight, and ſolubility in aqua regia: ſince the diſſolving it, by that liquor, is as inſeparable from it as the fuſion by fire; and they are both of them nothing, but the relation, which that ſubſtance has to two other bodies, which have a power to operate differently upon it. For by what right is it, that fuſibility comes to be a part of the eſſence, ſignified by the word gold, and ſolubility but a property of it? or why is its colour part of the eſſence, and its malleableneſs but a property? That which I mean is this, that theſe being all but properties depending on its real conſtitution, and nothing but powers, either active or paſſive, in reference to other bodies; no one has authority to determine the ſignification of the word gold (as referred to ſuch a body exiſting in nature) more to one collection of ideas, to be found in that body, than to another: whereby the ſignification of that name muſt unavoidably be very uncertain; ſince, as has been ſaid, ſeveral people obſerve ſeveral properties in the ſame ſubſtance; and, I think, I may ſay no body all. And therefore, have but very imperfect deſcriptions of things, and words have very uncertain ſignifications.

The names of ſimple ideas, the leaſt doubtful.

§ 18. From what has been ſaid, it is eaſy to obſerve, what has been before remarked, viz. that the names of ſimple ideas are, of all others, the leaſt liable to miſtakes, and that for theſe reaſons. Firſt, becauſe the ideas they ſtand for, being each but one ſingle perception, are much eaſier got, and more clearly retained, than the more complex ones, and therefore are not liable to the uncertainty, which uſually attends thoſe compounded ones of ſubſtances and mixed modes, in which the preciſe number of ſimple ideas, that make them up, are not eaſily agreed, and ſo readily kept in the mind. And ſecondly, becauſe they are never referred to any other eſſence, but barely that perception they immediately ſignify: which reference is that which renders the ſignification of the names of ſubſtances naturally ſo perplexed, and gives occaſion to ſo many diſputes. Men, that do not perverſely uſe their words, or on purpoſe ſet themſelves to cavil, ſeldom miſtake in any language, which they are acquainted with, the uſe and ſignification of the names of ſimple ideas: white and ſweet, yellow and bitter, carry a very obvious meaning with them, which every one preciſely comprehends, or eaſily perceives he is ignorant of, and ſeeks to be informed. But what preciſe collection of ſimple ideas, modeſty or frugality ſtand for, in another's uſe, is not ſo certainly known. And however we are apt to think, we well enough know what is meant by gold, or iron; yet the preciſe complex idea, others make them the ſigns of, is not ſo certain: and I believe it is very ſeldom that in ſpeaker and hearer they ſtand for exactly the ſame collection. Which muſt needs produce miſtakes and diſputes, when they are made uſe of in diſcourſes, wherein men have to do with univerſal propoſitions, and would ſettle in their minds univerſal truths, and conſider the conſequences that follow from them.

And next to them, ſimple modes.

§ 19. By the ſame rule, the names of ſimple modes, are, next to thoſe of ſimple ideas, leaſt liable to doubt and uncertainty, eſpecially thoſe of figure and number, of which men have ſo clear and diſtinct ideas. Whoever, that had a mind to underſtand them, miſtook the ordinary meaning of ſeven or a triangle? And in general, the leaſt compounded ideas in every kind have the leaſt dubious names.

The moſt doubtful are the names of very compounded

§ 20. Mixed modes therefore, that are made up but of a few and obvious ſimple ideas, have uſually names of no very uncertain ſignification. But the names of mixed modes, which comprehend a great number of ſimple ideas, are commonly of a very doubtful and undetermined meaning, as has been ſhewn. The names of ſubſtances, being annexed to ideas that are neither the real eſſences nor exact repreſentations of the patterns they are referred to, are liable yet to greater imperfection and uncertainty, eſpecially when we come to a philoſophical uſe of them.

mixed modes and ſubſtances.

Why this imperfection charged upon words.

§ 21. THE great diſorder, that happens in our names of ſubſtances, proceeding for the moſt part from our want of knowledge, and inability to penetrate into their real conſtitutions, it may probably be wondered, why I charge this as an imperfection, rather upon our words than underſtandings. This exception has ſo much appearance of juſtice, that I think myſelf obliged to give a reaſon why I have followed this method. I muſt confeſs then, that when I firſt began this diſcourſe of the underſtanding, and a good while after, I had not the leaſt thought, that any conſideration of words was at all neceſſary to it. But when, having paſſed over the original and compoſition of our ideas, I began to examine the extent and certainty of our knowledge, I found it had ſo near a connection with words, that unleſs their force and manner of ſignification were firſt well obſerved, there could be very little ſaid clearly and pertinently concerning knowledge: which being converſant about truth, had conſtantly to do with propoſitions. And tho' it terminated in things, yet it was for the moſt part ſo much by the intervention of words, that they ſeemed ſcarce ſeparable from our general knowledge. At leaſt they interpoſe themſelves ſo much between our underſtandings and the truth, which it would contemplate and apprehend, that, like the medium through which viſible objects paſs, their obſcurity and diſorder does not ſeldom caſt a miſt before our eyes, and impoſe upon our underſtandings. If we conſider, in the fallacies men put upon themſelves, as well as others, and the miſtakes in men's diſputes and notions, how great a part is owing to words, and their uncertain, or miſtaken ſignifications, we ſhall have reaſon to think this no ſmall obſtacle in the way to knowledge; which, I conclude, we are the more carefully to be warned of, becauſe it has been ſo far from being taken notice of, as an inconvenience, that the arts of improving it, have been made the buſineſs of men's ſtudy; and obtained the reputation of learning and ſubtilty, as we ſhall ſee in the following chapter. But I am apt to imagine, that were the imperfections of language, as the inſtrument of knowledge, more thoroughly weighed, a great many of the controverſies, that make ſuch a noiſe in the world, would of themſelves ceaſe; and the way to knowledge, and perhaps peace too, lie a great deal opener than it does.

This ſhould teach us moderation, in impoſing our own ſenſe of old authors.

§ 22. SURE I am, that the ſignification of words in all languages, depending very much on the thoughts, notions, and ideas of him that uſes them, muſt unavoidably be of great uncertainty to men of the ſame language and country. This is ſo evident in the Greek authors, that he that ſhall peruſe their writings will find, in almoſt every one of them, a diſtinct language, tho' the ſame words. But when, to this natural difficulty in every country, there ſhall be added different countries and remote ages, wherein the ſpeakers and writers had very different notions, tempers, cuſtoms, ornaments, and figures of ſpeech, &c. every one of which influenced the ſignification of their words then, tho' to us now they are loſt and unknown; it would become us to be charitable one to another in our interpretations, or miſunderſtanding of thoſe antient writings: which, tho' of great concernment to be underſtood, are liable to the unavoidable difficulties of ſpeech, which (if we except the name of ſimple ideas, and ſome very obvious things) is not capable, without a conſtant defining the terms, of conveying the ſenſe and intention of the ſpeaker, without any manner of doubt and uncertainty, to the hearer. And in diſcourſes of religion, law, and morality, as they are matters of the higheſt concernment, ſo there will be the greateſt difficulty.

§ 23. THE volumes of interpreters and commentators on the old and new teſtament, are but too manifeſt proofs of this. Tho' every thing ſaid in the text be infallibly true, yet the reader may be, nay cannot chuſe but be, very fallible in the underſtanding of it. Nor is it to be wondered, that the will of God, when clothed in words, ſhould be liable to that doubt and uncertainty, which unavoidably attends that ſort of conveyance; when even his ſon, whilſt clothed in fleſh, was ſubject to all the frailties and inconveniences of human nature, ſin excepted. And we ought to magnify his goodneſs, that he hath ſpread before all the world ſuch legible characters of his works and providence, and given all mankind ſo ſufficient a light of reaſon, that they, to whom this written word never came, could not (whenever they ſet themſelves to ſearch) either doubt of the being of a God, or of the obedience due to him. Since then the precepts of natural religion are plain, and very intelligible to all mankind, and ſeldom come to be controverted; and other revealed truths, which are conveyed to us by books and languages, are liable to the common and natural obſcurities and difficulties incident to words; methinks it would become us to be more careful and diligent in obſerving the former, and leſs magiſterial, poſitive, and imperious, in impoſing our own ſenſe and interpretations of the latter.

CHAP. X.

Of the abuſe of words.

CHAP. X.

Abuſe of words.

§ 1. BESIDES the imperfection, that is naturally in language, and the obſcurity and confuſion, that is ſo hard to be avoided in the uſe of words, there are ſeveral wilful faults and neglects, which men are guilty of, in this way of communication, whereby they render theſe ſigns leſs clear and diſtinct in their ſignification, than naturally they need to be.

Firſt, words without any, or without clear ideas.

§ 2. First, in this kind, the firſt and moſt palpable abuſe is, the uſing of words without clear and diſtinct ideas; or, which is worſe, ſigns without any thing ſignified. Of theſe there are two ſorts:

I. One may obſerve, in all languages, certain words, that if they be examined, will be found, in their firſt original, and their appropriated uſe, not to ſtand for any clear and diſtinct ideas. Theſe, for the moſt part, the ſeveral ſects of philoſophy and religion have introduced. For their authors, or promoters, either affecting ſomething ſingular and out of the way of common apprehenſions, or to ſupport ſome ſtrange opinions, or cover ſome weakneſs of their hypotheſis, ſeldom fail to coin new words, and ſuch, as when they come to be examined, may juſtly be called inſignificant terms. For having either had no determinate collection of ideas annexed to them, when they were firſt invented; or at leaſt ſuch as, if well examined, will be found inconſiſtent; it is no wonder if afterwards, in the vulgar uſe of the ſame party, they remain empty ſounds, with little or no ſignification, amongſt thoſe who think it enough to have them often in their mouths, as the diſtinguiſhing characters of their church, or ſchool, without much troubling their heads to examine what are the preciſe ideas they ſtand for. I ſhall not need here to heap up inſtances; every one's reading and converſation will ſufficiently furniſh him: or if he wants to be better ſtored, the great mint-maſters of theſe kind of terms, I mean the ſchool-men and metaphyſicians (under which, I think, the diſputing, natural and moral philoſophers of theſe latter ages may be comprehended) have wherewithal abundantly to content him.

§ 3. II. Others there be, who extend this abuſe yet farther, who take ſo little care to lay by words, which, in their primary notation, have ſcarce any clear and diſtinct ideas which they are annexed to, that, by an unpardonable negligence, they familiarly uſe words, which the propriety of language has affixed to very important ideas, without any diſtinct meaning at all. Wiſdom, glory, grace, &c. are words frequent enough in every man's mouth; but if a great many, of thoſe who uſe them, ſhould be aſked what they mean by them, they would be at a ſtand, and not know what to anſwer: a plain proof, that tho' they have learned thoſe ſounds, and have them ready at their tongue's end, yet there are no determined ideas laid up in their minds, which are to be expreſſed to others by them.

Occaſioned by learning names, before the ideas

§ 4. Men having been accuſtomed from their cradles to learn words, which are eaſily got and retained, before they knew, or had framed the complex ideas to they belong to.

which they were annexed, or which were to be found in the things, they were thought to ſtand for, they uſually continue to do ſo all their lives; and without taking the pains neceſſary to ſettle in their minds determined ideas, they uſe their words for ſuch unſteady and confuſed notions as they have, contenting themſelves with the ſame words other people uſe: as if their very ſound neceſſarily carried with it conſtantly the ſame meaning. This, tho' men make a ſhift with, in the ordinary occurrences of life, where they find it neceſſary to be underſtood, and therefore they make ſigns till they are ſo; yet this inſignificancy in their words, when they come to reaſon, concerning either their tenets, or intereſt, manifeſtly fills their diſcourſe with abundance of empty, unintelligible noiſe and jargon, eſpecially in moral matters, where the words, for the moſt part, ſtanding for arbitrary and numerous collections of ideas, not regularly and permanently united in nature, their bare ſounds are often only thought on, or, at leaſt, very obſcure and uncertain notions annexed to them. Men take the words they find in uſe, amongſt their neighbours, and, that they may not ſeem ignorant what they ſtand for, uſe them confidently, without much troubling their heads about a certain, fixed meaning: whereby, beſides the eaſe of it, they obtain this advantage, that, as in ſuch diſcourſes they ſeldom are in the right, ſo they are as ſeldom to be convinced, that they are in the wrong; it being all one to go about to draw thoſe men out of their miſtakes, who have no ſettled notions, as to diſpoſſeſs a vagrant of his habitation, who has no ſettled abode. This I gueſs to be ſo; and every one may obſerve in himſelf and others, whether it be or no.

2. Unſteady application of them.

§ 5. SECONDLY, another great abuſe of words, is, inconſtancy in the uſe of them. It is hard to find a diſcourſe, written of any ſubject, eſpecially of controverſy, wherein one ſhall not obſerve, if he read with attention, the ſame words (and thoſe commonly the moſt material in the diſcourſe, and upon which the argument turns) uſed ſometimes for one collection of ſimple ideas, and ſometimes for another; which is a perfect abuſe of language. Words being intended for ſigns of my ideas, to make them known to others, not by any natural ſignification, but by a voluntary impoſition, it is plain cheat and abuſe, when I make them ſtand ſometimes for one thing, and ſometimes for another; the wilful doing whereof, can be imputed to nothing but great folly, or greater diſhoneſty. And a man, in his accompts with another, may, with as much fairneſs, make the characters of numbers ſtand ſometimes for one, and ſometimes for another collection of units (v. g. this character 3 ſtand ſometimes for three, ſometimes for four, and ſometimes for eight) as in his diſcourſe, or reaſoning, make the ſame words ſtand for different collections of ſimple ideas. If men ſhould do ſo in their reckonings, I wonder who would have to do with them? One who would ſpeak thus, in the affairs and buſineſs of the world, and call 8 ſometimes ſeven, and ſometimes nine, as beſt ſerved his advantage, would preſently have clapped upon him one of the two names men conſtantly are diſguſted with. And yet, in arguings and learned conteſts, the ſame ſort of proceeding paſſes commonly for wit and learning: but to me it appears a greater diſhoneſty, than the miſplacing of counters in the caſting up a debt; and the cheat the greater, by how much truth is of greater concernment and value than money.

3. Affected obſcurity, by wrong application.

§ 6. THIRDLY, another abuſe of language is, an affected obſcurity, by either applying old words to new and unuſual ſignifications, or introducing new and ambiguous terms, without defining either; or elſe putting them ſo together, as may confound their ordinary meaning. Tho' the peripatetick philoſophy has been moſt eminent in this way, yet other ſects have not been wholly clear of it. There is ſcarce any of them, that are not cumbered with ſome difficulties (ſuch is the imperfection of human knowledge) which they have been fain to cover with obſcurity of terms, and to confound the ſignification of words, which, like a miſt before people's eyes, might hinder their weak parts from being diſcovered. That body and extenſion, in common uſe, ſtand for two diſtinct ideas, is plain, to any one that will but reflect a little. For, were their ſignification preciſely the ſame, it would be proper, and as intelligible to ſay, the body of an extenſion, as the extenſion of a body; and yet there are thoſe, who find it neceſſary to confound their ſignification. To this abuſe, and the miſchiefs of confounding the ſignification of words, logick, and the liberal ſciences, as they have been handled in the ſchools, have given reputation; and the admired art of diſputing hath added much to the natural imperfection of languages, whilſt it has been made uſe of, and fitted, to perplex the ſignification of words, more than to diſcover the knowledge and truth of things: and he that will look into that ſort of learned writings, will find the words there much more obſcure, uncertain, and undetermined in their meaning, than they are in ordinary converſation.

Logick and diſpute has much contributed to this.

§ 7. This is unavoidably to be ſo, where men's parts and learning are eſtimated by their ſkill in diſputing. And if reputation and reward ſhall attend theſe conqueſts, which depend moſtly on the fineneſs and niceties of words; it is no wonder if the wit of men ſo employed, ſhould perplex, involve, and ſubtilize the ſignification of ſounds, ſo as never to want ſomething to ſay, in oppoſing, or defending any queſtion; the victory being adjudged, not to him who had truth on his ſide, but the laſt word in the diſpute.

Calling it ſubtilty.

§ 8. This, tho' a very uſeleſs ſkill, and that which I think the direct oppoſite to the ways of knowledge, hath yet paſſed hitherto under the laudable and eſteemed names of ſubtilty and acuteneſs; and has had the applauſe of the ſchools, and encouragement of one part of the learned men of the world. And no wonder, ſince the philoſophers of old (the diſputing and wrangling philoſophers I mean, ſuch as Lucian wittily and with reaſon taxes) and the ſchoolmen ſince, aiming at glory and eſteem, for their great and univerſal knowledge, eaſier a great deal to be pretended to, than really acquired, found this a good expedient to cover their ignorance, with a curious and inexplicable web of perplexed words, and procure to themſelves the admiration of others, by unintelligible terms, the apter to produce wonder, becauſe they could not be underſtood: whilſt it appears in all hiſtory, that theſe profound doctors were no wiſer, nor more uſeful than their neighbours; and brought but ſmall advantage to human life, or the ſocieties wherein they lived: unleſs the coining of new words, where they produced no new things to apply them to, or the perplexing, or obſcuring the ſignification of old ones, and ſo bringing all things into queſtion and diſpute, were a thing profitable to the life of man, or worthy commendation and reward.

This learning very little benefits ſociety.

§ 9. For, notwithſtanding theſe learned diſputants, theſe all-knowing doctors, it was to the unſcholaſtick ſtateſman, that the governments of the world owed their peace, defence, and liberties; and from the illiterate and contemned mechanick (a name of diſgrace) that they received the improvements of uſeful arts. Nevertheleſs, this artificial ignorance, and learned gibberiſh, prevailed mightily in theſe laſt ages, by the intereſt and artifice of thoſe, who found no eaſier way to that pitch of authority and dominion they have attained, than by amuſing the men of buſineſs, and ignorant with hard words, or employing the ingenious and idle, in intricate diſputes about unintelligible terms, and holding them perpetually entangled in that endleſs labyrinth: beſides, there is no ſuch way to gain admittance, or give defence to ſtrange and abſurd doctrines, as to guard them round about with legions of obſcure, doubtful, and undefined words: which yet make theſe retreats more like the dens of robbers, or holes of foxes, than the fortreſſes of fair warriours; which if it be hard to get them out of, it is not for the ſtrength that is in them, but the briars and thorns, and the obſcurity of the thickets they are beſet with. For untruth being unacceptable to the mind of man, there is no other defence left for abſurdity, but obſcurity.

But deſtroys the inſtruments of knowledge and communication.

§ 10. Thus learned ignorance, and this art of keeping, even inquiſitive men, from true knowledge, hath been propagated in the world, and hath much perplexed, whilſt it pretended to inform the underſtanding. For we ſee that other well-meaning and wiſe men, whoſe education and parts had not acquired that acuteneſs, could intelligibly expreſs themſelves to one another; and in its plain uſe make a benefit of language. But tho' unlearned men well enough underſtood the words white and black, &c. and had conſtant notions of the ideas ſignified by thoſe words; yet there were philoſophers found, who had learning and ſubtilty enough to prove, that ſnow was black, i. e. to prove, that white was black. Whereby they had the advantage to deſtroy the inſtruments and means of diſcourſe, converſation, inſtruction and ſociety; whilſt, with great art and ſubtilty, they did no more but perplex and confound the ſignification of words, and thereby render language leſs uſeful, than the real defects of it had made it; a gift, which the illiterate had not attained to.

As uſeful as to confound the ſound of the letters.

§ 11. **These** learned men did equally inſtruct men's underſtandings, and profit their lives, as he, who ſhould alter the ſignification of known characters, and, by a ſubtile device of learning, far ſurpaſſing the capacity of the illiterate, dull and vulgar, ſhould in his writing, ſhew that he could put A for B, and D for E, &c. to the no ſmall admiration and benefit of his reader. It being as ſenſeleſs to put black, which is a word agreed on to ſtand for one ſenſible idea, to put it, I ſay, for another, or the contrary idea, i. e. to call ſnow black, as to put this mark A, which is a character agreed on to ſtand for one modification of ſound, made by a certain motion of the organs of ſpeech, for B; which is agreed on to ſtand for another modification of ſound, made by another certain motion of the organs of ſpeech.

This art has perplexed religion and juſtice.

§ 12. **Nor** hath this miſchief ſtopped in logical niceties, or curious, empty ſpeculations, it hath invaded the great concernments of human life and ſociety, obſcured and perplexed the material truths of law and divinity, brought confuſion, diſorder and uncertainty into the affairs of mankind; and if not deſtroyed, yet in great meaſure rendered uſeleſs, thoſe two great rules, religion and juſtice. What have the greateſt part of the comments and diſputes, upon the laws of God and man, ſerved for, but to make the meaning more doubtful, and perplex the ſenſe? What have been the effect of thoſe multiplied, curious diſtinctions and acute niceties, but obſcurity and uncertainty, leaving the words more unintelligible, and the reader more at a loſs? How elſe comes it to paſs that princes, ſpeaking or writing to their ſervants, in their ordinary commands, are eaſily underſtood; ſpeaking to their people, in their laws, are not ſo? And, as I remarked before, doth it not often happen, that a man of an ordinary capacity very well underſtands a text, or a law, that he reads, till he conſults an expoſitor, or goes to council; who by that time he hath done explaining them, makes the words ſignify either nothing at all, or what he pleaſes.

And ought not to paſs for learning.

§ 13. **Whether** any by-intereſts of theſe profeſſions have occaſioned this, I will not here examine; but I leave it to be conſidered, whether it would not be well for mankind, whoſe concernment it is to know things as they are, and to do what they ought, and not to ſpend their lives in talking about them, or toſſing words to and fro; whether it would not be well, I ſay, that the uſe of words were made plain and direct, and that language, which was given us for the improvement of knowledge, and bond of ſociety, ſhould not be employed to darken truth, and unſettle people's rights; to raiſe miſts, and render unintelligible both morality and religion? Or that, at leaſt, if this will happen, it ſhould not be thought learning, or knowledge to do ſo?

4. Taking them for things.

§ 14. **Fourthly**, another great abuſe of words is, the taking them for things. This, tho' it in ſome degree concerns all names in general, yet more particularly affects thoſe of ſubſtances. To this abuſe thoſe men are moſt ſubject, who moſt confine their thoughts to any one ſyſtem, and give themſelves up into a firm belief of the perfection of any received hypotheſis; whereby they come to be perſuaded, that the terms of that ſect are ſo united to the nature of things, that they perfectly correſpond with their real exiſtence. Who is there, that has been bred up in the peripatetick philoſophy, who does not think the ten names, under which are ranked the ten predicaments, to be exactly conformable to the nature of things? Who is there of that ſchool, that is not perſuaded, that ſubſtantial forms, vegetative ſouls, abhorrence of a vacuum, intentional ſpecies, &c. are ſomething real? Theſe words men have learned from their very entrance upon knowledge, and have found their maſters and ſyſtems lay great ſtreſs upon them; and therefore, they cannot quit the opinion, that they are conformable to nature, and are the repreſentations of ſomething that really exiſts. The Platoniſts have their ſoul of the world, and the Epicureans their endeavour towards motion in their atoms, when at reſt. There is ſcarce any ſect in philoſophy has not a diſtinct ſet of terms, that others underſtand not; but yet this gibberiſh, which, in the weakneſs of human underſtanding, ſerves ſo well to palliate men's ignorance, and cover their errors, comes by familiar uſe, among thoſe of the ſame tribe, to ſeem the moſt important part of language, and of all other the terms the moſt ſignificant. And ſhould aerial and ætherial vehicles come once, by the prevalency of that doctrine, to be generally received any where, no doubt thoſe terms would make impreſſions on men's minds, ſo as to eſtabliſh them in the perſuaſion of the reality of ſuch things, as much as peripatetick forms and intentional ſpecies have heretofore done.

Inſtance, in matter.

§ 15. How much names, taken for things, are apt to miſlead the underſtanding, the attentive reading of philoſophical writers would abundantly diſcover; and that, perhaps, in words little ſuſpected of any ſuch miſuſe. I ſhall inſtance in one only, and that a very familiar one: how many intricate diſputes have there been about matter, as if there were ſome ſuch thing really in nature, diſtinct from body; as it is evident the word matter ſtands for an idea diſtinct from the idea of body? For if the ideas theſe two terms ſtood for, were preciſely the ſame, they might indifferently in all places be put one for another. But we ſee, that tho' it be proper to ſay, there is one matter of all bodies, one cannot ſay, there is one body of all matters: we familiarly ſay, one body is bigger than another; but it ſounds harſh (and I think is never uſed) to ſay, one matter is bigger than another. Whence comes this then? viz. from hence, that tho' matter and body be not really diſtinct, but wherever there is the one, there is the other; yet matter and body ſtand for two different conceptions, whereof the one is incompleat, and but a part of the other. For body ſtands for a ſolid, extended, figured ſubſtance, whereof matter is but a partial and more confuſed conception, it ſeeming to me to be uſed for the ſubſtance and ſolidity of body, without taking in its extenſion and figure: and therefore it is, that ſpeaking of matter, we ſpeak of it always as one, becauſe in truth it expreſly contains nothing but the idea of a ſolid ſubſtance, which is every where the ſame, every where uniform. This being our idea of matter, we no more conceive, or ſpeak of different matters in the world, than we do of different ſolidities; tho' we both conceive and ſpeak of different bodies, becauſe extenſion and figure are capable of variation. But ſince ſolidity cannot exiſt, without extenſion and figure, the taking matter to be the name of ſomething, really exiſting under that preciſion, has no doubt produced thoſe obſcure and unintelligible diſcourſes and diſputes, which have filled the heads and books of philoſophers, concerning materia prima; which imperfection or abuſe, how far it may concern a great many other general terms, I leave to be conſidered. This, I think, I may at leaſt ſay, that we ſhould have a great many fewer diſputes in the world, if words were taken for what they are, the ſigns of our ideas only, and not for things themſelves. For when we argue about matter, or any the like term, we truly argue only about the idea we expreſs by that ſound, whether that preciſe idea agree to any thing really exiſting in nature, or no. And, if men would tell what ideas they make their words ſtand for, there could not be half that obſcurity, or wrangling, in the ſearch, or ſupport of truth, that there is.

This makes errors laſting.

§ 16. But, whatever inconvenience follows from this miſtake of words, this I am ſure, that by conſtant and familiar uſe, they charm men into notions, far remote from the truth of things. It would be a hard matter to perſuade any one, that the words which his father, or ſchoolmaſter, the parſon of the pariſh, or ſuch a reverend doctor uſed, ſignified nothing that really exiſted in nature; which, perhaps, is none of the leaſt cauſes, that men are ſo hardly drawn to quit their miſtakes, even in opinions purely philoſophical, and where they have no other intereſt but truth. For the words they have a long time been uſed to, remaining firm in their minds, it is no wonder that the wrong notions, annexed to them, ſhould not be removed.

5. Setting them for what they cannot ſignify.

§ 17. Fifthly, another abuſe of words, is the ſetting them in the place of things, which they do, or can by no means ſignify. We may obſerve, that, in the general names of ſubſtances, whereof the nominal eſſences are only known to us, when we put them into propoſitions, and affirm or deny any thing about them, we do moſt commonly tacitly ſuppoſe, or intend they ſhould ſtand for the real eſſence of a certain ſort of ſubſtances. For when a man ſays gold is malleable, he means and would inſinuate ſomething more than this, that what I call gold is malleable (tho' truly it amounts to no more) but would have this underſtood, viz. that gold, i. e. what has the real eſſence of gold, is malleable; which amounts to thus much, that malleableneſs depends on, and is inſeparable from the real eſſence of gold. But a man not knowing wherein that real eſſence conſiſts, the connection in his mind of malleableneſs, is not truly with an eſſence he knows not, but only with the ſound, gold, he puts for it. Thus when we ſay, that "animal rationale" is, and "animal implume, bipes, latis unguibus", is not, a good definition of a man; it is plain, we ſuppoſe the name man, in this caſe, to ſtand for the real eſſence of a ſpecies, and would ſignify, that a rational animal better deſcribed that real eſſence, than a two-legged animal, with broad nails, and without feathers. For elſe, why might not Plato as properly make the word ἄνθρωπος, or man, ſtand for his complex idea, made up of the ideas of a body, diſtinguiſhed from others by a certain ſhape, and other outward appearances, as Ariſtotle, make the complex idea, to which he gave the name ἄνθρωπος, or man, of body and the faculty of reaſoning joined together, unleſs the name ἄνθρωπος, or man, were ſuppoſed to ſtand for ſomething elſe, than what it ſignifies; and to be put in the place of ſome other thing, than the idea a man profeſſes he would expreſs by it.

v. g. Putting them for the real eſſences of ſubſtances.

§ 18. IT is true, the names of ſubſtances would be much more uſeful, and propoſitions, made in them, much more certain, were the real eſſences of ſubſtances the ideas in our minds, which thoſe words ſignified. And it is for want of thoſe real eſſences, that our words convey ſo little knowledge, or certainty, in our diſcourſes about them: and therefore the mind, to remove that imperfection, as much as it can, makes them, by a ſecret ſuppoſition, to ſtand for a thing having that real eſſence, as if thereby it made ſome nearer approaches to it. For tho' the word man, or gold, ſignify nothing truly but a complex idea of properties, united together in one ſort of ſubſtances: yet there is ſcarce any body, in the uſe of theſe words, but often ſuppoſes each of thoſe names to ſtand for a thing, having the real eſſence, on which thoſe properties depend. Which is ſo far from diminiſhing the imperfection of our words, that by a plain abuſe it adds to it, when we would make them ſtand for ſomething, which not being in our complex idea, the name we uſe can no ways be the ſign of.

Hence we think every change of our idea in ſubſtances, not to change the ſpecies.

§ 19. THIS ſhews us the reaſon, why in mixed modes any of the ideas that make the compoſition of the complex one, being left out, or changed, it is allowed to be another thing, i. e. to be of another ſpecies, as is plain in chance-medly, manſlaughter, murder, parricide, &c. The reaſon whereof is, becauſe the complex idea, ſignified by that name, is the real, as well as nominal, eſſence; and there is no ſecret reference of that name to any other eſſence but that. But in ſubſtances, it is not ſo. For tho', in that called gold, one puts into his complex idea what another leaves out, and vice verſa; yet men do not uſually think that therefore the ſpecies is changed; becauſe they ſecretly in their minds refer that name, and ſuppoſe it annexed to, a real, immutable eſſence of a thing exiſting, on which thoſe properties depend. He that adds to his complex idea of gold, that of fixedneſs, or ſolubility in aqua regia, which he put not in it before, is not thought to have changed the ſpecies; but only to have a more perfect idea, by adding another ſimple idea, which is always in fact joined with thoſe other, of which his former, complex idea conſiſted. But this reference of the name to a thing, whereof we have not the idea, is ſo far from helping at all, that it only ſerves the more to involve us in difficulties. For, by this tacit reference to the real eſſence of that ſpecies of bodies, the word gold (which by ſtanding for a more or leſs perfect collection of ſimple ideas, ſerves to deſign that ſort of body well enough in civil diſcourſe) comes to have no ſignification at all, being put for ſomewhat, whereof we have no idea at all, and ſo can ſignify nothing at all, when the body itſelf is away. For, however it may be thought all one; yet, if well conſidered, it will be found a quite different thing, to argue about gold in name, and about a parcel of the body itſelf, v. g. a piece of leaf-gold laid before us; tho' in diſcourſe we are fain to ſubſtitute the name for the thing.

The cauſe of the abuſe, a ſuppoſition of nature's working always regularly.

§ 20. That which, I think, very much diſpoſes men to ſubſtitute their names for the real eſſences of ſpecies, is the ſuppoſition before-mentioned, that nature works regularly in the production of things, and ſets the boundaries to each of thoſe ſpecies, by giving exactly the ſame real, internal conſtitution to each individual, which we rank under one general name. Whereas any one, who obſerves their different qualities, can hardly doubt, that many of the individuals, called by the ſame name, are, in their internal conſtitution, as different one from another, as ſeveral of thoſe, which are ranked under different, ſpecifick names. This ſuppoſition however, that the ſame preciſe, internal conſtitution goes always with the ſame ſpecifick name, makes men forward to take thoſe names for the repreſentatives of thoſe real eſſences, tho', indeed, they ſignify nothing, but the complex ideas they have in their minds, when they uſe them. So that, if I may ſo ſay, ſignifying one thing, and being ſuppoſed for, or put in the place of another, they cannot but, in ſuch a kind of uſe, cauſe a great deal of uncertainty in men's diſcourſes; eſpecially in thoſe, who have thoroughly imbibed the doctrine of ſubſtantial forms, whereby they firmly imagine the ſeveral ſpecies of things to be determined and diſtinguiſhed.

This abuſe contains two falſe ſuppoſitions.

§ 21. But, however prepoſterous and abſurd it be, to make our names ſtand for ideas we have not, or (which is all one) eſſences that we know not, it being in effect to make our words the ſigns of nothing; yet it is evident to any one, who ever ſo little reflects on the uſe men make of their words, that there is nothing more familiar. When a man aſks whether this, or that thing he ſees, let it be a drill, or a monſtrous fœtus, be a man or no; it is evident, the queſtion is not, whether that particular thing agree to his complex idea, expreſſed by the name man: but whether it has in it the real eſſence of a ſpecies of things, which he ſuppoſes his name man to ſtand for. In which way of uſing the names of ſubſtances, there are theſe falſe ſuppoſitions contained.

First, that there are certain, preciſe eſſences, according to which nature makes all particular things, and by which they are diſtinguiſhed into ſpecies. That every thing has a real conſtitution, whereby it is what it is, and on which its ſenſible qualities depend, is paſt doubt: but I think it has been proved, that this makes not the diſtinction of ſpecies, as we rank them; nor the boundaries of their names.

Secondly, this tacitly alſo inſinuates, as if we had ideas of theſe propoſed eſſences. For to what purpoſe elſe is it to enquire, whether this, or that thing have the real eſſence of the ſpecies man, if we did not ſuppoſe that there were ſuch a ſpecifick eſſence known? which yet is utterly falſe: and, therefore, ſuch application of names, as would make them ſtand for ideas, which we have not, muſt needs cauſe great diſorder, in diſcourſes and reaſonings about them, and be a great inconvenience in our communication by words.

6. A ſuppoſition that words have a certain and evident ſignification.

§ 22. Sixthly, there remains yet another more general, tho' perhaps leſs obſerved, abuſe of words; and that is, that men having by a long and familiar uſe annexed to them certain ideas, they are apt to imagine ſo near and neceſſary a connection between the names and the ſignification they uſe them in, that they forwardly ſuppoſe one cannot but underſtand what their meaning is; and therefore, one ought to acquieſce in the words delivered, as if it were paſt doubt, that in the uſe of thoſe common, received ſounds, the ſpeaker and hearer had neceſſarily the ſame preciſe ideas: whence preſuming, that when they have in diſcourſe uſed any term, they have thereby, as it were, ſet before others, the very thing they talk of. And ſo likewiſe taking the words of others, as naturally ſtanding for juſt what they themſelves have been accuſtomed to apply them to, they never trouble themſelves to explain their own, or underſtand clearly others meaning. From whence commonly proceeds noiſe and wrangling without improvement or information; whilſt men take words to be the conſtant, regular marks of agreed notions, which, in truth, are no more but the voluntary and unſteady ſigns of their own ideas. And yet men think it ſtrange, if in diſcourſe, or (where it is often abſolutely neceſſary) in diſpute, one ſometimes aſks the meaning of their terms: tho' the arguings one may every day obſerve in converſation, make it evident, that there are few names of complex ideas, which any two men uſe for the ſame juſt, preciſe collection. It is hard to name a word, which will not be a clear inſtance of this. Life is a term, none more familiar. Any one almoſt would take it for an affront to be aſked what he meant by it. And yet if it comes in queſtion, whether a plant, that lies ready formed in the ſeed, have life; whether the embrio in an egg before incubation, or a man in a ſwoon without ſenſe, or motion, be alive or no; it is eaſy to perceive that a clear diſtinct ſettled idea does not always accompany the uſe of ſo known a word as that of life is. Some groſs and confuſed conceptions men indeed ordinarily have, to which they apply the common words of their language; and ſuch a looſe uſe of their words ſerves them well enough in their ordinary diſcourſes or affairs. But this is not ſufficient for philoſophical enquiries. Knowledge and reaſoning require preciſe determinate ideas. And tho' men will not be ſo importunately dull, as not to underſtand what others ſay, without demanding an explication of their terms; nor ſo troubleſomely critical, as to correct others in the uſe of the words, they receive from them: yet where truth and knowledge are concerned in the caſe, I know not what fault it can be to deſire the explication of words, whoſe ſenſe ſeems dubious; or why a man ſhould be aſhamed to own his ignorance, in what ſenſe another man uſes his words, ſince he has no other way of certainly knowing it, but by being informed. This abuſe, of taking words upon truſt, has no where ſpread ſo far, nor with ſo ill effects, as amongſt men of letters. The multiplication and obſtinacy of diſputes, which has ſo laid waſte the intellectual world, is owing to nothing more, than to this ill uſe of words. For, tho' it be generally believed that there is great diverſity of opinions in the volumes and variety of controverſies, the world is diſtracted with; yet the moſt I can find that the contending, learned men of different parties do, in their arguings one with another, is, that they ſpeak different languages. For I am apt to imagine, that when any of them, quitting terms, think upon things, and know what they think, they think all the ſame; tho' perhaps what they would have, be different.

The ends of language; 1. To convey our ideas.

§ 23. To conclude this conſideration, of the imperfection and abuſe of language; the ends of language, in our diſcourſe with others, being chiefly theſe three: firſt, to make known one man's thoughts, or ideas to another: ſecondly, to do it, with as much eaſe and quickneſs, as is poſſible: and, thirdly, thereby to convey the knowledge of things. Language is either abuſed, or deficient, when it fails of any of theſe three.

FIRST, words fail in the firſt of theſe ends, and lay not open one man's ideas to another's view: 1. When men have names in their mouths, without any determined ideas in their minds, whereof they are the ſigns: or, 2. When they apply the common, received names of any language to ideas, to which the common uſe of that language does not apply them: or, 3. When they apply them very unſteadily, making them ſtand now for one, and by and by for another idea.

2. To do it with quickneſs.

§ 24. SECONDLY, men fail of conveying their thoughts, with all the quickneſs and eaſe that may be, when they have complex ideas, without having diſtinct names for them. This is ſometimes the fault of the language itſelf, which has not in it a ſound yet applied to ſuch a ſignification; and ſometimes the fault of the man, who has not yet learned the name for that idea he would ſhew another.

§ 25. THIRDLY, there is no knowledge of things conveyed by men's words, when their ideas agree not to the reality of things. Tho' it be a defect, that has its original in our ideas, which are not ſo conformable to the nature of things, as attention, ſtudy, and application might make them; yet it fails not to extend itſelf to our words too, when we uſe them as ſigns of real beings, which yet never had any reality, or exiſtence.

How men's words fail in all theſe.

§ 26. FIRST, he that hath words of any language, without diſtinct ideas in his mind, to which he applies them, does, ſo far as he uſes them in diſcourſe, only make a noiſe, without any ſenſe, or ſignification; and how learned ſoever he may ſeem, by the uſe of hard words, or learned terms, is not much more advanced thereby in knowledge, than he would be in learning, who had nothing in his ſtudy, but the bare titles of books, without poſſeſſing the contents of them. For all ſuch words, however put into diſcourſe, according to the right conſtruction of grammatical rules, or the harmony of well-turned periods, do yet amount to nothing but bare ſounds, and nothing elſe.

§ 27. Secondly, he that has complex ideas, without particular names for them, would be in no better a caſe than a bookſeller, who had, in his warehouſe, volumes, that lay there unbound, and without titles; which he could therefore make known to others, only by ſhewing the looſe ſheets, and communicate them only by tale. This man is hindered in his diſcourſe, for want of words, to communicate his complex ideas, which he is therefore forced to make known, by an enumeration of the ſimple ones that compoſe them; and ſo is fain often to uſe twenty words, to expreſs what another man ſignifies in one.

§ 28. Thirdly, he that puts not conſtantly the ſame ſign for the ſame idea, but uſes the ſame words ſometimes in one, and ſometimes in another ſignification, ought to paſs, in the ſchools and converſation, for as fair a man, as he does in the market and exchange, who ſells ſeveral things under the ſame name.

§ 29. Fourthly, he that applies the words of any language, to ideas different from thoſe, to which the common uſe of that country applies them, however his own underſtanding may be filled with truth and light, will not, by ſuch words, be able to convey much of it to others, without defining his terms. For, however the ſounds are ſuch as are familiarly known, and eaſily enter the ears of thoſe, who are accuſtomed to them; yet ſtanding for other ideas, than thoſe they uſually are annexed to, and are wont to excite in the mind of the hearers, they cannot make known the thoughts of him who thus uſes them.

§ 30. Fifthly, he that hath imagined to himſelf ſubſtances, ſuch as never have been, and filled his head with ideas, which have not any correſpondence with the real nature of things, to which yet he gives ſettled and defined names, may fill his diſcourſe, and, perhaps, another man's head, with the fantaſtical imaginations of his own brain, but will be very far from advancing thereby one jot in real and true knowledge.

§ 31. He that hath names without ideas, wants meaning in his words, and ſpeaks only empty ſounds. He that hath complex ideas, without names for them, wants liberty and diſpatch in his expreſſions, and is neceſſitated to uſe periphraſes. He that uſes his words looſely and unſteadily, will either be not minded, or not underſtood. He that applies his names to ideas, different from their common uſe, wants propriety in his language, and ſpeaks gibberiſh. And he, that hath the ideas of ſubſtances, diſagreeing with the real exiſtence of things, ſo far wants the materials of true knowledge in his underſtanding, and hath inſtead thereof chimera's.

How in ſubſtances.

§ 32. In our notions concerning ſubſtances, we are liable to all the former inconveniencies: v. g. he that uſes the word, tarantula, without having any imagination, or idea, of what it ſtands for, pronounces a good word: but ſo long means nothing at all by it. 2. He that in a new diſcovered country ſhall ſee ſeveral ſorts of animals and vegetables, unknown to him before, may have as true ideas of them, as of a horſe, or a ſtag; but can ſpeak of them only by a deſcription, till he ſhall either take the names the natives call them by, or give them names himſelf. 3. He that uſes the word body, ſometimes for pure extenſion, and ſometimes for extenſion and ſolidity together, will talk very fallaciouſly. 4. He that gives the name horſe to that idea, which common uſage calls mule, talks improperly, and will not be underſtood. 5. He that thinks the name, centaur, ſtands for ſome real being, impoſes on himſelf, and miſtakes words for things.

How in modes and relations.

§ 33. In modes and relations, generally, we are liable only to the four firſt of theſe inconveniencies; viz. 1. I may have in my memory the names of modes, as gratitude, or charity, and yet not have any preciſe ideas, annexed in my thoughts to thoſe names. 2. I may have ideas, and not know the names that belong to them; v. g. I may have the idea of a man's drinking, till his colour and humour be altered, till his tongue trips, and his eyes look red, and his feet fail him; and yet not know, that it is to be called drunkenneſs. 3. I may

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have the ideas of virtues, or vices, and names alſo, but apply them amiſs: v. g. when I apply the name frugality to that idea, which others call and ſignify by this ſound, covetouſneſs. 4. I may uſe any of thoſe names with inconſtancy. 5. But in modes and relations, I cannot have ideas diſagreeing to the exiſtence of things: for modes being complex ideas, made by the mind at pleaſure; and relation being but my way of conſidering, or comparing two things together, and ſo alſo an idea of my own making; theſe ideas can ſcarce be found to diſagree with any thing exiſting, ſince they are not in the mind, as the copies of things regularly made by nature, nor as properties, inſeparably flowing from the internal conſtitution, or eſſence of any ſubſtance; but as it were patterns lodged in my memory, with names annexed to them, to denominate actions and relations by, as they come to exiſt. But the miſtake is commonly in my giving a wrong name to my conceptions; and ſo uſing words in a different ſenſe from other people, I am not underſtood, but am thought to have wrong ideas of them, when I give wrong names to them. Only if I put in my ideas of mixed modes, or relations, any inconſiſtent ideas together, I fill my head alſo with chimera's; ſince ſuch ideas, if well examined, cannot ſo much as exiſt in the mind, much leſs any real being be ever denominated from them.

7. Figurative ſpeech alſo an abuſe of language.

§ 34. Since wit and fancy finds eaſier entertainment in the world, than dry truth and real knowledge, figurative ſpeeches, and alluſion in language, will hardly be admitted as an imperfection, or abuſe of it. I confeſs, in diſcourſes, where we ſeek rather pleaſure and delight, than information and improvement, ſuch ornaments, as are borrowed from them, can ſcarce paſs for faults. But yet, if we would ſpeak of things as they are, we muſt allow that all the art of rhetorick, beſides order and clearneſs, all the artificial and figurative application of words, eloquence hath invented, are for nothing elſe, but to inſinuate wrong ideas, move the paſſions, and thereby miſlead the judgment, and ſo, indeed, are perfect cheat: and therefore, however laudable, or allowable, oratory may render them, in harangues and popular addreſſes, they are certainly, in all diſcourſes that pretend to inform, or inſtruct, wholly to be avoided; and where truth and knowledge are concerned, cannot but be thought a great fault, either of the language, or perſon, that makes uſe of them. What, and how various they are, will be ſuperfluous here to take notice; the books of rhetorick, which abound in the world, will inſtruct thoſe who want to be informed: only I cannot but obſerve, how little the preſervation and improvement of truth and knowledge, is the care and concern of mankind; ſince the arts of fallacy are endowed and preferred. It is evident how much men love to deceive, and to be deceived, ſince rhetorick, that powerful inſtrument of error and deceit, has its eſtabliſhed profeſſors, is publickly taught, and has always been had in great reputation: and, I doubt not, but it will be thought great boldneſs, if not brutality in me, to have ſaid thus much againſt it. Eloquence, like the fair ſex, has too prevailing beauties in it, to ſuffer itſelf ever to be ſpoken againſt. And it is in vain to find fault with thoſe arts of deceiving, wherein men find pleaſure to be deceived.

CHAP. XI.

Of the remedies of the foregoing imperfections and abuſes.

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They are worth ſeeking.

§ 1. THE natural and improved imperfections of languages, we have ſeen above at large; and ſpeech being the great bond that holds ſociety together, and the common conduit whereby the improvements of knowledge are conveyed from one man, and one generation to another, it would well deſerve our moſt ſerious thoughts, to conſider what remedies are to be found for theſe inconveniences above-mentioned.

Are not eaſy.

§ 2. I am not ſo vain to think, that any one can pretend to attempt the perfect reforming the languages of the world, no not ſo much as of his own country, without rendring himſelf ridiculous. To require that men ſhould uſe their words conſtantly in the ſame ſenſe, and for none but determined and uniform ideas, would be to think that all men ſhould have the ſame notions, and ſhould talk of nothing, but what they have clear and diſtinct ideas of; which is not to be expected by any one, who hath not vanity enough to imagine he can prevail with men to be very knowing, or very ſilent. And he muſt be very little ſkilled in the world, who thinks that a voluble tongue ſhall accompany only a good underſtanding; or that men's talking much, or little, ſhall hold proportion only to their knowledge.

But yet neceſſary to philoſophy.

§ 3. But, tho' the market and exchange muſt be left to their own ways of talking, and goſſippings not to be robbed of their antient priviledge; tho' the ſchools and men of argument would, perhaps, take it amiſs, to have any thing offered to abate the length, or leſſen the number of their diſputes: yet, methinks, thoſe, who pretend ſeriouſly to ſearch after, or maintain truth, ſhould think themſelves obliged to ſtudy, how they might deliver themſelves without obſcurity, doubtfulneſs, or equivocation, to which men's words are naturally liable, if care be not taken.

Miſuſe of words, the cauſe of great errors.

§ 4. For he that ſhall well conſider the errors and obſcurity, the miſtakes and confuſion, that are ſpread in the world by an ill uſe of words, will find ſome reaſon to doubt, whether language, as it has been employed, has contributed more to the improvement, or hindrance of knowledge, amongſt mankind. How many are there, that when they would think on things, fix their thoughts only on words, eſpecially when they would apply their minds to moral matters? And who then can wonder, if the reſult of ſuch contemplations, and reaſonings, about little more than ſounds, whilſt the ideas, they annexed to them, are very confuſed, or very unſteady, or, perhaps, none at all; who can wonder, I ſay, that ſuch thoughts and reaſonings end in nothing, but obſcurity and miſtkae, without any clear judgment, or knowledge?

Obſtinacy.

§ 5. This inconvenience, in an ill uſe of words, men ſuffer in their own private meditations: but much more manifeſt are the diſorders, which follow from it, in converſation, diſcourſe, and arguings with others. For language being the great conduit, whereby men convey their diſcoveries, reaſonings, and knowledge, from one to another, he that makes an ill uſe of it, tho' he does not corrupt the fountains of knowledge, which are in things themſelves; yet he does, as much as in him lies, break, or ſtop the pipes, whereby it is diſtributed to the publick uſe and advantage of mankind. He that uſes words, without any clear and ſteady meaning, what does he but lead himſelf and others into errors? And he that deſignedly does it, ought to be looked on as an enemy to truth and knowledge. And yet who can wonder, that all the ſciences and parts of knowledge have been ſo over-charged with obſcure and equivocal terms, and inſignificant and doubtful expreſſions, capable to make the moſt attentive or quick-ſighted, very little or not at all the more knowing, or orthodox; ſince ſubtility in thoſe, who make profeſſion to teach or defend truth, hath paſſed ſo much for a virtue: a virtue, indeed, which conſiſting for the moſt part in nothing, but the fallacious and illuſory uſe of obſcure or deceitful terms, is only fit to make men more conceited in their ignorance, and obſtinate in their errors.

And wrangling.

§ 6. Let us look into the books of controverſy of any kind; there we ſhall ſee, that the effect of obſcure, unſteady, or equivocal terms, is nothing but noiſe and wrangling about ſounds, without convincing or bettering a man's underſtanding. For if the idea be not agreed on betwixt the ſpeaker and hearer, for which the words ſtand, the argument is not about things, but names. As often as ſuch a word, whoſe ſignification is not aſcertained betwixt them, comes in uſe, their underſtandings have no other object, wherein they agree, but barely the ſound; the things that they think on at that time, as expreſſed by that word, being quite different.

Inſtance, bat and bird.

§ 7. Whether a bat be a bird or no, is not a queſtion, whether a bat be another thing than indeed it is, or have other qualities than indeed it has, for that would be extremely abſurd to doubt of: but the queſtion is, 1. Either between thoſe that acknowledged themſelves to have but imperfect ideas of one, or both of thoſe ſort of things, for which theſe names are ſuppoſed to ſtand; and then it is a real enquiry, concerning the nature of a bird, or a bat, to make their yet imperfect ideas of it more compleat, by examining, whether all the ſimple ideas, to which, combined together, they both give the name bird, be all to be found in a bat: but this is a queſtion only of enquirers (not diſputers) who neither affirm, nor deny, but examine. Or, 2. It is a queſtion between diſputants, whereof the one affirms, and the other denies, that a bat is a bird. And then the queſtion is, barely, about the ſignification of one, or both theſe words; in that they not having both the ſame complex ideas, to which they give theſe two names, one holds, and the other denies, that theſe two names may be affirmed one of another. Were they agreed in the ſignification of theſe two names, it were impoſſible they ſhould diſpute about them: for they would preſently and clearly ſee (were that adjuſted between them) whether all the ſimple ideas, of the more general name bird, were found in the complex idea of a bat, or no; and ſo there could be no doubt, whether a bat were a bird, or no. And here I deſire it may be conſidered and carefully examined, whether the greateſt part of the diſputes in the world are not merely verbal, and about the ſignification of words; and whether, if the terms they are made in, were defined, and reduced in their ſignification (as they muſt be, where they ſignify any thing) to determined collections of the ſimple ideas they do, or ſhould ſtand for, thoſe diſputes would not end of themſelves, and immediately vaniſh. I leave it then to be conſidered, what the learning of diſputation is, and how well they are employed for the advantage of themſelves, or others, whoſe buſineſs is only the vain oſtentation of ſounds; i. e. thoſe who ſpend their lives in diſputes and controverſies. When I ſhall ſee any of thoſe combatants ſtrip all his terms of ambiguity and obſcurity (which every one may do, in the words he uſes himſelf) I ſhall think him a champion for knowledge, truth and peace, and not the ſlave of vain-glory, ambition, or a party.

§ 8. To remedy the defects of ſpeech before-mentioned, to ſome degree, and to prevent the inconveniences that follow from them, I imagine the obſervation of theſe following rules may be of uſe, till ſome body better able ſhall judge it worth his while, to think more maturely on this matter, and oblige the world with his thoughts on it.

1. Remedy, to uſe no word without an idea.

FIRST, a man ſhould take care to uſe no word without a ſignification, no name without an idea, for which he makes it ſtand. This rule will not ſeem altogether needleſs to any one, who ſhall take the pains to recollect, how often he has met with ſuch words, as inſtinct, ſympathy, and antipathy, &c. in the diſcourſe of others, ſo made uſe of, as he might eaſily conclude, that thoſe, that uſed them, had no ideas in their minds, to which they applied them; but ſpoke them only as ſounds, which uſually ſerved inſtead of reaſons on the like occaſions. Not but that theſe words, and the like, have very proper ſignifications, in which they may be uſed; but there being no natural connection between any words, and any ideas, theſe, and any other, may be learned by rote, and pronounced or writ by men, who have no ideas in their minds, to which they have annexed them, and for which they make them ſtand; which is neceſſary they ſhould, if men would ſpeak intelligibly, even to themſelves alone.

2. To have diſtinct ideas annexed to them in modes.

§ 9. SECONDLY, it is not enough a man uſes his words as ſigns of ſome ideas: thoſe ideas he annexes them to, if they be ſimple, muſt be clear and diſtinct; if complex, muſt be determinate, i. e. the preciſe collection of ſimple ideas ſettled in the mind, with that ſound annexed to it, as the ſign of that preciſe determined collection, and no other. This is very neceſſary in names of modes, and eſpecially moral words; which having no ſettled objects in nature, from whence their ideas are taken, as from their original, are apt to be very confuſed. Juſtice is a word in every man's mouth, but moſt commonly with a very undetermined, looſe ſignification: which will always be ſo, unleſs a man has in his mind a diſtinct comprehenſion of the component parts that complex idea conſiſts of; and if it be decompounded, muſt be able to reſolve it ſtill on, till he at laſt comes to the ſimple ideas that make it up: and unleſs this be done, a man makes an ill uſe of the word, let it be juſtice, for example, or any other. I do not ſay, a man needs ſtand to recollect and make this analyſis at large, every time the word juſtice comes in his way: but this at leaſt is neceſſary, that he have ſo examined the ſignification of that name, and ſettled the idea of all its parts in his mind, that he can do it, when he pleaſes. If one who makes his complex idea of juſtice, to be ſuch a treatment of the perſon, or goods of another, as is according to law, hath not a clear and diſtinct idea what law is, which makes a part of his complex idea of juſtice, it is plain his idea of juſtice itſelf will be confuſed and imperfect. This exactneſs will, perhaps, be judged very troubleſome; and therefore moſt men will think they may be excuſed from ſettling the complex ideas of mixed modes ſo preciſely in their minds. But yet I muſt ſay, till this be done, it muſt not be wondered, that they have a great deal of obſcurity and confuſion in their own minds, and a great deal of wrangling in their diſcourſes with others.

And diſtinct and conformable in ſubſtances.

§ 10. IN the names of ſubſtances, for a right uſe of them, ſomething more is required than barely determined ideas. In theſe the names muſt alſo be conformable to things, as they exiſt: but of this I ſhall have occaſion to ſpeak more at large by and by. This exactneſs is abſolutely neceſſary, in inquiries after philoſophical knowledge, and in controverſies about truth. And tho' it would be well too, if it extended itſelf to common converſation, and the ordinary affairs of life; yet I think that is ſcarce to be expected. Vulgar notions ſuit vulgar diſcourſes; and both, tho' confuſed enough, yet ſerve pretty well the market and the wake. Merchants and lovers, cooks and taylors, have words, wherewithal to diſpatch their ordinary affairs; and ſo, I think, might philoſophers and diſputants too, if they had a mind to underſtand, and to be clearly underſtood.

Propriety.

§ 11. THIRDLY, it is not enough that men have ideas, determined ideas, for which they make theſe ſigns ſtand; but they muſt alſo take care to apply their words, as near as may be, to ſuch ideas, as common uſe has annexed them to. For words, eſpecially of languages already framed, being no man's private poſſeſſion, but the common meaſure of commerce and communication, it is not for any one, at pleaſure, to change the ſtamp they are current in, nor alter the ideas they are affixed to; or at leaſt, when there is a neceſſity to do ſo, he is bound to give notice of it. Men's intentions in ſpeaking are, or at leaſt ſhould be, to be underſtood; which cannot be, without frequent explanations, demands, and other the like incommodious interruptions, where men do not follow common uſe. Propriety of ſpeech is that which gives our thoughts entrance into other men's minds, with the greateſt eaſe and advantage; and therefore deſerves ſome part of our care and ſtudy, eſpecially in the names of moral words. The proper ſignification and uſe of terms is beſt to be learned from thoſe, who in their writings and diſcourſes appear to have had the cleareſt notions, and applied to them their terms with the exacteſt choice and fitneſs. This way of uſing a man's words, according to the propriety of the language, tho' it have not always the good fortune to be underſtood; yet moſt commonly leaves the blame of it on him, who is ſo unſkilful in the language he ſpeaks, as not to underſtand it, when made uſe of as it ought to be.

4. To make known their meaning.

§ 12. FOURTHLY, but becauſe common uſe has not ſo viſibly annexed any ſignification to words, as to make men know always, certainly, what they preciſely ſtand for; and becauſe men, in the improvement of their knowledge, come to have ideas different from the vulgar and ordinary received ones, for which they muſt either make new words (which men ſeldom venture to do, for fear of being thought guilty of affectation or novelty) or elſe muſt uſe old ones in a new ſignification: therefore, after the obſervation of the foregoing rules, it is ſometimes neceſſary, for the aſcertaining the ſignification of words, to declare their meaning, where either common uſe has left it uncertain and looſe (as it has in moſt names of very complex ideas) or where the term, being very material in the diſcourſe, and that, upon which it chiefly turns, is liable to any doubtfulneſs, or miſtake.

And that three ways.

§ 13. As the ideas, men's words ſtand for, are of different ſorts; ſo the way of making known the ideas they ſtand for, when there is occaſion, is alſo different. For tho' defining be thought the proper way to make known the proper ſignification of words; yet there are ſome words that will not be defined, as there are others, whoſe preciſe meaning cannot be made known, but by definition; and perhaps a third, which partake ſomewhat of both the other, as we ſhall ſee in the names of ſimple ideas, modes and ſubſtances.

1. In ſimple ideas, by ſynonymous terms, or ſhewing.

§ 14. First, when a man makes uſe of the name of any ſimple idea, which he perceives is not underſtood, or is in danger to be miſtaken, he is obliged by the laws of ingenuity, and the end of ſpeech, to declare his meaning, and make known what idea he makes it ſtand for. This, as has been ſhewn, cannot be done by definition; and therefore, when a ſynonymous word fails to do it, there is but one of theſe ways left. Firſt, ſometimes the naming the ſubject, wherein that ſimple idea is to be found, will make its name be underſtood, by thoſe who are acquainted with that ſubject, and know it by that name. So, to make a countryman underſtand what fueillemorte colour ſignifies, it may ſuffice to tell him, it is the colour of withered leaves falling in autumn. Secondly, but the only ſure way of making known the ſignification of the name of any ſimple idea, is by preſenting to his ſenſes that ſubject, which may produce it in his mind, and make him actually have the idea, that word ſtands for.

2. In mixed modes, by definition.

§ 15. Secondly, mixed modes, eſpecially thoſe belonging to morality, being moſt of them ſuch combinations of ideas, as the mind puts together of its own choice, and whereof there are not always ſtanding patterns to be found exiſting; the ſignification of their names cannot be made known, as thoſe of ſimple ideas, by any ſhewing; but in recompence thereof, may be perfectly and exactly defined. For they being combinations of ſeveral ideas, that the mind of man has arbitrarily put together, without reference to any archetypes, men may, if they pleaſe, exactly know the ideas that go to each compoſition, and ſo both uſe theſe words in a certain and undoubted ſignification, and perfectly declare, when there is occaſion, what they ſtand for. This, if well conſidered, would lay great blame on thoſe, who make not their diſcourſes, about moral things, very clear and diſtinct. For, ſince the preciſe ſignification of the names of mixed modes, or, which is all one, the real eſſence of each ſpecies, is to be known, they being not of nature's, but man's making, it is a great negligence and perverſeneſs to diſcourſe of moral things, with uncertainty and obſcurity; which is more pardonable in treating of natural ſubſtances, where doubtful terms are hardly to be avoided, for a quite contrary reaſon, as we ſhall ſee by and by.

Morality, capable of demonſtration.

§ 16. Upon this ground it is, that I am bold to think, that morality is capable of demonſtration, as well as mathematicks: ſince the preciſe, real eſſence of the things moral words ſtand for, may be perfectly known; and ſo the congruity, or incongruity, of the things themſelves be certainly diſcovered, in which conſiſts perfect knowledge. Nor let any one object, that the names of ſubſtances are often to be made uſe of in morality, as well as thoſe of modes, from which will ariſe obſcurity. For as to ſubſtances, when concerned in moral diſcourſes, their divers natures are not ſo much enquired into, as ſuppoſed; v. g. when we ſay, that a man is ſubject to law, we mean nothing by man, but a corporeal, rational creature: what the real eſſence, or other qualities, of that creature are, in this caſe, is no way conſidered. And therefore, whether a child, or changeling, be a man in a phyſical ſenſe, may, amongſt the naturaliſts, be as diſputable as it will, it concerns not at all the moral man, as I may call him, which is this immoveable, unchangeable idea, a corporeal, rational being. For were there a monkey, or any other creature to be found, that has the uſe of reaſon to ſuch a degree as to be able to underſtand general ſigns, and to deduce conſequences about general ideas, he would no doubt be ſubject to law, and in that ſenſe be a man, how much ſoever he differed in ſhape from others of that name. The names of ſubſtances, if they be uſed in them as they ſhould, can no more diſturb moral, than they do mathematical diſcourſes: where, if the mathematician ſpeaks of a cube, or globe of gold, or any other body, he has his clear, ſettled idea, which varies not, tho' it may by miſtake be applied to a particular body, to which it belongs not.

Definition can make moral diſcourſes clear.

§ 17. This I have here mentioned by the by, to ſhew of what conſequence it is for men, in their names of mixed modes, and conſequently in all their moral diſcourſes, to define their words, when there is occaſion; ſince thereby moral knowledge may be brought to ſo great clearneſs and certainty. And it muſt be great want of ingenuity (to ſay no worſe of it) to refuſe to do it: ſince a definition is the only way, whereby the preciſe meaning of moral words can be known; and yet a way, whereby their meaning may be known certainly, and without leaving any room for any conteſt about it. And therefore, the negligence, or perverſeneſs of mankind cannot be excuſed, if their diſcourſes in morality be not much more clear, than thoſe in natural philoſophy: ſince they are about ideas in the mind, which are none of them falſe, or diſproportionate; the having no external beings for the archetypes, which they are referred to, and muſt correſpond with. It is far eaſier for men to frame in their minds an idea, which ſhall be the ſtandard to which they will give the name juſtice, with which pattern ſo made all actions that agree ſhall paſs under that denomination, than, having ſeen Ariſtides, to frame an idea, that ſhall in all things be exactly like him, who is as he is, let men make what idea they pleaſe of him. For the one they need but know the combination of ideas, that are put together, within in their own minds; for the other, they muſt enquire into the whole nature, and abſtruſe, hidden conſtitution, and various qualities of a thing exiſting without them.

And is the only way.

§ 18. Another reaſon, that makes the defining of mixed modes ſo neceſſary, eſpecially of moral words, is what I mentioned a little before, viz. that it is the only way whereby the ſignification of the moſt of them can be known with certainty. For the ideas, they ſtand for, being for the moſt part ſuch whoſe component parts no where exiſt together, but ſcattered and mingled with others, it is the mind alone that collects them, and gives them the union of one idea: and it is only by words, enumerating the ſeveral ſimple ideas, which the mind has united, that we can make known to others what their names ſtand for; the aſſiſtance of the ſenſes in this caſe not helping us, by the propoſal of ſenſible objects, to ſhew the ideas which our names of this kind ſtand for, as it does often in the names of ſenſible ſimple ideas, and alſo to ſome degree in thoſe of ſubſtances.

3. In ſubſtances, by ſhewing and defining.

§ 19. Thirdly, for the explaining the ſignification of the names of ſubſtances, as they ſtand for the ideas we have of their diſtinct ſpecies, both the fore-mentioned ways, viz. of ſhewing and defining, are requiſite in many caſes to be made uſe of. For there being ordinarily in each ſort ſome leading qualities, to which we ſuppoſe the other ideas, which make up our complex idea of that ſpecies, annexed; we forwardly give the ſpecifick name to that thing, wherein that characteriſtical mark is found, which we take to be the moſt diſtinguiſhing idea of that ſpecies. Theſe leading, or characteriſtical (as I may ſo call them) ideas, in the ſorts of animals, and vegetables, is (as has been before remarked, ch. vi. § 29. and ch. ix. § 15.) moſtly figure, and in inanimate bodies, colour, and in ſome both together. Now,

Ideas of the leading qualities of ſubſtances are beſt got by ſhewing.

§ 20. These leading, ſenſible qualities are thoſe, which make the chief ingredients of our ſpecifick ideas, and, conſequently, the moſt obſervable and unvariable part in the definitions of our ſpecifick names, as attributed to ſorts of ſubſtances, coming under our knowledge. For tho' the ſound, man, in its own nature, be as apt to ſignify a complex idea, made up of animality and rationality united in the ſame ſubject, as to ſignify any other combination; yet uſed as a mark to ſtand for a ſort of creatures we count of our own kind, perhaps the outward ſhape is as neceſſary to be taken into our complex idea, ſignified by the word, man, as any other we find in it: and therefore, why Plato's "animal implume, bipes, latis unguibus," ſhould not be a good definition of the name, man, ſtanding for that ſort of creatures, will not be eaſy to ſhew: for it is the ſhape, as the leading quality, that ſeems more to determine that ſpecies, than a faculty of reaſoning, which appears not at firſt, and in ſome never. And if this be not allowed to be ſo, I do not know how they can be excuſed from murder, who kill monſtrous births, (as we call them) becauſe of an unordinary ſhape, without knowing whether they have a rational ſoul, or no; which can be no more diſcerned in a well-formed, than ill ſhaped infant, as ſoon as born. And who is it has informed us, that a rational ſoul can inhabit no tenement, unleſs it has juſt ſuch a ſort of frontiſpiece, or can join itſelf to, and inform no ſort of body, but one that is juſt of ſuch an outward ſtructure?

§ 21. Now theſe leading qualities are beſt made known by ſhewing, and can hardly be made known otherwiſe. For the ſhape of an horſe, or caſſuary, will be but rudely and imperfectly imprinted on the mind by words, the ſight of the animals doth it a thouſand times better: and the idea of the particular colour of gold is not to be got by any deſcription of it, but only by the frequent exerciſe of the eyes about it, as is evident in thoſe who are uſed to this metal, who will frequently diſtinguiſh true from counterfeit, pure from adulterate, by the ſight; where others (who have as good eyes, but yet by uſe have not got the preciſe, nice idea of that peculiar yellow) ſhall not perceive any difference. The like may be ſaid of thoſe other ſimple ideas, peculiar in their kind to any ſubſtance; for which preciſe ideas there are no peculiar names. The particular ringing ſound there is in gold, diſtinct from the ſound of other bodies, has no particular name annexed to it, no more than the particular yellow, that belongs to that metal.

The ideas of their powers, beſt by definition.

§ 22. But becauſe many of the ſimple ideas, that make up our ſpecifick ideas of ſubſtances, are powers, which lie not obvious to our ſenſes in the things, as they ordinarily appear; therefore, in the ſignification of our names of ſubſtances, ſome part of the ſignification will be better made known by enumerating thoſe ſimple ideas, than in ſhewing the ſubſtance itſelf. For he that, to the yellow, ſhining colour of gold, got by ſight, ſhall, from my enumerating them, have the ideas of great ductility, fuſibility, fixedneſs, and ſolubility in aqua regia, will have a perfecter idea of gold, than he can have by ſeeing a piece of gold, and thereby imprinting in his mind only its obvious qualities. But, if the former conſtitution of this ſhining, heavy, ductil thing (from whence all theſe its properties flow) lay open to our ſenſes, as the formal conſtitution, or eſſence of a triangle does, the ſignification of the word, gold, might as eaſily be aſcertained, as that of triangle.

A reflection on the knowledge of ſpirits.

§ 23. Hence we may take notice how much the foundation of all our knowledge of corporeal things lies in our ſenſes. For how ſpirits, ſeparate from bodies (whoſe knowledge and ideas of theſe things are certainly much more perfect than our's) know them, we have no notion, no idea at all. The whole extent of our knowledge, or imagination, reaches not beyond our own ideas limited to our ways of perception. Tho' yet it be not to be doubted that ſpirits, of a higher rank than thoſe immerſed in fleſh, may have as clear ideas of the radical conſtitution of ſubſtances, as we have of a triangle, and ſo perceive how all their properties and operations flow from thence: but the manner how they come by that knowledge exceeds our conceptions.

Ideas alſo of ſubſtances muſt be conformable to things.

§ 24. But tho' definitions will ſerve to explain the names of ſubſtances, as they ſtand for our ideas; yet they leave them not without great imperfection, as they ſtand for things. For our names of ſubſtances being not put barely for our ideas, but being made uſe of ultimately to repreſent things, and ſo are put in their place, their ſignification muſt agree with the truth of things, as well as with men's ideas. And, therefore, in ſubſtances we are not always to reſt in the ordinary, complex idea, commonly received as the ſignification of that word, but muſt go a little farther, and enquire into the nature and properties of the things themſelves, and thereby perfect, as much as we can, our ideas of their diſtinct ſpecies; or elſe learn them from ſuch as are uſed to that ſort of things, and are experienced in them. For ſince it is intended their names ſhould ſtand for ſuch collections of ſimple ideas, as do really exiſt in things themſelves, as well as for the complex idea, in other men's minds, which in their ordinary acceptation they ſtand for: therefore, to define their names right, natural hiſtory is to be enquired into; and their properties are, with care and examination, to be found out. For it is not enough, for the avoiding inconveniences, in diſcourſes and arguings about natural bodies and ſubſtantial things, to have learned from the propriety of the language, the common, but confuſed, or very imperfect idea, to which each word is applied, and to keep them to that idea in our uſe of them: but we muſt, by acquainting ourſelves with the hiſtory of that ſort of things, rectify and ſettle our complex idea belonging to each ſpecifick name; and in diſcourſe with others (if we find them miſtake us) we ought to tell what the complex idea is, that we make ſuch a name ſtand for. This is the more neceſſary to be done, by all thoſe who ſearch after knowledge and philoſophical verity, in that children being taught words whilſt they have but imperfect notions of things, apply them at random, and without much thinking, and ſeldom frame determined ideas, to be ſignified by them. Which cuſtom (it being eaſy, and ſerving well enough for the ordinary affairs of life and converſation) they are apt to continue when they are men: and ſo begin at the wrong end, learning words firſt and perfectly, but make the notions, to which they apply thoſe words, afterwards very overtly. By this means it comes to paſs, that men, ſpeaking the proper language of their country, i. e. according to grammar-rules of that language, do yet ſpeak very improperly of things themſelves; and by their arguing one with another, make but ſmall progreſs in the diſcoveries of uſeful truths, and the knowledge of things, as they are to be found in themſelves, and not in our imaginations; and it matters not much, for the improvement of our knowledge, how they are called.

Not eaſy to be made ſo.

§ 25. It were therefore to be wiſhed, that men, verſed in phyſical enquiries, and acquainted with the ſeveral ſorts of natural bodies, would ſet down thoſe ſimple ideas, wherein they obſerve the individuals of each ſort conſtantly to agree. This would remedy a great deal of that confuſion, which comes from ſeveral perſons applying the ſame name to a collection of a ſmaller, or greater, number of ſenſible qualities, proportionably as they have been more or leſs acquainted with or accurate in examining the qualities of any ſort of things, which come under one denomination. But a dictionary of this ſort, containing, as it were, a natural hiſtory, requires too many hands, as well as too much time, coſt, pains, and ſagacity, ever to be hoped for; and till that be done, we muſt content ourſelves with ſuch definitions of the names of ſubſtances, as explain the ſenſe men uſe them in. And it would be well, where there is occaſion, if they would afford us ſo much. This yet is not uſually done; but men talk to one another, and diſpute in words, whoſe meaning is not agreed between them, out of a miſtake, that the ſignification of common words are certainly eſtabliſhed, and the preciſe ideas, they ſtand for, perfectly known; and that it is a ſhame to be ignorant of them. Both which ſuppoſitions are falſe: no names of complex ideas having ſo ſettled, determined ſignifications, that they are conſtantly uſed for the ſame preciſe ideas. Nor is it a ſhame for a man not to have a certain knowledge of any thing, but by the neceſſary ways of attaining it; and ſo it is no diſcredit not to know, what preciſe idea any ſound ſtands for, in another man's mind, without he declare it to me, by ſome other way than barely uſing that ſound, there being no other way, without ſuch a declaration, certainly to know it. Indeed the neceſſity of communication by language brings men to an agreement in the ſignification of common words, within ſome tolerable latitude, that may ſerve for ordinary converſation: and ſo a man cannot be ſuppoſed wholly ignorant of the ideas, which are annexed to words by common uſe, in a language familiar to him. But common uſe, being but a very uncertain rule, which reduces itſelf at laſt to the ideas of particular men, proves often but a very variable ſtandard. But tho' ſuch a dictionary, as I have above-mentioned, will require too much time, coſt, and pains, to be hoped for in this age; yet methinks it is not unreaſonable to propoſe, that words ſtanding for things, which are known and diſtinguiſhed by their outward ſhape, ſhould be expreſſed by little draughts and prints made of them. A vocabulary made after this faſhion would, perhaps, with more eaſe, and in leſs time, teach the true ſignification of many terms, eſpecially in languages of remote countries, or ages, or ſettle truer ideas in men's minds of ſeveral things, whereof we read the names in antient authors, than all the large and laborious comments of learned criticks. Naturaliſts, that treat of plants and animals, have found the benefit of this way: and he that has

CHAP. XI.

had occaſion to conſult them, will have reaſon to confeſs, that he has a clearer idea of apium, or ibex, from a little print of that herb, or beaſt, than he could have from a long definition of the names of either of them. And ſo no doubt he would have of ſtrigil and ſiſtrum, if, inſtead of a curry-comb and cymbal, which are the Engliſh names dictionaries render them by, he could ſee ſtamped in the margin, ſmall pictures of theſe inſtruments, as they were in uſe amongſt the ancients. "Toga, tunica, pallium," are words eaſily tranſlated by gown, coat, and cloak; but we have thereby no more true ideas of the faſhion of thoſe habits amongſt the Romans, than we have of the faces of the taylors who made them. Such things as theſe, which the eye diſtinguiſhes by their ſhapes, would be beſt let into the mind by draughts made of them, and more determine the ſignification of ſuch words, than any other words ſet for them, or made uſe of to define them. But this only by the by.

5. By conſtancy in their ſignification.

§ 26. Fifthly, if men will not be at the pains to declare the meaning of their words, and definitions of their terms are not to be had; yet this is the leaſt that can be expected, that in all diſcourſes, wherein one man pretends to inſtruct, or convince another, he ſhould uſe the ſame word, conſtantly, in the ſame ſenſe: If this were done (which no body can refuſe, without great diſingenuity) many of the books extant might be ſpared; many of the controverſies in diſpute would be at end; ſeveral of thoſe great volumes, ſwoln with ambiguous words, now uſed in one ſenſe, and by and by in another, would ſhrink into a very narrow compaſs; and many of the philoſophers (to mention no other) as well as poets works, might be contained in a nutſhell.

When the variation is to be explained.

§ 27. But after all, the proviſion of words is ſo ſcanty in reſpect of that infinite variety of thoughts, that men, wanting terms to ſuit their preciſe notions, will, notwithſtanding their utmoſt caution, be forced often to uſe the ſame word, in ſomewhat different ſenſes. And tho' in the continuation of a diſcourſe, or the purſuit of an argument, there be hardly room to digreſs into a particular definition, as often as a man varies the ſignification of any term; yet the import of the diſcourſe will, for the moſt part, if there be no deſigned fallacy, ſufficiently lead candid and intelligent readers into the true meaning of it: but where that is not ſufficient to guide the reader, there it concerns the writer to explain his meaning, and ſhew in what ſenſe he there uſes that term.

BOOK IV.

CHAP. I.

Of knowledge in general.

CHAP. I.

Our knowledge converſant about our ideas.

§ 1. SINCE the mind, in all its thoughts and reaſonings, hath no other immediate object but its own ideas, which it alone does, or can contemplate; it is evident, that our knowledge is only converſant about them.

Knowledge is the perception of the agreement or diſagreement of two ideas.

§ 2. Knowledge then ſeems to me to be nothing but the perception of the connection and agreement, or diſagreement and repugnancy of any of our ideas. In this alone it conſiſts. Where this perception is, there is knowledge; and where it is not, there, tho' we may fancy, gueſs, or believe, yet we always come ſhort of knowledge. For, when we know that white is not black, what do we elſe but perceive that theſe two ideas do not agree? When we poſſeſs ourſelves with the utmoſt ſecurity of the demonſtration, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones, what do we more but perceive, that equality to two right ones, does neceſſarily agree to, and is inſeparable from the three angles of a triangle?

This agreement fourfold.

§ 3. But to underſtand a little more diſtinctly, wherein this agreement, or diſagreement conſiſts, I think, we may reduce it all to theſe four ſorts:

1. Identity, or diverſity.
2. Relation.
3. Co-exiſtence, or neceſſary connection.
4. Real exiſtence.

1. Of identity, or diverſity.

§ 4. First, as to the firſt ſort of agreement, or diſagreement, viz. identity, or diverſity. It is the firſt act of the mind, when it has any ſentiments, or ideas at all, to perceive its ideas; and ſo far as it perceives them, to know each what it is, and thereby alſo to perceive their difference, and that one is not another. This is ſo abſolutely neceſſary, that without it there could be no knowledge, no reaſoning, no imagination, no diſtinct thoughts at all. By this the mind clearly and infallibly perceives each idea to agree with itſelf, and to be what it is; and all diſtinct ideas to diſagree, i. e. the one not to be the other: and this it does without pains, labour or deduction; but at firſt view, by its natural power of perception and diſtinction. And tho' men of art have reduced this into thoſe general rules, "what is, is;" and "it is impoſſible for the ſame thing to be, and not to be;" for ready application in all caſes, wherein there may be occaſion to reflect on it; yet it is certain, that the firſt exerciſe of this faculty is about particular ideas. A man infallibly knows, as ſoon as ever he has them in his mind, that the ideas he calls white and round, are the very ideas they are, and that they are not other ideas, which he calls red, or ſquare. Nor can any maxim, or propoſition in the world, make him know it clearer or ſurer than he did before, and without any ſuch general rule. This then is the firſt agreement or diſagreement, which the mind perceives in its ideas; which it always perceives at firſt ſight: and if there ever happen any doubt about it, it will always be found to be about the names, and not the ideas themſelves, whoſe identity and diverſity will always be perceived, as ſoon and as clearly as the ideas themſelves are, nor can it poſſibly be otherwiſe.

2. Relative,

§ 5. Secondly, the next ſort of agreement, or diſagreement, the mind perceives in any of its ideas, may, I think, be called relative, and is nothing but the perception of the relation between any two ideas, of what kind ſoever, whether ſubſtances, modes, or any other. For ſince all diſtinct ideas muſt eternally be known not to be the ſame, and ſo be univerſally and conſtantly denied one of another, there could be no room for any poſitive knowledge at all, if we could not perceive any relation between our ideas, and find out the agreement or diſagreement they have one with another, in ſeveral ways the mind takes of comparing them.

3. Of co-exiſtence.

§ 6. Thirdly, the third ſort of agreement, or diſagreement, to be found in our ideas, which the perception of the mind is employed about, is co-exiſtence, or non-co-exiſtence in the ſame ſubject; and this belongs particularly to ſubſtances. Thus, when we pronounce concerning gold that it is fixed, our knowledge of this truth amounts to no more but this, that fixedneſs, or a power to remain in the fire unconſumed, is an idea that always accompanies and is joined with that particular ſort of yellowneſs, weight, fuſibility, malleableneſs, and ſolubility in aqua regia, which make our complex idea, ſignified by the word gold.

4. Of real exiſtence.

§ 7. Fourthly, the fourth and laſt ſort is, that of actual real exiſtence, agreeing to any idea. Within theſe four ſorts of agreement or diſagreement, is, I ſuppoſe, contained all the knowledge we have, or are capable of: for all the enquiries, that we can make concerning any of our ideas, all that we know or can affirm concerning any of them, is, that it is, or is not, the ſame with ſome other; that it does, or does not, always co-exiſt with ſome other idea in the ſame ſubject; that it has this or that relation to ſome other idea; or that it has a real exiſtence without the mind. Thus blue is not yellow, is of identity: two triangles upon equal baſes between two parallels are equal, is of relation: iron is ſuſceptible of magnetical impreſſions, is of co-exiſtence: God is, is of real exiſtence. Though identity and co-exiſtence are truly nothing but relations,

lations, yet they are ſo peculiar ways of agreement or diſagreement of our ideas, that they deſerve well to be conſidered as diſtinct heads, and not under relation in general; ſince they are ſo different grounds of affirmation and negation, as will eaſily appear to any one, who will but reflect on what is ſaid in ſeveral places of this eſſay. I ſhould now proceed to examine the ſeveral degrees of our knowledge, but that it is neceſſary firſt to conſider the different acceptations of the word knowledge.

Knowledge, actual or habitual.

§ 8. THERE are ſeveral ways, wherein the mind is poſſeſſed of truth, each of which is called knowledge.

1. THERE is actual knowledge, which is the preſent view the mind has of the agreement, or diſagreement of any of its ideas, or of the relation they have one to another.

2. A MAN is ſaid to know any propoſition, which having been once laid before his thoughts, he evidently perceived the agreement or diſagreement of the ideas, whereof it conſiſts; and ſo lodged it in his memory, that, whenever that propoſition comes again to be reflected on, he, without doubt, or heſitation, embraces the right ſide, aſſents to, and is certain of the truth of it. This, I think, one may call habitual knowledge: and thus a man may be ſaid to know all thoſe truths, which are lodged in his memory, by a foregoing clear and full perception, whereof the mind is aſſured paſt doubt, as often as it has occaſion to reflect on them. For our finite underſtandings being able to think clearly and diſtinctly but on one thing at once, if men had no knowledge of any more than what they actually thought on, they would all be very ignorant; and he that knew moſt would know but one truth, that being all he was able to think on at one time.

Habitual knowledge twofold.

§ 9. OF habitual knowledge, there are alſo, vulgarly ſpeaking, two degrees:

FIRST, the one is of ſuch truths laid up in the memory, as whenever they occur to the mind, it actually perceives the relation is between thoſe ideas. And this is in all thoſe truths, whereof we have an intuitive knowledge; where the ideas themſelves, by an immediate view, diſcover their agreement or diſagreement one with another.

SECONDLY, the other is of ſuch truths, whereof the mind having been convinced, it retains the memory of the conviction, without the proofs. Thus a man that remembers certainly that he once perceived the demonſtration, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones, is certain that he knows it, becauſe he cannot doubt of the truth of it. In his adherence to a truth, where the demonſtration, by which it was at firſt known, is forgot, tho' a man may be thought rather to believe his memory, than really to know, and this way of entertaining a truth ſeemed formerly to me like ſomething between opinion and knowledge; a ſort of aſſurance, which exceeds bare belief, for that relies on the teſtimony of another: yet upon a due examination I find it comes not ſhort of perfect certainty, and is in effect true knowledge. That, which is apt to miſlead our firſt thoughts into a miſtake in this matter, is, that the agreement or diſagreement of the ideas in this caſe is not perceived, as it was at firſt, by an actual view of all the intermediate ideas, whereby the agreement or diſagreement of thoſe in the propoſition was at firſt perceived; but by other intermediate ideas, that ſhew the agreement or diſagreement of the ideas, contained in the propoſition, whoſe certainty we remember. For example, in this propoſition, "that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones," one who has ſeen and clearly perceived the demonſtration of this truth, knows it to be true, when that demonſtration is gone out of his mind; ſo that at preſent it is not actually in view, and poſſibly cannot be recollected: but he knows it, in a different way from what he did before. The agreement of the two ideas, joined in that propoſition, is perceived, but it is by the intervention of other ideas than thoſe which at firſt produced that perception. He remembers, i. e. he knows (for remembrance is but the reviving of ſome paſt knowledge) that he was once certain of the truth of this propoſition, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones. The immutability of the ſame relations between the ſame immutable things, is now the idea that ſhews him, that if the three angles of a triangle were once equal to two right ones, they will always be equal to two right ones. And hence he comes to be certain, “that what was once true in the caſe, is always true; what ideas once agreed, will always agree; and conſequently what he once knew to be true, he will always know to be true, as long as he can remember that he once knew it.” Upon this ground it is, that particular demonſtrations in mathematicks afford general knowledge. If then the perception, that the ſame ideas will eternally have the ſame habitudes and relations, be not a ſufficient ground of knowledge, there could be no knowledge of general propoſitions in mathematicks; for no mathematical demonſtration would be any other than particular: and when a man had demonſtrated any propoſition, concerning one triangle, or circle, his knowledge would not reach beyond that particular diagram. If he would extend it farther, he muſt renew his demonſtration in another inſtance, before he could know it to be true in another like triangle, and ſo on: by which means one could never come to the knowledge of any general propoſitions. No body, I think, can deny that Mr. Newton certainly knows any propoſition, that he now at any time reads in his book, to be true; tho' he has not in actual view that admirable chain of intermediate ideas, whereby he at firſt diſcovered it to be true. Such a memory as that, able to retain ſuch a train of particulars, may be well thought beyond the reach of human faculties; when the very diſcovery, perception, and laying together that wonderful connection of ideas, is found to ſurpaſs moſt readers comprehenſion. But yet it is evident, the author himſelf knows the propoſition to be true, remembring he once ſaw the connection of thoſe ideas, as certainly as he knows ſuch a man wounded another, remembring that he ſaw him run him through. But becauſe the memory is not always ſo clear as actual perception, and does in all men, more or leſs, decay, in length of time, this amongſt other differences is one, which ſhews that demonſtrative knowledge is much more imperfect than intuitive, as we ſhall ſee in the following chapter.

CHAP. II.

Of the degrees of our knowledge.

CHAP. II.

Intuitive.

§ 1. ALL our knowledge conſiſting, as I have ſaid, in the view the mind has of its own ideas, which is the utmoſt light and greateſt certainty we, with our faculties, and in our way of knowledge, are capable of; it may not be amiſs to conſider a little the degrees of its evidence. The different clearneſs of our knowledge ſeems to me to lie in the different way of perception the mind has, of the agreement or diſagreement of any of its ideas. For, if we will reflect on our own ways of thinking, we ſhall find that ſometimes the mind perceives the agreement or diſagreement of two ideas, immediately by themſelves, without the intervention of any other: and this, I think, we may call intuitive knowledge. For in this, the mind is at no pains of proving or examining, but perceives the truth, as the eye doth light, only by being directed toward it. Thus the mind perceives, that white is not black, that a circle is not a triangle, that three are more than two, and equal to one and two. Such kind of truths the mind perceives at the firſt ſight of the ideas together, by bare intuition, without the intervention of any other idea; and this kind of knowledge is the cleareſt and moſt certain, that human frailty is capable of. This part of knowledge is irreſiſtible, and, like bright ſun-ſhine, forces itſelf immediately to be perceived, as ſoon as ever the mind turns its view that way; and leaves no room for heſitation, doubt, or examination; but the mind is preſently filled with the clear light of it. It is on this intuition that depends all the certainty and evidence of all our knowledge; which certainty every one finds to be ſo great, that he cannot imagine, and therefore not require a greater: for a man cannot conceive himſelf capable of a greater certainty, than to know that any idea in his mind is ſuch as he perceives it to be; and that two ideas, wherein he perceives a difference, are different, and not preciſely the ſame. He that demands a greater certainty than this, demands he knows not what, and ſhews only that he has a mind to be a ſceptick, without being able to be ſo. Certainty depends ſo wholly on this intuition, that in the next degree of knowledge, which I call demonſtrative, this intuition is neceſſary in all the connections of the intermediate ideas, without which we cannot attain knowledge and certainty.

Demonſtrative.

§ 2. THE next degree of knowledge is, where the mind perceives the agreement or diſagreement of any ideas, but not immediately. Tho' wherever the mind perceives the agreement or diſagreement of any of its ideas, there be certain knowledge; yet it does not always happen, that the mind ſees that agreement or diſagreement, which there is between them, even where it is diſcoverable: and in that caſe remains in ignorance, and at moſt gets no farther than a probable conjecture. The reaſon, why the mind cannot always perceive preſently the agreement, or diſagreement of two ideas, is, becauſe thoſe ideas, concerning whoſe agreement or diſagreement the enquiry is made, cannot by the mind be ſo put together as to ſhew it. In this caſe then, when the mind cannot ſo bring its ideas together, as by their immediate compariſon, and as it were juxta-poſition, or application one to another, to perceive their agreement or diſagreement, it is fain, by the intervention of other ideas (one or more, as it happens) to diſcover the agreement or diſagreement which it ſearches; and this is that which we call reaſoning. Thus the mind being willing to know the agreement or diſagreement in bigneſs, between the three angles of a triangle and two right ones, cannot by an immediate view and comparing them do it; becauſe the three angles of a triangle cannot be brought at once, and be compared with any one or two angles; and ſo of this the mind has no immediate, no intuitive knowledge. In this caſe the mind is fain to find out ſome other angles, to which the three angles of a triangle have an equality; and finding thoſe equal to two right ones, comes to know their equality to two right ones.

Depends on proofs.

§ 3. THOSE intervening ideas, which ſerve to ſhew the agreement of any two others, are called proofs; and where the agreement, or diſagreement is by this means plainly and clearly perceived, it is called demonſtration, it being ſhewn to the underſtanding, and the mind made to ſee that it is ſo. A quickneſs in the mind to find out theſe intermediate ideas (that ſhall diſcover the agreement or diſagreement of any other) and to apply them right, is, I ſuppoſe, that which is called ſagacity.

But not ſo eaſy.

§ 4. THIS knowledge by intervening proofs, tho' it be certain, yet the evidence of it is not altogether ſo clear and bright, nor the aſſent ſo ready, as in intuitive knowledge. For tho', in demonſtration, the mind does at laſt perceive the agreement or diſagreement of the ideas it conſiders; yet it is not without pains and attention: there muſt be more than one tranſient view to find it. A ſteady application and purſuit is required to this diſcovery: and there muſt be a progreſſion by ſteps and degrees, before the mind can in this way arrive at certainty, and come to perceive the agreement or repugnancy between two ideas that need proofs, and the uſe of reaſon to ſhew it.

Not without precedent doubt.

§ 5. ANOTHER difference between intuitive and demonſtrative knowledge, is, that tho' in the latter, all doubt be removed, when by the intervention of the intermediate ideas the agreement, or diſagreement is perceived; yet, before the demonſtration, there was a doubt, which in intuitive knowledge cannot happen to the mind, that has its faculty of perception left to a degree capable of diſtinct ideas, no more than it can be a doubt to the eye (that can diſtinctly ſee white and black) whether this ink and this paper be all of a colour. If there be ſight in the eyes, it will at firſt glimpſe, without heſitation, perceive the words printed on this paper different from the colour of the paper: and ſo, if the mind have the faculty of diſtinct perceptions, it will perceive the agreement or diſagreement of thoſe ideas that produce intuitive knowledge. If the eyes have loſt the faculty of ſeeing, or the mind of perceiving, we in vain enquire after the quickneſs of ſight in one, or clearneſs of perception in the other.

Not ſo clear.

§ 6. IT is true, the perception produced by demonſtration is alſo very clear, yet it is often with a great abatement of that evident luſtre and full aſſurance, that always accompany that which I call intuitive; like a face reflected by ſeveral mirrors one to another, where as long as it retains the ſimilitude and agreement with the object, it produces a knowledge; but it is ſtill in every ſucceſſive reflection, with a leſſening of that perfect clearneſs and diſtinctneſs, which is in the firſt, till at laſt, after many removes, it has a great mixture of dimneſs, and is not at firſt ſight ſo knowable, eſpecially to weak eyes. Thus it is with knowledge, made out by a long train of proofs.

Each ſtep muſt have intuitive evidence.

§ 7. Now, in every ſtep reaſon makes, in demonſtrative knowledge, there is an intuitive knowledge of that agreement or diſagreement, it ſeeks with the next intermediate idea, which it uſes as a proof: for, if it were not ſo, that yet would need a proof; ſince without the perception of ſuch agreement or diſagreement, there is no knowledge produced. If it be perceived by itſelf, it is intuitive knowledge; if it cannot be perceived by itſelf, there is need of ſome intervening idea, as a common meaſure to ſhew their agreement, or diſagreement. By which it is plain, that every ſtep in reaſoning, that produces knowledge, has intuitive certainty; which, when the mind perceives, there is no more required, but to remember it to make the agreement, or diſagreement of the ideas, concerning which we enquire, viſible and certain. So that to make any thing a demonſtration, it is neceſſary to perceive the immediate agreement of the intervening ideas, whereby the agreement, or diſagreement, of the two ideas under examination (whereof the one is always the firſt, and the other the laſt in the account) is found. This intuitive perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of the intermediate ideas, in each ſtep and progreſſion of the demonſtration, muſt alſo be carried exactly in the mind, and a man muſt be ſure that no part is left out: which, becauſe in long deductions, and the uſe of many proofs, the memory does not always ſo readily and exactly retain; therefore it comes to paſs, that this is more imperfect than intuitive knowledge, and men embrace often falſehood for demonſtrations.

Hence the miſtake, "ex præcognitis & præconceſſis."

§ 8. The neceſſity of this intuitive knowledge, in each ſtep of ſcientifical, or demonſtrative reaſoning, gave occaſion, I imagine, to that miſtaken axiom, that all reaſoning was "ex præcognitis & præconceſſis;" which how far it is miſtaken, I ſhall have occaſion to ſhew more at large, when I come to conſider propoſitions, and particularly thoſe propoſitions which are called maxims; and to ſhew that it is by a miſtake, that they are ſuppoſed to be the foundations of all our knowledge and reaſonings.

Demonſtration not limited to quantity.

§ 9. It has been generally taken for granted, that mathematicks alone are capable of demonſtrative certainty: but to have ſuch an agreement, or diſagreement, as may intuitively be perceived, being, as I imagine, not the privilege of the ideas of number, extenſion, and figure alone; it may, poſſibly, be the want of due method and application in us, and not of ſufficient evidence in things, that demonſtration has been thought to have ſo little to do in other parts of knowledge, and been ſcarce ſo much as aimed at, by any but mathematicians. For whatever ideas we have, wherein the mind can perceive the immediate agreement, or diſagreement, that is between them, there the mind is capable of intuitive knowledge; and where it can perceive the agreement, or diſagreement, of any two ideas, by an intuitive perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, they have with any intermediate ideas, there the mind is capable of demonſtration, which is not limited to ideas of extenſion, figure, number, and their modes.

Why it has been ſo thought.

§ 10. The reaſon why it has been generally ſought for, and ſuppoſed to be only in thoſe, I imagine has been, not only the general uſefulneſs of thoſe ſciences; but becauſe, in comparing their equality, or exceſs, the modes of numbers have every the leaſt difference very clear and perceivable: and tho', in extenſion, every the leaſt exceſs is not ſo perceptible, yet the mind has found out ways, to examine and diſcover demonſtratively the juſt equality of two angles, or extenſions, or figures: and both theſe, i. e. numbers and figures, can be ſet down by viſible and laſting marks, wherein the ideas under conſideration are perfectly determined; which, for the moſt part, they are not, where they are marked only by names and words.

§ 11. But in other ſimple ideas, whoſe modes and differences are made and counted by degrees, and not quantity, we have not ſo nice and accurate a diſtinction of their differences, as to perceive, or find ways to meaſure their juſt equality, or the leaſt differences. For thoſe other ſimple ideas, being appearances, or ſenſations, produced in us by the ſize, figure, number, and motion of minute corpuſcles, ſingly inſenſible, their different degrees alſo depend upon the variation of ſome, or all of thoſe cauſes; which ſince it cannot be obſerved by us in particles of matter, whereof each is too ſubtle to be perceived, it is impoſſible for us to have any exact meaſures of the different degrees of theſe ſimple ideas. For, ſuppoſing the ſenſation, or idea, we name whiteneſs, be produced in us by a certain number of globules, which having a verticity about their own centers, ſtrike upon the retina of the eye, with a certain degree of rotation, as well as progreſſive ſwiftneſs; it will hence eaſily follow, that the more the ſuperficial parts of any body are ſo ordered, as to reflect the greater number of globules of light, and to give them that proper rotation, which is fit to produce this ſenſation of white in us, the more white will that body appear, that from an equal ſpace ſends to the retina the greater number of ſuch corpuſcles, with that peculiar ſort of motion. I do not ſay, that the nature of light conſiſts in very ſmall round globules, nor of whiteneſs in ſuch a texture of parts, as gives a certain rotation to theſe globules, when it reflects them; for I am not now treating phyſically of light, or colours. But this, I think, I may ſay, that I cannot (and I would be glad any one would make intelligible that he did) conceive, how bodies without us can any ways affect our ſenſes, but by the immediate contact of the ſenſible bodies themſelves, as in taſting and feeling, or the impulſe of ſome inſenſible particles coming from them, as in ſeeing, hearing, and ſmelling; by the different impulſe of which parts, cauſed by their different ſize, figure, and motion, the variety of ſenſations is produced in us.

§ 12. WHETHER then they be globules, or no; or whether they have a verticity about their own centers, that produce the idea of whiteneſs in us, this is certain, that the more particles of light are reflected from a body, fitted to give them that peculiar motion, which produces the ſenſation of whiteneſs in us; and, poſſibly, too, the quicker that peculiar motion is, the whiter does the body appear, from which the greater number are reflected, as is evident in the ſame piece of paper put in the ſun-beams, in the ſhade, and in a dark hole; in each of which it will produce in us the idea of whiteneſs in far different degrees.

§ 13. NOT knowing, therefore, what number of particles, nor what motion of them is fit to produce any preciſe degree of whiteneſs, we cannot demonſtrate the certain equality of any two degrees of whiteneſs, becauſe we have no certain ſtandard to meaſure them by, nor means to diſtinguiſh every the leaſt real difference, the only help we have being from our ſenſes, which in this point fail us. But where the difference is ſo great, as to produce in the mind clearly diſtinct ideas, whoſe differences can be perfectly retained, there theſe ideas or colours, as we ſee in different kinds, as blue and red, are as capable of demonſtration, as ideas of number and extenſion. What I have here ſaid of whiteneſs and colours, I think, holds true in all ſecondary qualities, and their modes.

Senſitive knowledge of particular exiſtence.

§ 14. THESE two, viz. intuition and demonſtration, are the degrees of our knowledge; whatever comes ſhort of one of theſe, with what aſſurance ſoever embraced, is but faith, or opinion, but not knowledge, at leaſt in all general truths. There is, indeed, another perception of the mind, imployed about the particular exiſtence of finite beings, without us; which going beyond bare probability, and yet not reaching perfectly to either of the foregoing degrees of certainty, paſſes under the name of knowledge. There can be nothing more certain, than that the idea, we receive from an external object, is in our minds; this is intuitive knowledge. But whether there be any thing more than barely that idea in our minds, whether we can thence certainly infer the exiſtence of any thing without us, which correſponds to that idea, is that, whereof ſome men think there may be a queſtion made; becauſe men may have ſuch ideas in their minds, when no ſuch thing exiſts, no ſuch object affects their ſenſes. But yet here, I think, we are provided with an evidence, that puts us paſt doubting: For I aſk any one, whether he be not invincibly conſcious to himſelf of a different perception, when he looks on the ſun by day, and thinks on it by night; when he actually taſtes wormwood, or ſmells a roſe, or only thinks on that ſavour, or odour? We as plainly find the difference there is between any idea, revived in our minds by our own memory, and actually coming into our minds by our ſenſes, as we do between any two diſtinct ideas. If any one ſay, a dream may do the ſame thing, and all theſe ideas may be produced in us without any external objects, he may pleaſe to dream that I make him this anſwer; 1. That it is no great matter, whether I remove his ſcruple, or no: where all is but dream, reaſoning, and arguments, are of no uſe, truth and knowledge nothing. 2. That I believe he will allow a very manifeſt difference between dreaming of being in the fire, and being actually in it. But yet, if he be reſolved to appear ſo ſceptical, as to maintain, that what I call being actually in the fire is nothing but a dream; and that we cannot thereby certainly know, that any ſuch thing as fire actually exiſts without us: I anſwer, that we certainly finding that pleaſure, or pain, follows upon the application of certain objects to us, whoſe exiſtence we perceive, or dream that we perceive, by our ſenſes; this certainty is as great as our happineſs, or miſery, beyond which we have no concernment to know, or to be. So that, I think, we may add, to the two former ſorts of knowledge, this alſo, of the exiſtence of particular, external objects, by that perception and conſciouſneſs we have of the actual entrance of ideas from them, and allow theſe three degrees of knowledge, *viz.* intuitive, demonſtrative, and ſenſitive: in each of which there are different degrees and ways of evidence and certainty.

Knowledge not always clear, where the ideas are ſo.

§ 15. But ſince our knowledge is founded on, and imployed about our ideas only, will it not follow from thence, that it is conformable to our ideas; and that, where our ideas are clear and diſtinct, or obſcure and confuſed, or knowledge will be ſo too? To which I anſwer, no: for our knowledge conſiſting in the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of any two ideas, its clearneſs, or obſcurity, conſiſts in the clearneſs, or obſcurity, of that perception, and not in the clearneſs, or obſcurity, of the ideas themſelves; *v. g.* a man that has as clear ideas of the angles of a triangle, and of equality to two right ones, as any mathematician in the world, may yet have but a very obſcure perception of their agreement, and ſo have but a very obſcure knowledge of it. But ideas, which, by reaſon of their obſcurity, or otherwiſe, are confuſed, cannot produce any clear, or diſtinct knowledge; becauſe, as far as any ideas are confuſed, ſo far the mind cannot perceive clearly, whether they agree, or diſagree. Or to expreſs the ſame thing in a way leſs apt to be miſunderſtood: he that hath not determined ideas to the words he uſes, cannot make propoſitions of them, of whoſe truth he can be certain.

CHAP. III.

Of the extent of human knowledge.

Chap. III.

1. No farther than we have ideas.
2. No farther than we can perceive their agreement, or diſagreement.
3. Intuitive knowledge extends itſelf not to all the relations of all our ideas.

§ 1. Knowledge, as has been ſaid, lying in the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of any of our ideas, it follows from hence, that,

First, we can have knowledge no farther than we have ideas.

§ 2. Secondly, that we can have no knowledge farther than we can have perception of that agreement, or diſagreement. Which perception being, 1. Either by intuition, or the immediate comparing any two ideas: or, 2. By reaſon, examining the agreement, or diſagreement, of two ideas, by the intervention of ſome others: or, 3. By ſenſation, perceiving the exiſtence of particular things: hence it alſo follows,

§ 3. Thirdly, that we cannot have an intuitive knowledge, that ſhall extend itſelf to all our ideas, and all that we would know about them; becauſe we cannot examine and perceive all the relations they have one to another, by juxtapoſition, or an immediate compariſon one with another. Thus having the ideas of an obtuſe, and an acute-angled triangle, both drawn from equal baſes, and between parallels, I can, by intuitive knowledge, perceive the one not to be the other, but cannot that way know whether they be equal, or no; becauſe their agreement, or diſagreement, in equality can never be perceived by an immediate comparing them: the difference of figure makes their parts uncapable of an exact, immediate application; and, therefore, there is need of ſome intervening quantities to meaſure them by, which is demonſtration, or rational knowledge.

4. Nor demonſtrative knowledge.

§ 4. FOURTHLY, it follows alſo, from what is above obſerved, that our rational knowledge cannot reach to the whole extent of our ideas: becauſe between two different ideas we would examine, we cannot always find ſuch mediums, as we can connect one to another with an intuitive knowledge, in all the parts of the deduction; and wherever that fails, we come ſhort of knowledge and demonſtration.

5. Senſitive knowledge, narrower than either.

§ 5. FIFTHLY, ſenſitive knowledge, reaching no farther than the exiſtence of things, actually preſent to our ſenſes, is yet much narrower than either of the former.

6. Our knowledge therefore, narrower than our ideas.

§ 6. FROM all which it is evident, that the extent of our knowledge comes not only ſhort of the reality of things, but even of the extent of our own ideas. Tho' our knowledge be limited to our ideas, and cannot exceed them either in extent, or perfection; and tho' theſe be very narrow bounds, in reſpect of the extent of all being, and far ſhort of what we may juſtly imagine to be in ſome, even created underſtandings, not tied down to the dull and narrow information is to be received from ſome few, and not very acute ways of perception, ſuch as are our ſenſes; yet it would be well with us, if our knowledge were but as large as our ideas, and there were not many doubts and inquiries concerning the ideas we have, whereof we are not, nor, I believe, ever ſhall be in this world reſolved. Nevertheleſs I do not queſtion but that human knowledge, under the preſent circumſtances of our beings and conſtitutions, may be carried much farther than it hitherto has been, if men would ſincerely, and with freedom of mind, imploy all that induſtry and labour of thought, in improving the means of diſcovering truth, which they do for the colouring, or ſupport of falſhood, to maintain a ſyſtem, intereſt, or party, they are once ingaged in. But yet, after all, I think I may, without injury to human perfection, be confident, that our knowledge would never reach to all we might deſire to know, concerning thoſe ideas we have; nor be able to ſurmount all the difficulties, and reſolve all the queſtions might ariſe concerning any of them. We have the ideas of a ſquare, a circle, and equality; and yet, perhaps, ſhall never be able to find a circle equal to a ſquare, and certainly know that it is ſo. We have the ideas of matter and thinking, but, poſſibly, ſhall never be able to know, whether any mere, material being thinks, or no; it being impoſſible for us, by the contemplation of our own ideas, without revelation, to diſcover, whether omnipotency has not given to ſome ſyſtems of matter fitly diſpoſed, a power to perceive and think, or elſe joined and fixed to matter ſo diſpoſed, a thinking immaterial ſubſtance: it being, in reſpect of our notions, not much more remote from our comprehenſion to conceive, that God can, if he pleaſes, ſuperadd to matter a faculty of thinking, than that he ſhould ſuperadd to it another ſubſtance, with a faculty of thinking; ſince we know not wherein thinking conſiſts, nor to what ſort of ſubſtances the Almighty has been pleaſed to give that power, which cannot be in any created being, but merely by the good pleaſure and bounty of the creator. For I ſee no contradiction in it, that the firſt, eternal, thinking being ſhould, if he pleaſed, give to certain ſyſtems of created ſenſeleſs matter, put together, as he thinks fit, ſome degrees of ſenſe, perception, and thought: tho', as I think, I have proved, lib. iv. ch. 10. § 14, &c. it is no leſs than a contradiction to ſuppoſe matter (which is evidently, in its own nature, void of ſenſe and thought) ſhould be that eternal, firſt thinking being. What certainty of knowledge can any one have that ſome perceptions, ſuch as, v. g. pleaſure and pain, ſhould not be in ſome bodies themſelves, after a certain manner modified and moved, as well as that they ſhould be in an immaterial ſubſtance, upon the motion of the parts of body? Body, as far as we can conceive, being able only to ſtrike and affect body; and motion, according to the utmoſt reach of our ideas, being able to produce nothing but motion: ſo that when we allow it to produce pleaſure, or pain, or the idea of a colour, or ſound, we are fain to quit our reaſon, go beyond our ideas, and attribute it wholly to the good pleaſure of our maker. For ſince we muſt allow he has annexed effects to motion, which we can no way conceive motion able to produce, what reaſon have we to conclude, that he could not order them as well to be produced in a ſubject, we cannot conceive capable of them, as well as in a ſubject, we cannot conceive the motion of matter can any way operate upon? I ſay not this, that I would any way leſſen the belief of the ſoul's immateriality: I am not here ſpeaking of probability, but knowledge; and I think not only, that it becomes the modeſty of philoſophy not to pronounce magiſterially, where we want that evidence, that can produce knowledge; but alſo, that it is of uſe to us to diſcern how far our knowledge does reach: for the ſtate we are at preſent in, not being that of viſion, we muſt, in many things, content our ſelves with faith and probability; and, in the preſent queſtion, about the immateriality of the ſoul, if our faculties cannot arrive at demonſtrative certainty, we need not think it ſtrange. All the great ends of morality and religion are well enough ſecured, without philoſophical proofs of the ſoul's immateriality; ſince it is evident, that he, who made us at firſt begin to ſubſiſt here, ſenſible, intelligent beings, and for ſeveral years continued us in ſuch a ſtate, can and will reſtore us to the like ſtate of ſenſibility, in another world, and make us capable, there, to receive the retribution he has deſigned to men, according to their doings in this life. And therefore it is not of ſuch mighty neceſſity to determine one way or the other, as ſome over-zealous for, or againſt, the immateriality of the ſoul, have been forward to make the world believe. Who either, on the one ſide, indulging too much their thoughts, immerſed altogether in matter, can allow no exiſtence to what is not material: or who, on the other ſide, finding not cogitation within the natural powers of matter, examined over and over again by the utmoſt intention of mind, have the confidence to conclude, that omnipotency itſelf cannot give perception and thought to a ſubſtance, which has the modification of ſolidity. He that conſiders how hardly ſenſation is, in our thoughts, reconcileable to extended matter; or exiſtence to any thing that hath no extenſion at all, will confeſs, that he is very far from certainly knowing what his ſoul is. It is a point which ſeems to me to be put out of the reach of our knowledge: and he, who will give himſelf leave to conſider freely, and look into the dark and intricate part of each hypotheſis, will ſcarce find his reaſon able to determine him fixedly for, or againſt the ſoul's materiality. Since, on which ſide ſoever he views it, either as an unextended ſubſtance, or as a thinking, extended matter; the difficulty to conceive either, will, whilſt either alone is in his thoughts, ſtill drive him to the contrary ſide. An unfair way which ſome men take with themſelves: who becauſe of the unconceivableneſs of ſomething they find in one, throw themſelves violently into the contrary hypotheſis, tho' altogether as unintelligible to an unbyaſſed underſtanding. This ſerves not only to ſhew the weakneſs and ſcantineſs of our knowledge, but the inſignificant triumph of ſuch ſort of arguments, which, drawn from our own views, may ſatisfy us that we can find no certainty on one ſide of the queſtion; but do not at all thereby help us to truth, by running into the oppoſite opinion, which, on examination, will be found clogged with equal difficulties. For what ſafety, what advantage to any one is it, for the avoiding the ſeeming abſurdities, and to him unſurmountable rubs he meets with, in one opinion, to take refuge in the contrary, which is built on ſomething, altogether as inexplicable, and as far remote from his comprehenſion? It is paſt controverſy, that we have in us ſomething that thinks; our very doubts about what it is, confirm the certainty of its being, tho' we muſt content ourſelves in the ignorance of what kind of being it is; and it is as vain to go about to be ſceptical in this, as it is unreaſonable in moſt other caſes to be poſitive againſt the being of any thing, becauſe we cannot comprehend its nature. For I would fain know what ſubſtance exiſts, that has not ſomething in it, which manifeſtly baffles our underſtandings. Other ſpirits who ſee and know the nature and inward conſtitution of things, how much muſt they exceed us in knowledge? To which if we add larger comprehenſion, which enables them at one glance to ſee the connection and agreement of very many ideas, and readily ſupplies to them the intermediate proofs, which we, by ſingle and ſlow ſteps, and long poring in the dark, hardly at laſt find out, and are often ready to forget one, before we have hunted out another; we may gueſs at ſome part of the happineſs of ſuperior ranks of ſpirits, who have a quicker and more penetrating ſight, as well as a larger field of knowledge. But to return to the argument in hand; our knowledge, I ſay, is not only limited to the paucity and imperfections of the ideas we have, and which we employ it about, but even comes ſhort of that too, but how far it reaches, let us now enquire.

How far our knowledge reaches.

§ 7. THE affirmations or negations we make, concerning the ideas we have, may, as I have before intimated in general, be reduced to theſe four ſorts, viz. identity, co-exiſtence, relation, and real exiſtence. I ſhall examine how far our knowledge extends in each of theſe.

1. Our knowledge of identity and diverſity, as far as our ideas.

§ 8. FIRST, as to identity and diverſity, in this way of the agreement or diſagreement of our ideas, our intuitive knowledge is as far extended as our ideas themſelves; and there can be no idea in the mind, which it does not preſently, by an intuitive knowledge, perceive to be what it is, and to be different from any other.

2. Of co-exiſtence, a very little way.

§ 9. SECONDLY, as to the ſecond ſort, which is the agreement or diſagreement of our ideas in co-exiſtence; in this, our knowledge is very ſhort, tho' in this conſiſts the greateſt and moſt material part of our knowledge concerning ſubſtances. For our ideas of the ſpecies of ſubſtances being, as I have ſhewed, nothing but certain collections of ſimple ideas, united in one ſubject, and ſo co-exiſting together; v. g. our idea of flame is a body hot, luminous, and moving upward; of gold, a body heavy to a certain degree, yellow, malleable, and fuſible: theſe, or ſome ſuch complex ideas as theſe in men's minds, do theſe two names of the different ſubſtances, flame, and gold, ſtand for. When we would know any thing farther concerning theſe, or any other ſort of ſubſtances, what do we enquire, but what other qualities, or powers, theſe ſubſtances have, or have not? which is nothing elſe, but to know what other ſimple ideas do, or do not co-exiſt, with thoſe that make up that complex idea?

Becauſe the connection between moſt ſimple ideas is unknown.

§ 10. THIS, how weighty and conſiderable a part ſoever of human ſcience, is yet very narrow, and ſcarce any at all. The reaſon whereof is, that the ſimple ideas, whereof our complex ideas of ſubſtances are made up, are, for the moſt part, ſuch as carry with them, in their own nature, no viſible, neceſſary connection, or inconſiſtency with any other ſimple ideas, whoſe co-exiſtence with them we would inform our ſelves about.

Eſpecially of ſecondary qualities.

§ 11. THE ideas, that our complex ones of ſubſtances are made up of, and about which our knowledge concerning ſubſtances is moſt employed, are thoſe of their ſecondary qualities: which depending all (as has been ſhewn) upon the primary qualities of their minute and inſenſible parts; or if not upon them, upon ſomething yet more remote from our comprehenſion; it is impoſſible we ſhould know which have a neceſſary union, or inconſiſtency one with another: for not knowing the root they ſpring from, not knowing what ſize, figure, and texture of parts they are, on which depend, and from which reſult thoſe qualities, which make our complex idea of gold, it is impoſſible we ſhould know what other qualities reſult from, or are incompatible with the ſame conſtitution of the inſenſible parts of gold; and ſo conſequently, muſt always co-exiſt with that complex idea we have of it, or elſe are inconſiſtent with it.

Becauſe all connection between any ſecondary and primary qualities is undiſcoverable.

§ 12. BESIDES this ignorance of the primary qualities of the inſenſible parts of bodies, on which depend all their ſecondary qualities, there is yet another and more incurable part of ignorance, which ſets us more remote from a certain knowledge of the co-exiſtence or in-co-exiſtence (if I may ſo ſay) of different ideas in the ſame ſubject; and that is, that there is no diſcoverable connection between any ſecondary quality, and thoſe primary qualities, which it depends on.

§ 13. THAT the ſize, figure and motion of one body ſhould cauſe a change in the ſize, figure and motion of another body, is not beyond our conception: the ſeparation of the parts of one body upon the intruſion of another; and the change from reſt to motion upon impulſe; theſe, and the like, ſeem to us to have ſome connection one with another. And if we knew theſe primary qualities of bodies, we might have reaſon to hope, we might be able to know a great deal more of theſe operations of them one upon another: but, our minds not being able to diſcover any connection betwixt theſe primary qualities of bodies, and the ſenſations that are produced in us by them, we can never be able to eſtabliſh certain and undoubted rules of the conſequences, or co-exiſtence of any ſecondary qualities, tho' we could diſcover the ſize, figure or motion of thoſe inviſible parts, which immediately produce them. We are ſo far from knowing what figure, ſize or motion of parts produce a yellow colour, a ſweet taſte, or a ſharp ſound, that we can by no means conceive how any ſize, figure, or motion of any particles, can poſſibly produce in us the idea of any colour, taſte or ſound whatſoever; there is no conceivable connection betwixt the one and the other.

§ 14. In vain, therefore, ſhall we endeavour to diſcover by our ideas (the only true way of certain and univerſal knowledge) what other ideas are to be found conſtantly joined with that of our complex idea of any ſubſtance: ſince we neither know the real conſtitution of the minute parts, on which their qualities do depend: nor, did we know them, could we diſcover any neceſſary connection between them, and any of the ſecondary qualities: which is neceſſary to be done, before we can certainly know their neceſſary co-exiſtence. So that let our complex idea of any ſpecies of ſubſtances be what it will, we can hardly, from the ſimple ideas contained in it, certainly determine the neceſſary co-exiſtence of any other quality whatſoever. Our knowledge in all theſe enquiries reaches very little farther than our experience. Indeed ſome few of the primary qualities have a neceſſary dependance and viſible connection one with another, as figure neceſſarily ſuppoſes extenſion; receiving or communicating motion by impulſe, ſuppoſes ſolidity. But tho' theſe, and perhaps ſome other of our ideas have, yet there are ſo few of them, that have a viſible connection one with another, that we can by intuition, or demonſtration, diſcover the co-exiſtence of very few of the qualities are to be found united in ſubſtances: and we are left only to the aſſiſtance of our ſenſes, to make known to us what qualities they contain. For of all the qualities that are co-exiſtent in any ſubject, without this dependance and evident connection of their ideas one with another, we cannot know certainly any two to co-exiſt any farther than experience, by our ſenſes, informs us. Thus, tho' we ſee the yellow colour, and upon trial find the weight, malleableneſs, fuſibility, and fixedneſs, that are united in a piece of gold; yet, becauſe no one of theſe ideas has any evident dependance, or neceſſary connection with the other, we cannot certainly know, that where any four of theſe are, the fifth will be there alſo, how highly probable ſoever it may be; becauſe the higheſt probability amounts not to certainty, without which there can be no true knowledge. For this co-exiſtence can be no farther known than it is perceived; and it cannot be perceived, but either in particular ſubjects, by the obſervation of our ſenſes, or in general, by the neceſſary connection of the ideas themſelves.

Of repugnancy to co-exiſtence larger.

§ 15. As to incompatibility, or repugnancy to co-exiſtence, we may know, that any ſubject can have, of each ſort of primary qualities, but one particular at once; v. g. each particular extenſion, figure, number of parts, motion, excludes all other of each kind. The like alſo is certain of all ſenſible ideas, peculiar to each ſenſe; for whatever of each kind is preſent in any ſubject, excludes all other of that ſort; v. g. no one ſubject can have two ſmells, or two colours at the ſame time. To this perhaps will be ſaid, has not an opall, or an infuſion of lignum nephriticum, two colours at the ſame time? To which I anſwer, that theſe bodies, to eyes differently placed, may at the ſame time afford different colours: but I take liberty alſo to ſay, that to eyes differently placed, it is different parts of the object, that reflect the particles of light: and therefore it is not the ſame part of the object, and ſo not the very ſame ſubject, which at the ſame time appears both yellow and azure. For it is as impoſſible that the very ſame particle of any body ſhould at the ſame time differently modify, or reflect the rays of light, as that it ſhould have two different figures and textures at the ſame time.

§ 16. But

Of the co-exiſtence of powers a very little way.

§ 16. But as to the powers of ſubſtances to change the ſenſible qualities of other bodies, which make a great part of our enquiries about them, and is no inconſiderable branch of our knowledge; I doubt, as to theſe, whether our knowledge reaches much farther than our experience; or whether we can come to the diſcovery of moſt of theſe powers, and be certain that they are in any ſubject, by the connection with any of thoſe ideas, which to us make its eſſence. Becauſe the active and paſſive powers of bodies, and their ways of operating, conſiſting in a texture and motion of parts, which we cannot by any means come to diſcover; it is but in very few caſes, we can be able to perceive their dependance on, or repugnance to any of thoſe ideas, which make our complex one of that ſort of things. I have here inſtanced in the corpuſcularian hypotheſis, as that which is thought to go fartheſt in an intelligible explication of the qualities of bodies; and I fear the weakneſs of human underſtanding is ſcarce able to ſubſtitute another, which will afford us a fuller and clearer diſcovery of the neceſſary connection and co-exiſtence of the powers, which are to be obſerved united in ſeveral ſorts of them. This at leaſt is certain, that which ever hypotheſis be cleareſt and trueſt (for of that it is not my buſineſs to determine) our knowledge concerning corporeal ſubſtances will be very little advanced by any of them, till we are made to ſee what qualities and powers of bodies have a neceſſary connection or repugnancy one with another; which, in the preſent ſtate of philoſophy, I think we know but to a very ſmall degree; and I doubt whether, with thoſe faculties we have, we ſhall ever be able to carry our general knowledge (I ſay not particular experience) in this part much farther. Experience is that which in this part we muſt depend on. And it were to be wiſhed that it were more improved. We find the advantages ſome men's generous pains have this way brought to the ſtock of natural knowledge. And if others, eſpecially the philoſophers by fire, who pretend to it, had been ſo wary in their obſervations, and ſincere in their reports, as thoſe, who call themſelves philoſophers, ought to have been; our acquaintance with the bodies here about us, and our inſight into their powers and operations, had been yet much greater.

Of ſpirits yet narrower.

§ 17. If we are at a loſs, in reſpect of the powers and operations of bodies, I think it is eaſy to conclude, we are much more in the dark in reference to ſpirits; whereof we naturally have no ideas, but what we draw from that of our own, by reflecting on the operations of our own ſouls within us, as far as they can come within our obſervation. But how inconſiderable a rank, the ſpirits that inhabit our bodies, hold amongſt thoſe various and poſſibly innumerable kinds of nobler beings; and how far ſhort they come of the endowments and perfections of cherubim and ſeraphim, and infinite ſorts of ſpirits above us; is what by a tranſient hint, in another place, I have offered to my reader's conſideration.

3. Of other relations it is not eaſy to ſay how far.

§ 18. As to the third ſort of our knowledge, viz. the agreement, or diſagreement of any of our ideas, in any other relation: this, as it is the largeſt field of our knowledge, ſo it is hard to determine, how far it may extend; becauſe the advances, that are made in this part of knowledge, depending on our ſagacity in finding intermediate ideas, that may ſhew the relations and habitudes of ideas, whoſe co-exiſtence is not conſidered, it is a hard matter to tell, when we are at an end of ſuch diſcoveries; and when reaſon has all the helps it is capable of, for the finding of proofs, or examining the agreement, or diſagreement of remote ideas. They, that are ignorant of algebra, cannot imagine the wonders in this kind are to be done by it: and what farther improvements and helps advantageous to other parts of knowledge, the ſagacious mind of man may yet find out, it is not eaſy to determine. This at leaſt I believe, that the ideas of quantity are not thoſe alone, that are capable of demonſtration and knowledge; and that other, and perhaps more uſeful parts of contemplation, would afford us certainty, if vices, paſſions, and domineering intereſt did not oppoſe, or menace ſuch endeavours.

Morality capable of demonſtration.

The idea of a ſupreme being, infinite in power, goodneſs and wiſdom, whoſe workmanſhip we are, and on whom we depend; and the idea of our ſelves, as underſtanding, rational beings, being ſuch as are clear in us, would, I ſuppoſe, if duly conſidered and purſued, afford ſuch foundations of our duty and rules of action, as might place morality amongſt the ſciences, capable of demonſtration; wherein I doubt not but from ſelf-evident propoſitions, by neceſſary conſequences, as inconteſtable as thoſe in mathematicks, the meaſures of right and wrong might be made out, to any one that will apply himſelf with the ſame indifferency and attention to the one, as he does to the other of theſe ſciences. The relation of other modes may certainly be perceived, as well as thoſe of number and extenſion: and I cannot ſee, why they ſhould not alſo be capable of demonſtration, if due methods were thought on to examine or purſue their agreement or diſagreement. Where there is no property, there is no injuſtice, is a propoſition as certain as any demonſtration in Euclid: for the idea of property being a right to any thing; and the idea, to which the name injuſtice is given, being the invaſion, or violation of that right; it is evident, that theſe ideas being thus eſtabliſhed, and theſe names annexed to them, I can as certainly know this propoſition to be true, as that a triangle has three angles equal to two right ones. Again, no government allows abſolute liberty: the idea of government being the eſtabliſhment of ſociety upon certain rules, or laws, which require conformity to them: and the idea of abſolute liberty being for any one to do whatever he pleaſes; I am as capable of being certain of the truth of this propoſition as of any in the mathematicks.

Two things have made moral ideas thought uncapable of demonſtration.

§ 19. That, which in this reſpect has given the advantage to the ideas of quantity, and made them thought more capable of certainty and demonſtration, is,

Their complexedneſs, and want of ſenſible repreſentations.

First, that they can be ſet down and repreſented by ſenſible marks, which have a greater and nearer correſpondence with them than any words or ſounds whatſoever. Diagrams drawn on paper are copies of the ideas in the mind, and not liable to the uncertainty that words carry in their ſignification. An angle, circle or ſquare, drawn in lines, lies open to the view, and cannot be miſtaken: it remains unchangeable, and may at leiſure be conſidered and examined, and the demonſtration be reviſed, and all the parts of it may be gone over, more than once, without any danger of the leaſt change in the ideas. This cannot be thus done in moral ideas, we have no ſenſible marks that reſemble them, whereby we can ſet them down; we have nothing but words to expreſs them by: which tho', when written, they remain the ſame, yet the ideas, they ſtand for, may change in the ſame man; and it is very ſeldom that they are not different in different perſons.

Secondly, another thing, that makes the greater difficulty in ethicks, is, that moral ideas are commonly more complex, than thoſe of the figures ordinarily conſidered in mathematicks. From whence theſe two inconveniences follow; firſt that their names are of more uncertain ſignification, the preciſe collection of ſimple ideas, they ſtand for, not being ſo eaſily agreed on, and ſo the ſign that is uſed for them in communication always, and, in thinking often, does not ſteadily carry with it the ſame idea. Upon which the ſame diſorder, confuſion, and error follows, as would if a man, going to demonſtrate ſomething of an heptagon, ſhould in the diagram he took to do it, leave out one of the angles, or by overſight make the figure with one angle more, than the name ordinarily imported, or he intended it ſhould, when at firſt he thought of his demonſtration. This often happens, and is hardly avoidable in very complex, moral ideas, where the ſame name being retained, one angle, i. e. one ſimple idea, is left out, or put in, in the complex one, (ſtill called by the ſame name) more at one time than another. Secondly, from the complexedneſs of theſe moral ideas, there follows another inconvenience, viz. that the mind cannot eaſily retain thoſe preciſe combinations, ſo exactly and perfectly as is neceſſary in the examination of the habitudes and correſpondencies, agreements or diſagreements, of ſeveral of them one with another; eſpecially where it is to be judged of, by long deductions, and the intervention of ſeveral other complex ideas, to ſhew the agreement or diſagreement of two remote ones.

The great help againſt this which mathematicians find in diagrams and figures, which remain unalterable in their draughts, is very apparent, and the memory would often have great difficulty otherwiſe to retain them ſo exactly, whilſt the mind went over the parts of them ſtep by ſtep, to examine their ſeveral correſpondencies. And tho' in caſting up a long ſum, either in addition, multiplication, or diviſion, every part be only a progreſſion of the mind, taking a view of its own ideas, and conſidering their agreement or diſagreement; and the reſolution of the queſtion be nothing but the reſult of the whole, made up of ſuch particulars, whereof the mind has a clear perception: yet without ſetting down the ſeveral parts by marks, whoſe preciſe ſignifications are known, and by marks that laſt and remain in view, when the memory had let them go, it would be almoſt impoſſible to carry ſo many different ideas in mind, without confounding or letting ſlip ſome parts of the reckoning, and thereby making all our reaſonings about it uſeleſs. In which caſe, the cyphers or marks help not the mind at all to perceive the agreement of any two, or more numbers, their equalities or proportions: that, the mind has only by intuition of its own ideas of the numbers themſelves. But the numerical characters are helps to the memory, to record and retain the ſeveral ideas, about which the demonſtration is made, whereby a man may know how far his intuitive knowledge, in ſurveying ſeveral of the particulars, has proceeded; that ſo he may, without confuſion, go on to what is yet unknown, and at laſt have in one view before him the reſult of all his perceptions and reaſonings.

Remedies of thoſe difficulties.

§ 20. ONE part of theſe diſadvantages in moral ideas, which has made them be thought not capable of demonſtration, may in a good meaſure be remedied by definitions, ſetting down that collection of ſimple ideas, which every term ſhall ſtand for, and then uſing the terms ſteadily and conſtantly for that preciſe collection. And what methods algebra, or ſomething of that kind, may hereafter ſuggeſt, to remove the other difficulties, is not eaſy to foretel. Confident I am, that if men would in the ſame method, and with the ſame indifferency, ſearch after moral, as they do mathematical truths, they would find them to have a ſtronger connection one with another, and a more neceſſary conſequence from our clear and diſtinct ideas, and to come nearer perfect demonſtration than is commonly imagined. But much of this is not to be expected, whilſt the deſire of eſteem, riches, or power makes men eſpouſe the well-endowed opinions in faſhion, and then ſeek arguments, either to make good their beauty, or varniſh over and cover their deformity: nothing being ſo beautiful to the eye, as truth is to the mind; nothing ſo deformed and irreconcileable to the underſtanding, as a lie. For tho' many a man can with ſatisfaction enough own a no very handſome wife in his boſom; yet who is bold enough openly to avow, that he has eſpouſed a falſehood, and received into his breaſt ſo ugly a thing as a lie? Whilſt the parties of men cram their tenets down all men's throats, whom they can get into their power, without permitting them to examine their truth, or falſehood, and will not let truth have fair play in the world, nor men the liberty to ſearch after it; what improvements can be expected of this kind? What greater light can be hoped for, in the moral ſciences? The ſubject part of mankind in moſt places might, inſtead thereof, with Egyptian bondage expect Egyptian darkneſs, were not the candle of the Lord ſet up by himſelf in men's minds, which it is impoſſible for the breath, or power of man wholly to extinguiſh.

4. Of real exiſtence: we have an intuitive knowledge of our own; demonſtrative, of God's; ſenſitive, of ſome few other things.

§ 21. As to the fourth ſort of our knowledge, viz. of the real actual exiſtence of things, we have an intuitive knowledge of our own exiſtence; a demonſtrative knowledge of the exiſtence of a God; of the exiſtence of any thing elſe, we have no other but a ſenſitive knowledge, which extends not beyond the objects preſent to our ſenſes.

Our ignorance great.

§ 22. OUR knowledge being ſo narrow, as I have ſhewed, it will, perhaps, give us ſome light into the preſent ſtate of our minds, if we look a little into the dark ſide, and take a view of our ignorance: which, being infinitely larger than our knowledge, may ſerve much to the quieting of diſputes, and improvement of uſeful knowledge; if diſcovering how far we have clear and diſtinct ideas, we confine our thoughts within the contemplation of thoſe things that are within the reach of our underſtandings, and launch not out into that abyſs of darkneſs (where we have not eyes to ſee, nor faculties to perceive any thing) out of a preſumption, that nothing is beyond our comprehenſion. But to be ſatisfied of the folly of ſuch a conceit, we need not go far. He, that knows any thing, knows this in the firſt place, that he need not ſeek long for inſtances of his ignorance. The meaneſt and moſt obvious things, that come in our way, have dark ſides, that the quickeſt ſight cannot penetrate into. The cleareſt and moſt enlarged underſtandings of thinking men find themſelves puzzled, and at a loſs, in every particle of matter. We ſhall the leſs wonder to find it ſo, when we conſider the cauſes of our ignorance; which, from what has been ſaid, I ſuppoſe, will be found to be chiefly theſe three:

First, want of ideas.

Secondly, want of a diſcoverable connection between the ideas we have.

Thirdly, want of tracing and examining our ideas.

Firſt, one cauſe of it, want of ideas, either ſuch as we have no conception of, or ſuch as particularly we have not.

§ 23. First, there are ſome things, and thoſe not a few, that we are ignorant of, for want of ideas.

First, all the ſimple ideas we have, are confined (as I have ſhewn) to thoſe we receive from corporeal objects, by ſenſation, and from the operations of our own minds, as the objects of reflection. But how much theſe few and narrow inlets are diſproportionate to the vaſt, whole extent of all beings, will not be hard to perſuade thoſe, who are not ſo fooliſh as to think their ſpan the meaſure of all things. What other ſimple ideas it is poſſible the creatures in other parts of the univerſe may have, by the aſſiſtance of ſenſes and faculties, more, or perfecter than we have, or different from our's, it is not for us to determine. But to ſay, or think, there are no ſuch, becauſe we conceive nothing of them, is no better argument, than if a blind man ſhould be poſitive in it, that there was no ſuch thing as ſight and colours, becauſe he had no manner of idea of any ſuch thing, nor could by any means frame to himſelf any notions about ſeeing. The ignorance and darkneſs that is in us, no more hinders, nor confines the knowledge that is in others, than the blindneſs of a mole is an argument againſt the quick-ſightedneſs of an eagle. He that will conſider the infinite power, wiſdom, and goodneſs of the creator of all things, will find reaſon to think, it was not all laid out upon ſo inconſiderable, mean, and impotent a creature, as he will find man to be; who, in all probability, is one of the loweſt of all intellectual beings. What faculties, therefore, other ſpecies of creatures have to penetrate into the nature and inmoſt conſtitutions of things, what ideas they may receive of them, far different from ours, we know not. This we know, and certainly find, that we want ſeveral other views of them, beſide thoſe we have, to make diſcoveries of them more perfect. And we may be convinced, that the ideas, we can attain to, by our faculties, are very diſproportionate to things themſelves, when a poſitive, clear, diſtinct one of ſubſtance itſelf, which is the foundation of all the reſt, is concealed from us. But want of ideas of this kind, being a part, as well as cauſe of our ignorance, cannot be deſcribed. Only this, I think, I may confidently ſay of it, that the intellectual and ſenſible world, are in this perfectly alike; that that part, which we ſee of either of them, holds no proportion with what we ſee not: and whatſoever we can reach with our eyes, or our thoughts, of either of them, is but a point, almoſt nothing in compariſon of the reſt.

Becauſe of their remoteneſs; or,

§ 24. Secondly, another great cauſe of ignorance, is the want of ideas we are capable of. As the want of ideas, which our faculties are not able to give us, ſhuts us wholly from thoſe views of things, which it is reaſonable to think other beings, perfecter than we, have, of which we know nothing; ſo the want of ideas, I now ſpeak of, keeps us in ignorance of things, we conceive capable of being known to us. Bulk, figure, and motion, we have ideas of. But tho' we are not without ideas of theſe primary qualities of bodies in general, yet not knowing what is the particular bulk, figure, and motion, of the greateſt part of the bodies of the univerſe, we are ignorant of the ſeveral powers, efficacies, and ways of operation, whereby the effects, which we daily ſee, are produced. Theſe are hid from us in ſome things, by being too remote; and in others, by being too minute. When we conſider the vaſt diſtance of the known and viſible parts of the world, and the reaſons we have to think, that what lies within our ken, is but a ſmall part of the immenſe univerſe, we ſhall then diſcover an huge abyſs of ignorance. What are the particular fabricks of the great maſſes of matter, which make up the whole ſtupendous frame of corporeal beings, how far they are extended, what is their motion, and how continued, or communicated, and what influence they have one upon another, are contemplations that at firſt glimpſe our thoughts loſe themſelves in. If we narrow our contemplation and confine our thoughts to this little canton, I mean this ſyſtem of our ſun, and the groſſer maſſes of matter, that viſibly move about it; what ſeveral ſorts of vegetables, animals, and intellectual, corporeal beings, infinitely different from thoſe of our little ſpot of earth, may there probably be in the other planets, to the knowledge of which, even of their outward figures and parts, we can no way attain, whilſt we are confined to this earth; there being no natural means, either by ſenſation, or reflection, to convey their certain ideas into our minds? They are out of the reach of thoſe inlets of all our knowledge: and what ſorts of furniture and inhabitants thoſe manſions contain in them, we cannot ſo much as gueſs, much leſs have clear and diſtinct ideas of them.

Becauſe of their minuteneſs.

§ 25. If a great, nay, far the greateſt part of the ſeveral ranks of bodies in the univerſe, eſcape our notice by their remoteneſs, there are others that are no leſs concealed from us by their minuteneſs. Theſe inſenſible corpuſcles being the active parts of matter, and the great inſtruments of nature, on which depend not only all their ſecondary qualities, but alſo moſt of their natural operations; our want of preciſe, diſtinct ideas of their primary qualities, keeps us in an incurable ignorance of what we deſire to know about them. I doubt not, but if we could diſcover the figure, ſize, texture, and motion of the minute, conſtituent parts of any two bodies, we ſhould know, without trial, ſeveral of their operations one upon another, as we do now the properties of a ſquare, or a triangle. Did we know the mechanical affections of the particles of rhubarb, hemlock, opium, and a man, as a watch-maker does thoſe of a watch, whereby it performs its operations, and of a file, which, by rubbing on them, will alter the figure of any of the wheels; we ſhould be able to tell beforehand, that rhubarb will purge, hemlock kill, and opium make a man ſleep, as well as a watch-maker can, that a little piece of paper, laid on the ballance, will keep the watch from going, till it be removed; or that ſome ſmall part of it being rubbed by a file, the machine would quite loſe its motion, and the watch go no more. The diſſolving of ſilver in aqua fortis, and gold in aqua regia, and not vice verſa, would be then, perhaps, no more difficult to know, than it is to a ſmith to underſtand, why the turning of one key will open a lock, and not the turning of another. But whilſt we are deſtitute of ſenſes, acute enough to diſcover the minute particles of bodies, and to give us ideas of their mechanical affections, we muſt be content to be ignorant of their properties and ways of operation; nor can we be aſſured about them any farther, than ſome few trials we make, are able to reach. But whether they will ſucceed again another time, we cannot be certain. This hinders our certain knowledge of univerſal truths, concerning natural bodies: and our reaſon carries us herein, very little beyond particular matter of fact.

Hence no ſcience of bodies.

§ 26. And therefore, I am apt to doubt, that how far ſoever human induſtry may advance uſeful and experimental philoſophy in phyſical things, ſcientifical will ſtill be out of our reach; becauſe we want perfect and adequate ideas of thoſe very bodies, which are neareſt to us, and moſt under our command. Thoſe, which we have ranked into claſſes under names, and we think ourſelves beſt acquainted with, we have but very imperfect and incompleat ideas of. Diſtinct ideas of the ſeveral ſorts of bodies, that fall under the examination of our ſenſes, perhaps we may have: but adequate ideas, I ſuſpect, we have not of any one amongſt them. And tho' the former of theſe will ſerve us for common uſe and diſcourſe, yet, whilſt we want the latter, we are not capable of ſcientifical knowledge; nor ſhall ever be able to diſcover general, inſtructive, unqueſtionable truths concerning them. Certainty and demonſtration are things we muſt not, in theſe matters, pretend to. By the colour, figure, taſte, and ſmell, and other ſenſible qualities, we have as clear and diſtinct ideas of ſage and hemlock, as we have of a circle and a triangle: but having no ideas of the particular, primary qualities of the minute parts of either of theſe plants, nor of other bodies, which we would apply them to, we cannot tell what effects they will produce; nor when we ſee thoſe effects, can we ſo much as gueſs, much leſs know, their manner of production. Thus having no ideas of the particular, mechanical affections of the minute parts of bodies, that are within our view and reach, we are ignorant of their conſtitutions, powers, and operations: and of bodies more remote, we are yet more ignorant, not knowing ſo much as their very outward ſhapes, or the ſenſible and groſſer parts of their conſtitutions.

Much leſs of ſpirits.

§ 27. This, at firſt ſight, will ſhew us how diſproportionate our knowledge is to the whole extent even of material beings; to which, if we add the conſideration of that infinite number of ſpirits that may be, and probably are, which are yet more remote from our knowledge, whereof we have no cognizance, nor can frame to ourſelves any diſtinct ideas of their ſeveral ranks and ſorts, we ſhall find this cauſe of ignorance conceal from us, in an impenetrable obſcurity, almoſt the whole intellectual world; a greater certainly, and more beautiful world than the material. For bating ſome very few, and thoſe, if I may ſo call them, ſuperficial ideas of ſpirit, which by reflection we get of our own, and from thence the beſt we can collect of the father of all ſpirits, the eternal, independent author of them, and us, and all things; we have no certain information, ſo much as of the exiſtence of other ſpirits, but by revelation. Angels of all ſorts are naturally beyond our diſcovery: and all thoſe intelligences, whereof it is likely there are more orders than of corporeal ſubſtances, are things, whereof our natural faculties give us no certain account at all. That there are minds and thinking beings in other men, as well as himſelf, every man has a reaſon, from their words and actions, to be ſatisfied: and the knowledge of his own mind cannot ſuffer a man, that conſiders, to be ignorant, that there is a God. But that there are degrees of ſpiritual beings between us and the great God, who is there that, by his own ſearch and ability, can come to know? Much leſs have we diſtinct ideas of their different natures, conditions, ſtates, powers, and ſeveral conſtitutions, wherein they agree, or differ from one another, and from us. And, therefore, in what concerns their different ſpecies and properties, we are under an abſolute ignorance.

Secondly, want of a diſcoverable connection, between ideas we have.

§ 28. Secondly, what a ſmall part of the ſubſtantial beings, that are in the univerſe, the want of ideas leave open to our knowledge, we have ſeen. In the next place, another cauſe of ignorance, of no leſs moment, is a want of a diſcoverable connection between thoſe ideas we have: for wherever we want that, we are utterly uncapable of univerſal and certain knowledge; and are, as in the former caſe, left only to obſervation and experiment: which, how narrow and confined it is, how far from general knowledge, we need not be told. I ſhall give ſome few inſtances of this cauſe of our ignorance, and ſo leave it. It is evident that the bulk, figure, and motion, of ſeveral bodies about us, produce in us ſeveral ſenſations, as of colours, ſounds, taſtes, ſmells, pleaſure and pain, &c. Theſe mechanical affections of bodies having no affinity at all with thoſe ideas they produce in us (there being no conceivable connection between any impulſe of any ſort of body, and any perception of a colour, or ſmell, which we find in our minds) we can have no diſtinct knowledge of ſuch operations beyond our experience; and can reaſon no otherwiſe about them, than as effects produced by the appointment of an infinitely wiſe agent, which perfectly ſurpaſs our comprehenſions. As the ideas of ſenſible, ſecondary qualities, which we have in our minds, can by us be no way deduced from bodily cauſes, nor any correſpondence, or connection, be found between them and thoſe primary qualities, which (experience ſhews us) produce them in us: ſo, on the other ſide, the operation of our minds upon our bodies is as unconceivable. How any thought ſhould produce a motion in body, is as remote from the nature of our ideas, as how any body ſhould produce any thought in the mind. That it is ſo, if experience did not convince us, the conſideration of the things themſelves would never be able in the leaſt to diſcover to us. Theſe, and the like, tho' they have a conſtant and regular connection, in the ordinary courſe of things;

yet that connection being not diſcoverable in the ideas themſelves, which appearing to have no neceſſary dependence one on another, we can attribute their connection to nothing elſe, but the arbitrary determination of that all-wiſe agent, who has made them to be, and to operate as they do, in a way wholly above our weak underſtandings to conceive.

Inſtances.

§ 29. In ſome of our ideas there are certain relations, habitudes, and connections, ſo viſibly included in the nature of the ideas themſelves, that we cannot conceive them ſeparable from them by any power whatſoever. And in theſe only we are capable of certain and univerſal knowledge. Thus the idea of a right-lined triangle neceſſarily carries with it an equality of its angles to two right ones. Nor can we conceive this relation, this connection of theſe two ideas, to be poſſibly mutable, or to depend on any arbitrary power, which of choice made it thus, or could make it otherwiſe. But the coherence and continuity of the parts of matter; the production of ſenſation in us of colours and ſounds, &c. by impulſe and motion; nay, the original rules and communication of motion being ſuch, wherein we can diſcover no natural connection with any ideas we have, we cannot but aſcribe them to the arbitrary will and good pleaſure of the wiſe architect. I need not, I think, here mention the reſurrection of the dead, the future ſtate of this globe of earth, and ſuch other things, which are by every one acknowledged to depend wholly on the determination of a free agent. The things that as far as our obſervation reaches, we conſtantly find to proceed regularly, we may conclude do act by a law ſet them; but yet by a law that we know not: whereby, tho' cauſes work ſteadily, and effects conſtantly flow from them, yet their connections and dependences being not diſcoverable in our ideas, we can have but an experimental knowledge of them. From all which it is eaſy to perceive what a darkneſs we are involved in, how little it is of being, and the things that are, that we are capable to know. And, therefore, we ſhall do no injury to our knowledge, when we modeſtly think with ourſelves, that we are ſo far from being able to comprehend the whole nature of the univerſe, and all the things contained in it, that we are not capable of a philoſophical knowledge of the bodies that are about us, and make a part of us: concerning their ſecondary qualities, powers, and operations, we can have no univerſal certainty. Several effects come every day within the notice of our ſenſes, of which we have ſo far ſenſitive knowledge; but the cauſes, manner, and certainty of their production for the two foregoing reaſons, we muſt be content to be ignorant of. In theſe we can go no farther than particular experience informs us of matter of fact, and by analogy to gueſs what effects the like bodies are, upon other trials, like to produce. But as to a perfect ſcience of natural bodies (not to mention ſpiritual beings) we are, I think, ſo far from being capable of any ſuch thing, that I conclude it loſt labour to ſeek after it.

Thirdly, want of tracing our ideas.

§ 30. Thirdly, where we have adequate ideas, and where there is a certain and diſcoverable connection between them, yet we are often ignorant, for want of tracing thoſe ideas which we have, or may have; and for want of finding out thoſe intermediate ideas, which may ſhew us what habitude of agreement, or diſagreement they have one with another. And thus many are ignorant of mathematical truths, not out of any imperfection of their faculties, or uncertainty in the things themſelves; but for want of application in acquiring, examining, and by due ways comparing thoſe ideas. That which has moſt contributed to hinder the due tracing of our ideas, and finding out their relations, and agreements or diſagreements one with another, has been, I ſuppoſe, the ill uſe of words. It is impoſſible that men ſhould ever truly ſeek, or certainly diſcover the agreement, or diſagreement of ideas themſelves, whilſt their thoughts flutter about, or ſtick only in ſounds of doubtful and uncertain ſignifications. Mathematicians, abſtracting their thoughts from names, and accuſtoming themſelves to ſet before their minds the ideas themſelves that they would conſider, and not ſounds inſtead of them, have avoided thereby a great part of that perplexity, puddering, and confuſion, which has ſo much hindered men's progreſs in other parts of knowledge. For whilſt they ſtick in words of undetermined and uncertain ſignification, they are unable to diſtinguiſh true from falſe, certain from probable, conſiſtent from inconſiſtent, in their own opinions. This having been the fate, or misfortune of a great part of the men of letters, the increaſe brought into the ſtock of real knowledge, has been very little, in proportion to the ſchools, diſputes and writings, the world has been filled with; whilſt ſtudents, being loſt in the great wood of words, knew not whereabout they were, how far their diſcoveries were advanced, or what was wanting in their own, or the general ſtock of knowledge. Had men, in the diſcoveries of the material done, as they have in thoſe of the intellectual world, involved all in the obſcurity of uncertain and doubtful ways of talking, volumes writ of navigation and voyages, theories and ſtories of zones and tides, multiplied and diſputed; nay, ſhips built, and fleets ſet out, would never have taught us the way beyond the line; and the antipodes would be ſtill as much unknown, as when it was declared hereſy to hold there were any. But, having ſpoken ſufficiently of words, and the ill or careleſs uſe that is commonly made of them, I ſhall not ſay any thing more of it here.

Extent, in reſpect of univerſality.

§ 31. Hitherto we have examined the extent of our knowledge, in reſpect of the ſeveral ſorts of beings that are. There is another extent of it, in reſpect of univerſality, which will alſo deſerve to be conſidered; and in this regard, our knowledge follows the nature of our ideas. If the ideas are abſtract, whoſe agreement or diſagreement we perceive, our knowledge is univerſal. For what is known of ſuch general ideas, will be true of every particular thing, in whom that eſſence, i. e. that abſtract idea is to be found; and what is once known of ſuch ideas, will be perpetually and for ever true. So that as to all general knowledge, we muſt ſearch and find it only in our minds, and it is only the examining of our own ideas, that furniſheth us with that. Truths belonging to eſſences of things (that is to abſtract ideas) are eternal, and are to be found out, by the contemplation only of thoſe eſſences: as the exiſtences of things are to be known only from experience. But having more to ſay of this, in the chapters, where I ſhall ſpeak of general and real knowledge, this may here ſuffice as to the univerſality of our knowledge in general.

CHAP. IV.

Of the reality of human knowledge.

Chap. IV.

Obj. Knowledge, placed in ideas, may be all bare viſion.

§ 1. I Doubt not but my reader, by this time, may be apt to think, that I have been, all this while, only building a caſtle in the air; and be ready to ſay to me, "To what purpoſe all this ſtir? Knowledge, ſay you, is only the "perception of the agreement or diſagreement of our own ideas: but who "knows what thoſe ideas may be? Is there any thing ſo extravagant, as the "imaginations of men's brains? Where is the head that has no chimera's in it? "Or if there be a ſober and a wiſe man, what difference will there be, by your "rules, between his knowledge and that of the moſt extravagant fancy in the "world? They both have their ideas, and perceive their agreement and diſagree-"ment one with another. If there be any difference between them, the advan-"tage will be on the warm-headed man's ſide, as having the more ideas, and "the more lively: and ſo, by your rules, he will be the more knowing. If it "be true, that all knowledge lies only in the perception of the agreement or "diſagreement of our own ideas, the viſions of an enthuſiaſt, and the reaſonings "of a ſober man will be equally certain. It is no matter how things are; ſo "a man obſerve but the agreement of his own imaginations, and talk conform-"ably, it is all truth, all certainty. Such caſtles in the air, will be as ſtrong-holds "of truth, as the demonſtrations of Euclid. That an harpy is not a centaur, is "by this way as certain knowledge, and as much a truth, as that a ſquare is not "a circle.

"But of what uſe is all this fine knowledge of men's own imaginations, to "a man that enquires after the reality of things? It matters not what men's fan-

“cies are, it is the knowledge of things that is only to be prized; it is this alone gives a value to our reaſonings, and preference to one man's knowledge over another's, that it is of things as they really are, and not of dreams and fancies.”

Anſw. Not ſo, where ideas agree with things.

§ 2. To which I anſwer, that if our knowledge of our ideas terminate in them, and reach no farther, where there is ſomething farther intended, our moſt ſerious thoughts will be of little more uſe, than the reveries of a crazy brain; and the truths built thereon of no more weight, than the diſcourſes of a man, who ſees things clearly in a dream, and with great aſſurance utters them. But, I hope before I have done, to make it evident, that this way of certainty, by the knowledge of our own ideas, goes a little farther than bare imagination: and, I believe it will appear, that all the certainty of general truths a man has, lies in nothing elſe.

§ 3. It is evident, the mind knows not things immediately, but only by the intervention of the ideas it has of them. Our knowledge, therefore, is real, only ſo far as there is a conformity between our ideas and the reality of things. But what ſhall be here the criterion? How ſhall the mind, when it perceives nothing but its own ideas, know that they agree with things themſelves? This, tho' it ſeems not to want difficulty, yet, I think, there be two ſorts of ideas, that, we may be aſſured, agree with things.

As, 1. All ſimple ideas do.

§ 4. First, the firſt are ſimple ideas, which ſince the mind, as has been ſhewed, can by no means make to itſelf, muſt neceſſarily be the product of things, operating on the mind in a natural way, and producing therein thoſe perceptions, which by the wiſdom and will of our maker they are ordained and adapted to. From whence it follows, that ſimple ideas are not fictions of our fancies, but the natural and regular productions of things without us, really operating upon us, and ſo carry with them all the conformity, which is intended, or which our ſtate requires: for they repreſent to us things under thoſe appearances, which they are fitted to produce in us, whereby we are enabled to diſtinguiſh the ſorts of particular ſubſtances, to diſcern the ſtates they are in, and ſo to take them for our neceſſities, and apply them to our uſes. Thus the idea of whiteneſs, or bitterneſs, as it is in the mind, exactly anſwering that power, which is in any body to produce it there, has all the real conformity it can, or ought to have, with things without us. And this conformity between our ſimple ideas, and the exiſtence of things, is ſufficient for real knowledge.

2. All complex ideas, except of ſubſtances.

§ 5. Secondly, all our complex ideas, except thoſe of ſubſtances, being archetypes of the mind's own making, not intended to be the copies of any thing, nor referred to the exiſtence of any thing, as to their originals, cannot want any conformity neceſſary to real knowledge. For that, which is not deſigned to repreſent any thing but itſelf, can never be capable of a wrong repreſentation, nor miſlead us from the true apprehenſion of any thing, by its diſlikeneſs to it; and ſuch, excepting thoſe of ſubſtances, are all our complex ideas: which, as I have ſhewed in another place, are combinations of ideas, which the mind, by its free choice, puts together, without conſidering any connection they have in nature. And hence it is, that in all theſe ſorts the ideas themſelves are conſidered as the archetypes, and things no otherwiſe regarded, but as they are conformable to them. So that we cannot but be infallibly certain, that all the knowledge we attain, concerning theſe ideas, is real, and reaches things themſelves; becauſe in all our thoughts, reaſonings and diſcourſes of this kind, we intend things no farther than as they are conformable to our ideas. So that in theſe, we cannot miſs of a certain and undoubted reality.

Hence the reality of mathematical knowledge.

§ 6. I doubt not but it will be eaſily granted, that the knowledge we have of mathematical truths, is not only certain, but real knowledge; and not the bare, empty viſion of vain, inſignificant chimera's of the brain: and yet, if we will conſider, we ſhall find that it is only of our own ideas. The mathematician conſiders the truth and properties belonging to a rectangle, or circle, only as they are in idea in his own mind. For it is poſſible he never found either of them exiſting mathematically, i. e. preciſely true, in his life. But yet, the knowledge he has of any truths, or properties belonging to a circle, or any other mathematical figure, are nevertheleſs true and certain, even of real things exiſting; becauſe real things are no farther concerned, nor intended to be meant by any ſuch propoſitions, than as things really agree to thoſe archetypes in his mind. Is it true of the idea of a triangle, that its three angles are equal to two right ones? It is true alſo of a triangle, wherever it really exiſts. Whatever other figure exiſts, that is not exactly anſwerable to the idea of a triangle in his mind, is not at all concerned in that propoſition: and therefore hat is certain all his knowledge concerning ſuch ideas, is real knowledge; becauſe intending things no farther than they agree with thoſe his ideas, he is ſure what he knows concerning thoſe figures, when they have barely an ideal exiſtence in his mind, will hold true of them alſo, when they have real exiſtence in matter; his conſideration being barely of thoſe figures, which are the ſame, wherever, or however they exiſt.

And of moral.

§ 7. And hence it follows, that moral knowledge is as capable of real certainty as mathematicks. For certainty being but the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement of our ideas; and demonſtration nothing but the perception of ſuch agreement by the intervention of other ideas, or mediums; our moral ideas, as well as mathematical, being archetypes themſelves, and ſo adequate and compleat ideas; all the agreement, or diſagreement, which we ſhall find in them, will produce real knowledge, as well as in mathematical figures.

Exiſtence not required to make it real.

§ 8. For the attaining of knowledge and certainty, it is requiſite that we have determined ideas; and to make our knowledge real, it is requiſite that the ideas anſwer their archetypes. Nor let it be wondered, that I place the certainty of our knowledge in the conſideration of our ideas, with ſo little care and regard (as it may ſeem) to the real exiſtence of things: ſince moſt of thoſe diſcourſes, which take up the thoughts, and engage the diſputes of thoſe who pretend to make it their buſineſs to enquire after truth and certainty, will, I preſume, upon examination, be found to be general propoſitions, and notions, in which exiſtence is not at all concerned. All the diſcourſes of the mathematicians, about the ſquaring of a circle, conick ſections, or any other part of mathematicks, concern not the exiſtence of any of thoſe figures; but their demonſtrations, which depend on their ideas, are the ſame, whether there be any ſquare, or circle, exiſting in the world, or no. In the ſame manner, the truth and certainty of moral diſcourſes abſtracts from the lives of men, and the exiſtence of thoſe virtues in the world, whereof they treat. Nor are Tully's Offices leſs true, becauſe there is no body in the world that exactly practiſes his rules, and lives up to that pattern of a virtuous man, which he has given us, and which exiſted no where, when he writ, but in idea. If it be true in ſpeculation, i. e. in idea, that murder deſerves death, it will alſo be true in reality of any action, that exiſts conformable to that idea of murder. As for other actions, the truth of that propoſition concerns them not. And thus it is of all other ſpecies of things, which have no other eſſences but thoſe ideas which are in the minds of men.

Nor will it be leſs true, or certain, becauſe moral ideas are of our own making and naming.

§ 9. But it will here be ſaid, that if moral knowledge be placed in the contemplation of our own moral ideas, and thoſe, as other modes, be of our own making, what ſtrange notions will there be of juſtice and temperance? What confuſion of virtues and vices, if every one may make what ideas of them he pleaſes? No confuſion, nor diſorder, in the things themſelves, nor the reaſonings about them; no more than (in mathematicks) there would be a diſturbance in the demonſtration, or a change in the properties of figures, and their relations one to another, if a man ſhould make a triangle with four corners, or a trapezium with four right angles; that is, in plain Engliſh, change the names of the figures, and call that by one name, which mathematicians call ordinarily by another. For let a man make to himſelf the idea of a figure with three angles, whereof one is a right one, and call it, if he pleaſe, equilaterum or trapezium, or any thing elſe, the properties of, and demonſtrations about, that idea will be the ſame, as if he called it a rectangular triangle. I confeſs the change of the name, by the impropriety of ſpeech, will at firſt diſturb him, who knows not what idea it ſtands for; but as ſoon as the figure is drawn, the conſequences and demonſtration are plain and clear. Juſt the ſame is it in moral knowledge, let a man have the idea of taking from others, without their conſent, what their honeſt induſtry has poſſeſſed them of, and call this juſtice, if he pleaſe. He that takes the name here, without the idea put to it, will be miſtaken, by joining another idea of his own to that name: but ſtrip the idea of that name, or take it ſuch as it is in the ſpeaker's mind, and the ſame things will agree to it, as if you called it injuſtice. Indeed wrong names in moral diſcourſes, breed uſually more diſorder, becauſe they are not ſo eaſily rectified as in mathematicks, where the figure once drawn and ſeen, makes the name uſeleſs and of no force. For what need of a ſign, when the thing ſignified is preſent and in view? But in moral names that cannot be ſo eaſily and ſhortly done, becauſe of the many decompoſitions that go to the making up the complex ideas of thoſe modes. But yet for all this, miſcalling of thoſe ideas, contrary to the uſual ſignification of the words of that language, hinders not, but that we may have certain and demonſtrative knowledge of their ſeveral agreements and diſagreements, if we will carefully, as in mathematicks, keep to the ſame preciſe ideas, and trace them in their ſeveral relations one to another, without being led away by their names. If we but ſeparate the idea, under conſideration, from the ſign that ſtands for it, our knowledge goes equally on, in the diſcovery of real truth and certainty, whatever ſounds we make uſe of.

Miſnaming diſturbs not the certainty of the knowledge.

§ 10. ONE thing more we are to take notice of, that where God, or any other law-maker, hath defined any moral names, there they have made the eſſence of that ſpecies, to which that name belongs; and there it is not ſafe to apply or uſe them otherwiſe: but in other caſes, it is bare impropriety of ſpeech to apply them contrary to the common uſage of the country. But yet even this too diſturbs not the certainty of that knowledge, which is ſtill to be had by a due contemplation, and comparing of thoſe even nick-named ideas.

Ideas of ſubſtances have their archetypes without us.

§ 11. THIRDLY, there is another ſort of complex ideas, which being referred to archetypes without us, may differ from them, and ſo our knowledge about them may come ſhort of being real. Such are our ideas of ſubſtances, which conſiſting of a collection of ſimple ideas, ſuppoſed taken from the works of nature, may yet vary from them, by having more, or different ideas united in them, than are to be found united in things themſelves. From whence it comes to paſs, that they may, and often do fail of being exactly conformable to things themſelves.

So far as they agree with thoſe, ſo far our knowledge concerning them is real.

§ 12. I SAY then, that to have ideas of ſubſtances, which by being conformable to things, may afford us real knowledge, it is not enough, as in modes, to put together ſuch ideas, as have no inconſiſtence, tho' they did never before ſo exiſt: v. g. the ideas of ſacrilege, or perjury, &c. were as real and true ideas before, as after the exiſtence of any ſuch fact. But our ideas of ſubſtances, being ſuppoſed copies, and referred to archetypes without us, muſt ſtill be taken from ſomething, that does or has exiſted; they muſt not conſiſt of ideas, put together at the pleaſure of our thoughts, without any real pattern they were taken from, tho' we can perceive no inconſiſtence in ſuch a combination. The reaſon whereof is, becauſe we not knowing what real conſtitution it is of ſubſtances, whereon our ſimple ideas depend, and which really is the cauſe of the ſtrict union of ſome of them one with another, and the excluſion of others; there are very few of them, that we can be ſure are, or are not inconſiſtent in nature, any farther than experience and ſenſible obſervation reach. Herein, therefore, is founded the reality of our knowledge concerning ſubſtances, that all our complex ideas of them muſt be ſuch, and ſuch only, as are made up of ſuch ſimple ones, as have been diſcovered to co-exiſt in nature. And our ideas, being thus true, tho' not perhaps, very exact copies, are yet the ſubjects of real (as far as we have any) knowledge of them. Which (as has been already ſhewn) will not be found to reach very far: but ſo far as it does, it will ſtill be real knowledge. Whatever ideas we have, the agreement we find they have with others, will ſtill be knowledge. If thoſe ideas be abſtract, it will be general knowledge. But to make it real concerning ſubſtances, the ideas muſt be taken from the real exiſtence of things. Whatever ſimple ideas have been found to co-exiſt in any ſubſtance, theſe we may with confidence join together again, and ſo make abſtract ideas of ſubſtances. For whatever have once had an union in nature, may be united again.

§ 13. THIS

In our enquiries about ſubſtances, we muſt conſider ideas, and not confine our thoughts to names, or ſpecies ſuppoſed, ſet out by names.

§ 13. This, if we rightly conſider, and confine not our thoughts and abſtract ideas to names, as if there were, or could be no other ſorts of things, than what known names had already determined, and as it were ſet out, we ſhould think of things with greater freedom and leſs confuſion than perhaps we do. It would poſſibly be thought a bold paradox, if not a very dangerous falſhood, if I ſhould ſay, that ſome changelings, who have lived forty years together, without any appearance of reaſon, are ſomething between a man and a beaſt: which prejudice is founded upon nothing elſe but a falſe ſuppoſition, that theſe two names, man and beaſt, ſtand for diſtinct ſpecies, ſo ſet out by real eſſences, that there can come no other ſpecies between them. Whereas, if we will abſtract from thoſe names, and the ſuppoſition of ſuch ſpecifick eſſences made by nature, wherein all things of the ſame denominations did exactly and equally partake; if we would not fancy that there were a certain number of theſe eſſences, wherein all things, as in molds, were caſt and formed, we ſhould find that the idea of the ſhape, motion, and life of a man without reaſon, is as much a diſtinct idea, and makes as much a diſtinct ſort of things from man and beaſt, as the idea of the ſhape of an aſs with reaſon, would be different from either that of man, or beaſt, and be a ſpecies of an animal between, or diſtinct from both.

Objection againſt a changeling, being ſomething between a man and a beaſt, anſwered.

§ 14. Here every body will be ready to aſk, if changelings may be ſuppoſed ſomething between man and beaſt, pray what are they? I anſwer, changelings, which is as good a word to ſignify ſomething different from the ſignification of man or beaſt, as the names, man and beaſt, are to have ſignifications different one from the other. This, well conſidered, would reſolve this matter, and ſhew my meaning, without any more ado. But I am not ſo unacquainted with the zeal of ſome men, which enables them to ſpin conſequences, and to ſee religion threatened, whenever any one ventures to quit their forms of ſpeaking, as not to foreſee what names ſuch a propoſition as this is like to be charged with: and without doubt it will be aſked, if changelings are ſomething between man and beaſt, what will become of them in the other world? To which I anſwer, 1. It concerns me not to know, or enquire. To their own maſter they ſtand or fall. It will make their ſtate neither better, nor worſe, whether we determine any thing of it, or no. They are in the hands of a faithful creator and a bountiful father, who diſpoſes not of his creatures according to our narrow thoughts or opinions, nor diſtinguiſhes them according to names and ſpecies of our contrivance. And we, that know ſo little of this preſent world, we are in, may, I think, content ourſelves without being peremptory in defining the different ſtates, which creatures ſhall come into, when they go off this ſtage. It may ſuffice us, that he hath made known to all thoſe, who are capable of inſtruction, diſcourſe and reaſoning, that they ſhall come to an account, and receive according to what they have done in this body.

§ 15. But, ſecondly, I anſwer, the force of theſe men's queſtion (viz. will you deprive changelings of a future ſtate?) is founded on one of theſe two ſuppoſitions, which are both falſe. The firſt is, that all things, that have the outward ſhape and appearance of a man, muſt neceſſarily be deſigned to an immortal, future being, after this life: or, ſecondly, that whatever is of human birth muſt be ſo. Take away theſe imaginations, and ſuch queſtions will be groundleſs and ridiculous. I deſire then thoſe, who think there is no more but an accidental difference between themſelves and changelings, the eſſence in both being exactly the ſame, to conſider, whether they can imagine immortality annexed to any outward ſhape of the body; the very propoſing it, is, I ſuppoſe, enough to make them diſown it. No one yet, that ever I heard of, how much ſoever immerſed in matter, allowed that excellency to any figure of the groſs, ſenſible, outward parts, as to affirm eternal life due to it, or a neceſſary conſequence of it; or that any maſs of matter ſhould, after its diſſolution here, be again reſtored hereafter to an everlaſting ſtate of ſenſe, perception, and knowledge, only becauſe it was molded into this, or that figure, and had ſuch a particular frame of its viſible parts. Such an opinion as this, placing immortality in a certain, ſuperficial figure, turns out of doors all conſideration of ſoul, or ſpirit, upon whoſe account alone ſome corporeal beings have hitherto been concluded immortal, and others not. This is to attribute more to the outſide than inſide of things; to place the excellency of a man more in the external ſhape of his body, than internal perfections of his ſoul: which is but little better than to annex the great and ineſtimable advantage of immortality and life everlaſting, which he has above other material beings; to annex it, I ſay, to the cut of his beard, or the faſhion of his coat. For this, or that, outward make of our bodies no more carries with it the hopes of an eternal duration, than the faſhion of a man's ſuit gives him reaſonable grounds to imagine it will never wear out, or that it will make him immortal. It will perhaps be ſaid, that no body thinks that the ſhape makes any thing immortal, but it is the ſhape is the ſign of a rational ſoul within, which is immortal. I wonder who made it the ſign of any ſuch thing: for barely ſaying it, will not make it ſo. It would require ſome proofs to perſuade one of it. No figure, that I know, ſpeaks any ſuch language. For it may as rationally be concluded, that the dead body of a man, wherein there is to be found no more appearance, or action, of life, than there is in a ſtatue, has yet nevertheleſs a living ſoul in it, becauſe of its ſhape; as that there is a rational ſoul in a changeling, becauſe he has the outſide of a rational creature, when his actions carry far leſs marks of reaſon with them, in the whole courſe of his life, than what are to be found in many a beaſt.

Monſters.

§ 16. BUT it is the iſſue of rational parents, and muſt therefore be concluded to have a rational ſoul. I know not by what logick you muſt ſo conclude. I am ſure this is a concluſion, that men no where allow of. For if they did, they would not make bold, as every where they do, to deſtroy ill-formed and miſ-ſhaped productions. Ay, but theſe are monſters. Let them be ſo; what will your driveling, unintelligent, intractable changeling be? Shall a defect in the body make a monſter: a defect in the mind (the far more noble, and in the common phraſe, the far more eſſential part) not? Shall the want of a noſe or a neck make a monſter, and put ſuch iſſue out of the rank of men; the want of reaſon and underſtanding, not? This is to bring all back again to what was exploded juſt now: This is to place all in the ſhape, and to take the meaſure of a man, only by his outſide. To ſhew that, according to the ordinary way of reaſoning in this matter, people do lay the whole ſtreſs on the figure, and reſolve the whole eſſence of the ſpecies of man (as they make it) into the outward ſhape, how unreaſonable ſoever it be, and how much ſoever they diſown it; we need but trace their thoughts and practice a little farther, and then it will plainly appear. The well-ſhaped changeling is a man, has a rational ſoul, tho' it appear not; this is paſt doubt, ſay you. Make the ears a little longer, and more pointed, and the noſe a little flatter than ordinary, and then you begin to boggle: make the face yet narrower, flatter, and longer, and then you are at a ſtand: add ſtill more and more of the likeneſs of a brute to it, and let the head be perfectly that of ſome other animal, then preſently it is a monſter; and it is demonſtration with you that it hath no rational ſoul, and muſt be deſtroyed. Where now (I aſk) ſhall be the juſt meaſure of the utmoſt bounds of that ſhape, that carries with it a rational ſoul? For ſince there have been human fœtus's produced, half beaſt, and half man; and others three parts one, and one part the other; and ſo it is poſſible they may be, in all the variety of approaches to the one, or the other ſhape, and may have ſeveral degrees of mixture of the likeneſs of a man, or a brute; I would gladly know what are thoſe preciſe lineaments, which, according to this hypotheſis, are, or are not, capable of a rational ſoul to be joined to them? What ſort of outſide is the certain ſign that there is, or is not, ſuch an inhabitant within? For, till that be done, we talk at random of man: and ſhall always, I fear, do ſo, as long as we give ourſelves up to certain ſounds, and the imaginations of ſettled and fixed ſpecies in nature, we know not what. But, after all, I deſire it may be conſidered, that thoſe, who think they have anſwered the difficulty, by telling us, that a miſ-ſhaped fœtus is a monſter, run into the ſame fault they are arguing againſt, by conſtituting a ſpecies between man and beaſt. For what elſe, I pray, is their monſter in the caſe (if the word monſter ſignifies any thing at all) but ſomething neither man nor beaſt, but partaking ſomewhat of either? And juſt ſo is the changeling before mentioned. So neceſſary is it to quit the common notion of ſpecies and eſſences, if we will truly look into the nature of things, and examine them, by what our faculties can diſcover in them as they exiſt, and not by groundleſs fancies, that have been taken up about them.

Words and ſpecies.

§ 17. I HAVE mentioned this here, becauſe, I think, we cannot be too cautious that words and ſpecies, in the ordinary notions, which we have been uſed to of them, impoſe not upon us. For I am apt to think, therein lies one great obſtacle to our clear and diſtinct knowledge, eſpecially in reference to ſubſtances; and from thence has roſe a great part of the difficulties about truth and certainty. Would we accuſtom ourſelves to ſeparate our contemplations and reaſonings from words, we might, in a great meaſure, remedy this inconvenience within our own thoughts: but yet it would ſtill diſturb us in our diſcourſe with others, as long as we retained the opinion, that ſpecies and their eſſences were any thing elſe but our abſtract ideas (ſuch as they are) with names annexed to them, to be the ſigns of them.

Recapitulation.

§ 18. WHEREVER we perceive the agreement, or diſagreement, of any of our ideas, there is certain knowledge: and wherever we are ſure thoſe ideas agree with the reality of things, there is certain real knowledge. Of which agreement of our ideas, with the reality of things, having here given the marks, I think I have ſhewn wherein it is, that certainty, real certainty, conſiſts: which, whatever it was to others, was, I confeſs, to me heretofore, one of thoſe deſiderata which I found great want of.

CHAP. V.

Of truth in general.

CHAP. V.

What truth is.

§ 1. "WHAT is truth?" was an enquiry many ages ſince; and it being that, which all mankind either do, or pretend to ſearch after, it cannot but be worth our while carefully to examine wherein its conſiſts, and ſo acquaint ourſelves with the nature of it, as to obſerve how the mind diſtinguiſhes it from falſhood.

A right joining, or ſeparating of ſigns; i. e. ideas, or words.

§ 2. TRUTH then ſeems to me, in the proper import of the word, to ſignify nothing but the joining, or ſeparating of ſigns, as the things ſignified by them, do agree, or diſagree, one with another. The joining, or ſeparating, of ſigns here meant, is what, by another name, we call propoſition. So that truth properly belongs only to propoſitions: whereof there are two ſorts, viz. mental and verbal; as there are two ſorts of ſigns commonly made uſe of, viz. ideas and words.

Which make mental, or verbal propoſitions.

§ 3. To form a clear notion of truth, it is very neceſſary to conſider truth of thought, and truth of words, diſtinctly one from another: but yet it is very difficult to treat of them aſunder. Becauſe it is unavoidable, in treating of mental propoſitions, to make uſe of words: and then the inſtances given, of mental propoſitions, ceaſe immediately to be barely mental, and become verbal. For a mental propoſition being nothing but a bare conſideration of the ideas, as they are in our minds ſtripped of names, they loſe the nature of purely mental propoſitions, as ſoon as they are put into words.

Mental propoſitions are very hard to be treated of.

§ 4. AND that, which makes it yet harder to treat of mental and verbal propoſitions ſeparately, is, that moſt men, if not all, in their thinking and reaſonings within themſelves, make uſe of words, inſtead of ideas; at leaſt when the ſubject of their meditation contains in it complex ideas. Which is a great evidence of the imperfection and uncertainty of our ideas of that kind, and may, if attentively made uſe of, ſerve for a mark to ſhew us, what are thoſe things we have clear and perfect, eſtabliſhed ideas of, and what not. For if we will curiouſly obſerve the way our mind takes in thinking and reaſoning, we ſhall find, I ſuppoſe, that, when we make any propoſitions within our own thoughts about white, or black; ſweet, or bitter; a triangle, or a circle; we can and often do frame in our minds the ideas themſelves, without reflecting on the names. But, when we would conſider, or make propoſitions about the more complex ideas, as of a man, vitriol, fortitude, glory, we uſually put the name for the idea:

becauſe the ideas, theſe names ſtand for, being for the moſt part, imperfect, confuſed, and undetermined, we reflect on the names themſelves, becauſe they are more clear, certain, and diſtinct, and readier occur to our thoughts than the pure ideas: and ſo we make uſe of theſe words, inſtead of the ideas themſelves, even when we would meditate and reaſon within ourſelves, and make tacit, mental propoſitions. In ſubſtances, as has been already noted, this is occaſioned by the imperfection of our ideas: we making the name ſtand for the real eſſence, of which we have no idea at all. In modes, it is occaſioned by the great number of ſimple ideas, that go to the making them up. For many of them being compounded, the name occurs much eaſier than the complex idea itſelf, which requires time and attention to be recollected, and exactly repreſented to the mind, even in thoſe men who have formerly been at the pains to do it; and is utterly impoſſible to be done by thoſe, who, tho' they have ready in their memory the greateſt part of the common words of their language, yet, perhaps, never troubled themſelves in all their lives to conſider what preciſe ideas the moſt of them ſtood for. Some confuſed or obſcure notions have ſerved their turns; and many who talk very much of religion and conſcience, of church and faith, of power and right, of obſtructions and humours, melancholy and choler, would, perhaps, have little left in their thoughts and meditations, if one ſhould deſire them to think only of the things themſelves, and lay by thoſe words, with which they ſo often confound others, and not ſeldom themſelves alſo.

Being nothing but the joining, or ſeparating ideas, without words.

§ 5. BUT to return to the conſideration of truth: we muſt, I ſay, obſerve two ſorts of propoſitions that we are capable of making.

FIRST, mental, wherein the ideas in our underſtandings are without the uſe of words put together, or ſeparated by the mind, perceiving, or judging, of their agreement, or diſagreement.

SECONDLY, verbal propoſitions, which are words, the ſigns of our ideas, put together, or ſeparated in affirmative, or negative ſentences. By which way of affirming, or denying, theſe ſigns, made by ſounds, are, as it were, put together, or ſeparated one from another. So that propoſition conſiſts in joining, or ſeparating ſigns; and truth conſiſts in the putting together, or ſeparating thoſe ſigns according as the things, which they ſtand for, agree, or diſagree.

When mental propoſitions contain real truth, and when verbal.

§ 6. EVERY one's experience will ſatisfy him, that the mind, either by perceiving, or ſuppoſing, the agreement, or diſagreement, of any of its ideas, does tacitly within itſelf put them into a kind of propoſition, affirmative, or negative, which I have endeavoured to expreſs by the terms, putting together and ſeparating. But this action of the mind, which is ſo familiar to every thinking and reaſoning man, is eaſier to be conceived by reflecting on what paſſes in us, when we affirm, or deny, than to be explained by words. When a man has in his mind the idea of two lines, viz. the ſide and diagonal of a ſquare, whereof the diagonal is an inch long, he may have the idea alſo of the diviſion of that line, into a certain number of equal parts; v. g. into five, ten, an hundred, a thouſand, or any other number, and may have the idea of that inch-line being diviſible, or not diviſible, into ſuch equal parts, as a certain number of them will be equal to the ſide-line. Now whenever he perceives, believes, or ſuppoſes, ſuch a kind of diviſibility to agree, or diſagree, to his idea of that line, he, as it were, joins, or ſeparates, thoſe two ideas, viz. the idea of that line, and the idea of that kind of diviſibility; and ſo makes a mental propoſition, which is true, or falſe, according as ſuch a kind of diviſibility, a diviſibility into ſuch aliquot parts, does really agree to that line, or no. When ideas are ſo put together, or ſeparated in the mind, as they, or the things they ſtand for, do agree, or not, that is, as I may call it, mental truth. But truth of words is ſomething more; and that is, the affirming, or denying, of words one of another, as the ideas they ſtand for, agree, or diſagree: and this again is twofold; either purely verbal and trifling, which I ſhall ſpeak of, chap. viii. or real and inſtructive; which is the object of that real knowledge, which we have ſpoken of already.

Objection againſt verbal truth, that thus it may all be chimerical.

§ 7. BUT here again will be apt to occur the ſame doubt about truth, that did about knowledge: and it will be objected, " that, if truth be nothing but " the joining, or ſeparating of words in propoſitions, as the ideas they ſtand for, “agree, or diſagree, in men's minds, the knowledge of truth is not ſo valuable a thing, as it is taken to be, nor worth the pains and time men employ to the ſearch of it; ſince, by this account, it amounts to no more than the conformity of words to the chimeras of men's brains. Who knows not, what odd notions many men's heads are filled with, and what ſtrange ideas all men's brains are capable of? But if we reſt here, we know the truth of nothing by this rule, but of the viſionary world in our own imaginations; nor have other truth, but what as much concerns harpies and centaurs, as men and horſes. For thoſe, and the like, may be ideas in our heads, and have their agreement and diſagreement there, as well as the ideas of real beings, and ſo have as true propoſitions made about them. And it will be altogether as true a propoſition, to ſay all centaurs are animals, as that all men are animals; and the certainty of one as great as the other. For in both the propoſitions, the words are put together, according to the agreement of the ideas in our minds: and the agreement of the idea of animal with that of centaur, is as clear and viſible to the mind, as the agreement of the idea of animal with that of man; and ſo theſe two propoſitions are equally true, equally certain. But of what uſe is all ſuch truth to us?”

Anſwered, real truth is about ideas, agreeing to things.

§ 8. THO' what has been ſaid in the foregoing chapter, to diſtinguiſh real from imaginary knowledge, might ſuffice here, in anſwer to this doubt, to diſtinguiſh real truth from chimerical, or (if you pleaſe) barely nominal, they depending both on the ſame foundation; yet it may be not amiſs here again to conſider, that tho' our words ſignify nothing but our ideas, yet being deſigned by them to ſignify things, the truth they contain, when put into propoſitions, will be only verbal, when they ſtand for ideas in the mind, that have not an agreement with the reality of things. And, therefore, truth, as well as knowledge, may well come under the diſtinction of verbal and real; that being only verbal truth, wherein terms are joined according to the agreement, or diſagreement of the ideas they ſtand for, without regarding whether our ideas are ſuch as really have, or are capable of having an exiſtence in nature. But then it is they contain real truth, when theſe ſigns are joined, as our ideas agree; and when our ideas are ſuch, as we know are capable of having an exiſtence in nature: which in ſubſtances we cannot know, but by knowing that ſuch have exiſted.

Falſhood is the joining of names, otherwiſe than their ideas agree.

§ 9. TRUTH is the marking down in words the agreement, or diſagreement, of ideas as it is. Falſhood is the marking down in words the agreement, or diſagreement of ideas, otherwiſe than it is. And ſo far as theſe ideas, thus marked by ſounds, agree to their archetypes, ſo far only is the truth real. The knowledge of this truth conſiſts in knowing what ideas the words ſtand for, and the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of thoſe ideas, according as it is marked by thoſe words.

General propoſitions to be treated of, more at large.

§ 10. BUT, becauſe words are looked on as the great conduits of truth and knowledge, and that in conveying and receiving of truth, and commonly in reaſoning about it, we make uſe of words and propoſitions, I ſhall more at large enquire, wherein the certainty of real truths, contained in propoſitions, conſiſts, and where it is to be had; and endeavour to ſhew, in what ſort of univerſal propoſitions we are capable of being certain of their real truth, or falſhood.

I SHALL begin with general propoſitions, as thoſe which moſt employ our thoughts, and exerciſe our contemplation. General truths are moſt looked after by the mind, as thoſe that moſt enlarge our knowledge; and by their comprehenſiveneſs, ſatisfying us at once of many particulars, enlarge our view, and ſhorten our way to knowledge.

Moral and metaphyſical truth.

§ 11. BESIDES truth, taken in the ſtrict ſenſe before-mentioned, there are other ſorts of truth; as, 1. Moral truth, which is ſpeaking of things according to the perſuaſion of our own minds, tho' the propoſition, we ſpeak, agree not to the reality of things. 2. Metaphyſical truth, which is nothing but the real exiſtence of things, conformable to the ideas, to which we have annexed their names. This, tho' it ſeems to conſiſt in the very beings of things, yet when conſidered a little nearly, will appear to include a tacit propoſition, whereby the mind joins that particular thing to the idea it had before ſettled with a name to it.

CHAP. V.

But theſe conſiderations of truth, either having been before taken notice of, or not being ſo much to our preſent purpoſe, it may ſuffice here only to have mentioned them.

CHAP. VI.

Of univerſal propoſitions, their truth and certainty.

CHAP. VI.

Treating of words neceſſary to knowledge.

§ 1. THO' the examining and judging of ideas by themſelves, their names being quite laid aſide, be the beſt and ſureſt way to clear and diſtinct knowledge; yet, thro' the prevailing cuſtom of uſing ſounds for ideas, I think it is very ſeldom practiſed. Every one may obſerve how common it is for names to be made uſe of, inſtead of the ideas themſelves, even when men think and reaſon within their own breaſts; eſpecially if the ideas be very complex, and made up of a great collection of ſimple ones. This makes the conſideration of words and propoſitions ſo neceſſary a part of the treatiſe of knowledge, that it is very hard to ſpeak intelligibly of the one, without explaining the other.

General truths hardly to be underſtood, but in verbal propoſitions.

§ 2. ALL the knowledge we have, being only of particular, or general truths, it is evident that, whatever may be done in the former of theſe, the latter, which is that which with reaſon is moſt ſought after, can never be well made known, and is very ſeldom apprehended, but as conceived and expreſſed in words. It is not therefore out of our way, in the examination of our knowledge, to enquire into the truth and certainty of univerſal propoſitions.

Certainty two-fold, of truth and of knowledge.

§ 3. BUT that we may not be miſled in this caſe, by that which is the danger every where, I mean by the doubtfulneſs of terms, it is fit to obſerve, that certainty is two-fold; certainty of truth, and certainty of knowledge. Certainty of truth is, when words are ſo put together in propoſitions, as exactly to expreſs the agreement, or diſagreement of the ideas they ſtand for, as really it is. Certainty of knowledge is, to perceive the agreement or diſagreement of ideas, as expreſſed in any propoſition. This we uſually call knowing, or being certain of the truth of any propoſition.

No propoſition can be known to be true, where the eſſence of each ſpecies mentioned is not known.

§ 4. Now becauſe we cannot be certain of the truth of any general propoſition, unleſs we know the preciſe bounds and extent of the ſpecies its terms ſtand for, it is neceſſary we ſhould know the eſſence of each ſpecies, which is that which conſtitutes and bounds it. This, in all ſimple ideas and modes, is not hard to do. For in theſe, the real and nominal eſſence being the ſame; or, which is all one, the abſtract idea, which the general term ſtands for, being the ſole eſſence and boundary, that is, or can be, ſuppoſed of the ſpecies, there can be no doubt, how far the ſpecies extends, or what things are comprehended under each term: which, it is evident, are all that have any exact conformity with the idea it ſtands for, and no other. But in ſubſtances, wherein a real eſſence diſtinct from the nominal is ſuppoſed to conſtitute, determine, and bound the ſpecies, the extent of the general word is very uncertain: becauſe, not knowing this real eſſence, we cannot know what is, or is not of that ſpecies; and conſequently what may, or may not with certainty be affirmed of it. And thus ſpeaking of a man, or gold, or any other ſpecies of natural ſubſtances, as ſuppoſed conſtituted by a preciſe, real eſſence, which nature regularly imparts to every individual of that kind, whereby it is made to be of that ſpecies, we cannot be certain of the truth of any affirmation, or negation made of it. For man, or gold, taken in this ſenſe, and uſed for ſpecies of things, conſtituted by real eſſences, different from the complex idea in the mind of the ſpeaker, ſtand for we know not what: and the extent of theſe ſpecies, with ſuch boundaries, are ſo unknown and undetermined, that it is impoſſible with any certainty to affirm, that all men are rational, or that all gold is yellow. But where the nominal eſſence is kept to, as the boundary of each ſpecies, and men extend the application of any general term no farther than to the particular things, in which the complex idea, it ſtands for, is to be found, there they are in no danger to miſtake the bounds of each ſpecies, nor can be in doubt, on this account, whether any propoſitions be true, or no.

I have choſe to explain this uncertainty of propoſitions in this ſcholaſtick way, and have made uſe of the terms of eſſences and ſpecies, on purpoſe to ſhew the abſurdity and inconvenience there is to think of them, as of any other ſort of realities, than barely abſtract ideas, with names to them. To ſuppoſe that the ſpecies of things are any thing, but the ſorting of them under general names, according as they agree to ſeveral abſtract ideas, of which we make thoſe names the ſigns, is to confound truth, and introduce uncertainty into all general propoſitions, that can be made about them. Tho' therefore, theſe things might, to people not poſſeſſed with ſcholaſtick learning, be perhaps treated better of in a better and clearer way; yet thoſe wrong notions of eſſences, or ſpecies, having got root in moſt people's minds, who have received any tincture from the learning, which has prevailed in this part of the world, are to be diſcovered and removed, to make way for that uſe of words, which ſhould convey certainty with it.

This more particularly concerns ſubſtances.

§ 5. The names of ſubſtances then, whenever made to ſtand for ſpecies, which are ſuppoſed to be conſtituted by real eſſences, which we know not, are not capable to convey certainty to the underſtanding: of the truth of general propoſitions made up of ſuch terms, we cannot be ſure. The reaſon whereof is plain: for how can we be ſure that this, or that quality is in gold, when we know not what is, or is not gold? Since, in this way of ſpeaking, nothing is gold but what partakes of an eſſence, which we not knowing, cannot know where it is or is not, and ſo cannot be ſure that any parcel of matter in the world, is, or is not, in this ſenſe, gold; being incurably ignorant, whether it has, or has not, that which makes any thing to be called gold, i. e. that real eſſence of gold, whereof we have no idea at all: this being as impoſſible for us to know, as it is for a blind man to tell in what flower the colour of a panſie is, or is not to be found, whilſt he has no idea of the colour of a panſie at all. Or if we could (which is impoſſible) certainly know where a real eſſence which we know not, is; v. g. in what parcels of matter the real eſſence of gold is; yet could we not be ſure, that this or that quality could with truth be affirmed of gold: ſince it is impoſſible for us to know, that this or that quality, or idea, has a neceſſary connection with a real eſſence, of which we have no idea at all, whatever ſpecies that ſuppoſed, real eſſence may be imagined to conſtitute.

The truth of few univerſal propoſitions concerning ſubſtances, is to be known.

§ 6. On the other ſide, the names of ſubſtances, when made uſe of, as they ſhould be, for the ideas men have in their minds, though they carry a clear and determinate ſignification with them, will not yet ſerve us to make many univerſal propoſitions, of whoſe truth we can be certain. Not becauſe in this uſe of them we are uncertain what things are ſignified by them, but becauſe the complex ideas they ſtand for, are ſuch combinations of ſimple ones, as carry not with them any diſcoverable connection, or repugnancy, but with a very few other ideas.

Becauſe coexiſtence of ideas in few caſes is to be known.

§ 7. The complex ideas, that our names of the ſpecies of ſubſtances properly ſtand for, are collections of ſuch qualities, as have been obſerved to coexiſt in an unknown ſubſtratum, which we call ſubſtance: but what other qualities neceſſarily co-exiſt with ſuch combinations, we cannot certainly know, unleſs we can diſcover their natural dependance; which in their primary qualities, we can go but a very little way in; and in all their ſecondary qualities, we can diſcover no connection at all, for the reaſons mentioned, chap. iii. § 11. &c. viz. 1. Becauſe we know not the real conſtitutions of ſubſtances, on which each ſecondary quality particularly depends. 2. Did we know that, it would ſerve us only for experimental (not univerſal) knowledge; and reach with certainty no farther than that bare inſtance: becauſe our underſtandings can diſcover no conceivable connection between any ſecondary quality, and any modification whatſoever, of any of the primary ones. And therefore, there are very few general propoſitions to be made concerning ſubſtances, which can carry with them undoubted certainty.

Inſtance in gold.

§ 8. All gold is fixed, is a propoſition, whoſe truth we cannot be certain of, how univerſally ſoever it be believed. For if, according to the uſeleſs imagination of the ſchools, any one ſuppoſes the term gold to ſtand for a ſpecies of things, ſet out by nature, by a real eſſence belonging to it, it is evident he knows not what particular ſubſtances are of that ſpecies, and ſo cannot, with certainty, affirm any thing univerſally of gold. But if he makes gold ſtand for a ſpecies, determined by its nominal eſſence, let the nominal eſſence, for example, be the complex idea of a body of a certain yellow colour, malleable, fuſible, and heavier than any other known; in this proper uſe of the word gold, there is no difficulty to know, what is, or is not gold. But yet no other quality can with certainty be univerſally affirmed, or denied, of gold, but what hath a diſcoverable connection, or inconſiſtency, with that nominal eſſence. Fixedneſs, for example, having no neceſſary connection, that we can diſcover, with the colour, weight, or any other ſimple idea of our complex one, or with the whole combination together; it is impoſſible that we ſhould certainly know the truth of this propoſition, that all gold is fixed.

§ 9. As there is no diſcoverable connection between fixedneſs; and the colour, weight, and other ſimple ideas of that nominal eſſence of gold; ſo if we make our complex idea of gold, a body yellow, fuſible, ductile, weighty, and fixed, we ſhall be at the ſame uncertainty concerning ſolubility in aqua regia, and for the ſame reaſon: ſince we can never, from conſideration of the ideas themſelves, with certainty affirm, or deny of a body, whoſe complex idea is made up of yellow, very weighty, ductile, fuſible, and fixed, that it is ſoluble in aqua regia; and ſo on, of the reſt of its qualities. I would gladly meet with one general affirmation, concerning any quality of gold, that any one can certainly know is true. It will, no doubt, be preſently objected, is not this an univerſal certain propoſition, "all gold is malleable?" To which I anſwer, it is a very certain propoſition, if malleableneſs be a part of the complex idea, the word gold ſtands for. But then, here is nothing affirmed of gold, but that that ſound ſtands for an idea, in which malleableneſs is contained: and ſuch a ſort of truth and certainty as this, it is to ſay, a centaur is four-footed. But if malleableneſs makes not a part of the ſpecifick eſſence, the name gold ſtands for, it is plain, "all gold is malleable," is not a certain propoſition. Becauſe, let the complex idea of gold be made up of which ſoever of its other qualities you pleaſe, malleableneſs will not appear to depend on that complex idea, nor follow from any ſimple one, contained in it: the connection that malleableneſs has (if it has any) with thoſe other qualities, being only by the intervention of the real conſtitution of its inſenſible parts; which, ſince we know not, it is impoſſible we ſhould perceive that connection, unleſs we could diſcover that which ties them together.

As far as any ſuch co-exiſtence can be known, ſo far univerſal propoſitions may be certain. But this will go but a little way, becauſe,

§ 10. The more, indeed, of theſe co-exiſting qualities we unite into one complex idea, under one name, the more preciſe and determinate we make the ſignification of that word; but yet never make it thereby more capable of univerſal certainty, in reſpect of other qualities, not contained in our complex idea; ſince we perceive not their connection, or dependance, one on another, being ignorant both of that real conſtitution, in which they are all founded, and alſo how they flow from it. For the chief part of our knowledge, concerning ſubſtances, is not, as in other things, barely of the relation of two ideas, that may exiſt ſeparately; but is of the neceſſary connection and co-exiſtence of ſeveral diſtinct ideas in the ſame ſubject, or of their repugnancy ſo to co-exiſt. Could we begin at the other end, and diſcover what it was, wherein that colour conſiſted, what made a body lighter, or heavier, what texture of parts made it malleable, fuſible, and fixed, and fit to be diſſolved in this ſort of liquor, and not in another; if (I ſay) we had ſuch an idea as this of bodies, and could perceive wherein all ſenſible qualities originally conſiſt, and how they are produced; we might frame ſuch abſtract ideas of them, as would furniſh us with matter of more general knowledge, and enable us to make univerſal propoſitions, that ſhould carry general truth and certainty with them. But whilſt our complex ideas, of the ſorts of ſubſtances, are ſo remote from that internal real conſtitution, on which their ſenſible qualities depend, and are made up of nothing but an imperfect collection of thoſe apparent qualities our ſenſes can diſcover, there can be very few general propoſitions concerning ſubſtances, of whoſe real truth we can be certainly aſſured: ſince there are but few ſimple ideas, of whoſe connection and neceſſary co-exiſtence we can have certain and undoubted knowledge. I imagine, amongſt all the ſecondary qualities of ſubſtances, and the powers relating to them, there cannot any two be named, whoſe neceſſary co-exiſtence, or repugnance to co-exiſt, can certainly be known, unleſs in thoſe of the ſame ſenſe, which neceſſarily exclude one another, as I have elſewhere ſhewed. No one, I think, by the colour that is in any body, can certainly know what ſmell, taſte, ſound, or tangible qualities it has, nor what alterations it is capable to make, or receive, on, or from other bodies. The ſame may be ſaid of the ſound, or taſte, &c. Our ſpecifick names of ſubſtances ſtanding for any collections of ſuch ideas, it is not to be wondered, that we can with them make very few general propoſitions of undoubted, real certainty. But yet ſo far as any complex idea, of any ſort of ſubſtances, contains in it any ſimple idea, whoſe neceſſary co-exiſtence with any other may be diſcovered, ſo far univerſal propoſitions may with certainty be made concerning it: v. g. could any one diſcover a neceſſary connection between malleableneſs, and the colour, or weight of gold, or any other part of the complex idea, ſignified by that name, he might make a certain, univerſal propoſition, concerning gold, in this reſpect; and the real truth of this propoſition, "that all gold is malleable," would be as certain as of this, "the three angles of all right-lined triangles are equal to two right ones."

The qualities, which make our complex ideas of ſubſtances, depend moſtly on external, remote, and unperceived cauſes.

§ 11. Had we ſuch ideas of ſubſtances, as to know what real conſtitutions produce thoſe ſenſible qualities, we find in them, and how thoſe qualities flowed from thence, we could, by the ſpecifick ideas of their real eſſences in our own minds, more certainly find out their properties, and diſcover what qualities they had, or had not, than we can now by our ſenſes: and to know the properties of gold, it would be no more neceſſary that gold ſhould exiſt, and that we ſhould make experiments upon it, than it is neceſſary for the knowing the properties of a triangle, that a triangle ſhould exiſt in any matter; the idea in our minds would ſerve for the one, as well as the other. But we are ſo far from being admitted into the ſecrets of nature, that we ſcarce ſo much as ever approach the firſt entrance towards them. For we are wont to conſider the ſubſtances we meet with, each of them as an entire thing by itſelf, having all its qualities in itſelf, and independent of other things; overlooking, for the moſt part, the operations of thoſe inviſible fluids they are encompaſſed with, and upon whoſe motions and operations depend the greateſt part of thoſe qualities which are taken notice of in them, and are made by us the inherent marks of diſtinction, whereby we know and denominate them. Put a piece of gold any where by itſelf, ſeparate from the reach and influence of all other bodies, it will immediately loſe all its colour and weight, and, perhaps, malleableneſs too; which, for ought I know, would be changed into a perfect friability. Water, in which to us fluidity is an eſſential quality, left to itſelf, would ceaſe to be fluid. But if inanimate bodies owe ſo much of their preſent ſtate to other bodies without them, that they would not be what they appear to us, were thoſe bodies, that environ them, removed, it is yet more ſo in vegetables, which are nouriſhed, grow, and produce leaves, flowers, and ſeeds, in a conſtant ſucceſſion. And, if we look a little nearer into the ſtate of animals, we ſhall find that their dependance, as to life, motion, and the moſt conſiderable qualities to be obſerved in them, is ſo wholly on extrinſical cauſes and qualities of other bodies, that make no part of them, that they cannot ſubſiſt a moment without them: tho' yet thoſe bodies, on which they depend, are little taken notice of, and make no part of the complex ideas we frame of thoſe animals. Take the air but a minute from the greateſt part of living creatures, and they preſently loſe ſenſe, life, and motion. This the neceſſity of breathing has forced into our knowledge. But how many other extrinſical, and, poſſibly, very remote bodies, do the ſprings of thoſe admirable machines depend on, which are not vulgarly obſerved, or ſo much as thought on; and how many are there, which the ſevereſt enquiry can never diſcover? The inhabitants of this ſpot of the univerſe, tho' removed ſo many millions of miles from the ſun, yet depend ſo much on the duly tempered motion of particles coming from, or agitated by it, that were this earth removed, but a ſmall part of that diſtance, out of its preſent ſituation, and placed a little farther, or nearer, that ſource of heat, it is more than probable that the greateſt part of the animals in it would immediately periſh: ſince we find them ſo often deſtroyed by an exceſs, or defect, of the ſun's warmth, which an accidental poſition, in ſome parts of this our little globe, expoſes them to. The qualities obſerved in a loadſtone muſt needs have their ſource far beyond the confines of that body; and the ravage made often on ſeveral ſorts of animals, by inviſible cauſes, the certain death, (as we are told) of ſome of them, by barely paſſing the line, or, as it is certain of others, by being removed into a neighbouring country, evidently ſhew that the concurrence and operation of ſeveral bodies, with which they are ſeldom thought to have any thing to do, is abſolutely neceſſary to make them be what they appear to us, and to preſerve thoſe qualities, by which we know and diſtinguiſh them. We are then quite out of the way, when we think that things contain within themſelves the qualities that appear to us in them: and we in vain ſearch for that conſtitution within the body of a fly, or an elephant, upon which depend thoſe qualities and powers we obſerve in them. For which, perhaps, to underſtand them aright, we ought to look not only beyond this our earth and atmoſphere, but even beyond the ſun, or remoteſt ſtar, our eyes have yet diſcovered. For how much the being and operation of particular ſubſtances, in this our globe, depend on cauſes utterly beyond our view, is impoſſible for us to determine. We ſee and perceive ſome of the motions, and groſſer operations of things here about us; but whence the ſtreams come, that keep all theſe curious machines in motion and repair, how conveyed and modified, is beyond our notice and apprehenſion: and the great parts and wheels, as I may ſo ſay, of this ſtupendous ſtructure of the univerſe, may, for ought we know, have ſuch a connection and dependance, in their influences and operations one upon another, that, perhaps, things in this our manſion would put on quite another face, and ceaſe to be what they are, if ſome one of the ſtars, or great bodies, incomprehenſibly remote from us, ſhould ceaſe to be, or move as it does. This is certain, things however abſolute and intire they ſeem in themſelves, are but retainers to other parts of nature, for that which they are moſt taken notice of by us. Their obſervable qualities, actions, and powers, are owing to ſomething without them; and there is not ſo compleat and perfect a part, that we know, of nature, which does not owe the being it has, and the excellencies of it, to its neighbours; and we muſt not confine our thoughts within the ſurface of any body, but look a great deal farther, to comprehend perfectly thoſe qualities that are in it.

§ 12. If this be ſo, it is not to be wondered, that we have very imperfect ideas of ſubſtances; and that the real eſſences, on which depend their properties and operations, are unknown to us. We cannot diſcover ſo much as that ſize, figure, and texture, of their minute and active parts, which is really in them; much leſs the different motions and impulſes made in, and upon them, by bodies from without, upon which depends, and by which is formed, the greateſt and moſt remarkable part of thoſe qualities we obſerve in them, and of which our complex ideas of them are made up. This conſideration alone is enough to put an end to all our hopes of ever having the ideas of their real eſſences; which, whilſt we want the nominal eſſences, we make uſe of, inſtead of them, will be able to furniſh us but very ſparingly with any general knowledge, or univerſal propoſitions, capable of real certainty.

Judgment may reach farther, but that is not knowledge.

§ 13. We are not, therefore, to wonder, if certainty be to be found in very few general propoſitions, made concerning ſubſtances: our knowledge of their qualities and properties go very ſeldom farther than our ſenſes reach and inform us. Poſſibly inquiſitive and obſerving men may, by ſtrength of judgment, penetrate farther, and on probabilities taken from wary obſervation, and hints well laid together, often gueſs right, at what experience has not yet diſcovered to them. But this is but gueſſing ſtill; it amounts only to opinion, and has not that certainty, which is requiſite to knowledge. For all general knowledge lies only in our own thoughts, and conſiſts barely in the contemplation of our own abſtract ideas. Wherever we perceive any agreement, or diſagreement amongſt them, there we have general knowledge; and, by putting the names of thoſe ideas together accordingly in propoſitions, can with certainty pronounce general truths. But becauſe the abſtract ideas of ſubſtances, for which their ſpecifick names ſtand, whenever they have any diſtinct and determinate ſignification, have a diſcoverable connection, or inconſiſtency with but a very few other ideas; the certainty of univerſal propoſitions, concerning ſubſtances, is very narrow and ſcanty in that part, which is our principal enquiry concerning them: and there are ſcarce any of the names of ſubſtances, let the idea, it is applied to, be what it will, of which we can generally and with certainty pronounce, that it has, or has not, this or that other quality belonging to it, and conſtantly co-exiſting, or inconſiſtent with that idea, wherever it is to be found.

What is requiſite for our knowledge of ſubſtances.

§ 14. Before we can have any tolerable knowledge of this kind, we muſt firſt know what changes the primary qualities of one body do regularly produce in the primary qualities of another, and how. Secondly, we muſt know what primary qualities of any body produce certain ſenſations, or ideas in us. This is in truth no leſs than to know all the effects of matter, under its divers modifications of bulk, figure, coheſion of parts, motion and reſt. Which, I think, every body will allow, is utterly impoſſible to be known by us, without revelation. Nor if it were revealed to us, what ſort of figure, bulk, or motion of corpuſcles, would produce in us the ſenſation of a yellow colour, and what ſort of figure, bulk and texture of parts, in the ſuperficies of any body were fit to give ſuch corpuſcles their due motion to produce that colour; would that be enough to make univerſal propoſitions with certainty, concerning the ſeveral ſorts of them, unleſs we had faculties acute enough to perceive the preciſe bulk, figure, texture and motion of bodies in thoſe minute parts, by which they operate on our ſenſes, that ſo we might by thoſe frame our abſtract ideas of them. I have mentioned here only corporeal ſubſtances, whoſe operations ſeem to lie more level to our underſtandings: for, as to the operations of ſpirits, both their thinking and moving of bodies, we at firſt ſight find ourſelves at a loſs; tho' perhaps when we have applied our thoughts a little nearer to the conſideration of bodies, and their operations, and examined how far our notions, even in theſe, reach, with any clearneſs, beyond ſenſible matter of fact, we ſhall be bound to confeſs, that even in theſe too our diſcoveries amount to very little, beyond perfect ignorance and incapacity.

Whilſt our ideas of ſubſtances contain not their real conſtitutions, we can make but few, general, certain propoſitions concerning them.

§ 15. This is evident, the abſtract, complex ideas of ſubſtances, for which their general names ſtand, not comprehending their real conſtitutions, can afford us but very little, univerſal certainty. Becauſe our ideas of them are not made up of that, on which thoſe qualities we obſerve in them, and would inform ourſelves about, do depend, or with which they have any certain connection: v. g. let the idea, to which we give the name man, be, as it commonly is, a body of the ordinary ſhape, with ſenſe, voluntary motion, and reaſon joined to it: this being the abſtract idea, and conſequently the eſſence of our ſpecies man, we can make but very few, general, certain propoſitions concerning man, ſtanding for ſuch an idea. Becauſe not knowing the real conſtitution on which ſenſation, power of motion, and reaſoning, with that peculiar ſhape, depend, and whereby they are united together in the ſame ſubject, there are very few other qualities, with which we can perceive them to have a neceſſary connection, and therefore we cannot with certainty affirm, that all men ſleep by intervals; that no man can be nouriſhed by wood, or ſtones; that all men will be poiſoned by hemlock: becauſe theſe ideas have no connection, nor repugnancy with this our nominal eſſence of man, with this abſtract idea that name ſtands for. We muſt in theſe and the like appeal to trial in particular ſubjects, which can reach but a little way. We muſt content ourſelves with probability in the reſt; but can have no general certainty, whilſt our ſpecifick idea of man contains not that real conſtitution, which is the root, wherein all his inſeparable qualities are united, and from whence they flow. Whilſt our idea, the word man ſtands for, is only an imperfect collection of ſome ſenſible qualities and powers in him, there is no diſcernible connection, or repugnance, between our ſpecifick idea, and the operation of either the parts of hemlock, or ſtones, upon his conſtitution. There are animals that ſafely eat hemlock, and others, that are nouriſhed by wood and ſtones: but, as long as we want ideas of thoſe real conſtitutions of different ſorts of animals, whereon theſe and the like qualities and powers depend, we muſt not hope to reach certainty in univerſal propoſitions concerning them. Thoſe few ideas only, which have a diſcernible connection with our nominal eſſence, or any part of it, can afford us ſuch propoſitions. But theſe are ſo few, and of ſo little moment, that we may juſtly look on our certain, general knowledge of ſubſtances, as almoſt none at all.

CHAP. VI.

Wherein lies the general certainty of propoſitions.

§ 16. To conclude, general propoſitions, of what kind ſoever, are then only capable of certainty, when the terms, uſed in them, ſtand for ſuch ideas, whoſe agreement or diſagreement, as there expreſſed, is capable to be diſcovered by us. And we are then certain of their truth, or falſhood, when we perceive the ideas, the terms ſtand for, to agree or not agree, according as they are affirmed or denied one of another. Whence we may take notice, that general certainty is never to be found, but in our ideas. Whenever we go to ſeek it elſewhere, in experiment, or obſervations without us, our knowledge goes not beyond particulars. It is the contemplation of our own abſtract ideas, that alone is able to afford us general knowledge.

CHAP. VII.

Of maxims.

CHAP. VII.

They are ſelf-evident.

§ 1. THERE are a ſort of propoſitions, which under the name of maxims and axioms have paſſed for principles of ſcience; and becauſe they are ſelf-evident, have been ſuppoſed innate, altho' no body (that I know) ever went about to ſhew the reaſon and foundation of their clearneſs, or cogency. It may however be worth while to enquire into the reaſon of their evidence, and ſee whether it be peculiar to them alone, and alſo examine how far they influence and govern our other knowledge.

Wherein that ſelf-evidence conſiſts.

§ 2. KNOWLEDGE, as has been ſhewn, conſiſts in the perception of the agreement or diſagreement of ideas: now where that agreement, or diſagreement is perceived immediately by itſelf, without the intervention, or help of any other, there our knowledge is ſelf-evident. This will appear to be ſo to any one, who will but conſider any of thoſe propoſitions, which, without any proof, he aſſents to at firſt ſight: for in all of them he will find, that the reaſon of his aſſent is from that agreement, or diſagreement, which the mind, by an immediate comparing them, finds in thoſe ideas anſwering the affirmation, or negation in the propoſition.

Self-evidence, not peculiar to received axioms.

§ 3. THIS being ſo, in the next place let us conſider, whether this ſelf-evidence be peculiar only to thoſe propoſitions, which commonly paſs under the name of maxims, and have the dignity of axioms allowed them. And here it is plain, that ſeveral other truths, not allowed to be axioms, partake equally with them, in this ſelf-evidence. This we ſhall ſee, if we go over theſe ſeveral ſorts of agreement, or diſagreement of ideas, which I have above-mentioned, viz. identity, relation, co-exiſtence, and real exiſtence; which will diſcover to us, that not only thoſe few propoſitions, which have had the credit of maxims, are ſelf-evident, but a great many, even almoſt an infinite number of other propoſitions are ſuch.

1. As to identity and diverſity, all propoſitions are equally ſelf-evident.

§ 4. FOR, firſt, the immediate perception of the agreement, or diſagreement of identity, being founded in the mind's having diſtinct ideas, this affords us as many ſelf-evident propoſitions, as we have diſtinct ideas. Every one that has any knowledge at all, has, as the foundation of it, various and diſtinct ideas: and it is the firſt act of the mind (without which it can never be capable of any knowledge) to know every one of its ideas by itſelf, and diſtinguiſh it from others. Every one finds in himſelf, that he knows the ideas he has; that he knows alſo, when any one is in his underſtanding, and what it is; and that, when more than one are there, he knows them diſtinctly and unconfuſedly one from another. Which always being ſo (it being impoſſible but that he ſhould perceive what he perceives) he can never be in doubt when any idea is in his mind, that it is there, and is that idea it is, and that two diſtinct ideas, when they are in his mind, are there, and are not one and the ſame idea. So that all ſuch affirmations and negations are made, without any poſſibility of doubt, uncertainty or heſitation, and muſt neceſſarily be aſſented to, as ſoon as underſtood; that is, as ſoon as we have in our minds determined ideas, which the terms in the propoſition ſtand for. And therefore, wherever the mind with attention conſiders any propoſition, ſo as to perceive the two ideas ſignified by the terms, and affirmed, or denied one of the other, to be the ſame, or different; it is preſently and infallibly certain of the truth of ſuch a propoſition, and this equally, whether theſe propoſitions be in terms ſtanding for more general ideas, or ſuch as are leſs ſo, v. g. whether the general idea of being be affirmed of itſelf, as in this propoſition, "whatſoever is, is;" or a more particular idea be affirmed of itſelf, as a man is a man, or whatſoever is white, is white; or whether the idea of being in general be denied of not being, which is the only (if I may ſo call it) idea different from it, as in this other propoſition, "it is impoſſible for the ſame "thing to be, and not to be;" or an idea of any particular being be denied of another different from it, as "a man is not a horſe, red is not blue." The difference of the ideas, as ſoon as the terms are underſtood, makes the truth of the propoſition preſently viſible, and that with an equal certainty and eaſineſs in the leſs, as well as the more general propoſitions, and all for the ſame reaſon, viz. becauſe the mind perceives in any ideas, that it has, the ſame idea to be the ſame with itſelf; and two different ideas to be different, and not the ſame. And this it is equally certain of, whether theſe ideas be more, or leſs general, abſtract and comprehenſive. It is not, therefore, alone to theſe two general propoſitions, "whatſoever is, is; and, it is impoſſible for the ſame thing to be, and not to be;" that this ſelf-evidence belongs, by any peculiar right. The perception of being, or not being, belongs no more to theſe vague ideas, ſignified by the terms, whatſoever and thing, than it does to any other ideas. Theſe two general maxims amounting to no more in ſhort, but this, that the ſame is the ſame, and ſame is not different, are truths known in more particular inſtances, as well as in theſe general maxims, and known alſo in particular inſtances, before theſe general maxims are ever thought on, and draw all their force from the diſcernment of the mind, imployed about particular ideas. There is nothing more viſible than that the mind, without the help of any proof, or reflection on either of theſe general propoſitions, perceives ſo clearly, and knows ſo certainly that the idea of white, is the idea of white, and not the idea of blue; and that the idea of white, when it is in the mind, is there, and is not abſent; that the conſideration of theſe axioms can add nothing to the evidence, or certainty of its knowledge. Juſt ſo it is (as every one may experiment in himſelf) in all the ideas, a man has in his mind: he knows each to be itſelf, and not to be another; and to be in his mind, and not away, when it is there, with a certainty that cannot be greater; and therefore the truth of no general propoſition can be known with a greater certainty, nor add any thing to this. So that in reſpect of identity, our intuitive knowledge reaches as far as our ideas. And we are capable of making as many ſelf-evident propoſitions, as we have names for diſtinct ideas. And I appeal to every one's own mind, whether this propoſition, a circle is a circle, be not as ſelf-evident a propoſition, as that conſiſting of more general terms, whatſoever is, is: and again, whether this propoſition, blue is not red, be not a propoſition, that the mind can no more doubt of, as ſoon as it underſtands the words, than it does of that axiom, it is impoſſible for the ſame thing to be, and not to be; and ſo of all the like.

2. In co-exiſtence we have few ſelf evident propoſitions.

§ 5. Secondly, as to co-exiſtence, or ſuch neceſſary connection between two ideas, that in the ſubject, where one of them is ſuppoſed, there the other muſt neceſſarily be alſo; of ſuch agreement, or diſagreement, as this, the mind has an immediate perception but in very few of them; and, therefore, in this ſort we have but very little intuitive knowledge; nor are there to be found very many propoſitions that are ſelf-evident, tho' ſome there are; v. g. the idea of filling a place equal to the contents of its ſuperficies, being annexed to our idea of body, I think it is a ſelf-evident propoſition, that two bodies cannot be in the ſame place.

3. In other relations we may have.

§ 6. Thirdly, as to the relations of modes, mathematicians have framed many axioms concerning that one relation of equality. As equals taken from equals, the remainder will be equals; which, with the reſt of that kind, however they are received for maxims by the mathematicians, and are unqueſtionable truths; yet, I think, that any one who conſiders them, will not find that they have a clearer ſelf-evidence than theſe, that one and one are equal to two; that if you take from the five fingers of one hand two, and from the five fingers of the other hand two, the remaining numbers will be equal. Theſe and a thouſand other ſuch propoſitions may be found in numbers, which, at the very firſt hearing, force the aſſent, and carry with them an equal, if not greater clearneſs, than thoſe mathematical axioms.

§ 7. FOURTHLY, as to real exiſtence, ſince that has no connection with any other of our ideas, but that of ourſelves, and of a firſt being, we have in that, concerning the real exiſtence of all other beings, not ſo much as demonſtrative, much leſs a ſelf-evident knowledge; and therefore, concerning thoſe there are no maxims.

4. Concerning real exiſtence, we have none.

§ 8. IN the next place let us conſider, what influence theſe received maxims have upon the other parts of our knowledge. The rules eſtabliſhed in the ſchools that all reaſonings are "ex præcognitis & præconceſſis," ſeem to lay the foundation of all other knowledge in theſe maxims, and to ſuppoſe them to be præcognita; whereby, I think, are meant theſe two things: firſt, that theſe axioms are thoſe truths that are firſt known to the mind. And, ſecondly, that upon them the other parts of knowledge depend.

Theſe axioms do not much influence our other knowledge.

§ 9. FIRST, that they are not the truths firſt known to the mind, is evident to experience, as we have ſhewn in another place, book i. chap. 2. Who perceives not that a child certainly knows that a ſtranger is not its mother; that its ſucking-bottle is not the rod, long before he knows that it is impoſſible for the ſame thing to be, and not to be? and how many truths are there about numbers, which it is obvious to obſerve that the mind is perfectly acquainted with, and fully convinced of, before it ever thought on theſe general maxims, to which mathematicians, in their arguings, do ſometimes refer them? Whereof the reaſon is very plain: for that which makes the mind aſſent to ſuch propoſitions, being nothing elſe but the perception it has of the agreement, or diſagreement of its ideas, according as it finds them affirmed, or denied one of another, in words it underſtands, and every idea being known to be what it is, and every two diſtinct ideas being known not to be the ſame; it muſt neceſſarily follow, that ſuch ſelf-evident truths muſt be firſt known, which conſiſt of ideas, that are firſt in the mind: and the ideas firſt in the mind, it is evident, are thoſe of particular things, from whence, by ſlow degrees, the underſtanding proceeds to ſome few general ones; which being taken from the ordinary and familiar objects of ſenſe, are ſettled in the mind, with general names to them. Thus particular ideas are firſt received and diſtinguiſhed, and ſo knowledge got about them; and next to them, the leſs general, or ſpecifick, which are next to particular: for abſtract ideas are not ſo obvious, or eaſy, to children, or the yet unexerciſed mind, as particular ones. If they ſeem ſo to grown men, it is only becauſe by conſtant and familiar uſe they are made ſo. For when we nicely reflect upon them, we ſhall find, that general ideas are fictions and contrivances of the mind, that carry difficulty with them, and do not ſo eaſily offer themſelves, as we are apt to imagine. For example, does it not require ſome pains and ſkill to form the general idea of a triangle (which is yet none of the moſt abſtract, comprehenſive, and difficult) for it muſt be neither oblique, nor rectangle, neither equilateral, equicrural, nor ſcalenon; but all and none of theſe at once? In effect, it is ſomething imperfect, that cannot exiſt; an idea, wherein ſome parts of ſeveral different and inconſiſtent ideas are put together. It is true the mind, in this imperfect ſtate, has need of ſuch ideas, and makes all the haſte to them it can, for the conveniency of communication, and enlargement of knowledge; to both which it is naturally very much inclined. But yet one has reaſon to ſuſpect ſuch ideas are marks of our imperfection; at leaſt this is enough to ſhew, that the moſt abſtract and general ideas are not thoſe, that the mind is firſt and more eaſily acquainted with, nor ſuch as its earlieſt knowledge is converſant about.

Becauſe they are not the truths we firſt knew.

§ 10. SECONDLY, from what has been ſaid, it plainly follows, that theſe magnified maxims are not the principles and foundations of all our other knowledge.

Becauſe on them the other parts

of our knowledge, do not depend.

For, if there be a great many other truths, which have as much ſelf-evidence as they, and a great many that we know before them, it is impoſſible they ſhould be the principles, from which we deduce all other truths. Is it impoſſible to know that one and two are equal to three, but by virtue of this, or ſome ſuch axiom, viz. the whole is equal to all its parts taken together? Many a one knows that one and two are equal to three, without having heard, or thought on that, or any other axiom, by which it might be proved; and knows it as certainly, as any other man knows, that the whole is equal to all its parts, or any other maxim, and all from the ſame reaſon of ſelf-evidence; the equality of thoſe ideas being as viſible and certain to him without that, or any other axiom, as with it, it needing no proof to make it perceived. Nor after the knowledge, that the whole is equal to all its parts, does he know that one and two are equal to three, better, or more certainly, than he did before. For if there be any odds in thoſe ideas, the whole and parts are more obſcure, or, at leaſt, more difficult to be ſettled in the mind, than thoſe of one, two, and three. And indeed, I think, I may aſk theſe men, who will needs have all knowledge beſides thoſe general principles themſelves, to depend on general, innate, and ſelf-evident principles, what principle is requiſite to prove, that one and one are two, that two and two are four, that three times two are ſix? Which being known without any proof, do evince, that either all knowledge does not depend on certain præcognita, or general maxims, called principles, or elſe that theſe are principles; and if theſe are to be counted principles, a great part of numeration will be ſo. To which if we add all the ſelf-evident propoſitions, which may be made about all our diſtinct ideas, principles will be almoſt infinite, at leaſt, innumerable, which men arrive to the knowledge of, at different ages; and a great many of theſe innate principles, they never come to know all their lives. But, whether they come in view of the mind, earlier, or later, this is true of them, that they are all known by their native evidence, are wholly independent, receive no light, nor are capable of any proof one from another; much leſs the more particular, from the more general; or the more ſimple, from the more compounded: the more ſimple, and leſs abſtract, being the moſt familiar, and the eaſier and earlier apprehended. But which-ever be the cleareſt ideas, the evidence and certainty of all ſuch propoſitions is in this, that a man ſees the ſame idea to be the ſame idea, and infallibly perceives two different ideas to be different ideas. For, when a man has in his underſtanding the ideas of one and of two, the idea of yellow, and the idea of blue, he cannot but certainly know, that the idea of one is the idea of one, and not the idea of two; and that the idea of yellow is the idea of yellow, and not the idea of blue. For a man cannot confound the ideas in his mind, which he has diſtinct: that would be to have them confuſed and diſtinct at the ſame time, which is a contradiction: and to have none diſtinct, is to have no uſe of our faculties, to have no knowledge at all. And, therefore, what idea ſoever is affirmed of itſelf, or whatſoever two entire, diſtinct ideas are denied one of another, the mind cannot but aſſent to ſuch a propoſition, as infallibly true, as ſoon as it underſtands the terms, without heſitation, or need of proof, or regarding thoſe made in more general terms, and called maxims.

What uſe theſe general maxims have.

§ 11. "What ſhall we then ſay? Are theſe general maxims of no uſe?" By no means; tho' perhaps their uſe is not that, which it is commonly taken to be. But ſince doubting in the leaſt, of what hath been by ſome men aſcribed to theſe maxims, may be apt to be cried out againſt, as overturning the foundations of all the ſciences; it may be worth while to conſider them, with reſpect to other parts of our knowledge, and examine more particularly, to what purpoſes they ſerve, and to what not.

1. It is evident from what has been already ſaid, that they are of no uſe to prove, or confirm, leſs general, ſelf-evident propoſitions.

2. It is as plain that they are not, nor have been the foundations whereon any ſcience hath been built. There is, I know, a great deal of talk, propagated from ſcolaſtick men, of ſciences, and the maxims on which they are built: but it has been my ill luck never to meet with any ſuch ſciences; much leſs any one, built upon theſe two maxims, "what is, is;" and "it is impoſſible for the

ſame thing to be, and not to be." And I would be glad to be ſhewn, where any ſuch ſcience, erected upon theſe, or any other general axioms, is to be found: and ſhould be obliged to any one, who would lay before me the frame, and ſyſtem of any ſcience ſo built on theſe, or any ſuch like maxims, that could not be ſhewn to ſtand as firm, without any conſideration of them. I aſk, whether theſe general maxims have not the ſame uſe in the ſtudy of divinity, and in theological queſtions, that they have in the other ſciences? They ſerve here too to ſilence wranglers, and put an end to diſpute. But I think that no body will therefore ſay, that the chriſtian religion is built upon theſe maxims, or that the knowledge, we have of it, is derived from theſe principles. It is from revelation we have received it, and without revelation theſe maxims had never been able to help us to it. When we find out an idea, by whoſe intervention we diſcover the connection of two others, this is a revelation from God to us, by the voice of reaſon. For we then come to know a truth, that we did not know before. When God declares any truth to us, this is a revelation to us by the voice of his ſpirit, and we are advanced in our knowledge. But, in neither of theſe, do we receive our light, or knowledge from maxims. But in the one, the things themſelves afford it, and we ſee the truth in them, by perceiving their agreement, or diſagreement. In the other, God himſelf affords it immediately to us, and we ſee the truth of what he ſays in his unerring veracity.

3. THEY are not of uſe to help men forward in the advancement of ſciences, or new diſcoveries of yet unknown truths. Mr. Newton, in his never-enough-to-be-admired book, has demonſtrated ſeveral propoſitions, which are ſo many new truths, before unknown to the world, and are farther advances in mathematical knowledge: but for the diſcovery of theſe, it was not the general maxims, " what is, is;" or, " the whole is bigger than a part," or the like, that helped him. Theſe were not the clues, that led him into the diſcovery of the truth, and certainty of thoſe propoſitions. Nor was it by them that he got the knowledge of thoſe demonſtrations; but by finding our intermediate ideas, that ſhewed the agreement, or diſagreement of the ideas, as expreſſed in the propoſitions he demonſtrated. This is the greateſt exerciſe and improvement of human underſtanding, in the enlarging of knowledge, and advancing the ſciences, wherein they are far enough from receiving any help from the contemplation of theſe, or the like magnified maxims. Would thoſe who have this traditional admiration of theſe propoſitions, that they think no ſtep can be made in knowledge, without the ſupport of an axiom, no ſtone laid in the building of the ſciences, without a general maxim, but diſtinguiſh between the method of acquiring knowledge, and of communicating; between the method of raiſing any ſcience, and that of teaching it to others, as far as it is advanced; they would ſee that thoſe general maxims were not the foundations, on which the firſt diſcoverers raiſed their admirable ſtructures, nor the keys, that unlocked and opened thoſe ſecrets of knowledge. Tho' afterwards, when ſchools were erected, and ſciences had their profeſſors to teach what others had found out, they often made uſe of maxims, i. e. laid down certain propoſitions, which were ſelf-evident, or to be received for true; which being ſettled in the minds of their ſcholars, as unqueſtionable verities, they on occaſion made uſe of, to convince them of truths, in particular inſtances, that were not ſo familiar to their minds, as thoſe general axioms, which had before been inculcated to them, and carefully ſettled in their minds. Tho' theſe particular inſtances, when well reflected on, are no leſs ſelf-evident to the underſtanding, than the general maxims brought to confirm them: and it was in thoſe particular inſtances that the firſt diſcoverer found the truth, without the help of the general maxims; and ſo may any one elſe do, who with attention conſiders them.

To come therefore to the uſe that is made of maxims.

1. THEY are of uſe, as has been obſerved, in the ordinary methods of teaching ſciences, as far as they are advanced; but of little, or none, in advancing them farther.

2. THEY are of uſe in diſputes, for the ſilencing of obſtinate wranglers, and bringing thoſe conteſts to ſome concluſion. Whether a need of them to that

end came not in, in the manner following, I crave leave to enquire. The ſchools, having made diſputation the touchſtone of men's abilities, and the criterion of knowledge, adjudged victory to him that kept the field: and he that had the laſt word, was concluded to have the better of the argument, if not of the cauſe. But, becauſe by this means there was like to be no deciſion between ſkilful combatants, whilſt one never failed of a medius terminus to prove any propoſition; and the other could as conſtantly, without, or with a diſtinction, deny the major, or minor; to prevent, as much as could be, the running out of diſputes, into an endleſs train of ſyllogiſms, certain general propoſitions, moſt of them indeed ſelf-evident, were introduced into the ſchools; which, being ſuch as all men allowed and agreed in, were looked on as general meaſures of truth, and ſerved inſtead of principles (where the diſputants had not laid down any other between them) beyond which there was no going, and which muſt not be receded from, by either ſide. And thus theſe maxims, getting the name of principles, beyond which men in diſpute could not retreat, were by miſtake taken to be originals and ſources, from whence all knowledge began, and the foundations whereon the ſciences were built. Becauſe, when in their diſputes they came to any of theſe, they ſtopped there, and went no farther, the matter was determined. But how much this is a miſtake, hath been already ſhewn.

This method of the ſchools, which have been thought the fountains of knowledge, introduced, as I ſuppoſe, the like uſe of theſe maxims, into a great part of converſation out of the ſchools, to ſtop the mouths of cavillers, whom any one is excuſed from arguing any longer with, when they deny theſe general ſelf-evident principles received by all reaſonable men, who have once thought of them: but yet their uſe herein is but to put an end to wrangling. They in truth, when urged in ſuch caſes, teach nothing: that is already done by the intermediate ideas, made uſe of in the debate, whoſe connection may be ſeen without the help of thoſe maxims, and ſo the truth known before the maxim is produced, and the argument brought to a firſt principle. Men would give off a wrong argument before it came to that, if in their diſputes they propoſed to themſelves the finding and embracing of truth, and not a conteſt for victory. And thus maxims have their uſe to put a ſtop to their perverſeneſs, whoſe ingenuity ſhould have yielded ſooner. But the method of the ſchools having allowed and encouraged men to oppoſe and reſiſt evident truth, till they are baffled, i. e. till they are reduced to contradict themſelves, or ſome eſtabliſhed principle; it is no wonder that they ſhould not in civil converſation be aſhamed of that, which in the ſchools is counted a virtue and a glory; viz. obſtinately to maintain that ſide of the queſtion they have choſen, whether true, or falſe, to the laſt extremity; even after conviction. A ſtrange way to attain truth and knowledge: and that, which I think the rational part of mankind, not corrupted by education, could ſcarce believe ſhould ever be admitted amongſt the lovers of truth, and ſtudents of religion, or nature; or introduced into the ſeminaries of thoſe, who are to propagate the truths of religion, or philoſophy, amongſt the ignorant and unconvinced. How much ſuch a way of learning is like to turn young men's minds from the ſincere ſearch and love of truth; nay, and to make them doubt whether there is any ſuch thing, or, at leaſt, worth the adhering to, I ſhall not now enquire. This I think, that bating thoſe places, which brought the peripatetick philoſophy into their ſchools, where it continued many ages without teaching the world any thing but the art of wrangling; theſe maxims were no where thought the foundations, on which the ſciences were built, nor the great helps to the advancement of knowledge.

As to theſe general maxims, therefore, they are, as I have ſaid, of great uſe in diſputes, to ſtop the mouths of wranglers; but not of much uſe to the diſcovery of unknown truths, or to help the mind forwards in its ſearch after knowledge. For whoever began to build his knowledge on this general propoſition, "what is, "is;" or "it is impoſſible for the ſame thing to be, and not to be:" and from either of theſe, as from a principle of ſcience, deduced a ſyſtem of uſeful knowledge? Wrong opinions often involving contradictions, one of theſe maxims, as a touch-ſtone, may ſerve well to ſhew whither they lead. But yet, however fit to lay open the abſurdity, or miſtake, of a man's reaſoning, or opinion, they are of very little uſe for enlightening the underſtanding: and it will not be found, that the mind receives much help from them, in its progreſs in knowledge; which would be neither leſs, nor leſs certain, were theſe two general propoſitions never thought on. It is true, as I have ſaid, they ſometimes ſerve in argumentation, to ſtop a wrangler's mouth, by ſhewing the abſurdity of what he ſaith, and by expoſing him to the ſhame of contradicting what all the world knows, and he himſelf cannot but own to be true. But it is one thing to ſhew a man that he is in an error; and another to put him in poſſeſſion of truth: and I would fain know, what truths theſe two propoſitions are able to teach, and by their influence make us know, which we did not know before, or could not know without them? Let us reaſon from them as well as we can, they are only about identical predications, and influence, if any at all, none but ſuch. Each particular propoſition concerning identity, or diverſity, is as clearly and certainly known in itſelf, if attended to, as either of theſe general ones: only theſe general ones, as ſerving in all caſes, are, therefore, more inculcated and inſiſted on. As to other, leſs general maxims, many of them are no more than bare verbal propoſitions, and teach us nothing but the reſpect and import of names one to another. "The whole is equal to all its parts;" what real truth, I beſeech you, does it teach us? What more is contained in that maxim, than what the ſignification of the word totum, or the whole, does of itſelf import? And he, that knows that the word whole ſtands for what is made up of all its parts, knows very little leſs, than that the whole is equal to all its parts. And upon the ſame ground, I think that this propoſition, "a hill is higher than a valley," and ſeveral the like, may alſo paſs for maxims. But yet maſters of mathematicks, when they would, as teachers of what they know, initiate others in that ſcience, do, not without reaſon, place this, and ſome other ſuch maxims, at the entrance of their ſyſtems; that their ſcholars, having in the beginning perfectly acquainted their thoughts with theſe propoſitions, made in ſuch general terms, may be uſed to make ſuch reflections, and have theſe more general propoſitions, as formed rules and ſayings, ready to apply to all particular caſes. Not that, if they be equally weighed, they are more clear and evident than the particular inſtances they are brought to confirm; but that, being more familiar to the mind, the very naming them is enough to ſatisfy the underſtanding. But this, I ſay, is more from our cuſtom of uſing them, and the eſtabliſhment they have got in our minds, by our often thinking of them, than from the different evidence of the things. But before cuſtom has ſettled methods of thinking and reaſoning in our minds, I am apt to imagine it is quite otherwiſe; and that the child, when a part of his apple is taken away, knows it better in that particular inſtance, than by this general propoſition, "the whole is equal to all its parts;" and that if one of theſe have need to be confirmed to him by the other, the general has more need to be let into his mind by the particular, than the particular by the general. For in particulars our knowledge begins, and ſo ſpreads itſelf by degrees to generals. Tho' afterwards the mind takes the quite contrary courſe, and having drawn its knowledge into as general propoſitions as it can, makes thoſe familiar to its thoughts, and accuſtoms itſelf to have recourſe to them, as to the ſtandards of truth and falſhood. By which familiar uſe of them, as rules to meaſure the truth of other propoſitions, it comes in time to be thought, that more particular propoſitions have their truth and evidence from their conformity to theſe more general ones, which in diſcourſe and argumentation, are ſo frequently urged, and conſtantly admitted. And this I think to be the reaſon why, amongſt ſo many ſelf-evident propoſitions, the moſt general only have had the title of maxims.

Maxims, if care be not taken in the uſe of words, may prove contradictions.

§ 12. One thing farther, I think, it may not be amiſs to obſerve, concerning theſe general maxims, that they are ſo far from improving, or eſtabliſhing our minds in true knowledge, that if our notions be wrong, looſe, or unſteady, and we reſign up our thoughts to the ſound of words, rather than fix them on ſettled, determined ideas of things: I ſay, theſe general maxims will ſerve to confirm us in miſtakes; and in ſuch a way of uſe of words, which is moſt common, will ſerve to prove contradictions: v. g. he that, with Des Cartes, ſhall frame in his mind an idea, of what he calls body, to be nothing but extenſion, may eaſily demonſtrate, that there is no vacuum, i. e. no ſpace void of body, by this maxim, “what is, is.” For the idea, to which he annexes the name body, being bare extenſion, his knowledge, that ſpace cannot be without body, is certain. For he knows his own idea of extenſion clearly and diſtinctly, and knows that it is what it is, and not another idea, tho' it be called by theſe three names, extenſion, body, ſpace. Which three words, ſtanding for one and the ſame idea, may no doubt, with the ſame evidence and certainty, be affirmed one of another, as each of itſelf: and it is as certain, that, whilſt I uſe them all to ſtand for one and the ſame idea, this predication is as true and identical in its ſignification, that ſpace is body, as this predication is true and identical, that body is body, both in ſignification and ſound.

Inſtance in vacuum.

§ 13. But if another ſhall come, and make to himſelf another idea, different from Des Cartes's, of the thing, which yet, with Des Cartes, he calls by the ſame name body; and make his idea, which he expreſſes by the word body, to be of a thing that hath both extenſion and ſolidity together; he will as eaſily demonſtrate, that there may be a vacuum, or ſpace without a body, as Des Cartes demonſtrated the contrary. Becauſe the idea, to which he gives the name ſpace, being barely the ſimple one of extenſion; and the idea, to which he gives the name body, being the complex idea of extenſion and reſiſtibility, or ſolidity, together, in the ſame ſubject, theſe two ideas are not exactly one and the ſame, but in the underſtanding as diſtinct as the ideas of one and two, white and black, or as of corporiety, and humanity, if I may uſe thoſe barbarous terms: and therefore, the predication of them in our minds, or in words ſtanding for them, is not identical, but the negation of them one of another; viz. this propoſition, “extenſion or ſpace, is not body,” is as true and evidently certain, as this maxim, it is impoſſible for the ſame thing to be, and not to be, can make any propoſition.

They prove not the exiſtence of things without us.

§ 14. But yet though both theſe propoſitions (as you ſee) may be equally demonſtrated, viz. that there may be a vacuum, and that there cannot be a vacuum, by theſe two certain principles, viz. “what is, is;” and “the ſame thing cannot be, and not be:” yet neither of theſe principles will ſerve to prove to us, that any, or what, bodies do exiſt: for that we are left to our ſenſes, to diſcover to us, as far as they can. Thoſe univerſal and ſelf-evident principles, being only our conſtant, clear, and diſtinct knowledge of our own ideas, more general or comprehenſive, can aſſure us of nothing, that paſſes without the mind, their certainty is founded only upon the knowledge we have of each idea by itſelf, and of its diſtinction from others; about which we cannot be miſtaken, whilſt they are in our minds, though we may, and often are miſtaken, when we retain the names without the ideas; or uſe them confuſedly ſometimes for one, and ſometimes for another idea. In which caſes the force of theſe axioms reaching only to the ſound, and not the ſignification of the words, ſerves only to lead us into confuſion, miſtake, and error. It is to ſhew men, that theſe maxims, however cried up for the great guards of truth, will not ſecure them from error, in a careleſs, looſe uſe of their words, that I have made this remark. In all that is here ſuggeſted, concerning the little uſe for the improvement of knowledge, or dangerous uſe in undetermined ideas, I have been far enough from ſaying, or intending they ſhould be laid aſide, as ſome have been too forward to charge me. I affirm them to be truths, ſelf-evident truths; and ſo cannot be laid aſide. As far as their influence will reach, it is in vain to endeavour, nor would I attempt to abridge it. But yet without any injury to truth or knowledge, I may have reaſon to think their uſe is not anſwerable to the great ſtreſs, which ſeems to be laid on them; and I may warn men not to make an ill uſe of them, for the confirming themſelves in errors.

Their application dangerous, about complex ideas.

§ 15. But let them be of what uſe they will in verbal propoſitions, they cannot diſcover, or prove to us the leaſt knowledge of the nature of ſubſtances, as they are found and exiſt without us, any farther than grounded on experience. And tho' the conſequence of theſe two propoſitions, called principles, be very clear, and their uſe not dangerous, or hurtful, in the probation of ſuch things, wherein there is no need at all of them for proof, but ſuch as are clear by themſelves without them, viz. where our ideas are determined, and known by the names that ſtand for them: yet when theſe principles, viz. what is, is; and, it is impoſſible for the ſame thing to be, and not to be; are made uſe of in the probation of propoſitions, wherein are words, ſtanding for complex ideas, v. g. man, horſe, gold, virtue; there they are of infinite danger, and moſt commonly make men receive and retain falſhood for manifeſt truth, and uncertainty for demonſtration: upon which follow error, obſtinacy, and all the miſchiefs, that can happen from wrong reaſoning. The reaſon whereof is not, that theſe principles are leſs true, or of leſs force in proving propoſitions, made of terms ſtanding for complex ideas, than where the propoſitions are about ſimple ideas: but, becauſe men miſtake generally, thinking that where the ſame terms are preſerved, the propoſitions are about the ſame things, tho' the ideas, they ſtand for, are in truth different; therefore theſe maxims are made uſe of to ſupport thoſe, which in ſound and appearance are contradictory propoſitions; as is clear in the demonſtrations above-mentioned, about a vacuum. So that, whilſt men take words for things, as uſually they do, theſe maxims may and do commonly ſerve to prove contradictory propoſitions: as ſhall yet be farther made manifeſt.

Inſtance in man.

§ 16. For inſtance; let man be that, concerning which you would, by theſe firſt principles, demonſtrate any thing, and we ſhall ſee, that, ſo far as demonſtration is by theſe principles, it is only verbal, and gives us no certain, univerſal, true propoſition, or knowledge of any being exiſting without us. Firſt, a child having framed the idea of a man, it is probable that his idea is juſt like that picture, which the painter makes of the viſible appearances joined together; and ſuch a complication of ideas together in his underſtanding, makes up the ſingle, complex idea, which he calls man, whereof white, or fleſh-colour in England being one, the child can demonſtrate to you that a negro is not a man, becauſe white colour was one of the conſtant, ſimple ideas of the complex idea he calls man: and therefore he can demonſtrate, by the principle, it is impoſſible for the ſame thing to be, and not to be, that a negro is not a man; the foundation of his certainty being not that univerſal propoſition, which perhaps he never heard, nor thought of, but the clear, diſtinct perception he hath of his own ſimple ideas, of black and white, which he cannot be perſuaded to take, nor can ever miſtake one for another, whether he knows that maxim, or no: and to this child, or any one who hath ſuch an idea, which he calls man, can you never demonſtrate, that a man hath a ſoul, becauſe his idea of man includes no ſuch notion, or idea in it. And therefore to him, the principle of what is, is, proves not this matter; but it depends upon collection and obſervation, by which he is to make his complex idea called man.

§ 17. Secondly, another, that hath gone farther in framing and collecting the idea he calls man, and to the outward ſhape adds laughter and rational diſcourſe, may demonſtrate that infants and changelings are no men, by this maxim, it is impoſſible for the ſame thing to be, and not to be: and I have diſcourſed with very rational men, who have actually denied that they are men.

§ 18. Thirdly, perhaps another makes up the complex idea, which he calls man, only out of the ideas of body in general, and the powers of language and reaſon, and leaves out the ſhape wholly: this man is able to demonſtrate, that a man may have no hands, but be quadrupes, neither of thoſe being included in his idea of man; and in whatever body or ſhape he found ſpeech and reaſon joined, that was a man: becauſe having a clear knowledge of ſuch a complex idea, it is certain that what is, is.

Little uſe of theſe maxims, in proofs, where we have clear and diſtinct ideas.

§ 19. So that, if rightly conſidered, I think we may ſay, that where our ideas are determined in our minds, and have annexed to them by us known and ſteady names under thoſe ſettled determinations, there is little need, or no uſe at all, of theſe maxims, to prove the agreement, or diſagreement of any of them. He that cannot diſcern the truth, or falſhood of ſuch propoſitions, without the help of theſe and the like maxims, will not be helped by theſe maxims to do it: ſince he cannot be ſuppoſed to know the truth of theſe maxims themſelves without proof, if he cannot know the truth of others without proof, which are as ſelf-evident as theſe. Upon this ground it is, that intuitive knowledge neither requires, nor admits any proof, one part of it more than another. He that will ſuppoſe it does, takes away the foundation of all knowledge and certainty: and he that needs any proof to make him certain, and give his aſſent to this propoſition, that two are equal to two, will alſo have need of a proof to make him admit, that what is, is. He that needs a probation to convince him, that two are not three, that white is not black, that a triangle is not a circle, &c. or any other two determined, diſtinct ideas are not one and the ſame, will need alſo a demonſtration to convince him, that it is impoſſible for the ſame thing to be and not to be.

Their uſe dangerous where our ideas are confuſed.

§ 20. And, as theſe maxims are of little uſe, where we have determined ideas; ſo they are, as I have ſhewed, of dangerous uſe, where our ideas are not determined; and where we uſe words, that are not annexed to determined ideas, but ſuch as are of a looſe and wandring ſignification, ſometimes ſtanding for one, and ſometimes for another idea: from which follows miſtake and error, which theſe maxims (brought as proofs to eſtabliſh propoſitions, wherein the terms ſtand for undetermined ideas) do by their authority confirm and rivet.

CHAP. VIII.

Of trifling propoſitions.

Chap. VIII.

Some propoſitions bring no increaſe to our knowledge.

§ 1. WHETHER the maxims, treated of in the foregoing chapter, be of that uſe to real knowledge, as is generally ſuppoſed, I leave to be conſidered. This, I think, may confidently be affirmed, that there are univerſal propoſitions, which, tho' they be certainly true, yet they add no light to our underſtandings, bring no increaſe to our knowledge. Such are,

As firſt, identical propoſitions.

§ 2. First, all purely identical propoſitions. Theſe, obviouſly and at firſt bluſh, appear to contain no inſtruction in them. For, when we affirm the ſaid term of itſelf, whether it be barely verbal, or whether it contains any clear and real idea, it ſhews us nothing, but what we muſt certainly know before, whether ſuch a propoſition be either made by, or propoſed to us. Indeed that moſt general one, what is, is, may ſerve ſometimes to ſhew a man, the abſurdity he is guilty of, when by circumlocution, or equivocal terms, he would in particular inſtances, deny the ſame thing of itſelf; becauſe no body will ſo openly bid defiance to common ſenſe, as to affirm viſible and direct contradictions in plain words: or if he does, a man is excuſed, if he breaks off any farther diſcourſe with him. But yet, I think I may ſay, that neither that received maxim, nor any other identical propoſition teaches us any thing: and tho', in ſuch kind of propoſitions, this great and magnified maxim, boaſted to be the foundation of demonſtration, may be, and often is made uſe of to confirm them; yet all it proves amounts to no more than this, that the ſame word may with great certainty be affirmed of itſelf, without any doubt of the truth of any ſuch propoſition, and let me add alſo, without any real knowledge.

§ 3. For at this rate, any very ignorant perſon, who can but make a propoſition, and knows what he means when he ſays, ay or no, may make a million of propoſitions, of whoſe truths he may be infallibly certain, and yet not know one thing in the world thereby; v. g. what is a ſoul, is a ſoul; or a ſoul is a ſoul; a ſpirit is a ſpirit; a fetiche is a fetiche, &c. theſe all being all equivalent to this propoſition, viz. what is, is, i. e. what hath exiſtence, hath exiſtence; or who hath a ſoul, hath a ſoul. What is this more than trifling with words? It is but like a monkey ſhifting his oyſter from one hand to the other; and had he had but words, might, no doubt, have ſaid, "oyſter in right hand is ſubject, "and oyſter in left hand is predicate:" and ſo might have made a ſelf-evident propoſition of oyſter, i. e. oyſter is oyſter; and yet, with all this, not have been one whit the wiſer or more knowing: and that way of handling the matter would much at one, have ſatisfied the monkey's hunger, or a man's underſtanding; and they two would have improved in knowledge and bulk together.

CHAP. VIII.

I KNOW there are ſome, who, becauſe identical propoſitions are ſelf-evident, ſhew a great concern for them, and think they do great ſervice to philoſophy, by crying them up, as if in them was contained all knowledge, and the underſtanding were led into all truth, by them only. I grant, as forwardly as any one, that they are all true and ſelf-evident. I grant farther, that the foundation of all our knowledge lies in the faculty we have of perceiving the ſame idea to be the ſame, and of diſcerning it from thoſe that are different, as I have ſhewn in the foregoing chapter. But how that vindicates the making uſe of identical propoſitions, for the improvement of knowledge, from the imputation of trifling, I do not ſee. Let any one repeat, as often as he pleaſes, that the will is the will, or lay what ſtreſs on it he thinks fit; of what uſe is this, and an infinite the like propoſitions, for the enlarging our knowledge? Let a man abound as much as the plenty of words, which he has, will permit him, in ſuch propoſitions as theſe; "a law is a law, and obligation is obligation; right is right, and wrong "is wrong," will theſe and the like ever help him to an acquaintance with ethicks? or inſtruct him, or others, in the knowledge of morality? Thoſe, who know not, nor perhaps ever will know, what is right and what is wrong, nor the meaſures of them; can with as much aſſurance make, and infallibly know the truth of theſe and all ſuch propoſitions, as he that is beſt inſtructed in morality can do. But what advance do ſuch propoſitions give in the knowledge of any thing neceſſary, or uſeful, for their conduct?

HE would be thought to do little leſs than trifle, who, for the enlightning the underſtanding, in any part of knowledge, ſhould be buſy with identical propoſitions, and inſiſt on ſuch maxims as theſe: "ſubſtance is ſubſtance, and body is body; vacuum is a vacuum, and a vortex is a vortex; a centaur is a centaur, and a chimera is a chimera," &c. For theſe and all ſuch are equally true, equally certain, and equally ſelf-evident. But yet they cannot but be counted trifling, when made uſe of, as principles of inſtruction, and ſtreſs laid on them, as helps to knowledge: ſince they teach nothing, but what every one, who is capable of diſcourſe, knows without being told, viz. that the ſame term is the ſame term, and the ſame idea the ſame idea. And upon this account it was that I formerly did, and do ſtill think, the offering and inculcating ſuch propoſitions, in order to give the underſtanding any new light, or inlet, into the knowledge of things, no better than trifling.

INSTRUCTION lies in ſomething very different; and he that would inlarge his own or another's mind, to truths he does not yet know, muſt find out intermediate ideas, and then lay them in ſuch order, one by another, that the underſtanding may ſee the agreement, or diſagreement, of thoſe in queſtion. Propoſitions, that do this, are inſtructive; but they are far from ſuch as affirm the ſame term of itſelf: which is no way to advance one's ſelf, or others, in any ſort of knowledge. It no more helps to that, than it would help any one in his learning to read, to have ſuch propoſitions as theſe inculcated to him, an A is an A, and a B is a B; which a man may know, as well as any ſchoolmaſter, and yet never be able to read a word, as long as he lives. Nor do theſe, or any ſuch identical propoſitions, help him one jot forward in the ſkill of reading, let him make what uſe of them he can.

IF thoſe, who blame my calling them trifling propoſitions, had but read, and been at the pains to underſtand what I had above writ, in very plain Engliſh, they could not but have ſeen that, by identical propoſitions, I mean only ſuch, wherein the ſame term importing the ſame idea, is affirmed of itſelf: which I take to be the proper ſignification of identical propoſitions; and, concerning all ſuch, I think I may continue ſafely to ſay, that to propoſe them as inſtructive, is no better than trifling. For no one, who has the uſe of reaſon, can miſs them, where it is neceſſary they ſhould be taken notice of; nor doubt of their truth, when he does take notice of them.

BUT if men will call propoſitions identical, wherein the ſame term is not affirmed of itſelf, whether they ſpeak more properly than I, others muſt judge.

This is certain, all that they ſay of propoſitions that are not identical in my ſenſe, concerns not me, nor what I have ſaid; all that I have ſaid, relating to thoſe propoſitions, wherein the ſame term is affirmed of itſelf. And I would fain ſee an inſtance, wherein any ſuch can be made uſe of, to the advantage and improvement of any one's knowledge. Inſtances of other kinds, whatever uſe may be made of them, concern not me, as not being ſuch as I call identical.

Secondly, when a part of any complex idea is predicated of the whole.

§ 4. SECONDLY, another ſort of trifling propoſitions is, when a part of the complex idea is predicated of the name of the whole; a part of the definition of the word defined. Such are all propoſitions, wherein the genus is predicated of the ſpecies, or more comprehenſive, of leſs comprehenſive terms: for what information, what knowledge carries this propoſition in it, viz. lead is a metal, to a man who knows the complex idea the name, lead, ſtands for? All the ſimple ideas, that go to the complex one ſignified by the term, metal, being nothing, but what he before comprehended, and ſignified by the name, lead. Indeed, to a man, that knows the ſignification of the word, metal, and not of the word, lead, it is a ſhorter way to explain the ſignification of the word, lead, by ſaying it is a metal, which at once expreſſes ſeveral of its ſimple ideas, and to enumerate them one by one, telling him it is a body very heavy, fuſible and malleable.

As part of the definition of the term defined.

§ 5. ALIKE trifling it is, to predicate any other part of the definition of the term defined, or to affirm any one of the ſimple ideas of a complex one, of the name of the whole complex idea; as, all gold is fuſible. For fuſibility being one of the ſimple ideas that goes to the making up the complex one the ſound, gold, ſtands for, what can it be but playing with ſounds, to affirm that of the name, gold, which is comprehended in its received ſignification? It would be thought little better than ridiculous, to affirm gravely as a truth of moment, that gold is yellow; and I ſee not how it is any jot more material to ſay, it is fuſible, unleſs that quality be left out of the complex idea, of which the ſound, gold, is the mark in ordinary ſpeech. What inſtruction can it carry with it, to tell one, that which he hath been told already, or he is ſuppoſed to know before? For I am ſuppoſed to know the ſignification of the word another uſes to me, or elſe he is to tell me. And if I know that the name gold ſtands for this complex idea of body, yellow, heavy, fuſible, malleable, it will not much inſtruct me, to put it ſolemnly afterwards in a propoſition, and gravely ſay, all gold is fuſible. Such propoſitions can only ſerve to ſhew the diſingenuity of one, who will go from the definition of his own terms, by reminding him ſometimes of it; but carry no knowledge with them, but of the ſignification of words, however certain they be.

Inſtance, man and palfry.

§ 6. EVERY man is an animal, or living body, is as certain a propoſition as can be; but no more conducing to the knowledge of things, than to ſay a palfry is an ambling horſe, or a neighing, ambling animal, both being only about the ſignification of words, and make me know but this; that body, ſenſe, and motion, or power of ſenſation and moving, are three of thoſe ideas, that I always comprehend and ſignify by the word man; and where they are not to be found together, the name man belongs not to that thing; and ſo of the other, that body, ſenſe, and a certain way of going, with a certain kind of voice, are ſome of thoſe ideas, which I always comprehend, and ſignify by the word palfry; and when they are not to be found together, the name palfry belongs not to that thing. It is juſt the ſame, and to the ſame purpoſe, when any term ſtanding for any one or more of the ſimple ideas, that altogether make up that complex idea which is called a man, is affirmed of the term man: v. g. ſuppoſe a Roman ſignified by the word homo, all theſe diſtinct ideas, united in one ſubject, "corporietas, ſenſibilitas, potentia ſe movendi, rationalitas, riſibilitas;" he might, no doubt, with great certainty, univerſally affirm one, more, or all of theſe together of the word homo, but did no more than ſay that the word homo, in his country, comprehended in its ſignification all theſe ideas. Much like a romance-knight, who by the word palfry ſignified theſe ideas; body of a certain figure, four-legged, with ſenſe, motion, ambling, neighing, white, uſed to have a woman on his back; might with the ſame certainty univerſally affirm alſo any, or all, of theſe of the word palfry: but did thereby teach no more, but that the word palfry, in his, or romance language, ſtood for all theſe, and was not to be applied to any thing, where any of theſe was wanting. But he that ſhall tell me, that in whatever thing ſenſe, motion, reaſon and laughter, were united, that thing had actually a notion of God, or would be caſt into a ſleep by opium, made indeed an inſtructive propoſition: becauſe neither having the notion of God, nor being caſt into ſleep by opium, being contained in the idea ſignified by the word, man, we are by ſuch propoſitions taught ſomething more than barely what the word, man, ſtands for; and therefore the knowledge contained in it, is more than verbal.

For this teaches but the ſignification of words.

§ 7. Before a man makes any propoſition, he is ſuppoſed to underſtand the terms he uſes in it, or elſe he talks like a parrot, only making a noiſe by imitation, and framing certain ſounds, which he has learnt of others; but not, as a rational creature, uſing them for ſigns of ideas, which he has in his mind. The hearer alſo is ſuppoſed to underſtand the terms as the ſpeaker uſes them, or elſe he talks jargon, and makes an unintelligible noiſe. And therefore, he trifles with words, who makes ſuch a propoſition, which when it is made, contains no more than one of the terms does, and which a man was ſuppoſed to know before; v. g. a triangle hath three ſides, or ſaffron is yellow. And this is no farther tolerable, than where a man goes to explain his terms, to one who is ſuppoſed, or declares himſelf not to underſtand him: and then it teaches only the ſignification of that word, and the uſe of that ſign.

But no real knowledge.

§ 8. We can know, then, the truth of two ſorts of propoſitions with perfect certainty; the one is, of thoſe trifling propoſitions, which have a certainty in them, but it is only a verbal certainty, not inſtructive. And, ſecondly, we can know the truth, and ſo may be certain in propoſitions which affirm ſomething of another, which is a neceſſary conſequence of its preciſe, complex idea, but not contained in it: as that the external angle of all triangles is bigger than either of the oppoſite, internal angles, which relation of the outward angle to either of the oppoſite, internal angles, making no part of the complex idea, ſignified by the name triangle, this is a real truth, and conveys with it inſtructive real knowledge.

General propoſitions, concerning ſubſtances, are often trifling.

§ 9. We having little, or no, knowledge of what combinations there be of ſimple ideas, exiſting together in ſubſtances, but by our ſenſes, we cannot make any univerſal, certain propoſitions concerning them, any farther than our nominal eſſences lead us: which being to a very few and inconſiderable truths, in reſpect of thoſe which depend on their real conſtitutions, the general propoſitions, that are made about ſubſtances, if they are certain, are for the moſt part but trifling; and if they are inſtructive, are uncertain, and are ſuch as we can have no knowledge of their real truth, how much ſoever conſtant obſervation and analogy may aſſiſt our judgments in gueſſing. Hence it comes to paſs, that one may often meet with very clear and coherent diſcourſes, that amount yet to nothing. For it is plain, that names of ſubſtantial beings, as well as others, as far as they have relative ſignifications affixed to them, may, with great truth, be joined negatively and affirmatively in propoſitions, as their relative definitions make them fit to be ſo joined, and propoſitions, conſiſting of ſuch terms, may, with the ſame clearneſs, be deduced one from another, as thoſe that convey the moſt real truths: and all this, without any knowledge of the nature, or reality of things exiſting without us. By this method one may make demonſtrations and undoubted propoſitions in words, and yet thereby advance not one jot in the knowledge of the truth of things; v. g. he that having learnt theſe following words, with their ordinary, mutually relative acceptations annexed to them; v. g. ſubſtance, man, animal, form, ſoul, vegetative, ſenſitive, rational, may make ſeveral undoubted propoſitions about the ſoul, without knowing at all what the ſoul really is: and of this ſort, a man may find an infinite number of propoſitions, reaſonings, and concluſions, in books of metaphyſicks, ſchool-divinity, and ſome ſort of natural philoſophy, and after all, know as little of God, ſpirits, or bodies, as he did before he ſet out.

And why.

§ 10. He that hath liberty to define, i. e. determine the ſignification of his names of ſubſtances (as certainly every one does in effect, who makes them ſtand for his own ideas) and makes their ſignifications at a venture, taking them from his own, or other men's fancies, and not from an examination, or enquiry, into the nature of things themſelves; may, with little trouble, demonſtrate them one of another, according to thoſe ſeveral reſpects and mutual relations he has given them one to another; wherein, however things agree, or diſagree in their own nature, he needs mind nothing but his own notions, with the names he hath beſtowed upon them: but thereby no more increaſes his own knowledge, than he does his riches, who taking a bag of counters, calls one in a certain place a pound, another in another place a ſhilling, and a third in a third place a penny; and ſo proceeding, may undoubtedly reckon right, and caſt up a great ſum, according to his counters ſo placed, and ſtanding for more or leſs, as he pleaſes, without being one jot the richer, or without even knowing how much a pound, ſhilling, or penny is, but only that one is contained in the other twenty times, and contains the other twelve: which a man may alſo do in the ſignification of words, by making them, in reſpect of one another, more, or leſs, or equally comprehenſive.

Thirdly, uſing words variouſly is trifling with them.

§ 11. Tho' yet concerning moſt words, uſed in diſcourſes, eſpecially argumentative and controverſial, there is this more to be complained of, which is the worſt ſort of trifling, and which ſets us yet farther from the certainty of knowledge we hope to attain by them, or find in them, viz. that moſt writers are ſo far from inſtructing us in the nature and knowledge of things, that they uſe their words looſely and uncertainly, and do not, by uſing them conſtantly and ſteadily in the ſame ſignifications, make plain and clear deductions of words one from another, and make their diſcourſes coherent and clear (how little ſoever it were inſtructive) which were not difficult to do, did they not find it convenient to ſhelter their ignorance, or obſtinacy, under the obſcurity and perplexedneſs of their terms: to which, perhaps, inadvertency and ill cuſtom do in many men much contribute.

Marks of verbal propoſitions.

§ 12. To conclude; barely verbal propoſitions may be known by theſe following marks.

1. Predication in abſtract.

First, all propoſitions, wherein two abſtract terms are affirmed one of another, are barely about the ſignification of ſounds. For ſince no abſtract idea can be the ſame with any other but itſelf, when its abſtract name is affirmed of any other term, it can ſignify no more but this, that it may, or ought to be called by that name, or that theſe two names ſignify the ſame idea. Thus, ſhould any one ſay, that parſimony is frugality, that gratitude is juſtice, that this, or that action is, or is not temperance; however ſpecious theſe and the like propoſitions may at firſt ſight ſeem, yet when we come to preſs them, and examine nicely what they contain, we ſhall find that it all amounts to nothing but the ſignification of thoſe terms.

2. A part of the definition, predicated of any term.

§ 13. Secondly, all propoſitions, wherein a part of the complex idea, which any term ſtands for, is predicated of that term, are only verbal; v. g. to ſay that gold is a metal, or heavy. And thus all propoſitions, wherein more comprehenſive words, called genera, are affirmed of ſubordinate, or leſs comprehenſive, called ſpecies, or individuals, are barely verbal.

When by theſe two rules, we have examined the propoſitions, that make up the diſcourſes we ordinarily meet with, both in and out of books, we ſhall, perhaps, find that a greater part of them, than is uſually ſuſpected, are purely about the ſignification of words, and contain nothing in them, but the uſe and application of theſe ſigns.

This, I think, I may lay down for an infallible rule, that wherever the diſtinct idea any word ſtands for, is not known and conſidered, and ſomething not contained in the idea is not affirmed, or denied of it; there our thoughts ſtick wholly in ſounds, and are able to attain no real truth, or falſhood. This, perhaps, if well heeded, might ſave us a great deal of uſeleſs amuſement and diſpute, and very much ſhorten our trouble and wandering, in the ſearch of real and true knowledge.

CHAP.

CHAP. IX.

Of our knowledge of exiſtence.

CHAP. IX.

General, certain propoſitions concern not exiſtence.

§ 1. HITHERTO we have only conſidered the eſſences of things, which being only abſtract ideas, and thereby removed in our thoughts from particular exiſtence (that being the proper operation of the mind, in abſtraction, to conſider an idea under no other exiſtence, but what it has in the underſtanding) gives us no knowledge of real exiſtence at all. Where, by the way, we may take notice, that univerſal propoſitions, of whoſe truth, or falſhood, we can have certain knowledge, concern not exiſtence; and farther, that all particular affirmations, or negations, that would not be certain, if they were made general, are only concerning exiſtence; they declaring only the accidental union, or ſeparation, of ideas in things exiſting, which, in their abſtract natures, have no known neceſſary union, or repugnancy.

A threefold knowledge of exiſtence.

§ 2. BUT, leaving the nature of propoſitions, and different ways of predication, to be conſidered more at large in another place, let us proceed now to enquire, concerning our knowledge of the exiſtence of things, and how we come by it. I ſay then, that we have the knowledge of our own exiſtence by intuition; of the exiſtence of God by demonſtration; and of other things by ſenſation.

Our knowledge of our own exiſtence is intuitive.

§ 3. As for our own exiſtence, we perceive it ſo plainly, and ſo certainly, that it neither needs, nor is capable of any proof. For nothing can be more evident to us, than our own exiſtence; I think, I reaſon, I feel pleaſure and pain; can any of theſe be more evident to me, than my own exiſtence? If I doubt of all other things, that very doubt makes me perceive my own exiſtence, and will not ſuffer me to doubt of that. For if I know I feel pain, it is evident I have as certain perception of my own exiſtence, as of the exiſtence of the pain I feel: or if I know I doubt, I have as certain perception of the exiſtence of the thing doubting, as of that thought which I call doubt. Experience then convinces us, that we have an intuitive knowledge of our own exiſtence, and an internal, infallible perception that we are. In every act of ſenſation, reaſoning, or thinking, we are conſcious to our ſelves of our own being; and, in this matter, come not ſhort of the higheſt degree of certainty.

CHAP. X.

Of our knowledge of the exiſtence of a God.

CHAP. X.

We are capable of knowing certainly, that there is a God.

§ 1. THO' God has given us no innate ideas of himſelf; tho' he has ſtampt no original characters on our minds, wherein we may read his being; yet having furniſhed us with thoſe faculties our minds are endowed with, he hath not left himſelf without witneſs: ſince we have ſenſe, perception, and reaſon, and cannot want a clear proof of him, as long as we carry our ſelves about us. Nor can we juſtly complain of our ignorance in this great point, ſince he has ſo plentifully provided us with the means to diſcover, and know him, ſo far as is neceſſary to the end of our being, and the great concernment of our happineſs. But tho' this be the moſt obvious truth that reaſon diſcovers; and tho' its evidence be (if I miſtake not) equal to mathematical certainty: yet it requires thought and attention, and the mind muſt apply itſelf to a regular deduction of it from ſome part of our intuitive knowledge, or elſe we ſhall be as uncertain and ignorant of this as of other propoſitions, which are in themſelves capable of clear demonſtration. To ſhew, therefore, that we are capable of knowing, i. e. being certain that there is a God, and how we may come by this certainty, I think we need go no farther than our ſelves, and that undoubted knowledge we have of our own exiſtence.

Man knows that he himſelf is.

§ 2. I think it is beyond queſtion, that man has a clear perception of his own being; he knows certainly, that he exiſts, and that he is ſomething. He that can doubt, whether he be any thing, or no, I ſpeak not to, no more than I would argue with pure nothing, or endeavour to convince non-entity, that it were ſomething. If any one pretends to be ſo ſceptical, as to deny his own exiſtence (for really to doubt of it is manifeſtly impoſſible) let him for me enjoy his beloved happineſs of being nothing, until hunger, or ſome other pain convince him of the contrary. This, then, I think, I may take for a truth, which every one's certain knowledge aſſures him of, beyond the liberty of doubting, viz. that he is ſomething that actually exiſts.

He knows alſo, that nothing cannot produce a being, therefore ſomething eternal.

§ 3. In the next place, man knows, by an intuitive certainty, that bare nothing can no more produce any real being, than it can be equal to two right angles. If a man knows not that non-entity, or the abſence of all being, cannot be equal to two right angles, it is impoſſible he ſhould know any demonſtration in Euclid. If, therefore, we know there is ſome real being, and that non-entity cannot produce any real being, it is an evident demonſtration, that from eternity there has been ſomething; ſince what was not from eternity, had a beginning; and what had a beginning, muſt be produced by ſomething elſe.

That eternal being muſt be moſt powerful.

§ 4. Next it is evident, that what had its being and beginning from another, muſt alſo have all that which is in, and belongs to, its being from another too. All the powers it has muſt be owing to, and received from the ſame ſource. This eternal ſource then of all being, muſt alſo be the ſource and original of all power; and ſo this eternal being muſt be alſo the moſt powerful.

And moſt knowing.

§ 5. Again, a man finds in himſelf perception and knowledge. We have then got one ſtep farther; and we are certain now, that there is not only ſome being, but ſome knowing, intelligent being in the world.

There was a time then, when there was no knowing being, and when knowledge began to be; or elſe there has been alſo a knowing being from eternity. If it be ſaid, there was a time when no being had any knowledge, when that eternal being was void of all underſtanding: I reply, that then it was impoſſible there ſhould ever have been any knowledge; it being as impoſſible that things wholly void of knowledge, and operating blindly, and without any perception, ſhould produce a knowing being, as it is impoſſible that a triangle ſhould make itſelf three angles bigger than two right ones. For it is as repugnant to the idea of ſenſeleſs matter, that it ſhould put into itſelf ſenſe, perception, and knowledge, as it is repugnant to the idea of a triangle, that it ſhould put into itſelf greater angles than two right ones.

And therefore God.

§ 6. Thus from the conſideration of our ſelves, and what we infallibly find in our own conſtitutions, our reaſon leads us to the knowledge of this certain and evident truth, that there is an eternal, moſt powerful, and moſt knowing being; which whether any one will pleaſe to call God, it matters not. The thing is evident, and, from this idea, duly conſidered, will eaſily be deduced all thoſe other attributes, which we ought to aſcribe to this eternal being. If, nevertheleſs, any one ſhould be found ſo ſenſeleſly arrogant, as to ſuppoſe man alone knowing and wiſe, but yet the product of mere ignorance and chance; and that all the reſt of the univerſe acted only by that blind hap-hazard: I ſhall leave with him that very rational and emphatical rebuke of Tully, l. ii. de leg. to be conſidered at his leiſure. "What can be more ſillily arrogant and miſ-" becoming, than for a man to think that he has a mind and underſtanding in" him, but yet in all the univerſe beſides there is no ſuch thing? Or that thoſe" things, which, with the utmoſt ſtretch of his reaſon, he can ſcarce compre-" hend, ſhould be moved and managed without any reaſon at all?" "Quid eſt" enim verius, quam neminem eſſe oportere tam ſtulte arrogantem, ut in ſe" mentem & rationem putet ineſſe, in cœlo mundoque non putet? Aut ea, quæ" vix ſummâ ingenii ratione comprehendat, nullâ ratione moveri putet?"

From what has been ſaid, it is plain to me, we have a more certain knowledge of the exiſtence of a God, than of any thing our ſenſes have not immediately diſcovered to us. Nay, I preſume I may ſay, that we more certainly know that there is a God, than that there is any thing elſe without us. When

I ſay we know, I mean there is ſuch a knowledge within our reach, which we cannot miſs, if we will but apply our minds to that, as we do to ſeveral other inquiries.

Our idea of a moſt perfect being, not the ſole proof of a God.

§ 7. How far the idea of a moſt perfect being, which a man may frame in his mind, does, or does not, prove the exiſtence of a God, I will not here examine. For, in the different make of men's tempers and application of their thoughts, ſome arguments prevail more on one, and ſome on another, for the confirmation of the ſame truth. But yet, I think, this I may ſay, that it is an ill way of eſtabliſhing this truth, and ſilencing atheiſts, to lay the whole ſtreſs of ſo important a point as this, upon that ſole foundation; and take ſome men's having that idea of God in their minds (for it is evident ſome men have none, and ſome worſe than none, and the moſt very different) for the only proof of a deity; and, out of an over-fondneſs of that darling invention, caſhier, or, at leaſt, endeavour to invalidate all other arguments, and forbid us to hearken to thoſe proofs, as being weak, or fallacious, which our own exiſtence, and the ſenſible parts of the univerſe offer ſo clearly and cogently to our thoughts, that I deem it impoſſible for a conſidering man to withſtand them. For I judge it is as certain and clear a truth, as can any where be delivered, that "the inviſible things of God are clearly ſeen, from the creation of the world, being underſtood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and god-head." Tho' our own being furniſhes us, as I have ſhewn, with an evident and inconteſtable proof of a deity; and, I believe, no body can avoid the cogency of it, who will but as carefully attend to it, as to any other demonſtration of ſo many parts: yet this being ſo fundamental a truth, and of that conſequence, that all religion and genuine morality depend thereon, I doubt not but I ſhall be forgiven by my reader if I go over ſome parts of this argument again, and enlarge a little more upon them.

Something from eternity.

§ 8. THERE is no truth more evident, than that ſomething muſt be from eternity. I never yet heard of any one ſo unreaſonable, or that could ſuppoſe ſo manifeſt a contradiction, as a time wherein there was perfectly nothing. This being of all abſurdities the greateſt, to imagine that pure nothing, the perfect negation and abſence of all beings, ſhould ever produce any real exiſtence.

IT being then unavoidable for all rational creatures to conclude, that ſomething has exiſted from eternity; let us next ſee what kind of thing that muſt be.

Two ſorts of beings, cogitative and incogitative.

§ 9. THERE are but two ſorts of beings in the world, that man knows or conceives.

FIRST, ſuch as are purely material, without ſenſe, perception or thought, as the clippings of our beards, and parings of our nails.

SECONDLY, ſenſible, thinking, perceiving beings, ſuch as we find ourſelves to be; which, if you pleaſe, we will hereafter call cogitative and incogitative beings: which to our preſent purpoſe, if for nothing elſe, are, perhaps, better terms than material and immaterial.

Incogitative being cannot produce a cogitative.

§ 10. IF then, there muſt be ſomething eternal, let us ſee what ſort of being it muſt be. And to that, it is very obvious to reaſon, that it muſt neceſſarily be a cogitative being. For it is as impoſſible to conceive, that ever bare incogitative matter ſhould produce a thinking, intelligent being, as that nothing ſhould of itſelf produce matter. Let us ſuppoſe any parcel of matter eternal, great or ſmall, we ſhall find it, in itſelf, able to produce nothing. For example; let us ſuppoſe the matter of the next pebble we meet with, eternal, cloſely united, and the parts firmly at reſt together, if there were no other being in the world, muſt it not eternally remain ſo, a dead, inactive lump? Is it poſſible to conceive it can add motion to itſelf, being purely matter, or produce any thing? Matter then, by its own ſtrength, cannot produce in itſelf ſo much as motion: the motion it has muſt alſo be from eternity, or elſe be produced, and added to matter, by ſome other being more powerful than matter; matter, as is evident, having not power to produce motion in itſelf. But let us ſuppoſe motion eternal too; yet matter, incogitative matter and motion, whatever changes it might produce of figure and bulk, could never produce thought: knowledge will ſtill be as far beyond the power of motion and matter to produce, as matter is beyond the power of nothing, or non-entity to produce. And I appeal to every one's own thoughts, whether he cannot as eaſily conceive matter produced by nothing, as thought to be produced by pure matter, when before there was no ſuch thing as thought, or an intelligent being exiſting. Divide matter into as minute parts as you will (which we are apt to imagine a ſort of ſpiritualizing, or making a thinking thing of it) vary the figure and motion of it, as much as you pleaſe, a globe, cube, cone, priſm, cylinder, &c. whoſe diameters are but 1000000th part of a gry[a], will operate no otherwiſe upon other bodies of proportionable bulk, than thoſe of an inch, or foot diameter; and you may as rationally expect to produce ſenſe, thought and knowledge, by putting together, in a certain figure and motion, groſs particles of matter, as by thoſe that are the very minuteſt, that do any where exiſt. They knock, impel and reſiſt one another, juſt as the greater do, and that is all they can do. So that, if we will ſuppoſe nothing firſt, or eternal; matter can never begin to be: If we ſuppoſe bare matter, without motion, eternal; motion can never begin to be: if we ſuppoſe only matter and motion firſt, or eternal; thought can never begin to be. For it is impoſſible to conceive that matter, either with, or without motion, could have originally in, and from itſelf, ſenſe, perception and knowledge, as is evident from hence, that then ſenſe, perception and knowledge muſt be a property eternally inſeparable from matter, and every particle of it. Not to add, that tho' our general, or ſpecifick conception of matter makes us ſpeak of it as one thing, yet really all matter is not one individual thing, neither is there any ſuch thing exiſting, as one material being, or one ſingle body, that we know, or can conceive. And therefore if matter were the eternal, firſt, cogitative being, there would not be one eternal, infinite, cogitative being, but an infinite number of eternal, finite, cogitative beings, independent one of another, of limited force, and diſtinct thoughts, which could never produce that order, harmony and beauty, which is to be found in nature. Since therefore, whatſoever is the firſt eternal being muſt neceſſarily be cogitative; and whatſoever is firſt of all things, muſt neceſſarily contain in it, and actually have, at leaſt, all the perfections than can ever after exiſt; nor can it ever give to another any perfection that it hath not, either actually in itſelf, or at leaſt in a higher degree; it neceſſarily follows, that the firſt, eternal being cannot be matter.

Therefore there has been an eternal wiſdom.

§ 11. If therefore, it be evident, that ſomething neceſſarily muſt exiſt from eternity, it is alſo as evident, that that ſomething muſt neceſſarily be a cogitative being: for it is as impoſſible that incogitative matter ſhould produce a cogitative being, as that nothing, or the negation of all being, ſhould produce a poſitive being, or matter.

§ 12. Tho' this diſcovery of the neceſſary exiſtence of an eternal mind, does ſufficiently lead us into the knowledge of God; ſince it will hence follow, that all other knowing beings, that have a beginning, muſt depend on him, and have no other ways of knowledge, or extent of power, than what he gives them; and therefore, if he made thoſe, he made alſo the leſs excellent pieces of this univerſe, all inanimate beings, whereby his omniſcience, power, and providence will be eſtabliſhed, and all his other attributes neceſſarily follow: yet to clear up this a little farther, we will ſee what doubts can be raiſed againſt it.

Whether material or no.

§ 13. First, perhaps it will be ſaid, that tho' it be as clear, as demonſtration can make it, that there muſt be an eternal being, and that being muſt alſo be knowing; yet it does not follow, but that thinking being may alſo be material. Let it be ſo; it equally ſtill follows, that there is a God. For if there be an eternal, omniſcient, omnipotent being, it is certain that there is a God, whether you imagine that being to be material, or no. But herein, I ſuppoſe, lies the danger and deceit of that ſuppoſition: there being no way to avoid the demonſtration, that there is an eternal, knowing being, men, devoted to matter, would willingly have it granted, that this knowing being is material; and then letting ſlide out of their minds, or the diſcourſe, the demonſtration, whereby an eternal, knowing being was proved neceſſarily to exiſt, would argue all to be matter, and ſo deny a God, that is, an eternal, cogitative being; whereby they are ſo far from eſtabliſhing, that they deſtroy their own hypotheſis. For, if there can be, in their opinion, eternal matter, without any eternal, cogitative being, they manifeſtly ſeparate matter and thinking, and ſuppoſe no neceſſary connection of the one with the other, and ſo eſtabliſh the neceſſity of an eternal ſpirit, but not of matter; ſince it has been proved already, that an eternal cogitative being is unavoidably to be granted. Now if thinking and matter may be ſeparated, the eternal exiſtence of matter will not follow from the eternal exiſtence of a cogitative being, and they ſuppoſe it to no purpoſe.

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[a] A gry is $\frac{1}{10}$ of a line, a line $\frac{1}{10}$ of an inch, an inch $\frac{1}{10}$ of a philoſophical foot, a philoſophical foot $\frac{1}{3}$ of a pendulum, whoſe diadroms, in the latitude of 45 degrees, are each equal to one ſecond of time or $\frac{1}{60}$ of a minute. I have affectedly made uſe of this meaſure here, and the parts of it, under a decimal diviſion, with names to them; becauſe, I think, it would be of general convenience, that this ſhould be the common meaſure, in the commonwealth of letters.

Not material; 1. Becauſe every particle of matter is not cogitative.

§ 14. BUT now let us ſee how they can ſatisfy themſelves or others, that this eternal, thinking being is material.

FIRST, I would aſk them, "whether they imagine, that all matter, every "particle of matter, thinks?" This, I ſuppoſe, they will ſcarce ſay; ſince then there would be as many eternal, thinking beings, as there are particles of matter, and ſo an infinity of gods. And yet, if they will not allow matter, as matter, that is, every particle of matter, to be as well cogitative, as extended, they will have as hard a taſk to make out, to their own reaſons, a cogitative being out of incogitative particles, as an extended being, out of unextended parts, if I may ſo ſpeak.

2. One particle alone of matter cannot be cogitative.

§ 15. SECONDLY, if all matter does not think, I next aſk, "whether it be "only one atom that does ſo?" This has as many abſurdities as the other; for then this atom of matter muſt be alone eternal, or not. If this alone be eternal, then this alone, by its powerful thought, or will, made all the reſt of matter. And ſo we have the creation of matter by a powerful thought, which is that the materialiſts ſtick at. For if they ſuppoſe one ſingle, thinking atom to have produced all the reſt of matter, they cannot aſcribe that pre-eminency to it, upon any other account, than that of its thinking, the only ſuppoſed difference. But allow it to be, by ſome other way, which is above our conception, it muſt be ſtill creation, and theſe men muſt give up their great maxim, "ex nihilo nil fit." If it be ſaid, that all the reſt of matter is equally eternal, as that thinking atom, it will be to ſay any thing at pleaſure, tho' never ſo abſurd: for to ſuppoſe all matter eternal, and yet one ſmall particle in knowledge and power, infinitely above all the reſt, is, without any the leaſt appearance of reaſon, to frame any hypotheſis. Every particle of matter, as matter, is capable of all the ſame figures and motions of any other; and I challenge any one, in his thoughts, to add any thing elſe, to one above another.

3. A ſyſtem of incogitative matter cannot be cogitative.

16. THIRDLY, if then, neither one peculiar atom alone can be this eternal, thinking being; nor all matter, as matter, i. e. every particle of matter can be it; it only remains, that it is ſome certain ſyſtem of matter, duly put together, that is this thinking, eternal being. This is that which, I imagine, is that notion which men are apteſt to have of God; who would have him a material being, as moſt readily ſuggeſted to them, by the ordinary conceit they have of themſelves, and other men, which they take to be material, thinking beings. But this imagination, however more natural, is no leſs abſurd than the other: for, to ſuppoſe the eternal, thinking being to be nothing elſe, but a compoſition of particles of matter, each whereof is incogitative, is to aſcribe all the wiſdom and knowledge of that eternal being, only to the juxta-poſition of parts; than which nothing can be more abſurd. For unthinking particles of matter, however put together, can have nothing thereby added to them, but a new relation of poſition, which it is impoſſible ſhould give thought and knowledge to them.

Whether in motion, or a reſt.

§ 17. BUT farther, this corporeal ſyſtem either has all its parts at reſt, or it is a certain motion of the parts, wherein its thinking conſiſts. If it be perfectly at reſt, it is but one lump, and ſo can have no privileges above one atom.

IF it be the motion of its parts, on which its thinking depends, all the thoughts there muſt be unavoidably accidental and limited; ſince all the particles,

ticles, that by motion cauſe thought, being each of them in itſelf without any thought, cannot regulate its own motions, much leſs be regulated by the thought of the whole; ſince that thought is not the cauſe of motion (for then it muſt be antecedent to it, and ſo without it) but the conſequence of it, whereby freedom, power, choice, and all rational and wiſe thinking, or acting, will be quite taken away: ſo that ſuch a thinking being will be no better nor wiſer, than pure, blind matter; ſince to reſolve all into the accidental unguided motions of blind matter, or into thought, depending on unguided motions of blind matter, is the ſame thing; not to mention the narrowneſs of ſuch thoughts and knowledge, that muſt depend on the motion of ſuch parts. But there needs no enumeration of any more abſurdities and impoſſibilities in this hypotheſis (however full of them it be) than that before-mentioned; ſince let this thinking ſyſtem be all, or a part of the matter of the univerſe, it is impoſſible that any one particle ſhould either know its own, or the motion of any other particle, or the whole know the motion of every particular; and ſo regulate its own thoughts, or motions, or indeed have any thoughts reſulting from ſuch motion.

Matter not co-eternal with an eternal mind.

§ 18. Others would have matter to be eternal, notwithſtanding that they allow an eternal, cogitative, immaterial being. This, tho' it take not away the being of a God, yet ſince it denies, one and the firſt great piece of his workmanſhip, the creation, let us conſider it a little. Matter muſt be allowed eternal; why? becauſe you cannot conceive how it can be made out of nothing; why do you not alſo think yourſelf eternal? You will anſwer perhaps, becauſe about twenty, or forty years ſince you began to be. But if I aſk you what that you is, which began then to be, you can ſcarce tell me. The matter, whereof you are made, began not then to be; for if it did, then it is not eternal: but it began to be put together in ſuch a faſhion and frame as makes up your body; but yet that frame of particles is not you, it makes not that thinking thing you are; (for I have now to do with one, who allows an eternal, immaterial, thinking being, but would have unthinking matter eternal too) therefore, when did that thinking thing begin to be? If it did never begin to be, then have you always been a thinking thing, from eternity; the abſurdity whereof I need not confute, till I meet with one, who is ſo void of underſtanding as to own it. If therefore, you can allow a thinking thing to be made out of nothing (as all things that are not eternal muſt be) why alſo can you not allow it poſſible, for a material being to be made out of nothing, by an equal power, but that you have the experience of the one in view, and not of the other? Tho' when well conſidered, creation of a ſpirit will be found to require no leſs power, than the creation of matter. Nay, poſſibly, if we would emancipate ourſelves from vulgar notions, and raiſe our thoughts, as far as they would reach, to a cloſer contemplation of things, we might be able to aim at ſome dim and ſeeming conception, how matter might at firſt be made and begin to exiſt, by the power of that eternal firſt being: but to give beginning and being to a ſpirit, would be found a more inconceivable effect of omnipotent power. But this being what would perhaps lead us too far from the notions, on which the philoſophy now in the world is built, it would not be pardonable to deviate ſo far from them; or to enquire ſo far as grammar itſelf would authorize, if the common ſettled opinion oppoſes it: eſpecially in this place, where the received doctrine ſerves well enough to our preſent purpoſe, and leaves this paſt doubt, that the creation or beginning, of any one ſubſtance, out of nothing, being once admitted, the creation of all other, but the creator himſelf, may, with the ſame eaſe, be ſuppoſed.

§ 19. But you will ſay, is it not impoſſible to admit of the making any thing out of nothing, ſince we cannot poſſibly conceive it? I anſwer, no: 1. Becauſe it is not reaſonable to deny the power of an infinite being, becauſe we cannot comprehend its operations. We do not deny other effects upon this ground, becauſe we cannot poſſibly conceive the manner of their production. We cannot conceive how any thing, but impulſe of body, can move body; and yet that is

not

not a reaſon ſufficient to make us deny it poſſible, againſt the conſtant experience we have of it in ourſelves, in all our voluntary motions, which are produced in us, only by the free action or thought of our own minds; and are not, nor can be the effects of the impulſe, or determination of the motion of blind matter in, or upon, our bodies; for then it could not be in our power, or choice, to alter it. For example: my right hand writes, whilſt my left hand is ſtill: what cauſes reſt in one, and motion in the other? Nothing but my will, a thought of my mind; my thought only changing, the right hand reſts, and the left hand moves. This is matter of fact, which cannot be denied: explain this and make it intelligible, and then the next ſtep will be to underſtand creation. For the giving a new determination to the motion of the animal ſpirits (which ſome make uſe of to explain voluntary motion) clears not the difficulty one jot: to alter the determination of motion, being in this caſe no eaſier, nor leſs, than to give motion itſelf; ſince the new determination given to the animal ſpirits, muſt be either immediately by thought, or by ſome other body put in their way by thought, which was not in their way before, and ſo muſt owe its motion to thought; either of which leaves voluntary motion as unintelligible as it was before. In the mean time, it is an over-valuing ourſelves, to reduce all to the narrow meaſure of our capacities; and to conclude all things impoſſible to be done, whoſe manner of doing exceeds our comprehenſion. This is to make our comprehenſion infinite, or God finite, when what he can do is limited to what we can conceive of it. If you do not underſtand the operations of your own finite mind, that thinking thing within you, do not deem it ſtrange, that you cannot comprehend the operations of that eternal, infinite mind, who made and governs all things, and whom the heaven of heavens cannot contain.

CHAP. XI.

Of our knowledge of the exiſtence of other things.

CHAP. XI.

§ 1. THE knowledge of our own being, we have by intuition. The exiſtence of a God, reaſon clearly makes known to us, as has been ſhewn.

It is to be had only by ſenſation.

THE knowledge of the exiſtence of any other thing, we can have only by ſenſation: for there being no neceſſary connection of real exiſtence with any idea, a man hath in his memory, nor of any other exiſtence, but that of God, with the exiſtence of any particular man; no particular man can know the exiſtence of any other being, but only when, by actual operating upon him, it makes itſelf perceived by him. For the having the idea of any thing in our mind, no more proves the exiſtence of that thing, than the picture of a man evidences his being in the world, or the viſions of a dream make thereby a true hiſtory.

Inſtance, whiteneſs of this paper.

§ 2. IT is therefore, the actual receiving of ideas from without, that gives us notice of the exiſtence of other things, and makes us know that ſomething doth exiſt at that time, without us, which cauſes that idea in us, tho' perhaps we neither know, nor conſider how it does it: for it takes not from the certainty of our ſenſes, and the ideas, we receive by them, that we know not the manner, wherein they are produced: v. g. whilſt I write this, I have, by the paper affecting my eyes, that idea produced in my mind, which whatever object cauſes, I call white; by which I know that that quality, or accident (i. e. whoſe appearance before my eyes always cauſes that idea) doth really exiſt, and hath a being without me. And of this, the greateſt aſſurance I can poſſibly have, and to which my faculties can attain, is the teſtimony of my eyes, which are the proper and ſole judges of this thing, whoſe teſtimony I have reaſon to rely on, as ſo certain, that I can no more doubt, whilſt I write this, that I ſee white and black, and that ſomething really exiſts, that cauſes that ſenſation in me, than that I write, or move my hand: which is a certainty, as great as human nature is capable of, concerning the exiſtence of any thing, but a man's ſelf alone, and of God.

This, tho' not ſo certain as demonſtration, yet may be called knowledge, and proves the exiſtence of things without us.

§ 3. The notice we have by our ſenſes, of the exiſting of things without us, tho' it be not altogether ſo certain, as our intuitive knowledge, or the deductions of our reaſon, employed about the clear, abſtract ideas of our own minds; yet it is an aſſurance, that deſerves the name of knowledge. If we perſuade our ſelves that our faculties act and inform us right, concerning the exiſtence of thoſe objects that affect them, it cannot paſs for an ill-grounded confidence: for I think no body can, in earneſt, be ſo ſceptical, as to be uncertain of the exiſtence of thoſe things, which he ſees and feels. At leaſt, he that can doubt ſo far (whatever he may have with his own thoughts) will never have any controverſy with me; ſince he can never be ſure, I ſay any thing contrary to his opinion. As to myſelf, I think God has given me aſſurance enough, of the exiſtence of things without me; ſince by their different application I can produce in myſelf both pleaſure and pain, which is one great concernment of my preſent ſtate. This is certain, the confidence, that our faculties do not herein deceive us, is the greateſt aſſurance we are capable of, concerning the exiſtence of material beings. For we cannot act any thing, but by our faculties; nor talk of knowledge itſelf, but by the help of thoſe faculties, which are fitted to apprehend even what knowledge is. But beſides the aſſurance we have, from our ſenſes themſelves, that they do not err in the information they give us, of the exiſtence of things, without us, when they are affected by them, we are farther confirmed in this aſſurance by other concurrent reaſons.

1. Becauſe we cannot have them, but by the inlet of the ſenſes.

§ 4. First, it is plain thoſe perceptions are produced in us by exterior cauſes affecting our ſenſes; becauſe thoſe, that want the organs of any ſenſe, never can have the ideas belonging to that ſenſe, produced in their minds. This is too evident to be doubted: and therefore, we cannot but be aſſured, that they come in by the organs of that ſenſe, and no other way. The organs themſelves, it is plain, do not produce them: for then the eyes of a man in the dark, would produce colours, and his noſe ſmell roſes in the winter: but we ſee no body gets the reliſh of a pine-apple, till he goes to the Indies, where it is, and taſtes it.

2. Becauſe an idea from actual ſenſation, and another from memory, are very diſtinct perceptions.

§ 5. Secondly, becauſe ſometimes I find, that I cannot avoid the having thoſe ideas produced in my mind. For tho', when my eyes are ſhut, or windows faſt, I can, at pleaſure, recal to my mind the ideas of light, or the ſun, which former ſenſations had lodged in my memory: ſo I can at pleaſure lay by that idea, and take into my view that of the ſmell of a roſe, or taſte of ſugar. But if I turn my eyes at noon towards the ſun, I cannot avoid the ideas, which the light or ſun, then produces in me. So that there is a manifeſt difference between the ideas, laid up in my memory (over which, if they were there only, I ſhould have conſtantly the ſame power to diſpoſe of them, and lay them by at pleaſure) and thoſe, which force themſelves upon me, and I cannot avoid having. And therefore, it muſt needs be ſome exterior cauſe, and the briſk acting of ſome objects without me, whoſe efficacy I cannot reſiſt, that produces thoſe ideas in my mind, whether I will or no. Beſides, there is no body, who doth not perceive the difference in himſelf, between contemplating the ſun, as he hath the idea of it in his memory, and actually looking upon it: of which two, his perception is ſo diſtinct, that few of his ideas are more diſtinguiſhable, one from another. And therefore, he hath certain knowledge, that they are not both memory, or the actions of his mind, and fancies only within him; but that actual ſeeing hath a cauſe without.

3. Pleaſure, or pain, which accompanies actual ſenſation, accompanies not the returning of thoſe ideas, without the external objects.

§ 6. Thirdly, add to this, that many of thoſe ideas are produced in us with pain, which afterwards we remember without the leaſt offence. Thus the pain of heat, or cold, when the idea of it is revived in our minds, gives us no diſturbance; which, when felt, was very troubleſome, and is again, when actually repeated: which is occaſioned by the diſorder the external object cauſes in our bodies, when applied to it. And we remember the pain of hunger, thirſt, or the head-ach, without any pain at all; which would either never diſturb us, or elſe conſtantly do it, as often as we thought of it, were there nothing more but ideas floating in our minds, and appearances entertaining our fancies, without the real exiſtence of things affecting us from abroad. The ſame may be ſaid of pleaſure, accompanying ſeveral actual ſenſations: and tho' mathematical demonſtration depends not upon ſenſe, yet the examining them by diagrams gives great credit to the evidence of our ſight, and ſeems to give it a certainty approaching to that of demonſtration itſelf. For it would be very ſtrange, that a man ſhould allow it for an undeniable truth, that two angles of a figure which he meaſures by lines and angles of a diagram, ſhould be bigger one than the other; and yet doubt of the exiſtence of thoſe lines and angles, which, by looking on, he makes uſe of to meaſure that by.

3. Our ſenſes aſſiſt one another's teſtimony of the exiſtence of outward things.

§ 7. Fourthly, our ſenſes in many caſes bare witneſs to the truth of each other's report, concerning the exiſtence of ſenſible things without us. He that ſees a fire, may, if he doubt whether it be any thing more than a bare fancy, feel it too; and be convinced, by putting his hand in it. Which certainly could never be put into ſuch exquiſite pain, by a bare idea, or phantom, unleſs that the pain be a fancy too: which yet he cannot, when the burn is well, by raiſing the idea of it, bring upon himſelf again.

Thus I ſee, whilſt I write this, I can change the appearance of the paper; and by deſigning the letters, tell before-hand what new idea it ſhall exhibit the very next moment, barely by drawing my pen over it: which will neither appear (let me fancy as much as I will) if my hands ſtand ſtill; or though I move my pen, if my eyes be ſhut: nor when thoſe characters are once made on the paper, can I chuſe afterwards but ſee them as they are; that is, have the ideas of ſuch letters as I have made. Whence it is manifeſt, that they are not barely the ſport and play of my own imagination, when I find that the characters, that were made at the pleaſure of my own thoughts, do not obey them; nor yet ceaſe to be, whenever I ſhall fancy it, but continue to affect my ſenſes conſtantly and regularly, according to the figures I made them. To which if we will add, that the ſight of thoſe ſhall, from another man, draw ſuch ſounds, as I before-hand deſign they ſhall ſtand for; there will be little reaſon left to doubt, that thoſe words I write, do really exiſt without me, when they cauſe a long ſeries of regular ſounds to affect my ears, which could not be the effect of my imagination, nor could my memory retain them in that order.

This certainty is as great as our condition needs.

§ 8. But yet, if after all this any one will be ſo ſceptical, as to diſtruſt his ſenſes, and to affirm that all we ſee and hear, feel and taſte, think and do, during our whole being, is but the ſeries and deluding appearances of a long dream, whereof there is no reality; and therefore will queſtion the exiſtence of all things, or our knowledge of any thing: I muſt deſire him to conſider, that if all be a dream, then he doth but dream that he makes the queſtion; and ſo it is not much matter, that a waking man ſhould anſwer him. But yet, if he pleaſes, he may dream that I make him this anſwer, that the certainty of things exiſting in rerum natura, when we have the teſtimony of our ſenſes for it, is not only as great as our frame can attain to, but as our condition needs. For our faculties being ſuited not to the full extent of being, nor to a perfect, clear, comprehenſive knowledge of things, free from all doubt and ſcruple; but to the preſervation of us, in whom they are; and accommodated to the uſe of life; they ſerve to our purpoſe well enough, if they will but give us certain notice of thoſe things, which are convenient, or inconvenient to us. For he that ſees a candle burning, and hath experimented the force of its flame, by putting his finger in it, will little doubt that this is ſomething exiſting without him, which does him harm, and puts him to great pain: which is aſſurance enough, when no man requires greater certainty to govern his actions by, than what is as certain as his actions themſelves. And if our dreamer pleaſes to try, whether the glowing heat of a glaſs furnace, be barely a wandring imagination in a drowſy man's fancy; by putting his hand into it, he may perhaps be wakened into a certainty, greater than he could wiſh, that it is ſomething more than bare imagination. So that this evidence is as great, as we can deſire, being as certain to us as our pleaſure or pain, i. e. happineſs or miſery; beyond which we have no concernment, either of knowing or being. Such an aſſurance of the exiſtence of things without us, is ſufficient to direct us in the attaining the good, and avoiding the evil, which is cauſed by them, which is the important concernment we have of being made acquainted with them.

But reaches no farther than actual ſenſation.

§ 9. In fine then, when our ſenſes do actually convey into our underſtandings any idea, we cannot but be ſatisfied, that there doth ſomething at that time really exiſt without us, which doth affect our ſenſes, and by them give notice of itſelf to our apprehenſive faculties, and actually produce that idea, which we then perceive: and we cannot ſo far diſtruſt their teſtimony, as to doubt, that ſuch collections of ſimple ideas, as we have obſerved by our ſenſes to be united together, do really exiſt together. But this knowledge extends as far as the preſent teſtimony of our ſenſes, employed about particular objects, that do then affect them, and no farther. For if I ſaw ſuch a collection of ſimple ideas, as is wont to be called man, exiſting together one minute ſince, and am now alone; I cannot be certain that the ſame man exiſts now, ſince there is no neceſſary connection of his exiſtence a minute ſince, with his exiſtence now: by a thouſand ways he may ceaſe to be, ſince I had the teſtimony of my ſenſes for his exiſtence. And if I cannot be certain, that the man I ſaw laſt to day is now in being, I can leſs be certain that he is ſo, who hath been longer removed from my ſenſes, and I have not ſeen ſince yeſterday, or ſince the laſt year: and much leſs can I be certain of the exiſtence of men that I never ſaw. And therefore, tho' it be highly probable, that millions of men do now exiſt, yet whilſt I am alone writing this, I have not that certainty of it, which we ſtrictly call knowledge; tho' the great likelihood of it puts me paſt doubt, and it be reaſonable for me to do ſeveral things, upon the confidence that there are men (and men alſo of my acquaintance, with whom I have to do) now in the world: but this is but probability, not knowledge.

Folly to expect demonſtration in every thing.

§ 10. Whereby yet we may obſerve, how fooliſh and vain a thing it is for a man of a narrow knowledge, who having reaſon given him, to judge of the different evidence and probability of things, and to be ſwayed accordingly; how vain, I ſay, it is to expect demonſtration and certainty, in things not capable of it; and refuſe aſſent to very rational propoſitions, and act contrary to very plain and clear truths, becauſe they cannot be made out ſo evident, as to ſurmount every the leaſt (I will not ſay reaſon, but) pretence of doubting. He that, in the ordinary affairs of life, would admit of nothing, but direct, plain demonſtration, would be ſure of nothing in this world, but of periſhing quickly. The wholeſomneſs of his meat, or drink, would not give him reaſon to venture on it: and I would fain know, what it is he could do upon ſuch grounds, as are capable of no doubt, no objection.

Paſt exiſtence is known by memory.

§ 11. As when our ſenſes are actually employed about any object, we do know that it does exiſt; ſo by our memory we may be aſſured, that heretofore, things that affected our ſenſes, have exiſted. And thus we have knowledge of the paſt exiſtence of ſeveral things, whereof our ſenſes having informed us, our memories ſtill retain the ideas; and of this we are paſt all doubt, ſo long as we remember well. But this knowledge alſo reaches no farther than our ſenſes have formerly aſſured us. Thus ſeeing water at this inſtant, it is an unqueſtionable truth to me, that water doth exiſt: and remembring that I ſaw it yeſterday, it will alſo be always true; and as long as my memory retains it, always an undoubted propoſition to me, that water did exiſt the 10th of July 1688, as it will alſo be equally true, that a certain number of very fine colours did exiſt, which at the ſame time I ſaw upon a bubble of that water: but being now quite out of the ſight both of the water and bubbles too, it is no more certainly known to me that the water doth now exiſt, than that the bubbles, or colours, therein do ſo; it being no more neceſſary that water ſhould exiſt to day, becauſe it exiſted yeſterday, than that the colours, or bubbles, exiſt to day, becauſe they exiſted yeſterday; tho' it be exceedingly much more probable, becauſe water hath been obſerved to continue long in exiſtence, but bubbles and the colours on them quickly ceaſe to be.

The exiſtence of ſpirits not knowable.

§ 12. What ideas we have of ſpirits, and how we come by them, I have already ſhewn. But, tho' we have thoſe ideas in our minds, and know we have them there, the having the ideas of ſpirits does not make us know, that any ſuch things do exiſt without us, or that there are any finite ſpirits, or any other ſpiritual beings, but the eternal God. We have ground from revelation, and ſeveral other reaſons, to believe with aſſurance, that there are ſuch creatures:

but, our ſenſes not being able to diſcover them, we want the means of knowing their particular exiſtences. For we can no more know, that there are finite ſpirits really exiſting, by the idea we have of ſuch beings in our minds, than by the ideas any one has of fairies, or centaurs, he can come to know that things, anſwering thoſe ideas, do really exiſt.

And therefore, concerning the exiſtence of finite ſpirits, as well as ſeveral other things, we muſt content ourſelves with the evidence of faith; but univerſal, certain propoſitions, concerning this matter, are beyond our reach. For however true it may be, v. g. that all the intelligent ſpirits that God ever created do ſtill exiſt; yet it can never make a part of our certain knowledge. Theſe and the like propoſitions we may aſſent to, as highly probable, but are not, I fear, in this ſtate capable of knowing. We are not then to put others upon demonſtrating, nor ourſelves upon ſearch of univerſal certainty in all thoſe matters, wherein we are not capable of any other knowledge, but what our ſenſes give us in this, or that particular.

Particular propoſitions concerning exiſtences are knowable.

§ 13. By which it appears, that there are two ſorts of propoſitions. 1. There is one ſort of propoſitions concerning the exiſtence of any thing anſwerable to ſuch an idea: as having the idea of an elephant, phœnix, motion, or an angle, in my mind, the firſt and natural enquiry is, whether ſuch a thing does any where exiſt? And this knowledge is only of particulars. No exiſtence of any thing without us, but only of God, can certainly be known, farther than our ſenſes inform us. 2. There is another ſort of propoſitions, wherein is expreſſed the agreement, or diſagreement of our abſtract ideas, and their dependance one on another. Such propoſitions may be univerſal and certain. So, having the idea of God and myſelf, of fear and obedience, I cannot but be ſure that God is to be feared and obeyed by me: and this propoſition will be certain, concerning man in general, if I have made an abſtract idea of ſuch a ſpecies, whereof I am one particular. But yet this propoſition, how certain ſoever, that men ought to fear and obey God, proves not to me the exiſtence of men in the world, but will be true of all ſuch creatures, whenever they do exiſt: which certainty of ſuch general propoſitions, depends on the agreement, or diſagreement, is to be diſcovered in thoſe abſtract ideas.

And general propoſitions concerning abſtract ideas.

§ 14. In the former caſe, our knowledge is the conſequence of the exiſtence of things, producing ideas in our minds by our ſenſes: in the latter, knowledge is the conſequence of the ideas (be they what they will) that are in our minds producing their general, certain propoſitions. Many of theſe are called "æternæ veritates," and all of them indeed are ſo; not from being written all, or any of them, in the minds of all men, or that they were any of them propoſitions in any one's mind, till he, having got the abſtract ideas, joined, or ſeparated them by affirmation, or negation. But, whereſoever we can ſuppoſe ſuch a creature as man is, endowed with ſuch faculties, and thereby furniſhed with ſuch ideas as we have, we muſt conclude, he muſt needs, when he applies his thoughts to the conſideration of his ideas, know the truth of certain propoſitions, that will ariſe from the agreement, or diſagreement, which he will perceive in his own ideas. Such propoſitions are therefore called eternal truths, not becauſe they are eternal propoſitions actually formed, and antecedent to the underſtanding, that any time makes them; nor becauſe they are imprinted on the mind from any patterns, that are any where of them out of the mind, and exiſted before; but becauſe being once made about abſtract ideas, ſo as to be true, they will, whenever they can be ſuppoſed to be made again at any time paſt, or to come, by a mind having thoſe ideas, always, actually, be true. For, names being ſuppoſed to ſtand perpetually for the ſame ideas, and the ſame ideas having immutably the ſame habitudes one to another; propoſitions concerning any abſtract ideas, that are once true, muſt needs be eternal verities.

CHAP. XII.

Of the improvement of our knowledge.

CHAP. XII.

Knowledge is not from maxims.

IT having been the common received opinion, amongſt men of letters, that maxims were the foundation of all knowledge; and that the ſciences were, each of them, built upon certain præcognita, from whence the underſtanding was to take its riſe, and by which it was to conduct itſelf, in its enquiries into the matters, belonging to that ſcience; the beaten road of the ſchools has been, to lay down, in the beginning, one, or more, general propoſitions, as foundations, whereon to build the knowledge that was to be had of that ſubject. Theſe doctrines thus laid down, for foundations of any ſcience, were called principles, as the beginnings, from which we muſt ſet out, and look no farther backwards in our enquiries, as we have already obſerved.

The occaſion of the opinion.

§ 2. One thing, which might probably give an occaſion to this way of proceeding in other ſciences, (as was I ſuppoſe) the good ſucceſs it ſeemed to have in mathematicks, wherein men, being obſerved to attain a great certainty of knowledge, theſe ſciences came by pre-eminence to be called μαθήματα and μαθησις, learning, or things learned, thoroughly learned, as having, of all others, the greateſt certainty, clearneſs and evidence in them.

But from the comparing clear and diſtinct ideas.

§ 3. But if any one will conſider, he will (I gueſs) find that the great advancement and certainty of real knowledge which men arrived to in theſe ſciences, was not owing to the influence of theſe principles, nor derived from any peculiar advantage they received, from two, or three general maxims, laid down in the beginning; but from the clear, diſtinct, compleat ideas their thoughts were imployed about, and the relation of equality and exceſs ſo clear between ſome of them, that they had an intuitive knowledge, and by that a way to diſcover it in others, and this without the help of thoſe maxims. For I aſk, is it not poſſible for a young lad to know, that his whole body is bigger than his little finger, but by virtue of this axiom, that the whole is bigger than a part; nor be aſſured of it, till he has learned that maxim? Or cannot a country-wench know, that having received a ſhilling from one that owes her three, and a ſhilling alſo from another, that owes her three, that the remaining debts in each of their hands are equal? Cannot ſhe know this, I ſay, without ſhe fetch the certainty from this maxim, "that if you take equals from equals, the remainders will be equal," a maxim which poſſibly ſhe never heard, or thought of? I deſire any one to conſider, from what has been elſewhere ſaid, which is known firſt and cleareſt by moſt people, the particular inſtance, or the general rule; and which it is that gives life and birth to the other. Theſe general rules are but the comparing our more general and abſtract ideas, which are the workmanſhip of the mind, made, and names given to them, for the eaſier diſpatch in its reaſonings, and drawing into comprehenſive terms, and ſhort rules, its various and multiplied obſervations. But knowledge began in the mind, and was founded on particulars; tho' afterwards, perhaps, no notice be taken thereof: it being natural for the mind (forward ſtill to enlarge its knowledge) moſt attentively to lay up thoſe general notions, and make the proper uſe of them, which is to diſburden the memory of the cumberſome load of particulars. For I deſire it may be conſidered, what more certainty there is to a child, or any one, that his body, little finger and all, is bigger than his little finger alone, after you have given to his body the name whole, and to his little finger the name part, than he could have had before; or what new knowledge concerning his body, can theſe two relative terms give him, which he could not have without them? Could he not know that his body was bigger than his little finger, if his language were yet ſo imperfect, that he had no ſuch relative terms as whole and part? I aſk farther, when he has got theſe names, how is he more certain that his body is a whole, and his little finger a part, than he was, or might be certain, before he learned thoſe terms, that his body was bigger than his little finger? Any one may as reaſonably doubt, or deny that his little finger is a part of his body, as that it is leſs than his body. And he that can doubt whether it be leſs, will as certainly doubt whether it be a part. So that the maxim, the whole is bigger than a part, can never be made uſe of, to prove the little finger leſs than the body, but when it is uſeleſs, by being brought to convince one of a truth which he knows already. For he that does not certainly know that any parcel of matter, with another parcel of matter joined to it, is bigger than either of them alone, will never be able to know it, by the help of theſe two relative terms, whole and part, make of them what maxim you pleaſe.

Dangerous to build upon precarious principles.

§ 4. But be it in the mathematicks as it will, whether it be clearer, that, taking an inch from a black line of two inches, and an inch from a red line of two inches, the remaining parts of the two lines will be equal, or that, if you take equals from equals, the remainders will be equal: which, I ſay, of theſe two is the clearer and firſt known, I leave to any one to determine, it not being material to my preſent occaſion. That which I have here to do, is to enquire, whether, if it be the readieſt way to knowledge to begin with general maxims, and build upon them, if it be yet a ſafe way to take the principles, which are laid down in any other ſcience, as unqueſtionable truths; and ſo receive them without examination, and adhere to them, without ſuffering to be doubted of, becauſe mathematicians have been ſo happy, or ſo fair, to uſe none but ſelf-evident and undeniable. If this be ſo, I know not what may not paſs for truth in morality, what may not be introduced and proved in natural philoſophy.

Let that principle of ſome of the philoſophers, "that all is matter, and that "there is nothing elſe," be received for certain and indubitable, and it will be eaſy to be ſeen, by the writings of ſome that have revived it again in our days, what conſequences it will lead us into. Let any one, with Polemo, take the world; or with the Stoicks, the æther, or the ſun; or with Anaximenes, the air to be God; and what a divinity, religion and worſhip muſt we needs have! Nothing can be ſo dangerous as principles, thus taken up without queſtioning, or examination; eſpecially if they be ſuch as concern morality, which influence men's lives, and give a biaſs to all their actions. Who might not juſtly expect another kind of life in Ariſtippus, who placed happineſs in bodily pleaſure; and in Antiſthenes, who made virtue ſufficient to felicity? And he who, with Plato, ſhall place beatitude in the knowledge of God, will have his thoughts raiſed to other contemplations than thoſe who looked not beyond this ſpot of earth, and thoſe periſhing things, which are to be had in it. He that, with Archelaus, ſhall lay it down as a principle, that right and wrong, honeſt and diſhoneſt, are defined only by laws, and not by nature, will have other meaſures of moral rectitude and pravity, than thoſe, who take it for granted, that we are under obligations, antecedent to all human conſtitutions.

This is no certain way to truth.

§ 5. If therefore, thoſe that paſs for principles, are not certain (which we muſt have ſome way to know, that we may be able to diſtinguiſh them from thoſe that are doubtful) but are only made ſo to us, by our blind aſſent, we are liable to be miſled by them; and inſtead of being guided into truth, we ſhall, by principles, be only confirmed in miſtake and error.

But to compare clear, compleat ideas under ſteady names.

§ 6. But, ſince the knowledge of the certainty of principles, as well as of all other truths, depends only upon the perception we have of the agreement, or diſagreement of our ideas, the way to improve our knowledge, is not, I am ſure, blindly, and with an implicit faith, to receive and ſwallow principles; but is, I think, to get and fix in our minds clear, diſtinct and compleat ideas, as far as they are to be had, and annex to them proper and conſtant names. And thus, perhaps, without any other principles but barely conſidering thoſe ideas, and by comparing them one with another, finding their agreement or diſagreement, and their ſeveral relations and habitudes; we ſhall get more true and clear knowledge, by the conduct of this one rule, than by taking up principles, and thereby puting our minds into the diſpoſal of others.

The true method of advancing knowledge is

§ 7. We muſt therefore, if we will proceed, as reaſon adviſes, adapt our methods of enquiry to the nature of the ideas we examine, and the truth we ſearch after. General and certain truths are only founded in the habitudes and relations by conſidering our abſtract ideas.

of abſtract ideas. A ſagacious and methodical application of our thoughts for the finding out theſe relations, is the only way to diſcover all that can be put, with truth and certainty, concerning them, into general propoſitions. By what ſteps we are to proceed in theſe, is to be learned in the ſchools of the mathematicians, who from very plain and eaſy beginnings, by gentle degrees, and a continued chain of reaſonings, proceed to the diſcovery and demonſtration of truths, that appear at firſt ſight beyond human capacity. The art of finding proofs, and the admirable methods they have invented, for the ſingling out, and laying in order thoſe intermediate ideas, that demonſtratively ſhew the equality, or inequality of unapplicable quantities, is that which has carried them ſo far, and produced ſuch wonderful and unexpected diſcoveries: but whether ſomething like this, in reſpect of other ideas, as well as thoſe of magnitude, may not in time be found out, I will not determine. This, I think, I may ſay, that if other ideas, that are the real as well as nominal eſſences of their ſpecies, were purſued in the way familiar to mathematicians, they would carry our thoughts farther, and with greater evidence and clearneſs, than poſſibly we are apt to imagine.

By which morality, alſo, may be made clearer.

§ 8. This gave me the confidence to advance that conjecture, which I ſuggeſt, ch. iii. § 18. viz. that morality is capable of demonſtration, as well as mathematicks. For the ideas, that ethicks are converſant about, being all real eſſences, and ſuch as I imagine have a diſcoverable connection and agreement one with another ſo far as we can find their habitudes and relations, ſo far we ſhall be poſſeſſed of certain, real and general truths: and I doubt not, but if a right method were taken, a great part of morality might be made out with that clearneſs, that could leave, to a conſidering man, no more reaſon to doubt, than he could have to doubt of the truth of propoſitions in mathematicks, which have been demonſtrated to him.

But knowledge of bodies is to be improved only by experience.

§ 9. In our ſearch after the knowledge of ſubſtances, our want of ideas, that are ſuitable to ſuch a way of proceeding, obliges us to a quite different method. We advance not here as in the other (where our abſtract ideas are real, as well as nominal eſſences) by contemplating our ideas, and conſidering their relations and correſpondencies; that helps us very little, for the reaſons, that, in another place, we have at large ſet down. By which, I think it is evident, that ſubſtances afford matter of very little general knowledge; and the bare contemplation of their abſtract ideas, will carry us but a very little way in the ſearch of truth and certainty. What then are we to do for the improvement of our knowledge in ſubſtantial beings? Here we are to take a quite contrary courſe; the want of ideas of their real eſſences, ſends us from our own thoughts, to the things themſelves, as they exiſt. Experience here muſt teach me, what reaſon cannot; and it is by trying alone, that I can certainly know, what other qualities co-exiſt with thoſe of my complex idea, v. g. whether that yellow, heavy, fuſible body, I call gold, be malleable, or no; which experience (which way ever it prove, in that particular body, I examine) makes me not certain, that it is ſo in all, or any other yellow, heavy, fuſible bodies, but that which I have tried. Becauſe it is no conſequence, one way or the other, from my complex idea; the neceſſity, or inconſiſtence, of malleability hath no viſible connection with the combination of that colour, weight and fuſibility in any body. What I have ſaid here, of the nominal eſſence of gold, ſuppoſed to conſiſt of a body of ſuch a determinate colour, weight and fuſibility, will hold true, if malleableneſs, fixedneſs, and ſolubility in aqua regia be added to it. Our reaſonings from theſe ideas will carry us but a little way, in the certain diſcovery of the other properties, in thoſe maſſes of matter, wherein all theſe are to be found. Becauſe the other properties of ſuch bodies, depending not on theſe, but on that unknown, real eſſence, on which theſe alſo depend, we cannot by them diſcover the reſt; we can go no farther than the ſimple ideas of our nominal eſſence will carry us, which is very little beyond themſelves: and ſo afford us but very ſparingly any certain, univerſal and uſeful truths. For upon trial having found that particular piece (and all others of that colour, weight and fuſibility that I ever tried) malleable, that alſo makes now perhaps a part of my complex idea, part of my nominal eſſence of gold: whereby, tho' I make my complex idea, to which I affix the name gold, to conſiſt of more ſimple ideas than before; yet ſtill, it not containing the real eſſence of any ſpecies of bodies, it helps me not certainly to know (I ſay, to know, perhaps it may to conjecture) the other remaining properties of that body, farther than they have a viſible connection with ſome, or all of the ſimple ideas, that make up my nominal eſſence. For example, I cannot be certain, from this complex idea, whether gold be fixed, or no; becauſe, as before, there is no neceſſary connection, or inconſiſtence to be diſcovered betwixt a complex idea of a body, yellow, heavy, fuſible, malleable; betwixt theſe, I ſay, and fixedneſs: ſo that I may certainly know, that in whatſoever body theſe are found, there fixedneſs is ſure to be. Here again for aſſurance, I muſt apply myſelf to experience, as far as that reaches, I may have certain knowledge, but no farther.

This may procure us convenience, not ſcience.

§ 10. I DENY not but a man, accuſtomed to rational and regular experiments, ſhall be able to ſee farther into the nature of bodies, and gueſs righter at their yet unknown properties, than one that is a ſtranger to them: but yet, as I have ſaid, this is but judgment and opinion, not knowledge and certainty. This way of getting, and improving our knowledge in ſubſtances, only by experience and hiſtory, which is all that the weakneſs of our faculties in this ſtate of mediocrity, which we are in in this world, can attain to, makes me ſuſpect, that natural philoſophy is not capable of being made a ſcience. We are able, I imagine, to reach very little general knowledge, concerning the ſpecies of bodies, and their ſeveral properties. Experiments and hiſtorical obſervations we may have, from which we may draw advantages of eaſe and health, and thereby increaſe our ſtock of conveniences for this life; but beyond this I fear our talents reach not, nor are our faculties, as I gueſs, able to advance.

We are fitted for moral knowledge, and natural improvements.

§ 11. FROM whence it is obvious to conclude, that ſince our faculties are not fitted to penetrate into the internal fabrick, and real eſſences of bodies; but yet plainly diſcover to us the being of a God, and the knowledge of our ſelves, enough to lead us into a full and clear diſcovery of our duty, and great concernment; it will become us, as rational creatures, to employ thoſe faculties we have, about what they are moſt adapted to, and follow the direction of nature, where it ſeems to point us out the way. For it is rational to conclude, that our proper employment lies in thoſe enquiries, and in that ſort of knowledge which is moſt ſuited to our natural capacities, and carries in it our greateſt intereſt, i. e. the condition of our eternal eſtate. Hence I think I may conclude, that morality is the proper ſcience, and buſineſs of mankind in general; (who are both concerned, and fitted to ſearch out their ſummum bonum) as ſeveral arts, converſant about ſeveral parts of nature, are the lot and private talent of particular men, for the common uſe of human life, and their own particular ſubſiſtence in this world. Of what conſequence the diſcovery of one natural body, and its properties may be to human life, the whole great continent of America is a convincing inſtance: whoſe ignorance in uſeful arts, and want of the greateſt part of the conveniencies of life, in a country that abounded with all ſorts of natural plenty, I think, may be attributed to their ignorance, of what was to be found in a very ordinary, deſpicable ſtone, I mean the mineral of iron. And whatever we think of our parts, or improvements, in this part of the world, where knowledge and plenty ſeem to vie each with other; yet to any one, that will ſeriouſly reflect on it, I ſuppoſe it will appear paſt doubt, that, were the uſe of iron loſt among us, we ſhould in a few ages be unavoidably reduced to the wants and ignorance of the antient, ſavage Americans, whoſe natural endowments and proviſions came no way ſhort of thoſe of the moſt flouriſhing and polite nations. So that he, who firſt made known the uſe of that one contemptible mineral, may be truly ſtiled "the father of arts, and author of plenty."

But muſt beware of hypotheſes and wrong principles.

§ 12. I WOULD not, therefore, be thought to diſeſteem, or diſſuade the ſtudy of nature. I readily agree the contemplation of his works gives us occaſion to admire, revere, and glorify their author: and, if rightly directed, may be of greater benefit to mankind, than the monuments of exemplary charity, that have, at ſo great a charge, been raiſed by the founders of hoſpitals and alms-houſes. He that firſt invented printing, diſcovered the uſe of the compaſs, or made publick the virtue and right uſe of Kin Kina, did more for the propagation of knowledge, for the ſupplying, and increaſe of uſeful commodities, and ſaved more from the grave, than thoſe who built colleges, work-houſes and hoſpitals. All that I would ſay, is, that we ſhould not be too forwardly poſſeſſed with the opinion, or expectation of knowledge, where it is not to be had; or by ways that will not attain to it: that we ſhould not take doubtful ſyſtems for compleat ſciences, nor unintelligible notions for ſcientifical demonſtrations. In the knowledge of bodies, we muſt be content to glean what we can, from particular experiments: ſince we cannot, from a diſcovery of their real eſſences, graſp at a time whole ſheaves; and in bundles comprehend the nature and properties of whole ſpecies together. Where our enquiry is concerning co-exiſtence, or repugnancy to co-exiſt, which by contemplation of our ideas we cannot diſcover; there experience, obſervation, and natural hiſtory, muſt give us, by our ſenſes, and by retail, an inſight into corporeal ſubſtances. The knowledge of bodies we muſt get by our ſenſes, warily imployed in taking notice of their qualities and operations on one another: and what we hope to know of ſeparate ſpirits in this world, we muſt, I think, expect only from revelation. He that ſhall conſider how little general maxims, precarious principles, and hypotheſes laid down at pleaſure, have promoted true knowledge, or helped to ſatisfy the inquiries of rational men after real improvements; how little, I ſay, the ſetting out at that end has, for many ages together, advanced men's progreſs towards the knowledge of natural philoſophy, will think we have reaſon to thank thoſe, who in this latter age have taken another courſe, and have trod out to us, tho' not an eaſier way to learned ignorance, yet a ſurer way to profitable knowledge.

The true uſe of hypotheſes.

§ 13. Not that we may not, to explain any phænomena of nature, make uſe of any probable hypotheſis whatſoever: hypotheſes, if they are well made, are, at leaſt, great helps to the memory, and often direct us to new diſcoveries. But my meaning is, that we ſhould not take up any one too haſtily (which the mind, that would always penetrate into the cauſes of things, and have principles to reſt on, is very apt to do) till we have very well examined particulars, and made ſeveral experiments, in that thing which we would explain by our hypotheſis, and ſee whether it will agree to them all; whether our principles will carry us quite thro', and not be as inconſiſtent with one phænomenon of nature, as they ſeem to accommodate and explain another. And at leaſt that we take care, that the name of principles deceive us not, nor impoſe on us, by making us receive that for an unqueſtionable truth, which is really, at beſt, but a very doubtful conjecture, ſuch as are moſt (I had almoſt ſaid all) of the hypotheſes in natural philoſophy.

Clear and diſtinct ideas, with ſettled names, and the finding of thoſe, which ſhew their agreement, or diſagreement, are the ways to inlarge our knowledge.

§ 14. But whether natural philoſophy be capable of certainty, or no, the ways to enlarge our knowledge, as far as we are capable, ſeem to me, in ſhort, to be theſe two:

First, the firſt is to get and ſettle in our minds determined ideas of thoſe things, whereof we have general, or ſpecifick names; at leaſt of ſo many of them as we would conſider and improve our knowledge in, or reaſon about. And, if they be ſpecifick ideas of ſubſtances, we ſhould endeavour alſo to make them as compleat as we can, whereby I mean, that we ſhould put together as many ſimple ideas as being conſtantly obſerved to co-exiſt, may perfectly determine the ſpecies: and each of thoſe ſimple ideas, which are the ingredients of our complex one, ſhould be clear and diſtinct in our minds. For it being evident, that our knowledge cannot exceed our ideas; as far as they are either imperfect, confuſed, or obſcure, we cannot expect to have certain, perfect, or clear knowledge.

Secondly, the other is the art of finding out thoſe intermediate ideas, which may ſhew us the agreement, or repugnancy, of other ideas, which cannot be immediately compared.

Mathematicks, an inſtance of it.

§ 15. That theſe two (and not the relying on maxims, and drawing conſequences from ſome general propoſitions) are the right method of improving our knowledge, in the ideas of other modes beſides thoſe of quantity, the conſideration of mathematical knowledge will eaſily inform us. Where firſt we ſhall find, that he that has not a perfect and clear idea of thoſe angles, or figures, of which he deſires to know any thing, is utterly thereby incapable of any knowledge about them. Suppoſe but a man, not to have a perfect, exact idea of a right angle, a ſcalenum, or trapezium; and there is nothing more certain, than that he will in vain ſeek any demonſtration about them. Farther, it is evident, that it was not the influence of thoſe maxims, which are taken for principles in mathematicks, that hath led the maſters of that ſcience into thoſe wonderful diſcoveries they have made. Let a man of good parts know all the maxims, generally made uſe of in mathematicks, never ſo perfectly, and contemplate their extent and conſequences, as much as he pleaſes, he will, by their aſſiſtance, I ſuppoſe, ſcarce ever come to know that the ſquare of the hypothenuſe in a right-angled triangle, is equal to the ſquares of two other ſides. The knowledge, that the whole is equal to all its parts, and if you take equals from equals, the remainder will be equal, &c. helped him not, I preſume, to this demonſtration: and a man may, I think, pore long enough on thoſe axioms, without ever ſeeing one jot the more of mathematical truths. They have been diſcovered by the thoughts otherwiſe applied: the mind had other objects, other views before it, far different from thoſe maxims, when it firſt got the knowledge of ſuch kind of truths in mathematicks, which men, well enough acquainted with thoſe received axioms, but ignorant of their method, who firſt made theſe demonſtrations, can never ſufficiently admire. And who knows what methods, to inlarge our knowledge in other parts of ſcience, may, hereafter, be invented, anſwering that of algebra in mathematicks, which ſo readily finds out ideas of quantities, to meaſure others by; whoſe equality, or proportion, we could, otherwiſe, very hardly, or, perhaps, never come to know?

CHAP. XIII.

Some farther conſiderations concerning our knowledge.

CHAP. XIII.

Our knowledge partly neceſſary, partly voluntary.

§ 1. OUR knowledge, as in other things, ſo in this, has a great conformity with our ſight, that it is neither wholly neceſſary, nor wholly voluntary. If our knowledge were altogether neceſſary, all men's knowledge would not only be alike, but every man would know all that is knowable: and, if it were wholly voluntary, ſome men ſo little regard, or value it, that they would have extreme little, or none at all. Men, that have ſenſes, cannot chuſe but receive ſome ideas by them; and, if they have memory, they cannot but retain ſome of them; and if they have any diſtinguiſhing faculty, cannot but perceive the agreement, or diſagreement, of ſome of them, one with another: as he, that has eyes, if he will open them by day, cannot but ſee ſome objects, and perceive a difference in them. But tho' a man, with his eyes open in the light, cannot but ſee; yet there be certain objects, which he may chuſe whether he will turn his eyes to: there may be in his reach a book containing pictures and diſcourſes, capable to delight and inſtruct him, which yet he may never have the will to open, never take the pains to look into.

The application voluntary; but we know as things are, not as we pleaſe.

§ 2. THERE is alſo another thing in a man's power, and that is, tho' he turns his eyes ſometimes towards an object, yet he may chuſe whether he will curiouſly ſurvey it, and, with an intent application, endeavour to obſerve accurately all that is viſible in it. But yet what he does ſee, he cannot ſee otherwiſe than he does. It depends not on his will to ſee that black, which appears yellow; nor to perſuade himſelf, that what actually ſcalds him, feels cold. The earth will not appear painted with flowers, nor the fields covered with verdure, whenever he has a mind to it: in the cold winter, he cannot help ſeeing it white and hoary, if he will look abroad. Juſt thus it is with our underſtanding; all that is voluntary in our knowledge, is the employing, or with-holding, any of our faculties, from this, or that ſort of objects, and a more, or leſs, accurate ſurvey of them: but they being imployed, our will hath no power to determine the knowledge of the mind one way or other; that is done only by the objects themſelves, as far as they are clearly diſcovered. And, therefore, as far as men's ſenſes are converſant about external objects, the mind cannot but receive thoſe ideas, which are preſented by them, and be informed of the exiſtence of things without: and ſo far as men's thoughts converſe with their own determined ideas, they cannot but, in ſome meaſure, obſerve the agreement, and diſagreement, that is to be found amongſt ſome of them, which is ſo far knowledge: and if they have names for thoſe ideas, which they have thus conſidered, they muſt needs be aſſured of the truth of thoſe propoſitions, which expreſs that agreement, or diſagreement, they perceive in them, and be undoubtedly convinced of thoſe truths. For what a man ſees, he cannot but ſee; and what he perceives, he cannot but know that he perceives.

Inſtance, in numbers.

§ 3. THUS, he that has got the ideas of numbers, and hath taken the pains to compare one, two, and three, to ſix, cannot chuſe but know that they are equal: he that hath got the idea of a triangle, and found the ways to meaſure its angles, and their magnitudes, is certain that its three angles are equal to two right ones; and can as little doubt of that, as of this truth, "that it is impoſſible for the ſame thing to be, and not to be."

In natural religion.

HE alſo that hath the idea of an intelligent, but frail and weak being, made by, and depending on another, who is eternal, omnipotent, perfectly wiſe and good, will as certainly know that man is to honour, fear, and obey God, as that the ſun ſhines, when he ſees it. For if he hath but the ideas of two ſuch beings in his mind, and will turn his thoughts that way, and conſider them, he will as certainly find that the inferior, finite, and dependant, is under an obligation to obey the ſupreme and infinite, as he is certain to find, that three, four, and ſeven, are leſs than fifteen, if he will conſider and compute thoſe numbers; nor can he be ſurer in a clear morning that the ſun is riſen, if he will but open his eyes, and turn them that way. But yet theſe truths, being never ſo certain, never ſo clear, he may be ignorant of either, or all of them, who will never take the pains to imploy his faculties, as he ſhould, to inform himſelf about them.

CHAP. XIV.

Of judgment.

CHAP. XIV.

Our knowledge being ſhort, we want ſomething elſe.

§ 1. THE underſtanding faculties being given to man, not barely for ſpeculation, but alſo for the conduct of his life, man would be at a great loſs, if he had nothing to direct him, but what has the certainty of true knowledge. For that being very ſhort and ſcanty, as we have ſeen, he would be often utterly in the dark, and in moſt of the actions of his life, perfectly at a ſtand, had he nothing to guide him in the abſence of clear and certain knowledge. He that will not eat, till he has demonſtration that it will nouriſh him; he that will not ſtir, till he infallibly knows the buſineſs, he goes about, will ſucceed; will have little elſe to do, but ſit ſtill and periſh.

What uſe to be made of this twilight ſtate.

§ 2. THEREFORE, as God has ſet ſome things in broad day-light; as he has given us ſome certain knowledge, tho' limited to a few things in compariſon, probably, as a taſte of what intellectual creatures are capable of, to exite in us a deſire and endeavour after a better ſtate: ſo, in the greateſt part of our concernment, he has afforded us only the twilight, as I may ſo ſay, of probability; ſuitable, I preſume, to that ſtate of mediocrity and probationerſhip, he has been pleaſed to place us in here; wherein, to check our over-confidence, and preſumption, we might, by every day's experience, be made ſenſible of our ſhort-ſightedneſs, and liableneſs to error; the ſenſe whereof might be a conſtant admonition to us, to ſpend the days of this our pilgrimage with induſtry and care, in the ſearch and following of that way, which might lead us to a ſtate of greater perfection: it being highly rational to think, even were revelation ſilent in the caſe, that as men employ thoſe talents God has given them here, they ſhall accordingly receive their rewards, at the cloſe of the day, when their ſun ſhall ſet, and night ſhall put an end to their labours.

CHAP. XIV.

Judgment ſupplies the want of knowledge.

§ 3. **The** faculty, which God has given man to ſupply the want of clear and certain knowledge, in caſes where that cannot be had, is judgment, whereby the mind takes its ideas to agree, or diſagree; or which is the ſame, any propoſition to be true, or falſe, without perceiving a demonſtrative evidence in the proofs. The mind ſometimes exerciſes this judgment out of neceſſity, where demonſtrative proofs, and certain knowledge, are not to be had; and ſometimes out of lazineſs, unſkilfulneſs, or haſte, even where demonſtrative and certain proofs are to be had. Men often ſtay not warily to examine the agreement, or diſagreement, of two ideas, which they are deſirous, or concerned to know; but either incapable of ſuch attention, as is requiſite in a long train of gradations, or impatient of delay, lightly caſt their eyes on, or wholly paſs by the proofs; and ſo without making out the demonſtration, determine of the agreement, or diſagreement, of two ideas, as it were by a view of them, as they are at a diſtance, and take it to be the one or the other, as ſeems moſt likely to them upon ſuch a looſe ſurvey. This faculty of the mind, when it is exerciſed immediately about things, is called judgment: when about truths delivered in words, is moſt commonly called aſſent, or diſſent: which being the moſt uſual way, wherein the mind has occaſion to employ this faculty, I ſhall under theſe terms treat of it, at leaſt liable in our language to equivocation.

Judgment is the preſuming things to be ſo, without perceiving it.

§ 4. **Thus** the mind has two faculties, converſant about truth and falſhood.

First, knowledge, whereby it certainly perceives, and is undoubtedly ſatisfied of the agreement, or diſagreement, of any ideas.

Secondly, judgment, which is the putting ideas together, or ſeparating them from one another in the mind, when their certain agreement, or diſagreement, is not perceived, but preſumed to be ſo; which is, as the word imports, taken to be ſo, before it certainly appears. And if it ſo unites, or ſeparates them, as in reality things are, it is right judgment.

CHAP. XV.

Of probability.

CHAP. XV.

Probability is the appearance of agreement, upon fallible proofs.

§ 1. AS demonſtration is the ſhewing the agreement, or diſagreement, of two ideas, by the intervention of one, or more proofs, which have a conſtant, immutable, and viſible connection one with another; ſo probability is nothing but the appearance of ſuch an agreement, or diſagreement, by the intervention of proofs, whoſe connection is not conſtant and immutable, or at leaſt is not perceived to be ſo, but is, or appears for the moſt part to be ſo, and is enough to induce the mind to judge the propoſition to be true, or falſe, rather than the contrary. For example: in the demonſtration of it, a man perceives the certain, immutable connection there is of equality between the three angles of a triangle, and thoſe intermediate ones, which are made uſe of, to ſhew their equality to two right ones; and ſo, by an intuitive knowledge of the agreement, or diſagreement, of the intermediate ideas, in each ſtep of the progreſs, the whole ſeries is continued with an evidence, which clearly ſhews the agreement, or diſagreement, of thoſe three angles, in equality to two right ones: and thus he has certain knowledge that it is ſo. But another man, who never took the pains to obſerve the demonſtration, hearing a mathematician, a man of credit, affirm the three angles of a triangle to be equal to two right ones, aſſents to it, i. e. receives it for true. In which caſe the foundation of his aſſent is the probability of the thing, the proof being ſuch as for the moſt part carries truth with it: the man, on whoſe teſtimony he receives it, not being wont to affirm any thing contrary to, or beſides his knowledge, eſpecially in matters of this kind. So that that which cauſes his aſſent to this propoſition, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones, that which makes him take theſe ideas to agree, without knowing them to do ſo, is the wonted veracity of the ſpeaker in other caſes, or his ſuppoſed veracity in this.

It is to ſupply the want of knowledge.

§ 2. Our knowledge, as has been ſhewn, being very narrow, and we not happy enough to find certain truth, in every thing which we have occaſion to conſider; moſt of the propoſitions we think, reaſon, diſcourſe, nay act upon, are ſuch, as we cannot have undoubted knowledge of their truth: yet ſome of them border ſo near upon certainty, that we make no doubt at all about them; but aſſent to them as firmly, and act, according to that aſſent, as reſolutely as if they were infallibly demonſtrated, and that our knowledge of them was perfect and certain. But there being degrees herein, from the very neighbourhood of certainty and demonſtration, quite down to improbability and unlikelineſs, even to the confines of impoſſibility; and alſo degrees of aſſent from full aſſurance and confidence, quite down to conjecture, doubt and diſtruſt; I ſhall come now (having, as I think, found out the bounds of human knowledge and certainty) in the next place, to conſider the ſeveral degrees and grounds of probability, and aſſent, or faith.

Being that, which makes us preſume things to be true, before we know them to be ſo.

§ 3. Probability is likelineſs to be true; the very notation of the word ſignifying ſuch a propoſition, for which there be arguments, or proofs, to make it paſs, or be received for true. The entertainment the mind gives this ſort of propoſitions, is called belief, aſſent, or opinion, which is the admitting, or receiving any propoſition for true, upon arguments, or proofs that are found to perſuade us to receive it as true, without certain knowledge that it is ſo. And herein lies the difference between probability and certainty, faith and knowledge, that in all the parts of knowledge there is intuition; each immediate idea, each ſtep has its viſible and certain connection; in belief, not ſo. That, which makes me believe, is ſomething extraneous to the thing I believe; ſomething not evidently joined on both ſides to, and ſo not manifeſtly ſhewing the agreement, or diſagreement, of thoſe ideas that are under conſideration.

The grounds of probability are two; conformity with our own experience, or the teſtimony of other's experience.

§ 4. Probability, then, being to ſupply the defect of our knowledge, and to guide us, where that fails, is always converſant about propoſitions, whereof we have no certainty, but only ſome inducements to receive them for true. The grounds of it are, in ſhort, theſe two following.

First, the conformity of any thing with our own knowledge, obſervation, and experience.

Secondly, the teſtimony of others, vouching their obſervation and experience. In the teſtimony of others is to be conſidered, 1. The number. 2. The integrity. 3. The ſkill of the witneſſes. 4. The deſign of the author, where it is a teſtimony out of a book cited. 5. The conſiſtency of the parts, and circumſtances of the relation. 6. Contrary teſtimonies.

In this all the agreements pro and con, ought to be examined, before we come to a judgment.

§ 5. Probability wanting that intuitive evidence, which infallibly determines the underſtanding, and produces certain knowledge, the mind, if it would proceed rationally, ought to examine all the grounds of probability, and ſee how they make more or leſs, for or againſt any propoſition, before it aſſents to, or diſſents from it; and upon a due ballancing the whole, reject or receive it, with a more or leſs firm aſſent, proportionably to the preponderancy of the greater grounds of probability, on one ſide or the other. For example:

If I myſelf ſee a man walk on the ice, it is paſt probability, it is knowledge; but if another man tells me he ſaw a man in England, in the midſt of a ſharp winter, walk upon water hardened with cold; this has ſo great conformity with what is uſually obſerved to happen, that I am diſpoſed, by the nature of the thing itſelf, to aſſent to it, unleſs ſome manifeſt ſuſpicion attend the relation of that matter of fact. But, if the ſame thing be told to one born between the tropicks, who never ſaw, nor heard of, any ſuch thing before, there the whole probability relies on teſtimony: and, as the relators are more in number, and of more credit, and have no intereſt to ſpeak contrary to the truth; ſo that matter of fact is like to find more, or leſs belief. Tho' to a man, whoſe experience has been always quite contrary, and has never heard of any thing like it, the moſt untainted credit of a witneſs will ſcarce be able to find belief. As it happened to a Dutch ambaſſador, who entertaining the king of Siam with the particularities of Holland, which he was inquiſitive after, amongſt other things told him, that the water in his country would ſometimes, in cold weather, be ſo hard, that men walked upon it, and that it would bear an elephant if he were there. To which the king replied, “ Hitherto I have believed the ſtrange things you “ have told me, becauſe I look upon you as a ſober, fair man; but now I am “ ſure you lie.”

They being capable of great variety.

§ 6. Upon theſe grounds depends the probability of any propoſition: and as the conformity of our knowledge, as the certainty of obſervations, as the frequency and conſtancy of experience, and the number and credibility of teſtimonies, do more or leſs agree or diſagree with it, ſo is any propoſition, in itſelf, more or leſs probable. There is another, I confeſs, which tho' by itſelf it be no true ground of probability, yet is often made uſe of for one, by which men moſt commonly regulate their aſſent, and upon which they pin their faith, more than any thing elſe, and that is the opinion of others: tho' there cannot be a more dangerous thing to rely on, nor more likely to miſlead one; ſince there is much more falſhood and error among men, than truth and knowledge. And, if the opinions and perſuaſions of others, whom we know and think well of, be a ground of aſſent, men have reaſon to be Heathens in Japan, Mahometans in Turkey, Papiſts in Spain, Proteſtants in England, and Lutherans in Sweden. But of this wrong ground of aſſent, I ſhall have occaſion to ſpeak more at large in another place.

CHAP. XVI.

Of the degrees of aſſent.

CHAP. XVI.

Our aſſent ought to be regulated by the grounds of probability.

§ 1. THE grounds of probability we have laid down, in the foregoing chapter; as they are the foundations, on which our aſſent is built, ſo are they alſo the meaſure, whereby its ſeveral degrees are, or ought to be regulated; only we are to take notice, that whatever grounds of probability there may be, they yet operate no further on the mind, which ſearches after truth, and endeavours to judge right, than they appear, at leaſt in the firſt judgment, or ſearch, that the mind makes. I confeſs, in the opinions men have, and firmly ſtick to, in the world, their aſſent is not always from an actual view of the reaſons that at firſt prevailed with them: it being in many caſes almoſt impoſſible, and in moſt very hard, even for thoſe, who have very admirable memories, to retain all the proofs, which upon a due examination, made them embrace that ſide of the queſtion. It ſuffices that they have once with care and fairneſs ſifted the mater, as far as they could; and that they have ſearched into all the particulars, that they could imagine to give any light to the queſtion; and, with the beſt of their ſkill, caſt up the account, upon the whole evidence: and thus, having once found, on which ſide the probability appeared to them, after as full and exact an enquiry, as they can make, they lay up the concluſion in their memories, as a truth they have diſcovered; and for the future they remain ſatisfied with the teſtimony of their memories, that this is the opinion, that by the proofs they have once ſeen of it, deſerves ſuch a degree of their aſſent, as they afford it.

Theſe cannot always be actually in view, and then we muſt content ourſelves with the remembrance, that we once ſaw ground for ſuch a degree of aſſent.

§ 2. This is all that the greateſt part of men are capable of doing, in regulating their opinions and judgments; unleſs a man will exact of them, either to retain diſtinctly in their memories all the proofs, concerning any probable truth, and that too in the ſame order, and regular deduction of conſequences in which they have formerly placed or ſeen them; which ſometimes is enough to fill a large volume, upon one ſingle queſtion: or elſe they muſt require a man, for every opinion that he embraces, every day to examine the proofs: both which are impoſſible. It is unavoidable therefore, that the memory be relied on, in the caſe, and that men be perſuaded of ſeveral opinions, whereof the proofs are not actually in their thoughts; nay, which perhaps they are not able actually to recal. Without this, the greateſt part of men muſt be either very ſcepticks, or change every moment, and yield themſelves up to whoever, having lately ſtudied the queſtion, offers them arguments; which, for want of memory, they are not able preſently to anſwer.

The ill conſequence of this, if our former judgment were not rightly made.

§ 3. I CANNOT but own, that men's ſticking to their paſt judgment, and adhering firmly to concluſions formerly made, is often the cauſe of great obſtinacy in error and miſtake. But the fault is, not that they rely on their memories, for what they have before well judged; but becauſe they judged before they had well examined. May we not find a great number (not to ſay the greateſt part) of men, that think they have formed right judgments of ſeveral matters, and that for no other reaſon, but becauſe they never thought otherwiſe? who imagine themſelves to have judged right, only becauſe they never queſtioned, never examined their own opinions? Which is, indeed, to think they judged right, becauſe they never judged at all: and yet theſe of all men hold their opinions with the greateſt ſtiffneſs; thoſe being generally the moſt fierce and firm in their tenets, who have leaſt examined them. What we once know, we are certain is ſo; and we may be ſecure, that there are no latent proofs undiſcovered, which may overturn our knowledge, or bring it in doubt. But in matters of probability, it is not in every caſe we can be ſure that we have all the particulars before us that any way concern the queſtion; and that there is no evidence behind, and yet unſeen, which may caſt the probability on the other ſide, and outweigh all that at preſent ſeems to preponderate with us. Who almoſt is there that hath the leiſure, patience, and means, to collect together all the proofs, concerning moſt of the opinions he has, ſo as ſafely to conclude that he hath a clear and full view; and that there is no more to be alledged for his better information? And yet we are forced to determine ourſelves on the one ſide or other. The conduct of our lives, and the management of our great concerns, will not bear delay; for thoſe depend, for the moſt part, on the determination of our judgment, in points, wherein we are not capable of certain and demonſtrative knowledge, and wherein it is neceſſary for us to embrace the one ſide, or the other.

The right uſe of it, is mutual charity and forbearance.

§ 4. SINCE therefore it is unavoidable to the greateſt part of men, if not all, to have ſeveral opinions, without certain and indubitable proofs of their truths; and it carries too great an imputation of ignorance, lightneſs, or folly, for men to quit and renounce their former tenets preſently, upon the offer of an argument, which they cannot immediately anſwer, and ſhew the inſufficiency of: it would methinks become all men to maintain peace, and the common offices of humanity and friendſhip, in the diverſity of opinions; ſince we cannot reaſonably expect, that any one ſhould readily and obſequiouſly quit his own opinion, and embrace ours, with a blind reſignation to an authority, which the underſtanding of man acknowledges not. For however it may often miſtake, it can own no other guide but reaſon, nor blindly ſubmit to the will and dictates of another. If he you would bring over to your ſentiments, be one that examines before he aſſents, you muſt give him leave at his leiſure to go over the account again, and recalling what is out of his mind, examine all the particulars, to ſee on which ſide the advantage lies: and if he will not think our arguments of weight enough to ingage him a-new in ſo much pains, it is but what we do often ourſelves in the like caſe; and we ſhould take it amiſs, if others ſhould preſcribe to us what points we ſhould ſtudy. And, if he be one who takes his opinions upon truſt, how can we imagine that he ſhould renounce thoſe tenets, which time and cuſtom have ſo ſettled in his mind, that he thinks them ſelf-evident, and of an unqueſtionable certainty; or which he takes to be impreſſions, he has received from God himſelf, or from men ſent by him? How can we expect, I ſay, that opinions, thus ſettled, ſhould be given up to the arguments, or authority of a ſtranger, or adverſary; eſpecially, if there be any ſuppoſition of intereſt, or deſign, as there never fails to be where men find themſelves ill-treated? We ſhould do well to commiſerate our mutual ignorance, and endeavour to remove it, in all the gentle and fair ways of information; and not inſtantly treat others ill, as obſtinate and perverſe, becauſe they will not renounce their own, and receive our opinions, or at leaſt thoſe we would force upon them, when it is more than probable, that we are no leſs obſtinate in not embracing ſome of theirs. For where is the man that has unconteſtable evidence of the truth of all that he holds, or of the falſhood of all he condemns; or can ſay, that he has examined to the bottom, all his own, or other men's opinions? The neceſſity of believing without knowledge, nay, often upon very ſlight grounds, in this fleeting ſtate of action and blindneſs we are in, ſhould make us more buſy and careful to inform ourſelves, than conſtrain others. At leaſt, thoſe who have not thorowly examined to the bottom all their own tenets, muſt confeſs they are unfit to preſcribe to others; and are unreaſonable in impoſing that as truth, on other men's belief, which they themſelves have not ſearched into, nor weighed the arguments of probability, on which they ſhould receive or reject it. Thoſe who have fairly and truly examined, and are thereby got paſt doubt, in all the doctrines they profeſs, and govern themſelves by, would have a juſter pretence to require others to follow them: but theſe are ſo few in number, and find ſo little reaſon to be magiſterial in their opinions, that nothing inſolent and imperious is to be expected from them: and there is reaſon to think, that if men were better inſtructed themſelves, they would be leſs impoſing on others.

Probability is either of matter of fact, or ſpeculation.

§ 5. BUT to return to the grounds of aſſent, and the ſeveral degrees of it: We are to take notice, that the propoſitions we receive, upon inducements of probability, are of two ſorts; either concerning ſome particular exiſtence, or, as it is uſually termed, matter of fact, which, falling under obſervation, is capable of human teſtimony; or elſe concerning things, which, being beyond the diſcovery of our ſenſes, are not capable of any ſuch teſtimony.

The concurrent experience of all other men with ours, produces aſſurance, approaching to knowledge.

§ 6. CONCERNING the firſt of theſe, viz. particular matter of fact.

FIRST, where any particular thing, conſonant to the conſtant obſervation of our ſelves, and others, in the like caſe, comes atteſted, by the concurrent reports of all that mention it, we receive it as eaſily, and build as firmly upon it, as if it were certain knowledge; and we reaſon and act thereupon, with as little doubt, as if it were perfect demonſtration. Thus, if all Engliſhmen, who have occaſion to mention it, ſhould affirm that it froze in England the laſt winter, or that there were ſwallows ſeen there in the ſummer; I think a man could almoſt as little doubt of it, as that ſeven and four are eleven. The firſt therefore, and higheſt degree of probability, is, when the general conſent of all men, in all ages, as far as it can be known, concurs with a man's conſtant and never-failing experience in like caſes, to confirm the truth of any particular matter of fact, atteſted by fair witneſſes: ſuch are all the ſtated conſtitutions and properties of bodies, and the regular proceedings of cauſes and effects in the ordinary courſe of nature. This we call an argument from the nature of things themſelves. For what our own and other men's conſtant obſervation has found always to be after the ſame manner, that we with reaſon conclude to be the effects of ſteady and regular cauſes, tho' they come not within the reach of our knowledge. Thus, that fire warmed a man, made lead fluid, and changed the colour, or conſiſtency in wood, or charcoal; that iron ſunk in water, and ſwam in quickſilver: theſe, and the like propoſitions about particular facts, being agreeable to our conſtant experience, as often as we have to do with theſe matters; and being generally ſpoke of (when mentioned by others) as things found conſtantly to be ſo, and therefore not ſo much as controverted by any body; we are put paſt doubt, that a relation, affirming any ſuch thing to have been true, or any predication that it will happen again in the ſame manner, is very true. Theſe probabilities riſe ſo near to certainty, that they govern our thoughts as abſolutely, and influence all our actions as fully, as the moſt evident demonſtration; and in what concerns us, we make little or no difference between them and certain knowledge. Our belief thus grounded, riſes to aſſurance.

Unqueſtionable teſtimony and experience for the moſt part produce confidence.

§ 7. SECONDLY, the next degree of probability is, when I find by my own experience, and the agreement of all others that mention it, a thing to be, for the moſt part ſo; and that the particular inſtance of it is atteſted by many and undoubted witneſſes, v. g. hiſtory giving us ſuch an account of men in all ages; and my own experience, as far as I had an opportunity to obſerve, confirming it, that moſt men prefer their private advantage to the publick: if all hiſtorians that write of Tiberius, ſay that Tiberius did ſo, it is extremely probable. And, in this caſe, our aſſent has a ſufficient foundation to raiſe itſelf to a degree, which we may call confidence.

Fair teſtimony, and the nature of the thing indifferent, produces alſo confident belief.

§ 8. THIRDLY, in things that happen indifferently, as that a bird ſhould fly this or that way; that it ſhould thunder on a man's right, or left hand, &c. when any particular matter of fact is vouched, by the concurrent teſtimony of unſuſpected witneſſes, there our aſſent is alſo unavoidable. Thus, that there is ſuch a city in Italy as Rome; that about ſeventeen hundred years ago, there lived in it a man, called Julius Cæſar; that he was a general; and that he won a battle againſt another, called Pompey: this, tho' in the nature of the thing there be nothing for, nor againſt it, yet being related by hiſtorians of credit, and contradicted by no one writer, a man cannot avoid believing it, and can as little doubt of it, as he does of the being and actions of his own acquaintance, whereof he himſelf is a witneſs.

Experience and teſtimonies claſhing, infinitely vary the degrees of probability.

§ 9. THUS far the matter goes eaſy enough. Probability upon ſuch grounds carries ſo much evidence with it, that it naturally determines the judgment, and leaves us as little liberty to believe, or diſbelieve, as a demonſtration does, whether we will know, or be ignorant. The difficulty is, when teſtimonies contradict common experience, and the reports of hiſtory and witneſſes claſh with the ordinary courſe of nature, or with one another; there it is, where diligence, attention, and exactneſs is required, to form a right judgment, and to proportion the aſſent to the different evidence and probability of the thing; which riſes and falls, according as thoſe two foundations of credibility, viz. common obſervation in like caſes, and particular teſtimonies in that particular inſtance, favour, or contradict it. Theſe are liable to ſo great variety of contrary obſervations, circumſtances, reports, different qualifications, tempers, deſigns, overſights, &c. of the reporters, that it is impoſſible to reduce to preciſe rules the various degrees, wherein men give their aſſent. This only may be ſaid in general, that as the arguments and proofs pro and con, upon due examination, nicely weighing every particular circumſtance, ſhall to any one appear, upon the whole matter, in a greater, or leſs degree, to preponderate on either ſide; ſo they are fitted to produce in the mind ſuch different entertainment, as we call belief, conjecture, gueſs, doubt, wavering, diſtruſt, diſbelief, &c.

Traditional teſtimonies, the farther removed, the leſs their proof.

§ 10. THIS is what concerns aſſent, in matters wherein teſtimony is made uſe of: concerning which, I think, it may not be amiſs to take notice of a rule, obſerved in the law of England; which is, that tho' the atteſted copy of a record be good proof, yet the copy of a copy never ſo well atteſted, and by never ſo credible witneſſes, will not be admitted as a proof in judicature. This is ſo generally approved as reaſonable, and ſuited to the wiſdom and caution to be uſed in our enquiry after material truths, that I never yet heard of any one that blamed it. This practice, if it be allowable in the deciſions of right and wrong, carries this obſervation along with it, viz. that any teſtimony, the farther off it is from the original truth, the leſs force and proof it has. The being and exiſtence of the thing itſelf, is what I call the original truth. A credible man vouching his knowledge of it, is a good proof: but if another, equally credible, do witneſs it from his report, the teſtimony is weaker; and a third that atteſts the hear-ſay of an hear-ſay, is yet leſs conſiderable. So that in traditional truths, each remove weakens the force of the proof: and the more hands the tradition has ſucceſſively paſſed thro', the leſs ſtrength and evidence does it receive from them. This I thought neceſſary to be taken notice of, becauſe I find, amongſt ſome men, the quite contrary commonly practiſed, who look on opinions to gain force by growing older; and what a thouſand years ſince would not, to a rational man, cotemporary with the firſt voucher, have appeared at all probable, is now urged as certain, beyond all queſtion, only becauſe ſeveral have ſince, from him, ſaid it one after another. Upon this ground, propoſitions, evidently falſe, or doubtful enough in their firſt beginning, come, by an inverted rule of probability, to paſs for authentick truths; and thoſe which found, or deſerved, little credit from the mouths of their firſt authors, are thought to grow venerable by age, and are urged as undeniable.

Yet hiſtory is of great uſe.

§ 11. I WOULD not be thought here to leſſen the credit and uſe of hiſtory: it is all the light we have in many caſes, and we receive from it a great part of the uſeful truths we have, with a convincing evidence. I think nothing more valuable than the records of antiquity: I wiſh we had more of them, and more uncorrupted. But this truth itſelf forces me to ſay, that no probability can ariſe higher than its firſt original. What has no other evidence than the ſingle teſtimony of one only witneſs, muſt ſtand, or fall, by his only teſtimony, whether good, bad, or indifferent; and tho' cited afterwards by hundreds of others, one after another, is ſo far from receiving any ſtrength thereby, that it is only the weaker. Paſſion, intereſt, inadvertency, miſtake of his meaning, and a thouſand odd reaſons, or capricio's, men's minds are acted by (impoſſible to be diſcovered) may make one man quote another man's words, or meaning, wrong. He that has but ever ſo little examined the citations of writers, cannot doubt how little credit the quotations deſerve, where the originals are wanting; and, conſequently, how much leſs, quotations of quotations can be relied on. This is certain, that what in one age was affirmed upon ſlight grounds, can never after come to be more valid in future ages, by being often repeated. But the farther ſtill it is from the original, the leſs valid it is, and has always leſs force in the mouth or writing of him that laſt made uſe of it, than in his from whom he received it.

In things, which ſenſe cannot diſcover, analogy is the great rule of probability.

§ 12. THE probabilities, we have hitherto mentioned, are only ſuch as concern matter of fact, and ſuch things as are capable of obſervation and teſtimony. There remains that other ſort, concerning which men entertain opinions with variety of aſſent, tho' the things be ſuch, that falling not under the reach of our ſenſes, they are not capable of teſtimony. Such are, 1. The exiſtence, nature, and operations of finite, immaterial beings without us; as ſpirits, angels, devils, &c. or the exiſtence of material beings; which, either for their ſmallneſs in themſelves, or remoteneſs from us, our ſenſes cannot take notice of: as whether there be any plants, animals, and intelligent inhabitants in the planets, and other manſions of the vaſt univerſe. 2. Concerning the manner of operation in moſt parts of the works of nature: wherein, tho' we ſee the ſenſible effects, yet their cauſes are unknown, and we perceive not the ways and manner how they are produced. We ſee animals are generated, nouriſhed, and move; the loadſtone draws iron; and the parts of a candle, ſucceſſively melting, turn into flame, and give us both light and heat. Theſe and the like effects we ſee and know: but the cauſes that operate, and the manner they are produced in, we can only gueſs, and probably conjecture. For theſe and the like, coming not within the ſcrutiny of human ſenſes, cannot be examined by them, or be atteſted by any body; and therefore can appear, more, or leſs probable, only as they more, or leſs agree to truths, that are eſtabliſhed in our minds, and as they hold proportion to other parts of our knowledge and obſervation. Analogy in theſe matters is the only help we have, and it is from that alone we draw all our grounds of probability. Thus obſerving that the bare rubbing of two bodies violently one upon another, produces heat, and very often fire itſelf, we have reaſon to think, that what we call heat and fire, conſiſts in a violent agitation of the imperceptible, minute parts of the burning matter: obſerving likewiſe that the different refractions of pellucid bodies produce in our eyes the different appearances of ſeveral colours; and alſo, that the different ranging and laying the ſuperficial parts of ſeveral bodies, as of velvet, watered ſilk, &c. does the like, we think it probable that the colour and ſhining of bodies, is in them nothing but the different arrangement and refraction of their minute and inſenſible parts. Thus finding in all parts of the creation, that fall under human obſervation, that there is a gradual connection of one with another, without any great, or diſcernable gaps between, in all that great variety of things we ſee in the world, which are ſo cloſely linked together, that in the ſeveral ranks of beings, it is not eaſy to diſcover the bounds betwixt them; we have reaſon to be perſuaded, that by ſuch gentle ſteps things aſcend upwards in degrees of perfection. It is a hard matter to ſay, where ſenſible and rational begin, and where inſenſible and irrational end: and who is there quick-ſighted enough to determine preciſely, which is the loweſt ſpecies of living things, and which the firſt of thoſe, which have no life? Things, as far as we can obſerve, leſſen and augment, as the quantity does in a regular cone; where tho' there be a manifeſt odds betwixt the bigneſs of the diameter at a remote diſtance, yet the difference between the upper and under, where they touch one another, is hardly diſcernable. The difference is exceeding great between ſome men, and ſome animals: but if we will compare the underſtanding and abilities of ſome men and ſome brutes, we ſhall find ſo little difference, that it will be hard to ſay, that that of the man is either clearer, or larger. Obſerving, I ſay, ſuch gradual and gentle deſcents downwards, in thoſe parts of the creation, that are beneath men, the rule of analogy may make it probable, that it is ſo alſo in things above us, and our obſervation; and that there are ſeveral ranks of intelligent beings, excelling us in ſeveral degrees of perfection, aſcending upwards towards the infinite perfection of the creator, by gentle ſteps and differences, that are every one at no great diſtance from the next to it. This ſort of probability, which is the beſt conduct of rational experiments, and the riſe of hypotheſes, has alſo its uſe and influence; and a wary reaſoning from analogy, leads us often into the diſcovery of truths and uſeful productions, which would otherwiſe lie concealed.

One caſe, where contrary experience leſſens not the teſtimony.

§ 13. Tho' the common experience, and the ordinary courſe of things, have juſtly a mighty influence on the minds of men, to make them give, or refuſe credit to any thing propoſed to their belief; yet there is one caſe, wherein the ſtrangeneſs of the fact leſſens not the aſſent to a fair teſtimony given of it. For where ſuch ſupernatural events are ſuitable to ends aimed at by him, who has the power to change the courſe of nature, there, under ſuch circumſtances, they may be the fitter to procure belief, by how much the more they are beyond, or contrary to ordinary obſervation. This is the proper caſe of miracles, which, well atteſted, do not only find credit themſelves, but give it alſo to other truths, which need ſuch confirmation.

The bare teſtimony of revelation is the higheſt certainty.

§ 14. Besides thoſe, we have hitherto mentioned, there is one ſort of propoſitions, that challenge the higheſt degree of our aſſent, upon bare teſtimony, whether the thing propoſed agree, or diſagree, with common experience, and the ordinary courſe of things, or no. The reaſon whereof is, becauſe the teſtimony is of ſuch an one, as cannot deceive, nor be deceived, and that is of God himſelf. This carries with it aſſurance beyond doubt, evidence beyond exception. This is called by a peculiar name, Revelation; and our aſſent to it, Faith: which as abſolutely determines our minds, and as perfectly excludes all wavering, as our knowledge itſelf; and we may as well doubt of our own being, as we can, whether any revelation from God be true. So that faith is a ſettled and ſure principle of aſſent and aſſurance, and leaves no manner of room for doubt, or heſitation. Only we muſt be ſure, that it be a divine revelation, and that we underſtand it right: elſe we ſhall expoſe ourſelves to all the extravagancy of enthuſiaſm, and all the error of wrong principles, if we have faith and aſſurance in what is not divine revelation. And, therefore, in thoſe caſes our aſſent can be rationally no higher, than the evidence of its being a revelation, and that this is the meaning of the expreſſions it is delivered in. If the evidence of its being a revelation, or that this is its true ſenſe, be only on probable proofs, our aſſent can reach no higher than an aſſurance, or diffidence, ariſing from the more, or leſs, apparent probability of the proofs. But of faith, and the precedency it ought to have before other argument of perſuaſion, I ſhall ſpeak more hereafter, where I treat of it, as it is ordinarily placed, in contradiction to reaſon; tho' in truth it be nothing elſe but an aſſent founded on the higheſt reaſon.

CHAP. XVII.

Of reaſon.

CHAP. XVII.

Various ſignifications of the word reaſon.

§ 1. THE word reaſon, in the Engliſh language, has different ſignifications; ſometimes it is taken for true and clear principles; ſometimes for clear and fair deductions from thoſe principles; and ſometimes for the cauſe, and particularly the final cauſe. But the conſideration, I ſhall have of it here, is in a ſignification different from all theſe; and that is, as it ſtands for a faculty in man, that faculty, whereby man is ſuppoſed to be diſtinguiſhed from beaſts, and wherein it is evident he much ſurpaſſes them.

Wherein reaſoning conſiſts.

§ 2. If general knowledge, as has been ſhewn, conſiſts in a perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of our own ideas; and the knowledge of the exiſtence of all things without us (except only of a God, whoſe exiſtence every man may certainly know, and demonſtrate to himſelf, from his own exiſtence) be had only by our ſenſes: what room then is there for the exerciſe of any other faculty, but outward ſenſe and inward perception? what need is there of reaſon? Very much; both, for the enlargement of our knowledge, and regulating our aſſent: for it hath to do, both in knowledge and opinion, and is neceſſary and aſſiſting to all our other intellectual faculties, and, indeed, contains two of them, viz. ſagacity and illation. By the one, it finds out; and by the other, it ſo orders the intermediate ideas, as to diſcover what connection there is in each link of the chain, whereby the extremes are held together; and thereby, as it were, to draw into view the truth ſought for, which is that we call illation, or inference, and conſiſts in nothing but the perception of the connection there is between the ideas, in each ſtep of the deduction, whereby the mind comes to ſee either the certain agreement, or diſagreement, of any two ideas, as in demonſtration, in which it arrives at knowledge; or their probable connection, on which it gives, or with-holds its aſſent, as in opinion. Senſe and intuition reach but a very little way. The greateſt part of our knowledge depends upon deductions and intermediate ideas: and in thoſe caſes, where we are fain to ſubſtitute aſſent inſtead of knowledge, and take propoſitions for true, without being certain they are ſo, we have need to find out, examine, and compare the grounds of their probability. In both theſe caſes, the faculty, which finds out the means, and rightly applies them to diſcover certainty in the one, and probability in the other, is that which we call reaſon. For as reaſon perceives the neceſſary and indubitable connection of all the ideas, or proofs, one to another, in each ſtep of any demonſtration, that produces knowledge; ſo it likewiſe perceives the probable connection of all the ideas, or proofs, one to another, in every ſtep of a diſcourſe, to which it will think aſſent due. This is the loweſt degree of that, which can be truly called reaſon. For, where the mind does not perceive this probable connection, where it does not diſcern whether there be any ſuch connection, or no; there men's opinions are not the product of judgment, or the conſequence of reaſon, but the effects of chance and hazard, of a mind floating at all adventures, without choice, and without direction.

Its four parts.

§ 3. So that we may, in reaſon, conſider theſe four degrees: the firſt and higheſt, is the diſcovering and finding out of proofs; the ſecond, the regular and methodical diſpoſition of them, and laying them in a clear and fit order, to make their connection and force be plainly and eaſily perceived; the third is the perceiving their connection; and the fourth, a making a right concluſion. Theſe ſeveral degrees may be obſerved, in any mathematical demonſtration; it being one thing to perceive the connection of each part, as the demonſtration is made by another; another to perceive the dependence of the concluſion on all the parts; a third, to make out a demonſtration clearly and neatly one's ſelf; and ſomething different from all theſe, to have firſt found out thoſe intermediate ideas, or proofs, by which it is made.

§ 4. There is one thing more, which I ſhall deſire to be conſidered concerning reaſon; and that is, whether ſyllogiſm, as is generally thought, be the proper inſtrument of it, and the uſefulleſt way of exerciſing this faculty. The cauſes I have to doubt, are theſe:

Syllogiſm, not the great inſtrument of reaſon.

First, becauſe ſyllogiſm ſerves our reaſon, but in one only of the fore-mentioned parts of it; and that is, to ſhew the connection of the proofs in any one inſtance, and no more: but in this it is of no great uſe, ſince the mind can perceive ſuch connection where it really is, as eaſily, nay, perhaps, better, without it.

If we will obſerve the actings of our own minds, we ſhall find that we reaſon beſt and cleareſt, when we only obſerve the connection of the proof, without reducing our thoughts to any rule of ſyllogiſm. And, therefore, we may take notice, that there are many men, that reaſon exceeding clear and rightly, who know not how to make a ſyllogiſm. He, that will look into many parts of Aſia and America, will find men reaſon there, perhaps, as acutely as himſelf, who yet never heard of a ſyllogiſm, nor can reduce any one argument to thoſe forms: and, I believe, ſcarce any one ever makes ſyllogiſms in reaſoning within himſelf. Indeed ſyllogiſm is made uſe of on occaſion, to diſcover a fallacy, hid in a rhetorical flouriſh, or cunningly wrapped up in a ſmooth period; and, ſtripping an abſurdity of the cover of wit and good language, ſhew it in its naked deformity. But the weakneſs, or fallacy, of ſuch a looſe diſcourſe, it ſhews, by the artificial form it is put into, only to thoſe who have thoroughly ſtudied mode and figure, and have ſo examined the many ways, that three propoſitions may be put together, as to know which of them does certainly conclude right, and which not, and upon what grounds it is that they do ſo. All who have ſo far conſidered ſyllogiſm, as to ſee the reaſon why, in three propoſitions laid together in one form, the concluſion will be certainly right, but in another, not certainly ſo; I grant are certain of the concluſion, they draw from the premiſes, in the allowed modes and figures. But they, who have not ſo far looked into thoſe forms, are not ſure, by virtue of ſyllogiſm, that the concluſion certainly follows from the premiſes; they only take it to be ſo, by an implicit faith in their teachers, and a confidence in thoſe forms of argumentation; but this is ſtill but believing, not being certain. Now if, of all mankind, thoſe, who can make ſyllogiſms, are extremely few, in compariſon of thoſe who cannot; and if of thoſe few, who have been taught logick, there is but a very ſmall number, who do any more than believe that ſyllogiſms, in the allowed modes and figures, do conclude right, without knowing certainly that they do ſo; if ſyllogiſms muſt be taken for the only proper inſtrument of reaſon and means of knowledge, it will follow, that, before Ariſtotle, there was not one man, that did, or could know any thing by reaſon; and that, ſince the invention of ſyllogiſms, there is not one of ten thouſand that doth.

But God has not been ſo ſparing to men to make them barely two-legged creatures, and left it to Ariſtotle to make them rational, i. e. thoſe few of them, that he could get ſo to examine the grounds of ſyllogiſms, as to ſee, that in above threeſcore ways that three propoſitions may be laid together, there are but about fourteen, wherein one may be ſure that the concluſion is right, and upon what ground it is, that in theſe few the concluſion is certain, and in the other not. God has been more bountiful to mankind than ſo. He has given them a mind that can reaſon, without being inſtructed in methods of ſyllogizing: the underſtanding is not taught to reaſon by theſe rules; it has a native faculty to perceive the coherence, or incoherence of its ideas, and can range them right, without any ſuch perplexing repetitions. I ſay not this any way to leſſen Ariſtotle, whom I look on as one of the greateſt men amongſt the antients; whoſe large views, acuteneſs, and penetration of thought, and ſtrength of judgment, few have equalled: and who, in this very invention of forms of argumentation, wherein the concluſion may be ſhewn to be rightly inferred, did great ſervice, againſt thoſe who were not aſhamed to deny any thing. And I readily own, that all right reaſoning may be reduced to his forms of ſyllogiſm. But yet I think, without any diminution to him, I may truly ſay, that they are not the only, nor the beſt way of reaſoning, for the leading of thoſe into truth, who are willing to find it, and deſire to make the beſt uſe they may of their reaſon, for the attainment of knowledge. And he himſelf, it is plain, found out ſome forms to be concluſive, and others not, not by the forms themſelves, but by the original way of knowledge, i. e. by the viſible agreement of ideas. Tell a country gentlewoman, that the wind is ſouth-weſt, and the weather lowering, and like to rain, and ſhe will eaſily underſtand, that it is not ſafe for her to go abroad thin clad, in ſuch a day, after a fever: ſhe clearly ſees the probable connection of all theſe, viz. ſouth-weſt wind, and clouds, rain, wetting, taking cold, relapſe, and danger of death, without tying them together in thoſe artificial and cumberſom fetters, of ſeveral ſyllogiſms, that clog and hinder the mind, which proceeds from one part to another, quicker and clearer without them; and the probability, which ſhe eaſily perceives in things, thus in their native ſtate, would be quite loſt, if this argument were managed learnedly, and propoſed in mode and figure. For it very often confounds the connection: and, I think, every one will perceive, in mathematical demonſtrations, that the knowledge gained thereby comes ſhorteſt and cleareſt without ſyllogiſms.

Inference is looked on as the great act of the rational faculty, and ſo it is, when it is rightly made: but the mind, either very deſirous to enlarge its knowledge, or very apt to favour the ſentiments it has once imbibed, is very forward to make inferences, and, therefore, often makes too much haſte, before it perceives the connection of the ideas that muſt hold the extremes together.

To infer, is nothing but, by virtue of one propoſition laid down as true, to draw in another as true, i. e. to ſee, or ſuppoſe, ſuch a connection of the two ideas of the inferred propoſition, v. g. let this be the propoſition laid down, "men ſhall be puniſhed in another world," and from thence be inferred this other, "then men can determine themſelves." The queſtion now is to know, whether the mind has made this inference right, or no; if it has made it, by finding out the intermediate ideas, and taking a view of the connection of them, placed in a due order, it has proceeded rationally, and made a right inference. If it has done it, without ſuch a view, it has not ſo much made an inference, that will hold, or an inference of right reaſon, as ſhewn a willingneſs to have it be, or be taken for ſuch. But in neither caſe is it ſyllogiſm, that diſcovered thoſe ideas, or ſhewed the connection of them; for they muſt be both found out, and the connection every where perceived, before they can rationally be made uſe of in ſyllogiſm: unleſs it can be ſaid, that any idea, without conſidering what connection it hath with the two other, whoſe agreement ſhould be ſhewn by it, will do well enough in a ſyllogiſm, and may be taken at a venture for the medius terminus, to prove any concluſion. But this no body will ſay, becauſe it is, by virtue of the perceived agreement of the intermediate idea with the extremes, that the extremes are concluded to agree; and therefore each intermediate idea muſt be ſuch, as in the whole chain hath a viſible connection with thoſe two, it is placed between, or elſe thereby the concluſion cannot be inferred, or drawn in: for wherever any link of the chain is looſe, and without connection, there the whole ſtrength of it is loſt, and it hath no force to infer, or draw in any thing. In the inſtance above-mentioned, what is it ſhews the force of the inference, and conſequently the reaſonableneſs of it, but a view of the connection of all the intermediate ideas that draw in the concluſion, or propoſition inferred? v. g. men ſhall be puniſhed-------God the puniſher-------juſt puniſhment-------the puniſhed guilty ------could have done otherwiſe------freedom------ſelf-determination: by which chain of ideas thus viſibly linked together in train, i. e. each intermediate idea agreeing on each ſide with thoſe two, it is immediately placed between, the ideas of men and ſelf-determination appear to be connected, i. e. this propoſition, men can determine themſelves, is drawn in, or inferred from this, that they ſhall be puniſhed in the other world. For here the mind, ſeeing the connection there is between the idea, of men's puniſhment in the other world, and the idea of God puniſhing; between God puniſhing and the juſtice of the puniſhment; between the juſtice of the puniſhment and guilt; between guilt and a power to do otherwiſe; between a power to do otherwiſe and freedom, and between freedom and ſelf-determination; ſees the connection between men and ſelf-determination.

Now I aſk, whether the connection of the extremes be not more clearly ſeen, in this ſimple and natural diſpoſition, than in the perplexed repetitions, and jumble of five, or ſix ſyllogiſms? I muſt beg pardon for calling it jumble, till ſome body ſhall put theſe ideas into ſo many ſyllogiſms, and then ſay, that they are leſs jumbled, and their connection more viſible, when they are tranſpoſed and repeated, and ſpun out to a greater length, in artificial forms; than in that ſhort, natural, plain order, they are laid down in here, wherein every one may ſee it; and wherein they muſt be ſeen, before they can be put into a train of ſyllogiſms. For the natural order of the connecting ideas, muſt direct the order of the ſyllogiſms, and a man muſt ſee the connection of each intermediate idea, with thoſe that it connects, before he can with reaſon make uſe of it in a ſyllogiſm. And when all thoſe ſyllogiſms are made, neither thoſe that are, nor thoſe that are not logicians will ſee the force of the argumentation, i. e. the connection of the extremes, one jot the better. [For thoſe that are not men of art, not knowing the true forms of ſyllogiſm, nor the reaſons of them, cannot know, whether they are made in right and concluſive modes and figures, or no, and ſo are not at all helped by the forms they are put into; tho' by them the natural order wherein the mind could judge of their reſpective connection, being diſturbed, renders the illation much more uncertain, than without them.] And as for logicians themſelves, they ſee the connection of each intermediate idea, with thoſe it ſtands between (on which the force of the inference depends) as well before, as after the ſyllogiſm is made, or elſe they do not ſee it at all. For a ſyllogiſm neither ſhews, nor ſtrengthens the connection of any two ideas, immediately put together, but only, by the connection ſeen in them, ſhews what connection the extremes have one with another. But what connection the intermediate has, with either of the extremes in that ſyllogiſm, that no ſyllogiſm does, or can ſhew. That the mind only doth, or can perceive, as they ſtand there, in that juxta-poſition, only by its own view, to which the ſyllogiſtical form, it happens to be in, gives no help, or light at all; it only ſhews, that if the intermediate idea agrees with thoſe it is on both ſides immediately applied to, then thoſe two remote ones, or, as they are called, extremes, do certainly agree, and therefore the immediate connection of each idea, to that which it is applied to, on each ſide, on which the force of the reaſoning depends, is as well ſeen before, as after the ſyllogiſm is made, or elſe, he that makes the ſyllogiſm, could never ſee it at all. This, as has been already obſerved, is ſeen only by the eye, or the perceptive faculty of the mind, taking a view of them laid together, in a juxta-poſition; which view of any two it has equally, whenever they are laid together in any propoſition, whether that propoſition be placed as a major, or a minor, in a ſyllogiſm, or no.

Of what uſe then are ſyllogiſms? I anſwer, their chief and main uſe is in the ſchools, where men are allowed, without ſhame, to deny the agreement of ideas, that do manifeſtly agree; or out of the ſchools, to thoſe who from thence have learned, without ſhame, to deny the connection of ideas, which even to themſelves is viſible. But, to an ingenuous ſearcher after truth, who has no other aim but to find it, there is no need of any ſuch form, to force the allowing of the inference: the truth and reaſonableneſs of it is better ſeen in ranging of the ideas, in a ſimple and plain order: and hence it is, that men, in their own enquiries after truth, never uſe ſyllogiſms to convince themſelves, [or, in teaching others, to inſtruct willing learners.] Becauſe, before they can put them into a ſyllogiſm, they muſt ſee the connection, that is between the intermediate idea and the two other ideas, it is ſet between and applied to, to ſhew their agreement; and when they ſee that, they ſee whether the inference be good or no, and ſo ſyllogiſm comes too late to ſettle it. For to make uſe again of the former inſtance; I aſk whether the mind conſidering the idea of juſtice, placed as an intermediate idea between the puniſhment of men, and the guilt of the puniſhed, (and, till it does ſo conſider it, the mind cannot make uſe of it, as a medius terminus) does not as plainly ſee the force and ſtrength of the inference, as when it is formed into ſyllogiſm? To ſhew it in a very plain and eaſy example; let animal be the intermediate idea, or medius terminus, that the mind makes uſe of, to ſhew the connection of homo and vivens: I aſk whether the mind does not more readily and plainly ſee that connection, in the ſimple and proper poſition of the connecting idea in the middle; thus,

Homo------------Animal------------Vivens,

than in this perplexed one,

Animal------------Vivens----------Homo----------Animal:

which is the poſition theſe ideas have in a ſyllogiſm, to ſhew the connection between homo and vivens, by the intervention of animal.

INDEED ſyllogiſm is thought to be of neceſſary uſe, even to the lovers of truth, to ſhew them the fallacies, that are often concealed in florid, witty, or involved diſcourſes. But that this is a miſtake, will appear, if we conſider, that the reaſon, why ſometimes men, who ſincerely aim at truth, are impoſed upon, by ſuch looſe, and as they are called rhetorical diſcourſes, is, that their fancies being ſtruck with ſome lively, metaphorical repreſentations, they neglect to obſerve, or do not eaſily perceive, what are the true ideas, upon which the inference depends. Now, to ſhew ſuch men the weakneſs of ſuch an argumentation, there needs no more, but to ſtrip it of the ſuperfluous ideas, which blended and confounded with thoſe, on which the inference depends, ſeem to ſhew a connection, where there is none; or, at leaſt, do hinder the diſcovery of the want of it; and then to lay the naked ideas, on which the force of the argumentation depends, in their due order; in which poſition the mind, taking a view of them, ſees what connection they have, and ſo is able to judge of the inference, without any need of a ſyllogiſm at all.

I GRANT that mode and figure is commonly made uſe of, in ſuch caſes, as if the detection of the incoherence of ſuch looſe diſcourſes were wholly owing to the ſyllogiſtical form; and ſo I myſelf formerly thought, till upon a ſtricter examination I now find, that laying the immediate ideas naked in their due order, ſhews the incoherence of the argumentation better than ſyllogiſm; not only as ſubjecting each link of the chain, to the immediate view of the mind in its proper place, whereby its connection is beſt obſerved; but alſo, becauſe ſyllogiſm ſhews the incoherence only to thoſe (who are not one of ten thouſand) who perfectly underſtand mode and figure, and the reaſon, upon which thoſe forms are eſtabliſhed: whereas a due and orderly placing of the ideas, upon which the inference is made, makes every one, whether logician, or not logician, who underſtands the terms, and hath the faculty to perceive the agreement, or diſagreement, of ſuch ideas (without which, in or out of ſyllogiſm, he cannot perceive the ſtrength, or weakneſs, coherence, or incoherence of the diſcourſe) ſee the want of connection in the argumentation, and the abſurdity of the inference.

AND thus I have known a man, unſkilful in ſyllogiſm, who at firſt hearing could perceive the weakneſs and inconcluſiveneſs of a long, artificial and plauſible diſcourſe, wherewith others, better ſkilled in ſyllogiſm, have been miſled. And, I believe, there are few of my readers, who do not know ſuch. And, indeed, if it were not ſo, the debates of moſt princes councils, and the buſineſs of aſſemblies, would be in danger to be miſmanaged, ſince thoſe, who are relied upon, and have uſually a great ſtroke in them, are not always ſuch, who have the good luck to be perfectly knowing in the forms of ſyllogiſm, or expert in mode and figure. And, if ſyllogiſm were the only, or ſo much as the ſureſt way to detect the fallacies of artificial diſcourſes; I do not think that all mankind, even princes, in matters that concern their crowns and dignities, are ſo much in love with falſhood and miſtake, that they would every where have neglected to bring ſyllogiſm into the debates of moment; or thought it ridiculous ſo much as to offer them in affairs of conſequence: a plain evidence to me, that men of parts and penetration, who were not idly to diſpute at their eaſe, but were to act, according to the reſult of their debates, and often pay for their miſtakes with their heads or fortunes, found thoſe ſcholaſtick forms were of little uſe, to diſcover truth, or fallacy, whilſt both the one and the other might be ſhewn, and better ſhewn, without them, to thoſe who would not refuſe to ſee what was viſibly ſhewn them.

Secondly, another reaſon that makes me doubt, whether ſyllogiſm be the only proper inſtrument of reaſon in the diſcovery of truth, is, that of whatever uſe mode and figure is pretended to be, in the laying open of fallacy (which has been above conſidered) thoſe ſcholaſtick forms of diſcourſe are not leſs liable to fallacies, than the plainer ways of argumentation: and for this I appeal to common obſervation, which has always found theſe artificial methods of reaſoning more adapted to catch and intangle the mind, than to inſtruct and inform the underſtanding. And hence it is, that men, even when they are baffled and ſilenced in this ſcholaſtick way, are ſeldom or never convinced, and ſo brought over to the conquering ſide: they, perhaps, acknowledge their adverſary to be the more ſkilful diſputant; but reſt nevertheleſs, perſuaded of the truth on their ſide; and go away, worſted as they are, with the ſame opinion they brought with them: which they could not do, if this way of argumentation carried light and conviction with it, and made men ſee where the truth lay. And, therefore, ſyllogiſm has been thought more proper for the attaining victory in diſpute, than for the diſcovery, or confirmation, of truth in fair enquiries. And, if it be certain, that fallacy can be couched in ſyllogiſm, as it cannot be denied, it muſt be ſomething elſe, and not ſyllogiſm, that muſt diſcover them.

I have had experience how ready ſome men are, when all the uſe, which they have been wont to aſcribe to any thing, is not allowed, to cry out, that I am for laying it wholly aſide. But to prevent ſuch unjuſt and groundleſs imputations, I tell them, that I am not for taking away any helps to the underſtanding, in the attainment of knowledge. And if men ſkilled in, and uſed to ſyllogiſms, find them aſſiſting to their reaſon, in the diſcovery of truth, I think they ought to make uſe of them. All that I aim at is, that they ſhould not aſcribe more to theſe forms than belongs to them; and think that men have no uſe, or not ſo full a uſe, of their reaſoning faculty, without them. Some eyes want ſpectacles, to ſee things clearly and diſtinctly; but let not thoſe that uſe them, therefore, ſay, no body can ſee clearly without them: thoſe who do ſo will be thought in favour of art (which, perhaps, they are beholden to) a little too much to depreſs and diſcredit nature. Reaſon, by its own penetration, where it is ſtrong and exerciſed, uſually ſees quicker and clearer without ſyllogiſm. If uſe of thoſe ſpectacles has ſo dimmed its ſight, that it cannot without them ſee conſequences, or inconſequences in argumentation, I am not ſo unreaſonable as to be againſt the uſing them. Every one knows what beſt fits his own ſight. But let him not thence conclude all in the dark, who uſe not juſt the ſame helps that he finds a need of.

Helps little in demonſtration, leſs in probability.

§ 5. But however it be in knowledge, I think I may truly ſay, it is of far leſs, or no uſe at all, in probabilities. For the aſſent there, being to be determined by the preponderancy, after due weighing of all the proofs, with all circumſtances, on both ſides, nothing is ſo unfit to aſſiſt the mind in that, as ſyllogiſm: which running away with one aſſumed probability, or one topical argument, purſues that, till it has led the mind quite out of ſight of the thing under conſideration; and forcing it upon ſome remote difficulty, holds it faſt there, entangled, perhaps, and as it were manacled in the chain of ſyllogiſms, without allowing it the liberty, much leſs affording it the helps, requiſite to ſhew on which ſide, all things conſidered, is the greater probability.

Serves not to increaſe our knowledge, but fence with it.

§ 6. But let it help us (as perhaps may be ſaid) in convincing men of their errors and miſtakes: (and yet I would fain ſee the man, that was forced out of his opinion, by dint of ſyllogiſm) yet ſtill it fails our reaſon in that part, which, if not its higheſt perfection, is yet certainly its hardeſt taſk, and that, which we moſt need its help in; and that is the finding out of proofs, and making new diſcoveries. The rules of ſyllogiſm ſerve not to furniſh the mind, with thoſe intermediate ideas, that may ſhew the connection of remote ones. This way of reaſoning diſcovers no new proofs, but is the art of marſhalling and ranging the old ones we have already. The 47th propoſition of the firſt book of Euclid is very true; but the diſcovery of it, I think, not owing to any rules of common logick. A man knows firſt, and then he is able to prove ſyllogiſtically. So that ſyllogiſm comes after knowledge, and then a man has little, or no need of it. But it is chiefly by the finding out thoſe ideas, that ſhew the connection of diſtant ones, that our ſtock of knowledge is increaſed, and that uſeful arts and ſciences are advanced. Syllogiſm at beſt is but the art of fencing, with the little knowledge, we have, without making any addition to it. And if a man ſhould employ his reaſon all this way, he will not do much otherwiſe than he, who, having got ſome iron out of the bowels of the earth, ſhould have it beaten up all into ſwords, and put it into his ſervants hands to fence with, and bang one another. Had the king of Spain imployed the hands of his people, and his Spaniſh iron ſo, he had brought to light but little of that treaſure, that lay ſo long hid in the dark entrails of America. And I am apt to think, that he, who ſhall employ all the force of his reaſon, only in brandiſhing of ſyllogiſms, will diſcover very little of that maſs of knowledge, which lies yet concealed in the ſecret receſſes of nature; and which I am apt to think, native, ruſtick reaſon (as it formerly has done) is likelier to open a way to, and add to the common ſtock of mankind, rather than any ſcholaſtick proceeding, by the ſtrict rules of mode and figure.

Other helps ſhould be ſought.

§ 7. I DOUBT not, nevertheleſs, but there are ways to be found, to aſſiſt our reaſon in this moſt uſeful part; and this the judicious Hooker encourages me to ſay, who in his Eccl. Pol. l. 1. § 6. ſpeaks thus: "If there might be added "the right helps of true art and learning (which helps I muſt plainly confeſs, "this age of the world, carrying the name of a learned age, doth neither much "know, nor generally regard) there would undoubtedly be almoſt as much dif"ference, in maturity of judgment, between men therewith inured, and that "which now men are, as between men that are now, and innocents." I do not pretend to have found, or diſcovered, here any of thoſe right helps of art, this great man of deep thought mentions; but this is plain, that ſyllogiſm, and the logick now in uſe, which were as well known in his days, can be none of thoſe he means. It is ſufficient for me, if, by a diſcourſe, perhaps, ſomething out of the way, I am ſure, as to me, wholly new and unborrowed, I ſhall have given occaſion to others, to caſt about for new diſcoveries, and to ſeek in their own thoughts, for thoſe right helps of art, which will ſcarce be found, I fear, by thoſe, who ſervilely confine themſelves to the rules and dictates of others. For beaten tracts lead theſe ſort of cattle (as an obſerving Roman calls them) whoſe thought reach only to imitation, "non quo eundem eſt, ſed quo itur." But I can be bold to ſay, that this age is adorned with ſome men of that ſtrength of judgment, and largeneſs of comprehenſion, that, if they would imploy their thoughts on this ſubject, could open new and undiſcovered ways to the advancement of knowledge.

We reaſon about particulars.

§ 8. HAVING here had an occaſion to ſpeak of ſyllogiſm in general, and the uſe of it in reaſoning, and the improvement of our knowledge; it is fit, before I leave this ſubject, to take notice of one manifeſt miſtake in the rules of ſyllogiſm, viz. that no ſyllogiſtical reaſoning can be right and concluſive, but what has, at leaſt, one general propoſition in it. As if we could not reaſon, and have knowledge about particulars: whereas, in truth, the matter rightly conſidered, the immediate object of all our reaſoning and knowledge, is nothing but particulars. Every man's reaſoning and knowledge is only about the ideas exiſting in his own mind, which are truly, every one of them, particular exiſtences; and our knowledge and reaſon about other things, is only, as they correſpond with thoſe our particular ideas. So that the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of our particular ideas, is the whole and utmoſt of all our knowledge. Univerſality is but accidental to it, and conſiſts only in this, that the particular ideas, about which it is, are ſuch, as more than one particular thing can correſpond with, and be repreſented by. But the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of any two ideas, and conſequently our knowledge, is equally clear and certain, whether either, or both, or neither of thoſe ideas be capable of repreſenting more real beings than one, or no. One thing more I crave leave to offer about ſyllogiſm, before I leave it, viz. may one not upon juſt ground enquire, whether the form ſyllogiſm now has, is that which in reaſon it ought to have? For the medius terminus being to join the extremes, i. e. the intermediate idea, by its intervention, to ſhew the agreement, or diſagreement, of the two in queſtion, would not the poſition of the medius terminus be more natural, and ſhew the agreement, or diſagreement, of the extremes clearer and better, if it were placed in the middle between them? which might be eaſily done, by tranſpoſing the propoſitions, and making the medius terminus the predicate of the firſt, and the ſubject of the ſecond. As thus,

" Omnis homo eſt animal,
" Omne animal eſt vivens,
" Ergo omnis homo eſt vivens."

" Omne corpus eſt extenſum & ſolidum,
" Nullum extenſum & ſolidum eſt pura extenſio,
" Ergo corpus non eſt pura extenſio."

I need not trouble my reader with inſtances in ſyllogiſms, whoſe concluſions are particular. The ſame reaſon holds for the ſame form in them, as well as in the general.

1. Reaſon fails us for want of ideas.

§ 9. Reason, tho' it penetrates into the depths of the ſea and earth, elevates our thoughts as high as the ſtars, and leads us thro' the vaſt ſpaces and large rooms of this mighty fabrick, yet it comes far ſhort of the real extent of even corporeal being; and there are many inſtances wherein it fails us: as,

First, it perfectly fails us, where our ideas fail. It neither does, nor can extend itſelf farther than they do. And, therefore, wherever we have no ideas, our reaſoning ſtops, and we are at an end of our reckoning: and if at any time we reaſon about words, which do not ſtand for any ideas, it is only about thoſe ſounds, and nothing elſe.

2. Becauſe of obſcure and imperfect ideas.

§ 10. Secondly, our reaſon is often puzzled, and at a loſs, becauſe of the obſcurity, confuſion, or imperfection of the ideas, it is imployed about: and there we are involved in difficulties and contradictions. Thus, not having any perfect idea of the leaſt extenſion of matter, nor of infinity, we are at a loſs about the diviſibility of matter; but having perfect, clear, and diſtinct ideas of number, our reaſon meets with none of thoſe inextricable difficulties in numbers, nor finds itſelf involved in any contradictions about them. Thus, we having but imperfect ideas of the operations of our minds, and of the beginning of motion, or thought, how the mind produces either of them in us, and much imperfecter yet, of the operation of God, run into great difficulties about free created agents, which reaſon cannot well extricate itſelf out of.

3. For want of intermediate ideas.

§ 11. Thirdly, our reaſon is often at a ſtand, becauſe it perceives not thoſe ideas, which could ſerve to ſhew the certain, or probable agreement, or diſagreement, of any two other ideas: and in this, ſome men's faculties far outgo others. Till algebra, that great inſtrument and inſtance of human ſagacity, was diſcovered, men, with amazement, looked on ſeveral of the demonſtrations of antient mathematicians, and could ſcarce forbear to think the finding ſeveral of thoſe proofs to be ſomething more than human.

4. Becauſe of wrong principles.

§ 12. Fourthly, the mind, by proceeding upon falſe principles, is often ingaged in abſurdities and difficulties, brought into ſtraits and contradictions, without knowing how to free itſelf: and, in that caſe, it is in vain to implore the help of reaſon, unleſs it be to diſcover the falſhood, and reject the influence of thoſe wrong principles. Reaſon is ſo far from clearing the difficulties, which the building upon falſe foundations brings a man into, that, if he will purſue it, it entangles him the more, and engages him deeper in perplexities.

§ 13. Fifthly,

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5. Becauſe of doubtful terms.

§ 13. FIFTHLY, as obſcure and imperfect ideas often involve our reaſon; ſo, upon the ſame ground, do dubious words, and uncertain ſigns, often in diſcourſes and arguings, when not warily attended to, puzzle men's reaſon, and bring them to a non-plus. But theſe two latter are our fault, and not the fault of reaſon. But yet the conſequences of them are nevertheleſs obvious: and the perplexities, or errors, they fill men's minds with, are every where obſervable.

Our higheſt degree of knowledge is intuitive, without reaſoning.

§ 14. SOME of the ideas, that are in the mind, are ſo there, that they can be by themſelves, immediately, compared one with another; and in theſe the mind is able to perceive, that they agree, or diſagree, as clearly, as that it has them. Thus the mind perceives, that an arch of a circle is leſs than the whole circle, as clearly as it does the idea of a circle: and this, therefore, as has been ſaid, I call intuitive knowledge; which is certain, beyond all doubt, and needs no probation, nor can have any; this being the higheſt of all human certainty. In this conſiſts the evidence of all thoſe maxims, which no body has any doubt about, but every man (does not, as is ſaid, only aſſent to, but) knows to be true, as ſoon as ever they are propoſed to his underſtanding. In the diſcovery of, and aſſent to theſe truths, there is no uſe of the diſcurſive faculty, no need of reaſoning, but they are known by a ſuperior and higher degree of evidence. And ſuch, if I may gueſs at things unknown, I am apt to think, that angels have now, and the ſpirits of juſt men made perfect ſhall have, in a future ſtate, of thouſands of things, which now either wholly eſcape our apprehenſions, or which, our ſhort-ſighted reaſon, having got ſome faint glimpſe of, we, in the dark, grope after.

The next is demonſtration by reaſoning.

§ 15. BUT tho' we have, here and there, a little of this clear light, ſome ſparks of bright knowledge; yet the greateſt part of our ideas are ſuch, that we cannot diſcern their agreement, or diſagreement, by an immediate comparing them. And in all theſe we have need of reaſoning, and muſt, by diſcourſe and inference, make our diſcoveries. Now of theſe there are two ſorts, which I ſhall take the liberty to mention here again.

FIRST, thoſe whoſe agreement, or diſagreement, tho' it cannot be ſeen by an immediate putting them together, yet may be examined by the intervention of other ideas, which can be compared with them. In this caſe, when the agreement, or diſagreement, of the intermediate idea on both ſides, with thoſe which we would compare, is plainly diſcerned, there it amounts to a demonſtration, whereby knowledge is produced; which tho' it be certain, yet it is not ſo eaſy, nor altogether ſo clear, as intuitive knowledge. Becauſe in that there is barely one ſimple intuition, wherein there is no room for any the leaſt miſtake, or doubt; the truth is ſeen all perfectly at once. In demonſtration, it is true, there is intuition too, but not altogether at once; for there muſt be a remembrance of the intuition of the agreement of the medium, or intermediate idea, with that we compared it with before, when we compare it with the other; and where there be many mediums, there the danger of the miſtake is the greater. For each agreement, or diſagreement, of the ideas muſt be obſerved, and ſeen in each ſtep of the whole train, and retained in the memory, juſt as it is; and the mind muſt be ſure, that no part of what is neceſſary to make up the demonſtration, is omitted, or overlooked. This makes ſome demonſtrations long and perplexed, and too hard for thoſe, who have not ſtrength of parts diſtinctly to perceive, and exactly carry ſo many particulars orderly in their heads. And even thoſe, who are able to maſter ſuch intricate ſpeculations, are fain ſometimes to go over them again, and there is need of more than one review, before they can arrive at certainty. But yet, where the mind clearly retains the intuition it had of the agreement of any idea with another, and that with a third, and that with a fourth, &c. there the agreement of the firſt and the fourth is a demonſtration, and produces certain knowledge, which may be called rational knowledge, as the other is intuitive.

To ſupply the narrowneſs of this, we have nothing but

§ 16. SECONDLY, there are other ideas, whoſe agreement, or diſagreement, can no otherwiſe be judged of, but by the intervention of others, which have not a certain agreement with the extremes, but an uſual, or likely one: and in theſe it is, that the judgment is properly exerciſed, which is the acquieſcing of judgment upon probable reaſoning.

the mind, that any ideas do agree, by comparing them with ſuch probable mediums. This, tho' it never amounts to knowledge, no not to that which is the loweſt degree of it; yet ſometimes the intermediate ideas tie the extremes ſo firmly together, and the probability is ſo clear and ſtrong, that aſſent as neceſſarily follows it, as knowledge does demonſtration. The great excellency and uſe of the judgment is to obſerve right, and take a true eſtimate of the force and weight of each probability; and then, caſting them up all right together, chuſe that ſide which has the over-balance.

Intuition, demonſtration, judgment.

§ 17. INTUITIVE knowledge is the perception of the certain agreement, or diſagreement, of two ideas, immediately compared together.

RATIONAL knowledge is the perception of the certain agreement, or diſagreement, of any two ideas, by the intervention of one, or more other ideas.

JUDGMENT is the thinking, or taking two ideas to agree, or diſagree, by the intervention of one, or more ideas, whoſe certain agreement, or diſagreement, with them it does not perceive, but hath obſerved to be frequent and uſual.

Conſequences of words, and conſequences of ideas.

§ 18. THO' the deducing one propoſition from another, or making inferences in words, be a great part of reaſon, and that which it is uſually imployed about; yet the principal act of ratiocination is the finding the agreement, or diſagreement, of two ideas, one with another, by the intervention of a third. As a man, by a yard, finds two houſes to be of the ſame length, which could not be brought together, to meaſure their quality by juxta-poſition. Words have their conſequences, as the ſigns of ſuch ideas: and things agree, or diſagree, as really they are; but we obſerve it only by our ideas.

Four ſorts of arguments.

§ 19. BEFORE we quit this ſubject, it may be worth our while a little to reflect on four ſorts of arguments, that men, in their reaſonings with others, do ordinarily make uſe of, to prevail on their aſſent; or, at leaſt, ſo to awe them as to ſilence their oppoſition.

1. Ad verecundiam.

FIRST, the firſt is, to alledge the opinions of men, whoſe parts, learning, eminency, power, or ſome other cauſe has gained a name, and ſettled their reputation, in the common eſteem, with ſome kind of authority. When men are eſtabliſhed in any kind of dignity, it is thought a breach of modeſty for others to derogate any way from it, and queſtion the authority of men, who are in poſſeſſion of it. This is apt to be cenſured, as carrying with it too much of pride, when a man does not readily yield to the determination of approved authors, which is wont to be received with reſpect and ſubmiſſion by others; and it is looked upon as inſolence for a man to ſet up, and adhere to his own opinion, againſt the current ſtream of antiquity; or to put it in the ballance againſt that of ſome learned doctor, or otherwiſe approved writer. Whoever backs his tenets with ſuch authorities, thinks he ought thereby to carry the cauſe, and is ready to ſtile it impudence in any one, who ſhall ſtand out againſt them. This, I think, may be called argumentum ad verecundiam.

2. Ad ignorantiam.

§ 20. SECONDLY, another way that men ordinarily uſe to drive others, and force them to ſubmit to their judgments, and receive the opinion in debate, is to require the adverſary to admit what they alledge as a proof, or to aſſign a better. And this I call argumentum ad ignorantiam.

3. Ad hominem.

§ 21. THIRDLY, a third way is, to preſs a man with conſequences drawn from his own principles, or conceſſions. This is already known, under the name of argumentum ad hominem.

4. Ad judicium.

§ 22. FOURTHLY, the fourth is, the uſing of proofs drawn from any of the foundations of knowledge, or probability. This I call argumentum ad judicium. This alone, of all the four, brings true inſtruction with it, and advances us in our way to knowledge. For, 1. It argues not another man's opinion to be right, becauſe I, out of reſpect, or any other conſideration but that of conviction, will not contradict him. 2. It proves not another man to be in the right way, nor that I ought to take the ſame with him, becauſe I know not a better. 3. Nor does it follow that another man is in the right way, becauſe he has ſhewn me that I am in the wrong. I may be modeſt, and therefore not oppoſe another man's perſuaſion: I may be ignorant, and not be able to produce a better: I may be in an error, and another may ſhew me that I am ſo. This may diſpoſe me, perhaps, for the reception of truth, but helps me not to it; that muſt come from proofs and arguments, and light ariſing from the nature of things themſelves, and not from my ſhamefacedneſs, ignorance, or error.

Above, contrary, and according to reaſon.

§ 23. **By** what has been before ſaid of reaſon, we may be able to make ſome gueſs at the diſtinction of things, into thoſe that are according to, above, and contrary to reaſon. 1. According to reaſon are ſuch propoſitions, whoſe truth we can diſcover, by examining, and tracing thoſe ideas we have from ſenſation and reflection; and by natural deduction find to be true, or probable. 2. Above reaſon are ſuch propoſitions, whoſe truth, or probability, we cannot, by reaſon, derive from thoſe principles. 3. Contrary to reaſon are ſuch propoſitions, as are inconſiſtent with, or irreconcileable to our clear and diſtinct ideas. Thus the exiſtence of one God, is according to reaſon; the exiſtence of more than one God, contrary to reaſon; the reſurrection of the dead, above reaſon. Farther, as above reaſon may be taken in a double ſenſe, viz. either as ſignifying above probability, or above certainty; ſo in that large ſenſe alſo, contrary to reaſon, is, I ſuppoſe, ſometimes taken.

Reaſon and faith not oppoſite.

§ 24. **There** is another uſe of the word reaſon, wherein it is oppoſed to faith; which, tho' it be in itſelf a very improper way of ſpeaking, yet common uſe has ſo authoriſed it, that it would be folly either to oppoſe, or hope to remedy it: only, I think, it may not be amiſs to take notice, that however faith be oppoſed to reaſon, faith is nothing but a firm aſſent of the mind: which, if it be regulated, as is our duty, cannot be afforded to any thing, but upon good reaſon; and ſo cannot be oppoſite to it. He that believes, without having any reaſon for believing, may be in love with his own fancies; but neither ſeeks truth, as he ought, nor pays the obedience due to his maker, who would have him uſe thoſe diſcerning faculties, he has given him, to keep him out of miſtake and error. He that does not this to the beſt of his power, however he ſometimes lights on truth, is in the right but by chance; and I know not whether the luckineſs of the accident will excuſe the irregularity of his proceeding. This, at leaſt, is certain, that he muſt be accountable for whatever miſtakes he runs into: whereas he, that makes uſe of the light and faculties God has given him, and ſeeks ſincerely to diſcover truth by thoſe helps and abilities he has, may have this ſatisfaction in doing his duty, as a rational creature, that, tho' he ſhould miſs truth, he will not miſs the reward of it. For he governs his aſſent right, and places it as he ſhould, who, in any caſe, or matter, whatſoever, believes, or diſbelieves, according as reaſon directs him. He, that does otherwiſe, tranſgreſſes againſt his own light, and miſuſes thoſe faculties, which were given him to no other end, but to ſearch and follow the clearer evidence, and greater probability. But ſince reaſon and faith are by ſome men oppoſed, we will ſo conſider them in the following chapter.

CHAP. XVIII.

Of faith and reaſon, and their diſtinct provinces.

CHAP. XVIII.

Neceſſary to know their boundaries.

§ 1. IT has been above ſhewn, 1. That we are of neceſſity ignorant, and want knowledge of all ſorts, where we want ideas. 2. That we are ignorant, and want rational knowledge, where we want proofs. 3. That we want general knowledge and certainty, as far as we want clear and determined, ſpecifick ideas. 4. That we want probability to direct our aſſent, in matters, where we have neither knowledge of our own, nor teſtimony of other men, to bottom our reaſon upon.

From theſe things thus premiſed, I think we may come to lay down the meaſures and boundaries between faith and reaſon; the want whereof may, poſſibly, have been the cauſe, if not of great diſorders, yet at leaſt, of great diſputes, and, perhaps, miſtakes in the world. For till it be reſolved how far we are to be guided by reaſon, and how far by faith, we ſhall in vain diſpute, and endeavour to convince one another in matters of religion.

Faith and reaſon what, as contra-diſtinguiſh'd.

§ 2. I find every ſect, as far as reaſon will help them, make uſe of it gladly; and where it fails them, they cry out, it is matter of faith, and above reaſon. And I do not ſee how they can argue with any one, or ever convince a gainſayer, who makes uſe of the ſame plea, without ſetting down ſtrict boundaries between faith and reaſon; which ought to be the firſt point, eſtabliſhed in all queſtions, where faith has any thing to do.

Reason therefore here, as contra-diſtinguiſhed to faith, I take to be the diſcovery of the certainty, or probability, of ſuch propoſitions, or truths, which the mind arrives at, by deduction made from ſuch ideas, which it has got by the uſe of its natural faculties, viz. by ſenſation, or reflection.

Faith, on the other ſide, is the aſſent to any propoſition, not thus made out by the deduction of reaſon; but upon the credit of the propoſer, as coming from God, in ſome extraordinary way of communication. This way of diſcovering truths to men we call revelation.

No new ſimple idea can be conveyed by traditional-revelation.

§ 3. First then I ſay, that no man inſpired by God, can by any revelation communicate to others any new ſimple ideas, which they had not before from ſenſation, or reflection. For, whatſoever impreſſions he himſelf may have from the immediate hand of God, this revelation, if it be of new ſimple ideas, cannot be conveyed to another, either by words, or any other ſigns. Becauſe words, by their immediate operation on us, cauſe no other ideas, but of their natural ſounds: and it is by the cuſtom of uſing them for ſigns, that they excite and revive in our minds latent ideas; but yet only ſuch ideas, as were there before. For words ſeen, or heard, recal to our thoughts thoſe ideas only, which to us they have been wont to be ſigns of; but cannot introduce any perfectly new, and formerly unknown, ſimple ideas. The ſame holds in all other ſigns, which cannot ſignify to us things, of which we have before never had any idea at all.

Thus, whatever things were diſcovered to St. Paul, when he was wrapped up into the third heaven, whatever new ideas his mind there received, all the deſcription he can make to others of that place, is only this, that there are ſuch things, as eye hath not ſeen, nor ear heard, nor hath it entered into the heart of man to conceive. And ſuppoſing God ſhould diſcover to any one, ſupernaturally, a ſpecies of creatures inhabiting, for example, Jupiter, or Saturn, (for that it is poſſible there may be ſuch, no body can deny) which had ſix ſenſes; and imprint on his mind the ideas conveyed to theirs, by that ſixth ſenſe; he could no more, by words, produce in the minds of other men thoſe ideas, imprinted by that ſixth ſenſe, than one of us could convey the idea of any colour, by the ſounds of words, into a man, who having the other four ſenſes perfect, had always totally wanted the fifth, of ſeeing. For our ſimple ideas then, which are the foundation and ſole matter of all our notions and knowledge, we muſt depend wholly on our reaſon, I mean our natural faculties; and can by no means receive them, or any of them, from traditional revelation; I ſay, traditional revelation, in diſtinction to original revelation. By the one, I mean that firſt impreſſion, which is made immediately by God, on the mind of any man, to which we cannot ſet any bounds; and by the other, thoſe impreſſions, delivered over to others in words, and the ordinary ways of conveying our conceptions one to another.

Traditional revelation may make us know propoſitions, knowable alſo by reaſon, but not with the ſame certainty that reaſon doth.

§ 4. Secondly, I ſay, that the ſame truths may be diſcovered, and conveyed down from revelation, which are diſcoverable to us by reaſon, and by thoſe ideas, we naturally may have. So God might, by revelation, diſcover the truth of any propoſition in Euclid; as well as men, by the natural uſe of their faculties, come to make the diſcovery themſelves. In all things of this kind, there is little need, or uſe of revelation, God having furniſhed us with natural and ſurer means to arrive at the knowledge of them. For whatſoever truth we come to the clear diſcovery of, from the knowledge and contemplation of our own ideas, will always be certainer to us, than thoſe which are conveyed to us by traditional revelation. For the knowledge we have, that this revelation came at firſt from God, can never be ſo ſure, as the knowledge we have, from the clear and diſtinct perception of the agreement, or diſagreement of our own ideas, v. g. if it were revealed ſome ages ſince, that the three angles of a triangle were equal to two right ones, I might aſſent to the truth of that propoſition, upon the credit of the tradition, that it was revealed: but that would never amount to ſo great a certainty, as the knowledge of it, upon the comparing and meaſuring my own ideas of two right angles, and the three angles of a triangle. The like holds in matter of fact, knowable by our ſenſes, v. g. the hiſtory of the deluge is conveyed to us by writings, which had their original from revelation: and yet no body, I think, will ſay he has as certain and clear a knowledge of the flood, as Noah that ſaw it; or that he himſelf would have had, had he then been alive, and ſeen it. For he has no greater an aſſurance than that of his ſenſes, that it is writ in the book, ſuppoſed writ by Moſes inſpired: but he has not ſo great an aſſurance, that Moſes writ that book, as if he had ſeen Moſes write it. So that the aſſurance of its being a revelation, is leſs ſtill than the aſſurance of his ſenſes.

Revelation cannot be admitted, againſt the clear evidence of reaſon.

§ 5. In propoſitions then, whoſe certainty is built upon the clear perception of the agreement, or diſagreement of our ideas, attained either by immediate intuition, as in ſelf-evident propoſitions, or by evident deductions of reaſon in demonſtrations, we need not the aſſiſtance of revelation, as neceſſary to gain our aſſent, and introduce them into our minds. Becauſe the natural ways of knowledge could ſettle them there, or had done it already; which is the greateſt aſſurance we can poſſibly have of any thing, unleſs where God immediately reveals it to us: and there too, our aſſurance can be no greater, than our knowledge is, that it is a revelation from God. But yet nothing, I think, can, under that title, ſhake or over-rule plain knowledge; or rationally prevail with any man to admit it for true, in a direct contradiction to the clear evidence of his own underſtanding. For ſince no evidence of our faculties, by which we receive ſuch revelations, can exceed, if equal, the certainty of our intuitive knowledge, we can never receive, for a truth, any thing, that is directly contrary to our clear and diſtinct knowledge; v. g. the ideas of one body, and one place, do ſo clearly agree, and the mind has ſo evident a perception of their agreement, that we can never aſſent to a propoſition, that affirms the ſame body to be in two diſtant places at once, however it ſhould pretend to the authority of a divine revelation: ſince the evidence, firſt, that we deceive not ourſelves, in aſcribing it to God; ſecondly, that we underſtand it right; can never be ſo great, as the evidence of our own intuitive knowledge, whereby we diſcern it impoſſible for the ſame body to be in two places at once. And therefore no propoſition can be received for divine revelation, or obtain the aſſent due to all ſuch, if it be contradictory to our clear, intuitive knowledge. Becauſe this would be to ſubvert the principles and foundations of all knowledge, evidence, and aſſent whatſoever: and there would be left no difference between truth and falſhood, no meaſures of credible and incredible, in the world, if doubtful propoſitions ſhall take place before ſelf-evident; and what we certainly know, give way to what we may poſſibly be miſtaken in. In propoſitions, therefore, contrary to the clear perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of any of our ideas, it will be in vain to urge them as matters of faith. They cannot move our aſſent, under that, or any other title whatſoever. For faith can never convince us of any thing, that contradicts our knowledge. Becauſe, tho' faith be founded on the teſtimony of God (who cannot lye) revealing any propoſition to us; yet we cannot have an aſſurance of the truth of its being a divine revelation, greater than our own knowledge: ſince the whole ſtrength of the certainty depends upon our knowledge that God revealed it, which in this caſe, where the propoſition, ſuppoſed to be revealed, contradicts our knowledge, or reaſon, will always have this objection hanging to it, viz. that we cannot tell how to conceive that to come from God, the bountiful author of our being, which, if received for true, muſt overturn all the principles and foundations of knowledge he has given us, render all our faculties uſeleſs, wholly deſtroy the moſt excellent part of his workmanſhip, our underſtandings; and put a man in a condition, wherein he will have leſs light, leſs conduct, than the beaſt that periſheth. For if the mind of man can never have a clearer (and perhaps not ſo clear) evidence of any thing, to be a divine revelation, as it has of the principles of its own reaſon, it can never have a ground to quit the clear evidence of its reaſon, to give place to a propoſition, whoſe revelation has not a greater evidence, than thoſe principles have.

Traditional revelation much leſs.

§ 6. Thus far a man has uſe of reaſon, and ought to hearken to it, even in immediate and original revelation, where it is ſuppoſed to be made to himſelf: but to all thoſe, who pretend not to immediate revelation, but are required to pay obedience, and to receive the truths revealed to others, which, by the traditions of writings, or word of mouth, are conveyed down to them; reaſon has a great deal more to do, and is that only, which can induce us to receive them. For, matter of faith being only divine revelation, and nothing elſe; faith, as we uſe the word, (called commonly divine faith) has to do with no propoſitions, but thoſe which are ſuppoſed to be divinely revealed. So that I do not ſee how thoſe who make revelation alone the ſole object of faith, can ſay that it is a matter of faith, and not of reaſon, to believe that ſuch, or ſuch a propoſition, to be found in ſuch or ſuch a book, is of divine inſpiration; unleſs it be revealed, that that propoſition, or all in that book, was communicated by divine inſpiration. Without ſuch a revelation, the believing, or not believing that propoſition, or book to be of divine authority, can never be matter of faith, but matter of reaſon; and ſuch as I muſt come to an aſſent to, only by the uſe of my reaſon, which can never require, or enable me to believe that, which is contrary to itſelf: it being impoſſible for reaſon ever to procure any aſſent to that, which to itſelf appears unreaſonable.

In all things, therefore, where we have clear evidence from our ideas, and thoſe principles of knowledge I have abovementioned, reaſon is the proper judge; and revelation, tho' it may in conſenting with it confirm its dictates, yet cannot in ſuch caſes invalidate its decrees: nor can we be obliged, where we have the clear and evident ſentence of reaſon, to quit it for the contrary opinion, under a pretence, that it is matter of faith; which can have no authority againſt the plain and clear dictates of reaſon.

Things above reaſon.

§ 7. But, thirdly, there being many things, wherein we have very imperfect notions, or none at all; and other things, of whoſe paſt, preſent, or future exiſtence, by the natural uſe of our faculties, we can have no knowledge at all; theſe, as being beyond the diſcovery of our natural faculties, and above reaſon, are, when revealed, the proper matter of faith. Thus, that part of the angels rebelled againſt God, and thereby loſt their firſt happy ſtate; and that the dead ſhall riſe, and live again: theſe, and the like, being beyond the diſcovery of reaſon, are purely matters of faith; with which reaſon has directly nothing to do.

Or not contrary to reaſon, if revealed, are matter of faith.

§ 8. But ſince God, in giving us the light of reaſon, has not thereby tied up his own hands from affording us, when he thinks fit, the light of revelation, in any of thoſe matters, wherein our natural faculties are able to give a probable determination; revelation, where God has been pleaſed to give it, muſt carry it, againſt the probable conjectures of reaſon. Becauſe the mind, not being certain of the truth of that it does not evidently know, but only yielding to the probability that appears in it, is bound to give up its aſſent to ſuch a teſtimony; which, it is ſatisfied, comes from one who cannot err, and will not deceive. But yet it ſtill belongs to reaſon to judge of the truth of its being a revelation, and of the ſignification of the words wherein it is delivered. Indeed, if any thing ſhall be thought revelation, which is contrary to the plain principles of reaſon, and the evident knowledge the mind has of its own clear and diſtinct ideas; there reaſon muſt be hearkened to, as to a matter within its province: ſince a man can never have ſo certain a knowledge, that a propoſition, which contradicts the clear principles and evidence of his own knowledge, was divinely revealed, or that he underſtands the words rightly, wherein it is delivered; as he has, that the contrary is true: and ſo is bound to conſider and judge of it, as a matter of reaſon, and not ſwallow it, without examination, as a matter of faith.

Revelation, in matters where reaſon cannot judge, or but probably, ought to be

§ 9. First, whatever propoſition is revealed, of whoſe truth our mind, by its natural faculties and notions, cannot judge; that is purely matter of faith, and above reaſon.

Secondly, all propoſitions, whereof the mind, by the uſe of its natural faculties, can come to determine and judge, from naturally acquired ideas, are matter of reaſon; with this difference ſtill, that in thoſe, concerning which it has but an uncertain evidence, and ſo is perſuaded of their truth, only upon probable grounds, which ſtill admit a poſſibility of the contrary to be true, without doing violence to the certain evidence of its own knowledge, and overturning the principles of all reaſon; in ſuch probable propoſitions, I ſay, an evident revelation ought to determine our aſſent, even againſt probability. For, where the principles of reaſon have not evidenced a propoſition to be certainly true, or falſe, there clear revelation, as another principle of truth, and ground of aſſent, may determine; and ſo it may be matter of faith, and be alſo above reaſon. Becauſe reaſon, in that particular matter, being able to reach no higher than probability, faith gave the determination, where reaſon came ſhort; and revelation diſcovered on which ſide the truth lay.

hearkened to.

In matters where reaſon can afford certain knowledge, that is to be hearkened to.

§ 10. Thus far the dominion of faith reaches, and that without any violence, or hindrance to reaſon; which is not injured, or diſturbed, but aſſiſted and improved, by new diſcoveries of truth, coming from the eternal fountain of all knowledge. Whatever God hath revealed, is certainly true; no doubt can be made of it. This is the proper object of faith: but, whether it be a divine revelation or no, reaſon muſt judge; which can never permit the mind to reject a greater evidence, to embrace what is leſs evident, nor allow it to entertain probability, in oppoſition to knowledge and certainty. There can be no evidence, that any traditional revelation is of divine original, in the words we receive it, and in the ſenſe we underſtand it, ſo clear and ſo certain, as that of the principles of reaſon; and, therefore, nothing that is contrary to, and inconſiſtent with, the clear and ſelf-evident dictates of reaſon, has a right to be urged, or aſſented to, as a matter of faith, wherein reaſon hath nothing to do. Whatſoever is divine revelation, ought to over-rule all our opinions, prejudices, and intereſts, and hath a right to be received with full aſſent. Such a ſubmiſſion as this, of our reaſon to faith, takes not away the land-marks of knowledge: This ſhakes not the foundations of reaſon, but leaves us that uſe of our faculties, for which they were given us.

If the boundaries be not ſet between faith and reaſon, no enthuſiaſm, or extravagancy in religion, can be contradicted.

§ 11. If the provinces of faith and reaſon are not kept diſtinct, by theſe boundaries, there will, in matters of religion, be no room for reaſon at all; and thoſe extravagant opinions and ceremonies that are to be found in the ſeveral religions of the world, will not deſerve to be blamed. For, to this crying-up of faith, in oppoſition to reaſon, we may, I think, in a good meaſure aſcribe thoſe abſurdities, that fill almoſt all the religions, which poſſeſs and divide mankind. For men, having been principled with an opinion, that they muſt not conſult reaſon in the things of religion, however apparently contradictory to common ſenſe, and the very principles of all their knowledge, have let looſe their fancies and natural ſuperſtition; and have been by them led into ſo ſtrange opinions, and extravagant practices, in religion, that a conſiderate man cannot but ſtand amazed at their follies, and judge them ſo far from being acceptable to the great and wiſe God, that he cannot avoid thinking them ridiculous and offenſive to a ſober good man. So that in effect religion, which ſhould moſt diſtinguiſh us from beaſts, and ought moſt peculiarly to elevate us, as rational creatures, above brutes, is that wherein men often appear moſt irrational, and more ſenſeleſs than beaſts themſelves. "Credo, quia impoſſibile eſt;" I believe, becauſe it is impoſſible, might in a good man paſs for a ſally of zeal; but would prove a very ill rule for men to chuſe their opinions, or religion by.

CHAP. XIX.

Of enthuſiaſm.

Love of truth neceſſary.

§ 1. HE, that would ſeriouſly ſet upon the ſearch of truth, ought, in the firſt place, to prepare his mind, with a love of it. For he, that loves it not, will not take much pains to get it, nor be much concerned, when he miſſes it. There is no body, in the commonwealth of learning, who does not profeſs himſelf a lover of truth; and there is not a rational creature, that would not take it amiſs, to be thought otherwiſe of. And yet, for all this, one may truly ſay, there are very few lovers of truth, for truth-ſake, even amongſt thoſe who perſuade themſelves that they are ſo. How a man may know, whether he be ſo, in earneſt, is worth enquiry: and I think, there is this one unerring mark of it, viz. the not entertaining any propoſition, with greater aſſurance, than the proofs, it is built upon, will warrant. Whoever goes beyond this meaſure of aſſent, it is plain, receives not truth, in the love of it; loves not truth for truth-ſake, but for ſome other by-end. For the evidence, that any propoſition is true (except ſuch as are ſelf-evident) lying only in the proofs, a man has of it, whatſoever degrees of aſſent he affords it, beyond the degrees of that evidence, it is plain, all that ſurpluſage of aſſurance is owing to ſome other affection, and not to the love of truth: it being as impoſſible, that the love of truth ſhould carry my aſſent, above the evidence there is to me, that it is true, as that the love of truth ſhould make me aſſent to any propoſition, for the ſake of that evidence which it has not, that it is true; which is in effect to love it as a truth, becauſe it is poſſible, or probable, that it may not be true. In any truth, that gets not poſſeſſion of our minds, by the irreſiſtible light of ſelf-evidence, or by the force of demonſtration, the arguments, that gain it aſſent, are the vouchers and gage of its probability to us; and we can receive it for no other, than ſuch, as they deliver it to our underſtandings. Whatſoever credit, or authority, we give to any propoſition, more than it receives from the principles and proofs, it ſupports itſelf upon, is owing to our inclinations that way, and is ſo far a derogation from the love of truth, as ſuch: which, as it can receive no evidence from our paſſions, or intereſts, ſo it ſhould receive no tincture from them.

A forwardneſs to dictate, from whence.

§ 2. The aſſuming an authority, of dictating to others, and a forwardneſs to preſcribe to their opinions, is a conſtant concomitant of this byaſs and corruption of our judgments. For how, almoſt, can it be otherwiſe, but that he ſhould be ready to impoſe on others belief, who has already impoſed on his own? Who can reaſonably expect arguments and conviction from him, in dealing with others, whoſe underſtanding is not accuſtomed to them, in his dealing with himſelf? Who does violence to his own faculties, tyrannizes over his own mind, and uſurps the prerogative, that belongs to truth alone, which is to command aſſent, by only its own authority, i. e. by and in proportion to that evidence, which it carries with it.

Force of enthuſiaſm.

§ 3. Upon this occaſion, I ſhall take the liberty to conſider a third ground of aſſent, which, with ſome men, has the ſame authority, and is as confidently relied on, as either faith or reaſon; I mean enthuſiaſm: which, laying by reaſon, would ſet up revelation without it. Whereby, in effect, it takes away both reaſon and revelation, and ſubſtitutes, in the room of it, the ungrounded fancies of a man's own brain, and aſſumes them for a foundation, both of opinion and conduct.

Reaſon and revelation.

§ 4. Reason is natural revelation, whereby the eternal father of light, and fountain of all knowledge, communicates, to mankind, that portion of truth, which he has laid within the reach of their natural faculties: revelation is natural reaſon, enlarged by a new ſet of diſcoveries, communicated by God immediately, which reaſon vouches the truth of, by the teſtimony and proofs it gives, that they come from God. So that he, that takes away reaſon, to make way for revelation, puts out the light of both, and does much-what the ſame, as if he would perſuade a man to put out his eyes, the better to receive the remote light of an inviſible ſtar, by a teleſcope.

Riſe of enthuſiaſm.

§ 5. Immediate revelation, being a much eaſier way for men, to eſtabliſh their opinions, and regulate their conduct, than the tedious and not always ſucceſsful labour of ſtrict reaſoning, it is no wonder, that ſome have been very apt to pretend to revelation, and to perſuade themſelves, that they are under the peculiar guidance of heaven, in their actions and opinions, eſpecially in thoſe of them, which they cannot account for, by the ordinary methods of knowledge, and principles of reaſon. Hence we ſee, that in all ages, men, in whom melancholy has mixed with devotion, or whoſe conceit of themſelves has raiſed them into an opinion of a greater familiarity with God, and a nearer admittance

tance to his favour, than is afforded to others, have often flattered themſelves with a perſuaſion of an immediate intercourſe with the deity, and frequent communications from the Divine Spirit. God, I own, cannot be denied to be able to enlighten the underſtanding, by a ray darted into the mind, immediately from the fountain of light: this they underſtand, he has promiſed to do, and who then has ſo good a title to expect it, as thoſe, who are his peculiar people, choſen by him, and depending on him?

Enthuſiaſm.

§ 6. THEIR minds being thus prepared, whatever groundleſs opinion comes to ſettle itſelf ſtrongly upon their fancies, is an illumination from the ſpirit of God, and preſently of divine authority: and, whatſoever odd action they find in themſelves a ſtrong inclination to do, that impulſe is concluded to be a call, or direction, from heaven, and muſt be obeyed; it is a commiſſion from above, and they cannot err, in executing it.

§ 7. THIS I take to be properly enthuſiaſm, which, tho' founded neither on reaſon, nor divine revelation, but riſing from the conceits of a warmed or overweening brain, works yet, where it once gets footing, more powerfully on the perſuaſions and actions of men, than either of thoſe two, or both together: men being moſt forwardly obedient to the impulſes they receive, from themſelves; and the whole man is ſure to act more vigorouſly, where the whole man is carried by a natural motion. For ſtrong conceit, like a new principle, carries all eaſily with it, when got above common ſenſe, and freed from all reſtraint of reaſon, and check of reflection, it is heightened into a divine authority, in concurrence with our own temper and inclination.

Enthuſiaſm, miſtaken for ſeeing and feeling.

§ 8. THO' the odd opinions, and extravagant actions, enthuſiaſm has run men into, were enough to warn them, againſt this wrong principle, ſo apt to miſguide them, both in their belief and conduct; yet the love of ſomething extraordinary, the eaſe and glory it is to be inſpired, and be above the common and natural ways of knowledge, ſo flatters many men's lazineſs, ignorance, and vanity, that, when once they are got into this way, of immediate revelation, of illumination without ſearch, and of certainty without proof, and without examination, it is a hard matter to get them out of it. Reaſon is loſt upon them, they are above it: they ſee the light infuſed into their underſtandings, and cannot be miſtaken; it is clear and viſible there, like the light of bright ſun-ſhine: ſhews itſelf, and needs no other proof, but its own evidence: they feel the hand of God, moving them within, and the impulſes of the Spirit, and cannot be miſtaken, in what they feel. Thus they ſupport themſelves, and are ſure, reaſon hath nothing to do with what they ſee and feel in themſelves: what they have a ſenſible experience of, admits no doubt, needs no probation. Would he not be ridiculous, who ſhould require to have it proved to him, that the light ſhines, and that he ſees it? It is its own proof, and can have no other. When the Spirit brings light into our minds, it diſpels darkneſs. We ſee it, as we do that of the ſun, at noon, and need not the twilight of reaſon, to ſhew it us. This light from heaven is ſtrong, clear, and pure, carries its own demonſtration with it: and we may, as rationally, take a glow-worm to aſſiſt us to diſcover the ſun, as to examine the celeſtial ray, by our dim candle, reaſon.

Enthuſiaſm, how to be diſcovered.

§ 9. THIS is the way of talking of theſe men; they are ſure, becauſe they are ſure: and their perſuaſions are right, only becauſe they are ſtrong in them. For, when what they ſay is ſtripped of the metaphor of ſeeing and feeling, this is all it amounts to: and yet theſe ſimilies ſo impoſe on them, that they ſerve them for certainty in themſelves, and demonſtration to others.

§ 10. BUT to examine, a little ſoberly, this internal light, and this feeling, on which they build ſo much. Theſe men have, they ſay, clear light, and they ſee; they have awakened ſenſe, and they feel: this cannot, they are ſure, be diſputed them. For, when a man ſays he ſees, or he feels, no body can deny it him, that he does ſo. But here, let me aſk: This ſeeing, is it the perception of the truth of the propoſition, or of this, that it is a revelation from God? This feeling, is it a perception of an inclination, or fancy, to do ſomething, or of the Spirit of God, moving that inclination? Theſe are two very different perceptions, and muſt be carefully diſtinguiſhed, if we would not impoſe upon ourſelves.

I may perceive the truth of a propoſition, and yet not perceive, that it is an immediate revelation from God. I may perceive the truth of a propoſition in Euclid, without its being, or my perceiving it to be, a revelation; nay, I may perceive I came not by this knowledge in a natural way, and ſo may conclude it revealed, without perceiving that it is a revelation from God; becauſe there be ſpirits, which, without being divinely commiſſioned, may excite thoſe ideas in me, and lay them in ſuch order, before my mind, that I may perceive their connection. So that the knowledge of any propoſition, coming into my mind I know not how, is not a perception that it is from God. Much leſs is a ſtrong perſuaſion, that it is true, a perception that it is from God, or ſo much as true. But, however it be called light and ſeeing, I ſuppoſe it is, at moſt, but belief and aſſurance: and the propoſition, taken for a revelation, is not ſuch as they know to be true, but take to be true. For, where a propoſition is known to be true, revelation is needleſs; and it is hard to conceive, how there can be a revelation, to any one, of what he knows already. If, therefore, it be a propoſition, which they are perſuaded, but do not know, to be true, whatever they may call it, it is not ſeeing, but believing. For theſe are two ways, whereby truth comes into the mind, wholly diſtinct, ſo that one is not the other. What I ſee, I know to be ſo, by the evidence of the thing itſelf: what I believe, I take to be ſo upon the teſtimony of another: but this teſtimony, I muſt know to be given, or elſe what ground have I of believing? I muſt ſee that it is God, that reveals this to me, or elſe I ſee nothing. The queſtion then here is, How do I know, that God is the revealer of this to me; that this impreſſion is made upon my mind, by his Holy Spirit, and that, therefore, I ought to obey it? If I know not this, how great ſoever the aſſurance is, that I am poſſeſſed with, it is groundleſs; whatever light I pretend to, it is but enthuſiaſm. For, whether the propoſition, ſuppoſed to be revealed, be in itſelf evidently true, or viſibly probable, or by the natural ways of knowledge, uncertain, the propoſition, that muſt be well grounded, and manifeſted to be true, is this, that God is the revealer of it, and that, what I take to be a revelation, is certainly put into my mind by him, and is not an illuſion, dropped in by ſome other ſpirit, or raiſed by my own fancy. For, if I miſtake not, theſe men receive it for true, becauſe they preſume God revealed it. Does it not then ſtand them upon, to examine, on what grounds they preſume it to be a revelation from God? or elſe, all their confidence is mere preſumption: and this light, they are ſo dazzled with, is nothing but an ignis fatuus, that leads them continually round in this circle; it is a revelation, becauſe they firmly believe it; and they believe it, becauſe it is a revelation.

Enthuſiaſm fails of evidence, that the propoſition is from God.

§ 11. In all that is of divine revelation, there is need of no other proof, but that it is an inſpiration from God; for he can neither deceive, nor be deceived. But how ſhall it be known, that any propoſition, in our minds, is a truth, infuſed by God; a truth, that is revealed to us by him, which he declares to us, and, therefore, we ought to believe? Here it is, that enthuſiaſm fails of the evidence it pretends to. For men, thus poſſeſſed, boaſt of a light, whereby, they ſay, they are enlightened, and brought into the knowledge of this, or that truth. But, if they know it to be a truth, they muſt know it to be ſo, either by its own ſelf-evidence to natural reaſon, or by the rational proofs, that make it out to be ſo. If they ſee and know it to be a truth either of theſe two ways, they in vain ſuppoſe it to be a revelation. For they know it to be true, by the ſame way, that any other man naturally may know that it is ſo, without the help of revelation. For thus all the truths, of what kind ſoever, that men, uninſpired, are enlightened with, came into their minds, and are eſtabliſhed there. If they ſay, they know it to be true, becauſe it is a revelation from God; the reaſon is good: but then, it will be demanded, how they know it to be a revelation from God? If they ſay, by the light it brings with it, which ſhines bright in their minds, and they cannot reſiſt: I beſeech them to conſider, whether this be any more, than what we have taken notice of already, viz. that it is a revelation, becauſe they ſtrongly believe it to be true. For all the light, they ſpeak of, is but a ſtrong, tho' ungrounded, perſuaſion of their own minds, that it is a truth. For rational grounds from proofs, that it is a truth, they muſt acknowledge to have none; for then, it is not received as a revelation, but upon the ordinary grounds, that other truths are received: and if they believe it to be true, becauſe it is a revelation, and have no other reaſon for its being a revelation, but becauſe they are fully perſuaded, without any other reaſon, that it is true, they believe it to be a revelation, only becauſe they ſtrongly believe it to be a revelation; which is a very unſafe ground to proceed on, either in our tenets or actions. And what readier way can there be, to run ourſelves into the moſt extravagant errors and miſcarriages, than thus to ſet up fancy for our ſupreme and ſole guide, and to believe any propoſition to be true, any action to be right, only becauſe we believe it to be ſo? The ſtrength of our perſuaſions is no evidence, at all, of their own rectitude: Crooked things may be as ſtiff and unflexible, as ſtreight: and men may be as poſitive and peremptory in error, as in truth. How come elſe the untractable zealots, in different and oppoſite parties? For, if the light, which every one thinks he has in his mind, which in this caſe is nothing but the ſtrength of his own perſuaſion, be an evidence that it is from God, contrary opinions may have the ſame title to be inſpirations; and God will be not only the father of lights, but of oppoſite and contradictory lights leading men contrary ways; and contradictory propoſitions will be divine truths, if an ungrounded ſtrength of aſſurance be an evidence, that any propoſition is a divine revelation.

Firmneſs of perſuaſion, no proof that any propoſition is from God.

§ 12. THIS cannot be otherwiſe, whilſt firmneſs of perſuaſion is made the cauſe of believing, and confidence, of being in the right, is made an argument of truth. St. Paul himſelf believed he did well, and that he had a call to it, when he perſecuted the chriſtians, whom he confidently thought in the wrong: but yet it was he, and not they, who were miſtaken. Good men are men ſtill, liable to miſtakes; and are ſometimes warmly engaged in errors, which they take for divine truths, ſhining in their minds with the cleareſt light.

Light in the mind, what.

§ 13. LIGHT, true light in the mind is, or can be nothing elſe, but the evidence of the truth of any propoſition; and, if it be not a ſelf-evident propoſition, all the light it has, or can have, is from the clearneſs and validity of thoſe proofs, upon which it is received. To talk of any other light in the underſtanding, is to put ourſelves in the dark, or in the power of the prince of darkneſs; and, by our own conſent, to give ourſelves up to deluſion, to believe a lye. For, if ſtrength of perſuaſion be the light, which muſt guide us; I aſk, how ſhall any one diſtinguiſh between the deluſions of Satan, and the inſpirations of the Holy Ghoſt? He can transform himſelf into an angel of light. And they, who are led by this ſon of the morning, are as fully ſatisfied of the illumination, i. e. are as ſtrongly perſuaded, that they are enlightened, by the Spirit of God, as any one, who is ſo: they acquieſce and rejoice in it, are acted by it: and no body can be more ſure, nor more in the right (if their own ſtrong belief may be judge) than they.

Revelation muſt be judged of, by reaſon.

§ 14. HE, therefore, that will not give himſelf up to all the extravagancies of deluſion and error, muſt bring this guide, of his light within, to the trial. God, when he makes the prophet, does not unmake the man. He leaves all his faculties in their natural ſtate, to enable him to judge of his inſpirations, whether they be of divine original, or no. When he illuminates the mind with ſupernatural light, he does not extinguiſh that which is natural. If he would have us aſſent to the truth of any propoſition, he either evidences that truth, by the uſual methods of natural reaſon, or elſe makes it known to be a truth, which he would have us aſſent to, by his authority: and convinces us, that it is from him, by ſome marks, which reaſon cannot be miſtaken in. Reaſon muſt be our laſt judge and guide, in every thing. I do not mean that we muſt conſult reaſon, and examine whether a propoſition, revealed from God, can be made out, by natural principles, and if it cannot, that then we may reject it: but conſult it we muſt, and by it examine, whether it be a revelation from God, or no. And, if reaſon finds it to be revealed from God, reaſon then declares for it, as much as for any other truth, and makes it one of her dictates. Every conceit, that thorowly warms our fancies, muſt paſs for an inſpiration, if there be nothing but the ſtrength of our perſuaſions, whereby to judge of our perſuaſions: if reaſon muſt not examine their truth, by ſomething extrinſical to the perſuaſions themſelves, inſpirations and deluſions, truth and falſhood, will have the ſame meaſure, and will not be poſſible to be diſtinguiſhed.

Belief, no proof of revelation.

§ 15. If this internal light, or any propoſition which, under that title, we take for inſpired, be conformable to the principles of reaſon, or to the word of God, which is atteſted revelation, reaſon warrants it, and we may ſafely receive it for true, and be guided by it, in our belief and actions: if it receive no teſtimony, nor evidence, from either of theſe rules, we cannot take it for a revelation, or ſo much as for true, till we have ſome other mark, that it is a revelation, beſides our believing that it is ſo. Thus we ſee the holy men of old, who had revelations from God, had ſomething elſe, beſides that internal light, of aſſurance in their own minds, to teſtify to them that it was from God. They were not left to their own perſuaſions alone, that thoſe perſuaſions were from God; but had outward ſigns to convince them of the author of thoſe revelations. And, when they were to convince others, they had a power given them, to juſtify the truth of their commiſſion from heaven: and, by viſible ſigns, to aſſert the divine authority of a meſſage they were ſent with. Moſes ſaw the buſh burn, without being conſumed, and heard a voice out of it. This was ſomething, beſides finding an impulſe upon his mind, to go to Pharaoh, that he might bring his brethren out of Egypt: and yet he thought not this enough, to authorize him to go with that meſſage, till God, by another miracle, of his rod turned into a ſerpent, had aſſured him of a power to teſtify his miſſion, by the ſame miracle repeated before them, whom he was ſent to. Gideon was ſent by an angel, to deliver Iſrael from the Midianites, and yet he deſired a ſign to convince him, that this commiſſion was from God. Theſe, and ſeveral the like inſtances to be found among the prophets of old, are enough to ſhew that they thought not an inward ſeeing, or perſuaſion of their own minds, without any other proof, a ſufficient evidence, that it was from God, tho' the ſcripture does not every where mention their demanding, or having ſuch proofs.

§ 16. In what I have ſaid, I am far from denying, that God can, or doth ſometimes enlighten men's minds, in the apprehending of certain truths, or excite them to good actions, by the immediate influence and aſſiſtance of the Holy Spirit, without any extraordinary ſigns accompanying it. But, in ſuch caſes too, we have reaſon and ſcripture, unerring rules, to know whether it be from God, or no. Where the truth, embraced, is conſonant to the revelation in the written word of God, or the action conformable to the dictates of right reaſon, or holy writ, we may be aſſured that we run no riſk, in entertaining it as ſuch; becauſe, tho' perhaps it be not an immediate revelation from God, extraordinarily operating on our minds, yet we are ſure it is warranted by that revelation, which he has given us of truth. But it is not the ſtrength of our private perſuaſion, within ourſelves, that can warrant it to be a light, or motion from heaven: nothing can do that, but the written word of God without us, or that ſtandard of reaſon, which is common to us with all men. Where reaſon, or ſcripture, is expreſs for any opinion, or action, we may receive it, as of divine authority: but it is not the ſtrength of our own perſuaſions, which can, by itſelf, give it that ſtamp. The bent of our own minds may favour it, as much as we pleaſe; that may ſhew it to be a fondling of our own, but will, by no means, prove it to be an offspring of heaven, and of divine original.

CHAP. XX.

Of wrong aſſent, or error.

Chap. XX.

Cauſes of error.

§ 1. KNOWLEDGE being to be had, only of viſible, certain truth, error is not a fault of our knowledge, but a miſtake of our judgment, giving aſſent to that which is not true.

But, if aſſent be grounded on likelihood, if the proper object and motive of our aſſent be probability, and that probability conſiſts in what is laid down, in the foregoing chapters, it will be demanded, "how men come to give their aſſents contrary to probability?" For there is nothing more common, than contrariety of opinions; nothing more obvious, than that one man wholly diſbelieves what another only doubts of, and a third ſtedfaſtly believes, and firmly adheres to. The reaſons whereof, tho' they may be very various, yet, I ſuppoſe, may be all reduced to theſe four.

1. Want of proofs.
2. Want of ability to uſe them.
3. Want of will to uſe them.
4. Wrong meaſures of probability.

1. Want of proofs.

§ 2. FIRST, by want of proofs, I do not mean only the want of thoſe proofs, which are no where extant, and ſo are no where to be had; but the want even of thoſe proofs, which are in being, or might be procured. And thus, men want proofs, who have not the convenience, or opportunity, to make experiments and obſervations themſelves, tending to the proof of any propoſition; nor likewiſe the convenience to enquire into, and collect the teſtimonies of others: and, in this ſtate, are the greateſt part of mankind, who are given up to labour, and enſlaved to the neceſſity of their mean condition; whoſe lives are worn out, only in the proviſions for living. Theſe men's opportunity of knowledge and enquiry are commonly as narrow as their fortunes; and their underſtandings are but little inſtructed, when all their whole time and pains is laid out to ſtill the croaking of their own bellies, or the cries of their children. It is not to be expected that a man, who drudges on all his life, in a laborious trade, ſhould be more knowing in the variety of things, done in the world, than a pack-horſe, who is driven conſtantly forwards and backwards, in a narrow lane, and dirty road, only to market, ſhould be ſkilled in the geography of the country. Nor is it at all more poſſible, that he, who wants leiſure, books, and languages, and the opportunity of converſing with variety of men, ſhould be in a condition to collect thoſe teſtimonies and obſervations, which are in being, and are neceſſary to make out many, nay moſt of the propoſitions that, in the ſocieties of men, are judged of the greateſt moment; or to find out grounds of aſſurance ſo great, as the belief of the points, he would build on them, is thought neceſſary; ſo that a great part of mankind are, by the natural and unalterable ſtate of things in this world, and the conſtitution of human affairs, unavoidably given over to invincible ignorance of thoſe proofs, on which others build, and which are neceſſary to eſtabliſh thoſe opinions: the greateſt part of men, having much to do to get the means of living, are not in a condition to look after thoſe of learned and laborious enquiries.

Obj. What ſhall become of thoſe who want them? anſwered.

§ 3. WHAT ſhall we ſay then? are the greateſt part of mankind, by the neceſſity of their condition, ſubjected to unavoidable ignorance, in thoſe things, which are of greateſt importance to them? (for of theſe it is obvious to enquire.) Have the bulk of mankind no other guide, but accident, and blind chance, to conduct them to their happineſs, or miſery? Are the current opinions, and licenſed guides of every country, ſufficient evidence and ſecurity, to every man, to venture his great concernments on; nay, his everlaſting happineſs, or miſery? Or, can thoſe be the certain and infallible oracles and ſtandards of truth, which teach one thing in Chriſtendom, and another in Turky? Or ſhall a poor countryman be eternally happy, for having the chance to be born in Italy; or a day-labourer be unavoidably loſt, becauſe he had the ill luck to be born in England? How ready ſome men may be to ſay ſome of theſe things, I will not here examine: but this I am ſure, that men muſt allow one, or other of theſe to be true, (let them chuſe which they pleaſe) or elſe grant, that God has furniſhed men with faculties, ſufficient to direct them in the way they ſhould take, if they will but ſeriouſly employ them that way, when their ordinary vocations allow them the leiſure. No man is ſo wholly taken up with the attendance on the means of living, as to have no ſpare time at all, to think of his ſoul, and inform himſelf in matters of religion. Were men as intent upon this, as they are on things of lower concernment, there are none ſo enſlaved to the neceſſities of life, who might not find many vacancies, that might be huſbanded to this advantage of their knowledge.

People hindered from enquiry.

§ 4. Besides thoſe, whoſe improvements and informations are ſtraitened by the narrowneſs of their fortunes, there are others, whoſe largeneſs of fortune would plentifully enough ſupply books, and other requiſites, for clearing of doubts, and diſcovering of truth: but they are cooped in cloſe, by the laws of their countries, and the ſtrict guards of thoſe, whoſe intereſt it is to keep them ignorant, leſt, knowing more, they ſhould believe the leſs in them. Theſe are as far, nay, farther from the liberty and opportunities of a fair enquiry, than thoſe poor and wretched labourers, we before ſpoke of. And, however they may ſeem high and great, are confined to narrowneſs of thought, and enſlaved in that, which ſhould be the freeſt part of man, their underſtandings. This is generally the caſe of all thoſe, who live in places, where care is taken to propagate truth, without knowledge; where men are forced, at a venture, to be of the religion of the country; and muſt, therefore, ſwallow down opinions, as ſilly people do empiricks pills, without knowing what they are made of, or how they will work, and have nothing to do, but believe that they will do the cure: but, in this, are much more miſerable than they, in that they are not at liberty to refuſe ſwallowing, what perhaps they had rather let alone; or to chuſe the phyſician, to whoſe conduct they would truſt themſelves.

2. Want of ſkill to uſe them.

§ 5. Secondly, thoſe, who want ſkill to uſe thoſe evidences they have, of probabilities; who cannot carry a train of conſequences in their heads, nor weigh exactly the preponderancy of contrary proofs and teſtimonies, making every circumſtance its due allowance, may be eaſily miſled to aſſent to poſitions, that are not probable. There are ſome men of one, ſome but of two ſyllogiſms, and no more; and others that can but advance one ſtep farther. Theſe cannot always diſcern that ſide, on which the ſtrongeſt proofs lie; cannot conſtantly follow that, which in itſelf is the more probable opinion. Now, that there is ſuch a difference between men, in reſpect of their underſtandings, I think no body, who has had any converſation with his neighbours, will queſtion: tho' he never was at Weſtminſter-hall, or the Exchange, on the one hand; or at Alms-houſes, or Bedlam, on the other. Which great difference in men's intellectuals, whether it riſes from any defect in the organs of the body, particularly adapted to thinking; or in the dulneſs, or untractableneſs, of thoſe faculties, for want of uſe; or, as ſome think, in the natural differences of men's ſouls themſelves; or ſome, or all of theſe together; it matters not here to examine: only this is evident, that there is a difference of degrees, in men's underſtandings, apprehenſions, and reaſonings, to ſo great a latitude, that one may, without doing injury to mankind, affirm, that there is a greater diſtance between ſome men and others, in this reſpect, than between ſome men and ſome beaſts. But, how this comes about, is a ſpeculation, tho' of great conſequence, yet not neceſſary to our preſent purpoſe.

3. Want of will to uſe them.

§ 6. Thirdly, there are another ſort of people that want proofs, not becauſe they are out of their reach, but becauſe they will not uſe them: who, tho' they have riches and leiſure enough, and want neither parts, nor other helps, are yet never the better for them. Their hot purſuit of pleaſure, or conſtant drudgery in buſineſs, engages ſome men's thoughts elſewhere: lazineſs and oſcitancy in general, or a particular averſion for books, ſtudy, and meditation, keep others from any ſerious thoughts at all: and ſome out of fear, that an impartial enquiry would not favour thoſe opinions, which beſt ſuit their prejudices, lives, and deſigns, content themſelves, without examination, to take upon truſt, what they find convenient and in faſhion. Thus moſt men, even of thoſe that might do otherwiſe, paſs their lives, without an acquaintance with, much leſs a rational aſſent to, probabilities, they are concerned to know, tho' they lie ſo much within their view, that to be convinced of them, they need but turn their eyes that way. But we know, ſome men will not read a letter, which is ſuppoſed to bring ill news; and many men forbear to caſt up their accounts, or ſo much as think upon their eſtates, who have reaſon to fear, their affairs are in no very good poſture. How men, whoſe plentiful fortunes allow them leiſure to improve their underſtandings, can ſatisfy themſelves with a lazy ignorance, I cannot tell: but methinks, they have a low opinion of their ſouls, who lay out all their incomes in proviſions for the body, and employ none of it to procure the means and helps of knowledge; who take great care to appear always in a neat and ſplendid outſide, and would think themſelves miſerable in coarſe clothes, or a patched coat, and yet contentedly ſuffer their minds to appear abroad in a pie-bald livery of coarſe patches, and borrowed ſhreds, ſuch as it has pleaſed chance, or their country taylor (I mean the common opinion of thoſe, they have converſed with) to clothe them in. I will not here mention, how unreaſonable this is, for men that ever think of a future ſtate, and their concernment in it, which no rational man can avoid to do ſometimes: nor ſhall I take notice what a ſhame and confuſion it is, to the greateſt contemners of knowledge, to be found ignorant, in things they are concerned to know. But this at leaſt is worth the conſideration of thoſe, who call themſelves gentlemen, that, however they may think credit, reſpect, power and authority, the concomitants of their birth and fortune; yet they will find all theſe ſtill carried away from them, by men of lower condition, who ſurpaſs them in knowledge. They, who are blind, will always be led by thoſe that ſee, or elſe ſhall fall into the ditch: and he is certainly the moſt ſubjected, the moſt enſlaved, who is ſo in his underſtanding. In the foregoing inſtances ſome of the cauſes have been ſhewn of wrong aſſent, and how it comes to paſs, that probable doctrines, are not always received, with an aſſent proportionable to the reaſons, which are to be had for their probability; but hitherto, we have conſidered only ſuch probabilities, whoſe proofs do exiſt, but do not appear to him who embraces the error.

4. Wrong meaſures of probability; whereof.

§ 7. Fourthly, there remains yet the laſt ſort, who, even where the real probabilities appear, and are plainly laid before them, do not admit of the conviction, nor yield unto manifeſt reaſons, but do either ἐπέχειν, ſuſpend their aſſent, or give it to the leſs probable opinion: and to this danger are thoſe expoſed, who have taken up wrong meaſures of probability; which are,

1. Propositions, that are not in themſelves certain and evident, but doubtful and falſe, taken up for principles.
2. Received hypotheſes.
3. Predominant paſſions, or inclinations.
4. Authority.

1. Doubtful propoſitions, taken for principles.

§ 8. First, the firſt and firmeſt ground of probability, is the conformity any thing has to our own knowledge; eſpecially that part of our knowledge, which we have embraced, and continue to look on, as principles. Theſe have ſo great an influence upon our opinions, that it is uſually by them, we judge of truth, and meaſure probability, to that degree, that what is inconſiſtent with our principles, is ſo far from paſſing for probable with us, that it will not be allowed poſſible. The reverence, borne to theſe principles, is ſo great, and their authority ſo paramount to all other, that the teſtimony, not only of other men, but the evidences of our own ſenſes, are often rejected, when they offer to vouch any thing, contrary to theſe eſtabliſhed rules. How much the doctrine of innate principles, and that principles are not to be proved, or queſtioned, has contributed to this, I will not here examine. This I readily grant, that one truth cannot contradict another: but withal I take leave alſo to ſay, that every one ought very carefully to beware what he admits for a principle, to examine it ſtrictly, and ſee whether he certainly knows it to be true of itſelf, by its own evidence, or whether he does only, with aſſurance, believe it to be ſo, upon the authority of others. For he hath a ſtrong biaſs, put into his underſtanding, which will unavoidably miſguide his aſſent, who hath imbibed wrong principles, and has blindly given himſelf up to the authority of any opinion, in itſelf not evidently true.

§ 9. There is nothing more ordinary, than children's receiving, into their minds, propoſitions (eſpecially about matters of religion) from their parents, nurſes, or thoſe about them: which, being inſinuated into their unwary, as well as unbiaſſed underſtandings, and faſtened by degrees, are at laſt (equally, whether true or falſe) riveted there, by long cuſtom and education, beyond all poſſibility of being pulled out again. For men, when they are grown up, reflecting upon their opinions, and finding thoſe, of this ſort, to be as antient in their minds, as their very memories, not having obſerved their early inſinuation, nor by what means they got them, they are apt to reverence them, as ſacred things, and not to ſuffer them to be profaned, touched, or queſtioned: They look on them as the urim and thummim, ſet up in their minds, immediately by God himſelf, to be the great and unerring deciders of truth and falſhood, and the judges, to which they are to appeal, in all manner of controverſies.

§ 10. This opinion of his principles (let them be what they will) being once eſtabliſhed in any one's mind, it is eaſy to be imagined, what reception any propoſition ſhall find, how clearly ſoever proved, that ſhall invalidate their authority, or at all thwart with theſe internal oracles; whereas the groſſeſt abſurdities and improbabilities, being but agreeable to ſuch principles, go down glibly, and are eaſily digeſted. The great obſtinacy, that is to be found in men, firmly believing quite contrary opinions, tho' many times equally abſurd, in the various religions of mankind, are as evident a proof, as they are an unavoidable conſequence of this way of reaſoning, from received, traditional principles. So that men will diſbelieve their own eyes, renounce the evidence of their ſenſes, and give their own experience the lye, rather than admit of any thing diſagreeing with theſe ſacred tenets. Take an intelligent Romaniſt, that, from the very firſt dawning of any notions in his underſtanding, hath had this principle, conſtantly inculcated, viz. that he muſt believe as the church (i. e. thoſe of his communion) believes, or, that the pope is infallible; and this he never ſo much as heard queſtioned, till at forty, or fifty, years old, he met with one of other principles: how is he prepared eaſily to ſwallow, not only againſt all probability, but even the clear evidence of his ſenſes, the doctrine of tranſubſtantiation? This principle has ſuch an influence on his mind, that he will believe that to be fleſh, which he ſees to be bread. And what way will you take to convince a man, of any improbable opinion he holds, who, with ſome philoſophers, hath laid down this as a foundation of reaſoning, that he muſt believe his reaſon (for ſo men improperly call arguments, drawn from their principles) againſt his ſenſes? Let an enthuſiaſt be principled, that he, or his teacher, is inſpired, and acted by an immediate communication of the divine Spirit, and you, in vain, bring the evidence of clear reaſons againſt his doctrine. Whoever, therefore, have imbibed wrong principles, are not, in things inconſiſtent with theſe principles, to be moved, by the moſt apparent and convincing probabilities, till they are ſo candid and ingenuous to themſelves, as to be perſuaded to examine, even thoſe very principles, which many never ſuffer themſelves to do.

2. Received hypotheſis.

§ 11. Secondly, next to theſe are men, whoſe underſtandings are caſt into a mold, and faſhioned juſt to the ſize of a received hypotheſis. The difference between theſe and the former, is, that they will admit of matter of fact, and agree with diſſenters in that; but differ only in aſſigning of reaſons, and explaining the manner of operation. Theſe are not at that open defiance with their ſenſes, as the former: they can endure to hearken to their information, a little more patiently; but will, by no means, admit of their reports, in the explanation of things; nor be prevailed on, by probabilities, which would convince them, that things are not brought about, juſt after the ſame manner, that they have decreed within themſelves, that they are. Would it not be an inſufferable thing, for a learned profeſſor, and that which his ſcarlet would bluſh at, to have his authority, of forty years ſtanding, wrought out of hard rock Greek and Latin, with no ſmall expence of time and candle, and confirmed by general tradition and a reverend beard, in an inſtant, over-turned by an upſtart noveliſt? Can any one expect that he ſhould be made to confeſs, that what he taught his ſcholars, thirty years ago, was all error and miſtake; and that he ſold them hard words and ignorance, at a very dear rate? What probabilities, I ſay, are ſufficient to prevail in ſuch a caſe? And whoever, by the moſt cogent arguments, will be prevailed with to diſrobe himſelf, at once, of all his old opinions, and pretences to knowledge and learning, which, with hard ſtudy, he hath all his time been labouring for; and turn himſelf out ſtark naked, in queſt a-freſh of new notions? All the arguments, can be uſed, will be as little able to prevail, as the wind did with the traveller, to part with his cloak, which he held only the faſter. To this of wrong hypotheſis, may be reduced the errors, that may be occaſioned by a true hypotheſis, or right principles, but not rightly underſtood. There is nothing more familiar than this. The inſtances of men, contending for different opinions, which they all derive from the infallible truth of the ſcripture, are an undeniable proof of it. All, that call themſelves chriſtians, allow the text, that ſays, μετανοεῖτε, to carry in it the obligation to a very weighty duty. But yet, how very erroneous will one of their practices be, who, underſtanding nothing but the French, take this rule, with one tranſlation, to be, "repentez vous," repent; or with the other, "faitiez penitence," do penance?

3. Predominant paſſions.

§ 12. THIRDLY, probabilities, which croſs men's appetites and prevailing paſſions, run the ſame fate. Let never ſo much probability hang on one ſide of a covetous man's reaſoning, and money on the other; it is eaſy to foreſee, which will outweigh. Earthly minds, like mud-walls, reſiſt the ſtrongeſt batteries: and tho' perhaps, ſometimes, the force of a clear argument may make ſome impreſſion; yet they nevertheleſs ſtand firm, keep out the enemy, truth, that would captivate or diſturb them. Tell a man, paſſionately in love, that he is jilted; bring a ſcore of witneſſes of the falſhood of his miſtreſs, it is ten to one but three kind words of her's ſhall invalidate all their teſtimonies. "Quod volumus, facile credimus; what ſuits our wiſhes, is forwardly believed;" is, I ſuppoſe, what every one hath more than once experimented; and tho' men cannot always openly gain-ſay, or reſiſt the force of manifeſt probabilities, that make againſt them, yet yield they not to the argument. Not but that it is the nature of the underſtanding, conſtantly to cloſe with the more probable ſide; but yet a man hath a power to ſuſpend and reſtrain its enquiries, and not permit a full and ſatisfactory examination, as far as the matter in queſtion is capable, and will bear it to be made. Until that be done, there will be always theſe two ways left of evading the moſt apparent probabilities.

The means of evading probabilities; 1. Suppoſed fallacy.

§ 13. FIRST, that the arguments being (as for the moſt part they are) brought in words, there may be a fallacy latent in them: and the conſequences being, perhaps, many in train, they may be ſome of them incoherent. There are very few diſcourſes ſo ſhort, clear, and conſiſtent, to which moſt men may not, with ſatisfaction enough to themſelves, raiſe this doubt; and from whoſe conviction they may not, without reproach of diſingenuity, or unreaſonableneſs, ſet themſelves free with the old reply, "non perſuadebis, etiamſi perſuaſeris; tho' I "cannot anſwer, I will not yield."

2. Suppoſed arguments for the contrary.

§ 14. SECONDLY, manifeſt probabilities may be evaded, and the aſſent withheld, upon this ſuggeſtion, that "I know not, yet, all that may be ſaid on the "contrary ſide:" and therefore, tho' I am beaten, it is not neceſſary I ſhould yield, not knowing what forces there are in reſerve behind. This is a refuge againſt conviction, ſo open and ſo wide, that it is hard to determine, when a man is quite out of the verge of it.

What probabilities determine the aſſent.

§ 15. BUT yet, there is ſome end of it: and a man, having carefully enquired into all the grounds of probability and unlikelineſs, done his utmoſt to inform himſelf in all particulars fairly, and caſt up the ſum total, on both ſides, may, in moſt caſes, come to acknowledge, upon the whole matter, on which ſide the probability reſts: wherein ſome proofs, in matter of reaſon, being ſuppoſitions upon univerſal experience, are ſo cogent and clear; and ſome teſtimonies, in matter of fact, ſo univerſal, that he cannot refuſe his aſſent. So that, I think, we may conclude, that in propoſitions, where, tho' the proofs in view are of moſt moment, yet there are ſufficient grounds to ſuſpect, that there is either fallacy in words, or certain proofs as conſiderable to be produced, on the contrary ſide, there aſſent, ſuſpence, or diſſent are often voluntary actions: but where the proofs are ſuch as make it highly probable, and there is not ſufficient ground to ſuſpect, that there is either fallacy of words (which ſober and ſerious conſideration may diſcover) nor equally valid proofs, yet undiſcovered, latent on the other ſide (which alſo the nature of the thing may, in ſome caſes, make plain to a conſiderate man) there, I think, a man, who has weighed them, can ſcarce refuſe his aſſent to the ſide, on which the greater probability appears. Whether it be probable, that a promiſcuous jumble of printing letters ſhould often fall into a method and order, which ſhould ſtamp, on paper, a coherent diſcourſe; or that a blind, fortuitous concourſe of atoms, not guided by an underſtanding agent, ſhould frequently conſtitute the bodies of any ſpecies of animals: in theſe and the like caſes, I think, no body that conſiders them, can be one jot at a ſtand, which ſide to take, nor at all waver in his aſſent. Laſtly, when there can be no ſuppoſition (the thing in its own nature indifferent, and wholly depending upon the teſtimony of witneſſes) that there is as fair teſtimony againſt, as for the matter of fact atteſted; which, by enquiry, is to be learned, v. g. whether there was, 1700 years ago, ſuch a man at Rome, as Julius Cæſar: in all ſuch caſes, I ſay, I think it is not in any rational man's power, to refuſe his aſſent; but that it neceſſarily follows, and cloſes with ſuch probabilities. In other leſs clear caſes, I think, it is in a man's power to ſuſpend his aſſent; and, perhaps, content himſelf with the proofs he has, if they favour the opinion, that ſuits with his inclination, or intereſt, and ſo ſtop from farther ſearch. But that a man ſhould afford his aſſent to that ſide, on which the leſs probability appears to him, ſeems to me utterly impracticable, and as impoſſible, as it is to believe the ſame thing probable, and improbable, at the ſame time.

Where it is in our power to ſuſpend it.

§ 16. As knowledge is no more arbitrary than perception; ſo, I think, aſſent is no more in our power than knowledge. When the agreement of any two ideas appears to our minds, whether immediately, or by the aſſiſtance of reaſon, I can no more refuſe to perceive, no more avoid knowing it, than I can avoid ſeeing thoſe objects, which I turn my eyes to, and look on, in day-light: and what, upon full examination, I find the moſt probable, I cannot deny my aſſent to. But, tho' we cannot hinder our knowledge, where the agreement is once perceived; nor our aſſent, where the probability manifeſtly appears, upon due conſideration of all the meaſures of it: yet we can hinder both knowledge and aſſent, by ſtopping our enquiry, and not employing our faculties, in the ſearch of any truth. If it were not ſo, ignorance, error, or infidelity could not in any caſe be a fault. Thus, in ſome caſes, we can prevent, or ſuſpend, our aſſent: but can a man, verſed in modern, or antient hiſtory, doubt whether there be ſuch a place as Rome, or whether there was ſuch a man as Julius Cæſar? Indeed, there are millions of truths, that a man is not, or may not think himſelf concerned to know; as whether our king Richard the Third was crook-backed, or no; or whether Roger Bacon was a mathematician, or a magician. In theſe and ſuch-like caſes, where the aſſent, one way or other, is of no importance, to the intereſt of any one; no action, no concernment of his, following, or depending thereon; there it is not ſtrange, that the mind ſhould give itſelf up to the common opinion, or render itſelf to the firſt comer. Theſe, and the like opinions, are of ſo little weight and moment, that, like motes in the ſun, their tendences are very rarely taken notice of. They are there, as it were by chance, and the mind lets them float at liberty. But, where the mind judges, that the propoſition has concernment in it; where the aſſent, or not aſſenting, is thought to draw conſequences of moment after it, and good, or evil, to depend on chuſing, or refuſing, the right ſide, and the mind ſets itſelf ſeriouſly to enquire and examine the probability: there, I think, it is not in our choice to take, which ſide we pleaſe, if manifeſt odds appear on either. The greater probability, I think, in that caſe, will determine the aſſent: and a man can no more avoid aſſenting, or taking it to be true, where he perceives the greater probability, than he can avoid knowing it to be true, where he perceives the agreement, or diſagreement, of any two ideas.

If this be ſo, the foundation of error will lie, in wrong meaſures of probability; as the foundation of vice, in wrong meaſures of good.

4. Authority.

§ 17. Fourthly, the fourth and laſt wrong meaſure of probability, I ſhall take notice of, and which keeps in ignorance, or error, more people, than all the other together, is that, which I have mentioned in the foregoing chapter; I mean, the giving up our aſſent to the common received opinions, either of our friends, or party, neighbourhood, or country. How many men have no other ground for their tenets, than the ſuppoſed honeſty, or learning, or number of thoſe of the ſame profeſſion? As if honeſt, or bookiſh men could not err, or truth were to be eſtabliſhed by the vote of the multitude: yet this with moſt men ſerves the turn. The tenet

CHAP. XX.

has had the atteſtation of reverend antiquity, it comes to me with the paſſport of former ages, and therefore I am ſecure in the reception I give it: other men have been, and are of the ſame opinion (for that is all is ſaid) and therefore, it is reaſonable for me to embrace it. A man may more juſtifiably throw up croſs and pile for his opinions, then take them up by ſuch meaſures. All men are liable to error, and moſt men are in many points, by paſſion, or intereſt, under temptation to it. If we could but ſee the ſecret motives, that influenced the men of name and learning in the world, and the leaders of parties, we ſhould not always find, that it was the embracing of truth, for its own ſake, that made them eſpouſe the doctrines they owned and maintained. This at leaſt is certain, there is not an opinion ſo abſurd, which a man may not receive, upon this ground: there is no error to be named, which has not had its profeſſors: and a man ſhall never want crooked paths to walk in, if he thinks that he is in the right way, wherever he has the footſteps of others to follow.

Men not in ſo many errors, as is imagined.

§ 18. But, notwithſtanding the great noiſe is made in the world about errors and opinions, I muſt do mankind that right, as to ſay, there are not ſo many men in errors and wrong opinions, as is commonly ſuppoſed. Not that I think they embrace the truth; but, indeed, becauſe concerning thoſe doctrines they keep ſuch a ſtir about, they have no thought, no opinion at all. For, if any one ſhould a little catechize the greateſt part of the partizans of moſt of the ſects in the world, he would not find, concerning thoſe matters they are ſo zealous for, that they have any opinions of their own: much leſs would he have reaſon to think, that they took them upon the examination of arguments, and appearance of probability. They are reſolved to ſtick to a party, that education, or intereſt, has engaged them in; and there, like the common ſoldiers of an army, ſhew their courage and warmth, as their leaders direct, without ever examining, or ſo much as knowing, the cauſe they contend for. If a man's life ſhews, that he has no ſerious regard for religion; for what reaſon ſhould we think, that he beats his head about the opinions of his church, and troubles himſelf to examine the grounds of this, or that doctrine? It is enough for him to obey his leaders, to have his hand and his tongue ready, for the ſupport of the common cauſe, and thereby approve himſelf to thoſe, who can give him credit, preferment, or protection in that ſociety. Thus men become profeſſors of, and combatants for, thoſe opinions, they were never convinced of, nor proſelytes to; no, nor ever had ſo much as floating in their heads: and tho' one cannot ſay, there are fewer improbable, or erroneous opinions in the world, than there are; yet this is certain, there are fewer, that actually aſſent to them, and miſtake them for truths, than is imagined.

CHAP. XXI.

Of the diviſion of the ſciences.

CHAP. XXI.

Three ſorts.

§ 1. ALL, that can fall within the compaſs of human underſtanding, being either, firſt, the nature of things, as they are in themſelves, their relations, and their manner of operation: or, ſecondly, that, which man himſelf ought to do, as a rational and voluntary agent, for the attainment of any end, eſpecially happineſs: or, thirdly, the ways and means, whereby the knowledge of both the one and the other of theſe is attained and communicated: I think ſcience may be divided, properly, into theſe three ſorts.

1. Phyſica.

§ 2. First, the knowledge of things, as they are in their own proper beings, their conſtitutions, properties, and operations; whereby I mean not only matter and body, but ſpirits alſo, which have their proper natures, conſtitutions, and operations, as well as bodies. This in a little more enlarged ſenſe of the word, I call Φυσικὴ, or natural philoſophy. The end of this, is bare, ſpeculative truth; and whatſoever can afford the mind of man any ſuch, falls under this branch, whether it be God himſelf, angels, ſpirits, bodies, or any of their affections, as number, and figure, &c.

2. Practica.

§ 3. Secondly, Πρακτικὴ, the ſkill of right applying our own powers and actions, for the attainment of things good and uſeful. The moſt conſiderable, under this head, is ethicks, which is the ſeeking out thoſe rules and meaſures of human actions, which lead to happineſs, and the means to practiſe them. The end of this is not bare ſpeculation, and the knowledge of truth; but right, and a conduct ſuitable to it.

3. Σημιωτικὴ.

§ 3. Thirdly, the third branch may be called Σημιωτικὴ, or the doctrine of ſigns, the moſt uſual whereof being words, it is aptly enough termed alſo Λογικὴ, logick; the buſineſs whereof, is to conſider the nature of ſigns, the mind makes uſe of, for the underſtanding of things, or conveying its knowledge to others. For ſince the things, the mind contemplates, are none of them, beſides itſelf, preſent to the underſtanding, it is neceſſary that ſomething elſe, as a ſign, or repreſentation of the thing it conſiders, ſhould be preſent to it: and theſe are ideas. And becauſe the ſcene of ideas that makes one man's thoughts, cannot be laid open to the immediate view of another, nor laid up any where, but in the memory, a no very ſure repoſitory, therefore, to communicate our thoughts to one another, as well as record them for our own uſe, ſigns of our ideas are alſo neceſſary. Thoſe, which men have found moſt convenient, and therefore, generally make uſe of, are articulate ſounds. The conſideration, then, of ideas and words, as the great inſtruments of knowledge, makes no deſpicable part of their contemplation, who would take a view of human knowledge, in the whole extent of it. And, perhaps, if they were diſtinctly weighed, and duly conſidered, they would afford us another ſort of logick and critick, than we have been hitherto acquainted with.

This is the firſt diviſion of the objects of knowledge.

§ 5. This ſeems to me the firſt and moſt general, as well as natural, diviſion of the objects of our underſtanding. For a man can employ his thoughts about nothing, but either the contemplation of things themſelves, for the diſcovery of truth; or about the things in his own power, which are his own actions for the attainment of his own ends; or the ſigns, the mind makes uſe of, both in the one and the other, and the right ordering of them, for its clearer information. All which three, viz. things, as they are in themſelves knowable; actions, as they depend on us, in order to happineſs; and the right uſe of ſigns, in order to knowledge, being toto cœlo different, they ſeem to me to be the three great provinces, of the intellectual world, wholly ſeparate and diſtinct one from another.

The end of the Eſſay of Human Understanding.

A
LETTER

To the Right Reverend

Edward Lord Biſhop of *Worceſter*,

Concerning ſome paſſages relating to

Mr. LOCKE's Eſſay of Human Underſtanding:

IN A

Late DISCOURSE of his Lordſhip's, in Vindication of the TRINITY.

My LORD,

I CANNOT but look upon it as a great honour, that your Lordſhip, who are ſo thoroughly acquainted with the incomparable writings of antiquity, and know ſo well how to entertain your ſelf with the great men, in the commonwealth of letters, ſhould, at any time, take into your hand my mean papers; and ſo far beſtow any of your valuable minutes, on my Eſſay of Human Underſtanding, as to let the world ſee, you have thought my notions worth your Lordſhip's conſideration. My aim in that, as well as every thing elſe written by me, being purely to follow truth, as far as I could diſcover it; I think myſelf beholden to whoever ſhews me my miſtakes, as to one who, concurring in my deſign, helps me forward in my way.

YOUR Lordſhip has been pleaſed to favour me with ſome thoughts of your's in this kind, in your late "Learned Diſcourſe, in Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity;" and I hope I may ſay, have gone a little out of your way, to do me that kindneſs; for the obligation is thereby the greater. And if your Lordſhip has brought in the mention of my book, in a chapter, entitled, "Objections againſt the Trinity, in point of Reaſon, anſwered;" when, in my whole Eſſay, I think, there is not to be found any thing like an objection againſt the Trinity: I have the more to acknowledge to your Lordſhip, who would not let the foreignneſs of the ſubject hinder your Lordſhip from endeavouring to ſet me right, as to ſome errors your Lordſhip apprehends in my book: when other writers, uſing ſome notions like mine, gave you that, which was occaſion enough for you, to do me the favour to take notice of what you diſlike in my Eſſay.

YOUR Lordſhip's name is of ſo great authority in the learned world, that I, who profeſs myſelf more ready, upon conviction, to recant, than I was at firſt to publiſh my miſtakes, cannot pay that reſpect is due to it, without telling the reaſons, why I ſtill retain any of my notions, after your Lordſhip's having appeared diſſatisfied with them. This muſt be my apology, and I hope ſuch a one as your Lordſhip will allow, for my examining what you have printed, againſt ſeveral paſſages in my book, and my ſhewing the reaſons, why it has not prevailed with me to quit them.

THAT your Lordſhip's reaſonings may loſe none of their force, by my miſapprehending, or miſrepreſenting them, (a way too familiarly uſed in writings, that have any appearance of controverſy) I ſhall crave leave to give the reader your Lordſhip's arguments in the full ſtrength of your own expreſſions; that ſo, in them, he may have the advantage to ſee the deficiency of my anſwers, in any point, where I ſhall be ſo unfortunate as not to perceive, or not to follow the light, your Lordſhip affords me.

Your Lordſhip having, in the two or three preceding pages, juſtly, as I think, found fault with the account of reaſon, given by the Unitarians and a late writer, in thoſe paſſages you quote out of them; and then coming to the Nature of ſubſtance, p. 233. and relating what that author has ſaid, concerning the mind's getting of ſimple ideas, and thoſe ſimple ideas, being the ſole matter and foundation of all our reaſonings, your Lordſhip thus concludes, p. 234.

" Then it follows, that we can have no foundation of reaſoning, where there " can be no ſuch ideas, from ſenſation, or reflection."

" Now this is the caſe of ſubſtance; it is not intromitted by the ſenſes, nor " depends upon the operation of the mind; and ſo it cannot be within the compaſs of our reaſon. And, therefore, I do not wonder, that the gentlemen of " this new way of reaſoning, have almoſt diſcarded ſubſtance, out of the reaſonable part of the world. For they not only tell us," &c.

This, as I remember, is the firſt place, where your Lordſhip is pleaſed to quote any thing out of my " Eſſay of Human Underſtanding," which your Lordſhip does in theſe words following.

p. 234. " That we can have no idea of it by ſenſation, or reflection; but that nothing is ſignified by it, only an uncertain ſuppoſition of we know not what." And therefore it is parallelled more than once, with the Indian philoſopher's " He-knew-not-what, which ſupported the tortoiſe, that ſupported the elephant, " that ſupported the earth: ſo ſubſtance was found out only to ſupport accidents. " And that when we talk of ſubſtances, we talk like children; who being aſked " a queſtion about ſomewhat which they knew not, readily give this ſatisfactory anſwer, that it is ſomething."

These words of mine, your Lordſhip brings to prove, that I am one of " the " gentlemen of this new way of reaſoning, that have almoſt diſcarded ſubſtance " out of the reaſonable part of the world." An accuſation, which your Lordſhip will pardon me, if I do not readily know what to plead to, becauſe I do not underſtand, what it is " almoſt to diſcard ſubſtance out of the reaſonable part of " the world." If your Lordſhip means by it, that I deny, or doubt, that there is in the world any ſuch thing, as ſubſtance, that your Lordſhip will acquit me of, when your Lordſhip looks again into that chapter, which you have cited more than once, where your Lordſhip will find theſe words.

Human Underſtanding, B. ii. c. 23. § 4. " When we talk, or think of any particular ſort of corporeal ſubſtances, " as horſe, ſtone, &c. tho' the idea we have of either of them, be but the complication, or collection of thoſe ſeveral ſimple ideas of ſenſible qualities, which " we uſe to find united in the thing, called horſe, or ſtone; yet becauſe we " cannot conceive, how they ſhould ſubſiſt alone, nor one in another, we ſuppoſe them exiſting in, and ſupported by ſome common ſubject, which ſupport " we denote by the name, ſubſtance; tho' it be certain, we have no clear or " diſtinct idea of that thing we ſuppoſe a ſupport." And again.

" The ſame happens concerning the operations of the mind, viz. thinking, " reaſoning, fearing, &c. which we conſidering not to ſubſiſt of themſelves, " nor apprehending how they can belong to body, or be produced by it, we are " apt to think theſe the actions of ſome other ſubſtance, which we call ſpirit: " whereby yet it is evident, that having no other idea, or notion, of matter, but " ſomething wherein thoſe many ſenſible qualities, which affect our ſenſes, do " ſubſiſt; by ſuppoſing a ſubſtance, wherein thinking, knowing, doubting, and " a power of moving, &c. do ſubſiſt, we have as clear a notion of the nature, " or ſubſtance, of ſpirit, as we have of body; the one being ſuppoſed to be " (without knowing what it is) the ſubſtratum to thoſe ſimple ideas, we have " from without; and the other ſuppoſed (with a like ignorance of what it is) " to be the ſubſtratum to thoſe operations, which we experiment in ourſelves " within." And again.

§ 5. " Whatever, therefore, be the ſecret nature of ſubſtance in general, all " the ideas we have, of particular diſtinct ſubſtances, are nothing but ſeveral com-

“ binations of ſimple ideas, co-exiſting in ſuch, tho' unknown, cauſe of their “ union, as makes the whole ſubſiſt of itſelf.”

And I further ſay, in the ſame ſection, “ That we ſuppoſe theſe combina“ tions to reſt in, and to be adherent to, that unknown, common ſubject, which “ inheres not in any thing elſe. And that our complex ideas of ſubſtances, “ beſides all thoſe ſimple ideas, they are made up of, have always the confuſed “ idea of ſomething to which they belong, and in which they ſubſiſt: and, “ therefore, when we ſpeak of any ſort of ſubſtance, we ſay it is a thing having “ ſuch and ſuch qualities; a body is a thing that is extended, figured and capa“ ble of motion; a ſpirit, a thing capable of thinking.”

These, and the like faſhions of ſpeaking, intimate, that the ſubſtance is ſuppoſed always ſomething, beſides the extenſion, figure, ſolidity, motion, thinking, or other obſervable idea, tho' we know not what it is.

B. ii. c. 23.
§ 22.

“ Our idea of body, I ſay, is an extended, ſolid ſubſtance; and our idea of “ our ſouls, is of a ſubſtance that thinks.” So that, as long as there is any ſuch thing as body, or ſpirit, in the world, I have done nothing towards the diſcarding ſubſtance out of the reaſonable part of the world. Nay, as long as there is any ſimple idea, or ſenſible quality, left, according to my way of arguing, ſubſtance cannot be diſcarded; becauſe all ſimple ideas, all ſenſible qualities, carry with them a ſuppoſition of a ſubſtratum to exiſt in, and of a ſubſtance, wherein they inhere: and of this, that whole chapter is ſo full, that I challenge any one, who reads it, to think I have almoſt, or one jot, diſcarded ſubſtance out of the reaſonable part of the world. And of this, man, horſe, ſun, water, iron, diamond, &c. which I have mentioned as diſtinct ſorts of ſubſtances, will be my witneſſes, as long as any ſuch thing remains in being; of which I ſay, “ that the “ ideas of ſubſtances are ſuch combinations of ſimple ideas, as are taken to repre“ ſent diſtinct, particular things, ſubſiſting by themſelves, in which the ſup“ poſed, or confuſed, idea of ſubſtance is always the firſt and chief.”

B. ii. c. 12.
§ 6.

B. ii. c. 23.
§ 1.
§ 2.
§ 3.
B. ii. c. 13.
§ 19.

If by almoſt diſcarding ſubſtance out of the reaſonable part of the world, your Lordſhip means, that I have deſtroyed, and almoſt diſcarded the true idea, we have of it, by calling it a “ ſubſtratum, a ſuppoſition of, we know not what, “ ſupport of ſuch qualities, as are capable of producing ſimple ideas in us, an “ obſcure and relative idea: that, without knowing what it is, it is that which “ ſupports accidents: ſo that of ſubſtance, we have no idea of what it is, but “ only a confuſed obſcure one, of what it does:” I muſt confeſs this and the like, I have ſaid of our idea of ſubſtance; and ſhould be very glad to be convinced by your Lordſhip, or any body elſe, that I have ſpoken too meanly of it. He, that would ſhew me a more clear and diſtinct idea of ſubſtance, would do me a kindneſs I ſhould thank him for. But this is the beſt I can hitherto find, either in my own thoughts, or in the books of logicians: for their account, or idea, of it is, that it is “ Ens, or res per ſe ſubſiſtens, et ſubſtans accidentibus;” which in effect is no more, but that ſubſtance is a being, or thing; or in ſhort, ſomething, they know not what, or of which they have no clearer idea, than that it is ſomething, which ſupports accidents, or other ſimple ideas, or modes, and is not ſupported itſelf, as a mode, or an accident. So that I do not ſee but Burgerſdicius, Sanderſon, and the whole tribe of logicians, muſt be reckoned with “ the gentlemen of this new way of reaſoning, who have almoſt diſcarded “ ſubſtance out of the reaſonable part of the world.”

But ſuppoſing, my Lord, that I, or theſe gentlemen, logicians of note in the ſchools, ſhould own, that we have a very imperfect, obſcure, inadequate idea of ſubſtance; would it not be a little too hard to charge us, with diſcarding ſubſtance out of the world? For what almoſt diſcarding, and reaſonable part of the world, ſignifies, I muſt confeſs, I do not clearly comprehend: but let almoſt, and reaſonable part, ſignify here, what they will, for I dare ſay your Lordſhip meant ſomething by them, would not your Lordſhip think you were a little hardly dealt with, if for acknowledging yourſelf to have a very imperfect and inadequate idea of God, or of ſeveral other things which, in this very treatiſe, you confeſs our underſtandings come ſhort in, and cannot comprehend, you ſhould be accuſed to be one of theſe gentlemen, that have almoſt diſcarded God, of thoſe other myſterious things, whereof, you contend, we have very imperfect and inadequate ideas, out of the reaſonable world? For, I ſuppoſe, your Lordſhip means by " almoſt diſcarding out of the reaſonable world," ſomething that is blameable, for it ſeems not to be inſerted for a commendation; and yet, I think, he deſerves no blame, who owns the having imperfect, inadequate, obſcure ideas, where he has no better: however, if it be inferred from thence, that either he almoſt excludes thoſe things out of being, or out of rational diſcourſe, if that be meant, by the reaſonable world; for the firſt of theſe will not hold, becauſe the being of things in the world depends not on our ideas: the latter, indeed, is true, in ſome degree, but is no fault; for it is certain, that where we have imperfect, inadequate, confuſed, obſcure ideas, we cannot diſcourſe and reaſon about thoſe things ſo well, fully and clearly, as if we had perfect, adequate, clear and diſtinct ideas.

YOUR Lordſhip, I muſt own, with great reaſon, takes notice that I parallelled more than once, our idea of ſubſtance, with the Indian philoſopher's he-knew-not-what, which ſupported the tortoiſe, &c.

THIS repetition is, I confeſs, a fault in exact writing: but I having acknowledged and excuſed it, in theſe words, in my preface; " I am not ignorant, how " little I herein conſult my own reputation, when I knowingly let my Eſſay go " with a fault, ſo apt to diſguſt the moſt judicious, who are always the niceſt " readers." And there further add, " that I did not publiſh my Eſſay for ſuch " great maſters of knowledge, as your Lordſhip; but fitted it to men of my own " ſize, to whom repetitions might be ſometimes uſeful." It would not, therefore, have been beſides your Lordſhip's generoſity (who were not intended to be provoked by this repetition) to have paſſed by ſuch a fault, as this, in one, who pretends not beyond the lower rank of writers. But I ſee your Lordſhip would have me exact, and without any faults; and I wiſh I could be ſo, the better to deſerve your Lordſhip's approbation.

MY ſaying, " that when we talk of ſubſtance, we talk like children, who " being aſked a queſtion about ſomething, which they know not, readily give " this ſatisfactory anſwer, that it is ſomething;" your Lordſhip ſeems mightily to lay to heart, in theſe words that follow.

P. 235. " IF this be the truth of the caſe, we muſt ſtill talk like children, and I " know not how it can be remedied. For, if we cannot come at a rational " idea of ſubſtance, we can have no principle of certainty to go upon, in this " debate."

IF your Lordſhip has any better and diſtincter idea of ſubſtance than mine is, which I have given an account of, your Lordſhip is not at all concerned in what I have here ſaid. But thoſe, whoſe idea of ſubſtance, whether a rational, or not rational idea, is like mine, ſomething, they know not what, muſt in that, with me, talk like children, when they ſpeak of ſomething, they know not what. For a philoſopher, that ſays, that which ſupports accidents is ſomething, he knows not what; and a country-man that ſays, the foundation of the great church at Harlem, is ſupported by ſomething, he knows not what; and a child, that ſtands in the dark, upon his mother's muff, and ſays, he ſtands upon ſomething, he knows not what, in this reſpect talk all three alike. But if the country-man knows, that the foundation of the church at Harlem is ſupported by a rock, as the houſes about Briſtol are; or by gravel, as the houſes about London are; or by wooden piles, as the houſes in Amſterdam are; it is plain, that then, having a clear and diſtinct idea of the thing, that ſupports the church, he does not talk of this matter, as a child, nor will he, of the ſupport of accidents, when he has a clearer and more diſtinct idea of it, than that it is barely ſomething. But as long as we think like children, in caſes, where our ideas are no clearer, nor diſtincter than theirs, I agree with your Lordſhip, that I know not how it can be remedied, but that we muſt talk like them.

YOUR Lordſhip's next paragraph begins thus: " I do not ſay, that we can P. 235. " have a clear idea of ſubſtance, either by ſenſation or reflection; but from " hence I argue, that this is a very inſufficient diſtribution of the ideas, neceſ" ſary to reaſon."

Your Lordſhip here argues againſt a propoſition, that I know no body that holds: I am ſure the author of the Eſſay of Human Underſtanding never thought, nor in that Eſſay, hath any where ſaid, that the ideas, that come into the mind by ſenſation and reflection, are all the ideas that are neceſſary to reaſon, or that reaſon is exerciſed about; for then, he muſt have laid by all the ideas of ſimple and mixed modes and relations, and the complex ideas, of the ſpecies of ſubſtances, about which he has ſpent ſo many chapters; and muſt have denied that theſe complex ideas are the objects of men's thoughts, or reaſonings, which he is far enough from. All that he has ſaid about ſenſation and reflection is, that all our ſimple ideas are received by them, and that theſe ſimple ideas are the foundation of all our knowledge, for as much as all our complex, relative, and general ideas are made by the mind, abſtracting, enlarging, comparing, compounding and referring, &c. theſe ſimple ideas, and their ſeveral combinations, one to another, whereby complex and general ideas are formed, of modes, relations, and the ſeveral ſpecies of ſubſtances, all which are made uſe of, by reaſon, as well as the other faculties of the mind.

I therefore agree with your Lordſhip, that the ideas of ſenſation, or reflection, is a very inſufficient diſtribution of the ideas neceſſary to reaſon. Only my agreement with your Lordſhip had been more intire to the whole ſentence, if your lordſhip had rather ſaid, ideas made uſe of by reaſon; becauſe I do not well know what is meant by ideas, neceſſary to reaſon. For reaſon, being a faculty of the mind, nothing, in my poor opinion, can properly be ſaid to be neceſſary to that faculty, but what is required to its being. As nothing is neceſſary to ſight in a man, but ſuch a conſtitution of the body and organ, that a man may have the power of ſeeing; ſo I ſubmit it to your Lordſhip, whether any thing can properly be ſaid, to be neceſſary to reaſon in a man, but ſuch a conſtitution of body, or mind, or both, as may give him the power of reaſoning. Indeed ſuch a particular ſort of object, or inſtruments, may be ſome times ſaid to be neceſſary to the eye, but that is never ſaid, in reference to the faculty of ſeeing, but in reference to ſome particular end of ſeeing; and then a microſcope, and a mite may be neceſſary to the eye, if the end propoſed be, to know the ſhape and parts of that animal. And ſo, if a man would reaſon about ſubſtance, then the idea of ſubſtance is neceſſary to his reaſon: but yet, I doubt not, but that many a rational creature has been, who, in all his life, never bethought himſelf of any neceſſity his reaſon had, of an idea of ſubſtance.

Your Lordſhip's next words are; "for, beſides theſe, there muſt be ſome general ideas, which the mind doth form, not by mere comparing thoſe ideas it has got, from ſenſe, or reflection; but by forming diſtinct general notions of things from particular ideas." P. 233.

Here, again, I perfectly agree with your Lordſhip, that, beſides the particular ideas, received from ſenſation and reflection, the mind "forms general ideas, not by mere comparing thoſe ideas it has got by ſenſation and reflection;" for this I do not remember I ever ſaid. But this I ſay, "ideas become general, by ſeparating them from the circumſtances of time and place, and any other ideas, that may determine them to this, or that, particular exiſtence. By this way of abſtraction they are made, &c." (B. iii. c. 3. § 6.) And to the ſame purpoſe, I explain myſelf in another place. (B. i. c. 11. § 9.)

Your Lordſhip ſays, "the mind forms general ideas, by forming general notions of things from particular ideas." And I ſay, "the mind forms general ideas, by abſtracting from particular ones." So that there is no difference, that I perceive, between us, in this matter, but only a little in expreſſion.

It follows, "and among theſe general notions, or rational ideas, ſubſtance is one of the firſt; becauſe we find, that we can have no true conceptions of any modes, or accidents, (no matter which) but we muſt conceive a ſubſtratum, or ſubject, wherein they are. Since it is a repugnancy to our firſt conceptions of things, that modes, or accidents, ſhould ſubſiſt by themſelves; and, therefore, the rational idea of ſubſtance, is one of the firſt and moſt natural ideas in our minds." P. 235.

WHETHER the general idea of ſubſtance be one of the firſt, or moſt natural, ideas in our minds, I will not diſpute with your Lordſhip, as not being, I think, very material to the matter in hand. But as to the idea of ſubſtance, what it is, and how we come by it, your Lordſhip ſays, “ it is a repugnancy to our “ conceptions of things, that modes and accidents ſhould ſubſiſt by themſelves; “ and therefore we muſt conceive a ſubſtratum, wherein they are.”

B. ii. c. 23. § 4. AND, I ſay, “ becauſe we cannot conceive how ſimple ideas of ſenſible qua- “ lities ſhould ſubſiſt alone, or one in another, we ſuppoſe them exiſting in, and “ ſupported by, ſome common ſubject.” Which I, with your Lordſhip, call alſo ſubſtratum.

§ 1. WHAT now can be more conſonant to itſelf, than what your Lordſhip and I have ſaid, in theſe two paſſages, is conſonant to one another? whereupon, my Lord, give me leave, I beſeech you, to boaſt to the world, that what I have ſaid, concerning our general idea of ſubſtance, and the way, how we come by it, has the honour to be confirmed by your Lordſhip's authority. And that from hence I may be ſure the ſaying, [that the general idea, we have of ſubſtance, is, that it is a ſubſtratum, or ſupport, to modes or accidents, wherein they do ſubſiſt: and that the mind forms it, becauſe it cannot conceive how they ſhould ſubſiſt of themſelves,] has no objection in it againſt the Trinity; for then your Lordſhip would not, I know, be of that opinion, nor own it, in a chapter, where you are anſwering objections againſt the Trinity; however my words, which amount to no more, have been (I know not how) brought into that chapter: tho' what they have to do there, I muſt confeſs to your Lordſhip, I do not yet ſee.

P. 236. IN the next words, your Lordſhip ſays, “ but we are ſtill told, that our under- “ ſtandings can have no other ideas, but either from ſenſation, or reflection.”

B. ii. c. 1. § 5. THE words of that ſection your Lordſhip quotes, are theſe; “ the under- “ ſtanding ſeems to me, not to have the leaſt glimmering of any ideas, which it “ doth not receive from one of theſe two. External objects furniſh the mind “ with the ideas of ſenſible qualities, which are all thoſe different perceptions, “ they produce in us: and the mind furniſhes the underſtanding with ideas of “ its own operations. Theſe, when we have taken a full ſurvey of them, and “ their ſeveral modes, and the compoſitions made out of them, we ſhall find to “ contain all our whole ſtock of ideas; and that we have nothing in our minds, “ which did not come in one of thoſe two ways. Let any one examine his own “ thoughts, and thoroughly ſearch into his underſtanding, and then let him tell “ me, whether all the original ideas he has there, are any other than of the ob- “ jects of his ſenſes, or of the operations of his mind, conſidered as objects of his “ reflection; and how great a maſs of knowledge ſoever he imagines to be lodged “ there, he will, upon taking a ſtrict view, ſee, that he has not any idea in his mind “ but what one of theſe two have imprinted, tho', perhaps, with infinite variety “ compounded and inlarged by the underſtanding, as we ſhall ſee hereafter.”

THESE words ſeem to me to ſignify ſomething different, from what your Lordſhip has cited out of them; and if they do not, were intended, I am ſure, by me, to ſignify all thoſe complex ideas of modes, relations, and ſpecifick ſubſtances, which how the mind itſelf forms out of ſimple ideas, I have ſhewn, in the following part of my book, and intended to refer to it, by theſe words, “ as “ we ſhall ſee hereafter,” with which I cloſe that paragraph. But if by ideas, your Lordſhip ſignifies ſimple ideas, in the words you have ſet down, I grant, then, they contain my ſenſe, viz. “ that our underſtandings can have (i. e. in the natural exerciſe of our faculties) “ no other ſimple ideas, but either from “ ſenſation, or reflection.”

YOUR Lordſhip goes on: “ and [we are ſtill told] that herein chiefly lies the “ excellency of mankind above brutes, that theſe cannot abſtract and inlarge “ ideas, as men do.”

HAD your Lordſhip done me the favour to have quoted the place in my book, from whence you had taken theſe words, I ſhould not have been at a loſs, where to find them. Thoſe in my book, which I can remember, any where, come neareſt to them, run thus.

“ This, I think, I may be poſitive in, that the power of abſtracting is not B. ii. c. 11. § 10.
“ at all in brutes; and that the having of general ideas, is that, which puts a perfect diſtinction betwixt man and brutes; and is an excellency, which the faculties of brutes do, by no means, attain to.”

Tho’ ſpeaking of the faculties of the human underſtanding, I took occaſion, by the by, to conjecture how far brutes partook with men, in any of the intellectual faculties; yet it never entered into my thoughts, on that occaſion, to compare the utmoſt perfections of human nature with that of brutes; and, therefore, was far from ſaying, “ herein chiefly lies the excellency of mankind above brutes, that theſe cannot abſtract and inlarge their ideas, as men do.” For it ſeems to me an abſurdity, I would not willingly be guilty of, to ſay, that the “ excellency of mankind lies chiefly, or any ways in this, that brutes cannot abſtract.” For brutes being not able to do any thing, cannot be any excellency of mankind. The ability of mankind does not lie in the impotency, or diſabilities of brutes. If your Lordſhip had charged me to have ſaid, that herein lies one excellency of mankind above brutes, viz. that men can, and brutes cannot abſtract; I muſt have owned it to be my ſenſe: but what I ought to ſay, to what your Lordſhip approved, or diſapproved of, in it, I ſhall better underſtand, when I know to what purpoſe your Lordſhip was pleaſed to cite it.

The immediately following paragraph runs thus: “ but how comes the gene- P. 236.
ral idea, of ſubſtance, to be framed in our minds?” Is this by “ abſtracting and inlarging ſimple ideas? no, “ but it is by a complication of many ſimple B. 2. c. 23. § 1.
“ ideas together: becauſe, not imagining how theſe ſimple ideas can ſubſiſt by themſelves, we accuſtom ourſelves to ſuppoſe ſome ſubſtratum, wherein they do ſubſiſt, and from whence they do reſult, which, therefore, we call ſubſtance.” And is this all, indeed, that is to be ſaid for the being of ſubſtance, “ that we accuſtom our ſelves to ſuppoſe a ſubſtratum?” Is that cuſtom grounded upon true reaſon, or not? If not, then accidents, or modes, “ muſt ſubſiſt of themſelves, and theſe ſimple ideas need no tortoiſe to ſupport them: for figures and colours, &c. would do well enough of themſelves, but for ſome fancies men have accuſtomed themſelves to.

Herein your Lordſhip ſeems to charge me with two faults: one, that I make “ the general idea of ſubſtance to be framed, not by abſtracting and enlarging ſimple ideas, but by a complication of many ſimple ideas together:” the other, as if I had ſaid, the being of ſubſtance had no other foundation, but the fancies of men.

As to the firſt of theſe, I beg leave to remind your Lordſhip, that I ſay, in more places than one, and particularly thoſe above quoted, where, ex profeſſo, I treat of abſtraction and general ideas, that they are all made by abſtracting; and, therefore, could not be underſtood to mean, that that of ſubſtance was made any other way; however my pen might have ſlipped, or the negligence of expreſſion, where I might have ſomething elſe, than the general idea of ſubſtance in view, might make me ſeem to ſay ſo.

That I was not ſpeaking of the general idea of ſubſtance, in the paſſage your Lordſhip quotes, is manifeſt from the title of that chapter, which is, “ of the complex ideas of ſubſtances.” And the firſt ſection of it, which your Lordſhip cites, for thoſe words you have ſet down, ſtands thus:

“ The mind being, as I have declared, furniſhed with a great number of the ſimple ideas, conveyed in by the ſenſes, as they are found in exterior things, or by reflections on its own operations, takes notice alſo, that a certain number of theſe ſimple ideas go conſtantly together; which being preſumed to belong to one thing, and words being ſuited to common apprehenſion, and made uſe of, for quick diſpatch, are called, ſo united in one ſubject, by one name; which, by inadvertency, we are apt afterward to talk of, and conſider as one ſimple idea, which, indeed, is a complication of many ideas together: becauſe, as I have ſaid, not imagining how theſe ſimple ideas can ſubſiſt by themſelves, we accuſtom ourſelves to ſuppoſe ſome ſubſtratum, wherein they do ſubſiſt, and from which they do reſult; which therefore we call ſubſtance.”

In which words, I do not obſerve any, that deny the general idea of ſubſtance to be made by abſtraction; nor any that ſay, " it is made by a complication of many ſimple ideas together." But ſpeaking, in that place, of the ideas of diſtinct ſubſtances, ſuch as man, horſe, gold, &c. I ſay they are made up of certain combinations of ſimple ideas; which combinations are looked upon, each of them, as one ſimple idea, tho' they are many; and we call it by one name of ſubſtance, tho' made up of modes, from the cuſtom of ſuppoſing a ſubſtratum, wherein that combination does ſubſiſt. So that, in this paragraph, I only give an account of the idea of diſtinct ſubſtances, ſuch as oak, elephant, iron, &c. how, tho' they are made up of diſtinct complications of modes, yet they are looked on, as one idea, called by one name, as making diſtinct ſorts of ſubſtances.

But that my notion, of ſubſtance in general, is quite different from theſe, and has no ſuch combination of ſimple ideas in it, is evident form the immediate B. ii. c. 23. § 2. following words, where I ſay, " the idea of pure ſubſtance in general, is only a " ſuppoſition of we know not what ſupport of ſuch qualities as are capable of " producing ſimple ideas in us." And theſe two, I plainly diſtinguiſh all along, § 6. particularly where I ſay, " whatever, therefore, be the ſecret and abſtract nature " of ſubſtance in general, all the ideas we have of particular, diſtinct ſubſtances, " are nothing but ſeveral combinations of ſimple ideas, co-exiſting in ſuch, tho' " unknown, cauſe of their union, as makes the whole ſubſiſt of itſelf."

The other thing laid to my charge, is, as if I took the being of ſubſtance to be doubtful, or rendered it ſo, by the imperfect and ill grounded idea I have given of it. To which I beg leave to ſay, that I ground not the being, but the idea of ſubſtance, on our accuſtoming ourſelves to ſuppoſe ſome ſubſtratum; for it is of the idea alone, I ſpeak there, and not of the being of ſubſtance. And having every where affirmed and built upon it, that a man is a ſubſtance: I cannot be ſuppoſed to queſtion, or doubt of, the being of ſubſtance, till I can queſtion, or doubt of, my own being. Further I ſay, " ſenſation convinces us that Ib. § 29. " there are ſolid, extended ſubſtances; and reflection, that there are thinking " ones." So that I think the being of ſubſtance is not ſhaken, by what I have ſaid: and if the idea of it ſhould be, yet (the being of things depending not on our ideas) the being of ſubſtance, would not be at all ſhaken, by my ſaying, we had but an obſcure, imperfect idea of it, and that that idea came from our accuſtoming ourſelves to ſuppoſe ſome ſubſtratum; or indeed, if I ſhould ſay, we had no idea of ſubſtance at all. For a great many things may be, and are granted to have a being, and be in nature, of which we have no ideas. For example; it cannot be doubted but there are diſtinct ſpecies of ſeparate ſpirits, of which yet we have no diſtinct ideas at all: it cannot be queſtioned but ſpirits have ways of communicating their thoughts, and yet we have no idea of it at all.

The being, then, of ſubſtance being ſafe and ſecure, notwithſtanding any thing I have ſaid, let us ſee whether the idea of it be not ſo too. Your Lordſhip aſks, with concern, " and is this all, indeed, that is to be ſaid for the being (if P. 236. your Lordſhip pleaſe, let it be the idea) " of ſubſtance, that we accuſtom ourſelves to ſuppoſe a ſubſtratum; is that cuſtom grounded upon true reaſon, or no?" I B. ii. c. 23. § 4. have ſaid, that it is grounded upon this, " that we cannot conceive how ſimple " ideas of ſenſible qualities ſhould ſubſiſt alone, and, therefore, we ſuppoſe them " to exiſt in, and to be ſupported by, ſome common ſubject, which ſupport " we denote by the name, ſubſtance." Which I think is a true reaſon, becauſe it is the ſame your Lordſhip grounds the ſuppoſition of a ſubſtratum on, in this very page; even on " the repugnancy to our conceptions, that modes and acci- " dents ſhould ſubſiſt by themſelves." So that I have the good luck, here again, to agree with your Lordſhip: and conſequently conclude, I have your approbation in this, that the ſubſtratum to modes, or accidents, which is our idea of ſubſtance in general, is founded in this, " that we cannot conceive how modes, or " accidents, can ſubſiſt by themſelves."

The words next following, are: " if it be grounded, upon plain and evident P. 237. " reaſon, then we muſt allow an idea of ſubſtance, which comes not in by ſen- " ſation, or reflection; and ſo we may be certain of ſome thing, which we have " not, by thoſe ideas."

These words of your Lordſhip's contain nothing, as I ſee in them, againſt me: for I never ſaid, that the general idea of ſubſtance comes in by ſenſation and reflection; or, that it is a ſimple idea of ſenſation, or reflection, tho' it be ultimately founded in them: for it is a complex idea, made up of the general idea of ſomething, or being, with the relation of a ſupport to accidents. For general ideas come not into the mind by ſenſation or reflection, but are the creatures, or inventions, of the underſtanding, as, I think, I have ſhewn; and alſo, how the mind makes them from ideas, which it has got by ſenſation and reflection: and as to the ideas of relation, how the mind forms them, and how they B. iii. c. 3.
are derived from, and ultimately terminate in, ideas of ſenſation and reflection, I have likewiſe ſhewn.

But that I may not be miſtaken what I mean, when I ſpeak of ideas of ſen- B. ii. c. 25.
ſation and reflection, as the materials of all our knowledge; give me leave, my & c. 28.
Lord, to ſet down here a place or two out of my book, to explain myſelf; as I § 18.
thus ſpeak of ideas of ſenſation and reflection.

“ That theſe, when we have taken a full ſurvey of them, and their ſeveral B. ii. c. 1.
“ modes, and the compoſitions made out of them, we ſhall find to contain all § 5.
“ our whole ſtock of ideas: and we have nothing in our minds, which did not
“ come in one of theſe two ways.” This thought, in another place, I expreſs thus:

“ These ſimple ideas, the materials of all our knowledge, are ſuggeſted and B. ii. c. 2.
“ furniſhed to the mind, only by thoſe two ways above-mentioned, viz. ſenſation § 2.
“ and reflection.” And again,

“ These are the moſt conſiderable of thoſe ſimple ideas, which the mind has, B. ii. c. 7.
“ and out of which is made all its other knowledge: all which it receives by § 10.
“ the two fore-mentioned ways, of ſenſation and reflection.” And,

“ Thus I have, in a ſhort draught, given a view of our original ideas, from B. ii. c. 21.
“ whence all the reſt are derived, and of which they are made up.” § 73.

This, and the like ſaid in other places, is what I have thought concerning ideas of ſenſation and reflection, as the foundation and materials of all our ideas, and conſequently of all our knowledge. I have ſet down theſe particulars out of my book, that the reader having a full view of my opinion herein, may the better ſee what in it is liable to your Lordſhip's reprehenſion. For that your Lordſhip is not very well ſatisfied with it, appears not only by the words under conſideration, but by theſe alſo: “ But we are ſtill told, that our underſtanding P. 236.
“ can have no other ideas, but either from ſenſation, or reflection. And, let P. 240.
“ us ſuppoſe this principle to be true, that the ſimple ideas, by ſenſation or re-
“ flection, are the ſole matter and foundation of all our reaſoning.”

Your Lordſhip's argument, in the paſſage we are upon, ſtands thus: “ If the “ general idea of ſubſtance be grounded upon plain and evident reaſon, then we “ muſt allow an idea of ſubſtance, which comes not in by ſenſation, or reflec- “ tion.” This is a conſequence which, with ſubmiſſion, I think will not hold, becauſe it is founded upon a ſuppoſition which, I think, will not hold, viz. that reaſon and ideas are inconſiſtent; for if that ſuppoſition be not true, then the general idea of ſubſtance may be grounded on plain and evident reaſon: and yet it will not follow from thence, that it is not ultimately grounded on, and derived from, ideas, which come in by ſenſation or reflection, and ſo cannot be ſaid to come in by ſenſation or reflection.

To explain myſelf, and clear my meaning in this matter: all the ideas of all the ſenſible qualities of a cherry come into my mind by ſenſation; the ideas of perceiving, thinking, reaſoning, knowing, &c. come into my mind by reflection: the ideas of theſe qualities and actions, or powers, are perceived by the mind, to be by themſelves inconſiſtent with exiſtence; or, as your Lordſhip well expreſſes it, “ we find that we can have no true conception of any modes, or P. 236.
“ accident, but we muſt conceive a ſubſtratum, or ſubject, wherein they are;” i. e. that they cannot exiſt, or ſubſiſt, of themſelves. Hence the mind perceives their neceſſary connection with inherence, or being ſupported; which being a relative idea, ſuperadded to the red colour in a cherry, or to thinking in a man, the mind frames the correlative idea of a ſupport. For I never denied, that the

mind could frame to itſelf ideas of relation, but have ſhewed the quite contrary in my chapters about relation. But becauſe a relation cannot be founded in nothing, or be the relation of nothing, and the thing here related as a ſupporter, or a ſupport, is not repreſented to the mind, by any clear and diſtinct idea; therefore the obſcure, indiſtinct, vague idea of thing, or ſomething, is all that is left to be the poſitive idea, which has the relation of a ſupport, or ſubſtratum, to modes, or accidents; and that general indetermined idea of ſomething, is, by the abſtraction of the mind, derived alſo from the ſimple ideas of ſenſation and reflection: and thus the mind, from the poſitive, ſimple ideas, got by ſenſation or reflection, comes to the general, relative idea of ſubſtance; which, without theſe poſitive ſimple ideas, it would never have.

This your Lordſhip (without giving, by retail, all the particular ſteps of the mind in this buſineſs) has well expreſſed in this more familiar way.

P. 236. “ We find, we can have no true conception of any modes, or accidents, but
“ we muſt conceive a ſubſtratum, or ſubject, wherein they are; ſince it is a re-
“ pugnancy to our conceptions of things, that modes, or accidents, ſhould ſub-
“ ſiſt by themſelves.”

Ibid. Hence your Lordſhip calls it the rational idea of ſubſtances: and ſays, “ I grant
P. 253. “ that, by ſenſation and reflection, we come to know the powers and properties
“ of things; but our reaſon is ſatisfied, that there muſt be ſomething beyond
“ theſe, becauſe it is impoſſible that they ſhould ſubſiſt by themſelves.” So that
if this be that, which your Lordſhip means by the rational idea of ſubſtance, I
ſee nothing there is in it, againſt what I have ſaid, that it is founded on ſimple
ideas of ſenſation or reflection, and that it is a very obſcure idea.

Your Lordſhip's concluſion from your foregoing words, is, “ and ſo we may
P. 273. “ be certain of ſome things, which we have not by thoſe ideas:” which is a
propoſition, whoſe preciſe meaning your Lordſhip will forgive me, if I profeſs, as it ſtands there, I do not underſtand. For it is uncertain to me, whether your Lordſhip means, we may certainly know the exiſtence of ſomething, which we have not by thoſe ideas; or certainly know the diſtinct properties of ſomething, which we have not by thoſe ideas; or certainly know the truth of ſome propoſition, which we have not by thoſe ideas: for, to be certain of ſomething, may ſignify either of theſe. But, in which ſoever of theſe it be meant, I do not ſee how I am concerned in it.

Your Lordſhip's next paragraph is as followeth:

P. 273. “ The idea of ſubſtance, we are told again, is nothing but the ſuppoſed, but “ unknown ſupport of thoſe qualities, we find exiſting, which we imagine can- “ not ſubſiſt, ſine re ſubſtante; which, according to the true import of the word, “ is in plain Engliſh, ſtanding under or upholding. But very little weight is to “ be laid upon a bare grammatical etymology, when the word is uſed in another “ ſenſe by the beſt authors, ſuch as Cicero and Quintilian; who take ſubſtance “ for the ſame as eſſence, as Valla hath proved; and ſo the Greek word imports; “ but Boetius in tranſlating Ariſtotle's Predicaments, rather choſe the word ſub- “ ſtance, as more proper to expreſs a compound being, and reſerved eſſence for “ what was more ſimple and immaterial. And in this ſenſe, ſubſtance was not “ applied to God, but only eſſence, as St. Auguſtin obſerves.”

Your Lordſhip here ſeems to diſlike my taking notice, that the derivation of the word ſubſtance favours the idea we have of it: and your Lordſhip tells me “ that very little weight is to be laid on a bare grammatical etymology.” Tho' little weight were to be laid on it, if there were nothing elſe to be ſaid for it; yet when it is brought to confirm an idea, which your Lordſhip allows of, nay, calls a rational idea, and ſays is founded in evident reaſon, I do not ſee what your Lordſhip had to blame in it. For tho' Cicero and Quintilian take ſubſtantia for the ſame with eſſence, as your Lordſhip ſays; or for riches and eſtate, as I think they alſo do; yet I ſuppoſe it will be true, that ſubſtantia is derived a ſubſtando, and that that ſhews the original import of the word. For, my Lord, I have been long of opinion, as may be ſeen in my book, that if we knew the original of all the words we meet with, we ſhould thereby be very much helped to know the ideas they were firſt applied to, and made to ſtand for; and therefore I muſt beg your Lordſhip to excuſe this conceit of mine, this etymological obſervation, eſpecially ſince it hath nothing in it againſt the truth, nor againſt your Lordſhip's idea of ſubſtance.

But your Lordſhip oppoſes to this etymology, the uſe of the word ſubſtance, by the beſt authors, in another ſenſe; and thereupon gives the world a learned account of the uſe of the word ſubſtance, in a ſenſe, wherein it is not taken for the ſubſtratum of accidents: however, I think it a ſufficient juſtification of myſelf to your Lordſhip, that I uſe it in the ſame ſenſe, your Lordſhip does, and that your Lordſhip thinks not fit to govern yourſelf, by thoſe authorities; for then, your Lordſhip could not apply the word ſubſtance to God, as Boethius did not, and as your Lordſhip has proved out of St. Auguſtin, that it was not applied. Tho' I gueſs it is the conſideration of ſubſtance, as it is applied to God, that brings it into your Lordſhip's preſent diſcourſe. But if your Lordſhip and I (if without preſumption I may join myſelf with you) have, in the uſe of the word, ſubſtance, quitted the example of the beſt authors, I think the authority of the ſchools, which has a long time been allowed in philoſophical terms, will bear us out in this matter.

In the remaining part of this paragraph it follows: "but afterwards, the P. 238.
" names of ſubſtances and eſſence were promiſcuouſly uſed, with reſpect to God
" and his creatures; and do imply, that which makes the real being, as diſtin-
" guiſhed from modes and properties. And ſo the ſubſtance and eſſence of a
" man are the ſame; not being taken for the individual ſubſtance, which cannot
" be underſtood without particular modes and properties; but the general ſub-
" ſtance, or nature, of man, abſtractly from all the circumſtances of perſons."

Here your Lordſhip makes theſe terms, general ſubſtance, nature and eſſence, to ſignify the ſame thing; how properly, I ſhall not here enquire. Your Lordſhip goes on.

" And I deſire to know, whether, according to true reaſon, that be not a clear
" idea of man; not of Peter, James or John, but of a man, as ſuch?" P. 238.

This, I think, no body denies: nor can any one deny it, who will not ſay, that the general, abſtract idea, which he has in his mind of a ſort, or ſpecies of animals, that he calls man, ought not to have that general name man applied to it; for that is all (as I humbly conceive) which theſe words of your Lordſhip here amount to.

" This, your Lordſhip ſays, is not a mere univerſal name, or mark, or ſign." Ibid.
Your Lordſhip ſays it is an idea, and every body muſt grant it to be an idea: and therefore it is, in my opinion, ſafe enough from being thought a mere name, or mark, or ſign of that idea. For he muſt think very oddly, who takes the general name of any idea, to be the general idea itſelf: it is a mere mark, or ſign, of it, without doubt, and nothing elſe. Your Lordſhip adds,

" But there is as clear and diſtinct a conception of this in our minds, as we
" can have from any ſuch ſimple ideas, as are conveyed by our ſenſes." Ibid.

If your Lordſhip means by this, (as the words ſeem to me to import) that we have as clear and diſtinct an idea of the general ſubſtance, or nature, or eſſence of the ſpecies, man, as we have of the particular colour and figure of a man, when we look on him, or of his voice, when we hear him ſpeak, I muſt crave leave to diſſent from your Lordſhip. Becauſe the idea, we have of the ſubſtance, wherein the properties of a man do inhere, is a very obſcure idea: ſo in that part, our general idea of man is obſcure and confuſed: as alſo, how that ſubſtance is differently modified in the different ſpecies of creatures, ſo as to have different properties, and powers, whereby they are diſtinguiſhed, that alſo we have very obſcure, or rather no diſtinct ideas of at all. But there is no obſcurity, or confuſion at all, in the idea of a figure, that I clearly ſee, or of a ſound, that I diſtinctly hear; and ſuch are, or may be, the ideas that are conveyed in, by ſenſation or reflection. It follows:

" I do not deny that the diſtinction of particular ſubſtances, is by the ſeve- P. 238.
" ral modes and properties of them (which they may call a complication of
" ſimple ideas, if they pleaſe) but I do aſſert, that the general idea, which re-

"lates to the eſſence, without theſe, is ſo juſt and true an idea, that, without it, "the complication of ſimple ideas will never give us a right notion of it."

HERE, I think, that your Lordſhip aſſerts, "that the general idea of the real "eſſence (for ſo I underſtand general idea, which relates to the eſſence) with-"out the modes and properties, is a juſt and true idea." For example: the real eſſence of a thing, is that internal conſtitution, on which the properties of that thing depend. Now your Lordſhip ſeems to me to acknowledge, that that P. 256. internal conſtitution, or eſſence, we cannot know: for your Lordſhip ſays, "that "from the powers and properties of things, which are knowable by us, we "may know as much of the internal eſſence of things as theſe powers and pro-"perties diſcover." That is unqueſtionably ſo; but if thoſe powers and properties diſcover no more of thoſe internal eſſences, but that there are internal eſſences, we ſhall know only that there are internal eſſences, but ſhall have no idea, or conception at all, of what they are; as your Lordſhip ſeems to confeſs, in the next words of the ſame 256th page, where you add; "I do not ſay, that we "can know all eſſences of things alike, nor that we can attain to a perfect under-"ſtanding of all that belong to them; but if we can know ſo much, as that "there are certain beings in the world, endued with ſuch diſtinct powers and "properties, what is it we complain of the want of?" Wherein your Lordſhip ſeems to terminate our knowledge of thoſe internal eſſences in this, "that there "are certain beings endued with diſtinct powers and properties." But what theſe beings, theſe internal eſſences are, that we have no diſtinct conceptions of: P. 257. as your Lordſhip confeſſes yet plainer, a little after, in theſe words: "for altho' "we cannot comprehend the internal frame and conſtitution of things." So that we having, as is confeſſed, no idea of what this eſſence, this internal conſtitution of things, on which their properties depend, is: how can we ſay it is any way a juſt and true idea? But your Lordſhip ſays, "it is ſo juſt and true "an idea, that, without it, the contemplation of ſimple ideas will never give us "a right notion of it." All the idea we have of it, which is only that there is an internal, tho' unknown conſtitution of things, on which their properties depend, ſimple ideas of ſenſation and reflection, and the contemplation of them have alone helped us to; and becauſe they can help us no further, that is the reaſon, we have no perfecter notions of it.

THAT, which your Lordſhip ſeems to me principally to drive at, in this and the foregoing paragraph, is, to aſſert, that the general ſubſtance of man, and ſo of any other ſpecies, is that, which makes the real being of that ſpecies, abſtractly from the individuals of that ſpecies. By general ſubſtance, here, I ſuppoſe, your Lordſhip means the general idea of ſubſtance: and that which induces me to take the liberty to ſuppoſe ſo, is that I think your Lordſhip is here diſcourſing of the idea of ſubſtance, and how we come by it. And if your Lordſhip ſhould mean otherwiſe, I muſt take the liberty to deny there is any ſuch thing, in rerum natura, as a general ſubſtance that exiſts itſelf, or makes any thing.

TAKING it, then, for granted, that your Lordſhip ſays, that this is the general idea of ſubſtance, viz. "that it is that, which makes the real being of "any thing; your Lordſhip ſays, that it is as clear and diſtinct a conception in "our minds, as we can have from any ſuch ſimple ideas, as are conveyed by "our ſenſes." Here I muſt crave leave to diſſent from your Lordſhip. Your Lordſhip ſays, in the former part of this page, "that ſubſtance and eſſence do "imply that, which makes the real being." Now what, I beſeech your Lordſhip, do theſe words, that which, here ſignify more than ſomething? And the idea expreſſed by ſomething, I am apt to think your Lordſhip will not ſay is as clear and diſtinct a conception, or idea, in the mind, as the idea of the red colour of a cherry, or the bitter taſte of wormwood, or the figure of a circle, brought into the mind by the ſenſes.

YOUR Lordſhip farther ſays, "it makes (whereby, I ſuppoſe, your Lord-"ſhip means, conſtitutes, or is) the real being, as diſtinguiſhed from modes and "properties."

For example, my Lord, ſtrip this ſuppoſed, general idea of a man, or gold, of all its modes and properties, and then tell me whether your Lordſhip has as clear and diſtinct an idea, of what remains, as you have of the figure of the one, or the yellow colour of the other. I muſt confeſs the remaining ſomething, to me affords ſo vague, confuſed and obſcure an idea, that I cannot ſay, I have any diſtinct conception of it; for barely by being ſomething, it is not in my mind clearly diſtinguiſhed from the figure, or voice of a man, or the colour, or taſte of a cherry, for they are ſomething too. If your Lordſhip has a clear and diſtinct idea of that "ſomething, which makes the real being as diſtinguiſhed from "all its modes and properties," your Lordſhip muſt enjoy the privilege of the ſight and clear ideas you have: nor can you be denied them, becauſe I have not the like; the dimneſs of my conceptions muſt not pretend to hinder the clearneſs of your Lordſhip's, any more than the want of them, in a blind man, can debar your Lordſhip of the clear and diſtinct ideas of colours. The obſcurity I find in my own mind, when I examine, what poſitive, general, ſimple idea of ſubſtance I have, is ſuch as I profeſs, and further than that I cannot go: but what, and how clear it is in the underſtanding of a ſeraph, or of an elevated mind, that I cannot determine. Your Lordſhip goes on.

"I must do that right to the ingenious author of the Eſſay of Human Underſtanding (from whence theſe notions are borrowed, to ſerve other purpoſes than he intended them) that he makes the caſe of ſpiritual and corporeal "ſubſtances to be alike, as to their ideas. And, that we have as clear a notion "of a ſpirit, as we have of a body; the one being ſuppoſed to be the ſubſtratum to thoſe ſimple ideas, we have from without, and the other of thoſe operations, we find within ourſelves. And that it is as rational to affirm, there "is no body, becauſe we cannot know its eſſence, as it is called, or have no idea "of the ſubſtance of matter; as to ſay there is no ſpirit, becauſe we know not "its eſſence, or have no idea of a ſpiritual ſubſtance." P. 239.

"From hence it follows, that we may be certain, that there are both ſpiritual and bodily ſubſtances, altho' we can have no clear and diſtinct ideas of "them. But, if our reaſon depend upon our clear and diſtinct ideas, how is "this poſſible? We cannot reaſon without clear ideas, and yet we may be certain without them; can we be certain without reaſon? Or, doth our reaſon "give us true notions of things, without theſe ideas? If it be ſo, this new hypotheſis about reaſon muſt appear to be very unreaſonable."

That which your Lordſhip ſeems to argue here, is, that we may be certain, without clear and diſtinct ideas. Who your Lordſhip here argues againſt, under the title, of this new hypotheſis about reaſon, I confeſs I do not know. For I do not remember, that I have any where placed certainty, only in clear and diſtinct ideas, but in the clear and viſible connection of any of our ideas, be thoſe ideas what they will; as will appear to any one who will look into B. iv. c. 4. § 18. and B. iv. c. 6. § 3. of my Eſſay, in the latter of which, he will find theſe words: "certainty of knowledge is to perceive the agreement, or diſagreement of ideas, as expreſſed in any propoſition." As, in the propoſition your Lordſhip mentions, v. g. "that we may be certain there are ſpiritual and bodily "ſubſtances;" or, that bodily ſubſtances do exiſt, is a propoſition, of whoſe truth we may be certain; and ſo of ſpiritual ſubſtances. Let us now examine, wherein the certainty of theſe propoſitions conſiſts.

First, as to the exiſtence of bodily ſubſtances, I know, by my ſenſes, that ſomething extended, and ſolid, and figured does exiſt; for my ſenſes are the utmoſt evidence and certainty I have, of the exiſtence of extended, ſolid, figured things. Theſe modes being, then, known to exiſt by our ſenſes, the exiſtence of them (which I cannot conceive can ſubſiſt, without ſomething to ſupport them) makes me ſee the connection of thoſe ideas, with a ſupport, or as it is called, a ſubject of inheſion, and ſo conſequently the connection of that ſupport (which cannot be nothing) with exiſtence. And thus I come by a certainty of the exiſtence of that ſomething, which is a ſupport of thoſe ſenſible modes, tho' I have but a very confuſed, looſe, and undetermined idea of it, ſignified by the name ſubſtance. After the ſame manner, experimenting thinking in myſelf, by the exiſtence of thought in me, to which ſomething, that thinks, is evidently and neceſſarily connected in my mind; I come to be certain that there exiſts in me, ſomething that thinks, tho' of that ſomething, which I call ſubſtance alſo, I have but a very obſcure, imperfect idea.

Before I go any farther, it is fit I return my acknowledgments to your Lordſhip, for the good opinion you are pleaſed here to expreſs of the "author of "The Eſſay of Human Underſtanding," and that you do not impute to him the ill uſe, ſome may have made of his notions. But he craves leave to ſay, that he ſhould have been better preſerved from the hard and ſiniſter thoughts, which ſome men are always ready for, if in what you have here publiſhed, your Lordſhip had been pleaſed to have ſhewn where you have directed your diſcourſe againſt him, and where againſt others, from p. 234. to p. 262. of your Vindication of the Trinity. For nothing, but my book and my words, being quoted, the world will be apt to think that I am the perſon, who argue againſt the Trinity, and deny myſteries, againſt whom your Lordſhip directs thoſe pages. And indeed, my Lord, tho' I have read them over with great attention, yet, in many places, I cannot diſcern, whether it be againſt me, or any body elſe, that your Lordſhip is arguing. That which often makes the difficulty is, that I do not ſee how, what I ſay, does at all concern the controverſy your Lordſhip is engaged in, and yet I alone am quoted. Your Lordſhip goes on.

P. 240. "Let us ſuppoſe this principle to be true," that the ſimple ideas, by ſenſation or reflection, are the ſole matter and foundation of all our reaſoning: "I aſk then, "how we come to be certain, that there are ſpiritual ſubſtances in the world, "ſince we can have no clear and diſtinct ideas concerning them? Can we be "certain, without any foundation of reaſon? This is a new ſort of certainty, "for which we do not envy theſe pretenders to reaſon. But methinks, they "ſhould not at the ſame time aſſert the abſolute neceſſity of theſe ideas to our "knowledge, and declare that we may have certain knowledge without them. "If there be any other method, they overthrow their own principle; if there "be none, how come they to any certainty, that there are both bodily and ſpiritual ſubſtances?".

This paragraph, which continues to prove, that we may have certainty without clear and diſtinct ideas, I would flatter myſelf is not meant againſt me, becauſe it oppoſes nothing that I have ſaid; and ſo ſhall not ſay any thing to it, but only ſet it down to do your Lordſhip right, that the reader may judge. Tho' I do not find how he will eaſily overlook me, and think I am not at all concerned in it, ſince my words alone are quoted, in ſeveral pages immediately preceding and following: and in the very next paragraph it is ſaid, how they come to know; which word, they, muſt ſignify ſome body beſides the author of Chriſtianity not myſterious; and then I think, by the whole tenor of your Lordſhip's diſcourſe, no body will be left but me, that can poſſibly be taken to be the other: for, in the ſame paragraph, your Lordſhip ſays, "the ſame perſons ſay, that, "notwithſtanding their ideas, it is poſſible for matter to think."

I know not what other perſon ſays ſo, but I; but if any one does, I am ſure no perſon but I, ſay ſo in my book, which your Lordſhip has quoted for them, viz. Human Underſtanding, B. iv. c. 3. This, which is a riddle to me, the more amazes me, becauſe I find it in a treatiſe of your Lordſhip's, who ſo perfectly underſtands the rules and methods of writing, whether in controverſy, or any other way. But this, which ſeems wholly new to me, I ſhall better underſtand, when your Lordſhip pleaſes to explain it. In the mean time, I mention it as an apology for myſelf, if ſometimes I miſtake your Lordſhip's aim, and ſo miſapply my anſwer. What follows in your Lordſhip's next paragraph, is this:

P. 240. "As to theſe latter (which is my buſineſs) I muſt enquire farther, how they "come to know there are ſuch?" The anſwer is, by ſelf-reflection on thoſe powers, we find in ourſelves, which cannot come from a mere bodily ſubſtance. "I allow the reaſon to be very good," but the queſtion I aſk is, "whether this "argument be from the clear and diſtinct idea, or not?" We have ideas, in our ſelves, of the ſeveral operations of our minds, of knowing, willing, conſidering, &c. which cannot come from a bodily ſubſtance. "Very true; but is all

“ this contained in the ſimple idea of theſe operations? How can that be, when
“ the ſame perſons ſay, that notwithſtanding their ideas, it is poſſible for matter
“ to think? For it is ſaid, “ that we have the ideas of matter and thinking,
“ but poſſibly ſhall never be able to know, whether any material being thinks,
“ or not; it being impoſſible for us, by the contemplation of our own ideas,
“ without revelation, to diſcover, whether omnipotency hath not given to ſome
“ ſyſtems of matter, fitly diſpoſed, a power to perceive, or think. If this be
“ true, then, for all that we can know, by our ideas of matter and thinking,
“ matter may have a power of thinking: and if this hold, then it is impoſſible
“ to prove a ſpiritual ſubſtance in us, from the idea of thinking: for, how can
“ we be aſſured, by our ideas, that God hath not given ſuch a power of thinking
“ to matter, ſo diſpoſed as our bodies are? Eſpecially ſince it is ſaid, that in reſpect
“ of our notions, it is not much more remote from our comprehenſion to
“ conceive that God can, if he pleaſes, ſuper-add, to our idea of matter, a faculty
“ of thinking, than that he ſhould ſuper-add to it another ſubſtance, with a
“ faculty of thinking.” Whoever aſſerts this, can “ never prove a ſpiritual ſubſtance
“ in us, from a faculty of thinking; becauſe he cannot know, from the
“ idea of matter and thinking, that matter ſo diſpoſed cannot think. And he
“ cannot be certain, that God hath not framed the matter of our bodies ſo, as
“ to be capable of it.”

Human Underſtanding, l. iv. c. 3. § 6. 2d. edit. p. 310.

These words, my Lord, I am forced to take to myſelf; for tho' your Lordſhip has put it, the ſame perſons ſay, in the plural number, yet there is no body quoted for the following words, but my Eſſay; nor do I think any body, but I, has ſaid ſo. But ſo it is, in this preſent chapter, I have the good luck to be joined with others, for what I do not ſay, and others with me for what, I imagine, they do not ſay; which, how it came about, your Lordſhip can beſt reſolve. But to the words themſelves: in them your Lordſhip argues, that, upon my principles, “ it cannot be proved that there is a ſpiritual ſubſtance in us.” To which, give me leave, with ſubmiſſion, to ſay, that I think it may be proved from my principles, and I think I have done it; and the proof in my book ſtands thus. Firſt, we experiment in ourſelves thinking. The idea of this action, or mode of thinking, is inconſiſtent with the idea of ſelf-ſubſiſtence; and, therefore, has a neceſſary connection with a ſupport, or ſubject of inheſion: the idea of that ſupport is what we call ſubſtance; and ſo from thinking, experimented in us, we have a proof of a thinking ſubſtance in us, which, in my ſenſe, is a ſpirit. Againſt this your Lordſhip will argue, that by what I have ſaid, of the poſſibility that God may, if he pleaſes, ſuper-add to matter a faculty of thinking, it can never be proved, that there is a ſpiritual ſubſtance in us, becauſe, upon that ſuppoſition, it is poſſible it may be a material ſubſtance, that thinks in us. I grant it: but add, that the general idea of ſubſtance being the ſame every where, the modification of thinking, or the power of thinking joined to it, makes it a ſpirit, without conſidering what other modifications it has, as, whether it has the modification of ſolidity, or no. As, on the other ſide, ſubſtance, that has the modification of ſolidity, is matter, whether it has the modification of thinking, or no. And therefore, if your Lordſhip means by a ſpiritual, an immaterial ſubſtance, I grant I have not proved, nor upon my principles can it be proved (your Lordſhip meaning, as I think you do, demonſtratively proved) that there is an immaterial ſubſtance in us, that thinks. Tho' I preſume, from what I have ſaid about the ſuppoſition of a ſyſtem of matter, thinking (which there demonſtrates that God is immaterial) will prove it in the higheſt degree probable, that the thinking ſubſtance in us is immaterial. But your Lordſhip thinks not probability enough; and by charging the want of demonſtration upon my principles, that the thinking thing in us is immaterial, your Lordſhip ſeems to conclude it demonſtrable, from principles of philoſophy. That demonſtration I ſhould with joy receive from your Lordſhip, or any one. For, tho' all the great ends of morality and religion are well enough ſecured without it, as I have ſhewn, yet it would be a great advance of our knowledge in nature and philoſophy.

B. iv. c. 10. § 16.

B. iv. c. 3. § 6.

To what I have ſaid in my book, to ſhew that all the great ends of religion and morality are ſecured, barely by the immortality of the ſoul, without a neceſſary ſuppoſition that the ſoul is immaterial, I crave leave to add, that immortality may and ſhall be annexed to that, which in its own nature is neither immaterial nor immortal, as the apoſtle expreſly declares in theſe words; 1 Cor. xv. 53. "for this corruptible muſt put on incorruption, and this mortal muſt put on immortality."

Perhaps my uſing the word ſpirit, for a thinking ſubſtance, without excluding materiality out of it, will be thought too great a liberty, and ſuch as deſerves cenſure, becauſe I leave immateriality out of the idea, I make it a ſign of. I readily own, that words ſhould be ſparingly ventured on, in a ſenſe wholly new; and nothing, but abſolute neceſſity, can excuſe the boldneſs of uſing any term, in a ſenſe whereof we can produce no example. But in the preſent caſe, I think I have great authorities to juſtify me. The ſoul is agreed, on all hands, to be that in us, which thinks. And he, that will look into the firſt book of Cicero's Tuſculan queſtions, and into the ſixth book of Virgil's Æneids, will find that theſe two great men, who of all the Romans beſt underſtood philoſophy, thought, or at leaſt did not deny, the ſoul to be a ſubtil matter, which might come under the name of aura, or ignis, or æther; and this ſoul, they both of them called ſpiritus: in the notion of which, it is plain, they included only thought and active motion, without the total excluſion of matter. Whether they thought right in this, I do not ſay, that is not the queſtion: but whether they ſpoke properly, when they called an active, thinking, ſubtil ſubſtance, out of which they excluded only groſs and palpable matter, ſpiritus, ſpirit: I think that no body will deny, that if any among the Romans can be allowed to ſpeak properly, Tully and Virgil are the two, who may moſt ſecurely be depended on for it: and one of them ſpeaking of the ſoul, ſays "dum ſpiritus hos reget artus;" and the other, "vita continetur corpore & ſpiritu." Where it is plain, by corpus, he means (as generally every where) only groſs matter that may be felt and handled; as appears by theſe words; "ſi cor aut ſanguis, aut cerebrum eſt animus, certe, "quoniam eſt corpus, interibit cum reliquo corpore; ſi anima eſt, forte diſſapabitur; ſi ignis, extinguetur." Tuſc. Quæſt. l. i. c. 11. Here Cicero oppoſes corpus to ignis and anima, i. e. aura, or breath: and the foundation of that his diſtinction of the ſoul, from that which he calls corpus, or body, he gives a little lower in theſe words; "tanta ejus tenuitas ut fugiat aciem." Ib. c. 22.

Nor was it the heathen world alone, that had this notion of ſpirit; the moſt enlightened of all the antient people of God, Solomon himſelf, ſpeaks after the Eccleſ. iii. 19. ſame manner: "That, which befalleth the ſons of men, befalleth beaſts, even "one thing befalleth them; as the one dieth, ſo dieth the other, yea they have "all one ſpirit." So I tranſlate the Hebrew word רוח, here, for ſo I find it Ver. 21. tranſlated, the very next verſe but one; "Who knoweth the ſpirit of a man "that goeth upward, and the ſpirit of a beaſt that goeth down to the earth?" In which places it is plain that Solomon applies the word רוח, and our tranſlators of him the word ſpirit, to a ſubſtance, out of which immateriality was not wholly excluded, unleſs "the ſpirit of a beaſt, that goeth downwards to the "earth," be immaterial. Nor did the way of ſpeaking in our Saviour's time vary from this: St. Luke tells us, that when our Saviour, after his reſurrection, Chap. xxiv. 37. ſtood in the midſt of them, "they were affrighted, and ſuppoſed that they had ſeen πνεῦμα," the Greek word which always anſwers ſpirit, in Engliſh; and ſo the tranſlators of the Bible render it here, "they ſuppoſed that they had ſeen a "ſpirit." But our Saviour ſays to them, "Behold my hands and my feet, that Ver. 39. "it is I myſelf, handle me and ſee; for a ſpirit hath not fleſh and bones, as "you ſee me have." Which words of our Saviour put the ſame diſtinction be- Lib. 6. tween body and ſpirit, that Cicero did in the place above cited, viz. that the one was a groſs compages, that could be felt and handled; and the other ſuch as Virgil deſcribes the ghoſt, or ſoul, of Anchiſes.

"Ter conatus ibi collo dare brachia circum,
"Ter fruſtra comprenſa manus effugit imago,
"Par levibus, ventis, volucrique ſimillima ſomno."

I would not be thought hereby to ſay, that ſpirit never does ſignify a purely immaterial ſubſtance. In that ſenſe the ſcripture, I take it, ſpeaks, when it ſays, "God is a ſpirit:" and, in that ſenſe, I have uſed it; and in that ſenſe, I have proved from my principles, that there is a ſpiritual ſubſtance; and am certain that there is a ſpiritual, immaterial ſubſtance: which is, I humbly conceive, a direct anſwer to your Lordſhip's queſtion in the beginning of this argument, viz. "How come we to be certain, that there are ſpiritual ſubſtances, ſuppoſing "this principle to be true," that the ſimple ideas by ſenſation and reflection, are the ſole matter and foundation of all our reaſoning? But this hinders not, but that if God, that infinite, omnipotent, and perfectly immaterial ſpirit, ſhould pleaſe to give a ſyſtem of very ſubtil matter, ſenſe, and motion, it might, with propriety of ſpeech, be called ſpirit; tho' materiality were not excluded out of its complex idea. Your Lordſhip proceeds:

"It is ſaid indeed elſewhere, that it is repugnant to the idea of ſenſeleſs P. 242.
"matter, that it ſhould put into itſelf ſenſe, perception, and knowledge. But B. iv. c. 10.
"this doth not reach the preſent caſe; which is not what matter can do of it- § 5.
"ſelf, but what matter prepared by an omnipotent hand can do. And what "certainty can we have, that he hath not done it? We can have none from the "ideas, for thoſe are given up in this caſe; and, conſequently, we can have no "certainty upon theſe principles, whether we have any ſpiritual ſubſtance with-"in us, or not."

Your Lordſhip in this paragraph proves, that from what I ſay, "we can B. iv. c. 10.
"have no certainty whether we have any ſpiritual ſubſtance in us, or not." If, § 5.
by ſpiritual ſubſtance, your Lordſhip means an immaterial ſubſtance in us, as you ſpeak, p. 246. I grant what your Lordſhip ſays is true, that it cannot, upon theſe principles, be demonſtrated. But I muſt crave leave to ſay, at the ſame time, that, upon theſe principles, it can be proved, to the higheſt degree of probability. If, by ſpiritual ſubſtance, your Lordſhip means a thinking ſubſtance, I muſt diſſent from your Lordſhip, and ſay, that we can have a certainty, upon my principles, that there is a ſpiritual ſubſtance in us. In ſhort, my Lord, upon my principles, i. e. from the idea of thinking, we can have a certainty that there is a thinking ſubſtance in us; from hence we have a certainty that there is an eternal, thinking ſubſtance. This thinking ſubſtance, which has been from B. 4.
eternity, I have proved to be immaterial. This eternal, immaterial, thinking ſubſtance, has put into us a thinking ſubſtance, which whether it be a material or immaterial ſubſtance, cannot be infallibly demonſtrated from our ideas; tho' from them it may be proved, that it is to the higheſt degree probable, that it is immaterial. This, in ſhort, my Lord, is what I have to ſay on this point; which may, in good meaſure, ſerve for an anſwer to your Lordſhip's next leaf, or two; which I ſhall ſet down, and then take notice of ſome few particulars, which I wonder to find your Lordſhip accuſe me of. Your Lordſhip ſays:

"But we are told, That from the operations of our minds, we are able to P. 242.
"frame a complex idea of a ſpirit. How can that be, when we cannot from B. ii. c. 23.
"thoſe ideas be aſſured, but that thoſe operations may come from a material § 15.
"ſubſtance? If we frame an idea on ſuch grounds, it is at moſt but a poſſible "idea; for it may be otherwiſe, and we can have no aſſurance from our ideas, "that it is not: ſo that the moſt men may come to, in this way of ideas, is, "that it is poſſible it may be ſo, and it is poſſible it may not; but that it is im-"poſſible for us, from our ideas, to determine either way. And is not this an "admirable way to bring us to a certainty of reaſon?

"I am very glad to find the idea of a ſpiritual ſubſtance made as conſiſtent P. 243.
"and intelligible, as that of a corporeal. "For as the one conſiſts of a cohesion "of ſolid parts, and the power of communicating motion by impulſe, ſo the "other conſiſts in a power of thinking, and willing, and moving the body; and "that the coheſion of ſolid parts, is as hard to be conceived as thinking: and
"we are as much in the dark, about the power of communicating motion by § 27.
"impulſe, as in the power of exciting motion by thought. We have by daily "experience clear evidence of motion, produced both by impulſe and by thought; "but

“ but the manner how, hardly comes within our comprehenſion; we are equally
“ at a loſs in both.

§ 28. “ From whence it follows, that we may be certain of a being of a ſpiritual
“ ſubſtance, altho' we have no clear and diſtinct idea of it, nor are able to com-
“ prehend the manner of its operations: and, therefore, it is a vain thing in any
“ to pretend, that all our reaſon and certainty is founded on clear and diſtinct
“ ideas; and that they have reaſon to reject any doctrine, which relates to ſpi-
“ ritual ſubſtances, becauſe they cannot comprehend the manner of it. For the
“ ſame thing is confeſſed by the moſt inquiſitive men, about the manner of ope-
“ ration, both in material and immaterial ſubſtances. It is affirmed, that the
31. “ very notion of body implies ſomething very hard, if not impoſſible to be ex-
“ plained or underſtood by us; and that the natural conſequence of it, viz. divi-
“ ſibility, involves us in difficulties impoſſible to be explicated, or made conſiſtent;
§ 32. “ that we have but ſome few ſuperficial ideas of things; that we are deſtitute of
“ faculties to attain to the true nature of them; and that when we do that, we
“ fall preſently into darkneſs and obſcurity, and can diſcover nothing further but
“ our own blindneſs and ignorance.

“ These are very fair and ingenuous confeſſions of the ſhortneſs of human
“ underſtanding, with reſpect to the nature and manner of ſuch things, which
“ we are moſt certain of the being of, by conſtant and undoubted experience. I
“ appeal now to the reaſon of mankind, whether it can be any reaſonable foun-
“ dation for rejecting a doctrine propoſed to us, as of divine revelation, becauſe
“ we cannot comprehend the manner of it; eſpecially when it relates to the
§33, 34, 35. “ divine eſſence. For as the ſame author obſerves, “ our idea of God is framed
“ from the complex ideas of thoſe perfections, we find in our ſelves, but en-
“ larging them ſo, as to make them ſuitable to an infinite being, as knowledge,
“ power, duration, &c. And the degrees, or extent, of theſe, which we aſ-
“ cribe to the ſovereign being, are all boundleſs and infinite. For it is infinity,
§ 36. “ which joined to our ideas of exiſtence, power, knowledge, &c. makes that
“ complex idea, whereby we repreſent to our ſelves the beſt we can, the ſupreme
“ being.

“ Now, when our knowledge of groſs material ſubſtances is ſo dark; when
“ the notion of ſpiritual ſubſtances is above all ideas of ſenſation; when the
“ higher any ſubſtance is, the more remote from our knowledge; but eſpecially,
“ when the very idea of a ſupreme being implies its being infinite and incom-
“ prehenſible; I know not whether it argues more ſtupidity, or arrogance, to
“ expoſe a doctrine, relating to the divine eſſence, becauſe they cannot compre-
“ hend the manner of it: but of this more afterwards. I am yet upon the cer-
“ tainty of our reaſon, from clear and diſtinct ideas: and if we can attain to cer-
“ tainty without them, and where it is confeſſed we cannot have them, as about
“ ſubſtance; then theſe cannot be the ſole matter and foundation of our reaſon-
“ ing, which is peremptorily aſſerted by this late author.”

Here, after having argued, that notwithſtanding what I ſay, about our idea
of a ſpirit, it is impoſſible, from our ideas, to determine whether that ſpirit in us
be a material ſubſtance, or no, your Lordſhip concludes the paragraph thus:
P. 243. “ and is not this an admirable way to bring us to a certainty of reaſon?”

I answer, I think it is a way to bring us to a certainty in thoſe things, which I have offered as certain; but I never thought it a way to certainty, where we cannot reach certainty; nor ſhall I think the worſe of it, if your Lordſhip ſhould inſtance in an hundred other things, as well as the immateriality of the ſpirit in us, wherein this way does not bring us to a certainty; unleſs, at the ſame time, your Lordſhip ſhall ſhew us another way, that will bring us to a certainty in thoſe points, wherein this way of ideas failed. If your Lordſhip, or any body elſe, will ſhew me a better way to a certainty in them, I am ready to learn, and will lay by that of ideas. The way of ideas will not, from philoſophy, afford us a demonſtration, that the thinking ſubſtance in us is immaterial. Whereupon your Lordſhip aſks, “ and is not this an admirable way to bring us to a certainty “ of reaſon?” The way of argument, which your Lordſhip oppoſes to the way of ideas, will, I humbly conceive, from philoſophy, as little afford us a demonſtration, that the thinking ſubſtance in us is immaterial. Whereupon, may not any one likewiſe aſk, "and is not this an admirable way to bring us to a certainty of reaſon?" Is any way, I beſeech your Lordſhip, to be condemned as an ill way to bring us to certainty, demonſtrative certainty, becauſe it brings us not to it, in a point where reaſon cannot attain to ſuch certainty? Algebra is a way to bring us to certainty, in mathematicks; but muſt it be preſently condemned as an ill way, becauſe there are ſome queſtions in mathematicks, which a man cannot come to certainty in, by the way of Algebra?

In page 247. after having ſet down ſeveral confeſſions of mine, "of the ſhortneſs of human underſtanding," your Lordſhip adds theſe words: "I appeal now to the reaſon of mankind, whether it can be any reaſonable foundation for rejecting a doctrine propoſed to us, as of divine revelation; becauſe we cannot comprehend the manner of it; eſpecially, when it relates to the divine eſſence." And I beſeech you, my Lord, where did I ever ſay ſo, or any thing like it? And yet it is impoſſible, for any reader, but to imagine, that that propoſition, which your Lordſhip appeals to the reaſon of mankind againſt, is a propoſition of mine which your Lordſhip is confuting, out of confeſſions of my own, great numbers whereof ſtand quoted out of my Eſſay, in ſeveral pages of your Lordſhip's book both before, and after, this your Lordſhip's appeal to the reaſon of mankind. And now I muſt appeal to your Lordſhip, whether you find any ſuch propoſition in my book? If your Lordſhip does not, I too muſt then appeal to the reaſon of mankind, whether it be reaſonable for your Lordſhip, to bring ſo many confeſſions out of my book to confute a propoſition, that is no where in it? There is no doubt, reaſon for it; which, ſince your Lordſhip does not, that I ſee, declare, and I have not wit enough to diſcover, I ſhall, therefore, leave to the reaſon of mankind to find out.

Your Lordſhip has, in this part of your diſcourſe, ſpoke very much of rea- P. 243.
ſon; as, "is not this an admirable way to bring us to a certainty of reaſon? P. 244.
"And therefore it is a vain thing in any to pretend, that all our reaſon and cer- P. 245.
"tainty is founded on clear and diſtinct ideas. I appeal now to the reaſon of P. 246.
"mankind. I am yet upon the certainty of our reaſon. The certainty is not P. 250.
"placed in the idea, but in good and ſound reaſon. Allowing the argument to P. 251.
"be good, yet it is not taken from the idea, but from principles of true reaſon."

What your Lordſhip ſays at the beginning of this chapter, in theſe words, "we muſt conſider what we underſtand by reaſon," made me hope, I ſhould here find what your Lordſhip underſtands by reaſon, explained; that ſo I might P. 250. rectify my notion of it, and might be able to avoid the obſcurity and confuſion, which very much perplex moſt of their diſcourſes, wherein it is appealed to, or from, as judge. But notwithſtanding the explication, I flattered myſelf with the hopes of, from what I thought your Lordſhip had promiſed, I find no other account of reaſon, but in quotations out of others, which your Lordſhip juſtly blames. Had I been ſo happy, as to have been inlightened in this point, by your Lordſhip's learned pen, ſo as to have ſeen diſtinctly, what your Lordſhip underſtands by reaſon, I ſhould poſſibly have excuſed myſelf, from giving your Lordſhip the trouble of theſe papers, and been able to have perceived, without applying myſelf any farther to your Lordſhip, how ſo much of my Eſſay came into a chapter, which was deſigned to anſwer "objections againſt the trinity, in point "of reaſon." It follows:

"But I go yet farther: and as I have already ſhewed, we can have no certainty of an immaterial ſubſtance within us, from theſe ſimple ideas; ſo I P. 246. ſhall now ſhew, that there can be no ſufficient evidence, brought from them, by their own confeſſion concerning the exiſtence of the moſt ſpiritual and infinite ſubſtance, even God himſelf." And then your Lordſhip goes on, to give an account of my proof of a God: which your Lordſhip cloſes with theſe words:

"That, which I deſign, is to ſhew, that the certainty of it is not placed P. 225. upon any clear and diſtinct ideas, but upon the force of reaſon diſtinct from it; which was the thing I intended to prove."

If this be the thing your Lordſhip deſigned, I am then at a loſs, who your Lordſhip deſigned it againſt: for I do not remember, that I have any where ſaid, that we could not be convinced by reaſon of any truth, but where all the ideas, concerned in that conviction, were clear and diſtinct; for knowledge and certainty, in my opinion, lies in the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of ideas, ſuch as they are, and not always in having perfectly clear and diſtinct ideas. Tho' thoſe, I muſt own, the clearer and more diſtinct they are, contribute very much to our more clear and diſtinct reaſoning and diſcourſing about them. But, in ſome caſes, we may have certainty about obſcure ideas; v. g. by the clear idea of thinking in me, I find the agreement of the clear idea of exiſtence, and the obſcure idea of a ſubſtance in me, becauſe I perceive the neceſſary agreement of thinking, and the relative idea of a ſupport; which ſupport, without having any clear and diſtinct idea of what it is, beyond this relative one of a ſupport, I call ſubſtance.

If your Lordſhip intended this againſt another, who has ſaid, "clear and "diſtinct ideas are the ſole matter and foundation of all our reaſoning;" it ſeems very ſtrange to me, that your Lordſhip ſhould intend it againſt one, and quote only the words of another. For above ten pages before, your Lordſhip had quoted nothing but my book; and, in the immediate preceding paragraph, you bring a large quotation out of the tenth ſection of the tenth chapter of my fourth book;
P. 251. of which your Lordſhip ſays, "this is the ſubſtance of the argument uſed, to "prove an infinite, ſpiritual being, which I am far from weakening the force "of: but that which I deſign, is to ſhew, that the certainty of it is not placed "upon clear and diſtinct ideas." Whom now, I beſeech your Lordſhip, can this be underſtood to be intended againſt, but me? For how can my uſing an argument, whoſe certainty is not placed upon clear and diſtinct ideas, prove any thing againſt another man, who ſays, "that clear and diſtinct ideas are the ſole "matter and foundation of all our reaſoning?" This proves only againſt him, that uſes the argument; and, therefore, either I muſt be ſuppoſed here to hold, that clear and diſtinct ideas are the ſole matter and foundation of all our reaſoning, (which I do not remember that I ever ſaid) or elſe that your Lordſhip here proves againſt no body.

But tho' I do not remember that I have any where ſaid, that clear and diſtinct ideas are the ſole matter and foundation of all our reaſoning; yet I do own, that ſimple ideas are the foundations of all our knowledge, if that be it, which your Lordſhip queſtions: and, therefore, I muſt think myſelf concerned in what your Lordſhip ſays in this very place, p. 246. in theſe words, "I ſhall now ſhew, "that there can be no ſufficient evidence brought from theſe ſimple ideas, by "their own confeſſion, concerning the exiſtence of God himſelf."

This being ſpoken in the plural number, cannot be underſtood to be meant of the author of Chriſtianity not Myſterious, and no body elſe: and whom can any reader reaſonably apply to it, but the author of the Eſſay of Human Underſtanding; ſince, beſides that it ſtands in the midſt of a great many quotations out of that book, without any other perſon being named, or any one's words but mine quoted, my proof alone of a deity is brought out of that book, to make good what your Lordſhip here ſays; and no body elſe is any where mentioned, or quoted concerning it?

The ſame way of ſpeaking of the perſons you are arguing againſt, in the plural
P. 238. number, your Lordſhip uſes in other places; as, "which they may call a "complication of ſimple ideas, if they pleaſe."

P. 240. "We do not envy theſe pretenders to reaſon; but methinks they ſhould not, "at the ſame time, aſſert the abſolute neceſſity of theſe ideas to our knowledge, "and declare, that we may have certain knowledge without them." And all along in that page, they. And in the very next page, my words being quoted,
P. 241. your Lordſhip aſks, "how that can be, when the ſame perſons ſay, that not"withſtanding their ideas, it is poſſible for matter to think?" So that I do not ſee, how I can exempt myſelf from being meant, to be one of thoſe pretenders to reaſon, wherewith we can be certain, without any foundation of reaſon; which
P. 240. your Lordſhip, in the immediate foregoing page, does not envy for this new ſort of

of certainty. How can it be underſtood, but that I am one of thoſe perſons, that "at the ſame time, aſſert the abſolute neceſſity of theſe ideas to our knowledge, and declare that we may have certain knowledge without them? tho' "your Lordſhip very civilly ſays, p. 239. that you muſt do that right to the ingenious author of the Eſſay of Human Underſtanding (from whence theſe "notions are borrowed, to ſerve other purpoſes than he intended them) that," &c. yet, methinks, it is the author himſelf, and his uſe of theſe notions, that is blamed and argued againſt; but ſtill in the plural number, which he confeſſes himſelf not to underſtand.

My Lord, if your Lordſhip can ſhew me, where I pretend to reaſon, or certainty, without any foundation of reaſon; or where it is I aſſert the abſolute neceſſity of any ideas to our knowledge, and declare that we may have certain knowledge without them, your Lordſhip will do me a great favour: for this, I grant, is a new ſort of certainty, which I long to be rid of, and to diſown to the world. But truly, my Lord, as I pretend to no new ſort of certainty, but juſt ſuch as human underſtanding was poſſeſſed of, before I was born; and ſhould be glad, I could get more out of the books and writings, that come abroad in my days: ſo, my Lord, if I have any where pretended to any new ſort of certainty, I beſeech your Lordſhip ſhew me the place, that I may correct the vanity of it, and unſay it to the world.

Again, your Lordſhip ſays thus, "I know not, whether it argues more ſtupidity, or arrogance, to expoſe a doctrine relating to the divine eſſence, becauſe "they cannot comprehend the manner of it." P. 246.

Here, my Lord, I find the ſame, they, again, which ſome pages back, evidently involved me: and ſince that you have named no body beſides me, nor alledged any body's writing but mine; give me leave, therefore, to aſk your Lordſhip, whether I am one of theſe, they, here alſo, that I may know, whether I am concerned to anſwer for myſelf? I am aſhamed to importune your Lordſhip ſo often, about the ſame matter; but I meet with ſo many places, in your Lordſhip's (I had almoſt ſaid new) way of writing, that put me to a ſtand, not knowing whether I am meant, or no, that I am at a loſs, whether I ſhould clear myſelf from what poſſibly your Lordſhip does not lay to my charge; and yet the reader, thinking it meant of me, ſhould conclude that to be in my book, which is not there, and which I utterly diſown.

Tho' I cannot be joined with thoſe, who expoſe a doctrine relating to the divine eſſence, becauſe they cannot comprehend the manner of it; unleſs your Lordſhip can ſhew where I have ſo expoſed it, which I deny that I have any where done: yet your Lordſhip, before you come to the bottom of the ſame page, has theſe words, "I ſhall now ſhew, that there can be no ſufficient evidence brought from them, by their own confeſſion, concerning the exiſtence "of the moſt ſpiritual and infinite ſubſtance, even God himſelf." P. 246. P. 246.

If your Lordſhip did mean me in that, they, which is ſome lines backwards, I muſt complain to your Lordſhip, that you have done me an injury, in imputing that to me, which I have not done. And if, their, here, were not meant, by your Lordſhip, to relate to the ſame perſons, I aſk, by what ſhall the reader diſtinguiſh them? and how ſhall any body know, who it is your Lordſhip means? For that I am comprehended here is apparent, by your quoting my Eſſay, in the very next words, and arguing againſt it, in the following pages.

I enter not here into your Lordſhip's argument; that which I am now conſidering is your Lordſhip's peculiar way of writing, in this part of your treatiſe, which makes me often in a doubt, whether the reader will not condemn my book, upon your Lordſhip's authority, where he thinks me concerned, if I ſay nothing: and yet your Lordſhip may look upon my defence, as ſuperfluous, when I did not hold what your Lordſhip argued againſt.

But to go on with your Lordſhip's argument, your Lordſhip ſays, "I ſhall "now ſhew, that there can be no ſufficient evidence, brought from ſimple ideas, "by their own confeſſion, concerning the exiſtence of the moſt ſpiritual and "infinite ſubſtance, even God himſelf." P. 246.

Your Lordſhip's way of proving it, is this: your Lordſhip ſays, we are told, P. 246. b. iv. c. 10. § 1. "That the evidence of it is equal to mathematical certainty; "and very good arguments are brought to prove it, in a chapter on purpoſe: "but that which I take notice of, is, that the argument from the clear and diſtinct idea of a God, is paſſed over." Suppoſing all this to be ſo, your Lordſhip, methinks, with ſubmiſſion, does not prove the propoſition you undertook, which was this; "there can be no ſufficient evidence, brought from ſimple ideas, "by their own confeſſion, concerning [i. e. to prove] the exiſtence of a God." For if I did in that chapter, as your Lordſhip ſays, paſs over the proof from the clear and diſtinct idea of God, that, I preſume, is no confeſſion, that there can be no ſufficient evidence, brought from clear and diſtinct ideas, much leſs from ſimple ideas, concerning the exiſtence of a God; becauſe the uſing of one argument, brought from one foundation, is no confeſſion that there is not another principle, or foundation. But, my Lord, I ſhall not inſiſt upon this, whether it be a confeſſion or no.

Leaving confeſſion, out of the propoſition, I humbly conceive your Lordſhip's argument does not prove. Your Lordſhip's propoſition to be proved, is, "there can be no ſufficient evidence brought, from ſimple ideas, to prove the "exiſtence of a God;" and your Lordſhip's reaſon is, becauſe the argument from the clear and diſtinct idea of God, is omitted in my proof of a God. I will ſuppoſe, for the ſtrengthening your Lordſhip's reaſoning in the caſe, that I had ſaid (which I am far enough from ſaying) that there was no other argument to prove the exiſtence of God, but what I had uſed in that chapter; yet, my Lord, with all this, your Lordſhip's argument, I humbly conceive, would not hold: for I might bring evidence from ſimple ideas, tho' I brought none from the idea of God; for the idea, we have of God, is a complex, and no ſimple idea. So that the terms being changed from ſimple ideas, to a clear and diſtinct complex idea of God, the propoſition which was undertaken to be proved, ſeems to me unproved.

P. 247. Your Lordſhip's next words are, "how can this be conſiſtent with deducing our certainty of knowledge from clear and ſimple ideas?"

Here your Lordſhip joins ſomething that is mine, with ſomething that is not mine. I do ſay, that all our knowledge is founded in ſimple ideas; but I do not ſay, it is all deduced from clear ideas; much leſs that we cannot have any certain knowledge of the exiſtence of any thing, whereof we have not a clear, diſtinct, complex idea; or, that the complex idea muſt be clear enough, to be in itſelf the evidence of the exiſtence of that thing; which ſeems to be your Lordſhip's meaning here. Our knowledge is all founded on ſimple ideas, as I have before explained, tho' not always about ſimple ideas; for we may know the truth of propoſitions, which include complex ideas, and thoſe complex ideas may not always be perfectly clear ideas.

In the remaining part of this page, it follows: "I do not go about to juſtify P. 247. "thoſe who lay the whole ſtreſs upon that foundation, which I grant to be too "weak to ſupport ſo important a truth; and that thoſe are very much to blame, "who go about to invalidate other arguments for the ſake of that: but I doubt "all that talk about clear and diſtinct ideas being made the foundation of certainty, came originally from theſe diſcourſes, or meditations, which are aimed "at. The author of them was an ingenious, thinking man, and he endeavoured to lay the foundation of certainty, as well as he could. The firſt thing he "found any certainty in, was his own exiſtence; which he founded upon the "perceptions of the acts of his mind, which ſome call an internal, infallible "perception, that we are. From hence he proceeded to enquire, how we came "by this certainty? And he reſolved it into this, that he had a clear and diſtinct perception of it; and from hence he formed this general rule, that what "he had a clear and diſtinct perception of, was true. Which, in reaſon, ought "to go no farther, than where there is the like degree of evidence."

This account which your Lordſhip gives here, what it was, wherein Deſcartes laid the foundation of certainty, containing nothing in it to ſhew, what your Lordſhip propoſed here, viz. "that there can be no ſufficient evidence, brought

" from ideas, by my own confeſſion, concerning the exiſtence of God himſelf;" I willingly excuſe myſelf, from troubling your Lordſhip concerning it. Only I crave leave to make my acknowledgment to your Lordſhip, for what you are pleaſed by the way, to drop in theſe words: " But I doubt all this talk, about " clear and diſtinct ideas being made the foundation of certainty, came original- " ly from theſe diſcourſes, or meditations, which are aimed at."

By the quotations, in your Lordſhip's immediately preceding words, taken out of my Eſſay, which relate to that ingenious, thinking author, as well as by what in your following words is ſaid, of his founding certainty in his own exiſtence; it is hard to avoid thinking that your Lordſhip means, that I borrowed from him my notions concerning certainty. And your Lordſhip is ſo great a man, and every way ſo far above my meanneſs, that it cannot be ſuppoſed that your Lordſhip intended this for any thing, but a commendation of me to the world, as a ſcholar of ſo great a maſter. But tho' I muſt always acknowledge, of that juſtly admired gentleman, the great obligation, of my firſt deliverance from the unintelligible way of talking, of the philoſophy in uſe, in the ſchools in his time; yet I am ſo far from entitling his writings to any of the errors, or imperfections, which are to be found in my Eſſay, as deriving their original from him, that I muſt own to your Lordſhip, they were ſpun barely out of my own thoughts, reflecting, as well as I could, on my own mind, and the ideas I had there, and were not, that I know, derived from any other original. But, poſſibly, I all this while aſſume to myſelf an honour, which your Lordſhip did not intend to me, by this intimation; for tho' what goes before and after, ſeems to appropriate thoſe words to me, yet ſome part of them brings me under my uſual doubt, which I ſhall remain under, till I know, whom theſe words, viz. " This talk about clear and diſtinct ideas, being made the foundation of certain- " ty," belong to. B. iv. c. 10. § 7.

The remaining part of this paragraph contains a diſcourſe of your Lordſhip's upon Deſcartes's general rule of certainty, in theſe words: " For the certainty " here was not grounded on the clearneſs of the perception, but on the plain- " neſs of the evidence, which is of that nature, that the very doubting of it " proves it; ſince it is impoſſible, that any thing ſhould doubt, or queſtion, its " own being, that had it not. So that here it is not the clearneſs of the idea, " but an immediate act of perception, which is the true ground of certainty. " And this cannot extend to things without ourſelves, of which we can have no " other perception, than what is cauſed by the impreſſions of outward objects. " But whether we are to judge according to theſe impreſſions, doth not depend " on the ideas themſelves, but upon the exerciſe of our judgment and reaſon " about them, which put the difference between true and falſe, and adequate " and inadequate ideas. So that our certainty is not from the ideas themſelves, " but from the evidence of reaſon, that thoſe ideas are true and juſt, and, con- " ſequently, that we may build our certainty upon them." P. 248.

Granting all this to be ſo, yet I muſt confeſs, my Lord, I do not ſee how it any ways tends to ſhew either your Lordſhip's proof, or my confeſſion, that my proof of an infinite ſpiritual being is not placed upon ideas; which is, what your Lordſhip profeſſes to be your deſign here.

But tho' we are not yet come to your Lordſhip's proof, that the certainty in my proof of a deity is not placed on ideas; yet I crave leave to conſider, what your Lordſhip ſays here, concerning certainty, about which one cannot employ too many thoughts, to find wherein it is placed. Your Lordſhip ſays, " That " Deſcartes's certainty was not grounded on the clearneſs of the perception, but " on the plainneſs of the evidence." And a little lower; here (i. e. in Deſcartes's foundation of certainty) it is not the clearneſs of the idea, but an immediate " act " of perception, on which is the true ground of certainty. And a little lower, " that in things without us, our certainty is not from the ideas, but from the " evidence of reaſon, that thoſe ideas are true and juſt."

Your Lordſhip, I hope, will pardon my dulneſs, if, after your Lordſhip has placed the grounds of certainty of our own exiſtence, ſometimes in the plainneſs of the evidence, in oppoſition to the clearneſs of the perception; ſometimes in P. 248.

the immediate act of perception, in oppoſition to the clearneſs of the idea, and the certainty of other things without us, in the evidence of reaſon, that theſe ideas are true and juſt, in oppoſition to the ideas themſelves: I know not, by theſe rules, wherein to place certainty; and therefore ſtick to my own plain way, by ideas delivered in theſe words: "wherever we perceive the agreement, or "diſagreement, of any of our ideas, there is certain knowledge; and where- B. iv. c. 4. § 18. "ever we are ſure thoſe ideas agree with the reality of things, there is certain, "real knowledge. Of which agreement of our ideas with the reality of things, "I think I have ſhewn, wherein it is that certainty, real certainty, conſiſts." Whereof more may be ſeen in chap. vi. in which, your Lordſhip find any miſtakes, I ſhall take it as a great honour to be ſet right by you.

Your Lordſhip, as far as I can gueſs your meaning (for I muſt own, I do not clearly comprehend it) ſeems to me, in the foregoing paſſage, to oppoſe this aſſertion, that the certainty of the being of any thing, might be made out from the idea of that thing. Truly, my Lord, I am ſo far from ſaying (or thinking) ſo, that I never knew any one of that mind, but Deſcartes, and ſome that have followed him, in his proof of a God, from the idea, which we have of God in us; which I was ſo far from thinking a ſufficient ground of certainty, that your Lordſhip makes uſe of my denying, or doubting of it, againſt me, as we ſhall ſee in the following words, p. 248.

"But the idea of an infinite being has this peculiar to it, that neceſſary exiſ-"tence is implied in it. This is a clear and diſtinct idea, and yet it is denied "that this doth prove the exiſtence of God. How then can the grounds of our "certainty ariſe from clear and diſtinct ideas, when, in one of the cleareſt ideas "of our minds, we can come to no certainty by it?"

Your Lordſhip's proof here, as far as I comprehend it, ſeems to be, that it is confeſſed, "That certainty does not ariſe from clear and diſtinct ideas, becauſe "it is denied that the clear and diſtinct idea of an infinite being, that implies "neceſſary exiſtence in it, does prove the exiſtence of a God."

Here your Lordſhip ſays, it is denied; and, in five lines after, you recal that ſaying, and uſe theſe words, "I do not ſay that it is denied, to prove it." Which of theſe two ſayings of your Lordſhip's muſt I now anſwer to? If your Lordſhip ſays it is denied, I fear that will not hold to be ſo in matter of fact, which made your Lordſhip unſay it; tho' that being moſt to your Lordſhip's purpoſe, occaſioned, I ſuppoſe, its dropping from your pen. For if it be not denied, I think the whole force of your Lordſhip's argument fails. But your Lordſhip helps that out, as well as the thing will bear, by the words that follow in the ſentence, which altogether ſtands thus: "I do not ſay, that it is denied, to prove it; but "this is ſaid, that it is a doubtful thing, from the different make of men's tem-"pers, and application of their thoughts. What can this mean, unleſs it be "to let us know, that even clear and diſtinct ideas may loſe their effect, by the "difference of men's tempers and ſtudies? ſo that beſides ideas, in order to a "right judgment, a due temper and application of the mind is required."

If I meant in thoſe words of mine, quoted here by your Lordſhip, juſt as your Lordſhip concludes they mean, I know not why I ſhould be aſhamed of it; for I never thought that ideas, even the moſt clear and diſtinct, would make men certain of what might be demonſtrated from them, unleſs they were of a temper to conſider, and would apply their minds to them. There are no ideas more clear and diſtinct, than thoſe of numbers, and yet there are a thouſand demonſtrations concerning numbers, which millions of men do not know, (and ſo have not the certainty about them, they might have) for want of application.

I could not avoid here to take this to myſelf: for this paſſage of your Lordſhip's is pinned down upon me ſo cloſe, by your Lordſhip's citing the 7th ſect. of the 10th chapter of my ivth book, that I am forced here to anſwer for myſelf; which I ſhall do, after having firſt ſet down my words, as they ſtand in the place quoted by your Lordſhip: "How far the idea of a moſt perfect being, which a B. iv. c. 10. § 7. "man may frame in his mind, does, or does not, prove the exiſtence of a God, "I will not here examine. For in the different make of men's tempers and "application of their thoughts, ſome arguments prevail more on one, and ſome on

" another, for the confirmation of the ſame truth. But yet, I think, this I may
" ſay, that it is an ill way of eſtabliſhing this truth, and ſilencing atheiſts, to lay
" the whole ſtreſs of ſo important a point as this, upon that ſole foundation, and
" take ſome men's having that idea of God in their minds (for it is evident, ſome
" men have none, and ſome a worſe than none, and the moſt very different) for
" the only proof of a deity; and out of an over-fondneſs of that darling inven-
" tion, caſhier, or at leaſt endeavour to invalidate all other arguments, and forbid
" us to hearken to thoſe proofs, as being weak, or fallacious, which our own
" exiſtence, and the ſenſible parts of the univerſe, offer ſo clearly and cogently
" to our thoughts, that I deem it impoſſible for a conſidering man to withſtand
" them. For I judge it as certain and clear a truth, as can any where be de-
" livered, that the inviſible things of God are clearly ſeen from the creation of
" the world, being underſtood by the things that are made, even his eternal
" power and godhead."

THE meaning of which words of mine, were not to deny that the idea of a moſt perfect being doth prove a God; but to blame thoſe, who take it for the only proof, and endeavour to invalidate all others. For the belief of a God being, as I ſay in the ſame ſection, the foundation of all religion and genuine morality, I thought no arguments, that are made uſe of, to work the perſuaſion of a God, into men's minds, ſhould be invalidated. And the reaſon I give, why they ſhould all be left to their full ſtrength, and none of them rejected, as unfit to be hearkened to, is this: becauſe "in the different make of men's tempers, and appli-
" cation of their thoughts, ſome arguments prevail more on one, and ſome on
" another, for the confirmation of the ſame truth." So that my meaning here, was not, as your Lordſhip ſuppoſes, to ground certainty on the different make of men's tempers, and application of their thoughts, in oppoſition to clear and diſtinct ideas, as is very evident from my words; but to ſhew of what ill conſequence it is, to go about to invalidate any argument, which hath a tendency to ſettle the belief of a God, in any one's mind; becauſe, in the difference of men's tempers and application, ſome arguments prevail more on one, and ſome on another: ſo that I ſpeaking of belief, and your Lordſhip, as I take it, ſpeaking in that place of certainty, nothing can (I crave leave to ſay) be inferred from theſe words of mine, to your Lordſhip's purpoſe. And that I meant belief, and not certainty, is evident from hence, that I look upon the argument, there ſpoke of, as not concluſive, and ſo not able to produce certainty in any one, tho' I did not know how far it might prevail on ſome men's perſuaſions, to confirm them in the truth. And ſince not all, nor the moſt of thoſe that believe a God, are at the pains, or have the ſkill, to examine and clearly comprehend the demonſtrations of his being; I was unwilling to ſhew the weakneſs of the argument there ſpoke of; ſince poſſibly by it, ſome men might be confirmed in the belief of a God, which is enough to preſerve in them true ſentiments of religion and morality.

YOUR Lordſhip hereupon aſks, "Wherein is this different from what all P. 249.
" men of underſtanding have ſaid?"

I ANSWER: in nothing that I know; nor did I ever, that I remember, ſay that it was. Your Lordſhip goes on to demand,

"WHY then ſhould theſe clear and ſimple ideas be made the ſole foundation P. 249.
" of reaſon?"

I ANSWER: that I know not; they muſt give your Lordſhip a reaſon for it, who have made clear ideas the ſole foundation of reaſon. Why I have made ſimple ones the foundation of all knowledge, I have ſhewn. Your Lordſhip goes on.

"ONE would think by this"—— P. 249.

BY what, I beſeech your Lordſhip?

"THAT theſe ideas would preſently ſatisfy men's minds, if they attended to
" them."

WHAT thoſe ideas are, from which your Lordſhip would expect ſuch preſent ſatisfaction, and upon what grounds your Lordſhip expects it, I do not know. But this I will venture to ſay, that all the ſatisfaction men's minds can have, in their enquiries after truth and certainty, is to be had only from conſidering, obſerving, and rightly laying together of ideas, ſo as to find out their agreement, or diſagreement, and no other way.

BUT I do not think ideas have truth and certainty, always ſo ready to ſatisfy the mind in its enquiries, that there needs no more to be ſatisfied, than to attend to them, as one does to a man, whom one aſks a queſtion, to be ſatisfied; which your Lordſhip's way of expreſſion ſeems to me to intimate. But they muſt be conſidered well, and their habitudes examined; and where their agreement, or diſagreement, cannot be perceived by an immediate compariſon, other ideas muſt be found out, to diſcover the agreement, or diſagreement, of thoſe under conſideration, and then all laid in a due order, before the mind can be ſatisfied in the certainty of that truth, which it is ſeeking after. This, my Lord, requires often a little more time and pains, than attending to a tale that is told, for preſent ſatiſfaction. And I believe ſome of the incomparable Mr. Newton's wonderful demonſtrations coſt him ſo much pains, that tho' they were all founded in nothing, but ſeveral ideas of quantity, yet thoſe ideas did not preſently ſatisfy his mind, tho' they were ſuch that, with great application and labour of thought, they were able to ſatisfy him with certainty, i. e. produce demonſtration. Your Lordſhip adds,

P. 249. " BUT even this will not do, as to the idea of an infinite being."

THO' the complex idea, for which the ſound, God, ſtands (whether containing in it the idea of neceſſary exiſtence, or no, for the caſe is the ſame) will not prove the real exiſtence of a being, anſwering that idea, any more than any other idea, in any one's mind, will prove the exiſtence of any real being, anſwering that idea; yet, I humbly conceive, it does not hence follow, but that there may be other ideas, by which the being of a God may be proved. For no body, that I know, ever ſaid, that every idea would prove every thing, or that an idea, in men's minds, would prove the exiſtence of ſuch a real being: and therefore, if this idea fails to prove what is propoſed to be proved by it, it is no more an exception againſt the way of ideas, than it would be an exception againſt the way of a medius terminus, in arguing that ſome body uſed one that did not prove. It follows:

P. 249. " IT is not enough to ſay, they will not examine how far it will hold; for " they ought either to ſay, that it doth hold, or give up this ground of certain- " ty from clear and diſtinct ideas."

HERE, my Lord, I am got again into the plural number: but not knowing any body, but myſelf, who has uſed theſe words, which are ſet down out of my Eſſay, and which you are, in this and the foregoing paragraph, arguing againſt, I am forced to beg your Lordſhip to let me know, who thoſe perſons are, whom your Lordſhip, joining with me, intitles with me to theſe words of my book; or to whom your Lordſhip, joining me, intitles me by theſe words of mine, to what they have publiſhed, that I may ſee how far I am anſwerable for them.

NOW, as to the words themſelves, viz. " I will not examine how far the idea " propoſed does, or does not, prove the exiſtence of a God," becauſe they are mine; and your Lordſhip excepts againſt them, and tells me, " it was not " enough to ſay, I will not examine, &c. For I ought either to have ſaid, that " it doth hold, or give up this ground of certainty from clear and diſtinct ideas." I will anſwer as well as I can.

I COULD not then, my Lord, well ſay, that that doth hold, which I thought did not hold; but I imagined I might, without entring into the examen, and ſhewing the weakneſs of that argument, paſs it by, with ſaying, " I would not " examine," and ſo left it with this thought, " valeat quantum valere poteſt."

BUT tho' I did this, and ſaid not then, it will hold, nay think now, it will not hold, yet I do not ſee how from thence I was then, or am now, under any neceſſity to give up the ground of certainty from ideas; becauſe the ground of certainty from ideas may be right, tho', in the preſent inſtance, a right uſe were not made of them, or a right idea was not made uſe of, to produce the certainty ſought. Ideas in mathematicks are a ſure ground of certainty; and yet every one may not make ſo right a uſe of them, as to attain to certainty by them: but yet any one's failing of certainty by them, is not the overturning of this truth, that " certainty is to be had by them." Clear and diſtinct I have omitted here to join with ideas, not becauſe clear and diſtinct make any ideas unfit to produce certainty, which have all other fitneſs to do it; but becauſe I do not limit certainty to clear and diſtinct ideas only, ſince there may be certainty from ideas, that are not in all their parts perfectly clear and diſtinct.

Your Lordſhip, in the following paragraph, endeavours to ſhew, that I have not proved the being of a God by ideas; and from thence, with an argument not unlike the preceding, you conclude, that ideas cannot be the grounds of certainty, becauſe I have not grounded my proof of a God on ideas. To which way of argumentation, I muſt crave leave here again to reply, that your Lordſhip's ſuppoſing, as you do, that there is another way to certainty, which is not that of ideas, does not prove that certainty may not be had from ideas, becauſe I make uſe of that other way. This being premiſed, I ſhall endeavour to ſhew, that my proof of a deity is all grounded on ideas, however your Lordſhip is pleaſed to call it by other names. Your Lordſhip's words are:

"But inſtead of the proper argument from ideas, we are told, that "from P. 249.
"the conſideration of ourſelves, and what we find in our own conſtitutions, our § 6.
"reaſon leads us to the knowledge of this certain and evident truth; that there
"is an eternal, moſt powerful, and moſt knowing being. All which I readily
"yield; but we ſee plainly, the certainty is not placed in the idea, but in good
"and ſound reaſon," from the conſideration of ourſelves and our conſtitutions.
"What! in the idea of our ſelves? No certainly."

Give me leave, my Lord, to aſk where I ever ſaid, that certainty was placed in the idea, which your Lordſhip urges my words, as a contradiction of? I think, I never ſaid ſo. 1. Becauſe I do not remember it. 2. Becauſe your Lordſhip has not quoted any place, where I have ſaid ſo. 3. Becauſe I, all along in my book, which has the honour to be ſo often quoted here by your Lordſhip, ſay the quite contrary. For I place certainty, where I think every body will find it, and no where elſe, viz. in the perception of the agreement or diſagreement of ideas; ſo that, in my opinion, it is impoſſible to be placed in any one ſingle idea, ſimple or complex. I muſt own, that I think certainty grounded on ideas: and, therefore, to take your Lordſhip's words here, as I think they are meant, in oppoſition to what I ſay, I ſhall take the liberty to change your Lordſhip's words here, "What! in the idea of ourſelves? No certainly;" into words uſed by your Lordſhip in the foregoing page, to the ſame purpoſe, "What! can the "grounds of our certainty ariſe from the idea of ourſelves? No certainly."

To which permit me, my Lord, with due reſpect to reply, Yes, certainly. The certainty of the being of a God, in my proof, is grounded on the idea of ourſelves, as we are thinking beings. But your Lordſhip urges my own words, which are, that, "from the conſideration of our ſelves, and what we find in our conſtitu-"tions, our reaſon leads us to the knowledge of this certain and evident truth."

My Lord, I muſt confeſs I never thought that the conſideration of ourſelves, and what we find in our own conſtitutions, excluded the conſideration of the idea, either of being, or of thinking, two of the ideas, that make a part of the complex ideas, a man has of himſelf. If conſideration of ourſelves excludes thoſe ideas, I may be charged with ſpeaking improperly: but it is plain, nevertheleſs, that I ground the proof of a God, on thoſe ideas, and, I thought, I ſpoke properly enough; when meaning, that the conſideration of thoſe ideas, which our own being offered us, and ſo finding their agreement, or diſagreement, with others, we were thereby, i. e. by thus reaſoning, led into the knowledge of the exiſtence of the firſt, infinite being, i. e. of God, I expreſſed it, as I did, in the more familiar way of ſpeaking: for my purpoſe, in that chapter, being to make out the knowledge of the exiſtence of a God, and not to prove that it was by ideas, I thought it moſt proper to expreſs myſelf, in the moſt uſual and familiar way, to let it the eaſier into men's minds, by common words and known ways of expreſſion: and therefore, as I think, I have ſcarce uſed the word idea, in that whole chapter, but only in one place, where my ſpeaking againſt laying the whole proof, only upon our idea of a moſt perfect being, obliged me to it.

But your Lordſhip ſays, that in this way of coming to a certain knowledge of the being of a God, "from the conſideration of ourſelves, and what we find in "our own conſtitutions," the certainty is placed in good and ſound reaſon. I hope ſo. But not in the idea.

What your Lordſhip here means by, not placed in the idea, I confeſs I do not well underſtand; but if your Lordſhip means, that it is not grounded on the ideas of thinking and exiſtence, before-mentioned, and the comparing of them, and finding their agreement, or diſagreement, with other ideas; that I muſt take the liberty to diſſent from; for, in this ſenſe, it may be placed in ideas, and in good and ſound reaſon too, i. e. in reaſon rightly managing thoſe ideas, ſo as to produce evidence by them. So that, my Lord, I muſt own, I ſee not the force of the argument, which ſays, not in ideas, but in ſound reaſon; ſince I ſee no ſuch oppoſition between them, but that ideas and ſound reaſon may conſiſt together. For inſtance: when a man would ſhew the certainty of this truth, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones; the firſt thing, probably, that he does, is to draw a diagram. What is the uſe of that diagram? but ſteadily to ſuggeſt to his mind thoſe ſeveral ideas, he would make uſe of, in that demonſtration. The conſidering and laying theſe together, in ſuch order, and with ſuch connection, as to make the agreement of the ideas of the three angles of the triangle, with the ideas of two right ones, to be perceived, is called right reaſoning, and is the buſineſs of that faculty, which we call reaſon; which when it operates rightly, by conſidering and comparing ideas ſo as to produce certainty, this ſhewing, or demonſtration, that the thing is ſo, is called good and ſound reaſon. The ground of this certainty lies in ideas themſelves, and their agreement, or diſagreement, which reaſon neither does, nor can alter, but only lays them ſo together, as to make it perceivable; and, without ſuch a due conſideration and ordering of the ideas, certainty could not be had: and thus certainty is placed both in ideas, and in good and ſound reaſon.

This affords an eaſy anſwer to your Lordſhip's next words, brought to prove, that the certainty of a God is not placed on the idea of ourſelves. They ſtand thus:

P. 250. "For let our ideas be taken, which way we pleaſe, by ſenſation or reflection; "yet it is not the idea, that makes us certain, but the argument, from that "which we perceive in, and about, ourſelves."

Nothing truer than that it is not the idea, that makes us certain, without reaſon, or without the underſtanding: but it is as true, that it is not reaſon, it is not the underſtanding, that makes us certain without ideas. It is not the ſun, makes me certain it is day, without my eyes; nor it is not my ſight makes me certain it is day, without the ſun; but the one imployed about the other. Nor is it one idea by itſelf, that in this, or any caſe, makes us certain; but certainty conſiſts in the perceived agreement, or diſagreement, of all the ideas, that ſerve to ſhew the agreement, or diſagreement, of diſtinct ideas, as they ſtand in the propoſition, whoſe truth, or falſhood, we would be certain of. The uſing of intermediate ideas to ſhew this, is called argumentation, and the ideas ſo uſed in train, an argument; ſo that, in my poor opinion, to ſay, that the argument makes us certain, is no more than ſaying, the ideas made uſe of, make us certain.

The idea of thinking in ourſelves, which we receive by reflection, we may by intermediate ideas, perceive to have a neceſſary agreement and connection with the idea of the exiſtence of an eternal, thinking being. This, whether your Lordſhip will call placing of certainty in the idea, or placing the certainty in reaſon; whether your Lordſhip will ſay, it is not the idea, that gives us the certainty, but the argument, is indifferent to me; I ſhall not be ſo unmannerly as to preſcribe to your Lordſhip, what way you ſhould ſpeak, in this or any other matter. But this your Lordſhip will give me leave to ſay, that let it be called, how your Lordſhip pleaſes, there is no contradiction in it, to what I have ſaid concerning certainty, or the way, how we came by it, or the ground, on which I place it. Your Lordſhip farther urges my words, out of the fifth ſection of the ſame chapter.

P. 250. But, "we find in ourſelves perception and knowledge." It is very true. But how doth this prove there is a God? Is it from the clear and diſtinct idea of it? No, but from this argument, that, "either there muſt have been a knowing being from eternity, or an unknowing; for ſomething muſt have been "from eternity: but if an unknowing being, then it was impoſſible there ever "ſhould have been any knowledge, it being as impoſſible that a thing, without knowledge, ſhould produce it, as that a triangle ſhould make itſelf three "angles bigger than two right ones." Allowing the argument to be good, "yet "it is not taken from the idea, but from the principles of true reaſon; as, that "no man can doubt his own perception; that every thing muſt have a cauſe; "that this cauſe muſt either have knowledge, or not; if it have, the point is "gained; if it hath not, nothing can produce nothing; and conſequently a not "knowing being cannot produce a knowing."

Your Lordſhip here contends, that my argument is not taken from the idea, but from true principles of reaſon. I do not ſay it is taken from any one idea, but from all the ideas concerned in it. But your Lordſhip, if you herein oppoſe any thing I have ſaid, muſt, I humbly conceive, ſay, not from ideas, but from true principles of reaſon; ſeveral whereof your Lordſhip has here ſet down. And whence, I beſeech your Lordſhip, comes the certainty of any of thoſe propoſitions, which your Lordſhip calls true principles of reaſon, but from the perceivable agreement, or diſagreement, of the ideas contained in them? Juſt as it is expreſſed in thoſe propoſitions, v. g. "a man cannot doubt of his own perception," is a true principle of reaſon, or a true propoſition, or a certain propoſition; but to the certainty of it we arrive, only by perceiving the neceſſary agreement of the two ideas, of perception and ſelf-conſciouſneſs.

Again, "every thing muſt have a cauſe:" Tho' I find it ſo ſet down for one, by your Lordſhip, yet, I humbly conceive, is not a true principle of reaſon, nor a true propoſition; but the contrary. The certainty whereof we attain, by the contemplation of our ideas, and by perceiving that the idea of eternity, and the idea of the exiſtence of ſomething do agree, and the idea of exiſtence from eternity, and of having a cauſe, do not agree, or are inconſiſtent within the ſame thing. But "every thing, that has a beginning, muſt have a cauſe," is a true principle of reaſon, or a propoſition certainly true; which we come to know, by the ſame way, i. e. by contemplating our ideas, and perceiving that the idea, of beginning to be, is neceſſarily connected with the idea of ſome operation; and the idea of operation, with the idea of ſomething operating, which we call a cauſe; and ſo the beginning to be, is perceived to agree with the idea of a cauſe, as it is expreſſed in the propoſition: and thus it comes to be a certain propoſition; and ſo may be called a principle of reaſon, as every true propoſition is to him that perceives the certainty of it.

This, my Lord, is my way of ideas, and of coming to certainty by them; which, when your Lordſhip has again conſidered, I am apt to think your Lordſhip will no more condemn, than I do except againſt your Lordſhip's way of arguments, or principles of reaſon. Nor will it, I ſuppoſe, any longer offend your Lordſhip, under the notion of a new way of reaſoning; ſince I flatter myſelf, both theſe ways will be found to be equally old, one as the other; tho', perhaps, formerly they have not been ſo diſtinctly taken notice of, and the name of ideas is of later date, in our Engliſh language.

If your Lordſhip ſays, as I think you mean, viz. that my argument, to prove a God, is not taken from ideas, your Lordſhip will pardon me, if I think otherwiſe. For I beſeech your Lordſhip, are not ideas, whoſe agreement, or diſagreement, as they are expreſſed in propoſitions, as perceived, immediately, or by intuition, the principles of true reaſon? And does not the certainty we have, of the truth of theſe propoſitions, conſiſt in the perception of ſuch agreement, or diſagreement? And does not the agreement, or diſagreement, depend upon the ideas themſelves? Nay, ſo intirely depend upon the ideas themſelves, that it is impoſſible for the mind, or reaſon, or argument, or any thing to alter it? All that reaſon, or the mind does, in reaſoning or arguing, is to find out, and obſerve, that agreement, or diſagreement: and all that argument does, is, by an intervening idea, to ſhew it, where an immediate putting the ideas together will not do it.

As for example, in the preſent caſe: the propoſition, of whoſe truth I would be certain, is this: "a knowing being has eternally exiſted." Here the ideas joined, are eternal exiſtence, with a knowing being. But does my mind perceive any immediate connection, or repugnancy, in theſe ideas? No. The propoſition then, at firſt view, affords me no certainty; or, as our Engliſh idiom phraſes it, it is not certain, or am I not certain of it. But tho' I am not, yet I would be certain, whether it be true, or no. What then muſt I do? Find arguments to prove that it is true, or the contrary. And what is that, but to caſt about, and find out intermediate ideas, which may ſhew me the neceſſary connection, or inconſiſtency, of the ideas in the propoſition? Either of which, when, by theſe intervening ideas, I am brought to perceive, I am then certain that the propoſition is true, or I am certain that it is falſe. As in the preſent caſe, I perceive in myſelf thought and perception; the idea of actual perception has an evident connection with an actual being, that doth perceive and think: the idea of an actual, thinking being, hath a perceivable connection with the eternal exiſtence of ſome knowing being, by the intervention of the negation of all being, or the idea of nothing, which has a neceſſary connection with no power, no operation, no cauſality, no effect, i. e. with nothing. So that the idea of once actually nothing, has a viſible connection with nothing to eternity, for the future; and hence the idea of an actual being, is perceived to have a neceſſary connection with ſome actual being from eternity. And, by the like way of ideas, may be perceived the actual exiſtence of a knowing being, to have a connection with the exiſtence of an actual, knowing being, from eternity; and the idea of an eternal, actual, knowing being, with the idea of immateriality, by the intervention of the idea of matter, and of its actual diviſion, diviſibility, and want of perception, &c. which are the ideas, or, as your Lordſhip is pleaſed to call them, arguments, I make uſe of, in this proof, which I need not here go over again; and which is partly contained in theſe following words, which your Lordſhip thus quotes, out of the 10th ſection of the ſame chapter.

P. 251. AGAIN, "If we ſuppoſe nothing to be firſt, matter can never begin to be: "if bare matter without motion be eternal, motion can never begin to be: "if matter and motion to be ſuppoſed eternal, thought can never begin to be: "for if matter could produce thought, then thought muſt be in the power of "matter; and if it be in matter, as ſuch, it muſt be the inſeparable property of "all matter; which is contrary to the ſenſe and experience of mankind. If only "ſome parts of matter have a power of thinking, how comes ſo great a difference in the properties of the ſame matter? What diſpoſition of matter is required to thinking? And from whence comes it? Of which no account can "be given in reaſon." To which your Lordſhip ſubjoins:

P. 251. "THIS is the ſubſtance of the argument uſed, to prove an infinite, ſpiritual "being, which I am far from weakening the force of: but that which I deſign, "is to ſhew, that the certainty of it is not placed upon any clear and diſtinct "ideas, but upon the force of reaſon, diſtinct from it; which was the thing I "intended to prove."

YOUR Lordſhip ſays, that the certainty of it (I ſuppoſe your Lordſhip means the certainty produced by my proof of a deity) is not placed upon clear and diſtinct ideas. It is placed, among others, upon the ideas of thinking, exiſtence, and matter, which I think are all clear and diſtinct ideas; ſo that there are ſome clear and diſtinct ideas in it: and one can hardly ſay, there are not any clear and diſtinct ideas in it, becauſe there is one obſcure and confuſed one in it, viz. that of ſubſtance; which yet hinders not the certainty of the proof.

P. 252. THE words which your Lordſhip ſubjoins to the former, viz. "But upon the "force of reaſon, diſtinct from it;" ſeem to me to ſay, as far as I can underſtand them, that the certainty of my argument for a deity, is placed not on clear and diſtinct ideas, but upon the force of reaſon.

THIS, among other places before ſet down, makes me wiſh your Lordſhip had told us, what you underſtand by reaſon; for in my acceptation of the word reaſon, I do not ſee but the ſame proof may be placed upon clear and diſtinct ideas, and upon reaſon too. As I ſaid before, I can perceive no inconſiſtency, or oppoſition, between them, no more than there is any oppoſition between a clear object and my faculty of ſeeing, in the certainty of any thing I receive by my eyes; for this certainty may be placed very well on, both the clearneſs of the object, and the exerciſe of that faculty in me.

P. 245.

Your Lordſhip's next words, I think, ſhould be read thus; "diſtinct from them:" for if they were intended, as they are printed, "diſtinct from it," I confeſs I do not underſtand them. "Certainty not placed on clear and diſtinct ideas, but upon the force of reaſon diſtinct from them," my capacity will reach the ſenſe of: but then I cannot but wonder what, "diſtinct from them," do there; for I know no body that does not think that reaſon, or the faculty of reaſoning, is diſtinct from the ideas, it makes uſe of, or is employed about, whether thoſe ideas be clear and diſtinct, or obſcure and confuſed. But if that ſentence be to be read, as it is printed, viz. "The certainty of it is not placed upon any clear and diſtinct ideas, but upon the force of reaſon diſtinct from it;" I acknowledge your Lordſhip's meaning is above my comprehenſion. Upon the whole matter, my Lord, I muſt confeſs, that I do not ſee that what your Lordſhip ſays, you intended here to prove, is proved, viz. that certainty, in my proof of a God, is not placed on ideas. And next, if it were proved, I do not ſee how it anſwers any objection againſt the Trinity, in point of reaſon.

P. 250.

Before I go on to what follows, I muſt beg leave to confeſs, I am troubled to find theſe words of your Lordſhip, among thoſe I have above ſet down, out of the foregoing page, viz. allowing the argument to be good, and cannot forbear to wiſh, that when your Lordſhip was writing this paſſage, you had had in your mind what you are pleaſed here to ſay, viz. that you are far from weakening the force of my argument, which I uſed to prove an infinite, ſpiritual being.

My Lord, your Lordſhip is a great man, not only by the dignity your merits are inveſted with, but more by the merits of your parts and learning. Your Lordſhip's words carry great weight and authority with them: and he that ſhall quote but a ſaying, or a doubt, of your Lordſhip's, that queſtions the force of my argument, for the proof of a God, will think himſelf well founded and to be hearkened to, as gone a great way in the cauſe. Theſe words "allowing the argument to be good," in the received way of ſpeaking, are uſually taken to ſignify, that he that ſpeaks them, does not judge the argument to be good; but that, for diſcourſe-ſake, he at preſent admits it. Truly, my Lord, till I read theſe words in your Lordſhip, I always took it for a good argument; and was ſo fully perſuaded of its goodneſs, that I ſpoke higher of it, than of any reaſoning of mine, any where, becauſe I thought it equal to a demonſtration. If it be not ſo, it is fit I recal my words, and that I do not betray ſo important and fundamental a truth, by a weak, but over-valued argument: and, therefore, I cannot, upon this occaſion, but importune your Lordſhip, that, if your Lordſhip (as your words ſeems to intimate) ſees any weakneſs in it, your Lordſhip would be pleaſed to ſhew it me; that either I may amend that fault, and make it concluſive, or elſe retract my confidence, and leave that cauſe to thoſe, who have ſtrength ſuitable to its weight. But to return to what follows, in your Lordſhip's next paragraph.

P. 252.

2. "The next thing neceſſary to be cleared in this diſpute, is, the diſtinction between nature and perſon; and of this we can have no clear and diſtinct idea, from ſenſation, or reflection. And yet all our notions of the doctrine of the Trinity, depend upon the right underſtanding of it. For we muſt talk unintelligibly about this point unleſs we have clear and diſtinct apprehenſions, concerning nature and perſon, and the grounds of identity and diſtinction. But that theſe come not into our minds, by theſe ſimple ideas, of ſenſation and reflection, I ſhall now make it appear."

By this it is plain, that the buſineſs of the following pages is to make it appear, that "we have no clear and diſtinct idea of the diſtinction of nature and perſon, from ſenſation, or reflection:" or, as your Lordſhip expreſſes it, a little lower, "The apprehenſions concerning nature and perſon, and the grounds of identity and diſtinction, come not into our minds by the ſimple ideas, of ſenſation and reflection.

And what, pray my Lord, can be inferred from hence, if it ſhould be ſo? Your Lordſhip tells us,

"All our notions of the doctrine of the Trinity, depend upon the right un-" derſtanding of the diſtinction between nature and perſon; and we muſt talk " unintelligibly about this point, unleſs we have clear and diſtinct apprehenſions " concerning nature and perſon, and the grounds of identity and diſtinction."

If it be ſo, the inference I ſhould draw from thence (if it were fit for me to draw any) would be this, that it concerns thoſe, who write on that ſubject, to have themſelves, and to lay down to others, clear and diſtinct apprehenſions, or notions, or ideas (call them what you pleaſe) of what they mean, by nature and perſon, and of the grounds of identity and diſtinction.

This ſeems, to me, the natural concluſion flowing from your Lordſhip's words; which ſeem here to ſuppoſe clear and diſtinct apprehenſions (ſomething like clear and diſtinct ideas) neceſſary for the avoiding unintelligible talk, in the doctrine of the Trinity. But I do not ſee how your Lordſhip can, from the neceſſity of clear and diſtinct apprehenſions of nature and perſon, &c. in the diſpute of the Trinity, bring in one, who has perhaps miſtaken the way, to clear and diſtinct notions concerning nature and perſon, &c. as fit to be anſwered among thoſe, who bring objections againſt the Trinity, in point of reaſon. I do not ſee, why an Unitarian may not as well bring him in, and argue againſt his Eſſay, in a chapter, that he ſhould write, to anſwer objections againſt the unity of God, in point of reaſon, or revelation: for upon what ground ſoever any one writes in this diſpute, or any other, it is not tolerable to talk unintelligibly, on either ſide.

If by the way of ideas, which is that of the author of the Eſſay of Human Underſtanding, a man cannot come to clear and diſtinct apprehenſions, concerning nature and perſon; if, as he propoſes from the ſimple ideas of ſenſation and reflection, ſuch apprehenſions cannot be got; it will follow from thence, that he is a miſtaken philoſopher: but it will not follow from thence, that he is not an orthodox chriſtian; for he might (as he did) write his Eſſay of Human Underſtanding, without any thought of the controverſy between the Trinitarians and Unitarians: nay, a man might have writ all, that is in his book, that never heard one word of any ſuch diſpute.

There is in the world a great and fierce conteſt, about nature and grace: it would be very hard for me, if I muſt be brought in as a party, on either ſide, becauſe a diſputant, in that controverſy, ſhould think the clear and diſtinct apprehenſions of nature and grace, come not into our minds, by the ſimple ideas of ſenſation and reflection. If this be ſo, I may be reckoned among the objectors againſt all ſorts and points of orthodoxy, whenever any one pleaſes: I may be callled to account as one heterodox, in the points of "free-grace, free-will, predeſ-" tination, original ſin, juſtification by faith, tranſubſtantiation, the Pope's ſupre-" macy," and what not? as well as in the doctrine of the Trinity; and all, becauſe they cannot be furniſhed with clear and diſtinct notions of grace, free-will, tranſubſtantiation, &c. by ſenſation, or reflection. For, in all theſe, or any other points, I do not ſee, but there may be complaint made, that they have not always a right underſtanding and clear notions of thoſe things, on which the doctrine, they diſpute of, depends. And it is not altogether unuſual, for men to talk unintelligibly, to themſelves and others, in theſe and other points of controverſy, for want of clear and diſtinct apprehenſions, or (as I would call them, did not your Lordſhip diſlike it) ideas: for all which unintelligible talking, I do not think myſelf accountable, tho' it ſhould ſo fall out, that my way, by ideas, would not help them to, what it ſeems is wanting, clear and diſtinct notions. If my way be ineffectual to that purpoſe, they may, for all me, make uſe of any other more ſucceſsful, and leave me out of the controverſy, as one uſeleſs to either party, for deciding of the queſtion.

Supposing, as your Lordſhip ſays, and as you have undertaken to make appear, that "the clear and diſtinct apprehenſions concerning nature and perſon, " and the grounds of identity and diſtinction, ſhould not come into the mind " by the ſimple ideas of ſenſation and reflection;" what, I beſeech your Lordſhip,

ſhip, is this to the diſpute concerning the Trinity, on either ſide? And if, after your Lordſhip has endeavoured to give clear and diſtinct apprehenſions of nature and perſon, the diſputants in this controverſy ſhould ſtill talk unintelligibly, about this point, for want of clear and diſtinct apprehenſions, concerning nature and perſon; ought your Lordſhip to be brought in, among the partiſans on the other ſide, by any one, who writ a Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity? In good earneſt, my Lord, I do not ſee how the clear and diſtinct notions of nature and perſon, not coming into the mind, by the ſimple ideas of ſenſation and reflection, any more contains any objection againſt the doctrine of the Trinity, than the clear and diſtinct apprehenſions of original ſin, juſtification, or tranſubſtantiation, not coming to the mind, by the ſimple ideas of ſenſation and reflection, contains any objection againſt the doctrine of original ſin, juſtification, or tranſubſtantiation, and ſo of all the reſt of the terms, uſed in any controverſy in religion; however your Lordſhip, in a Treatiſe of the Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity, and in the chapter, where you make it your buſineſs to anſwer objections in point of reaſon, ſet yourſelf ſeriouſly to prove, that "clear and diſtinct apprehenſions, "concerning nature and perſon, and the grounds of identity and diſtinction, "come not into our minds by theſe ſimple ideas, of ſenſation and reflection." In order to the making this appear, we read as followeth:

"As to nature, that is ſometimes taken for the eſſential property of a thing: P. 252.
"as, when we ſay, that ſuch a thing is of a different nature from another; we "mean no more, than that it is differenced by ſuch properties, as come to our "knowledge. Sometimes, nature is taken for the thing itſelf, in which theſe pro-"perties are; and ſo Ariſtotle took nature for a corporeal ſubſtance, which had "the principles of motion in itſelf: but nature and ſubſtance are of an equal ex-"tent; and ſo that, which is the ſubject of powers and properties, is the nature, "whether it be meant of bodily, or ſpiritual ſubſtances."

Your Lordſhip, in this paragraph, gives us two ſignifications of the word nature; 1. That it is ſometimes taken for eſſential properties, which I eaſily admit. 2. That ſometimes it is taken for the thing itſelf, in which theſe properties are, and conſequently for ſubſtance itſelf. And this your Lordſhip proves out of Ariſtotle.

Whether Ariſtotle called the thing itſelf, wherein the eſſential properties are, nature, I will not diſpute; but that your Lordſhip thinks fit to call ſubſtance, nature, is evident. And from thence I think your Lordſhip endeavours to prove, in the following words, that we can have from ideas no clear and diſtinct apprehenſions concerning nature. Your Lordſhip's words are:

"I grant, that by ſenſation and reflection we come to know the powers P. 253.
"and properties of things; but our reaſon is ſatisfied that there muſt be ſome-"thing beyond theſe, becauſe it is impoſſible, that they ſhould ſubſiſt by them-"ſelves. So that the nature of things properly belongs to our reaſon, and not "to mere ideas."

How we come by the idea of ſubſtance, from the ſimple ones of ſenſation and reflection, I have endeavoured to ſhew, in another place, and therefore ſhall not trouble your Lordſhip with it here again. But what your Lordſhip infers, in theſe words, "So that the nature of things properly belongs to our reaſon, and "not to mere ideas;" I do not well underſtand. Your Lordſhip, indeed, here again, ſeems to oppoſe reaſon and ideas; and to that I ſay, mere ideas are the objects of the underſtanding, and reaſon is one of the faculties of the underſtanding employed about them; and that the underſtanding, or reaſon, which ever your Lordſhip pleaſes to call it, makes, or forms, out of the ſimple ones, that come in by ſenſation and reflection, all the other ideas, whether general, relative, or complex, by abſtracting, comparing, and compounding its poſitive, ſimple ideas, whereof it cannot make, or frame any one, but what it receives by ſenſation, or reflection. And therefore, I never denied that reaſon was employed about our particular, ſimple ideas, to make out of them ideas general, relative, and complex; nor about all our ideas, whether ſimple or complex, poſitive or relative, general or particular: it being the proper buſineſs of reaſon, in the ſearch after truth and knowledge, to find out the relations between all theſe ſorts of ideas, in the perception whereof knowledge and certainty of truth conſiſts.

These, my Lord, are in ſhort, my notions about ideas, their original and formation, and of the uſe the mind, or reaſon, makes of them in knowledge. Whether your Lordſhip thinks fit to call this a new way of reaſoning, muſt be left to your Lordſhip; whether it be a right way, is that alone, which I am concerned for. But your Lordſhip ſeems all along (I crave leave here once for all to take notice of it) to have ſome particular exception againſt ideas, and particularly clear and diſtinct ideas, as if they were not to be uſed, or were of no uſe in reaſon and knowledge; or, as if reaſon were oppoſed to them, or leads us into the knowledge and certainty of things without them; or, the knowledge of things did not at all depend on them. I beg your Lordſhip's pardon for expreſſing myſelf ſo variouſly and doubtfully in this matter; the reaſon whereof is, becauſe I muſt own, that I do not every where clearly underſtand what your Lordſhip means, when you ſpeak, as you do, of ideas; as if I aſcribed more to them, than belonged to them; or expected more of them, than they could do; v. g. where your Lordſhip ſays,

P. 241. "But is all this contained in the ſimple idea of theſe operations?" And again,
P. 248. "ſo that here it is not the clearneſs of the idea, but an immediate act of perception, which is the true ground of certainty." And farther, "ſo that our certainty is not from the ideas themſelves, but from the evidence of reaſon." And
P. 250. in another place, "it is not the idea that makes us certain, but the argument from that which we perceive in, and about ourſelves. Is it from the clear and diſtinct idea of it? No! but from this argument." And here, p. 253, "the nature of things belongs to our reaſon, and not to mere ideas."

P. 243. These, and ſeveral of the like paſſages, your Lordſhip has, againſt what your Lordſhip calls this new way of ideas, and an admirable way to bring us to the certainty of reaſon.

I never ſaid, nor thought ideas, nor any thing elſe, could bring us to the certainty of reaſon, without the exerciſe of reaſon. And then, my Lord, if we will employ our minds, and exerciſe our reaſon, to bring us to certainty; what,
B. i. c. i. § 8. I beſeech you, ſhall they be employed about, but ideas? For ideas, in my ſenſe of the word, are, whatſoever is the object of the underſtanding, when a man "thinks; or, whatſoever it is the mind can be imployed about, in thinking."
B. ii. c. 8. § 8. And again, I have theſe words, "whatſoever is the immediate object of perception, thought, or underſtanding, that I call idea." So that my way of ideas, and of coming to certainty by them, is to imploy our minds in thinking upon ſomething; and I do not ſee, but your Lordſhip yourſelf, and every body elſe, muſt make uſe of my way of ideas, unleſs they can find out a way, that will bring them to certainty, by thinking on nothing. So that let certainty be placed, as much as it will, on reaſon, let the nature of things belong as properly as it will, to our reaſon, it will neverthleſs be true, that certainty conſiſts in the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of ideas; and that the complex idea the word, nature, ſtands for, is ultimately made up of the ſimple ideas of ſenſation and reflection. Your Lordſhip proceeds,

P. 253. "But we muſt yet proceed farther: for nature may be conſidered two ways: "1. As it is in diſtinct individuals; as the nature of a man is equally in Peter, James and John; and this is the common nature, with a particular ſubſiſtence, proper to each of them. For the nature of man, as in Peter, is diſtinct from the ſame nature, as it is in James and John; otherwiſe, they would be but one perſon, as well as have the ſame nature. And this diſtinction, of perſons in them, is diſcerned, both by our ſenſes, as to their different accidents; and by our reaſon, becauſe they have a ſeparate exiſtence; not coming into it at once, and in the ſame manner."

P. 253. "Nature may be conſidered abſtractly, without reſpect to individual perſons; and then it makes an intire notion of itſelf. For however the ſame nature may be in different individuals, yet the nature in itſelf remains one and the ſame; which appears from this evident reaſon, that otherwiſe every individual muſt make a different kind."

I AM ſo little confident of my own quickneſs, and of having got, from what your Lordſhip has ſaid here, a clear and diſtinct apprehenſion concerning nature, that I muſt beg your Lordſhip's pardon, if I ſhould happen to diſſatisfy your Lordſhip, by talking unintelligibly, or beſides the purpoſe, about it. I muſt then confeſs to your Lordſhip, 1. That I do not clearly underſtand, whether your Lordſhip, in theſe two paragraphs, ſpeaks of nature, as ſtanding for eſſential properties; or of nature, as ſtanding for ſubſtance; and yet it is of great moment in the caſe, becauſe your Lordſhip allows, that the notion of nature, in the former of theſe ſenſes, may be had from ſenſation and reflection; but of nature, in the latter ſenſe, your Lordſhip ſays, "it properly belongs to reaſon, and not "mere ideas." P. 253. 2. Your Lordſhip's ſaying, in the firſt of theſe paragraphs, "that "the nature of man, as in Peter, is diſtinct from the ſame nature, as it is in "James and John;" and in the ſecond of them, "that however the ſame "nature may be in different individuals, yet the nature itſelf remains one and "the ſame;" does not give me ſo clear and diſtinct an apprehenſion concerning nature, that I know which, in your Lordſhip's opinion, I ought to think, either that one and the ſame nature is in Peter and John; or that a nature, diſtinct from that in John, is in Peter: and the reaſon is, becauſe I cannot, in my way by ideas, well put together one and the ſame, and diſtinct. P. 254. My apprehenſion, concerning the nature of man, or the common nature of man (if your Lordſhip will, upon this occaſion, give me leave to trouble your Lordſhip with it) is, in ſhort, this; that it is a collection of ſeveral ideas, combined into one complex, abſtract idea, which when they are found united in any individual exiſting, tho' joined in that exiſtence, with ſeveral other ideas, that individual, or particular being, is truly ſaid to have the nature of a man, or the nature of a man to be in him; for as much as all theſe ſimple ideas are found united in him, which anſwer the complex, abſtract idea, to which the ſpecifick name man is given, by any one; which abſtract, ſpecifick idea, he keeps the ſame, when he applies the ſpecifick name ſtanding for it, to diſtinct individuals; i. e. no body changes his idea of a man, when he ſays Peter is a man, from that idea, which he makes the name man to ſtand for, when he calls John a man. This ſhort way by ideas, has not, I confeſs, thoſe different, and more learned and ſcholaſtick conſiderations, ſet down by your Lordſhip. But how they are neceſſary, or at all tend to prove, what your Lordſhip has propoſed to prove, viz. that we have no clear and diſtinct idea of nature, from the ſimple ideas, got from ſenſation and reflection, I confeſs I do not yet ſee. But your Lordſhip goes on to it:

"LET us now ſee, how far theſe things can come from our ſimple ideas, by "reflection and ſenſation. And I ſhall lay down the hypotheſis of thoſe, who "reſolve our certainty into ideas as plainly and intelligibly as I can." P. 254.

HERE I am got again into the plural number: for tho' it be ſaid the hypotheſis of thoſe, yet my words alone are quoted for that hypotheſis, and not a word of any elſe, in this whole buſineſs concerning nature. What they are, I ſhall give the reader, as your Lordſhip has ſet them down.

1. WE are told, "that all ſimple ideas are true and adequate. Not, that "they are the true repreſentations of things without us; but that they are the "true effects of ſuch powers in them, as produce ſuch ſenſation within us. So "that really we can underſtand nothing certainly by them, but the effects they "have upon us." Human Underſtanding, b. ii. chap. 30, 31.

FOR theſe words of mine, I find Human Underſtanding, B. ii. ch. 30, 31. quoted; but I crave leave to obſerve to your Lordſhip, that in neither of theſe chapters do I find the words, as they ſtand here, in your Lordſhip's book. B. ii. chap. 31. § 2. of my Eſſay, I find theſe words, "that all our ſimple ideas are "adequate, becauſe being nothing but the effects of certain powers in things "fitted, or ordained, by God, to produce ſuch ſenſations in us, they cannot "but be correſpondent and adequate to thoſe powers." And in chap. 30. § 2. I ſay, that "our ſimple ideas are all real, all agree to the reality of things. Not "that they are all of them the images, or repreſentations, of what does exiſt; "the contrary whereof, in all but the primary qualities of bodies, hath been "already ſhewed."

THESE are the words in my book, from whence thoſe in your Lordſhip's ſeem to be gathered, but with ſome difference; for I do not remember that I have any where ſaid, of all our ſimple ideas, that they are none of them true repreſentations of things without us; as the words I find in your Lordſhip's book, ſeem to make me ſay. The contrary whereof, appears from the words, which I have ſet down, out of chap. 30. where I deny only the ſimple ideas of ſecondary qualities, to be repreſentations; but do every where affirm, that the ſimple ideas of primary qualities, are the images, or repreſentations, of what does exiſt without us. So that my words, in the chapters quoted by your Lordſhip, not ſaying that all our ſimple ideas are only effects, and none of them repreſentations, P. 245. your Lordſhip, I humbly conceive, cannot, upon that account, infer from my words, as you do here, viz. "ſo that really we can underſtand nothing certainly "by them."

P. 245. THE remaining words of this ſentence, I muſt beg your Lordſhip's pardon, if I profeſs I do not underſtand; they are theſe; "but the effects they have upon "us." They here, and them in the preceding words, to which they are joined, ſignify ſimple ideas; for it is of thoſe your Lordſhip infers, "ſo that really we "can underſtand nothing certainly by them, but the effects they have upon us." And then your Lordſhip's words import thus much, "ſo that really we can un"derſtand nothing certainly by ſimple ideas, but the effects ſimple ideas have "upon us;" which I cannot underſtand to be, what your Lordſhip intended to infer, from the preceding words, taken to be mine. For, I ſuppoſe your Lordſhip argues, from my opinion, concerning the ſimple ideas of ſecondary qualities, the little real knowledge we ſhould receive from them, if it be true, that they are not repreſentations, or images, of any thing in bodies, but only effects of certain powers in bodies to produce them in us: and, in that ſenſe, I take the liberty to read your Lordſhip's words thus; ſo that we can really underſtand nothing certainly by [theſe ideas] but the effects [thoſe powers] have upon us. To which I anſwer,

1. THAT we as certainly know and diſtinguiſh things by ideas, ſuppoſing them nothing but effects, produced in us by theſe powers, as if they were repreſentations. I can as certainly, when I have occaſion for either, diſtinguiſh gold from ſilver, by the colour, or wine from water, by the taſte; if the colour of the one, or the taſte of the other, be only an effect of their powers on me, as if that colour and that taſte were repreſentations and reſemblances of ſomething in thoſe bodies.

2. I ANSWER; that we have certainly as much pleaſure and delight by thoſe ideas, one way as the other. The ſmell of a violet, or taſte of a peach, gives me as real and certain delight, if it be only an effect, as if it were the true reſemblance of ſomething in that flower and fruit. And I a little the more wonder, to hear your Lordſhip complain ſo much of want of certainty in this caſe, when I read theſe words of your Lordſhip in another place:

P. 256. "THAT from the powers and properties of things, which are knowable by us, "we may know as much of the internal eſſence of things, as thoſe powers "and properties diſcover. I do not ſay, that we can know all eſſences of things "alike; nor that we can attain to a perfect underſtanding of all that belong to "them: but if we can know ſo much, as that there are certain beings in the "world, endued with ſuch diſtinct powers and properties; what is it we com"plain of the want of, in order to our certainty of things? But we do not ſee "the bare eſſence of things. What is that bare eſſence, without the powers and "properties belonging to it? It is that internal conſtitution of things, from "whence thoſe powers and properties flow. Suppoſe we be ignorant of this (as "we are like to be, for any diſcoveries that have been yet made) that is a good "argument, to prove the uncertainty of philoſophical ſpeculations, about the "real eſſence of things; but it is no prejudice to us, who enquire after the cer"tainty of ſuch eſſences. For although we cannot comprehend the internal "frame, or conſtitution of things, nor in what manner they do flow from the "ſubſtance; yet by them we certainly know, that there are ſuch eſſences, and "that they are diſtinguiſhed from each other, by their powers and properties."

Give me leave, if your Lordſhip pleaſe, to argue after the ſame manner in the preſent caſe: "that from theſe ſimple ideas, which are knowable by us, we "know as much of the powers and internal conſtitutions of things, as theſe "powers diſcover; and, if we can know ſo much, as that there are ſuch powers, "and that there are certain beings in the world, endued with ſuch powers and "properties," that by theſe ſimple ideas, that are but the effects of theſe powers, we can as certainly diſtinguiſh the beings, wherein thoſe powers are, and receive as certain advantage from them, as if thoſe ſimple ideas were reſemblances: "what is it we complain of the want of, in order to our certainty of things? "But we do not ſee that internal conſtitution, from whence thoſe powers flow. "Suppoſe we be ignorant of this (as we are like to be for any diſcoveries that "have been yet made) that is a good argument, to ſhew how ſhort our philo-"ſophical ſpeculations are about the real, internal conſtitutions of things; but "is no prejudice to us, who, by thoſe ſimple ideas, ſearch out, find and diſtin-"guiſh things for our uſes. For tho', by thoſe ideas, which are not reſem-"blances, we cannot comprehend the internal frame, or conſtitution of things, "nor, in what manner, theſe ideas are produced in us by thoſe powers; yet, "by them we certainly know, that there are ſuch eſſences, or conſtitutions, "of theſe ſubſtances, that have thoſe powers, whereby they regularly produce "thoſe ideas in us; and that they are diſtinguiſhed from each other by thoſe "powers."

The next words your Lordſhip ſets down, as out of my book, are:

"2. All our ideas of ſubſtances are imperfect and inadequate, becauſe they "refer to the real eſſences of things, of which we are ignorant, and no man knows "what ſubſtance is in itſelf: and they are all falſe, when looked on, as the "repreſentations of the unknown eſſences of things." P. 254.

In theſe too, my Lord, you muſt give me leave to take notice, that there is a little variation from my words: for I do not ſay, "that all our ideas of ſub-"ſtances are imperfect and inadequate, becauſe they refer to the real eſſences of "things; for ſome people may not refer them to real eſſences." But I do ſay, "that all ideas of ſubſtances, which are referred to real eſſences, are in that re-"ſpect inadequate:" as may be ſeen more at large in that chapter. B. ii. c. 21. P. 254.

Your Lordſhip's next quotation has in it ſomething of a like ſlip. The words, which your Lordſhip ſets down, are,

"3. Abstract ideas are only general names, made by ſeparating circum-"ſtances of time, and place, &c. from them, which are only the inventions "and creatures of the underſtanding."

For theſe, your Lordſhip quotes chap. 3. § 6. of my third Book; where my words are, "the next thing to be conſidered, is how general words come to be "made. For ſince all things, that exiſt, are only particulars, how come we "by general terms? or where find we thoſe general natures, they are ſuppoſed "to ſtand for? Words become general, by being made ſigns of general ideas; "and ideas become general, by ſeparating from them the circumſtances of time "or place, and any other ideas, that may determine them to this, or that par-"ticular exiſtence. By this way of abſtraction, they are made capable of re-"preſenting more individuals than one; each of which, having in it a confor-"mity to that abſtract idea, is (as we call it) of that ſort." By which words it appears, that I am far enough from ſaying, "that abſtract ideas are only general "names." Your Lordſhip's next quotation out of my book, is, P. 255.

"4. Essence may be taken two ways. 1. For the real, internal unknown "conſtitutions of things; and in this ſenſe it is underſtood as to particular things. "2. For the abſtract idea; and one is ſaid to be the nominal, the other the "real eſſence. And the nominal eſſences only are immutable, and are helps to "enable them to conſider things, and to diſcourſe of them."

Here too, I think, there are ſome words left out, which are neceſſary to make my meaning clearly underſtood; which your Lordſhip will find, if you think fit to give yourſelf the trouble, to caſt your eye again on that chapter, which you here quote. But not diſcerning clearly, what uſe your Lordſhip makes of them, as they are either in your Lordſhip's quotation, or in my book, I ſhall not trouble your Lordſhip about them. Your Lordſhip goes on:

"But

P. 255. "BUT two things are granted, which tend to clear this matter.

"1. THAT there is a real eſſence, which is the foundation of powers and properties.

"2. THAT we may know theſe powers and properties, altho' we are ignorant of the real eſſence."

IF, by that indefinite expreſſion, "we may know theſe powers and properties," your Lordſhip means, "that we may know ſome of the powers and properties that depend on the real eſſences of ſubſtances;" I grant it to be my meaning. If your Lordſhip, in theſe words, comprehends all their powers and properties, that goes beyond my meaning. From theſe two things, which I grant, your Lordſhip ſays, you infer,

P. 255. "1. THAT from thoſe true and adequate ideas, which we have of the modes and properties of things, we have ſufficient certainty of the real eſſence of them: for theſe ideas are allowed to be true; and either by them, we may judge of the truth of things, or we can make no judgment at all of any thing without ourſelves.

"IF our ideas be only the effects we ſee, of the powers without us; yet our reaſon muſt be ſatisfied, that there could be no ſuch powers, unleſs there were ſome real beings, which had them. So that either we may be certain, by theſe effects, of the real being of things; or it is not poſſible, as we are framed, to have any certainty at all, of any thing without ourſelves."

ALL this, if I miſtake not your Lordſhip, is only to prove, that by the ideas of properties and powers, which we obſerve in things, our reaſon muſt be ſatisfied that there are without us real beings, with real eſſences: which being that, which I readily own, and have ſaid in my book, I cannot but acknowledge myſelf obliged to your Lordſhip, for being at the pains, to collect places out of my book, to prove what I hold in it; and the more becauſe your Lordſhip does it by ways and ſteps, which poſſibly I ſhould never have thought of. Your Lordſhip's next inference is,

P. 256. "2. THAT from the powers and properties of things, which are knowable by us, we may know as much of the internal eſſence of things, as thoſe powers and properties diſcover. I do not ſay, that we can know all eſſences of things alike; nor that we can attain to a perfect underſtanding of all that belong to them: but if we can know ſo much, as that there are certain beings in the world, endued with ſuch diſtinct powers and properties; what is it we complain of the want of, in order to our certainty of things? But we do not ſee the bare eſſence of things. What is that bare eſſence without the powers and properties belonging to it? It is that internal conſtitution of things, from whence thoſe powers and properties flow. Suppoſe we be ignorant of this (as we are like to be, for any diſcoveries that have been yet made) that is a good argument to prove the uncertainty of philoſophical ſpeculations, about the real eſſences of things: but it is no prejudice to us, who inquire after the certainty of ſuch eſſences. For altho' we cannot comprehend the internal frame, or conſtitution of things, nor in what manner they do flow from the ſubſtance; yet, by them, we certainly know that there are ſuch eſſences, and that they are diſtinguiſhed from each other, by their powers and properties."

THIS ſecond inference ſeems to be nothing but a reproof to thoſe who complain, "that they do not ſee the bare eſſences of things." Complaining that God did not make us, otherwiſe than he has, and with larger capacities, than he has thought fit to give us, is, I confeſs, a fault worthy of your Lordſhip's reproof. But to ſay, that if we knew the real eſſences, or internal conſtitutions of thoſe beings, ſome of whoſe properties we know, we ſhould have much more certain knowledge concerning thoſe things, and their properties, I am ſure is true, and I think no faulty complaining; and if it be, I muſt own myſelf to your Lordſhip to be one of thoſe complainers.

BUT your Lordſhip aſks, "what is it we complain of the want of, in order to our certainty of things?"

IF your Lordſhip means, as your words ſeem to import, "what is it we complain of, in order to our certainty," that thoſe properties are the properties of ſome beings, or that ſomething does exiſt, when thoſe properties exiſt? I anſwer, we complain of the want of nothing, in order to that certainty, or ſuch a certainty as that is. But there are other very deſirable certainties, or other parts of knowledge concerning the ſame things, which we may want, when we have thoſe certainties. Knowing the colour, figure and ſmell of hyſop, "I can when "I ſee hyſop, know ſo much, as that there is a certain being in the world, en-"dued with ſuch diſtinct powers and properties;" and yet I may juſtly complain, that I want ſomething in order to certainty, that hyſop will cure a bruiſe, or cough, or that it will kill moths: or uſed in a certain way, harden iron; or an hundred other uſeful properties that may be in it, which I ſhall never know; and yet might be certain of, if I knew the real eſſences, or internal conſtitution of things, on which all their properties depend.

Your Lordſhip agreeing with me, "that the real eſſence is that internal con-"ſtitution of things, from whence their powers and properties flow; adds far-"ther, ſuppoſe we be ignorant of this [eſſence,] as we are like to be for any "diſcoveries have been yet made, that is a good argument to prove the uncer-"tainty of philoſophical ſpeculations, about the real eſſences of things; but it "is no prejudice to us, who enquire after the certainty of ſuch eſſences.

I know no body that ever denied the certainty of ſuch real eſſences, or internal conſtitutions, in things that do exiſt, if it be that your Lordſhip means by certainty of ſuch eſſences. If it be any other certainty, that your Lordſhip enquires after, relating to ſuch eſſences, I confeſs I know not what it is, ſince your Lordſhip acknowledges, "we are ignorant of thoſe real eſſences, thoſe in-"ternal conſtitutions, and are like to be ſo; and ſeem to think it the uncurable "cauſe of uncertainty in philoſophical ſpeculations."

Your Lordſhip adds, "for altho' we cannot comprehend the internal frame and "conſtitution of things, nor in what manner they do flow from the ſubſtance."

Here I muſt acknowledge to your Lordſhip, that my notion of theſe eſſences differs a little from your Lordſhip's; for I do not take them to flow from the ſubſtance in any created being, but to be, in every thing, that internal conſtitution, or frame, or modification of the ſubſtance, which God in his wiſdom and good pleaſure thinks fit to give to every particular creature, when he gives it a being: and ſuch eſſences I grant there are in all things that exiſt. Your Lordſhip's third inference begins thus:

"3. The eſſences of things, as they are knowable by us, have a reality in "them: for they are founded on the natural conſtitution of things." P. 257.

I think the real eſſences of things are not ſo much founded on, as that they are the very real conſtitution of things, and therefore I eaſily grant there is reality in them; and it was from that reality, that I called them real eſſences. But yet, from hence, I cannot agree to what follows.

"And however the abſtracted ideas are the work of the mind, yet they are "not mere creatures of the mind; as appears by an inſtance produced of the "eſſence of the ſun, being in one, ſingle individual; in which caſe it is granted, "that the idea may be ſo abſtracted that more ſuns might agree in it, and it is "as much a ſort, as if there were as many ſuns as there are ſtars. So that here "we have a real eſſence, ſubſiſting in one individual, but capable of being mul-"tiplied into more, and the ſame eſſence remaining. But in this one ſun, there "is a real eſſence, and not a mere nominal, or abſtracted eſſence: but, ſuppoſe "there were more ſuns; would not each of them have the real eſſence of the "ſun? For what is it makes the ſecond ſun, but having the ſame real eſſence "with the firſt? If it were but a nominal eſſence, then the ſecond would have "nothing but the name." P. 257.

This, my Lord, as I underſtand it, is to prove, that the abſtract, general eſſence of any ſort of things, or things of the ſame denomination, v. g. of man, or marigold, hath a real being, out of the underſtanding; which I confeſs, my Lord, I am not able to conceive. Your Lordſhip's proof here, brought out of my Eſſay, concerning the ſun, I humbly conceive will not reach it: becauſe what is ſaid there, does not at all concern the real, but nominal eſſence; as is evident from hence, that the idea, I ſpeak of there, is a complex idea:

but we have no complex idea of the internal conſtitution, or real eſſence, of the ſun. Beſides, I ſay expreſly, that our diſtinguiſhing ſubſtances into ſpecies by names, is not at all founded on their real eſſences. So that, the ſun being one of theſe ſubſtances, I cannot, in the place quoted by your Lordſhip, be ſuppoſed to mean, by eſſence of the ſun, the real eſſence of the ſun, unleſs I had ſo expreſſed it. But all this argument will be at an end, when your Lordſhip ſhall have explained what you mean by theſe words, " true ſun." In my ſenſe of them, any thing will be a true ſun, to which the name ſun may be truly and properly applied; and to that ſubſtance, or thing, the name ſun, may be truly and properly applied, which has united in it that combination of ſenſible qualities, by which any thing elſe, that is called ſun, is diſtinguiſhed from other ſubſtances, i. e. by the nominal eſſence: and thus our ſun is denominated and diſtinguiſhed from a fixed ſtar; not by a real eſſence, that we do not know (for if we did, it is poſſible we ſhould find the real eſſence, or conſtitution, of one of the fixed ſtars, to be the ſame with that of our ſun) but by a complex idea of ſenſible qualities co-exiſting; which wherever they are found, make a true ſun. And thus I crave leave to anſwer your Lordſhip's queſtion, " for what is it makes " the ſecond ſun to be a true ſun, but having the ſame real eſſence with the firſt? " If it were but a nominal eſſence, then the ſecond would have nothing but the " name?"

I HUMBLY conceive, if it had the nominal eſſence, it would have ſomething beſides the name, viz. that nominal eſſence, which is ſufficient to denominate it truly a ſun, or to make it be a true ſun, tho' we know nothing of that real eſſence, whereon that nominal one depends. Your Lordſhip will then argue, that that real eſſence is in the ſecond ſun, and makes the ſecond ſun. I grant it, when the ſecond ſun comes to exiſt, ſo as to be perceived by us, to have all the ideas contained in our complex idea, i. e. in our nominal eſſence of a ſun. For ſhould it be true (as is now believed by aſtronomers) that the real eſſence of the ſun were in any of the fixed ſtars; yet ſuch a ſtar could not, for that, be by us called a ſun, whilſt it anſwers not our complex idea, or nominal eſſence, of a ſun. But how far that will prove, that the eſſences of things, as they are knowable by us, have a reality in them, diſtinct from that of abſtract ideas in the mind, which are merely creatures of the mind, I do not ſee; and we ſhall farther enquire, in conſidering your Lordſhip's following words:

P. 258. " THEREFORE there muſt be a real eſſence in every individual of the ſame " kind." Yes, and I beg leave of your Lordſhip to ſay, of a different kind too. For that alone is it, which makes it to be what it is.

THAT every individual ſubſtance has a real, internal, individual conſtitution, i. e. a real eſſence, that makes it to be what it is, I readily grant. Upon this your Lordſhip ſays,

P. 258. " PETER, James and John are all true and real men." Anſw. Without doubt, ſuppoſing them to be men, they are true and real men, i. e. ſuppoſing the name of that ſpecies belongs to them. And ſo three bobaques are all true and real bobaques, ſuppoſing the name of that ſpecies of animals belongs to them.

FOR I beſeech your Lordſhip to conſider, whether, in your way of arguing, by naming them Peter, James and John, names familiar to us, as appropriated to individuals of the ſpecies, man, your Lordſhip does not firſt ſuppoſe them men; and then very ſafely aſk, whether they be not all true and real men? But if I ſhould aſk your Lordſhip, whether Weweena, Chuckery and Couſheda, were true and real men or no; your Lordſhip would not be able to tell me, until, I having pointed out to your Lordſhip the individuals, called by thoſe names; your Lordſhip by examining whether they had in them thoſe ſenſible qualities, which your Lordſhip has combined into that complex idea, to which you give the ſpecifick name, man, determined them all, or ſome of them, to be of the ſpecies, which you call man, and ſo to be true and real men: which when your Lordſhip has determined, it is plain you did it by that, which is only the nominal eſſence, as not knowing the real one. But your Lordſhip farther aſks,

P. 258. " WHAT is it makes Peter, James and John, real men? Is it the attributing the " general name to them? No certainly; but that the true and real eſſence of a " man is in every one of them."

If, when your Lordſhip aſks, what makes them men? your Lordſhip uſed the word, making, in the proper ſenſe, for the efficient cauſe, and in that ſenſe it were true, that the eſſence of a man, i. e. the ſpecifick eſſence of that ſpecies made a man; it would undoubtedly follow, that this ſpecifick eſſence had a reality, beyond that of being only a general abſtract idea in the mind. But when it is ſaid, "that it is the true and real eſſence of a man, in every one of them, that makes "Peter, James and John, true and real men;" the true and real meaning of theſe words is no more, but that the eſſence of that ſpecies, i. e. the properties, anſwering the complex, abſtract idea, to which the ſpecific name is given, being found in them, that makes them be properly and truly called men, or is the reaſon, why they are called men. Your Lordſhip adds,

"And we muſt be as certain of this, as we are, that they are men." P. 258.

How, I beſeech your Lordſhip, are we certain, that they are men, but only by our ſenſes, finding thoſe properties in them, which anſwer the abſtract complex idea, which is in our minds, of the ſpecifick idea, to which we have annexed the ſpecific name man? This I take to be the true meaning of what your Lordſhip ſays, in the next words, viz. "they take their denomination of being "men, from that common nature, or eſſence, which is in them;" and I am apt to think, theſe words will not hold true, in any other ſenſe. P. 258.

Your Lordſhip's fourth inference begins thus:

"That the general idea is not made from the ſimple ideas, by the mere act "of the mind, abſtracting from circumſtances, but from reaſon and conſidera"tion of the nature of things." P. 258.

I thought, my Lord, that reaſon and conſideration had been acts of the mind, mere acts of the mind, when any thing was done by them. Your Lordſhip gives a reaſon for it, viz.

"For, when we ſee ſeveral individuals, that have the ſame powers and pro"perties, we thence infer, that there muſt be ſomething common to all, which "makes them of one kind." P. 258.

I grant the inference to be true; but muſt beg leave to deny that this proves, that the general idea, the name is annexed to, is not made by the mind. I have ſaid, and it agrees with what your Lordſhip here ſays, that the mind, "in mak"ing its complex ideas of ſubſtances, only follows nature, and puts no ideas to"gether, which are not ſuppoſed to have an union in nature: no body joins the "voice of a ſheep, with the ſhape of an horſe; nor the colour of lead, with the "weight and fixedneſs of gold, to be the complex ideas of any real ſubſtances; "unleſs he has a mind to fill his head with chimera's, and his diſcourſe with "unintelligible words. Men obſerving certain qualities always joined and exiſt"ing together, therein copied nature, and, of ideas ſo united, made their com"plex ones of ſubſtances, &c." Which is very little different from what your Lordſhip here ſays, that it is from our obſervation of individuals, that we come to infer, "that there is ſomething common to them all." But I do not ſee how it will thence follow, that the general, or ſpecifick, idea is not made, by the mere act of the mind. No, ſays your Lordſhip, B. iii. c. 6, § 28, 29.

"There is ſomething common to them all, which makes them of one kind; "and if the difference of kinds be real, that which makes them all of one kind, "muſt not be a nominal, but real eſſence." P. 259.

This may be ſome objection to the name of nominal eſſence; but is, as I humbly conceive, none to the thing deſigned by it. There is an internal conſtitution of things, on which their properties depend. This your Lordſhip and I are agreed of, and this we call the real eſſence. There are alſo certain complex ideas, or combinations of theſe properties, in men's minds, to which they commonly annex ſpecifick names, or names of ſorts, or kinds, of things. This, I believe, your Lordſhip does not deny. Theſe complex ideas, for want of a better name, I have called nominal eſſences; how properly, I will not diſpute. But if any one will help me to a better name for them, I am ready to receive it; till then I muſt, to expreſs myſelf, uſe this. Now, my Lord, body, life, and the power of reaſoning, being not the real eſſence of a man, as I believe your Lordſhip will agree; will your Lordſhip ſay, that they are not enough to make the thing, wherein they are found, of the kind called man, and not of the kind called baboon, becauſe the difference of theſe kinds is real? If this be not real enough to make the thing of one kind and not of another, I do not ſee how animal rationale can be enough really to diſtinguiſh a man from an horſe: for that is but the nominal, not real eſſence of that kind, deſigned by the name man. And yet, I ſuppoſe, every one thinks it real enough, to make a real difference between that and other kinds. And if nothing will ſerve the turn, to make things of one kind and not of another (which, as I have ſhewed, ſignifies no more but ranking of them under different, ſpecifick names) but their real unknown conſtitutions, which are the real eſſences, we are ſpeaking of, I fear it would be a long while, before we ſhould have really different kinds of ſubſtances, or diſtinct names for them; unleſs we could diſtinguiſh them, by theſe differences, of which we have no diſtinct conceptions. For I think it would not be readily anſwered me, if I ſhould demand, wherein lies the real difference, in the internal conſtitution, of a ſtag, from that of a buck, which are each of them very well known to be of one kind, and not of the other; and no body queſtions but that the kinds, whereof each of them is, are really different. Your Lordſhip farther ſays,

P. 259. "AND this difference doth not depend upon the complex ideas of ſubſtances, "whereby men arbitrarily join modes together in their minds."

I CONFESS, my Lord, I know not what to ſay to this, becauſe I do not know what theſe complex ideas of ſubſtances are, whereby men arbitrarily join modes together in their minds. But I am apt to think there is a miſtake in the matter, by the words that follow, which are theſe:

P. 259. "FOR, let them miſtake in their complication of ideas, either in leaving out, "or putting in, what doth not belong to them; and let their ideas be what they "pleaſe, the real eſſence of a man, and a horſe, and a tree, are juſt what they "were."

THE miſtake I ſpoke of, I humbly ſuppoſe, is this, that things are here taken to be diſtinguiſhed by their real eſſences; when, by the very way of ſpeaking of them, it is clear, that they are already diſtinguiſhed by their nominal eſſences, and are ſo taken to be. For what, I beſeech your Lordſhip, does your Lordſhip mean, when you ſay, "the real eſſence of a man, and an horſe, and a tree," but that there are ſuch kinds, already ſet out, by the ſignification of theſe names, man, horſe, tree? And what, I beſeech your Lordſhip, is the ſignification of each of theſe ſpecifick names, but the complex idea it ſtands for? And that complex idea is the nominal eſſence, and nothing elſe. So that taking man, as your Lordſhip does here, to ſtand for a kind, or ſort of individuals, all which agree in that common, complex idea, which that ſpecifick name ſtands for; it is certain that the real eſſence of all the individuals, comprehended under the ſpecifick name, man, in your uſe of it, would be juſt the ſame, let others leave out, or put into their complex idea, of man, what they pleaſe; becauſe the real eſſence, on which that unaltered complex idea, i. e. thoſe properties depend, muſt neceſſarily be concluded to be the ſame.

FOR I take it for granted, that in uſing the name, man, in this place, your Lordſhip uſes it for that complex idea, which is in your Lordſhip's mind, of that ſpecies. So that your Lordſhip, by putting it for, or ſubſtituting it in the place of that complex idea, where you ſay, the real eſſence of it is juſt as it was, or the very ſame it was, does ſuppoſe the idea it ſtands for, to be ſteadily the ſame. For, if I change the ſignification of the word, man, whereby it may not comprehend juſt the ſame individuals which, in your Lordſhip's ſenſe, it does but ſhut out ſome of thoſe that, to your Lordſhip, are men, in your ſignification of the word, man; or take in others, to which your Lordſhip does not allow the name, man; I do not think your Lordſhip will ſay, that the real eſſence of man, in both the ſenſes, is the ſame; and yet your Lordſhip ſeems to ſay ſo, when you ſay, "let "men miſtake, in the complication of their ideas, either in leaving out, or putting "in, what does not belong to them; and let their ideas be what they pleaſe, "the real eſſence of the individuals, comprehended under the names, annexed "to theſe ideas, will be the ſame:" for ſo, I humbly conceive, it muſt be put, to make out what your Lordſhip aims at. For as your Lordſhip puts it, by the name, of man, or any other ſpecifick name, your Lordſhip ſeems to me to ſuppoſe, that that name ſtands for, and not for the ſame idea, at the ſame time.

For example, my Lord, let your Lordſhip's idea, to which you annex the ſign man, be a rational animal: let another man's idea be a rational animal of ſuch a ſhape; let a third man's idea be of an animal, of ſuch a ſize, and ſhape, leaving out rationality; let a fourth's be an animal, with a body of ſuch a ſhape, and an immaterial ſubſtance, with a power of reaſoning; let a fifth leave out of his idea, an immaterial ſubſtance: It is plain every one of theſe will call his, a man, as well as your Lordſhip; and yet it is as plain that, man, as ſtanding for all theſe diſtinct, complex ideas, cannot be ſuppoſed to have the ſame internal conſtitution, i. e. the ſame real eſſence. The truth is, every diſtinct, abſtract idea, with a name to it, makes a real, diſtinct kind, whatever the real eſſence (which we know not, of any of them) be.

And therefore I grant it true, what your Lordſhip ſays in the next words, P. 259. " and let the nominal eſſences differ never ſo much, the real, common eſſence, " or nature, of the ſeveral kinds, are not at all altered by them;" i. e. that our thoughts or ideas cannot alter the real conſtitutions, that are in things that exiſt; there is nothing more certain. But yet it is true, that the change of ideas, to which we annex them, can and does alter the ſignification of their names, and thereby alter the kinds, which, by theſe names, we rank and ſort them into. Your Lordſhip farther adds,

" And theſe real eſſences are unchangeable, i. e. the internal conſtitutions are P. 259. " unchangeable." Of what, I beſeech your Lordſhip, are the internal conſtitutions unchangeable? Not of any thing that exiſts, but of God alone; for they may be changed all as eaſily, by that hand that made them, as the internal frame of a watch. What then is it, that is unchangeable? The internal conſtitution, or real eſſence of a ſpecies; which, in plain Engliſh, is no more but this, whilſt the ſame ſpecifick name, v. g. of man, horſe, or tree, is annexed to, or made the ſign of the ſame, abſtract, complex idea, under which I rank ſeveral individuals, it is impoſſible, but the real conſtitution, on which that unaltered, complex idea, or nominal eſſence depends, muſt be the ſame, i. e. in other words, where we find all the ſame properties, we have reaſon to conclude there is the ſame real, internal conſtitution, from which thoſe properties flow.

But your Lordſhip proves the real eſſences to be unchangeable, becauſe God makes them, in theſe following words:

" For, however there may happen ſome variety in individuals, by particular P. 259. " accidents, yet the eſſences of men, and horſes, and trees, remain always the " ſame; becauſe they do not depend on the ideas of men, but on the will of " the creator, who hath made ſeveral ſorts of beings."

It is true, the real conſtitutions, or eſſences, of particular things exiſting, do not depend on the ideas of men, but on the will of the creator; but their being ranked into ſorts, under ſuch and ſuch names, does depend, and wholly depend upon the ideas of men.

Your Lordſhip here ending your four inferences, and all your diſcourſe about nature; you come, in the next place, to treat of perſon, concerning which your Lordſhip diſcourſeth thus:

" 2. Let us now come to the idea of a perſon. For altho' the common P. 259. " nature in mankind be the ſame, yet we ſee a difference in the ſeveral indivi- " duals, from one another: ſo that Peter, and James, and John, are all of the " ſame kind; yet Peter is not James, and James is not John. But what is this " diſtinction founded upon? They may be diſtinguiſhed from each other, by our " ſenſes, as to difference of features, diſtance of place, &c. but that is not all; " for ſuppoſing there were no ſuch external difference, yet there is a difference " between them, as ſeveral individuals in the ſame nature. And here lies the " true common idea of a perſon, which ariſes from that manner of ſubſiſtence, " which is in one individual, and is not communicable to another. An individual, " intelligent ſubſtance, is rather ſuppoſed to the making of a perſon, than the pro- " per definition of it: for a perſon relates to ſomething, which doth diſtinguiſh " it from another intelligent ſubſtance, in the ſame nature; and therefore the

" foundation of it lies in the peculiar manner of ſubſiſtence, which agrees to one, " and to none elſe of the kind: and this is it which is called perſonality."

But then your Lordſhip aſks, " but how do our ſimple ideas help us out, in " this matter? Can we learn from them the difference of nature and perſon?"

If nature and perſon are taken for two real beings, that do, or can, exiſt any where, without any relation to theſe two names, I muſt confeſs I do not ſee how ſimple ideas, or any thing elſe, can help us out, in this matter; nor can we, from ſimple ideas, or any thing elſe, that I know, learn the difference between them, nor what they are.

The reaſon, why I ſpeak thus, is, becauſe your Lordſhip, in your fore-cited words, ſays, " here lies the true idea of a perſon;" and in the foregoing diſcourſe ſpeaks of nature, as if it were ſome ſteady, eſtabliſhed being, to which one certain, preciſe idea neceſſarily belongs, to make it a true idea; whereas, my Lord, in the way of ideas, I begin at the other end, and think that the word perſon, in itſelf, ſignifies nothing; and ſo no idea belonging to it, nothing can be ſaid to be the true idea of it. But as ſoon as the common uſe of any language has appropriated it to any idea, then, that is the true idea of a perſon, and ſo of nature: but becauſe the propriety of language, i. e. the preciſe idea, that every word ſtands for, is not always exactly known, but is often diſputed, there is no other way for him, that uſes a word, which is in diſpute, but to define what he ſignifies by it; and then the diſpute can be no longer verbal, but muſt neceſſarily be about the idea, which he tells us he puts it for.

Taking, therefore, nature and perſon for the ſigns of two ideas, they are put to ſtand for, there is nothing, I think, that helps us ſo ſoon, nor ſo well, to find the difference of nature and perſon, as ſimple ideas; for, by enumerating all the ſimple ideas, that are contained in the complex idea, that each of them is made to ſtand for, we ſhall immediately ſee the whole difference, that is between them.

Far be it from me to ſay, there is no other way but this: your Lordſhip propoſing to clear the diſtinction between nature and perſon, and having declared, " we can have no clear and diſtinct idea of it, by ſenſation or reflection, and " that the grounds of identity and diſtinction come not into our minds, by the " ſimple ideas of ſenſation and reflection;" gave me ſome hopes of getting farther inſight into theſe matters, ſo as to have more clear and diſtinct apprehenſions, concerning nature and perſon than was to be had by ideas. But after having, with attention, more than once read over what your Lordſhip, with ſo much application, has writ thereupon; I muſt, with regret, confeſs, that the way is too delicate, and the matter too abſtruſe, for my capacity; and that I have learned nothing, out of your Lordſhip's elaborate diſcourſe, but this, that I muſt content myſelf with the condemned way by ideas, and deſpair of ever attaining any knowledge, by any other than that, or farther than that will lead me to it. P. 252.

The remaining part of the chapter containing no remarks of your Lordſhip, upon any thing in my book, I am glad I have no occaſion to give your Lordſhip any farther trouble, but only to beg your Lordſhip's pardon for this, and to aſſure your Lordſhip, that I am,

My LORD,

Your Lordſhip's moſt humble

and moſt obedient ſervant,

John Locke.

POSTSCRIPT.

My Lord,

UPON a review of theſe papers, I can hardly forbear wondering at myſelf what I have been doing in them; ſince I can ſcarce find upon what ground this controverſy with me ſtands, or whence it roſe, or whither it tends. And I ſhould certainly repent my pains in it, but that I conclude that your Lordſhip, who does not throw away your time upon ſlight matters and things of ſmall moment, having a quicker ſight and larger views than I have, would not have troubled yourſelf ſo much with my book, as to beſtow on it ſeven and twenty pages together, of a very learned treatiſe, and that on a very weighty ſubject; and in thoſe twenty ſeven pages, bring ſeven and twenty quotations out of my book, unleſs there were ſomething in it, wherein it is very material that the world ſhould be ſet right; which is what I earneſtly deſire ſhould be done. And to that purpoſe alone, have taken the liberty to trouble your Lordſhip with this letter.

If I have any where omitted any thing of moment, in your Lordſhip's diſcourſe, concerning my notions, or any where miſtaken your Lordſhip's ſenſe, in what I have taken notice of, I beg your Lordſhip's pardon; with this aſſurance, that it was not wilfully done. And if any where, in the warm purſuit of an argument, over-attention to the matter ſhould have made me let ſlip any form of expreſſion, in the leaſt circumſtance not carrying with it the utmoſt marks of that reſpect, that I acknowledge due, and ſhall always pay to your Lordſhip's perſon, and known, great learning, I diſown it; and deſire your Lordſhip to look on it, as not coming from my intention, but inadvertency.

No body's notions, I think, are the better or truer, for ill manners joined with them; and I conclude your Lordſhip, who ſo well knows the different caſt of men's heads, and of the opinions that poſſeſs them, will not think it ill manners, in any one, if his notions differ from your Lordſhip's, and that he owns that difference, and explains the grounds of it, as well as he can. I have always thought, that truth and knowledge, by the ill and over eager management of controverſies, loſe a great deal of the advantages, they might receive from the variety of conceptions, there is in men's underſtandings. Could the heats, and paſſion, and ill language, be left out of them, they would afford great improvements to thoſe, who could ſeparate them from by-intereſts and perſonal prejudices. Theſe I look upon your Lordſhip to be altogether above.

It is not for me, who have ſo mean a talent in it myſelf to preſcribe to any one, how he ſhould write; for when I have ſaid all I can, he it is like, will follow his own method, and perhaps cannot help it. Much leſs would it be good manners in me, to offer any thing that way, to a perſon of your Lordſhip's high rank, above me, in parts and learning, as well as place and dignity. But yet, your Lordſhip will excuſe it to my ſhortſightedneſs, if I wiſh ſometimes that your Lordſhip would have been pleaſed, in this debate, to have kept every one's part ſeparate to himſelf, that what I am concerned in, might not have been ſo mingled with the opinions of others, which are no tenets of mine, nor, as I think, does, what I have written, any way relate to; but that I, and every one might have ſeen, whom your Lordſhip's arguments bore upon, and what intereſt he had in the controverſy, and how far. At leaſt, my Lord, give me leave to wiſh, that your Lordſhip had ſhewn what connection any thing I have ſaid, about ideas, and particularly about the idea of ſubſtance, about the poſſibility that God, if he pleaſed, might endue ſome ſyſtems of matter with a power of thinking; or what I have ſaid to prove a God, &c. has, with any objections, that are made, by others, againſt the doctrine of the Trinity, or againſt myſteries: for many paſſages, concerning ideas, ſubſtances, the poſſibility of God's beſtowing thought on ſome ſyſtems of matter, and the proof of a God, &c. your Lordſhip has quoted, out of my book, in a chapter, wherein your Lordſhip profeſſes to anſwer "objections againſt the Trinity, in point of reaſon." Had I been able to diſcover, in theſe paſſages of my book, quoted by your Lordſhip, what tendency your Lordſhip had obſerved in them, to any ſuch objections, I ſhould perhaps have troubled your Lordſhip with leſs impertinent anſwers. But the uncertainty, I was very often in, to what purpoſe your Lordſhip brought them, may have made my explications of myſelf leſs appoſite, than what your Lordſhip might have expected. If your Lordſhip had ſhewed me any thing, in my book, that contained, or implied, any oppoſition in it, to any thing revealed in holy writ, concerning the Trinity, or any other doctrine contained in the bible, I ſhould have been thereby obliged to your Lordſhip, for freeing me from that miſtake, and for affording me an opportunity to own to the world that obligation, by publickly retracting my error. For I know not any thing more diſingenuous, than not publickly to own a conviction, one has received, concerning any thing erroneous, in what one has printed; nor can there, I think, be a greater offence againſt mankind, than to propagate a falſehood, whereof one is convinced, eſpecially in a matter, wherein men are highly concerned not to be miſled.

The holy ſcripture is to me, and always will be, the conſtant guide of my aſſent; and I ſhall always hearken to it, as containing infallible truth, relating to things of the higheſt concernment. And I wiſh I could ſay, there were no myſteries in it: I acknowledge there are to me, and I fear always will be. But, where I want the evidence of things, there yet is ground enough for me to believe, becauſe God has ſaid it: and I ſhall preſently condemn and quit any opinion of mine, as ſoon as I am ſhewn that it is contrary to any revelation in the holy ſcripture. But I muſt confeſs to your Lordſhip, that I do not yet perceive any ſuch contrariety in any thing in my Eſſay of Human Underſtanding.

Oates, Jan. 7.
1696-7.

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Mr. *LOCKE*'s REPLY

To the Right Reverend the

Lord Biſhop of *Worceſter*'s Anſwer to his Letter,

Concerning ſome Paſſages relating to

Mr. Locke's Eſſay of Human Underſtanding:

IN A

Late DISCOURSE of his Lordſhip's, in Vindication
of the Trinity.

My Lord,

YOUR Lordſhip having done my Letter the honour to think it worth your reply, I think myſelf bound in good manners, publickly to acknowledge the favour, and to give your Lordſhip an account of the effect, it has had upon me, and the grounds, upon which I yet differ from you in thoſe points, wherein I am ſtill under the mortification of not being able to bring my ſentiments wholly to agree with your Lordſhip's. And this I the more readily do, becauſe it ſeems to me, that that, wherein the great difference now lies between us, is founded only on your fears; which, I conclude, upon a ſedate review, your Lordſhip will either part with, or elſe give me other reaſons, beſides your apprehenſions, to convince me of miſtakes in my book, which your Lordſhip thinks to be of conſequence, even in matters of religion.

Your Lordſhip makes my Letter to conſiſt of two parts: my complaint to your Lordſhip, and my vindication of myſelf. You begin with my complaint; one part whereof was, that I was brought into a controverſy, wherein I had never meddled, nor knew how I came to be concerned in. To this your Lordſhip is pleaſed to promiſe me ſatisfaction.

Since your Lordſhip has condeſcended ſo far, as to be at the pains to give me and others, ſatisfaction in this matter, I crave leave to ſecond your deſign herein, and to premiſe a remark, or two, for the clearer underſtanding the nature of my complaint, which is the only way to ſatisfaction in it.

1. Then it is obſerved, that the propoſition, which you diſpute againſt, as oppoſite to the doctrine of the Trinity, is this, that clear and diſtinct ideas are neceſſary to certainty. This is evident not only from what your Lordſhip ſubjoins to the account of reaſon, given by the author of Chriſtianity not myſterious; but alſo, by what your Lordſhip ſays here again, in your anſwer to me, in theſe words: "to lay all foundation of certainty, as to matters of faith, upon "clear and diſtinct ideas, was the opinion I oppoſed." Vindicat. p. 232. P. 14.

2. It is to be obſerved, that this you call a new way of reaſoning; and thoſe that build upon it, gentlemen of this new way of reaſoning,. Vindicat. p. 233, 234.

3. It is to be obſerved, that a great part of my complaint was, that I was made one of the gentlemen of this new way of reaſoning, without any reaſon at all.

To this complaint of mine, your Lordſhip has had the goodneſs to make this anſwer:

"Now to give you, and others, ſatisfaction as to this matter, I ſhall firſt give "an account of the occaſion of it; and then ſhew what care I took to prevent "miſunderſtanding about it." Anſw. p. 4.

The firſt part of the ſatisfaction your Lordſhip is pleaſed to offer, is contained in theſe words:

P. 4. “ The occaſion was this: being to anſwer the objections, in point of reaſon
“ (which had not been anſwered before) the firſt I mentioned was: That it was
P. 5. “ above reaſon, and therefore not to be believed. In anſwer to this, I propoſed
“ two things to be conſidered: 1. What we underſtand by reaſon. 2. What
“ ground, in reaſon, there is to reject any doctrine above it, when it is propoſed
“ as a matter of faith.”

“ As to the former I obſerved, that the Unitarians, in their late pamphlets, “ talked very much about clear and diſtinct ideas and perceptions, and that the “ myſteries of faith were repugnant to them; but never went about to ſtate the “ nature and bounds of reaſon, in ſuch a manner, as they ought to have done, “ who make it the rule and ſtandard of what they are to believe. But I added, “ that a late author, in a book called Chriſtianity not myſterious, had taken upon “ him to clear this matter, whom, for that cauſe, I was bound to conſider: the “ deſign of his diſcourſe related wholly to matters of faith, and not to philo- “ ſophical ſpeculations; ſo that there can be no diſpute, about his application of “ thoſe, he calls principles of reaſon and certainty.

“ When the mind makes uſe of intermediate ideas, to diſcover the agreement “ or diſagreement of the ideas, received into them; this method of knowledge, “ he ſaith, is properly called reaſon, or demonſtration.

“ The mind, as he goes on, receives ideas two ways.

P. 6. “ 1. By intromiſſion of the ſenſes.

“ 2. By conſidering its own operations.

“ And theſe ſimple and diſtinct ideas are the ſole matter and foundation of all “ our reaſoning.”

And ſo all our certainty is reſolved into two things, either “ immediate per- “ ception, which is ſelf evidence: or the uſe of intermediate ideas, which diſ- “ cover the certainty of any thing dubious: which is what he calls reaſon.

“ Now this, I ſaid, did ſuppoſe, that we muſt have clear and diſtinct ideas, of “ whatever we pretend to any certainty of, in our minds (by reaſon) and that “ the only way to attain this certainty, is by comparing theſe ideas together; “ which excludes all certainty of faith, or reaſon; where we cannot have ſuch “ clear and diſtinct ideas.

“ From hence I proceeded to ſhew, that we could not have ſuch clear and “ diſtinct ideas, as were neceſſary in the preſent debate, either by ſenſation or “ reflection, and conſequently we could not attain to any certainty about it; for “ which I inſtanced in the nature of ſubſtance, and perſon, and the diſtinction “ between them.

P. 7. “ And by virtue of theſe principles, I ſaid, that I did not wonder that the “ gentlemen, of this new way of reaſoning, had almoſt diſcarded ſubſtance out “ of the reaſonable part of the world.”

This is all your Lordſhip ſays here, to give me, and others ſatisfaction, as to the matters of my complaint. For what follows, to the 35th page of your anſwer, is nothing but your Lordſhip's arguing, againſt what I have ſaid, concerning ſubſtance.

In theſe words, therefore, above quoted, I am to find the ſatisfaction, your Lordſhip has promiſed, as to the occaſion, why your Lordſhip made me one of the gentlemen of the new way of reaſoning, and in that joined me with the Unitarians, and the author of Chriſtianity not myſterious. But I crave leave to repreſent to your Lordſhip, wherein the words above quoted come ſhort of giving me ſatisfaction.

In the firſt place, it is plain, they were intended for a ſhort narrative of what was contained in the tenth chapter of your Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity, relating to this matter. But how could your Lordſhip think, that the repeating the ſame things over again, could give me, or any body elſe, ſatisfaction, as to my being made one of the gentlemen of this new way of reaſoning?

Indeed, I cannot ſay it is an exact repetition of what is to be found, in the beginning of that tenth chapter; becauſe your Lordſhip ſaid, in that tenth chapter, that "the author of Chriſtianity not myſterious, gives an account of "reaſon, which ſuppoſes, that we muſt have clear and diſtinct ideas, of whatever "we pretend to a certainty of, in our minds." But here, in the paſſage above ſet down, out of your anſwer to my letter, I find it is not to his account of reaſon, but to ſomething taken out of that, and ſomething borrowed by him, out of my book, to which your Lordſhip annexes this ſuppoſition. For your Lordſhip ſays, "now this, I ſaid, did ſuppoſe, that we muſt have clear and diſtinct ideas "of whatever we pretend to any certainty of, in our minds (by reaſon.)" Vin. p. 232. Anſw. p 6.

If your Lordſhip did ſay ſo, in your Vindication of the doctrine of the Trinity, your Printer did your Lordſhip two manifeſt injuries; the one is, that he omitted theſe words [by reaſon]: and the other, that he annexed your Lordſhip's words, to the account of reaſon, there given by the author of Chriſtianity not myſterious: and not to thoſe words, your Lordſhip here ſays, you annexed them to. For this, here refers to other words, and not barely to that author's account of reaſon; as any one may ſatisfy himſelf, who will but compare theſe two places together.

One thing more ſeems to me very remarkable in this matter, and that is, that "the laying all foundation of certainty, as to matters of faith, upon clear and "diſtinct ideas, ſhould be the opinion, which you oppoſe," as your Lordſhip declares; and that this ſhould be it, for which the Unitarians, the author of Chriſtianity not myſterious, and I, are jointly brought on the ſtage, under the title of The Gentlemen of this new way of reaſoning: and yet no one quotation be brought out of the Unitarians, to ſhew it to be their opinion; nor any thing alleged out of the author of Chriſtianity not myſterious, to ſhew it to be his; but only ſome things quoted out of him, which are ſaid to ſuppoſe all foundation of certainty to be laid upon clear and diſtinct ideas: which, that they do ſuppoſe it, is not, I think, ſelf-evident, nor yet proved. But this I am ſure, as to myſelf, I do no where lay all foundation of certainty in clear and diſtinct ideas; and therefore am ſtill at a loſs, why I was made one of the gentlemen of this new way of reaſoning. Anſw. p. 14.

Another thing, wherein your Lordſhip's narrative, intended for my ſatisfaction, comes ſhort of giving it me, is this: that at moſt it gives but an account of the occaſion, why the Unitarians, and the author of Chriſtianity not myſterious were made, by your Lordſhip, the gentlemen of this new way of reaſoning. But it pretends not to ſay a word, why I was made one of them; which was the thing, wherein I needed ſatisfaction. For your Lordſhip breaks off your report of the matter of fact, juſt when you were come to the matter of my complaint; which you paſs over in ſilence, and turn your diſcourſe to what I have ſaid in my letter: for your Lordſhip ends the account of the occaſion, in theſe words: "the gentlemen of this new way of reaſoning had almoſt diſcarded ſubſtance out "of the reaſonable part of the world." And there your Lordſhip ſtops. Whereas, it is in the words, that immediately follow, that I am brought in, as one of thoſe gentlemen, of which I would have been glad to have known the occaſion; and it is in this, that I needed ſatisfaction. For that which concerns the others, I meddle not with; I only deſire to know, upon what occaſion, or why, I was brought into this diſpute of the Trinity? But of that, in this account of the occaſion, I do not ſee that your Lordſhip ſays any thing. Anſw. p. 7. Vin. p. 234.

I have been forced, therefore, to look again a little cloſer into this whole matter: and, upon a freſh examination of what your Lordſhip has ſaid, in your Vindication of the doctrine of the Trinity, and in your anſwer to my letter, I come now to ſee a little clearer, that the matter, in ſhort, ſtands thus: the author of Chriſtianity not myſterious, was one of the gentlemen of this new way of reaſoning, becauſe he had laid down a doctrine, concerning reaſon, which ſuppoſed clear and diſtinct ideas neceſſary to certainty. But that doctrine of his tied me not at all to him, as may be ſeen by comparing his account of reaſon, with what I have ſaid of reaſon, in my Eſſay, which your Lordſhip accuſes of no ſuch ſuppoſition; and ſo I ſtood clear from his account of reaſon, or any thing it ſuppoſes. But he having given an account of the original of our ideas, and having ſaid ſomething about them, conformable to what is in my Eſſay, that has tied him and me ſo cloſe together, that by this ſort of connection, I came to be one of the gentlemen of this new way of reaſoning, which conſiſts in making clear and diſtinct ideas neceſſary to certainty, tho' I no where ſay, or ſuppoſe, clear and diſtinct ideas neceſſary to certainty.

How your Lordſhip came to join me, with the author of Chriſtianity not myſterious, I think is now evident. And he being the link, whereby your Lordſhip joins me to the Unitarians, in objections againſt the Trinity, in point of reaſon, anſwered; give me leave, my Lord, a little to examine the connection of this link, on that ſide alſo, i. e. what has made your Lordſhip join him and the Unitarians in this point, viz. making clear and diſtinct ideas neceſſary to certainty; that great battery, it ſeems, which they make uſe of, againſt the doctrine of the Trinity in point of reaſon.

Vindic. p. 231. Now as to this, your Lordſhip ſays, "that the Unitarians having not explained the nature and bounds of reaſon, as they ought; the author of Chriſtianity not myſterious hath endeavoured to make amends for this, and takes upon him to make this matter clear." And then your Lordſhip ſets down his account of reaſon, at large.

I WILL not examine how it appears, that the author of Chriſtianity not myſterious, gave this account of reaſon, to ſupply the defect of the Unitarians herein, or to make amends for their not having done it. Your Lordſhip does not quote any thing out of him, to ſhew that it was to make amends for what the Unitarians had neglected. I only look to ſee how the Unitarians and he come to be united, in this dangerous principle of the neceſſity of clear and diſtinct ideas to certainty: which is that, which makes him a gentleman of this new and dangerous way of reaſoning; and conſequently me too; becauſe he agrees in ſome particulars with my Eſſay.

Now, my Lord, having looked over his account of reaſon, as ſet down by your Lordſhip; give me leave to ſay, that he, that ſhall compare that account of reaſon, with your Lordſhip's animadverſion annexed to it, in theſe words, Vindic. p. 232. "this is offered to the world, as an account of reaſon; but to ſhew how very looſe and unſatisfactory it is, I deſire it may be conſidered, that this doctrine ſuppoſes that we muſt have clear and diſtinct ideas of whatever we pretend to any certainty of, in our minds; and that the only way to attain this certainty, is by comparing theſe ideas together; which excludes all certainty of faith, or reaſon, where we cannot have ſuch clear and diſtinct ideas:" will, I fear, hardly defend himſelf from wondering at the way, your Lordſhip has taken to ſhew, how looſe and unſatisfactory an account of reaſon his is; but by imagining that your Lordſhip had a great mind to ſay ſomething againſt clear and diſtinct ideas, as neceſſary to certainty; or that your Lordſhip had ſome reaſon for bringing them in, that does not appear in that account of reaſon; ſince in it, from one end to the other, there is not the leaſt mention of clear and diſtinct ideas. Nor does he (that I ſee) ſay any thing, that ſuppoſes, that we muſt have clear and diſtinct ideas of whatever we pretend to any certainty of, in our minds.

BUT whether he and the Unitarians do, or do not, lay all foundation of certainty, as to matters of faith, upon clear, and diſtinct ideas, I concern not myſelf: all my enquiry is, how he, and I, and the Unitarians come to be joined together, as gentlemen of this new way of reaſoning? Which, in ſhort, as far as I can trace and obſerve the connection, is only thus.

Vindic. p. 231. THE Unitarians are the men of this new way of reaſoning, becauſe they ſpeak of clear and diſtinct perceptions, in their anſwer to your Lordſhip's ſermon, as your Lordſhip ſays. The author of Chriſtianity not myſterious, is joined to the Unitarians, as a gentleman of this new way of reaſoning, becauſe his doctrine, concerning reaſon, ſuppoſes we muſt have clear and diſtinct ideas of whatever we pretend to any certainty of in our minds: and I am joined to that author, becauſe he ſays, "that the uſing of intermediate ideas to diſcover the agreement, or diſagreement, of the ideas received into our minds, is reaſon; and that the mind receives ideas, by the intromiſſion of the ſenſes, and by conſidering its own operations. And theſe ſimple and diſtinct ideas are the ſole matter and foundation of all our reaſoning." This, becauſe it ſeems to be borrowed out of my book, is that, which unites me to him, and by him conſequently to the Unitarians.

And thus I am come to the end of the thread of your Lordſhip's diſcourſe, whereby I am brought into the company of the gentlemen of this new way of reaſoning, and thereby bound up in the bundle and cauſe of the Unitarians, arguing againſt the doctrine of the Trinity, by objections in point of reaſon.

I have been longer upon this, than I thought I ſhould be: but the thread, that ties me to the Unitarians, being ſpun very fine and ſubtil, is, as it naturally falls out, the longer for it, and the harder to be followed, ſo as to diſcover the connection every where. As for example; the thread, that ties me to the author of Chriſtianity not myſterious, is ſo fine and delicate, that, without laying my eyes cloſe to it, and poring a good while, I can hardly perceive how it hangs together; that becauſe he ſays, what your Lordſhip charges him to ſay in the 234th page of your Vindication, &c. and becauſe I ſay what your Lordſhip quotes out of my Eſſay, in the ſame page, that therefore, I am one of the gentlemen of this new way of reaſoning, which your Lordſhip oppoſes in the Unitarians, as dangerous to the doctrine of the Trinity. This connection of me with the author of Chriſtianity not myſterious; and by him with the Unitarians (being in a point, wherein I agree with your Lordſhip, and not with them, if they do lay all the foundation of knowledge in clear and diſtinct ideas) is, I ſay, pretty hard for me clearly to perceive now, tho' your Lordſhip has given me, in your letter, that end of the clue, which was to lead me to it, for my ſatisfaction; but was impoſſible for me, or (as I think) any body elſe, to diſcover, whilſt it ſtood, as it does, in your Lordſhip's Vindication, &c.

And now my Lord it is time, I aſk your Lordſhip's pardon, for ſaying in my firſt letter, "that I hoped I might ſay, you had gone a little out of your way to "do me a kindneſs;" which your Lordſhip by ſo often repeating of it ſeems to be diſpleaſed with. For, beſides that there is nothing out of the way, to a willing mind, I have now the ſatisfaction to be joined to the author of Chriſtianity not myſterious, for his agreeing with me, in the original of our ideas and the materials of our knowledge (tho' I agree not with him, or any body elſe, in laying all foundation of certainty in matters of faith, in clear and diſtinct ideas;) and his being joined with the Unitarians, by giving an account of reaſon, which ſuppoſes clear and diſtinct ideas, as neceſſary to all knowledge and certainty; I have now, I ſay, the ſatisfaction to ſee, how I lay directly in your Lordſhip's way, in oppoſing theſe gentlemen, who lay all foundation of certainty, as to matters of faith, upon clear and diſtinct ideas; i. e. the Unitarians, the gentlemen of this new way of reaſoning, ſo dangerous to the doctrine of the Trinity. For the author of Chriſtianity not myſterious agreeing with them in ſome things, and with me in others, he being joined to them, on one ſide, by an account of reaſon, that ſuppoſes clear and diſtinct ideas neceſſary to certainty; and to me, on the other ſide, by ſaying, "the mind has its ideas from ſenſation and reflection, and that "thoſe are the materials and foundations of all our knowledge," &c. who can deny, but ſo ranged in a row, your Lordſhip may place yourſelf ſo, that we may ſeem to you but one object, and ſo one ſhot be aimed at us, all together? Tho', if your Lordſhip would be at the pains to change your ſtation a little, and view us on the other ſide, we ſhould viſibly appear to be very far aſunder; and I, in particular, be found, in the matter controverted, to be nearer to your Lordſhip, than to either of them, or any body elſe, who lay all foundation of certainty, as to matters of faith, upon clear and diſtinct ideas. For I perfectly aſſent to what your Lordſhip ſaith, "That there are many things, of which we may be certain, and yet can have no clear and diſtinct ideas of them." Vind. p. 233.

Beſides this account of the occaſion, of bringing me into your Lordſhip's chapter, wherein objections againſt the Trinity, in point of reaſon, are anſwered, which we have conſidered; your Lordſhip promiſes, "to ſhew, what care you "took, to prevent being miſunderſtood about it, to give me and others ſatisfaction as to this matter:" which I find about the end of the firſt quarter of your Lordſhip's anſwer to me. All the pages between, being taken up, in a diſpute againſt what I have ſaid about ſubſtance, and our idea of it, that I think has now no more to do with the queſtion, whether I ought to have been made one of the gen- P. 4.

gentlemen of this new way of reaſoning, or with my complaint about it; tho' there be many things in it, that I ought to conſider apart, to ſhew the reaſon why I am not yet brought to your Lordſhip's ſentiments, by what you have there ſaid. To return, therefore, to the buſineſs in hand.

P. 35. YOUR Lordſhip ſays, "I come, therefore, now to ſhew the care I took, to prevent being miſunderſtood; which will beſt appear, by my own words, viz. I muſt do that right to the ingenious author of the Eſſay of Human Underſtanding (from whence theſe notions are borrowed, to ſerve other purpoſes, than he intended them) that he makes the caſes of ſpiritual and corporeal ſubſtances to be alike."

THESE words, my Lord, which you have quoted out of your Vindication, &c. I, with acknowledgment, own, will keep your Lordſhip from being miſunderſtood, if any one ſhould be in danger to be ſo fooliſhly miſtaken, as to think your Lordſhip could not treat me with great civility, when you pleaſed; or that you did not here make me a great compliment, in the epithet, which you here beſtow upon me. Theſe words, alſo, of your Lordſhip, will certainly prevent your Lordſhip's being miſunderſtood, in allowing me to have made the caſe of ſpiritual and corporeal ſubſtances to be alike. But this was not what I complained of: my complaint was, that I was brought into a controverſy, wherein what I had written, had nothing more to do, than in any other controverſy whatſoever; and that I was made a party, on one ſide of a queſtion, tho' what I ſaid, in my book, made me not more on the one ſide of that queſtion, than the other. And that your Lordſhip had ſo mixed me, in many places, with thoſe gentlemen, whoſe objections againſt the Trinity, in point of reaſon, your Lordſhip was anſwering, that the reader could not but take me to be one of them, that had objected againſt the Trinity, in point of reaſon. As for example; where your
Vind. p. 234. Lordſhip firſt introduces me, your Lordſhip ſays, "That the gentlemen of this new way of reaſoning have almoſt diſcarded ſubſtance out of the reaſonable part of the world. For they not only tell us, That we can have no idea of it by ſenſation and reflection; but that nothing is ſignified by it, only an uncertain ſuppoſition of we know not what." And for theſe words, B. i. ch. iv. § 18. of my Eſſay, is quoted.

Now, my Lord, what care is there taken? what proviſion is there made, in the words above alledged by your Lordſhip, to prevent your being miſunderſtood, if you meant not, that I was one of the gentlemen of this new way of reaſoning? And if you did mean, that I was, your Lordſhip did me a manifeſt injury. For I no where make clear and diſtinct ideas neceſſary to certainty; which is the new way of reaſoning, which your Lordſhip oppoſes in the Unitarians, as contrary to the doctrine of the Trinity. Your Lordſhip ſays, you took care not to be miſunderſtood. And the words, wherein you took that care, are theſe: "I muſt
P. 35. do that right to the ingenious author of the Eſſay of Human Underſtanding, (from whence theſe notions are borrowed, to ſerve other purpoſes than he intended them) that he makes the caſe of ſpiritual and corporeal ſubſtances to be alike." But which of theſe words are they, my Lord, I beſeech you, which are to hinder people from taking me, to be one of the gentlemen of that new way of reaſoning, wherewith they overturn the doctrine of the Trinity? I confeſs, my Lord, I cannot ſee any of them that do: and that I did not ſee any of them, that could hinder men from that miſtake, I ſhewed your Lordſhip, in my firſt letter to your Lordſhip, where I take notice of that paſſage in your Lordſhip's book. My words are: "I return my acknowledgment to your Lordſhip,
P. 58. for the good opinion, you are here pleaſed to expreſs of the author of the Eſſay of Human Underſtanding; and that you do not impute to him the ill uſe, ſome may have made of his notions. But he craves leave to ſay, That he ſhould have been better preſerved from the hard and ſiniſter thoughts which ſome men are always ready for; if, in what you have here publiſhed, your Lordſhip had been pleaſed to have ſhewn, where you directed your diſcourſe againſt him, and where againſt others, from p. 234, to p. 262. Nothing but my words and my book being quoted, the world will be apt to think, that I am the perſon, who argue againſt the Trinity, and deny myſteries, againſt whom your Lordſhip

" directs thoſe pages. And indeed, my Lord, tho' I have read them over, with " great attention, yet, in many places, I cannot diſcern, whether it be againſt " me, or any body elſe, that your Lordſhip is arguing. That which often " makes the difficulty is, that I do not ſee, how what I ſay does at all concern " the controverſy your Lordſhip is engaged in, and yet I alone am quoted." To which complaint of mine, your Lordſhip returns no other anſwer, but refers me to the ſame paſſage again for ſatisfaction; and tells me, that therein you took care not to be miſunderſtood. Your Lordſhip might ſee, that thoſe words did not ſatisfy me in that point, when I did myſelf the honour to write to your Lordſhip; and how your Lordſhip ſhould think the repetition of them in your anſwer, ſhould ſatisfy me better, I confeſs I cannot tell.

I MAKE the like complaint in theſe words: "This paragraph, which continues to prove, that we may have certainty without clear and diſtinct ideas, " I would flatter myſelf is not meant againſt me, becauſe it oppoſes nothing " that I have ſaid, and ſo ſhall not ſay any thing to it; but only ſet it down to " do your Lordſhip right, that the reader may judge. Tho' I do not find how " he will eaſily overlook me, and think I am not at all concerned in it, ſince " my words alone are quoted in ſeveral pages, immediately preceding and following: and in the very next paragraph it is ſaid, how they come to know; " which word, they, muſt ſignify ſome body, beſides the author of Chriſtianity not myſterious: and then, I think, by the whole tenour of your Lordſhip's diſcourſe, no body will be left but me, poſſible to be taken to be the " other; for in the ſame paragraph your Lordſhip ſays, the ſame perſons ſay, " that notwithſtanding their ideas, it is poſſible for matter to think." P. 60.

" I KNOW not what other perſon ſays ſo, but I; but if any one does, I am " ſure no perſon, but I, ſay ſo, in my book, which your Lordſhip has quoted for " them, viz. Human Underſtanding, B. iv. ch. 3. This, which is a riddle to " me, the more amazes me, becauſe I find it in a treatiſe of your Lordſhip's, " who ſo perfectly underſtands the rules and methods of writing, whether in " controverſy or any other way: but this, which ſeems wholly new to me, I " ſhall better underſtand, when your Lordſhip pleaſes to explain it." In the mean time, I mention it as an apology for myſelf, if ſometimes I miſtake your Lordſhip's aim, and ſo miſapply my anſwer.

To this alſo your Lordſhip anſwers nothing, but for ſatisfaction refers me to the care you took to prevent being miſunderſtood; which, you ſay, appears by thoſe words of your's above-recited. But what there is, in thoſe words, that can prevent the miſtake I complained I was expoſed to; what there is in them, that can hinder any one from thinking, that I am one of the they and them that oppoſe the doctrine of the Trinity, with arguments in point of reaſon; that I muſt confeſs, my Lord, I cannot ſee, tho' I have read them over and over again to find it out.

THE like might be ſaid, in reſpect of all thoſe other paſſages, where I make the like complaint, which your Lordſhip takes notice, I was frequent in; nor could I avoid it, being almoſt every leaf perplexed to know, whether I was concerned, and how far, in what your Lordſhip ſaid, ſince my words were quoted, and others argued againſt. And for ſatisfaction herein, I am ſent to a compliment of your Lordſhip's. I ſay not this, my Lord, that I do not highly value the civility and good opinion your Lordſhip has expreſſed of me therein; but to let your Lordſhip ſee, that I was not ſo rude, as to complain of want of civility in your Lordſhip: but my complaint was of ſomething elſe; and therefore it was ſomething elſe, wherein I wanted ſatisfaction.

INDEED your Lordſhip ſays, in that paſſage; "from the author of the Eſſay " of Human Underſtanding, theſe notions are borrowed, to ſerve other purpoſes than he intended them." But, my Lord, how this helps, in the caſe, to prevent my being miſtaken to be one of thoſe, whom your Lordſhip had to do with in this chapter, in anſwering objections, in point of reaſon, againſt the Trinity, I muſt own, I do not yet perceive: for theſe notions, which your Lordſhip is there arguing againſt, are all taken out of my book, and made uſe of, by no body that I know, but your Lordſhip, or myſelf: and which of us two it is, that P. 35.

that hath borrowed them, to ſerve other purpoſes than I intended them, I muſt leave to your Lordſhip to determine. I, and I think every body elſe with me, will be at a loſs, to know who they are, till their words, and not mine, are produced to prove, that they do uſe thoſe notions of mine, which your Lordſhip there calls theſe notions, to purpoſes to which I intended them not.

BUT to thoſe words, in your Lordſhip's Vindication of the doctrine of the Trinity, you, in your anſwer to my letter, for farther ſatisfaction, add as followeth: "it was too plain, that the bold writer againſt the myſteries of our faith, "took his notions and expreſſions from thence: and what could be ſaid more for "your Vindication, than that he turned them into other purpoſes, than the au-"thor intended them?" P. 35.

WITH ſubmiſſion, my Lord, it is as plain, as print can make it, that whatever notions and expreſſions, that writer took from my book; thoſe in queſtion, which your Lordſhip there calls theſe notions, my book is only quoted for; nor does it appear, that your Lordſhip knew, that that writer had any where made uſe of them: or, if your Lordſhip knew them to be any where in his writings, the matter of aſtoniſhment and complaint is ſtill the greater, that your Lordſhip ſhould know where they were, in his writings, uſed to ſerve other purpoſes than I intended them; and yet your Lordſhip ſhould quote only my book, where they were uſed to ſerve only thoſe purpoſes I intended them. Vindic. p. 239.

How much this is for my vindication, we ſhall preſently ſee: but what it can do to give ſatisfaction to me, or others, as to the matters of my complaint, for which it is brought by your Lordſhip, that I confeſs I do not ſee. For my complaint was not againſt thoſe gentlemen, that they had caſt any aſperſions upon my book, againſt which I deſired your Lordſhip to vindicate me; but my complaint was of your Lordſhip, that you had brought me into a controverſy, and ſo joined me with thoſe, againſt whom you were diſputing, in defence of the Trinity, that thoſe, who read your Lordſhip's book, would be apt to miſtake me for one of them.

BUT your Lordſhip aſks, "what could be ſaid more for my vindication?" My Lord, I ſhall always take it for a very great honour, to be vindicated by your Lordſhip againſt others. But in the preſent caſe, I wanted no vindication againſt others: if my book or notions had need of any vindication, it was only againſt your Lordſhip; for it was your Lordſhip, and not others, who had in your book diſputed againſt paſſages, quoted out of mine, for ſeveral pages together.

P. 36. NEVERTHELESS, my Lord, I gratefully acknowledge the favour you have done me, for being guarantee for my intentions, which you can have no reaſon to repent of. For as it was not in my intention to write any thing againſt truth, much leſs againſt any of the ſacred truths contained in the ſcriptures; ſo I will be anſwerable for it, that there is nothing in my book, which can be made uſe of, to other purpoſes, but what may be turned upon them, who ſo uſe it, to ſhew their miſtake and error. No body can hinder, but that ſyllogiſm, which was intended for the ſervice of truth, will ſometimes be made uſe of, againſt it. But it is nevertheleſs of truth's ſide, and always turns upon the adverſaries of it.

YOUR Lordſhip adds, "and the true reaſon why the plural number was ſo "often uſed by me, was becauſe he [i. e. the author of Chriſtianity not myſte-"rious] built upon thoſe, which he imagined had been your grounds."

WHETHER it was your Lordſhip, or he, that imagined thoſe to be my grounds which were not my grounds, I will not pretend to ſay. Be that as it will; it is plain, from what your Lordſhip here ſays, that all the foundation of your Lordſhip's ſo poſitively, and in ſo many places, making me one of the gentlemen of the new way of reaſoning, was but an imagination of an imagination. Your Lordſhip ſays, "he built upon thoſe, which he imagined had been my "grounds;" but it is but an imagination in your Lordſhip, that he did ſo imagine; and with all due reſpect, give me leave to ſay, a very ill-grounded imagination too. For it appears to me no foundation to think, that becauſe he, or any body, agrees with me in things, that are in my book, and ſo appear to be of my opinion; therefore he imagines, he agrees with me in other things, which are not in my book, and are not my opinion. As in the matter before us;

what

what reaſon is there to imagine, that the author of Chriſtianity not myſterious imagined, that he built on my grounds, in laying all foundation of certainty in clear and diſtinct ideas, (if he does ſo) which is no where laid down in my book; becauſe he builds on my grounds, concerning the original of our ideas, or any thing elſe, he finds in my book, or quotes out of it? For this is all that the author of Chriſtianity not myſterious has done in this caſe, or can be brought to ſupport ſuch an imagination.

But ſuppoſing it true, that he imagined he built upon my grounds; what reaſon, I beſeech your Lordſhip, is that for uſing the plural number, in quoting words, which I alone ſpoke, and he no where makes uſe of? To this your Lordſhip ſays, "that he imagined he built upon my grounds; and your Lordſhip's P. 36. buſineſs was to ſhew thoſe expreſſions of mine, which ſeemed moſt to countenance his method of proceeding, could not give any reaſonable ſatisfaction:" which, as I humbly conceive, amounts to thus much. The author of Chriſtianity not myſterious, writes ſomething, which your Lordſhip diſapproves; your Lordſhip imagines, he builds upon my grounds; and then your Lordſhip picks out ſome expreſſions of mine, which, you imagine, do moſt countenance his method of proceeding, and quote them, as belonging in common to us both; tho' it be certain, he no where uſed them. And this your Lordſhip tells me (to give me ſatisfaction, what care you took not to be miſunderſtood) was the true reaſon, why you ſo often uſed the plural number: which with ſubmiſſion, my Lord, ſeems to me to be no reaſon at all; unleſs it can be a reaſon to aſcribe my words to another man, and me together, which he never ſaid; becauſe your Lordſhip imagines, he might, if he would, have ſaid them. And ought not this, my Lord, to ſatisfy me of the care you took, not to be miſunderſtood?

Your Lordſhip goes on to ſhew your care to prevent your being miſunder- P. 36. ſtood: your words are, "but you [i. e. the author of the letter to your Lordſhip] ſay, you don't place certainty only in clear and diſtinct ideas, but in the clear and viſible connection of any of our ideas. And certainty of knowledge, you tell us, is to perceive the agreement or diſagreement of ideas, as expreſſed in any propoſition. Whether this be a true account of the certainty of knowledge, or not, will be preſently conſidered. But it is very poſſible he might miſtake, or miſapply your notions; but there is too much reaſon to believe, he thought them the ſame: and we have no reaſon to be ſorry, that he hath given you this occaſion for explaining your meaning, and for the vindication of yourſelf, in the matters you apprehend I had charged you with."

Your Lordſhip herein ſays, it is very poſſible the author of Chriſtianity not myſterious might miſtake, or miſapply my notions. I find it, indeed, very poſſible, that my notions may be miſtaken and miſapplied; if by miſapplied, be meant drawing inferences from thence, which belong not to them. But if that poſſibility be reaſon enough to join me in the plural number, with the author of Chriſtianity not myſterious, or with the Unitarians; it is as much a reaſon to join me in the plural number with the Papiſts, when your Lordſhip has an occaſion to write againſt them next; or with the Lutherans, or Quakers, &c. for it is poſſible, that any of theſe may miſtake, or in that ſenſe miſapply my notions. But if miſtaking, or miſapplying my notions, does actually join me to any body, I know no body that I am ſo ſtrictly joined to, as your Lordſhip: for, as I humbly conceive, no body has ſo much miſtaken and miſapplied my notions, as your Lordſhip. I ſhould not take the liberty to ſay this, were not my thinking ſo the very reaſon and excuſe, for my troubling your Lordſhip with this ſecond letter. For, my Lord, I do not ſo well love controverſy, eſpecially with ſo great and ſo learned a man, as your Lordſhip, as to ſay a word more; had I not hopes to ſhew, for my excuſe, that it is my misfortune to have my notions to be miſtaken or miſapplied by your Lordſhip.

Your Lordſhip adds, "but there is too much reaſon to believe, that he P. 36. thought them the ſame; i. e. that the author of Chriſtianity not myſterious thought that I had laid all foundation of certainty in clear and diſtinct ideas," as well as he did; for that is it, upon which all this diſpute is raiſed. Whether he himſelf laid all foundation of certainty in clear and diſtinct ideas, is more than I know. But what that too much reaſon is to believe, that he thought that I did, I am ſure is hard for me to gueſs, till your Lordſhip is pleaſed to name it. For that there is not any ſuch thing in my book, to give him, or any body elſe, reaſon to think ſo, I ſuppoſe your Lordſhip is now ſatisfied: and I would not willingly ſuppoſe the reaſon to be, that unleſs he, or ſomebody elſe thought ſo, my book could not be brought into the diſpute; tho' it be not eaſy to find any other. It follows in your Lordſhip's letter,

P. 36. "And we have no reaſon to be ſorry, that he hath given you this occaſion, "for the explaining your meaning, and for the vindication of yourſelf, in the "matter you apprehended, I had charged you with."

My Lord, I know not any occaſion he has given me, of vindicating myſelf: your Lordſhip was pleaſed to join me with the gentlemen of the new way of reaſoning, who laid all foundation of certainty in clear and diſtinct ideas. All the vindication I make, or need to make, in the caſe, is, that I lay not all foundation of certainty in clear and diſtinct ideas; and ſo there was no reaſon to join me with thoſe that do. And for this vindication of myſelf, your Lordſhip alone gives me occaſion: but whether your Lordſhip has reaſon to be ſorry, or not ſorry, your Lordſhip beſt knows.

Your Lordſhip goes on, in what is deſigned for my ſatisfaction, as followeth:

P. 37. "And if your anſwer doth not come fully up, in all things, to what I could "wiſh; yet I am glad to find, that in general, you own the myſteries of the "chriſtian faith, and the ſcriptures to be the rule and foundation of it."

Which words, my Lord, ſeem to me rather to ſhew, that your Lordſhip is not willing to be ſatisfied with my book, than to ſhew any care, your Lordſhip took, to prevent people's being led, by your Lordſhip's book, into a miſtake, that I was one of the gentlemen of that new way of reaſoning, who argued againſt the doctrine of the Trinity.

The gentlemen of the new way of reaſoning, whom your Lordſhip ſets yourſelf to anſwer, in that tenth chapter of your Vindication of the doctrine of the Trinity, are thoſe, who lay all foundation of certainty in clear and diſtinct ideas; and from that foundation, raiſe objections againſt the Trinity, in point of reaſon. Your Lordſhip joins me with theſe gentlemen, in that chapter, and calls me one of them. Of this I complain; and tell your Lordſhip, in the place and words you have quoted out of my letter, "that I do not place certainty only in clear "and diſtinct ideas." I expected upon this, that your Lordſhip would have aſſoiled me, and ſaid, that then I was none of them; nor ſhould have been joined with them. But, inſtead of that, your Lordſhip tells me, "my anſwer doth "not come fully up in all things, to what your Lordſhip could wiſh." The queſtion is, whether I ought to be liſted with theſe, and ranked on their ſide, who place certainty only in clear and diſtinct ideas? What more direct and categorical anſwer could your Lordſhip wiſh for, to decide this queſtion, than that which I give? To which nothing can be replied, but that it is not true: but that your Lordſhip does not object to it; but ſays, "it does not come fully up in "all things, to what your Lordſhip could wiſh." What other things there can be wiſhed for, in an anſwer, which, if it be true, decides the matter, and which is not doubted to be true, comes not within my gueſs. But tho' my anſwer be an unexceptionable anſwer, as to the point in queſtion, yet, it ſeems, my book is not an unexceptionable book, becauſe I own, that in it I ſay, "that certainty of know"ledge is to perceive the agreement or diſagreement of any ideas, as expreſſed in "any propoſition." Whether it be true, that certainty of knowledge lies in ſuch a perception, is nothing to the queſtion here; that, perhaps, we may have an occaſion to examine in another place. The queſtion here is, whether I ought to have been ranked with thoſe, who lay all foundation of certainty in clear and diſtinct ideas? And to that, I think, my anſwer is a full and deciſive anſwer; and there is nothing wanting in it, which your Lordſhip could wiſh for, to make it fuller.

But it is natural the book ſhould be found fault with, when the author, it ſeems, has had the ill luck to be under your Lordſhip's ill opinion. This I could not but be ſurprized to find in a paragraph, which your Lordſhip declares was deſigned to give me ſatisfaction. Your Lordſhip ſays, "tho' my anſwer doth not

“ come up, in all things, to what you could wiſh; yet you are glad to find, that “ in general I own the myſteries of the chriſtian faith, and the ſcriptures to be “ the foundation and rule of it.”

My Lord, I do not remember that ever I declared to your Lordſhip, or any body elſe, that I did not own all the doctrines of the chriſtian faith, and the ſcriptures to be the ſole rule and foundation of it. And, therefore, I know no more reaſon your Lordſhip had to ſay, that you are glad to find, that in general I own, &c. than I have reaſon to ſay, “ that I am glad to find that in general your “ Lordſhip owns the myſteries of the chriſtian faith, and the ſcriptures to be the “ foundation and rule of it.” Unleſs it be taken for granted that thoſe, who do not write and appear in print, in controverſies of religion, do not own the chriſtian faith, and the ſcriptures as the rule of it.

I know, my Lord, of what weight a commendation from your Lordſhip's pen is in the world: and I perceive your Lordſhip knows the value of it, which has made your Lordſhip temper your's of me, with ſo large an alloy, for fear poſſibly, leſt it ſhould work too ſtrongly on my vanity. For whether I conſider, where theſe words ſtand, or how they are brought in, or what intimation they carry with them; which way ſoever I turn them, I do not find they were intended to puff me up, tho' they are in a paragraph purpoſely written to give me ſatisfaction; and grounded on words of mine, which ſeem to be approved by your Lordſhip, before any, in my letter; but which yet have nothing to do in this place (whither your Lordſhip has been at the pains to fetch them from my poſtſcript) unleſs it be to give vent to ſo extraordinary a ſort of compliment: for they are, I think, in their ſubject, as well as place, the remoteſt of any in my letter, from the argument your Lordſhip was then upon; which was to ſhew what care you had taken not to be miſunderſtood to my prejudice. For what, I beſeech you, my Lord, would you think of him, who from ſome words of your Lordſhip's, that ſeemed to expreſs much of a chriſtian ſpirit and temper (for ſo your Lordſhip is pleaſed to ſay, of theſe of mine) ſhould ſeek occaſion to tell your Lordſhip, and the world, that he was glad to find that your Lordſhip was a chriſtian, and that you believed the bible? For this, common humanity, as well as chriſtian charity, obliges us to believe, of every one, who calls himſelf a chriſtian, till he manifeſts the contrary. Whereas the ſaying, I am glad to find ſuch an one believes the ſcripture, is underſtood to intimate, that I knew the time when he did not; or, at leaſt, when I ſuſpected he did not. But perhaps your Lordſhip had ſome other meaning in it, which I do not ſee. The largeneſs of your Lordſhip's mind, and the charity of a father of our church, makes me hope that I paſſed not in your Lordſhip's opinion for a heathen, till your Lordſhip read that paſſage, in the poſtſcript of my late letter to you.

But to return to the ſatisfaction your Lordſhip is giving me. To thoſe words quoted out of my poſtſcript, your Lordſhip ſubjoins: “ which words ſeem to ex- “ preſs ſo much of a chriſtian ſpirit and temper, that I cannot believe, you in- “ tended to give any advantage to the enemies of the chriſtian faith; but whe- “ ther there hath not been too juſt occaſion for them, to apply them in that man- “ ner, is a thing very fit for you to conſider.”

Your Lordſhip here again expreſſe as favourable opinion of my intentions, which I gratefully acknowledge: but you add, “ that it is fit for me to conſider, “ whether there hath not been too juſt occaſion for them, to apply them in that “ manner.” My Lord, I ſhall do what, your Lordſhip thinks, is fit for me to do, when your Lordſhip does me the favour to tell me, who thoſe enemies of the faith are, who have applied thoſe words of my poſtſcript (for to thoſe, alone, by any kind of conſtruction, can I make your Lordſhip's word, them, refer) and the manner, which they have applied them in, and the too juſt occaſion, they have had, ſo to apply them. For I confeſs, my Lord, I am at a loſs, as to all theſe; and thereby unable to obey your Lordſhip's commands, till your Lordſhip does me the favour to make me underſtand all theſe particulars better.

But if, by any new way of conſtruction, unintelligible to me, the word, them, here ſhall be applied to any paſſages of my Eſſay of Human Underſtanding; I muſt humbly crave leave to obſerve this one thing, in the whole courſe of what your Lordſhip has deſigned for my ſatisfaction, that tho' my complaint be of your

Lordſhip's manner of applying, what I had publiſhed in my Eſſay, ſo as to intereſt me in a controverſy, wherein I meddled not; your Lordſhip all along tells me of others, that have miſapplied, I know not what, words in my book, after I know not what manner. Now, as to this matter, I beſeech your Lordſhip to believe, that when any one, in ſuch a manner, applies my words, contrary to what I intended them, ſo as to make them oppoſite to the doctrine of the Trinity, and me a party in that controverſy againſt the Trinity, as your Lordſhip knows, I complain your Lordſhip has done, I ſhall complain of them too; and conſider, as well as I can, what ſatisfaction they give me and others in it.

P. 37. YOUR Lordſhip's next words are: "for, in an age, wherein the myſteries of "faith are ſo much expoſed, by the promoters of ſcepticiſm and infidelity; it is "a thing of dangerous conſequence, to ſtart ſuch new methods of certainty, as "are apt to leave men's minds more doubtful, than before; as will ſoon appear "from your own conceſſions."

THESE words contain a further accuſation of my book, which ſhall be conſidered in its due place. What I am now upon, is the ſatisfaction your Lordſhip is giving me, in reference to my complaint. And as to that, what follows to the 46th page, is brought only to ſhew that your Lordſhip had reaſon to ſay, "that my notions were carried beyond my intentions:" for, in theſe words, your Lordſhip winds up all the following eight or nine pages, viz. "thus far I have "endeavoured, with all poſſible brevity and clearneſs, to lay down your ſenſe "about this matter; by which it is ſufficiently proved, that I had reaſon to ſay, "that your notions were carried beyond your intentions." P. 46.

I BEG leave to remind your Lordſhip, that my complaint was not that your Lordſhip ſaid, "that my notions were carried beyond my intentions." I was not ſo abſurd, as to turn what was matter of acknowledgment, into matter of complaint. And, therefore, in ſhewing the care, you had taken of me, for my ſatisfaction, your Lordſhip needed not to have been at ſo much pains, in ſo long a deduction, to prove to me, that you had reaſon for ſaying, what was ſo manifeſtly in my favour, whether you had reaſon for ſaying it, or no. But my complaint was, that the new way of reaſoning, accuſed by your Lordſhip, as oppoſite to the doctrine of the Trinity, being, in laying all foundation of certainty in clear and diſtinct ideas, your Lordſhip ranked me amongſt the gentlemen of this new way of reaſoning, tho' I laid not all foundation of certainty in clear and diſtinct ideas. And this being my complaint, it is for this, that there needs a reaſon. Your Lordſhip ſubjoins,

P. 46. "BUT you ſtill ſeem concerned that I quote your words; altho' I declare, they "were uſed to other purpoſes, than you intended them. I do confeſs to you, "that the reaſon of it was, that I found your notions, as to certainty, by ideas, "was the main foundation, which the author of Chriſtianity not myſterious "went upon; and that he had nothing, which looked like reaſon, if that prin- P. 47. "ciple were removed; which made me ſo much endeavour to ſhew, that it "would not hold. And ſo, I ſuppoſe, the reaſon of my mentioning your words "ſo often, is no longer a riddle to you."

MY Lord, he that will give himſelf the trouble to look into the 61ſt page of my former letter, where I ſpeak of your Lordſhip's way of proceeding, as a riddle to me; or into the 59th page, which your Lordſhip here quoted, for my ſeeming concerned at it; will find my complaint, in both places, as well as ſeveral others, was, that I was ſo every where joined with others, under the comprehenſive words of, they, and them, &c. tho' my book alone was every where quoted, "that the world would be apt to think I was the perſon, who argued "againſt the Trinity, and denied myſteries;" againſt whom your Lordſhip directed theſe very pages. For ſo I expreſs myſelf, in that very 59th page, which your Lordſhip here quotes. And, as to this, your Lordſhip's way of writing (which is the ſubject of my complaint) is (for any thing, your Lordſhip has, in your anſwer, ſaid, to give me ſatisfaction) as much ſtill a riddle to me, as ever.

FOR that, which your Lordſhip here ſays, and is the only thing, I can find, your Lordſhip has ſaid to clear it, ſeems to me to do nothing towards it. Your

Lordſhip ſays, "the reaſon of it was, that you found my notions, as to certainty by ideas, was the main foundation, which the author of Chriſtianity not myſterious went upon." &c. P. 47.

With ſubmiſſion, I thought your Lordſhip had found, that the foundation, which the author of Chriſtianity not myſterious went upon, and for which he was made one of the gentlemen of the new way of reaſoning, oppoſite to the doctrine of the Trinity, was, that he made, or ſuppoſed, clear and diſtinct ideas, neceſſary to certainty; but that is not my notion, as to certainty by ideas. My notion of certainty by ideas, is, that certainty conſiſts in the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of ideas, ſuch as we have, whether they be, in all their parts, perfectly clear and diſtinct, or no: nor have I any notions of certainty, more than this one. And if your Lordſhip had for this called me a gentleman of a new way of reaſoning, or made me one of the oppoſers of the doctrine of the Trinity, I ſhould perhaps have wondered; but ſhould not at all have complained of your Lordſhip, for directly queſtioning this, or any of my opinions: I ſhould only have examined what your Lordſhip has ſaid to ſupport, or have deſired you to make out, that charge againſt me; which is what I ſhall do, by and by, when I come to examine what your Lordſhip now charges this opinion with: but I ſhall not add any complaints to my defence. Vindicat. p. 232. and Anſw. p. 14.

That which I complained of, was, that I was made one of the gentlemen of the new way of reaſoning, without being guilty of what made them ſo; and ſo was brought into a chapter, wherein I thought myſelf not concerned: which was managed ſo, that my book was all along quoted, and others argued againſt; others were entitled to what I ſaid, and I, to what others ſaid, without knowing why, or how. Nor am I yet, I muſt own, much enlightened in the reaſon of it: that was the cauſe, why I then thought it a new way of writing; and that muſt be my apology for thinking ſo ſtill, till I light upon, or am directed to, ſome author, who has ever writ thus before.

And thus I come to the end of what your Lordſhip has ſaid, to that part of my letter, which your Lordſhip calls my complaint; wherein, I think, I have omitted nothing which your Lordſhip has alleged for the ſatisfaction of others, or myſelf, under thoſe two heads, of the occaſion of your Lordſhip's way of writing, as you did, and the care you took not to be miſunderſtood. And if, my Lord, as to me, it has not, poſſibly, had all the ſucceſs, your Lordſhip propoſed; I beg your Lordſhip to attribute it to my dulneſs, or any thing, rather than an unwillingneſs to be ſatisfied.

My Lord, I ſo little love controverſy, that I never began a diſpute with any body; nor ſhall ever continue it, where others begin with me, any longer than the appearance of truth, which firſt made me write, obliges me not to quit it. But leaſt of all, would I have any controverſy with your Lordſhip, if I had any deſign in writing, but the defence of truth. I do not know my own weakneſs, or your Lordſhip's ſtrength ſo little, as to enter the liſts with your Lordſhip, only for a tryal of ſkill, or the vain and ridiculous hopes of victory. Nothing, I know, but truth on my ſide, can ſupport me againſt ſo great a man; whoſe very name in writing, and authority in the learned world, is of weight enough to cruſh, and ſink, whatever opinion has not that ſolid baſis to bear it up.

There are men, that enter into diſputes to get a name in controverſy, or for ſome little by-ends of a party; your Lordſhip has been ſo long in the firſt rank of the men of letters, and, by common conſent, ſettled at the top of this learned age, that it muſt paſs for the utmoſt folly, not to think, that, if your Lordſhip condeſcended ſo far, as to meddle with any of the opinions of ſo inconſiderable a man, as I am, it was with a deſign to convince me of my errors, and not to gain reputation on one, ſo infinitely below your match. It is upon this ground, that I ſtill continue to offer my doubts to your Lordſhip, in thoſe parts, wherein I am not yet ſo happy as to be convinced; and it is with this ſatisfaction, I return this anſwer to your Lordſhip, that, if I am in a miſtake, your Lordſhip will certainly detect it, and lead me into the truth; which I ſhall embrace, with the acknowledgment of the benefit I have received from your Lordſhip's inſtructions. And, that your Lordſhip, in the mean time, will have the goodneſs to allow me, as becomes a ſcholar, willing to profit by the favour you do me, to ſhew your Lordſhip where I ſtick, and in what points your Lordſhip's arguments have failed to work upon me. For, as on the one ſide, it would not become one, that would learn of your Lordſhip, to acknowledge himſelf convinced, before he is convinced; and I know, your Lordſhip would blame me for it, if I ſhould do ſo: ſo, on the other ſide, to continue to diſſent from your Lordſhip, where you have done me the honour to take pains with me without giving you my reaſons for it, would, I think, be an ungrateful and unmannerly ſullenneſs.

Your Lordſhip has had the goodneſs to write ſeveral leaves, to give me ſatiſfaction as to the matter of my complaints, I return your Lordſhip my moſt humble thanks, for this great condeſcenſion; which I take as a pledge, that you will bear with the repreſentation of my doubts, in other points, wherein I am ſo unlucky, as not to be yet thoroughly enlightened by your Lordſhip. And ſo I go on to the remaining parts of your letter, which, I think, may be comprehended under theſe two, viz. thoſe things in my Eſſay, which your Lordſhip now charges, as concerned in the controverſy of the Trinity; and others, as faulty in themſelves, whether we conſider them with reſpect to any doctrines of religion, or no.

P. 133. In the cloſe of your Lordſhip's letter, after ſome other expreſſions of civility to me, for which I return your Lordſhip my thanks, I find theſe words: "I do "aſſure you, that it is out of no diſreſpect, or the leaſt ill-will to you, that I "have again conſidered this matter; but becauſe I am further convinced, that, "as you have ſtated your notion of ideas, it may be of dangerous conſequence "to that article of chriſtian faith, which I endeavour to defend."

This now is a direct charge againſt my book; and I muſt own it a great ſatiſfaction to me, that I ſhall now be no longer at a loſs, who it is your Lordſhip means; that I ſhall ſtand by myſelf, and by myſelf anſwer for my own faults, and not be ſo placed in ſuch an aſſociation with others, that will hinder me from knowing, what is my particular guilt, and ſhare in the accuſation. Had your Lordſhip done me the favour to have treated me ſo before, you had heard nothing of all thoſe complaints, which have been ſo troubleſome to your Lordſhip.

To take now a right view of this matter, it is fit to conſider the beginning and progreſs of it: your Lordſhip had a controverſy with the Unitarians; they, in their anſwer to your Lordſhip's ſermons, and elſewhere, talk of ideas; the author of Chriſtianity not myſterious (whether an Unitarian, or no, your Lordſhip ſays not, neither do I enquire) gives an account of reaſon, which, as your Lordſhip ſays, ſuppoſes certainty to conſiſt only in clear and diſtinct ideas: and, becauſe he expreſſes himſelf in ſome other things, conformable to what I had ſaid in my book, my book is brought into the controverſy, tho' there be no ſuch opinion in it, as your Lordſhip oppoſed. For what that was, is plain, both from what has been obſerved out of the beginning of the tenth chapter of your Vindication of the Trinity, and the fourteenth page of your letter, viz. this propoſition, "That certainty, as to matters of faith, is founded upon clear and "diſtinct ideas." But my book not having that propoſition in it, which your Lordſhip then oppoſed, as overthrowing myſteries of faith, at that time, fell, by I know not what chance and misfortune, into the Unitarian controverſy.

Upon examination, my book being not found guilty of that propoſition, which your Lordſhip, in your Vindication of the doctrine of the Trinity, oppoſed, becauſe it overthrows the myſteries of faith; I thought it acquitted, and clear from that controverſy. No it muſt not eſcape ſo: your Lordſhip, having again conſidered this matter, has found new matter of accuſation, and a new charge is brought againſt my book; and what now is it? Even this, "That, as I have "ſtated my notion of ideas, it may be of dangerous conſequence to that article "of the chriſtian faith, which your Lordſhip has endeavoured to defend."

The accuſation then, as it now ſtands, is, that my notion of ideas may be of dangerous conſequence, &c.

Such an accuſation as this, brought in any court in England, would, no doubt, be thought to ſhew a great inclination to have the accuſed be ſuſpected, rather than any evidence of being guilty of any thing; and ſo would immediately be diſmiſſed, without hearing any plea to it. But to controverſies, in print, wherein an appeal is made to the judgment of mankind, the ſtrict rules of proceeding in juſtice, are not always thought neceſſary to be obſerved; and the ſentence of thoſe, who are appealed to, being never formally pronounced, a cauſe can never be diſmiſſed, as long as the proſecutor is pleaſed to continue, or renew his charge.

As to the matter in hand, tho' what your Lordſhip ſays here, againſt my book, be nothing but your apprehenſion of what may be; yet no body will think it ſtrange, or unſuitable to your Lordſhip's character and ſtation, to be watchful over any article of the chriſtian faith, eſpecially one, that you have endeavoured to defend; and to warn the world of any thing, your Lordſhip may ſuſpect to be of dangerous conſequence to it, as far as you can eſpy it. And to this give me leave, my Lord, to attribute the trouble your Lordſhip has been at, to write again in this matter.

Another thing I muſt take notice of, in this your Lordſhip's new charge againſt my book, that it is againſt my notion of ideas, as I have ſtated it. This containing all that I have ſaid, in my Eſſay, concerning ideas, which, as your Lordſhip takes notice, is not a little; your Lordſhip, I know, would not be thought to leave ſo general an accuſation upon my book, as you could receive no anſwer to: and therefore, tho' your Lordſhip has not been pleaſed plainly to ſpecify here the particulars, in my notion of ideas, which your Lordſhip apprehends to be of dangerous conſequence to that article, which your Lordſhip has defended; I ſhall endeavour to find them, in other parts of your letter. P. 132.

Your Lordſhip's words, in the immediately preceding page, run thus: "I can "eaſily bear the putting of philoſophical notions into a modern and faſhionable "dreſs."

"Let men expreſs their minds, by ideas, if they pleaſe; and take pleaſure in "ſorting, and comparing, and connecting of them, I am not forward to condemn them: for every age muſt have its new modes; and it is very well, if "truth and reaſon be received in any garb. I was, therefore, far enough from "condemning your way of ideas, until I found it made the only ground of certainty, and made uſe of, to overthrow the myſteries of our faith, as I told you "in the beginning."

These words, leading to your Lordſhip's accuſation, I thought the likelieſt to ſhew me what it was in my book, that your Lordſhip now declared againſt, as what might be of dangerous conſequence to that article, you have defended; and that ſeemed to me, to lie in theſe two particulars, viz. the making ſo much uſe of the word ideas; and my placing, as I do, certainty in ideas, i. e. in the things ſignified by them. And theſe two ſeem here to be the particulars, which your Lordſhip comprehends, under my way by ideas. But that I might not be led into miſtake, by this paſſage, which ſeemed a little more obſcure and doubtful to me, than I could have wiſhed; I conſulted thoſe other places, wherein your Lordſhip ſeemed to expreſs what it was, that your Lordſhip now accuſed in my book, in reference to the Unitarian controverſy; and which your Lordſhip apprehends, may be of dangerous conſequence to that article.

Your Lordſhip, in the cloſe of the words above-quoted, out of the 132d page of your anſwer, tells me: "you were far enough from condemning my way of "ideas, till your Lordſhip found it made the only ground of certainty, and made "uſe of, to overthrow the myſteries of our faith, as you told me in the beginning."

My Lord, the way of ideas, which your Lordſhip oppoſed at firſt, was the way of certainty only by clear and diſtinct ideas; as appears by your words above-quoted, out of your 14th page: but that, your Lordſhip now knows, was not my way of certainty by ideas; and therefore that, and all the uſe can be made of it, to overthrow the myſteries of our faith, be that as it will, cannot any more be charged on my book, but is quite out of doors: and, therefore, what you ſaid in the beginning, gave me no light into what was your Lordſhip's preſent accuſation. P. 23.

But, page the 23d, I found theſe words: "when new terms are made uſe "of, by ill men, to promote ſcepticiſm and infidelity, and to overthrow the "myſteries of our faith, we have then reaſon to enquire into them, and to ex- "amine the foundation and tendency of them. And this was the true and only "reaſon, of my looking into this way of certainty by ideas, becauſe I found it "applied to ſuch purpoſes."

Here, my Lord, your Lordſhip ſeems to lay your accuſation wholly againſt new terms and their tendency.

And in another place, your Lordſhip has theſe words:

P. 93. "The world hath been ſtrangely amuſed with ideas of late; and we have been "told, that ſtrange things might be done, by the help of the ideas; and yet "theſe ideas, at laſt, come to be only common notions of things, which we muſt "make uſe of, in our reaſoning. You [i. e. the author of the Eſſay concerning "Human Underſtanding] ſay, in that chapter about the exiſtence of God, you "thought it moſt proper to expreſs yourſelf, in the moſt uſual and familiar way, "by common words and expreſſions. I would you had done ſo quite thorough "your book; for then you had never given that occaſion to the enemies of our "faith, to take up your new way of ideas, as an effectual battery, (as they ima- "gined) againſt the myſteries of the chriſtian faith. But you might have en- "joyed the ſatisfaction of your ideas, long enough, before I had taken notice of "them, unleſs I had found them employed about doing miſchief."

By which places it is plain, that that, which your Lordſhip apprehends, in my book, "may be of dangerous conſequence, to the article, which your Lord- "ſhip has endeavoured to defend," is my introducing new terms; and that, which your Lordſhip inſtances in, is that of ideas. And the reaſon, your Lordſhip gives, in every of theſe places, why your Lordſhip has ſuch an apprehenſion of ideas, as "that they be of dangerous conſequence to that article of "faith, which your Lordſhip has endeavoured to defend, is, becauſe they have "been applied to ſuch purpoſes. And I might (your Lordſhip ſays) have en- "joyed the ſatisfaction of my ideas, long enough, before you had taken notice "of them, unleſs your Lordſhip had found them employed in doing miſchief." Which, at laſt, as I humbly conceive, amounts to thus much, and no more, viz. that your Lordſhip fears ideas, i. e. the term, ideas, may, ſome time or other, prove of very dangerous conſequence to what your Lordſhip has endeavoured to defend, becauſe they have been made uſe of, in arguing againſt it. For I am ſure your Lordſhip does not mean that you apprehend the things, ſignified by ideas, "may be of dangerous conſequence to the article of faith, your Lordſhip "endeavours to defend," becauſe they have been made uſe of, againſt it: for (beſides that your Lordſhip mentions terms) that would be to expect that thoſe, who oppoſe that article, ſhould oppoſe it, without any thoughts: for the thing ſignified by ideas, is nothing but the immediate object of our minds, in thinking: ſo that, unleſs any one can oppoſe the article, your Lordſhip defends, without thinking on ſomething, he muſt uſe the things ſignified by ideas: for he, that thinks, muſt have ſome immediate object of his mind, in thinking, i. e. muſt have ideas.

But whether it be the name, or the thing; ideas in ſound, or ideas in ſignification, that your Lordſhip apprehends may be of dangerous conſequence to that article of faith, which your Lordſhip endeavours to defend; it ſeems to me, I will not ſay a new way of reaſoning, (for that belongs to me) but were it not your Lordſhip's, I ſhould think it a very extraordinary way of reaſoning, to write againſt a book, wherein your Lordſhip acknowledges, they are not uſed to bad purpoſes, nor employed to do miſchief; only, becauſe that you find, that ideas are, by thoſe who oppoſe your Lordſhip, employed to do miſchief; and ſo apprehend, they may be of dangerous conſequence to the article, your Lordſhip has engaged in the defence of. For, whether ideas, as terms, or ideas, as the immediate objects of the mind, ſignified by thoſe terms, may be, in your Lordſhip's apprehenſion, of dangerous conſequence to that article; I do not ſee, how your Lordſhip's writing againſt the notion of ideas, as ſtated in my book, will at all hinder your oppoſers from employing them, in doing miſchief, as before.

"HOWEVER, be that as it will, ſo it is, that your Lordſhip apprehends theſe new terms, theſe ideas, with which the world hath, of late, been ſo ſtrangely amuſed (tho' at laſt they come to be only common notions of things, as your Lordſhip owns) may be of dangerous conſequence to that article." P. 93.

MY LORD, if any, in their anſwer to your Lordſhip's ſermons, and, in their other pamphlets, wherein your Lordſhip complains, they have talked ſo much of ideas, have been troubleſome to your Lordſhip with that term; it is not ſtrange, that your Lordſhip ſhould be tired with that ſound: but how natural ſoever it be to our weak conſtitutions, to be offended with any ſound, wherewith an importunate din hath been made about our ears; yet, my Lord, I know your Lordſhip has a better opinion of the articles of our faith, than to think any of them can be overturned, or ſo much as ſhaken with a breath, formed into any ſound, or term, whatſoever.

NAMES are but the arbitrary marks of conceptions, and ſo they be ſufficiently appropriated to them, in their uſe, I know no other difference any of them have, in particular, but as they are of eaſy, or difficult, pronunciation, and of a more, or leſs, pleaſant ſound: and what particular antipathies there may be in men, to ſome of them, upon that account, is not eaſy to be foreſeen. This I am ſure, no term whatſoever in itſelf bears, one more than another, any oppoſition to truth of any kind; they are only propoſitions that do, or can, oppoſe the truth of any article, or doctrine: and thus no term is privileged from being ſet in oppoſition to truth.

THERE is no word to be found, which may not be brought into a propoſition, wherein the moſt ſacred and moſt evident truths may be oppoſed; but that is not a fault in the term, but him that uſes it: and, therefore, I cannot eaſily perſuade myſelf (whatever your Lordſhip hath ſaid, in the heat of your concern) that you have beſtowed ſo much pains upon my book, becauſe the word, idea, is ſo much uſed there. For tho' upon my ſaying, in my chapter about the exiſtence of God, "that I ſcarce uſed the word, idea, in that whole chapter; your Lordſhip P. 93. wiſhes, that I had done ſo quite thro' my book:" yet I muſt rather look upon that as a compliment to me, wherein your Lordſhip wiſhed, that my book had been, all thro', ſuited to vulgar readers, not uſed to that, and the like terms, than that your Lordſhip has ſuch an apprehenſion of the word, idea; or that there is any ſuch harm in the uſe of it, inſtead of the word, notion, (with which P. 23. your Lordſhip, ſeems to take it to agree, in ſignification) that your Lordſhip would think it worth your while to ſpend any part of your valuable time and thoughts, about my book, for having the word, idea, ſo often in it: for this would be to make your Lordſhip to write only againſt an impropriety of ſpeech. I own to your Lordſhip, it is a great condeſcention in your Lordſhip to have done it, if that word have ſuch a ſhare, in what your Lordſhip has writ againſt my book, as ſome expreſſions would perſuade one; and I would, for the ſatisfaction of your Lordſhip, change the term of idea for a better, if your Lordſhip, or any one, could help me to it. For, that notion will not ſo well ſtand for every immediate object of the mind, in thinking, as ideas does, I have (as I gueſs) ſomewhere given a reaſon in my book, by ſhewing that the term, notion, is more peculiarly appropriated to a certain ſort of thoſe objects, which I call mixed modes: and, I think, it would not ſound altogether ſo well, to ſay, the notion of red, and the notion of a horſe; as the idea of red, and the idea of a horſe. But if any one thinks it will I contend not; for I have no fondneſs for, nor antipathy to any particular, articulate ſounds: nor do I think there is any ſpell, or faſcination in any of them.

BUT be the word, idea, proper, or improper, I do not ſee, how it is the better, or worſe, becauſe ill men have made uſe of it, or becauſe it has been made uſe of to bad purpoſes: for if that be a reaſon to condemn, or lay it by, we muſt lay by the terms of ſcripture, reaſon, perception, diſtinct, clear, &c. nay, the name of God, himſelf, will not eſcape: for I do not think any one of theſe, or any other term, can be produced, which has not been made uſe of, by ſuch men, and to ſuch purpoſes. And, therefore, "if the Unitarians, in their late pamphlets, "have talked very much of, and ſtrangely amuſed the world with, ideas;" I cannot believe your Lordſhip will think that word one jot the worſe, or the more dangerous, becauſe they uſe it; any more than, for the uſe of them, you will think reaſon, or ſcripture terms, ill, or dangerous. And, therefore, what your Lordſhip ſays, in the bottom of this ninety-third page, that "I might have enjoyed the ſatisfaction of my ideas, long enough, before your Lordſhip had "taken notice of them, unleſs you had found them employed in doing miſchief;" will, I preſume, when your Lordſhip has conſidered again of this matter, prevail with your Lordſhip, to let me enjoy ſtill the ſatisfaction, I take in my ideas, i. e. as much ſatisfaction as I can take, in ſo ſmall a matter, as is the uſing of a proper term, notwithſtanding it ſhould be imployed by others, in doing miſchief.

For, my Lord, if I ſhould leave it wholly out of my book, and ſubſtitute the word notion, every where, in the room of it; and every body elſe do ſo too, (tho' your Lordſhip does not, I ſuppoſe, ſuſpect that I have the vanity to think, they would follow my example) my book would, it ſeems, be the more to your Lordſhip's liking: but I do not ſee how this would one jot abate the miſchief, your Lordſhip complains of: for the Unitarians might as much employ notions, as they do now ideas, to do miſchief; unleſs they are ſuch fools as to think, they can conjure with this notable word, idea, and that the force of what they ſay, lies in the ſound, and not in the ſignification of their terms.

This I am ſure of, that the truths of the chriſtian religion can be no more battered by one word, than another: nor can they be beaten down, or endangered, by any ſound whatſoever: and I am apt to flatter myſelf, that your Lordſhip is ſatisfied, there is no harm in the word, ideas, becauſe you ſay, you ſhould not have taken any notice of my ideas, "if the enemies of our faith had not taken "up my new way, of ideas, as an effectual battery againſt the myſteries of the "chriſtian faith." In which place, by new way of ideas, nothing, I think, can be conſtrued to be meant, but my expreſſing myſelf, by that of ideas; and not by other more common words, and of antienter ſtanding in the Engliſh language.

My new way by ideas, or my way by ideas, which often occurs in your Lordſhip's letter, is, I confeſs, a very large and doubtful expreſſion; and may, in the full latitude, comprehend my whole Eſſay: becauſe treating in it of the Underſtanding, which is nothing but the faculty of thinking, I could not well treat of that faculty of the mind, which conſiſts in thinking, without conſidering the immediate objects of the mind, in thinking, which I call ideas: And therefore, in treating of the underſtanding, I gueſs it will not be thought ſtrange, that the greateſt part of my book has been taken up in conſidering what theſe objects of the mind, in thinking, are; whence they come; what uſe the mind makes of them, in its ſeveral ways of thinking; and what are the outward marks, whereby it ſignifies them to others, or records them for its own uſe. And this, in ſhort, is my way by ideas, that which your Lordſhip calls my new way by ideas; which, my Lord, if it be new, it is but a new hiſtory of an old thing; for I think, it will not be doubted, that men always performed the actions of thinking, reaſoning, believing, and knowing, juſt after the ſame manner, that they do now, tho', whether the ſame account has heretofore been given of the way, how they performed theſe actions, or wherein they conſiſted, I do not know. Were I as well read as your Lordſhip, I ſhould have been ſafe from that gentle reprimand of your Lordſhip's for "thinking my way of ideas "new, for want of looking into other men's thoughts, which appear in their "books." P. 81.

Your Lordſhip's words, as an acknowledgment of your inſtructions in the caſe, and as a warning to others, who will be ſo bold adventurers as to ſpin any thing barely out of their own thoughts, I ſhall ſet down at large; and they run thus: "whether you took this way of ideas, from the modern philoſopher, mentioned by you, is not at all material: but I intended no reflection upon you in "it (for that you mean, by my commending you, as a ſcholar of ſo great a "maſter) I never meant to take from you the honour of your own inventions; P. 80.

" and I do believe you, when you ſay, that you wrote from your own thoughts, " and the ideas you had there. But many things may ſeem new to one, who " converſes only with his own thoughts, which really are not ſo; as he may " find, when he looks into the thoughts of other men, which appear in their " books. And therefore, altho' I have a juſt eſteem for the invention of ſuch " who can ſpin volumes barely out of their own thoughts; yet I am apt to think, " they would oblige the world more, if, after they have thought ſo much them- " ſelves, they would examine what thoughts others have had before them, con- " cerning the ſame things; that ſo thoſe may not be thought their own inven- " tions, which are common to themſelves and others. If a man ſhould try all " the magnetical experiments himſelf, and publiſh them, as his own thoughts, " he might take himſelf to be the inventor of them: but he that examines and " compares with them what Gibbert, and others, have done before him, will " not diminiſh the praiſe of his diligence, but may wiſh he had compared his " thoughts with other men's; by which the world would receive greater advan- " tage, altho' he had loſt the honour of being an original."

To alleviate my fault herein, I agree with your Lordſhip, " that many things " may ſeem new, to one, that converſes only with his own thoughts, which " really are not ſo:" But I muſt crave leave to ſuggeſt to your Lordſhip, that if, in the ſpinning them out of his own thoughts, they ſeem new to him, he is certainly the inventor of them: and they may as juſtly be thought his own invention, as any one's, and he is as certainly the inventor of them, as any one, who thought on them, before him: the diſtinction of invention, or not invention, lying not in thinking firſt, or not firſt, but in borrowing, or not borrowing, your thoughts from another: and he to whom, ſpinning them out of his own thoughts, they ſeem new, could not certainly borrow them from another. So he truly invented printing in Europe, who without any communication with the Chineſe, ſpun it out of his own thoughts; tho' it were ever ſo true, that the Chineſe had the uſe of printing, nay, of printing in the very ſame way among them, many ages before him. So that he, that ſpins any thing out of his own thoughts, that ſeems new to him, cannot ceaſe to think it his own invention, ſhould he examine ever ſo far, what thoughts others have had before him, concerning the ſame thing; and ſhould find, by examining, that they had the ſame thoughts too.

But what great obligation this would be to the world, or weighty cauſe of turning over and looking into books, I confeſs I do not ſee. The great end to me, in converſing with my own, or rather other men's thoughts, in matters of ſpeculation, is to find truth, without being much concerned, whether my own ſpinning of it out of mine, or their ſpinning of it out of their own thoughts, helps me to it. And how little I affect the honour of an original, may be ſeen, in that place of my book, where, if any where, that itch of vain-glory was likelieſt to have ſhewn itſelf, had I been ſo over-run with it, as to need a cure. It is where I ſpeak of certainty in theſe following words, taken notice of, by your Lordſhip, in another place: " I think I have ſhewn, wherein it is, " that certainty, real certainty, conſiſts; which, whatever it was to others, was, " I confeſs, to me, heretofore, one of thoſe deſiderata, which I found great " want of." p. 39.

Here, my Lord, however new this ſeemed to me, and the more ſo, becauſe, poſſibly, I had in vain hunted for it, in the books of others; yet I ſpoke of it, as new only to myſelf; leaving others in the undiſturbed poſſeſſion of what either by invention or reading, was theirs before; without aſſuming to myſelf any other honour, but that of my own ignorance, till that time, if others before had ſhewn wherein certainty lay. And yet, my Lord; if I had, upon this occaſion, been forward to aſſume to myſelf the honour of an original, I think I had been pretty ſafe in it; ſince I ſhould have had your Lordſhip for my guarantee and vindicator in that point, who are pleaſed to call it new; and, as ſuch, to write againſt it.

And truly, my Lord, in this reſpect, my book has had very unlucky ſtars, ſince it hath had the miſfortune to diſpleaſe your Lordſhip, with many things in it, for their novelty; as " new way of reaſoning; new hypotheſis about rea- " ſon; new ſort of certainty; new terms; new way of ideas; new method Vind. p. 234, 240.

“ of certainty,” &c. and yet, in other places, your Lordſhip ſeems to think it worthy in me, of your Lordſhip's reflection, for ſaying but what others have ſaid before: as where I ſay, “ in the different make of men's tempers, and application of their thoughts, ſome arguments prevail more on one, and ſome on another, for the confirmation of the ſame truth;” your Lordſhip aſks, Vindic. p. 249. “ what is this different from what all men of underſtanding have ſaid?” Again, I take it, your Lordſhip meant not theſe words, for a commendation of my book, where you ſay; P. 23. “ but if no more be meant by the ſimple ideas that come in, by ſenſation or reflection, and their being the foundation of our knowledge; but that our notions of things come in, either from our ſenſes, or the exerciſe of our minds; as there is nothing extraordinary in the diſcovery, ſo your Lordſhip is far enough from oppoſing that, wherein you think all mankind are agreed.

P. 29. “ And again, but what need all this great noiſe, about ideas and certainty, true and real certainty by ideas; if after all, it comes only to this, our ideas only repreſent to us ſuch things, from whence we bring arguments to prove the truth of things?

P. 93. “ And the world hath been ſtrangely amuſed with ideas of late; and we have been told, that ſtrange things might be done by the help of ideas; and yet theſe ideas, at laſt, come to be only common notions of things, which we muſt make uſe of, in our reaſoning.” And to the like purpoſe, in other places.

Whether therefore, at laſt, your Lordſhip will reſolve, that it is new, or no, or more faulty by its being new, muſt be left to your Lordſhip. This I find, by it, that my book cannot avoid being condemned on the one ſide, or the other; nor do I ſee a poſſibility to help it. If there be readers, that like only new thoughts; or, on the other ſide, others that can bear nothing, but what can be juſtified, by received authorities in print; I muſt deſire them to make themſelves amends, in that part, which they like, for the diſpleaſure, they receive in the other: but if many ſhould be ſo exact as to find fault with both, truly I know not well what to ſay to them. The caſe is a plain caſe, the book is all over naught, and there is not a ſentence in it, that is not, either for its antiquity, or novelty, to be condemned; and ſo there is a ſhort end of it. From your Lordſhip, indeed, in particular, I can hope for ſomething better; for your Lordſhip P. 35. thinks the general deſign of it ſo good, that that, I flatter myſelf, would prevail on your Lordſhip, to preſerve it from the fire.

But, as to the way, your Lordſhip thinks, I ſhould have taken, to prevent the having it thought my invention, when it was common to me with others; it unluckily ſo fell out, in the ſubject of my Eſſay of Human Underſtanding, that I could not look into the thoughts of other men, to inform myſelf. For my deſign being, as well as I could, to copy nature, and to give an account of the operations of the mind in thinking, I could look into no body's underſtanding, but my own, to ſee how it wrought; nor have a proſpect into other men's minds, to view their thoughts there, and obſerve what ſteps and motions they took, and by what gradations they proceeded, in their acquainting themſelves with truth, and their advance to knowledge. What we find of their thoughts, in books, is but the reſult of this, and not the progreſs and working of their minds, in coming to the opinions, or concluſions, they ſet down and publiſhed.

All, therefore, that I can ſay of my book, is, that it is a copy of my own mind, in its ſeveral ways of operation. And all that I can ſay, for the publiſhing of it, is, that I think the intellectual faculties are made, and operate alike in moſt men; and that ſome, that I ſhewed it to, before I publiſhed it, liked it ſo well, that I was confirmed in that opinion. And, therefore, if it ſhould happen, that it ſhould not be ſo, but that ſome men ſhould have ways of thinking, reaſoning, or arriving at certainty, different from others, and above thoſe, that I find my mind to uſe, and acquieſce in, I do not ſee, of what uſe my book can be to them. I can only make it my humble requeſt, in my own name, and in the name of thoſe, that are of my ſize, who find their minds work, reaſon and know in the ſame low way, that mine does, that thoſe men of a more happy genius would ſhew us the way of their nobler flights; and particularly would diſcover to us their ſhorter, or ſurer, way to certainty, than by ideas, and the obſerving their agreement or diſagreement.

In the mean time, I muſt acknowledge, that if I had been guilty of affecting to be thought an original, a correction could not have come from any body, ſo diſintereſted in the caſe, as your Lordſhip; ſince your Lordſhip ſo much declines being thought an original, for writing in a way, wherein it is hard to avoid thinking, that you are the firſt, till ſome other can be produced that writ ſo before you.

But to return to your Lordſhip's preſent charge againſt my book; in the 38th page of your Lordſhip's anſwer, I find theſe words; "in an age, wherein the "myſteries of faith are ſo much expoſed by the promoters of ſcepticiſm and in"fidelity, it is a thing of dangerous conſequence, to ſtart ſuch new methods of "certainty, as are apt to leave men's minds more doubtful than before."

By which paſſage, and ſome expreſſions that ſeem to look that way, in the places above-quoted; I take it for granted, that another particular in my book, which your Lordſhip ſuſpects may be of dangerous conſequence to that article of faith, which your Lordſhip has endeavoured to defend, is my placing of certainty, as I do, in the perception of the agreement or diſagreement of our ideas.

Tho' I cannot conceive how any term, new or old, idea or not idea, can have any oppoſition, or danger in it, to any article of faith, or any truth whatſoever; yet I eaſily grant, that propoſitions are capable of being oppoſite to propoſitions, and may be ſuch as, if granted, may overthrow articles of faith, or any other truth they are oppoſite to. But your Lordſhip not having, as I remember, ſhewn, or gone about to ſhew, how this propoſition, viz. that certainty conſiſts in the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of two ideas, is oppoſite or inconſiſtent, with that article of faith, which your Lordſhip has endeavoured to defend, it is plain, it is but your Lordſhip's fear, that it may be of dangerous conſequence to it; which, as I humbly conceive, is no proof that it is any way inconſiſtent with that article.

No body, I think, can blame your Lordſhip or any one elſe, for being concerned for any article of the Chriſtian faith: but if that concern (as it may, and, as we know, it has done) makes any one apprehend danger, where no danger is; are we, therefore, to give up and condemn any propoſition, becauſe any one, tho' of the firſt rank and magnitude, fears it may be of dangerous conſequence to any truth of religion, without ſhewing that it is ſo? If ſuch fears be the meaſures, whereby to judge of truth or falſehood, the affirming that there are antipodes would be ſtill a hereſy; and the doctrine of the motion of the earth muſt be rejected, as overthrowing the truth of the ſcripture: for of that dangerous conſequence, it has been apprehended to be, by many learned and pious divines, out of their great concern for religion. And yet, notwithſtanding thoſe great apprehenſions of what dangerous conſequence it might be, it is now univerſally received by learned men, as an undoubted truth: and writ for by ſome, whoſe belief of the ſcripture is not at all queſtioned; and particularly, very lately, by a divine of the church of England, with great ſtrength of reaſon, in his wonderfully ingenious New Theory of the earth.

The reaſon your Lordſhip gives, of your fears, that it may be of ſuch dangerous conſequence to that article of faith which your Lordſhip endeavours to defend, tho' it occurs, in more places than one, is only this, viz. that it is made uſe of, by ill men, to do miſchief; i. e. to oppoſe that article of faith, which your Lordſhip has endeavoured to defend. But, my Lord, if it be a reaſon to lay by any thing as bad, becauſe it is, or may be uſed to an ill purpoſe; I know not what will be innocent enough to be kept. Arms, which were made for our defence, are ſometimes made uſe of, to do miſchief; and yet they are not thought of dangerous conſequence, for all that. No body lays by his ſword and piſtols, or thinks them of ſuch dangerous conſequence, as to be neglected, or thrown away; becauſe robbers, and the worſt of men, ſometimes make uſe of them to take away honeſt men's lives, or goods: and the reaſon is, becauſe they were deſigned, and will ſerve to preſerve them. And who knows, but this, may be the preſent caſe? If your Lordſhip thinks, that placing of certainty in the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement of ideas, be to be rejected as falſe, becauſe you apprehend it may be of dangerous conſequence to that article of faith; on the other ſide, perhaps others, with me, may think it a defence againſt error, and ſo (as being of good uſe) to be received and adhered to.

I would not, my Lord, be hereby thought to ſet up my own, or any one's judgment againſt your Lordſhip's: but I have ſaid this only to ſhew, while the argument lies for, or againſt the truth of any propoſition, barely in an imagination, that it may be of conſequence to the ſupporting, or overthrowing of any remote truth; it will be impoſſible, that way, to determine of the truth, or falſhood, of that propoſition. For imagination will be ſet up againſt imagination, and the ſtronger, probably, will be againſt your Lordſhip; the ſtrongeſt imaginations being uſually in the weakeſt heads. The only way, in this caſe, to put it paſt doubt, is, to ſhew the inconſiſtency of the two propoſitions; and then it will be ſeen, that one overthrows the other; the true the falſe one.

Your Lordſhip ſays, indeed, this is a new method of certainty. I will not ſay ſo myſelf, for fear of deſerving a ſecond reproof from your Lordſhip, for being too forward to aſſume to myſelf the honour of being an original. But this, I think, gives me occaſion, and will excuſe me from being thought impertinent, if I aſk your Lordſhip, whether there be any other, or older method of certainty? and what it is? For if there be no other, nor older than this, either this was always the method of certainty, and ſo mine is no new one; or elſe the world is obliged to me for this new one, after having been ſo long, in the want of ſo neceſſary a thing, as a method of certainty. If there be an older, I am ſure your Lordſhip cannot but know it; your condemning mine, as new, as well as your thorough inſight into antiquity, cannot but ſatisfy every body that you do. And, therefore, to ſet the world right, in a thing of that great concernment, and to overthrow mine, and thereby prevent the dangerous conſequence there is, in my having unreaſonably ſtarted it, will not, I humbly conceive, miſbecome your Lordſhip's care of that article you endeavoured to defend; nor the good-will, you bear to truth in general: for I will be anſwerable for myſelf, that I ſhall; and I think, I may be, for all others, that they all will give off the placing of certainty, in the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of ideas, if your Lordſhip will be pleaſed to ſhew, that it lies in any thing elſe.

But truly, not to aſcribe to myſelf an invention of what has been as old, as knowledge is in the world, I muſt own, I am not guilty of what your Lordſhip is pleaſed to call ſtarting new methods of certainty. Knowledge, ever ſince there has been any in the world, has conſiſted in one particular action of the mind; and ſo, I conceive, will continue to do, to the end of it: and to ſtart new methods of knowledge or certainty (for they are to me the ſame thing) i. e. to find out and propoſe new methods of attaining knowledge, either with more eaſe and quickneſs, or in things yet unknown, is what, I think, no body could blame: but this is not that, which your Lordſhip here means, by new methods of certainty. Your Lordſhip, I think, means by it, the placing of certainty in ſomething, wherein either it does not conſiſt; or elſe, where it was not placed before now; if this be to be called a new method of certainty: as to the latter of theſe, I ſhall know, whether I am guilty or no, when your Lordſhip will do me the favour to tell me, wherein it was placed before; which your Lordſhip knows, I profeſſed myſelf ignorant of when I writ my book, and ſo am ſtill; but if ſtarting of new methods of certainty, be the placing of certainty in ſomething, wherein it does not conſiſt; whether I have done that, or no, I muſt appeal to the experience of mankind.

There are ſeveral actions of men's minds, that they are conſcious to themſelves of performing; as willing, believing, knowing, &c. which they have ſo particular a ſenſe of, that they can diſtinguiſh them one from another; or elſe they could not ſay, when they willed, when they believed, and when they knew any thing. But tho' theſe actions were different enough, from one another, not to be confounded by thoſe, who ſpoke of them; yet no-body, that I had met with, had, in their writings, particularly ſet down, wherein the act of knowing preciſely conſiſted.

To this reflection, upon the actions of my own mind, the ſubject of my Eſſay concerning Human Underſtanding naturally led me; wherein, if I have done any thing new, it has been to deſcribe to others, more particularly than had been done before, what it is their minds do, when they perform that action, which they call knowing; and if, upon examination, they obſerve, I have given a true account of that action of their minds, in all the parts of it; I ſuppoſe it will be in vain to diſpute, againſt what they find, and feel, in themſelves: and if I have not told them right, and exactly what they find and feel in themſelves, when their minds perform the act of knowing, what I have ſaid, will be all in vain; men will not be perſuaded againſt their ſenſes. Knowledge is an internal perception of their minds; and if, when they reflect on it, they find it is not, what I have ſaid it is, my groundleſs conceit will not be hearkened to, but be exploded by every body, and die of itſelf; and no body need to be at any pains to drive it out of the world: ſo impoſſible is it to find out, or ſtart new methods of certainty, or to have them received, if any one places it in any thing, but in that, wherein it really conſiſts: much leſs can any one be in danger to be miſled into error, by any ſuch new, and, to every one viſibly, ſenſeleſs project. Can it be ſuppoſed, that any one could ſtart a new method of ſeeing, and perſuade men thereby, that they do not ſee what they do ſee? Is it to be feared, that any one can caſt ſuch a miſt over their eyes, that they ſhould not know, when they ſee, and ſo be led out of their way by it?

Knowledge, I find, in myſelf, and, I conceive in others, conſiſts in the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of the immediate objects of the mind in thinking, which I call ideas: but whether it does ſo, in others, or no, muſt be determined by their own experience, reflecting upon the action of their mind, in knowing; for that I cannot alter, nor, I think, they themſelves: but, whether they will call thoſe immediate objects of their minds, in thinking, ideas, or no, is perfectly in their own choice. If they diſlike that name, they may call them notions, or conceptions, or how they pleaſe; it matters not, if they uſe them ſo, as to avoid obſcurity and confuſion. If they are conſtantly uſed in the ſame and a known ſenſe, every one has the liberty to pleaſe himſelf in his terms; there lies neither truth, nor error, nor ſcience, in that; tho' thoſe, that take them for things, and not for what they are, bare arbitrary ſigns of our ideas, make a great deal ado, often about them, as if ſome great matter lay in the uſe of this, or that ſound. All that I know, or can imagine, of difference about them, is, that thoſe words are always beſt, whoſe ſignifications are beſt known, in the ſenſe they are uſed; and ſo are leaſt apt to breed confuſion.

My Lord, your Lordſhip has been pleaſed to find fault with my uſe of the new term, ideas, without telling me a better name, for the immediate objects of the mind, in thinking. Your Lordſhip has alſo been pleaſed to find fault with my definition of knowledge, without doing me the favour to give me a better: for it is only about my definition of knowledge, that all this ſtir, concerning certainty, is made. For with me, to know and to be certain, is the ſame thing; what I know, that I am certain of: and what I am certain of, that I know. What reaches to knowledge, I think, may be called certainty; and what comes ſhort of certainty, I think, cannot be called knowledge; as your Lordſhip could not but obſerve, in § 18. of chap. iv. of my fourth book, which you have quoted.

My definition of knowledge, in the beginning of the fourth book of my Eſſay, ſtands thus: "knowledge ſeems to me to be nothing but the perception of the "connexion, and agreement, or diſagreement, and repugnancy of any of our "ideas." This definition your Lordſhip diſlikes, and apprehends, "it may be "of dangerous conſequence, as to that article of chriſtian faith, which your "Lordſhip has endeavoured to defend." For this, there is a very eaſy remedy: It is but for your Lordſhip to ſet aſide this definition of knowledge, by giving us a better, and this danger is over. But your Lordſhip chuſes rather to have a controverſy with my book, for having it in it, and to put me upon the defence of it; for which I muſt acknowledge myſelf obliged to your Lordſhip, for affording me ſo much of your time, and for allowing me the honour of converſing ſo much with one, ſo far above me, in all reſpects.

YOUR Lordſhip ſays, "it may be of dangerous conſequence to that article of "chriſtian faith, which you have endeavoured to defend." Tho' the laws of diſputing allow bare denial, as a ſufficient anſwer to ſayings, without any offer of a proof; yet, my Lord, to ſhew how willing I am to give your Lordſhip all ſatisfaction, in what you apprehend may be of dangerous conſequence, in my book, as to that article, I ſhall not ſtand ſtill ſullenly, and put your Lordſhip upon the difficulty of ſhewing, wherein that danger lies: but ſhall, on the other ſide, endeavour to ſhew your Lordſhip, that that definition of mine, whether true or falſe, right or wrong, can be of no dangerous conſequence to that article of faith. The reaſon, which I ſhall offer for it, is this; becauſe it can be of no conſequence to it, at all.

THAT which your Lordſhip is afraid, it may be dangerous to, is an article of faith: that, which your Lordſhip labours, and is concerned for, is the certainty of faith. Now, my Lord, I humbly conceive the certainty of faith, if your Lordſhip thinks fit to call it ſo, has nothing to do with the certainty of knowledge: and to talk of the certainty of faith, ſeems all one to me, as to talk of the knowledge of believing; a way of ſpeaking not eaſy to me to underſtand.

PLACE knowledge in what you will, "ſtart what new methods of certainty "you pleaſe, that are apt to leave men's minds more doubtful than before;" place certainty on ſuch grounds, as will leave little, or no, knowledge in the world: (for theſe are the arguments your Lordſhip uſes, againſt my definition of knowledge) this ſhakes not at all, nor in the leaſt concerns the aſſurance of faith; that is quite diſtinct from it, neither ſtands nor falls with knowledge.

FAITH ſtands by itſelf, and upon grounds of its own; nor can be removed from them, and placed on thoſe of knowledge. Their grounds are ſo far from being the ſame, or having any thing common, that when it is brought to certainty, faith is deſtroyed; it is knowledge then, and faith no longer.

WITH what aſſurance ſoever of believing, I aſſent to any article of faith, ſo that I ſtedfaſtly venture my all upon it, it is ſtill but believing. Bring it to certainty, and it ceaſes to be faith. I believe that Jeſus Chriſt was crucified, dead, and buried, roſe again the third day from the dead, and aſcended into heaven: let now ſuch methods of knowledge, or certainty, be ſtarted, as leave men's minds more doubtful than before: let the grounds of knowledge be reſolved into what any one pleaſes, it touches not my faith: the foundation of that ſtands, as ſure, as before, and cannot be at all ſhaken by it: and one may as well ſay, that any thing, that weakens the ſight, or caſts a miſt before the eyes, endangers the hearing; as that any thing, which alters the nature of knowledge (if that could be done) ſhould be of dangerous conſequence to an article of faith.

WHETHER then I am, or am not, miſtaken, in the placing certainty in the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of ideas; whether this account of knowledge be true, or falſe, enlarges, or ſtraitens, the bounds of it, more than it ſhould; faith ſtill ſtands upon its own baſis, which is not at all altered by it; and every article of that has juſt the ſame unmoved foundation, and the very ſame credibility that it had before. So that, my Lord, whatever I have ſaid about certainty, and how much ſoever I may be out in it: if I am miſtaken, your Lordſhip has no reaſon to apprehend any danger to any article of faith, from thence; every one of them ſtands upon the ſame bottom, it did before, out of the reach of what belongs to knowledge and certainty. And thus much, of my way of certainty by ideas; which, I hope, will ſatisfy your Lordſhip, how far it is from being dangerous to any article of the chriſtian faith whatſoever.

P. 103. I FIND one thing more, your Lordſhip charges on me, in reference to the Unitarians controverſy; and that is, where your Lordſhip ſays, that "if theſe "[i. e. my notions of nature, and perſon] hold, your Lordſhip does not ſee, "how it is poſſible to defend the doctrine of the Trinity."

My Lord, ſince I have a great opinion, that your Lordſhip ſees as far as any one, and I ſhall be juſtified to the world, in relying upon your Lordſhip's foreſight, more than on any one's; theſe diſcomforting words of your Lordſhip would diſhearten me ſo, that I ſhould be ready to give up what your Lordſhip confeſſes ſo untenable; with this acknowledgment however to your Lordſhip, as its great defender,

> "——————Si Pergama dextrâ
> "Defendi poſſint, etiam hâc defenſa fuiſſent."

This, I ſay, after ſuch a declaration of your Lordſhip's, I ſhould think, out of a due value for your Lordſhip's great penetration and judgment, I had reaſon to do, were it any other cauſe, but that of an article of the chriſtian faith. For theſe, I am ſure, ſhall all be defended and ſtand firm to the world's end; tho' we are not always ſure, what hand ſhall defend them. I know as much may be expected from your Lordſhip's, in the caſe, as any body's; and therefore I conclude, when you have taken a view of this matter again, out of the heat of diſpute, you will have a better opinion of the articles of the chriſtian faith, and of your own ability to defend them, than to pronounce, that "if my notions of nature and perſon hold, your Lordſhip cannot ſee, how it is poſſible to defend that article of the chriſtian faith, which your Lordſhip has endeavoured to defend." For it is, methinks, to put that article upon a very tickliſh iſſue, and to render it as ſuſpected, and as doubtful, as is poſſible, to men's minds, that your Lordſhip ſhould declare it not poſſible to be defended, "if my notions of nature and perſon hold;" when all, that I can find that your Lordſhip excepts againſt, in my notions of nature and perſon, is nothing but this, viz. that theſe are two ſounds, which in themſelves ſignify nothing.

But before I come to examine, how by nature and perſon your Lordſhip, at preſent in your anſwer, engages me in the Unitarian controverſy; it will not be beſide the matter to conſider, how, by them, your Lordſhip at firſt brought my book into it.

Vind. p. 252. "In your Vindication of the doctrine of the Trinity, your Lordſhip ſays, the next thing to be cleared in this diſpute, is the diſtinction between nature and perſon. And of this, we can have no clear and diſtinct idea, from ſenſation or reflection: and yet all our notions of the doctrine of the Trinity, depend upon the right underſtanding of it. For we muſt talk unintelligibly, about this point, unleſs we have clear and diſtinct apprehenſions concerning nature and perſon, and the grounds of identity and diſtinction: but that theſe come not into our minds, by theſe ſimple ideas of ſenſation and reflection."

P. 148. To this I replied, "If it be ſo, the inference, I ſhould draw from thence, (if it were fit for me to draw any) would be this; that it concerns thoſe, who write on that ſubject, to have themſelves, and to lay down to others, clear and diſtinct apprehenſions, or notions, or ideas (call them what you pleaſe) of what they mean, by nature and perſon, and of the grounds of identity and diſtinction.

"This appears to me to be the natural concluſion, flowing from your Lordſhip's words; which ſeem here to ſuppoſe clear and diſtinct apprehenſions (ſomething like clear and diſtinct ideas) neceſſary for the avoiding unintelligible talk, in the doctrine of the Trinity. But I do not ſee, how your Lordſhip can, from the neceſſity of clear and diſtinct apprehenſions of nature and perſon, &c. in the diſpute of the Trinity, bring in one, who has, perhaps, miſtaken the way to clear and diſtinct notions, concerning nature and perſon, &c. as fit to be anſwered among thoſe, who bring objections againſt the Trinity, in point of reaſon. I do not ſee, why an Unitarian may not as well bring him in, and argue againſt his Eſſay in a chapter, that he ſhould write, to anſwer objections againſt the unity of God, in point of reaſon, or revelation: for upon what ground ſoever any one writes in this diſpute, on any other, it is not tolerable to talk unintelligibly, on either ſide.

" If by the way of ideas, which is that of the author of the Eſſay of Human Underſtanding, a man cannot come to clear and diſtinct apprehenſions concerning nature and perſon; if, as he propoſes, from the ſimple ideas of ſenſation and reflection, ſuch apprehenſions cannot be got; it will follow from thence, that he is a miſtaken philoſopher: but it will not follow from thence, that he is not an orthodox chriſtian; for he might (as he did) write his Eſſay of Human Underſtanding, without any thought of the controverſy between the Trinitarians and the Unitarians. Nay, a man might have writ all that is in his book, that never heard one word of any ſuch diſpute.

" There is in the world a great and fierce conteſt, about nature and grace: It would be very hard for me, if I muſt be brought in as a party, on either ſide, becauſe a diſputant in that controverſy ſhould think, the clear and diſtinct apprehenſions of nature and grace come not into our minds, by theſe ſimple ideas of ſenſation and reflection. If this be ſo, I may be reckoned among the objectors againſt all ſorts and points of orthodoxy, whenever any one pleaſes: I may be called to account, as one heterodox, in the points of free-grace, free-will, predeſtination, original ſin, juſtification by faith, tranſubſtantiation, the pope's ſupremacy, and what not? as well as in the doctrine of the Trinity; and all, becauſe they cannot be furniſhed with clear and diſtinct notions of grace, free-will, tranſubſtantiation, &c. by ſenſation or reflection. For in all theſe, or any other points, I do not ſee, but there may be a complaint made, that they have not always a right underſtanding and clear notions of thoſe things, on which the doctrine they diſpute of, depends. And it is not altogether unuſual for men to talk unintelligibly to themſelves, and others, in theſe and other points in controverſy, for want of clear and diſtinct apprehenſions, or (as I would call them, did not your Lordſhip diſlike it) ideas: for all which unintelligible talking, I do not think myſelf accountable, tho' it ſhould ſo fall out, that my way, by ideas, would not help them to, what it ſeems is wanting, clear and diſtinct notions. If my way be ineffectual to that purpoſe, they may, for all me, make uſe of any other more ſucceſsful; and leave me out of the controverſy, as one uſeleſs to either party, for deciding of the queſtion."

" Supposing, as your Lordſhip ſays, and as you have undertaken to make appear, that the clear and diſtinct apprehenſions, concerning nature and perſon, and the grounds of identity and diſtinction, ſhould not come into the mind, by the ſimple ideas of ſenſation and reflection; what, I beſeech your Lordſhip, is this to the diſpute, concerning the Trinity, on either ſide? And if, after your Lordſhip has endeavoured to give clear and diſtinct apprehenſions, of nature and perſon, the diſputants in this controverſy ſhould ſtill talk unintelligibly, about this point, for want of clear and diſtinct apprehenſions, concerning nature and perſon; ought your Lordſhip to be brought in, among the partiſans, on the other ſide, by any one, who writ a Vindication of the doctrine of the Trinity? In good earneſt, my Lord, I do not ſee how the clear and diſtinct notions of nature and perſon, not coming into the mind, by the ſimple ideas of ſenſation and reflection, any more contains any objection againſt the doctrine of the Trinity, than the clear and diſtinct apprehenſions of original ſin, juſtification, or tranſubſtantiation, not coming into the mind, by the ſimple ideas of ſenſation and reflection, contains any objection againſt the doctrine of original ſin, juſtification, or tranſubſtantiation: and ſo of all the reſt of the terms, uſed in any controverſy, in religion:"

Anſ. p. 100. All that your Lordſhip anſwers to this, is in theſe words: " The next thing, I undertook to ſhew, was, that we can have no clear and diſtinct idea of nature and perſon, from ſenſation or reflection. Here you ſpend many pages to ſhew, that this doth not concern you. Let it be ſo. But it concerns the matter I was upon; which was to ſhew, that we muſt have ideas [I think, my Lord, it ſhould be, clear and diſtinct ideas] of theſe things, which we cannot come to, by ſenſation and reflection."

But be that as it will; I have troubled your Lordſhip here, with this large repetition out of my former letter, becauſe I think it clearly ſhews, that my book is no more concerned in the controverſy about the Trinity, than any other controverſy extant; nor any more oppoſite to that ſide of the queſtion, that your Lordſhip has endeavoured to defend, than to the contrary; and alſo becauſe, by your Lordſhip's anſwer to it, in theſe words, "let it be ſo," I thought you had not only agreed to all that I had ſaid, but that, by it, I had been diſmiſſed out of that controverſy.

It is an obſervation, I have ſomewhere met with, "That whoever is once "got into the inquiſition, guilty, or not guilty, ſeldom ever gets clear out again." I think your Lordſhip is ſatisfied there is no hereſy in my book. The ſuſpicion it was brought into, upon the account of placing certainty only upon clear and diſtinct ideas, is found groundleſs, there being no ſuch thing in my book; and yet it is not diſmiſſed out of the controverſy. It is alleged ſtill, that "my no-"tion of ideas, as I have ſtated it, may be of dangerous conſequence, as to that "article of the chriſtian faith, which your Lordſhip has endeavoured to defend;" and ſo I am bound over to another trial. "Clear and diſtinct apprehenſions "concerning nature and perſon, and the grounds of identity and diſtinction, ſo "neceſſary in the diſpute of the Trinity, cannot be had from ſenſation and re-"flection," was another accuſation. To this, whether true or falſe, I pleaded, that it makes me no party in this diſpute of the Trinity, more than in any diſpute, that can ariſe; nor of one ſide of the queſtion more than another. My plea is allowed, "let it be ſo;" and yet nature and perſon are made uſe of again, to hook me into the heretical ſide of the diſpute: and what is now the charge againſt me, in reference to the Unitarian controverſy, upon the account of nature and perſon? Even this new one, viz. that "if my notions of nature and perſon hold, "your Lordſhip does not ſee how it is poſſible to defend the doctrine of the "Trinity." How is this new charge proved? even thus, in theſe words annexed to it: "For if theſe terms really ſignify nothing in themſelves, but are only "abſtract and complex ideas, which the common uſe of language hath appro-"priated to be the ſigns of two ideas, then it is plain, that they are only no-"tions of the mind, as all abſtracted and complex ideas are; and ſo one nature "and three perſons can be no more." P. 103.

My Lord, I am not ſo conceited of my notions, as to think that they deſerve that your Lordſhip ſhould dwell long upon the conſideration of them: But pardon me, my Lord, if I ſay, that it ſeems to me that this repreſentation, which your Lordſhip here makes to yourſelf, of my notions of nature and perſon, and the inference from it, were made a little in haſte: and that if it had not been ſo, your Lordſhip would not, from the preceding words, have drawn this concluſion; "and ſo one nature and three perſons can be no more;" nor charged it upon me.

For as to that part of your Lordſhip's repreſentation of my notions of nature and perſon, wherein it is ſaid, "if theſe terms in themſelves ſignify nothing;" tho' I grant that to be my notion of the terms, nature and perſon, that they are two ſounds, that naturally ſignify not one thing, more than another, nor in themſelves ſignify any thing at all, but have the ſignification, which they have, barely by impoſition; yet in this my notion of them, give me leave to preſume, that, upon more leiſurely thoughts, I ſhall have your Lordſhip, as well as the reſt of mankind, that ever thought of this matter, concurring with me. So that if your Lordſhip continues poſitive in it, "That you cannot ſee how it is poſſible to de-"fend the doctrine of the Trinity, if this my notion of nature and perſon hold;" I, as far as my eye ſight will reach in the caſe (which poſſibly is but a little way) cannot ſee, but it will be plain to all mankind, that your Lordſhip gives up the doctrine of the Trinity: ſince this notion of nature and perſon, that they are two words, that ſignify by impoſition, is what will hold in the common ſenſe of all mankind. And then, my Lord, all thoſe, who think well of your Lordſhip's ability to defend it, and believe that you ſee as far into that queſtion, as any body (which I take to be the common ſentiment of all the learned world, eſpecially of thoſe of our country and church) will be in great danger to have an ill opinion of the evidence of that article: ſince, I imagine, there is ſcarce one of them, who does not think this notion will hold, viz. that theſe terms nature and perſon, ſignify what they do ſignify, by impoſition, and not by nature.

THO', if the contrary were true, viz. that theſe two words, nature and perſon, had this particular privilege, above other names of things, that they did naturally, and in themſelves, ſignify what they do ſignify, and that they received not their ſignifications from the arbitrary impoſition of men; I do not ſee how the defence of the doctrine of the Trinity ſhould depend hereon: unleſs your Lordſhip concludes, that it is neceſſary to the defence of the doctrine of the Trinity, that theſe two articulate ſounds ſhould have natural ſignifications, and that, unleſs they are uſed in thoſe ſignifications, it were impoſſible to defend the doctrine of the Trinity. Which is, in effect, to ſay, that where theſe two words are not in uſe, and in their natural ſignification, the doctrine of the Trinity cannot be defended. And if this be ſo, I grant your Lordſhip had reaſon to ſay, that if it hold, that the terms, nature and perſon, ſignify by impoſition, your Lordſhip does not ſee how it is poſſible to defend the doctrine of the Trinity. But then, my Lord, I beg your Lordſhip to conſider, whether this be not mightily to prejudice that doctrine, and to undermine the belief of that article of faith, to make ſo extraordinary a ſuppoſition neceſſary to the defence of it; and of more dangerous conſequence to it, than any thing, your Lordſhip can imagine, deducible from my book?

As to the remaining part of what your Lordſhip has, in the foregoing paſſage, ſet down as ſome of my notions of nature and perſon, viz. that theſe terms are only abſtract, or complex ideas; I crave leave to plead, that I never ſaid any ſuch thing; and I ſhould be aſhamed, if I ever had ſaid, that theſe, or any other terms, were ideas: which is all one as to ſay, that the ſign is the thing ſignified. Much leſs did I ever ſay, "That theſe terms are only abſtract and "complex ideas, which the common uſe of language hath appropriated to be "the ſigns of two ideas." For to ſay, "that the common uſe of language has appropriated abſtract and complex ideas to be the ſigns of ideas," ſeems to me ſo extraordinary a way of talking, that I can ſcarce perſuade myſelf it would be c. credit to your Lordſhip, to think it worth your while to anſwer a man whom you could ſuppoſe to vent ſuch groſs jargon.

THIS, therefore, containing none of my notions of nature and perſon, nor, indeed, any thing that I underſtand; whether your Lordſhip rightly deduces from it this conſequence, viz. "and ſo one nature and three perſons can be no "more;" is what I neither know, nor am concerned to examine.

YOUR Lordſhip has been pleaſed to take my Eſſay of Human Underſtanding to taſk, in your Vindication of the doctrine of the Trinity; becauſe the doctrine of it will not furniſh your Lordſhip "with clear and diſtinct apprehenſions, "concerning nature and perſon, and the grounds of identity and diſtinction. "For, ſays your Lordſhip, we muſt talk unintelligibly about this point [of "the Trinity] unleſs we have clear and diſtinct apprehenſions of nature and perſon," &c. Vind. p. 252.

WHETHER, by my way of ideas, one can have clear and diſtinct apprehenſions of nature and perſon, I ſhall not now diſpute, how much ſoever I am of the mind one may. Nor ſhall I queſtion the reaſonableneſs of this principle, your Lordſhip goes upon, viz. that my book is to be diſputed againſt, as oppoſite to the doctrine of the Trinity, becauſe it fails to furniſh your Lordſhip "with clear "and diſtinct apprehenſions of nature and perſon, and the diſtinction between "them;" tho' I promiſed no ſuch clear and diſtinct apprehenſions, nor have treated, in my book, any where of nature, at all. But upon this occaſion I cannot but obſerve, that your Lordſhip yourſelf, in that place, makes "clear and "diſtinct ideas neceſſary to that certainty of faith," which your Lordſhip thinks requiſite, tho' it be that very thing, for which you blame the men of the new way of reaſoning, and is the very ground of your diſputing againſt the Unitarians, the author of Chriſtianity not myſterious, and me, jointly under that title.

YOUR Lordſhip, to ſupply that defect in my book, of clear and diſtinct apprehenſions of nature and perſon, for the vindication of the doctrine of the Trinity, without which it cannot be talked of intelligibly, nor defended, undertook to clear the diſtinction between nature and perſon. This, I told your Lordſhip, gave me hopes of getting farther inſight into theſe matters, and more clear and diſtinct apprehenſions, concerning nature and perſon, than was to be had by ideas; but that, after all the attention, and application, I could uſe, in reading what your Lordſhip had writ of it, I found myſelf ſo little enlightened concerning nature and perſon, by what your Lordſhip had ſaid, that I found no other remedy, but that I muſt be content with the condemned way by ideas. Vindic. p. 252.

THIS, which I thought not only an innocent, but a reſpectful anſwer, to what your Lordſhip had ſaid, about nature and perſon, has drawn upon me a more ſevere reflection than I thought it deſerved. SCEPTICISM is a pretty hard word, which I find dropt in more places than one; but I ſhall refer the conſideration of that, to another place. All that I ſhall do now, ſhall be to mark out (ſince your Lordſhip forces me to it) more particularly than I did before what I think very hard to be underſtood, in that which your Lordſhip has ſaid to clear the diſtinction between nature and perſon; which I ſhall do, for theſe two ends: P. 125.

FIRST, as an excuſe for my ſaying, "that I had learnt nothing out of your "Lordſhip's elaborate diſcourſe of them, but this; that I muſt content myſelf "with my condemned way by ideas."

AND next to ſhew, why not only I, but ſeveral others, think, that if my book deſerved to be brought in, and taken notice of, among the Anti-trinitarian writers, for want of clear and diſtinct ideas of nature and perſon; what your Lordſhip has ſaid upon theſe ſubjects, will more juſtly deſerve, by him that writes next in the defence of the doctrine of the Trinity, to be brought in, among the oppoſers of the doctrine of the Trinity, as of dangerous conſequence to it, for want of giving clear and diſtinct apprehenſions of nature and perſon; unleſs the ſame thing ranks one man among the Unitarians, and another among the Trinitarians.

WHAT your Lordſhip had ſaid, for the clearing of the diſtinction of nature and perſon, having ſurpaſſed my underſtanding, as I told your Lordſhip in my former letter; I was reſolved not to incur your Lordſhip's diſpleaſure, a ſecond time, by confeſſing I found not myſelf enlightened by it, till I had taken all the help I could imagine, to find out theſe clear and diſtinct apprehenſions of nature and perſon, which your Lordſhip had ſo much declared for. To this purpoſe, I conſulted others, upon what you had ſaid; and deſired to find ſome body, who underſtanding it himſelf, would help me out, where my own application and endeavours had been uſed to no purpoſe. But my misfortune has been, my Lord, that, among ſeveral, whom I have deſired to tell me the ſenſe of what your Lordſhip had ſaid, for clearing the notions of nature and perſon, there has not been one, who owned, that he underſtood your Lordſhip's meaning; but confeſſed, the farther he looked into what your Lordſhip had there ſaid, about nature and perſon, the more he was at a loſs about them.

ONE ſaid, your Lordſhip began with giving two ſignifications of the word, nature. One of them, as it ſtood for properties, he ſaid he underſtood: but the other, wherein "nature was taken for the thing itſelf, wherein thoſe properties "were," he ſaid, he did not underſtand. But that, he added, I was not to wonder at, in a man, who was not very well acquainted with Greek; and, therefore, might well be allowed not to have learning enough to underſtand an Engliſh word, that Ariſtotle was brought to explain and ſettle the ſenſe of. Beſides, he added, that, which puzzled him the more in it, was the very explication, which was brought of it out of Ariſtotle, viz. that "nature was a corpo-"real ſubſtance, which had the principles of motion in itſelf;" becauſe he could not conceive a corporeal ſubſtance, having the principles of motion in itſelf. And if nature were a corporeal ſubſtance, having the principles of motion in itſelf; it muſt be good ſenſe to ſay, that a corporeal ſubſtance, or, which is the ſame thing, a body, having the principles of motion in itſelf, is nature; which he confeſſed, if any body ſhould ſay to him, he could not underſtand. Vindicat. p. 252.

ANOTHER thing, he ſaid, that perplexed him in this explication of nature, was, that if "nature was a corporeal ſubſtance, which had the principles of motion "in itſelf," he thought it might happen, that there might be no nature at all:

for corporeal ſubſtances having all equally principles, or no principles of motion in themſelves; and all men, who do not make matter and motion eternal, being poſitive in it, that a body, at reſt, has no principle of motion in it, muſt conclude, that corporeal ſubſtance has no principle of motion in itſelf: from hence it will follow, that to all thoſe, who admit not matter and motion to be eternal, no nature, in that ſenſe, will be left at all, ſince nature is ſaid to be a corporeal ſubſtance, which hath the principles of motion in itſelf; but ſuch a ſort of corporeal ſubſtance, thoſe men have no notion of, at all, and conſequently none of nature, which is ſuch a corporeal ſubſtance.

Now, ſaid he, if this be that clear and diſtinct apprehenſion of nature, which is ſo neceſſary to the doctrine of the Trinity, they who have found it out for that purpoſe, and find it clear and diſtinct, have reaſon to be ſatisfied with it, upon that account: but how they will reconcile it to the creation of matter, I cannot tell. I, for my part, ſaid he, can make it conſiſt, neither with the creation of the world, nor with any other notions; and ſo, plainly, cannot underſtand it.

Vindic. p. 252. HE farther ſaid, in the following words, which are theſe, "but nature and "ſubſtance are of an equal extent; and ſo that, which is the ſubject of powers "and properties, is the nature, whether it be meant of bodily or ſpiritual ſub-"ſtances;" he neither underſtood the connexion, nor ſenſe: firſt, he underſtood not, he ſaid, that "nature and ſubſtance were of the ſame extent." Nature, he ſaid, in his notion of it, extended to things, that were not ſubſtances; as he thought it might properly be ſaid, the nature of a rectangular triangle was, that the ſquare of the hypotenuſe, was equal to the ſquare of the two other ſides; or, it is the nature of ſin to offend God: tho' it be certain, that neither ſin, nor a rectangular triangle, to which nature is attributed in theſe propoſitions, are either of them ſubſtances.

FURTHER, he ſaid, that he did not ſee how the particle, but, connects this to the preceding words: but leaſt of all, could he comprehend the inference from hence: "and ſo, that, which is the ſubject of powers and properties, is nature, whether it be meant of bodily, or ſpiritual ſubſtances." Which deduction, ſaid he, ſtands thus: "Ariſtotle takes nature for a corporeal ſubſtance, "which has the principle of motion in itſelf; therefore nature and ſubſtance "are of an equal extent, and ſo both corporeal and incorporeal ſubſtances are "nature." This is the very connexion, ſaid he, of the whole deduction, in the foregoing words, which I underſtand not, if I underſtand the words: and if I underſtand not the words, I am yet farther from underſtanding any thing of this explication of nature, whereby we are to come to clear and diſtinct apprehenſions of it.

METHINKS, ſaid he, going on, I underſtand how by making nature and ſubſtance one and the ſame thing, that may ſerve to bring ſubſtance into this diſpute; but for all that, I cannot, for my life, underſtand nature to be ſubſtance, nor ſubſtance to be nature.

THERE is another inference, ſaid he, in the cloſe of this paragraph, which, both for its connexion and expreſſion, ſeems to me very hard to be underſtood,
Vindicat. p. 253. it being ſet down in theſe words: "ſo that the nature of things properly be-"longs to our reaſon, and not to mere ideas." For when a man knows what it is, for the nature of things properly to belong to reaſon, and not to mere ideas, there will, I gueſs, ſome difficulty remain, in what ſenſe ſoever he ſhall underſtand that expreſſion, to deduce this propoſition, as an inference from the foregoing words, which are theſe: "I grant, that by ſenſation or reflection, we come "to know the powers and properties of things; but our reaſon is ſatisfied that "there muſt be ſomething beyond thoſe, becauſe it is impoſſible that they ſhould "ſubſiſt by themſelves: ſo that the nature of things properly belongs to our rea-"ſon, and not to mere ideas."

IT is true, ſaid I; but his Lordſhip, upon my taking reaſon in that place for the power of reaſoning, hath, in his anſwer, with a little kind of warmth, cor-
Anſw. p. 101. rected my miſtake in theſe words: "ſtill you are at it, that you can find no "oppoſition between ideas and reaſon: but ideas are objects of the underſtand-"ing, and the underſtanding is one of the faculties imployed about them.

" No doubt of it. But you might eaſily ſee that, by reaſon, I underſtood prin-
" ciples of reaſon, allowed by mankind; which, I think, are very different from
" ideas. But I perceive reaſon, in this ſenſe, is a thing you have no idea of;
" or one as obſcure as that of ſubſtance."

I IMAGINE, ſaid the gentleman, that if his Lordſhip ſhould be aſked, " how " he perceives you have no idea of reaſon, in that ſenſe, or one, as obſcure as " that of ſubſtance?" he would ſcarce have a reaſon ready to give for his ſaying ſo: and what we ſay, which reaſon cannot account for, muſt be aſcribed to ſome other cauſe.

Now truly, ſaid I, my miſtake was ſo innocent and ſo unaffected, that if I had had thoſe very words ſaid to me then, which his Lordſhip ſounds in my ears now, to awaken my underſtanding, viz. " that the principles of reaſon are very " different from ideas," I do not yet find, how they would have helped me to ſee what, it ſeems, was no ſmall fault, that I did not ſee before. Becauſe, let reaſon, taken for principles of reaſon, be as different as it will from ideas; reaſon, taken as a faculty, is as different from them, in my apprehenſion; and in both ſenſes of the word, reaſon, either as taken for a faculty, or for the principles of reaſon allowed by mankind, reaſon and ideas may conſiſt together.

CERTAINLY, ſaid the gentleman, ideas have ſomething in them, that you do not ſee; or elſe ſuch a ſmall miſtake, as you made, in endeavouring to make them conſiſtent with reaſon, as a faculty, would not have moved ſo great a man as my Lord Biſhop of Worceſter ſo as to make him tell you, " that reaſon, taken " for the common principles of reaſon, is a thing, whereof you have no idea, " or one, as obſcure as that of ſubſtance." For if I miſtake not, you have, in your book, in more places than one, ſpoke, and that pretty largely, of ſelf-evident propoſitions and maxims: ſo that, if his Lordſhip has ever read thoſe parts of your Eſſay, he cannot doubt, but that you have ideas of thoſe common principles of reaſon.

IT may be ſo, I replied; but ſuch things are to be born from great men, who often uſe them as marks of diſtinction: tho' I ſhould leſs expect them from my Lord Biſhop of W. than from almoſt any one; becauſe he has the ſolid and interior greatneſs of learning, as well as that of outward title and dignity. But ſince he expects it from me, I will do what I can to ſee what he ſays, is his meaning here, by reaſon. I will repeat it juſt as his Lordſhip ſays, " I might " eaſily have ſeen what he underſtood by it." My Lord's words, immediately following thoſe above taken notice of, are: " and ſo that, which is the ſubject " of powers and properties, is the nature, whether it be meant of bodily or ſpi- " ritual ſubſtances." And then follow theſe, which, to be rightly underſtood, his Lordſhip ſays, muſt be read thus: " I grant, that by ſenſation and reflection, " we come to know the properties of things; but our reaſon, i. e. the principles " of reaſon allowed by mankind, are ſatisfied that there muſt be ſomething be- " yond theſe, becauſe it is impoſſible, they ſhould ſubſiſt by themſelves: ſo that " the nature of things properly belongs to our reaſon, i. e. to the principles of " reaſon allowed by mankind; and not to mere ideas." This explication of it, replied the gentleman, which my Lord Biſhop has given of this paſſage, makes it more unintelligible to me, than it was before; and I know him to be ſo great a maſter of ſenſe, that I doubt, whether he himſelf will be better ſatisfied with this ſenſe of his words, than with that, which you underſtood it in. But let us go on to the two next paragraphs, wherein his Lordſhip is at farther pains to give us clear and diſtinct apprehenſions of nature: and, that we may not miſtake, let us firſt read his words, which run thus:

Vindic. p. 252.

" BUT we muſt yet proceed farther: for nature may be conſidered two ways.
" 1. As it is in diſtinct individuals; as the nature of a man is equally in Peter, " James, and John; and this is the common nature, with a particular ſubſiſtence, " proper to each of them. For the nature of a man, as in Peter, is diſtinct " from that ſame nature, as it is in James and John; otherwiſe they would be " but one perſon, as well as have the ſame nature. And this diſtinction of per- " ſons in them, is diſcerned both by our ſenſes, as to their different accidents; " and

Vindic. p. 253.

" and by our reaſon, becauſe they have a ſeparate exiſtence, not coming into it
" at once, and in the ſame manner.

" 2. Nature may be conſidered abſtractly, without reſpect to individual
" perſons; and then it makes an intire notion of itſelf. For, however the ſame
" nature may be in different individuals, yet the nature in ſelf remains one and
" the ſame; which appears from this evident reaſon, that otherwiſe every indi-
" vidual muſt make a different kind."

In theſe words, ſaid he, having read them, I find the ſame difficulties, you took notice of, in your letter. As, firſt, that it is not declared whether his Lordſhip ſpeaks here of nature, as ſtanding for eſſential properties, or of nature, as ſtanding for ſubſtance; which dubiouſneſs caſts an obſcurity on the whole place. And next, I can no more tell than you, whether it be his Lordſhip's opinion, that I ought to think, that one and the ſame nature is in Peter and John; or, that a nature diſtinct from that in John, is in Peter; and that for the ſame reaſon which left you at a loſs, viz. becauſe I cannot put together one and the ſame and diſtinct. But ſince his Lordſhip, in his anſwer to you, has ſaid nothing to give us light in theſe matters, we muſt be content to be in the dark; and if he has not thought fit to explain it, ſo as to make himſelf to be underſtood by us, we may be ſure he has a reaſon for it. But pray tell me, did you underſtand the reſt of theſe two paragraphs, that you mentioned only thoſe two difficulties? For I muſt profeſs to you, that I underſtand ſo little of either of them, that they contribute nothing at all, to give me thoſe clear and diſtinct apprehenſions of nature and perſon, which I find, by his Lordſhip, it is neceſſary to have, before one can have a right underſtanding of the doctrine of the Trinity. Nay, I am ſo far from gaining, by his Lordſhip's diſcourſe, thoſe clear and diſtinct apprehenſions of nature and perſon, that what he objects to your new method of certainty, I found verified in this his clearing the diſtinction between nature and perſon, that it left me in more doubt than I was in before.

Truly, Sir, replied I, that was juſt my caſe; but minding then, only what I thought immediately related to the objections to my book, which followed, I paſſed by what I might have retorted, concerning the obſcurity and difficulty in his Lordſhip's doctrine, about nature and perſon, and contented myſelf to tell his Lordſhip, in as reſpectful terms, as I could find, that I could not underſtand him; which drew from him that ſevere reflection, that I obſtinately ſtick to a way, that leads to ſcepticiſm, which is the way of ideas. But now that, for the vindication of my book, I am ſhewing that his Lordſhip's way, without ideas, does as little (I will not ſay leſs) furniſh us with clear and diſtinct apprehenſions, concerning nature and perſon, as my Eſſay does; I do not ſee, but that his Lordſhip's Vindication of the Trinity is as much againſt the doctrine of the Trinity, as my Eſſay of Human Underſtanding; and may, with as much reaſon on that account, be animadverted on by another, who vindicates the doctrine of the Trinity, as my book is by his Lordſhip.

Indeed, ſaith he, if failing of clear and diſtinct apprehenſions, concerning nature and perſon, render any book obnoxious, to one, that vindicates the doctrine of the Trinity, and gives him ſufficient cauſe to write againſt it, as oppoſite to that doctrine; I know no book of more dangerous conſequence to that article of faith, nor more neceſſary to be writ againſt, by a defender of that article, than that part of his Lordſhip's vindication, which we are now upon. For, to my thinking, I never met with any thing more unintelligible about that ſubject, nor that is more remote from clear and diſtinct apprehenſions of nature and perſon. For what more effectual method could there be to confound the notions of nature and perſon, inſtead of clearing their diſtinction, than to diſcourſe of them, without firſt defining them? Is this a way, to give clear and diſtinct apprehenſions of two words, upon a right underſtanding of which, all our notions of the doctrine of the Trinity depend; and without which, we muſt talk unintelligibly about that point?

Vind. p. 253. His Lordſhip tells us here, nature may be conſidered two ways. What is it the nearer to be told, nature may be conſidered, two, or twenty ways, till we know what that is, which is to be conſidered two ways? i. e. till he defines the term, nature, that we may know what preciſely is the thing meant by it.

He tells us, " nature may be conſidered,

" 1. As it is in individuals.

" 2. Abſtractly."

1. His Lordſhip ſays, " nature may be conſidered, as in diſtinct individuals." It is true, by thoſe, that know what nature is. But his Lordſhip having not yet told me, what nature is, nor what he here means by it, it is impoſſible for me to conſider nature in, or out of, individuals, unleſs I can conſider I know not what: ſo that this conſideration is, to me, as good as no conſideration; neither does or can it help at all, to any clear and diſtinct apprehenſions of nature. Indeed he ſays, Ariſtotle, by nature, ſignified a corporeal ſubſtance; and from thence his Lordſhip takes occaſion to ſay, " that nature and ſubſtance, are of an equal extent:" tho' Ariſtotle, taking nature for a corporeal ſubſtance, gave no ground for ſuch a ſaying, becauſe corporeal ſubſtance and ſubſtance are not of an equal extent. But to paſs by that: if his Lordſhip would have us underſtand here, that, by nature, he means ſubſtance, this is but ſubſtituting one name, in the place of another; and which is worſe, a more doubtful and obſcure term, in the place of one that is leſs ſo: which will, I fear, not give us very clear and diſtinct apprehenſions of nature. His Lordſhip goes on;

" As the nature of a man is equally in Peter, James, and John; and this is " the common nature, with a particular ſubſiſtence, proper to each of them."

Here his Lordſhip does not tell us what conſideration of nature there may be, but actually affirms and teaches ſomething. I wiſh I had the capacity to learn by it the clear and diſtinct apprehenſions of nature and perſon, which is the leſſon he is upon here. He ſays, " That the nature of a man is equally in Peter, James, " and John." That's more than I know: becauſe I do not know what things Peter, James, and John are. They may be drills, or horſes, for ought I know; as well as Weweena, Cuchipe, and Couſheda, may be drills, as his Lordſhip ſays, for ought he knows. For I know no law of ſpeech, that more neceſſarily makes theſe three ſounds, Peter, James, and John, ſtand for three men, then Weweena, Cuchipe, and Couſheda, ſtand for three men: For I knew a horſe that was called Peter; and I do not know but the maſter of the ſame team might call other of his horſes, James and John. Indeed if Peter, James, and John, are ſuppoſed to be the names only of men, it cannot be queſtioned but the nature of man is equally in them; unleſs one can ſuppoſe each of them to be a man, without having the nature of man in him; that is, ſuppoſe him to be a man, without being a man. But then this, to me, I confeſs, gives no manner of clear, or diſtinct, apprehenſions, concerning nature, in general, or the nature of man in particular; it ſeeming to me to ſay no more but this, that a man is a man, and a drill is a drill, and a horſe is a horſe: or, which is all one, what has the nature of a man, has the nature of a man, or is a man; and what has the nature of a drill, has the nature of a drill, or is a drill; and what has the nature of a horſe, has the nature of a horſe, or is a horſe; whether it be called Peter, or not called Peter. But if any one ſhould repeat this a thouſand times to me, and go over all the ſpecies of creatures, with ſuch an unqueſtionable aſſertion of every one of them; I do not find, that thereby I ſhould get one jot clearer, or diſtincter, apprehenſions either of nature in general, or of the nature of a man, a horſe, or a drill, &c. in particular.

His Lordſhip adds, " and this is the common nature, with a particular ſubſiſtence proper to each of them." I do not doubt but his Lordſhip ſet down theſe words, with a very good meaning; but ſuch is my misfortune, that I, for my life, cannot find it out. I have repeated, and this, twenty times to myſelf; and my weak underſtanding always rejolts, and what? To which I am always ready to anſwer, " the nature of a man in Peter, and the nature of a man in " James, and the nature of a man in John, is the common nature;" and there I ſtop, and can go no farther, to make it coherent to myſelf, till I add, of man: and then it muſt be read thus: " the nature of man in Peter is the "common nature of man, with a particular ſubſiſtence, proper to Peter." That the nature of man in Peter, is the nature of a man, if Peter be ſuppoſed to be a man, I certainly know, let the nature of a man be what it will, of which I yet know nothing: but if Peter be not ſuppoſed to be the name of a man, but be the name of a horſe, all that knowledge vaniſhes, and I know nothing. But let Peter be ever ſo much a man, and let it be impoſſible to give that name to a horſe; yet I cannot underſtand theſe words, that the common nature of man is in Peter; for whatſoever is in Peter, exiſts in Peter; and whatſoever exiſts in Peter, is particular: but the common nature of man, is the general nature of man, or elſe I underſtand not what is meant by common nature: and it confounds my underſtanding, to make a general, a particular.

BUT to help me to conceive this matter, I am told, "it is the common nature, with a particular ſubſiſtence proper to Peter." But this helps not my underſtanding in the caſe: for, firſt, I do not underſtand what ſubſiſtence is, if it ſignify any thing different from exiſtence; and if it be the ſame with exiſtence, then it is ſo far from looſening the knot, that it leaves it juſt as it was, only covered with the obſcure and leſs known term ſubſiſtence. For the difficulty to me, is, to conceive an univerſal nature, or univerſal any thing, to exiſt; which would be, in my mind, to make an univerſal a particular; which, to me, is impoſſible.

No, ſaid another who was by, it is but uſing the word, ſubſiſtence, inſtead of exiſtence, and there is nothing eaſier; if one will conſider this common, or univerſal nature, with a particular exiſtence, under the name of ſubſiſtence, the buſineſs is done.

JUST as eaſy, replied the former, I find it in myſelf, as to conſider the nature of a circle with four angles; for to conſider a circle with four angles, is no more impoſſible to me, than to conſider a univerſal, with a particular exiſtence; which is to conſider a univerſal, really exiſting, and in effect a particular. But the words, "proper to each of them," follow to help me out. I hoped ſo, till I conſidered them; and then I found I underſtood them, as little as all the reſt: for I know not what is, a ſubſiſtence proper to Peter, more than to James, or John, till I knew Peter himſelf: and then, indeed, my ſenſes will diſcern him from James or John, or any man living.

HIS Lordſhip goes on: "for the nature of man, as in Peter, is diſtinct from "that ſame nature, as it is in James and John; otherwiſe they would be but one "perſon, as well as have the ſame nature." Theſe words, by the caſual particle, for, which introduces them, ſhould be a proof of ſomething, that goes before: but what they are meant, for a proof of, I confeſs I underſtand not. For the propoſition preceding, as far as I can make any thing of it, is this; that the general nature of a man has a particular exiſtence in each of the three, Peter, James, and John. But then how the ſaying, that "the nature of man, as in Peter, is diſtinct from the ſame nature, as it is in James and John," does prove that the general nature of man does, or can, exiſt in either of them, I cannot ſee.

THE words which follow, "otherwiſe they would be but one perſon, as well "as have the ſame nature," I ſee the connexion of; for it is viſible they were brought to prove, that the nature in Peter is diſtinct from the nature in James and John. But with all that, I do not ſee of what uſe, or ſignificancy, they are here; becauſe to me they are more obſcure and doubtful, than the propoſition they are brought to prove: for I ſcarce think there can be a clearer propoſition than this, viz. that three natures that have three diſtinct exiſtences in three men, are, as his Lordſhip ſays, three diſtinct natures, and ſo needs no proof. But to prove it by this, that "otherwiſe they could not be three perſons," is to prove it by a propoſition unintelligible to me; becauſe his Lordſhip has not yet told me, what the clear and diſtinct apprehenſion of perſon is, which I ought to have. For his Lordſhip ſuppoſing it, as he does, to be a term, which has in itſelf a certain ſignification; I, who have no ſuch conception of it, ſhould in vain look for it, in the propriety of our language, which is eſtabliſhed upon arbitrary impoſition; and ſo can, by no means, imagine what, perſon, here ſignifies, till his Lordſhip ſhall do me the favour to tell me.

To this I replied, that page 259, which is but ſix pages farther, your Lordſhip explains the notion of perſon.

To which the gentleman anſwered, whether I can get clear and diſtinct apprehenſions of perſon, by what his Lordſhip ſays there, of perſon, I ſhall ſee, when I come to it. But this, in the mean time, muſt be confeſſed, that perſon comes in here, ſix pages too ſoon, for thoſe, who want his Lordſhip's explication of it, to make them have clear and diſtinct apprehenſions of what he means, when he uſes it.

For we muſt certainly talk unintelligibly, about nature and perſon, as well as about the doctrine of the Trinity, unleſs we have clear and diſtinct apprehenſions, concerning nature and perſon; as his Lordſhip ſays, in the foregoing page.

It follows, "and this diſtinction of perſons, in them, is diſcerned both by " our ſenſes, as to their different accidents; and by our reaſon, becauſe they " have a ſeparate exiſtence; not coming into it, at once, and in the ſame " manner."

These words, ſaid he, which conclude this paragraph, tell us how perſons are diſtinguiſhed; but, as far as I can ſee, ſerve not at all to give us any clear and diſtinct apprehenſions of nature, by conſidering it in diſtinct individuals; which was the buſineſs of this paragraph.

His Lordſhip ſays, we may conſider nature, as in diſtinct individuals: and ſo I do, as much, when I conſider it, in three diſtinct phyſical atoms, or particles, of the air or æther, as when I conſider it in Peter, James, and John: for three diſtinct phyſical atoms are three diſtinct individuals, and have three diſtinct natures in them, as certainly as three diſtinct men; tho' I cannot diſcern the diſtinction between them, by my ſenſes, as to their different accidents; nor is their ſeparate exiſtence diſcernible to my reaſon, by their not coming into it at once, and in the ſame manner: for they did, for ought I know, or at leaſt might, come into exiſtence at once, and in the ſame manner, which was by creation. I think it will be allowed, that God did, or might, create more than one phyſical atom of matter, at once: ſo that here nature may be conſidered in diſtinct individuals, without any of thoſe ways of diſtinction, which his Lordſhip here ſpeaks of: and ſo I cannot ſee, how theſe laſt words contribute ought, to give us clear and diſtinct apprehenſions of nature, by conſidering nature in diſtinct individuals.

But to try what clear and diſtinct apprehenſions concerning nature, his Lordſhip's way of conſidering nature, in this paragraph, carries in it: let me repeat his Lordſhip's diſcourſe to you here, only changing one common nature, for another, viz. putting the common nature of animal, for the common nature of man, which his Lordſhip has choſe to inſtance in; and then his Lordſhip's words would run thus: " nature may be conſidered two ways; firſt, as it is in diſ- " tinct individuals; as the nature of an animal is equally in Alexander, Buce- " phalus, and Podargus: and this is the common nature, with a particular ſub- " ſiſtence, proper to each of them. For the nature of animal, as in Bucephalus, " is diſtinct from the ſame nature, as in Podargus and Alexander; otherwiſe " they would be but one perſon, as well as have the ſame nature. And this " diſtinction of perſons in them, is diſcerned both by our ſenſes, as to their dif- " ferent accidents, and by our reaſon, becauſe they have a ſeparate exiſtence, not " coming into it at once, and in the ſame manner."

To this I ſaid, I thought he did violence to your Lordſhip's ſenſe, in applying the word perſon, which ſignifies an intelligent individual, to Bucephalus and Podargus, which were two irrational animals.

To which the gentleman replied, that he fell into this miſtake, by his thinking, your Lordſhip had ſomewhere ſpoken, as if an individual intelligent ſubſtance were not the proper definition of perſon. But, continued he, I lay no ſtreſs on the word, perſon, in the inſtance, wherein I have uſed his Lordſhip's words, and therefore, if you pleaſe, put individual, for it; and then reading it ſo, let me aſk you whether that way of conſidering it, contributes any thing, to the giving you clear and diſtinct apprehenſions of nature? which it ought to do, if his Lordſhip's way of conſidering nature, in that paragraph, were of any uſe to that purpoſe: ſince the common nature of animal, is as much the ſame, or as his Lordſhip ſays, in the next paragraph, as much an entire notion of itſelf, as the common nature of man. And the common nature of animal, is as equally in Alexander, Bucephalus, and Podargus, with a particular ſubſiſtence proper to each of them, as the common nature of man is equally in Peter, James, and John, with a particular ſubſiſtence, proper to each of them, &c. but pray what does all this do, towards the giving you clear and diſtinct apprehenſions of nature?

I REPLIED, truly neither the conſideration of nature, as in his Lordſhip's diſtinct individuals, viz. in Peter, James, and John; nor the conſideration of nature, as in your diſtinct individuals, viz. in Alexander, Bucephalus, and Podargus, did any thing towards the giving me clear and diſtinct apprehenſions of nature. Nay, they were ſo far from it, that, after having gone over both the one and the other, ſeveral times in my thoughts, I ſeem to have leſs clear and diſtinct apprehenſions of nature, than I had before; but whether it will be ſo with other people, as I perceive it is with you, and me, and ſome others, none of the dulleſt, whom I have talked with, upon this ſubject, that muſt be left to experience; and if there be others, that do hereby get ſuch clear and diſtinct apprehenſions concerning nature, which may help them, in their notions of the Trinity, that cannot be denied them.

THAT is true, ſaid he: but if that be ſo, I muſt neceſſarily conclude, that the Notioniſts, and the Ideiſts, have their apprehenſive faculties very differently turned; ſince in their explaining themſelves (which they, on both ſides, think clear and intelligible) they cannot underſtand one another.

BUT let us go on to nature, conſidered abſtractly, in the next words.

SECONDLY, nature may be conſidered, ſays his Lordſhip, abſtractly, without reſpect to individual perſons.

I DO not ſee, ſaid he, what perſons do here, more than any other individuals: for nature, conſidered abſtractly, has no more reſpect to perſons, than any other ſort of individuals.

AND then, ſays his Lordſhip, it makes an entire notion of itſelf. To make an entire notion of itſelf, being an expreſſion, I never met with before, I ſhall not, I think, be much blamed, if I be not confident, that I perfectly underſtand it. To gueſs, therefore, as well as I can, what can be meant by it, I conſider, that whatever the mind makes an object of its contemplation at any time, may be called one notion, or, as you perhaps would call it, one idea; which may be an entire notion, or idea, tho' it be but the half of what is the object of the mind, at another time. For methinks the number, five, is as much an entire notion of itſelf, when the mind contemplates the number, five, by itſelf, as the number ten is an entire notion by itſelf, when the mind contemplates that alone, and its properties; and, in this ſenſe, I can underſtand an entire notion by itſelf: but if it mean any thing elſe, I confeſs I do not underſtand it. But then the difficulty remains; for I cannot ſee how, in this ſenſe, nature, abſtractly conſidered, makes an entire notion, more than the nature of Peter makes an entire notion. For if the nature in Peter be conſidered by itſelf, or if the abſtract nature of man be conſidered by itſelf, or if the nature of animal (which is yet more abſtract) be conſidered by itſelf; every one of theſe, being made the whole object, that the mind, at any time, contemplates, ſeems to me, as much an entire notion, as either of the other.

BUT farther, what the calling nature, abſtractly conſidered, an entire notion in itſelf, contributes to our having, or not having clear and diſtinct apprehenſions of nature, is yet more remote from my comprehenſion.

Vindic. p. 254. HIS Lordſhip's next words are; "for however the ſame nature may be in different individuals; yet the nature in itſelf remains one and the ſame: which "appears, from this evident reaſon, that otherwiſe every individual muſt make "a different kind."

THE coherence of which diſcourſe, continued he, tending, as it ſeems, to prove, that nature, conſidered abſtractly, makes an entire notion of itſelf; ſtands as far as I can comprehend it, thus: "becauſe every individual muſt not make "a different kind; therefore nature, however it be in different individuals, yet "in itſelf it remains one and the ſame. And becauſe nature, however it be in "different individuals, yet in itſelf remains one and the ſame; therefore, conſi"dered abſtractly, it makes an intire notion of itſelf." This is the argument of this paragraph; and the connexion of it, if I underſtand the connecting words, "for, and from this evident reaſon." But if they are uſed for any thing elſe, but to tie thoſe propoſitions together, as the proofs one of another, in that way I have mentioned them; I confeſs I underſtand them not, nor any thing, that is meant by this whole paragraph. And, in that ſenſe, I underſtand it in, what it does towards the giving us clear and diſtinct apprehenſions of nature, I muſt confeſs, I do not ſee at all.

Thus far, ſaid he, we have conſidered his Lordſhip's explication of nature; and my underſtanding what his Lordſhip had diſcourſed upon it, under ſeveral heads, for the giving us clear and diſtinct apprehenſions concerning it.

Let us now read what his Lordſhip has ſaid concerning perſon; that I may, ſince you deſire it of me, let you ſee, how far I have got any clear and diſtinct apprehenſion of perſon, from his Lordſhip's explication of that. His Lordſhip's words are; "let us now come to the idea of a perſon. For altho' the common "nature of mankind be the ſame, yet we ſee a difference in the ſeveral indivi"duals from one another: ſo that Peter, and James, and John, are all of the "ſame kind; yet Peter is not James, and James is not John. But what is this "diſtinction founded upon? They may be diſtinguiſhed from each other by our "ſenſes, as to difference of features, diſtance of place, &c. but that is not all; "for ſuppoſing there were no external difference, yet there is a difference be"tween them, as ſeveral individuals in the ſame common nature. And here "lies the true idea of a perſon, which ariſes from the manner of ſubſiſtence, "which is in one individual, and is not communicable to another. An indivi"dual, intelligent ſubſtance is rather ſuppoſed to the making of a perſon, than "the proper definition of it; for a perſon relates to ſomething, which doth diſ"tinguiſh it from another intelligent ſubſtance in the ſame nature; and, there"fore, the foundation of it lies in the peculiar manner of ſubſiſtence, which "agrees to one, and to none elſe, of the ſame kind; and this is it which is call"ed perſonality." Vindic. p. 259.

In theſe words, this I underſtand very well, that ſuppoſing Peter, James, and John to be all three men; and man, being a name for one kind of animals, they are all of the ſame kind. I underſtand too very well, that Peter is not James, and James is not John, but that there is a difference in theſe ſeveral individuals. I underſtand alſo, that they may be diſtinguiſhed from each other by our ſenſes, as to different features and diſtance of place, &c. But what follows, I do confeſs, I do not underſtand, where his Lordſhip ſays, "but that is not all; "for ſuppoſing there were no ſuch external difference, yet there is a difference "between them, as ſeveral individuals in the ſame nature." For firſt, whatever willingneſs I have to gratify his Lordſhip, in whatever he will have me ſuppoſe, yet I cannot, I find, ſuppoſe, that there is no ſuch external difference between Peter and James, as difference of place; for I cannot ſuppoſe a contradiction: and it ſeems to me to imply a contradiction to ſay, Peter and James are not in different places. The next thing, I do not underſtand, is, what his Lordſhip ſays in theſe words; "for ſuppoſing there were no ſuch external difference, "yet there is a difference between them, as ſeveral individuals in the ſame na"ture." For theſe words being here to ſhew, what the diſtinction of Peter, James, and John is founded upon, I do not underſtand how they at all do it.

His Lordſhip ſays, "Peter is not James, and James is not John." He then aſks, "but what is this diſtinction founded upon?" And to reſolve that he anſwers, "not by difference of features, or diſtance of place, with an &c. becauſe, ſup"poſing there were no ſuch external difference, yet there is a difference between "them." In which paſſage, by theſe words, ſuch external difference, muſt be meant all other difference, but what his Lordſhip, in the next words, is going to name; or elſe I do not ſee, how his Lordſhip ſhews, what this diſtinction is founded upon. For if, ſuppoſing ſuch external differences away, there may be other differences, on which to found their diſtinction, beſides that other, which his Lordſhip ſubjoins, viz. "the difference that is between them, as ſeveral individuals in the ſame nature:" I cannot ſee, that his Lordſhip has ſaid any thing to ſhew, what the diſtinction between thoſe individuals is founded on; becauſe, if he has not, under the terms external difference, comprized all the differences, beſides that his chief and fundamental one, viz. "the difference between them as ſeveral individuals, in the ſame common nature;" it may be founded on what his Lordſhip has not mentioned. I conclude then, it is his Lordſhip's meaning, (or elſe I can ſee no meaning in his words) that ſuppoſing no difference between them, of features, or diſtance of place, &c. i. e. no other difference between them, yet there would be ſtill the true ground of diſtinction, in the difference between them, as ſeveral individuals in the ſame common nature.

Let us then underſtand, if we can, what is the difference between things, barely as ſeveral individuals, in the ſame common nature, all other differences laid aſide.

Truly, ſaid I, that I cannot conceive.

Nor I neither, replied the gentleman; for conſidering them as ſeveral individuals, was what his Lordſhip did, when he ſaid, Peter was not James, and James was not John; and if that were enough to ſhew, on what the diſtinction between them was founded, his Lordſhip needed have gone no farther in his enquiry, after that, for that he had found already: and yet methinks thither are we at laſt come again, as to the foundation of the diſtinction between them, viz. that they are ſeveral individuals, in the ſame common nature. Nor can I here ſee any other ground of the diſtinction between thoſe, that are ſeveral individuals in the ſame common nature, but this, that they are ſeveral individuals in the ſame common nature. Either this is all the meaning, that his Lordſhip's words, when conſidered, carry in them; or elſe I do not underſtand what they mean: and either way I muſt own, they do not much towards the giving me clear and diſtinct apprehenſions of nature and perſon.

One thing more I muſt remark to you, in his Lordſhip's way of expreſſing himſelf here; and that is, in the former part of the words laſt read, he ſpeaks, as he does all along, of the ſame common nature being in mankind, or in the ſeveral individuals: and, in the latter part of them, he ſpeaks of ſeveral individuals being in the ſame common nature. I do by no means find fault with ſuch figurative and common ways of ſpeaking, in popular and ordinary diſcourſes, where inaccurate thoughts allow inaccurate ways of ſpeaking; but I think I may ſay, that metaphorical expreſſions (which ſeldom terminate in preciſe truth) ſhould be as much as poſſible avoided, when men undertake to deliver clear and diſtinct apprehenſions, and exact notions of things: becauſe, being taken ſtrictly and according to the letter, (as we find they are apt to be) they always puzzle and miſlead, rather then inlighten and inſtruct.

I do not ſay this (continued he) with an intention to accuſe his Lordſhip of inaccurate notions; but yet, I think, his ſticking ſo cloſe all along to that vulgar way of ſpeaking, of the ſame common nature being in ſeveral individuals, has made him leſs eaſy to be underſtood. For to ſpeak truly and preciſely of this matter, as in reality it is, there is no ſuch thing as one and the ſame common nature in ſeveral individuals: for all, that in truth is in them, is particular, and can be nothing but particular. But the true meaning (when it has any) of that metaphorical and popular phraſe, I take to be this, and no more, that every particular individual man, or horſe, &c. has ſuch a nature or conſtitution, as agrees, and is conformable to that idea, which that general name ſtands for.

His Lordſhip's next words are; "And here lies the true idea of a perſon, "which ariſes from that manner of ſubſiſtence, which is in one individual, and "is not communicable to another." The reading of theſe words, ſaid he, makes me wiſh, that we had ſome other way of communicating our thoughts, than by words: for, no doubt, it would have been as much a pleaſure to have ſeen what his Lordſhip's thoughts were, when he writ this, as it is now an uneaſineſs to pudder in words and expreſſions, whoſe meaning one does not comprehend. But let us do the beſt we can. "And here, ſays his Lordſhip, lies the true idea of perſon."

Person, being a diſ-ſyllable, that in it ſelf ſignifies nothing; what is meant by the true idea of it (it having no idea, one more than another, that belongs to it, but the idea of the articulate ſound, that thoſe two ſyllables make in pronouncing) I do not underſtand. If, by true idea, be meant true ſignification, then theſe words will run thus; here lies the true ſignification of the word perſon; and then, to make it more intelligible, we muſt change here into herein, and then the whole comma will ſtand thus; herein lies the true ſignification of the word perſon: which reading herein, muſt refer to the preceding words: and then the meaning of theſe words will be, the true ſignification of perſon lies in this, that "ſuppoſing there were no other difference, in the ſeveral individuals of the ſame kind; yet there is a difference between them as ſeveral individuals, in the ſame common nature." Now, if in this lies the true ſignification of the word, perſon, he muſt find it here, that can. For if he does find it in theſe words, he muſt find it to be ſuch a ſignification, as will make the word, perſon, agree as well to Bucephalus and Podargus, as to Alexander: for, let the difference between Bucephalus and Podargus, as ſeveral individuals, in the ſame common nature, be what it will; it is certain, it will always be as great, as the difference between Alexander and Hector, as ſeveral individuals in the ſame common nature. So that, if the true ſignification of perſon lies in that difference, it will belong to Bucephalus and Podargus, as well as to Alexander and Hector. But let any one reaſon ever ſo ſubtilly, or profoundly, about the true idea, or true ſignification of the term, perſon, he will never be able to make me underſtand, that Bucephalus and Podargus are perſons in the true ſignification of the word, perſon, as commonly uſed in the Engliſh tongue.

But that, which more certainly and for ever, will hinder me from finding the true ſignification of perſon, lying in the foregoing words, is, that they require me to do, what I find is impoſſible for me to do, i. e. find a difference between two individuals, as ſeveral individuals, in the ſame common nature, without any other difference. For if I never found any other difference, I ſhould never find two individuals. For, firſt, we find ſome difference, and by that we find they are two, or ſeveral, individuals; but, in this way, we are bid to find two individuals, without any difference: but that, I find, is too ſubtil and ſublime for my weak capacity. But when, by any difference of time, or place, or any thing elſe, I have once found them to be two, or ſeveral, I cannot for ever after, conſider them but as ſeveral. They being once by ſome difference, found to be two, it is unavoidable for me, from henceforth, to conſider them as two. But to find ſeverals, where I find no difference; or, as his Lordſhip is pleaſed to call it, external difference at all; is, I confeſs, too hard for me.

This his Lordſhip farther tells us, in theſe words which follow; "which ariſes from the manner of ſubſiſtence, which is in one individual, which is not communicable to another:" which is, I own, a learned way of ſpeaking, and is ſuppoſed to contain ſome refined philoſophick notion in it, which to me is either wholly incomprehenſible, or elſe may be expreſſed in theſe plain and common words, viz. that every thing that exiſts has, in the time or place, or other perceivable differences of its exiſtence, ſomething incommunicable to all thoſe of its own kind, whereby it will eternally be kept ſeveral from all the reſt. This, I think, is that which the learned have been pleaſed to term a peculiar manner of ſubſiſtence; but if this manner of ſubſiſtence be any thing elſe, it will need ſome farther explication to make me underſtand it.

His Lordſhip's next words, which follow, I muſt acknowledge are alſo wholly incomprehenſible to me: they are, "an individual, intelligent ſubſtance is rather ſuppoſed to the making of a perſon, than the proper definition of it."

Person is a word; and the idea, that word ſtands for, or the proper ſignification of that word, is what I take his Lordſhip is here giving us. Now what is meant by ſaying, "an individual, intelligent ſubſtance is rather ſuppoſed to the making the ſignification of the word perſon, than the proper definition of it," is beyond my reach. And the reaſon his Lordſhip adjoins, puts it, in that, or any other ſenſe, farther from my comprehenſion. "For a perſon relates to ſomething, which does diſtinguiſh it from another intelligent ſubſtance, in the ſame nature; and, therefore, the foundation of it lies in the peculiar manner of ſubſiſtence, which agrees to one, and none elſe, of the kind; and this is that, which is called perſonality."

THESE words, if nothing elſe, convince me, that I am Davus and not Oedipus; and ſo I muſt leave them.

Vind. p. 261. HIS Lordſhip at laſt, gives us what, I think, he intends for a definition of perſon, in theſe words: "Therefore, a perſon is a compleat, intelligent ſubſtance, with a peculiar manner of ſubſiſtence." Where I cannot but obſerve, that what was, as I think, denied or half-denied to be the proper definition of perſon; in ſaying, "it was rather ſuppoſed to the making of a perſon, than the proper definition of it," is yet here got into his Lordſhip's definition of perſon; which I cannot ſuppoſe, but his Lordſhip takes to be a proper definition. There is only one word changed in it; and inſtead of individual, intelligent ſubſtance, his Lordſhip has put it compleat, intelligent ſubſtance; which whether it makes his the more proper definition, I leave to others; ſince, poſſibly, ſome will be apt to think, that a proper definition of perſon cannot be well made, without the term individual, or an equivalent. Vind. p. 261. But his Lordſhip has, as appears by the place, put in compleat, to exclude the ſoul from being a perſon; which whether it does it, or no, to me ſeems doubtful: becauſe, poſſibly, many may think, that the ſoul is a compleat, intelligent ſubſtance by itſelf, whether in the body, or out of the body; becauſe every ſubſtance, that has a being, is a compleat ſubſtance, whether joined, or not joined, to another. And as to the ſoul's being intelligent, no-body, I gueſs, thinks, that the ſoul is compleated in that, by its union with the body, for then it would follow, that it would not be equally intelligent out of the body; which, I think, no-body will ſay.

AND thus I have, at your requeſt, gone over all, that his Lordſhip has ſaid, to give us clear and diſtinct apprehenſions of nature and perſon, which are ſo neceſſary to the underſtanding the doctrine of the Trinity, and talking intelligibly about it. And if I ſhould judge of others by my own dulneſs, I ſhould fear, that by his Lordſhip's diſcourſe, few would be helped to think, or talk, intelligibly about it. But I meaſure not others, by my narrow capacity: I wiſh others may profit by his Lordſhip's explication of nature and perſon, more than I have done. And ſo the converſation ended.

MY Lord, I ſhould not have troubled your Lordſhip with a dialogue of this kind, had not your Lordſhip forced me to it, in my own defence. Your Lordſhip at the end of your above-mentioned explication of nature, has theſe words; Vindic. p. 254. "let us now ſee how far theſe things can come from our ideas, by ſenſation and reflection." And, to the like purpoſe, in the cloſe of your explication of perſon, your Lordſhip ſays, "but how do our ſimple ideas help us out, in this matter? Can we learn from them the difference of nature and perſon?" Your Lordſhip concludes we cannot. But you ſay, what makes a perſon, muſt be underſtood ſome other way. And hereupon, my Lord, my book is thought worthy, by your Lordſhip, to be brought into the controverſy, and argued againſt in your Vindication of the doctrine of the Trinity; becauſe, as your Lordſhip conceives, clear and diſtinct apprehenſions of nature and perſon cannot be had from it.

I HUMBLY crave leave to repreſent to your Lordſhip, that, if want of affording clear and diſtinct apprehenſions, concerning nature and perſon, makes any book Anti-trinitarian, and, as ſuch, fit to be writ againſt, by your Lordſhip; your Lordſhip ought, in the opinion of a great many men, in the firſt place, to write againſt your own Vindication of the doctrine of the Trinity; ſince, among the many I have conſulted, concerning your Lordſhip's notions of nature and perſon, I do not find any one, that underſtands them better, or has got from them any clear, or more diſtinct, apprehenſions concerning nature and perſon, than I myſelf; which indeed is none at all.

THE owning of this to your Lordſhip, in my former letter, I find, diſpleaſed your Lordſhip: I, therefore, here laid before your Lordſhip ſome part of thoſe difficulties, which appear to me, and others, in your Lordſhip's explication of nature and perſon, as my apology for ſaying, I had not learned any thing by it. And, to make it evident, that if want of clear and diſtinct apprehenſions of nature and perſon, involve any treatiſe in the Unitarian controverſy, your Lordſhip's upon that account, is, I humbly conceive, as guilty as mine; and may be reckoned one of the firſt, that ought to be charged with that offence againſt the doctrine of the Trinity.

THIS, my Lord, I cannot help thinking, till I underſtand better. Whether the not being able to get clear and diſtinct apprehenſions concerning nature and perſon, from what your Lordſhip has ſaid of them, be the want of capacity in my underſtanding, or want of clearneſs in that, which I have endeavoured to underſtand, I ſhall not preſume to ſay; of that the world muſt judge. If it be my dulneſs (as I cannot preſume much upon my own quickneſs, having every day experience, how ſhort-ſighted I am) I have this yet to defend me, from any very ſevere cenſure in the caſe, that I have as much endeavoured to underſtand your Lordſhip, as I ever did to underſtand any body. And if your Lordſhip's notions, laid down about nature and perſon, are plain and intelligible, there are a great many others, whoſe parts lie under no blemiſh in the world, who find them neither plain, nor intelligible.

PARDON me therefore, I beſeech you, my Lord, if I return your Lordſhip's queſtion, "how do your Lordſhip's notions help us out in this matter? Can we "learn from them, clear and diſtinct apprehenſions concerning nature and per- "ſon, and the grounds of identity and diſtinction?" To which the anſwer will ſtand, no; till your Lordſhip has explained your notions of them a little clearer, and ſhewn what ultimately they were founded on, and made up of, if they are not ultimately founded on, and made up of, our ſimple ideas, received from ſenſation and reflection; which is that, for which, in this point, you except againſt my book: and yet, tho' your Lordſhip ſets yourſelf to prove, that they cannot be had from our ſimple ideas by ſenſation and reflection; tho' your Lordſhip lays down ſeveral heads about them; yet you do not, that I ſee, offer any thing to inſtruct us, from what other original they come, or whence they are to be had. Vindic. p. 254, &c.

BUT, perhaps, this may be my want of underſtanding what your Lordſhip has ſaid about them: and, poſſibly, from the ſame cauſe it is, that I do not ſee how the four paſſages your Lordſhip ſubjoins, as out of my book (tho' there be no ſuch paſſages in my book; as, I think, your Lordſhip acknowledges, ſince your Lordſhip anſwers nothing, to what I ſaid thereupon;) the two things your Lordſhip ſays, are granted, that tend to the clearing this matter; and the four inferences your Lordſhip makes, are all or any of them, applied by your Lordſhip, to ſhew that clear and diſtinct apprehenſions, concerning nature and perſon, cannot be had, upon my principles; at leaſt, as clear as can be had upon your Lordſhip's, when you pleaſe to let us know them. Vindic. p. 254, 255-- 259. P. 255. P. 255-259.

HITHERTO, my Lord, I have conſidered only what is charged upon my book, by your Lordſhip, in reference to the Unitarian controverſy, viz. the manner and grounds, on which my book has been, by your Lordſhip, endeavoured to be brought into the controverſy concerning the Trinity, with which it hath nothing to do; nor has your Lordſhip, as I humbly conceive, yet ſhewn that it has.

THERE remains to be conſidered ſeveral things, which your Lordſhip thinks faulty in my book; which, whether they have any thing to do, or no, with the doctrine of the Trinity, I think myſelf obliged to give your Lordſhip ſatisfaction in, either by acknowledging my errors, or giving your Lordſhip an account, wherein your Lordſhip's diſcourſe comes ſhort of convincing me of them. But theſe papers being already grown to a bulk, that exceeds the ordinary ſize of a letter, I ſhall reſpite your Lordſhip's farther trouble in this matter, for the preſent, with this promiſe, that I ſhall not fail to return my acknowledgments to your Lordſhip, for thoſe other parts of the letter, you have honoured me with.

BEFORE I conclude, it is fit, with due acknowledgment, I take notice of theſe words, in the cloſe of your Lordſhip's letter: "I hope, that in the ma- "naging this debate, I have not either tranſgreſſed the rules of civility, or miſ-

"taken your meaning; both which I have endeavoured to avoid. And I return "you thanks for the civilites, you have expreſſed to me, through your letter: "and I do aſſure you, that it is out of no diſreſpect, or the leaſt ill-will to you, "that I have again conſidered this matter," &c.

Your Lordſhip hopes, you have not miſtaken my meaning: and I, my Lord, hope, that where you have (as I humbly conceive, I ſhall make it appear, you have) miſtaken my meaning, I may, without offence, lay it before your Lordſhip. And I the more confidently ground that hope, upon this expreſſion of your Lordſhip, here, which I take to be intended to that purpoſe; ſince, in thoſe ſeveral inſtances I gave, in my former letter, of your Lordſhip's miſtaking not only my meaning, but the very words of my book, which you quoted, your Lordſhip has had the goodneſs to bear with me, without any manner of reply.

P. 133. Your Lordſhip aſſures me, "that it is out of no diſreſpect, or the leaſt ill-"will to me, that you have again conſidered this matter."

My Lord, my never having, by any act of mine, deſerved otherwiſe of your Lordſhip, is a ſtrong reaſon to keep me from queſtioning what your Lordſhip ſays: and, I hope, my part in the controverſy has been ſuch, that I may be excuſed from making any ſuch profeſſion, in reference to what I write to your Lordſhip. And I ſhall take care to continue to defend myſelf ſo, in this controverſy, which your Lordſhip is pleaſed to have with me, that I ſhall not come within the need of any apology, that what I ſay is out of no diſreſpect, or the leaſt ill-will, to your Lordſhip. But this muſt not hinder me any where, from laying the argument in its due light for the advantage of truth.

This, my Lord, I ſay not to your Lordſhip, who, propoſing to yourſelf, as you ſay, in this very page, nothing but truth, will not, I know, take it amiſs, that I endeavour to make every thing, as plain and as clear as I can: but this I ſay, upon occaſion of ſome exceptions of this kind, which I have heard others have made againſt the former letter, I did myſelf the honour to write to your Lordſhip, as if I did therein bear too hard upon your Lordſhip. Tho' your Lordſhip, who knows very well the end of arguing, as well as rules of civility, finds nothing to blame in my way of writing; and I ſhould be very ſorry, it ſhould deſerve any other character, than what your Lordſhip has been pleaſed to give it in the beginning of your poſtſcript. It is my misfortune to have any controverſy with your Lordſhip; but ſince the concern of truth alone engages me in it, as I know your Lordſhip will expect, that I ſhould omit nothing, that ſhould make for truth, for that is the end we both profeſs to aim at; ſo I ſhall take care to avoid all foreign, paſſionate, and unmannerly mixtures, which do no way become a lover of truth, in any debate, eſpecially with one of your Lordſhip's character and dignity.

My Lord, the imputation of a tendency to ſcepticiſm, and to the overthrowing any article of the chriſtian faith, are no ſmall charges; and all cenſures of that high nature, I humbly conceive, are with the more caution to be paſſed, the greater the authority is of the perſon, they come from. But whether to pronounce ſo hardly of the book, merely upon ſurmiſes, be to be taken for a mark of good-will to the author, I muſt leave to your Lordſhip. This I am ſure, I find the world thinks me obliged to vindicate myſelf. I have taken leave to ſay, merely upon ſurmiſes, becauſe I cannot ſee any argument, your Lordſhip has any where brought, to ſhew its tendency to ſcepticiſm, beyond what your Lordſhip has in theſe words in this page, viz. that it is your Lordſhip's great prejudice againſt it, that it leads to ſcepticiſm; or, that your Lordſhip can find no way to attain to certainty in it, upon my grounds.

I confess, my Lord, I think, that there is a great part of the viſible, and a great deal more of the yet much larger intellectual world, wherein our poor and weak underſtandings, in this ſtate, are not capable of knowledge; and this, I think, a great part of mankind agrees with me in. But whether, or no, my way of certainty, by ideas, comes ſhort of what it ſhould, or your Lordſhip's way, with or without ideas, will carry us to clearer and larger degrees of certainty; we ſhall ſee, when your Lordſhip pleaſes to let us know, wherein your way of certainty conſiſts. Till then, I think, to avoid ſcepticiſm, it is better to have ſome way of certainty (tho' it will not lead us to it, in every thing) than no way at all.

The neceſſity your Lordſhip has put upon me, of vindicating myſelf, muſt be my apology for giving your Lordſhip this ſecond trouble; which, I aſſure myſelf, you will not take amiſs, ſince your Lordſhip was ſo much concerned for my vindication, as to declare, you had no reaſon to be ſorry, that the author of Chriſtianity P. 36. not myſterious had given me occaſion to vindicate myſelf. I return your Lordſhip my humble thanks for affording me this ſecond opportunity to do it, and am, with the utmoſt reſpect,

London,
29 June,
1697.

My LORD,

Your Lordſhip's moſt humble

and moſt obedient ſervant,

John Locke.

POSTSCRIPT.

My Lord,

THO' I have ſo great a precedent, as your Lordſhip has given me, in the letter, you have honoured me with; yet, I doubt, whether even your Lordſhip's example will be enough to juſtify me to the world, if, in a letter writ to one, I ſhould put a poſtſcript in anſwer to another man, to whom I do not ſpeak in my letter: I ſhall therefore only beg, that your Lordſhip will be pleaſed to excuſe it, if you find a ſhort anſwer to the paper of another man, not big enough to be publiſhed by itſelf, appear under the ſame cover with my anſwer to your Lordſhip. The paper itſelf came to my hands, at the ſame time, that your Lordſhip's Letter did; and, containing ſome exceptions to my Eſſay concerning Human Underſtanding, is not wholly foreign in the matter of it.

AN ANSWER TO REMARKS UPON An Eſſay concerning Human Underſtanding, &c.

BEFORE any thing came out againſt my Eſſay concerning Human Underſtanding, the laſt year, I was told, that I muſt prepare myſelf for a ſtorm, that was coming againſt it; it being reſolved by ſome men, that it was neceſſary that book of mine ſhould, as it is phraſed, be run down. I do not ſay, that the author of theſe remarks was one of thoſe men; but I premiſe this, as the reaſon of the anſwer, I am about to give him: and tho' I do not ſay, he was one of them; yet in this, I think, every indifferent reader will agree with me, that his letter does not very well ſuit with the character, he takes upon himſelf, or the deſign he pretends in writing it.

P. 4. He pretends, the buſineſs of his letter to be informed: but if that were in earneſt ſo, I ſuppoſe he would have done two things, quite otherwiſe, than he has. The firſt is, that he would not have thought it neceſſary, for his particular information, that his letter (that pretends inquiry in the body of it, tho' it carries remarks in the title) ſhould have been publiſhed in print: whereby I am apt to think, that, however, in it, he puts on the perſon of a learner, yet he would miſs his aim, if he were not taken notice of, as a teacher; and particularly, that his remarks ſhewed the world great faults in my book.

The other is, that he has not ſet his name to his letter of inquiries; whereby I might, by knowing the perſon that inquires, the better know how to ſuit my anſwer to him. I cannot much blame him, in another reſpect, for concealing his name; for, I think, any one, who appears among chriſtians, may be well aſhamed of his name, when he raiſes ſuch a doubt as this, *viz.* whether an infinitely powerful and wiſe being, be veracious or no; unleſs falſhood be in ſuch reputation with this gentleman, that he concludes lying to be no mark of weakneſs and folly. Beſides, this author might, if he had pleaſed, have taken notice, that, in more places than one, I ſpeak of the goodneſs of God; another evidence, as I take it, of his veracity.

P. 6, 7. He ſeems concerned to know, "upon what ground I will build the divine law, "when I purſue morality to a demonſtration?"

If he had not been very much in haſte, he would have ſeen, that his queſtions, in that paragraph, are a little too forward; unleſs he thinks it neceſſary I ſhould write, when, and upon what, he thinks fit. When I know him better, I may, perhaps, think I owe him great obſervance; but ſo much as that, very few men think due to themſelves.

I have ſaid, indeed, in my book, that I thought morality capable of demonſtration, as well as the mathematicks: but I do not remember, where I promiſed this gentleman to demonſtrate it to him.

P. 6. He ſays, "if he knew upon what grounds I would build my demonſtration "of morality, he could make a better judgment of it." His judgment, who makes ſuch demands as this, and is ſo much in haſte to be a judge, that he cannot ſtay, till what he has ſuch a mind to be ſitting upon, be born; does not ſeem of that conſequence, that any one ſhould be in haſte to gratify his impatience.

And, ſince, "he thinks the illiterate part of mankind (which is the greateſt) "muſt have a more compendious way to know their duty, than by long de-"ductions;" he may do well to conſider, whether it were, for their ſakes, he publiſhed this queſtion, viz. "what is the reaſon and ground of the divine law?" P. 4.

Whoever ſincerely acknowledges any law to be the law of God, cannot fail to acknowledge alſo, that it hath all that reaſon and ground, that a juſt and wiſe law can, or ought to have; and will eaſily perſuade himſelf to forbear raiſing ſuch queſtions and ſcruples about it. P. 6.

A man, that inſinuates as he does, as if I held, that "the diſtinction of virtue "and vice, was to be picked up by our eyes, our ears, or our noſtrils;" ſhews ſo much ignorance, or ſo much malice, that he deſerves no other anſwer but pity. P. 4.

"The immortality of the ſoul is another thing, he ſays, he cannot clear to "himſelf, upon my principles." It may be ſo. The right reverend the Lord Biſhop of Worceſter, in the letter he has lately honoured me with in print, has undertaken to prove, upon my principles, the ſoul's immateriality; which, I ſuppoſe, this author will not queſtion to be a proof of its immortality: and to his Lordſhip's letter, I refer him for it. But, if that will not ſerve his turn, I will tell him a principle of mine, that will clear it to him; and that is, the revelation of life and immortality, by Jeſus Chriſt, thro' the goſpel. P. 8. P. 69.

He mentions other doubts he has, unreſolved by my principles. If my principles do not reach them, the world I think will, I am ſure I ſhall, be obliged to him, to direct me to ſuch as will ſupply that defect in mine. For I never had the vanity to hope to out-do all other men. Nor did I propoſe to my ſelf in publiſhing my Eſſay, to be an anſwerer of queſtions; or expect that all doubts ſhould go out of the world, as ſoon as my book came into it.

The world has now my book, ſuch as it is: if any one finds, that there be many queſtions, that my principles will not reſolve, he will do the world more ſervice to lay down ſuch principles as will reſolve them, than to quarrel with my ignorance (which I readily acknowledge) and poſſibly for that, which cannot be done. I ſhall never think the worſe of mine, becauſe they will not reſolve every one's doubts, till I ſee thoſe principles, laid down by any one, that will; and then I will quit mine.

If any one finds any thing in my Eſſay, to be corrected, he may, when he pleaſes, write againſt it; and, when I think fit, I will anſwer him. For I do not intend my time ſhall be waſted, at the pleaſure of every one, who may have a mind to pick holes in my book, and ſhew his ſkill in the art of confutation.

To conclude; were there nothing elſe in it, I ſhould not think it fit to trouble myſelf about the queſtions of a man, which he himſelf does not think worth the owning.

Mr. *LOCKE's* REPLY

To the Right Reverend the

Lord Biſhop of WORCESTER's Anſwer to his Second Letter:

Wherein, beſides other incident matters, what his Lordſhip has ſaid concerning certainty by reaſon, certainty by ideas, and certainty of faith; the reſurrection of the ſame body; the immateriality of the ſoul; the inconſiſtency of Mr. LOCKE's notions with the articles of the chriſtian faith, and their tendency to ſcepticiſm, is examined.

MY LORD,

YOUR Lordſhip, in the beginning of the laſt letter, you honoured me with, ſeems ſo uneaſy and diſpleaſed at my having ſaid too much already, in the queſtion between us, that I think I may conclude, you would be well enough pleaſed, if I ſhould ſay no more; and you would diſpenſe with me, for not keeping my promiſe I made you to anſwer the other parts of your firſt letter. 2d Letter, p. 167. If this proceeds from any tenderneſs in your Lordſhip for my reputation, that you would not have me expoſe myſelf, by an overflow of words, in many places void of clearneſs, coherence, and argument, and that, therefore, might have been ſpared; I muſt acknowledge it is a piece of great charity, and ſuch, wherein you will have a laſting advantage over me, ſince good manners will not permit me to return you the like. Or, ſhould I, in the ebullition of thoughts, which in me your Lordſhip finds as impetuous, as the ſprings of Modena, mentioned by Ramazzini, be in danger to forget my ſelf, and to think, I had ſome right, to return the general complaint of length and intricacy without force; yet you have ſecured your ſelf from the ſuſpicion of any ſuch traſh, on your ſide, by Page 1. making cobwebs the eaſy product of thoſe, who write out of their own thoughts, which it might be a crime in me to impute to your Lordſhip.

IF this complaint of your's be not a charitable warning to me, I cannot well gueſs at the deſign of it; for I would not think that, in a controverſy, which you, my Lord, have dragged me into, you would aſſume it as a privilege due to your ſelf to be as copious, as you pleaſe, and ſay, what you think fit, and expect, I ſhould reply only ſo, and ſo much, as would juſt ſuit your good liking, and ſerve to ſet the cauſe right, on that ſide, which your Lordſhip contends for.

MY Lord, I ſhall always acknowledge the great diſtance, that is between your Lordſhip and myſelf, and pay that deference, that is due to your dignity and perſon: but controverſy, tho' it excludes not good manners, will not be managed with all that ſubmiſſion, which one is ready to pay in other caſes. Truth, which is inflexible, has here its intereſt, which muſt not be given up in a compliment. Plato, and Ariſtotle, and other great names, muſt give way, rather than make us renounce truth, or the friendſhip we have for her.

THIS, poſſibly, your Lordſhip will allow; for it is not ſpun out of my own thoughts; I have the authority of others for it, and, I think, it was in print before I was born. But you will ſay, however, I am too long in my replies. It is not impoſſible, but it may be ſo: but with all due reſpect to your Lordſhip's authority, (the greatneſs whereof I ſhall always readily acknowledge) I muſt crave leave to ſay, that, in this caſe, you are by no means a proper judge. We are now, as well your Lordſhip, as myſelf, before a tribunal, to which you have appealed, and before which you have brought me: it is the publick muſt be judge, whether your Lordſhip has enlarged too far, in accuſing me, or I, in defending myſelf. Common juſtice makes great allowance to a man, pleading in his own defence, and a little length (if he ſhould be guilty of it) finds excuſe, in the compaſſion of by-ſtanders, when they ſee a man cauſeleſly attacked, after a new way, by a potent adverſary; and, under various pretences, occaſions ſought, and words wreſted to his diſadvantage.

THIS, my Lord, you muſt give me leave to think, to be my caſe, whilſt this ſtrange way, your Lordſhip has brought me into this controverſy; your gradual accuſations of my book, and the different cauſes, your Lordſhip has aſſigned of them; together with quotations out of it, which I cannot find there, and other things, I have complained of (to ſome of which, your Lordſhip has not vouchſafed any anſwer) ſhall remain unaccounted for, as I humbly conceive, they do.

I CONFESS my anſwers are long, and I wiſh they could have been ſhorter; but the difficulty I have, to find out, and ſet before others, your Lordſhip's meaning, that they may ſee, what I am anſwering to, and ſo be able to judge of the pertinency of what I ſay, has unavoidably enlarged them: Whether this be wholly owing to my dulneſs, or whether a little perplexedneſs, both as to grammar and coherence, cauſed by thoſe numbers of thoughts, whether of your own, or others, that crowd from all parts to be ſet down, when you write, may not be allowed to have ſome ſhare in it, I ſhall not preſume to ſay. I am at the mercy of your Lordſhip, and my other readers, in the point, and know not how to avoid a fault, that has no remedy.

YOUR Lordſhip ſays, "the world ſoon grows weary of controverſies, eſpe- P. 4.
"cially when they are about perſonal matters; which made your Lordſhip won-
"der, that one, who underſtands the world ſo well, ſhould ſpend above fifty
"pages, in renewing and inlarging a complaint, wholly concerning himſelf."

To which give me leave to ſay, that if your Lordſhip had ſo much conſidered the world, and what it is not much pleaſed with, when you publiſhed your diſcourſe, in vindication of the Trinity, perhaps your Lordſhip had not ſo perſonally concerned me, in that controverſy, as it appears now you have, and continue ſtill to do.

YOUR Lordſhip "wonders, that I ſpend above fifty pages, in renewing and P. 4.
"enlarging my complaint, concerning myſelf." Your wonder, I humbly conceive, will not be ſo great, when you recollect, that your anſwer to my complaint, and the ſatisfaction you propoſed to give me, and others, in that perſonal matter, began the firſt letter, you honoured me with, and ended, in the 47th page of it; where you ſaid, "you ſuppoſe the reaſon of your mentioning my "words ſo often, was now no longer a riddle to me; and ſo you proceeded to "other particulars of my vindication." If, therefore, I have ſpent fifty pages of my anſwer, in ſhewing, that what you offered in forty-ſeven pages, for my ſatisfaction, was none, but that the riddle was a riddle ſtill; the diſproportion, in the number of pages, is not ſo great, as to be the ſubject of much wonder; eſpecially to thoſe, who conſider, that in what you call perſonal matter, I was ſhewing that my Eſſay, having in it, nothing contrary to the doctrine of the Trinity, was yet brought into that diſpute; and that, therefore, I had reaſon to complain of it, and of the manner of its being brought in: and if you had pleaſed not to have moved other queſtions, nor brought other charges againſt my book, till this, which was the occaſion and ſubject of my firſt letter, had been cleared; by making out that the paſſages you had, in your Vindication of the doctrine of the Trinity, quoted out of my book, had ſomething in them, againſt the doctrine of the Trinity; and ſo were, with juſt reaſon, brought by you, as they were, into that diſpute; there had been no other, but that perſonal matter, as you call it, between us.

In the examination of thoſe pages, meant, as you ſaid, for my ſatisfaction, and of other parts of your letter, I found (contrary to what I expected) matter of renewing and enlarging my complaint, and this I took notice of, and ſet down in my Reply, which it ſeems I ſhould not have done: the knowledge of the world ſhould have taught me better; and I ſhould have taken that for ſatisfaction, which you were pleaſed to give, in which I could not find any, nor, as I believe, any intelligent or impartial reader: ſo that your Lordſhip's care of the world, that it ſhould not grow weary of this controverſy, and the fault, you find, of my miſimploying fifty pages of my letter, reduces itſelf at laſt, in effect, to no more but this, that your Lordſhip ſhould have a liberty to ſay what you pleaſe, pay me in what coin you think fit; my part ſhould be, to be ſatisfied with it, reſt content, and ſay nothing. This, indeed, might be a way not to weary the world, and to ſave fifty pages of clean paper, and put ſuch an end to the controverſy, as your Lordſhip would not diſlike.

P. 178. I learn, from your Lordſhip, that it is the firſt part of wiſdom, in ſome men's opinions, not to begin in ſuch diſputes. What the knowledge of the world (which is a ſort of wiſdom) ſhould, in your Lordſhip's opinion, make a man do, when one of your Lordſhip's character begins with him, is very plain: he is not to reply, ſo far as he judges his defence and the matter requires, but as your Lordſhip is pleaſed to allow; which ſome may think no better, than if one might not reply at all.

After having thus rebuked me, for having been too copious in my Reply, in the next words, your Lordſhip inſtructs me, what I ſhould have anſwered; that "I ſhould have cleared myſelf, by declaring to the world, that I owned the "doctrine of the Trinity, as it has been received, in the chriſtian church."

This, as I take it, is a mere perſonal matter, of the ſame woof with a Spaniſh ſam-benito, and, as it ſeems to me, deſigned to fit cloſe to me. What muſt I do now, my Lord? Muſt I ſilently put on, and wear this badge of your Lordſhip's favour, and, as one well underſtanding the world, ſay not a word of it, becauſe the world ſoon grows weary of perſonal matters? If, in gratitude for this perſonal favour, I ought to be ſilent; yet I am forced to tell you, that, in what you require of me here, you poſſibly have cut out too much work, for a poor, ordinary layman, for whom it is too hard to know how a doctrine, ſo diſputed, has been received in the chriſtian church, and who might have thought it enough to own it, as delivered in the ſcriptures. Your Lordſhip, herein, lays upon me what I cannot do, without owning to know, what, I am ſure, I do not know; for how the doctrine of the Trinity has been always received in the chriſtian church, I confeſs myſelf ignorant. I have not had time to examine the hiſtory of it, and to read thoſe controverſies, that have been writ about it: and to own a doctrine, as received by others, when I do not know, how thoſe others received it, is perhaps a ſhort way to orthodoxy, that may ſatisfy ſome men: but he, that takes this way to give ſatisfaction, in my opinion, makes a little bold with truth; and it may be queſtioned, whether ſuch a profeſſion be pleaſing to that God, who requires truth in the inward parts, however acceptable it may, in any man, be to his dioceſan.

I presume your Lordſhip, in your diſcourſe in vindication of the doctrine of the Trinity, intends to give it us, as it has been received in the chriſtian church: and, I think, your words, viz. "it is the ſenſe of the chriſtian church, which P. 87. "you are bound to defend, and no particular opinions of your own," authorize one to think ſo. But if I am to own it, as your Lordſhip has there delivered it, I muſt own, what I do not underſtand; for, I confeſs, your expoſition, of the church, wholly tranſcends my capacity.

If you require me to own it with an implicit faith, I ſhall pay that deference as ſoon, to your Lordſhip's expoſition of the doctrine of the church, as any one's. But if I muſt underſtand, and know, what I own, it is my misfortune, and I cannot deny it, that I am as far from owning what you, in that diſcourſe, deliver, as I can be from profeſſing the moſt unintelligible thing, that ever I read, to be the doctrine that I own.

Whether I make more uſe of my poor underſtanding in the caſe, than you are willing to allow every one of your readers, I cannot tell: but ſuch an underſtanding, as God has given me, is the beſt I have, and that, which I muſt uſe, in the apprehending what others ſay, before I can own the truth of it; and for this, there is no help, that I know.

That, which keeps me a little in countenance, is, that, if I miſtake not, men of no mean parts, even divines of the church of England, and thoſe of neither the loweſt reputation, nor rank, find their underſtandings fail them, on this occaſion; and ſtick not to own, that they underſtand not your Lordſhip, in that diſcourſe, and particularly, that your ſixth chapter is unintelligible to them, as well as me; whether the fault be in their, or my underſtanding, the world muſt be judge. But this is only by the by; for this is not the anſwer I here intend your Lordſhip.

Your Lordſhip tells me, that "to clear myſelf, I ſhould have owned to the "world the doctrine of the Trinity, as it has been received," &c. Anſwer. I know not whether in a diſpute, managed after a new way, wherein one man is argued againſt, and another man's words all along quoted, it may not alſo be a good, as well as a new rule, for the anſwerer to reply to what was never objected, and clear himſelf from what was never laid to his charge. If this be not ſo, and that this new way of attacking, requires not this new way of defence, your Lordſhip's preſcription to me here, what I ſhould have done, will, "amongſt "the moſt intelligent and impartial readers," paſs for a ſtrange rule in controverſy, and ſuch as the learnedeſt of them will not be able to find in all antiquity; and therefore muſt be imputed to ſomething elſe, than your Lordſhip's great learning.

Did your Lordſhip, in the diſcourſe of the vindication of the Trinity, wherein you firſt fell upon my book, or in your letter (my anſwer to which, you are here correcting) did your Lordſhip, I ſay, any where object to me, that "I did "not own the doctrine of the Trinity, as it has been received in the chriſtian "church," &c.? If you did, the objection was ſo ſecret, ſo hidden, ſo artificial, that your words declared quite the contrary. In the Vindication of the doctrine of the Trinity, your Lordſhip ſays, that my notions were borrowed to ſerve Vind. p. 239. other purpoſes [whereby, if I underſtand you right, you meant againſt the doctrine of the Trinity] than I intended them; which you repeat again *, for my ſatisfaction, and inſiſt † upon my vindication.

You having ſo ſolemnly, more than once, profeſſed to clear me and my intentions Anſw. 1. p. 132, 133. from all ſuſpicion of having any part in that controverſy, as appears farther, in the cloſe of your firſt letter, where all you charge on me, is the ill uſe, that others had made, or might make of my notions; how could I ſuppoſe ſuch an objection, made by your Lordſhip, which you declare againſt, without accuſing your Lordſhip of manifeſt prevarication?

If your Lordſhip had any thing upon your mind, any ſecret aims, which you did not think fit to own, but yet would have me divine, and anſwer to, as if I knew them; this, I confeſs, is too much for me, who look no farther into men's thoughts, than as they appear in their books. Where you have given your thoughts vent in your words, I have not, I think, omitted to take notice of them, not wholly paſſing by thoſe inſinuations, which have been dropped from your Lordſhip's pen; which from another, who had not profeſſed ſo much perſonal reſpect, would have ſhewn no exceeding good diſpoſition of mind towards me.

When your Lordſhip ſhall go on to accuſe me, of not believing the doctrine of the Trinity, as received in the chriſtian church, or any other doctrine, you ſhall think fit, I ſhall anſwer as I would to an inquiſitor. For tho' your Lordſhip tells me, "I need not be afraid of the inquiſition, or that you intended to "charge me with hereſy, in denying the Trinity;" yet he, that ſhall conſider P. 3. your Lordſhip's proceeding with me, from the beginning, as far as it is hitherto gone, may have reaſon to think, that the methods and management of that holy office are not wholly unknown to your Lordſhip, nor have eſcaped your great reading. Your proceedings with me, have had theſe ſteps:

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* Anſw. 1. p. 35.

† Ibid. p. 36, 37, 40, 42, 46.

1. SEVERAL paſſages of my Eſſay of Human Underſtanding, and ſome of them relating barely to the being of a God, and other matters, wholly remote from any queſtion about the Trinity, were brought into the Vindication of the doctrine of the Trinity, and there argued againſt, as containing the errors of thoſe and them; which thoſe and them, are not known to this day.

2. IN your Lordſhip's anſwer to my firſt letter, when that was given, as the great reaſon, why my Eſſay was brought into that controverſy, viz. becauſe in it "certainty was founded upon clear and diſtinct ideas;" was found to fail, and was only a ſuppoſition of your own; other accuſations were ſought out againſt it, in relation to the doctrine of the Trinity: viz. that "it might be of dangerous conſequence to that doctrine, to introduce the new term of ideas, and to "place certainty, in the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of our "ideas." What are become of theſe charges, we ſhall ſee in the progreſs of this letter, when we come to conſider what your Lordſhip has replied to my anſwer upon theſe points. Anſw. 1. p. 133.

3. THESE accuſations not having, it ſeems, weight enough, to effect what you intended, my book has been rumaged again, to find new, and more important faults in it; and now, at laſt, at the third effort, "my notions of ideas are "found inconſiſtent with the articles of the chriſtian faith." This, indeed, carries ſome ſound in it, and may be thought worthy the name and pains of ſo great a man, and zealous a father of the church, as your Lordſhip. Anſw. 1. title page.

THAT I may not be too bold, in affirming a thing, I was not privy to, give me leave, my Lord, to tell your Lordſhip, why I preſume my book has, upon this occaſion, been looked over again, to ſee what could be found in it, capable to bear a deeper accuſation, that might look like ſomething, in a title-page. Your Lordſhip, by your ſtation in the church, and the zeal you have ſhewn, in defending its articles, could not be ſuppoſed, when you firſt brought my book into this controverſy, to have omitted theſe great enormities, that it now ſtands accuſed of, and to have cited it for ſmaller miſtakes, ſome whereof were not found, but only imagined to be, in it, if you had then known theſe great faults, which you now charge it with, to have been in it. If your Lordſhip had been apprized of its being guilty of ſuch dangerous errors, you would not certainly have paſſed them by: and, therefore, I think, one may reaſonably conclude, that my Eſſay was new looked into, on purpoſe.

YOUR Lordſhip ſays, "that what you have done herein, you thought it your "duty to do, not with reſpect to yourſelf, but to ſome of the myſteries of our "faith, which you do not charge me with oppoſing, but by laying ſuch foun-"dations as do tend to the overthrow of them." It cannot be doubted, but your duty would have made you, at the firſt, warn the world, that "my notions "were inconſiſtent with the articles of the chriſtian faith," if your Lordſhip had then known it: tho' the exceſſive reſpect and tenderneſs, you expreſs towards me perſonally, in the immediately preceding words, would be enough utterly to confound me, were I not a little acquainted with your Lordſhip's civilities in this kind. For you tell me, "that theſe things laid together, made your Lord-"ſhip think it neceſſary to do that, which you was unwilling to do, until I had "driven you to it; which was, to ſhew the reaſons you had, why you looked "on my notion of ideas, and of certainty by them, as inconſiſtent with itſelf, "and with ſome important articles of the chriſtian faith." P. 177. P. 177.

WHAT muſt I think now, my Lord, of theſe words? Muſt I take them as a mere compliment, which is never to be interpreted rigorouſly, according to the preciſe meaning of the words? Or muſt I believe that your unwillingneſs to do ſo hard a thing to me, reſtrained your duty, and you could not prevail on yourſelf (how-much-ſo-ever the myſteries of faith were in danger to be overthrown) to get out theſe harſh words, viz. that "my notions were inconſiſtent with the ar-"ticles of the chriſtian faith," till your third onſet, after I had forced you to your duty, by two replies of mine?

IT will not become me, my Lord, to make myſelf a compliment from your words, which you did not intend me in them: but, on the other ſide, I would not willingly neglect to acknowledge any civility from your Lordſhip, in the full extent of it. The buſineſs is a little nice, becauſe what is contained in thoſe two paſſages, cannot by a leſs ſkilful hand than your's be well put together, tho' they immediately follow one another. This, I am ſure, falls out very untowardly, that your Lordſhip ſhould drive me (who had much rather have been otherwiſe employed) to drive your Lordſhip, to do that, which you were unwilling to do. The world ſees, how much I was driven: for what cenſures, what imputations muſt my book have lain under, if I had not cleared it from thoſe accuſations, your Lordſhip brought againſt it, when I am charged now with evaſions, for not clearing myſelf, from an accuſation, which you never brought againſt me? But if it be an evaſion, not to anſwer to an objection, that has not been made, what is it, I beſeech you, my Lord, to make no reply to objections that have been made? Of which I promiſe to give your Lordſhip a liſt, whenever you pleaſe to call for it.

I FORBEAR it now, for fear that, if I ſhould ſay all that I might, upon this new accuſation, it would be more, than would ſuit with your Lordſhip's liking; and you ſhould complain again, that you have opened a paſſage, which brings to your mind Ramazzini, and his ſprings of Modena. But your Lordſhip need not be afraid of being overwhelmed with the ebullition of my thoughts, nor much trouble yourſelf to find a way to give check to it: mere ebullition of thoughts never overwhelms, or ſinks, any one, but the author himſelf: but if it carries truth with it, that, I confeſs, has force, and it may be troubleſome to thoſe, that ſtand in its way.

YOUR Lordſhip ſays, "you ſee how dangerous it is, to give occaſion to one of P. 3.
"ſuch a fruitful invention as I am, to write."

I AM obliged to your Lordſhip, that you think my invention worth concerning yourſelf about, tho' it be ſo unlucky, as to have your Lordſhip and me, always, differ about the meaſure of its fertility. In your firſt anſwer, you thought, P. 80.
I too much extended the fertility of my invention, and aſcribed to it what it had no title to; and here, I think, you make the fertility of my invention greater than it is. For, in what I have anſwered to your Lordſhip, there ſeems to me no need at all of a fertile invention. It is true, it has been hard for me to find out, whom you writ againſt, or what you meant, in many places; as ſoon as that was found, the anſwer lay always ſo obvious, and ſo eaſy, that there needed no labour of invention, to diſcover what one ſhould reply. The things themſelves (where there were any) ſtripped of the ornaments of ſcholaſtick language, and the leſs obvious ways of learned writings, ſeemed to me to carry their anſwers viſibly with them. This, permit me, my Lord, to ſay, that however fertile my invention is, it has not, in all this controverſy, produced one fiction, or wrong quotation.

BUT, before I leave the anſwer you dictate, permit me to obſerve, that I am Anſ. 1. p. 8.
ſo unfortunate to be blamed for owning, what I was not accuſed to diſown; and here for not owning, what I was never charged to diſown. The like misfortune have my poor writings: they offend your Lordſhip in ſome places, becauſe they are new; and in others, becauſe they are not new.

YOUR next words, which are a new charge, I ſhall paſs over, till I come to your proof of them, and proceed to the next paragraph. Your Lordſhip tells me, P. 5.
"you ſhall wave all unneceſſary repetitions, and come immediately to the matter "of my complaint, as it is renewed in my ſecond letter."

WHAT your Lordſhip means, by unneceſſary repetitions here, ſeems to be of a piece with your blaming me in the foregoing page, for having ſaid too much in my own defence; and this, taken altogether, confirms my opinion, that, in your thoughts, it would have been better, I ſhould have replied nothing at all. For you having ſet down here, near twenty lines, as a neceſſary repetition out of your former letter, your Lordſhip omits my anſwer to them, as wholly unneceſſary to be ſeen; and conſequently, you muſt think, was at firſt unneceſſary to have been ſaid. For, when the ſame words are neceſſary to be repeated again, if the ſame Reply, which was made to them, be not thought fit to be repeated too, it is plainly judged to be nothing to the purpoſe, and ſhould have been ſpared at firſt.

It is true, your Lordſhip has ſet down ſome few expreſſions, taken out of ſeveral parts of my reply; but, in what manner, the reader cannot clearly ſee, without going back to the original of this matter. He muſt, therefore, pardon me the trouble of a deduction, which cannot be avoided, where controverſy is managed at this rate; which neceſſitates, and ſo excuſes, the length of the anſwer.

My book was brought into the Trinitarian controverſy by theſe ſteps. Your Lordſhip ſays, that,

Vindic. p. 23. “ 1. The Unitarians have not explained the nature and bounds of reaſon.

Ibid. “ 2. The author of Chriſtianity not myſterious, to make amends for this, “ has offered an account of reaſon.

Ibid. p. 232. “ 3. His doctrine, concerning reaſon, ſuppoſes that we muſt have clear and “ diſtinct ideas, of whatever we pretend to any certainty of, in our mind.

Ibid. p. 233. “ 4. Your Lordſhip calls this a new way of reaſoning.

“ 5. This gentleman of this new way of reaſoning,” in his firſt chapter, ſays ſomething, which has a conformity with ſome of the notions in my book. But it is to be obſerved, he ſpeaks them, as his own thoughts, and not upon my authority, nor with taking any notice of me.

Vindic. p. 234. 6. By virtue of this, he is preſently entitled to, I know not how much, of my book; and divers paſſages of my Eſſay are quoted, and attributed to him, under the title of “ the gentlemen of the new way of reaſoning,” (for he is, by this time, turned into a troop) and certain unknown (if they are not all contained in this one author's doublet) they, and theſe, are made, by your Lordſhip, to lay about them ſhrewdly, for ſeveral pages together, in your Lordſhip's Vindication of the doctrine of the Trinity, &c. with paſſages, taken out of my book, which your Lordſhip was at the pains to quote, as theirs, i. e. certain, unknown Anti-trinitarians.

Letts. p. 59. Of this your Lordſhip's way, ſtrange and new to me, of dealing with my book, I took notice.

P. 5. To which your Lordſhip tells me here, you replied in theſe following words, which your Lordſhip has ſet down, as no unneceſſary repetition. Your words are: “ it was, becauſe the perſon, who oppoſed the myſteries of chriſtianity, “ went upon my grounds, and made uſe of my words;” altho' your Lordſhip declared withal, “ that they were uſed to other purpoſes, than I intended them:” and your Lordſhip confeſſed, “ that the reaſon, why you quoted my words ſo “ much, was, becauſe your Lordſhip found my notions, as to certainty by ideas, “ was the main foundation, on which the author of Chriſtianity not myſterious “ went; and that he had nothing that looked like reaſon, if that principle were “ removed, which made your Lordſhip ſo much endeavour to ſhew, that it “ would not hold; and ſo you ſuppoſed the reaſon, why your Lordſhip ſo often “ mentioned my words, was no longer a riddle to me.” And to this repetition P. 6. your Lordſhip ſubjoins, that “ I ſet down theſe paſſages, in my ſecond letter,” but with theſe words annexed, “ that all this ſeems to me to do nothing to the “ clearing of this matter.”

Answ. I ſay ſo, indeed, in the place quoted by your Lordſhip; and if I had ſaid no more, your Lordſhip had done me juſtice, in ſetting down barely theſe words, as my reply, which being ſet down, when your Lordſhip was in the way of repeating your own words, with no ſparing hand, as we ſhall ſee by and by, theſe few of mine ſet down thus, without the leaſt intimation, that I had ſaid any thing more, cannot but leave the reader under an opinion, that this was my whole reply.

Lett. 2. p. 48, &c. But if your Lordſhip will pleaſe to turn to that place of my ſecond letter, out of which you take theſe words, I preſume you will find that I not only ſaid, but proved, that what you had ſaid, in the words above repeated, to clear the “ riddle, in your Lordſhip's way of writing, did nothing towards it.”

That, which was the riddle to me, was, that your Lordſhip writ againſt others, and yet quoted only my words; and that you pinned my words, which you argued againſt, upon a certain ſort of theſe, and them, that no-where appeared, or were to be found; and, by this way, brought my book into the controverſy.

To this your Lordſhip ſays, "you told me, it was becauſe the perſon, who "oppoſed the myſteries of chriſtianity, went upon my grounds, and made uſe "of my words."

Answ. He that will be at the pains to compare this, which you call a repetition here, with the place you quote for it, viz. Anſw. 1. p. 46. will, I humbly conceive, find it a new ſort of repetition; unleſs the ſetting down of words, and expreſſions, not to be found in it, be the repetition of any paſſage. But for a repetition, let us take it, of what your Lordſhip had ſaid before.

The reaſon, and the only reaſon, there given, why you quoted my words, after the manner you did, was, "becauſe you found my notions, as to certainty "by ideas, was the main foundation, which the author of Chriſtianity not myſ-"terious went upon." Theſe are the words, in your Lordſhip's firſt letter, and this the only reaſon there given, tho' it hath grown a little, by repetition. And to this my reply was, "that I thought your Lordſhip had found, that that, "which the author of Chriſtianity not myſterious went upon, and for which he "was made one of the gentlemen of the new way of reaſoning, oppoſite to the "doctrine of the Trinity, was, that he made, or ſuppoſed, clear and diſtinct "ideas, neceſſary to certainty: but that was not my notion, as to certainty by "ideas, &c." which reply, my Lord, did not barely ſay, but ſhewed the reaſon why I ſaid, that what your Lordſhip had offered, as the reaſon of your manner of proceeding, did nothing towards the clearing of it; unleſs it could clear the matter, to ſay you joined me with the author of Chriſtianity not myſterious, who goes upon a different notion of certainty from mine, becauſe he goes upon the ſame with me. For he (as your Lordſhip ſuppoſes) making certainty to conſiſt in the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of clear and diſtinct ideas; and I, on the contrary, making it conſiſt in the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of ſuch ideas, as we have, whether they be perfectly, in all their parts, clear and diſtinct, or no; it is impoſſible he ſhould go upon my grounds, whilſt they are ſo different; or that his going upon my grounds ſhould be the reaſon of your Lordſhip's joining me with him. And now I leave your Lordſhip to judge, how you had cleared this matter; and whether what I had anſwered, did not prove, that what you ſaid did nothing towards the clearing of it.

Anſw. 1. p. 46.

Lett. 2. p. 49.

This one thing, methinks, your Lordſhip has made very clear, that you thought it neceſſary to find ſome way to bring in my book, where you were arguing againſt that author, that he might be the perſon, and mine the words, you would argue againſt together: but it is as clear, that the particular matter, which your Lordſhip made uſe of, to this purpoſe, happened to be ſomewhat unluckily choſen: for your Lordſhip, having accuſed him of ſuppoſing clear and diſtinct ideas neceſſary to certainty, which you declared to be the opinion you oppoſed; and, for that opinion, having made him a gentleman of the new way of reaſoning, your Lordſhip imagined that was the notion of certainty, I went on: but it falling out otherwiſe, and I denying it to be mine, the imaginary tie, between that author and me, was unexpectedly diſſolved; and there was no appearance of reaſon, for bringing paſſages out of my book, and arguing againſt them, as your Lordſhip did, as if they were that author's.

Vindic. p. 232.
Anſw. 1. p. 14.

To juſtify this (ſince my notion of certainty could not be brought to agree with what he was charged with, as oppoſite to the doctrine of the Trinity) he, at any rate, muſt be brought to agree with me, and to go upon my notion of certainty. Pardon me, my Lord, that I ſay at any rate: the reaſon, I have to think ſo, is this: either that author does make clear and diſtinct ideas neceſſary to certainty, and ſo does not go upon my notion of certainty; and then your aſſigning his going upon my notion of certainty, as the reaſon for your joining us as you did, ſhews no more but a willingneſs in your Lordſhip to have us joined: or he does not lay all certainty, only in clear and diſtinct ideas, and ſo poſſibly, for ought I know, may go upon my notion of certainty: But then, my Lord, the reaſon of your firſt bringing him and me into this diſpute, will appear to have been none.

All your arguing againſt the gentlemen of this new way of reaſoning, will be found to be againſt no-body, ſince there is nobody to be found, that lays all foundation of certainty, only in clear and diſtinct ideas; no body to be found, that holds the opinion, that your Lordſhip oppoſes.

Page 6. HAVING thus given you an account of ſome part of my reply, (to what your Lordſhip really anſwered, in that 46th page of your firſt letter) to ſhew that my reply contained ſomething more, than theſe words here ſet down by your Lordſhip, viz. "That all this ſeems to me to do nothing to the clearing this matter;" I come now to thoſe parts of your repetition, as your Lordſhip is pleaſed to call it, wherein there is nothing repeated.

Page 5. YOUR Lordſhip ſays, "that you told me" the reaſon, why I was brought into the controverſy after the manner I had complained of, "was becauſe the perſon, "who oppoſed the myſteries of chriſtianity, went upon my grounds;" and for this you quote the 46th page of your firſt letter. But having turned to that place, and finding there theſe words, "that you found my notions, as to certainty by ideas, was the main foundation, which that author went upon;" which are far from being repeated in the words, ſet down here, unleſs grounds, in general, be the ſame with notions, as to certainty by ideas; I beg leave to conſider what you here ſay, as new to me, and not repeated.

YOUR Lordſhip ſays, that you brought me into the controverſy, as you did, "becauſe the author went upon my grounds." It is poſſible he did, or did not; but it cannot appear, that he did go upon my grounds, till thoſe grounds are aſſigned, and the places both out of him and me produced to ſhew, that we agree in the ſame grounds, and go both upon them; when this is done, there will be room to conſider, whether it be ſo, or no.

IN the mean time, you have brought me into the controverſy, for his going upon this particular ground, ſuppoſed to be mine, "that clear and diſtinct ideas "are neceſſary to certainty." It can do nothing towards the clearing this, to

Page 6. ſay in general, as your Lordſhip does, "that he went upon my grounds;" becauſe tho' he ſhould agree with me, in ſeveral other things, but differ from me, in this one notion of certainty, there could be no reaſon for your dealing with me, as you have done: that notion of certainty being your very exception, againſt his account of reaſon, and the ſole occaſion, you took, of bringing in paſſages, out of my book, and the very foundation of arguing againſt them.

Page 6. YOUR Lordſhip farther ſays here, in this repetition, which you did not ſay before, in the place referred to, as repeated, "that he made uſe of my words." I think he did, of words, ſomething like mine. But, as I humbly conceive alſo, he made uſe of them, as his own, and not as my words; for I do not remember that he quotes me for them. This I am ſure, that in the words, quoted out of him, by your Lordſhip, upon which my book is brought in, there is not one ſyllable of certainty by ideas.

No doubt whatever he, or I, or any one have ſaid, if your Lordſhip diſapproves of it, you have a right to queſtion him that ſaid it: but I do not ſee, how this gives your Lordſhip any right to entitle any body, to what he does not ſay, whoever elſe ſays it.

THE author of Chriſtianity not myſterious, ſays, in his book, ſomething ſuitable to what I had ſaid in mine; borrowed, or not borrowed, from mine, I leave your Lordſhip to determine for him: but I do not ſee what ground that gives your Lordſhip, to concern me in the controverſy you have with him, for things I ſay, which he does not, and which I ſay, to a different purpoſe from his. Let that author and I agree in this one notion of certainty, as much as you pleaſe, what reaſon, I beſeech your Lordſhip, could this be, to quote my words, as his, who never uſed them; and to purpoſes, as you ſay, more than once, to which I never intended them? This was that, which I complained, was a riddle to me: and ſince your Lordſhip can give no other reaſon for it, than thoſe we have hitherto ſeen, I think it ſufficiently unriddled, and you are in the right, when you ſay, "you think it is no longer a riddle to me."

I EASILY grant my little reading may not have inſtructed me, what has been, or what may be, done in the ſeveral ways of writing, and managing of controverſy,

verſy, which, like war, always produces new ſtratagems; only I beg my ignorance may be my apology, for ſaying, that this appears a new way of writing to me, and this is the firſt time I ever met with it.

But let the ten lines, which your Lordſhip has ſet down, out of him, be, if you pleaſe, ſuppoſed to be preciſely my words, and that he quoted my book for them; I do not ſee how even this, entitles him to any more of my book, than he has quoted; or how any words of mine, in other parts of my book, can be aſcribed to him, or argued againſt, as his, or rather, as I know not whoſe; which was the thing, I complained of; for the theſe, and they, thoſe paſſages of my book were aſcribed to, could not be that author, for he uſed them not; nor the author of the Eſſay of Human Underſtanding, for he was not argued againſt, but was diſcharged from the controverſy under debate: ſo that neither he, nor I, being the they, and thoſe, that ſo often occur, and deſerved ſo much pains from your Lordſhip; I could not but complain of this, to me, incomprehenſible way of bringing my book into that controverſy. Vindic. p. 234.

Another part of your Lordſhip's repetition, which, I humbly conceive, is no repetition, becauſe this alſo I find not, in that paſſage quoted for it, is this, that your Lordſhip confeſſed that the reaſon, why you quoted my words ſo much. Page 6.

My Lord, I do not remember any need your Lordſhip had, to give a reaſon why you quoted my words ſo much, becauſe I do not remember that I made that the matter of my complaint. That which I complained of, was not the quantity of what was quoted out of my book, but the manner of quoting it, viz. "That "I was ſo every-where joined with others, under the comprehenſive words, "they and them, tho' my book alone were every where quoted, that the world "would be apt to think, I was the perſon, who argued againſt the Trinity." And again, "that, which I complained of, was, that I was made one of the "gentlemen of the new way of reaſoning, without being guilty of what made "them ſo, and was ſo brought into a chapter, wherein I thought myſelf not "concerned; which was managed ſo, that my book was all along quoted, and "others argued againſt; others were entitled to what I ſaid, and I to what others "ſaid, without knowing why, or how." Nay, I told your Lordſhip in that very reply, "that, if your Lordſhip had directly queſtioned any of my opinions, "I ſhould not have complained." Thus your Lordſhip ſees my complaint was, not of the largeneſs, but of the manner of your quotations. But of that, in all theſe many pages imployed, by your Lordſhip, for my ſatisfaction, you, as I remember, have not been pleaſed to offer any reaſon; nor can I hitherto find it any way cleared: when I do, I ſhall readily acknowledge your great maſtery in this, as in all other ways of writing. Lett. 2. p. 49. Ibid. p. 51. Lett. 2. p. 50.

I have, in the foregoing pages, for the clearing this matter, been obliged to take notice of them and thoſe, as directly ſignifying nobody. Whether your Lordſhip will excuſe me, for ſo doing, I know not, ſince I perceive ſuch ſlight words, as them, and thoſe, are not to be minded in your Lordſhip's writings: your Lordſhip has a privilege to uſe ſuch trifling particles, without taking any great care what, or whom, they refer to.

To ſhew the reader, that I do not talk without book in the caſe, I ſhall ſet down your Lordſhip's own words: "what a hard fate doth that man lie under, "that falls into the hands of a ſevere critick! He muſt have a care of his but, "and for, and them, and it. For the leaſt ambiguity in any of theſe, will "fill up pages, in an anſwer, and make a book look conſiderable for the bulk "of it. And what muſt a man do, who is to anſwer all ſuch objections, about "the uſe of particles?" I humbly conceive, it is not without reaſon, that your Lordſhip here claims an exemption from having care of your but, and your for, and your them, and other particles: the ſequel of your letter will ſhew, that it is a privilege your Lordſhip makes great uſe of, and therefore have reaſon to be tender of it, and to cry out againſt thoſe unmannerly criticks, who queſtion it. Upon this conſideration, I cannot but look on it, as a misfortune to me, that it ſhould fall in my way, to diſpleaſe your Lordſhip, by diſturbing you in the quiet, and perhaps ancient poſſeſſion of ſo convenient a privilege. But how great ſoever the advantages of it may be to a writer, I, upon experience, find it is very trouble- P. 90.

troubleſome and perplexing to a reader, who is concerned to underſtand what is written, that he may anſwer to it. But to return to the place we were upon:

P. 6. Your Lordſhip goes on, and ſays, "whether it doth, or no," i. e. whether what your Lordſhip had ſaid, doth clear this matter or no, "you are content to "leave it to any indifferent reader; and there it muſt reſt at laſt, altho' I ſhould "write volumes about it."

Upon the reading of theſe laſt words of your Lordſhip's, I thought you had quite done, with this perſonal matter, ſo apt, as you ſay, to weary the world. But whether it be, that your Lordſhip is not much ſatisfied in the handling of it, or in the letting it alone; whether your Lordſhip meant by theſe laſt words, that what I write about it, is volumes, i. e. too much, as your Lordſhip has told me, in the firſt page; but what your Lordſhip ſays about it, is but neceſſary: whether theſe, or any other, be the cauſe of it, perſonal matter, as it ſeems, is very importunate and troubleſome to your Lordſhip, as it is to the world. You turn it going in the end of one paragraph, and perſonal matter thruſts itſelf in again, in the beginning of the next, whether of itſelf, without your Lordſhip's notice, or conſent, I examine not: but thus ſtands the immediate following words, P. 6. wherein your Lordſhip aſks me, "but for what cauſe do I continue ſo unſatiſ- "fied?" To which you make me give this anſwer, "that *the cauſe, why I continue ſo unſatisfied, is, that the author mentioned went upon this ground, that clear and diſtinct ideas are neceſſary to certainty, but that is not my notion, as to certainty by ideas; which is, that certainty conſiſts in the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of ideas, ſuch as we have, whether they be, in all their parts, perfectly clear and diſtinct, or no; and that I have no notions of certainty more than this one.*"

These words, which your Lordſhip has ſet down for mine, I have printed in a diſtinct character, that the reader may take particular notice of them; not that there is any thing very remarkable in this paſſage itſelf, but becauſe it makes the buſineſs of the fourſcore following pages. For the three ſeveral anſwers, that your Lordſhip ſays, you have given to it, and that which you call your defence of them, reach, as I take it, to the 87th page. But another particular reaſon, why this anſwer, which your Lordſhip has made for me, to a queſtion of your own putting, is diſtinguiſhed by a particular character, is, to ſave frequent repetitions of it; that the reader, by having recourſe to it, may ſee, whether thoſe things, which your Lordſhip ſays of it, be ſo, or no, and judge whether I am in the wrong, when I aſſure him, that I cannot find them to be, as you ſay.

Only, before I come to what your Lordſhip poſitively ſays of this, which you call my anſwer, I crave leave to obſerve, that it ſuppoſes, I continue unſatisfied: to which I reply, that I no where ſay, that I continue unſatisfied. I may ſay, that what is offered for ſatisfaction, gives none to me, or any body elſe; and yet I, as well as other people, may be ſatisfied concerning the matter.

I come now to what your Lordſhip ſays poſitively of it.

1. You ſay, that I tell you, that "the cauſe why I continued unſatisfied, is, "that the author mentioned, went upon this ground, that clear and diſtinct "ideas are neceſſary to certainty; but that is not my notion of certainty by "ideas, &c."

To which I crave leave to reply, that neither in the 50th page of my ſecond letter, which your Lordſhip quotes for it, nor any where elſe, did I tell your Lordſhip any ſuch thing. Neither could I aſſign, that author's going upon that ground, there mentioned, as any cauſe of diſſatisfaction to me; becauſe I know not "that he went upon this ground, that clear and diſtinct ideas are neceſſary "to certainty:" for I have met with nothing, produced by your Lordſhip out of him, to prove that he did ſo. And if it be true, that he goes upon grounds of certainty, that are not mine, I know nobody, that ought to be diſſatisfied with it, but your Lordſhip, who have taken ſo much pains to make his grounds mine, and my grounds his, and to entitle us both to what each has ſaid apart.

2. Your Lordſhip ſays, "this is no more than what I had ſaid before in my "former letter." Anſw. For this I appeal to the 57th, or rather (as I think

you writ) 87th page, quoted for it by your Lordſhip; where any one muſt have very good eyes, to find all, that is ſet down here, in this anſwer (as you a little lower call it) which you have been pleaſed to put into my mouth: for neither in the one nor the other of thoſe pages, is there any ſuch anſwer of mine. Indeed, in the 87th page, there are theſe words; "that certainty, in my opinion, lies in "the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of ideas, ſuch as they are, "and not always in having perfectly clear and diſtinct ideas." But theſe words there, are not given, as an anſwer to this queſtion, why do I continue ſo unſatisfied? And the remarkable anſwer, above ſet down, is, as I take it, more than theſe words, as much more in proportion, as your Lordſhip's whole letter is more than the half of it.

3. Your Lordſhip ſays of the remarkable anſwer above ſet down, that you "took particular notice of it."

To which I crave leave to reply, that your Lordſhip, no where before, took notice of this anſwer, as you call it, for it was no where before extant, tho' it be true, ſome part of the words of it were. But ſome part of the words of this anſwer (which, too, were never given as an anſwer to the queſtion propoſed) can never be this anſwer itſelf.

Your Lordſhip farther ſays, that "you gave three ſeveral anſwers to it."

To which I muſt crave leave further to reply, that never any one of the three anſwers, which you here ſay, you gave to this my anſwer, were given to this anſwer; which, in the words above ſet down, you made me give to your queſtion, why I continued ſo unſatisfied?

To juſtify this my reply, there needs no more but to ſet down theſe your Lordſhip's three anſwers, and to turn to the places, where you ſay you gave them.

The firſt of your three anſwers is this, "that thoſe, who offer at clear and P. 7.
"diſtinct ideas, bid much fairer for certainty than I do (according to this anſwer) "and ſpeak more agreeably to my original grounds of certainty." The place, you quote for this, is, Anſw. 1. p. 80. but in that place, it is not given as an anſwer to my ſaying, that "the cauſe, why I continue unſatisfied, is, that the "author mentioned, went upon this ground, that clear and diſtinct ideas are neceſſary to certainty, but," &c. And if it be given for anſwer to it here, it ſeems a very ſtrange one: for I am ſuppoſed to ſay, that "the cauſe, why I continue "unſatisfied, is, that the author mentioned went upon a ground different from "mine;" and to ſatisfy me, I am told, his way is better than mine; which cannot but be thought an anſwer, very likely to ſatisfy me.

Your ſecond Anſwer, which you ſay, you gave to that remarkable paſſage, above ſet down, is this; "that it is very poſſible the author of Chriſtianity not "myſterious might miſtake, or miſapply, my notions; but there is too much P. 15.
"reaſon to believe, he thought them the ſame; and we have no reaſon to be "ſorry, that he hath given me this occaſion, for the explaining my meaning, "and for the vindication of myſelf, in the matters I apprehend, he had charged "me with:" and for this you quote your firſt letter, p. 36. But neither are theſe words, in that place, an anſwer to my ſaying, "that the cauſe, why I continued diſſatisfied, is, that the author went upon this ground, that clear and "diſtinct ideas are neceſſary to certainty, but," &c.

Your third anſwer, which you ſay you gave to that paſſage, above ſet down, is, "that my own grounds of certainty tend to ſcepticiſm; and that in an age, P. 20.
"wherein the myſteries of faith are too much expoſed, by the promoters of "ſcepticiſm and infidelity, it is a thing of dangerous conſequence, to ſtart ſuch "new methods of certainty, as are apt to leave men's minds more doubtful, than "before:" For this you refer the reader to your firſt letter. But I muſt crave P. 36.
leave alſo to obſerve, theſe words are not all to be found in that place, and thoſe of them, which are there, are by no means an anſwer to my ſaying, "that "the cauſe, why I continue unſatisfied, is, &c.

What the words which your Lordſhip has here ſet down, as your three anſwers, are brought in for, in thoſe three places, quoted by your Lordſhip, any one, that will conſult them, may ſee; it would hold me too long in perſonal matter, to explain that here; and therefore, for your Lordſhip's ſatisfaction, I paſs by thoſe particulars. But this I crave leave to be poſitive in, that in neither of them, they are given in reply to that, which is above ſet down, as my anſwer to your Lordſhip's queſtion, "for what cauſe do I continue ſo unſatisfied?" Tho' your Lordſhip here ſays, that to this anſwer, they were given as a reply, P. 7. and it was it you had taken notice of, and given theſe three ſeveral replies to. As anſwers, therefore, to what you make me ſay here, viz. "That the cauſe "of my continuing unſatisfied, is, that the author mentioned, went upon a "ground of certainty, that is none of mine;" I cannot conſider them. For to this neither of them is given as an anſwer; tho' this, and it, in ordinary conſtruction, make them have that reference. But theſe are ſome of your privileged particles, and may be applied how, and to what, you pleaſe.

But tho' neither of theſe paſſages be any manner of anſwer, to what your Lordſhip calls them anſwers to, yet you laying ſuch ſtreſs on them, that well-nigh half your letter, as I take it, is ſpent in the defence of them; it is fit I conſider what you ſay, under each of them.

I say, as I take it, near half your letter is in the defence of theſe three paſſages.

P. 7. One reaſon why I ſpeak ſo doubtfully, is, that tho' you ſay here, "that you "will lay them together, and defend them," and that, in effect, all that is ſaid to the 87th page is ranged under theſe three heads; yet they being brought in, as anſwers to what I am made to ſay, is "the cauſe why I continued unſatisfied." I ſhould ſcarce think your Lordſhip ſhould ſpend ſo many pages, in this perſonal matter, after you had, but two or three pages before, ſo openly blamed me, for ſpending a leſs number of pages in my anſwer, concerning perſonal matters, to what your Lordſhip had ſaid, in your letter, concerning them.

Another reaſon, why I ſpeak ſo doubtfully, is, becauſe I do not ſee, how theſe three paſſages need ſo long, or any defences, where they are not attacked, or if they be attacked, methinks the defences of them ſhould have been applied to the anſwers I had made to them; or if I have made none, and they be of ſuch moment, that they require anſwers, your Lordſhip's minding me, that they did ſo, would either, by my continued ſilence, have left to your Lordſhip all, that you can pretend to, for my granting them, or elſe my anſwers to them have given your Lordſhip an occaſion to defend them, and perhaps to have defended them otherwiſe, than you have done. This is certain, that theſe defences had come time enough, when they had been attacked, and then it would have been ſeen, whether what was ſaid, did defend them, or no. The truth is, my Lord, if you will give me leave to ſpeak my thoughts freely, when I conſider theſe three, as you call them, anſwers, how they themſelves are brought in, and what relation that, which is brought, under each of them, has to them, and to the matter in queſtion; methink they look rather like texts choſen to be diſcourſed on, than as anſwers to be defended in a controverſy; for the connection of that, which in train is tacked on to them, is ſuch that makes me ſee I am wholly miſtaken, in what I thought the eſtabliſhed rule of controverſy. This was alſo another reaſon, why I ſaid, you ſpent, as I take it, near half of your letter in defence of them. For when I conſider how one thing hangs on to another, under the third anſwer, from page 20. where it is brought in, to page 87. where, I think, that which you call your defending it ends; it is a hard matter, by the relation and dependency of the parts of that diſcourſe (contained in thoſe pages) one on another, to tell where it ends.

But to conſider the paſſages themſelves, and the defence of them.

That which you call your firſt anſwer, and which you ſay, you would defend, is P. 7. in theſe words: "thoſe, who offer at clear and diſtinct ideas, bid much fairer for "certainty, than I do (according to this anſwer) and ſpeak more agreeably to my "original grounds of certainty." Theſe words being brought in, at firſt, as a reply to what was called my anſwer, but was not my anſwer, as may be ſeen, Lett. 1. p. 87. I took no notice of them, in my ſecond letter, as being nothing at all to the point in hand; and therefore what need they have of a farther defence, when nothing is objected to them, I do not ſee. To what purpoſe is it to ſpend ſeven, or eight, pages to ſhew, that another's notion about certainty is better than mine; when that tends not to ſhew how your ſaying, "that the certainty of my proof of a God is not placed upon any clear and diſtinct ideas, but "upon the force of reaſon diſtinct from it," concerns me, which was the thing there to be ſhewn, as is viſible to any one, who will vouchſafe to look into that 87th page of my firſt letter? And, indeed, why ſhould your Lordſhip trouble yourſelf to prove, which of two different ways of certainty by ideas, is the beſt, when you have ſo ill an opinion of the whole way of certainty by ideas, that you accuſe it of tendency to ſcepticiſm? But it ſeems your Lordſhip is reſolved to have all the faults in my book cleared or corrected, and ſo you go on to defend theſe words: "that thoſe, who offer at clear and diſtinct ideas, bid much fairer "for certainty than I do." I could have wiſhed that your Lordſhip had pleaſed a little to explain them, before you had defended them; for they are not, to me, without ſome obſcurity. However, to gueſs as well as I can, I think that the propoſition that you intend here, is this, that thoſe, who place certainty in the perception of the agreement or diſagreement, of only clear and diſtinct ideas, are more in the right than I am, who place it in the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of ideas, ſuch as we have, tho' they be not, in all their parts, perfectly clear and diſtinct.

WHETHER your Lordſhip has proved this, or no, will be ſeen, when we come to conſider, what you have ſaid in the defence of it. In the mean time, I have no reaſon to be ſorry to hear your Lordſhip ſay ſo; becauſe this ſuppoſes, that certainty can be attained by the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of clear and diſtinct ideas: for, if certainty cannot be attained by the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of clear and diſtinct ideas, how can they be more in the right, who place certainty in one ſort of ideas, that it cannot be had in, than thoſe, who place it in another ſort of ideas, that it cannot be had in?

I SHALL proceed now, to examine, what your Lordſhip has ſaid, in defence of the propoſition you have here ſet down to defend, which you may be ſure, I ſhall do with all the favourableneſs that truth will allow; ſince, if your Lordſhip makes it out to be true, it puts an end to the diſpute, you have had with me: for it confutes that main propoſition, which you have ſo much contended for: "that "to lay all foundation of certainty, as to matters of faith, upon clear and diſtinct ideas, does certainly overthrow all myſteries of faith:" unleſs you will ſay that myſteries of faith cannot conſiſt with what you have proved to be true.

To prove that they are more in the right, than I, who place certainty in the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of clear and diſtinct ideas only, your Lordſhip ſays, "that it is a wonderful thing, in point of reaſon, for me P. 7. "to pretend to certainty by ideas, and not allow theſe ideas to be clear and diſtinct." This, my Lord, looks as if I placed certainty only in obſcure and confuſed ideas, and did not allow, it might be had, by clear and diſtinct ones. But I have declared myſelf ſo clearly, and ſo fully, to the contrary, that I doubt not but your Lordſhip would think, I deſerved to be aſked, whether this were fair and ingenuous dealing to repreſent this matter, as this expreſſion does? But the inſtances are ſo many, how apt my unlearned way of writing is to miſlead your Lordſhip, and that always on the ſide leaſt favourable to my ſenſe, that if I ſhould cry out, as often as I think I meet with occaſion for it, your Lordſhip would have reaſon to be uneaſy, at the ebullition and inlarging of my complaints.

YOUR Lordſhip farther aſks, "how can I clearly perceive the agreement, or P. 7, 8. "diſagreement, of ideas, if I have not clear and diſtinct ideas? For how is it "poſſible for a man's mind to know, whether they agree, or diſagree, if there "be ſome parts of thoſe ideas, we have only general and confuſed ideas of?" I would rather read theſe latter words, if your Lordſhip pleaſe, "if there be ſome "parts of thoſe ideas, that are only general and confuſed;" for "parts of ideas, "that we have only general and confuſed ideas of," is not very clear and intelligible to me.

Taking, then, your Lordſhip's queſtion, as cleared of this obſcurity, it will ſtand thus: "how is it poſſible for a man's mind to know, whether ideas agree "or diſagree, if there be ſome parts of thoſe ideas obſcure and confuſed?" In anſwer to which, I crave leave to aſk; "Is it poſſible for a man's mind to per"ceive, whether ideas agree, or diſagree, if no parts of thoſe ideas be obſcure "and confuſed;" and, by that perception, to attain certainty? If your Lordſhip ſays, no: how do you hereby prove, that they who place certainty in the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of only clear and diſtinct ideas, are more in the right than I? For they, who place certainty, where it is impoſſible to be had, can, in that, be no more in the right, than he who places it, in any other impoſſibility. If you ſay, yes, certainty may be attained by the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of clear and diſtinct ideas, you give up the main queſtion: you grant the propoſition, which, you declare, you chiefly oppoſe; and ſo all this great diſpute with me is at an end. Your Lordſhip may take which of theſe two you pleaſe; if the former, the propoſition here to be proved is given up; if the latter, the whole controverſy is given up; one of them, it is plain, you muſt ſay.

This, and what your Lordſhip ſays farther, on this point, ſeems to me to prove nothing, but that you ſuppoſe, that either there are no ſuch things, as obſcure and confuſed ideas; and then, with ſubmiſſion, the diſtinction between clear and obſcure, diſtinct and confuſed, is uſeleſs; and it is in vain to talk of clear and obſcure, diſtinct and confuſed ideas, in oppoſition to one another: or elſe, your Lordſhip ſuppoſes, that an obſcure and confuſed idea is wholly undiſtinguiſhable from all other ideas, and ſo, in effect, is all other ideas. For if an obſcure and confuſed idea be not one and the ſame, with all other ideas, as it is impoſſible for it to be, then the obſcure and confuſed idea may, and will, be ſo far different from ſome other ideas, that it may be perceived whether it agrees, or diſagrees, with them, or no. For every idea in the mind, clear or obſcure, diſtinct or confuſed, is but that one idea, that it is, and not another idea, that it is not; and the mind perceives it to be the idea that it is, and not another idea, that it is different from.

Eſſay, b. ii. c. 29.

What, therefore, I mean by obſcure and confuſed ideas, I have at large ſhewn, and ſhall not trouble your Lordſhip with a repetition of here. For that there are ſuch obſcure and confuſed ideas, I ſuppoſe the inſtances, your Lordſhip gives, here evince: to which I ſhall add this one more; ſuppoſe you ſhould, in the twilight, or in a thick miſt, ſee two things ſtanding upright, near the ſize and ſhape of an ordinary man; but in ſo dim a light, or at ſuch a diſtance, that they appeared very much alike, and you could not perceive them to be, what they really were, the one a ſtatue, the other a man; would not theſe two be obſcure and confuſed ideas? And yet could not your Lordſhip be certain of the truth of this propoſition, concerning either of them, that it was ſomething, or did exiſt; and that by perceiving the agreement of that idea (as obſcure and confuſed as it was) with that of exiſtence, as expreſſed in that propoſition?

P. 24.

This, my Lord, is juſt the caſe of ſubſtance, upon which you raiſed this argument, concerning obſcure and confuſed ideas; which this inſtance ſhews, may have propoſitions made about them, of whoſe truth we may be certain.

Hence I crave liberty to conclude, that I am nearer the truth, than thoſe, who ſay, that "certainty is founded only in clear and diſtinct ideas;" if any body does ſay ſo. For no ſuch ſaying of any one of thoſe, with whom your Lordſhip joined me, for ſo ſaying, is, that I remember, yet produced; tho' this be that, for which they, and thoſe, whoever they be, had, from your Lordſhip, the title of the gentlemen of the new way of reaſoning; and this be the opinion, which your Lordſhip declares, "you oppoſe, as certainly overthrowing all my"ſteries of faith, and excluding the notion of ſubſtance out of rational diſcourſe." Which terrible, termagant propoſition, viz. "that certainty is founded only in "clear and diſtinct ideas," which has made ſuch a noiſe, and been the cauſe of the ſpending above ten times fifty pages, and given occaſion to very large ebullition of thoughts, appears not, by any thing, that has been yet produced, to be

Vind. p. 233, 234. Anſw. 1. p. 14.

any where, in their writings, with whom, upon this ſcore, you have had ſo warm a controverſy, but only, in your Lordſhip's imagination, and what you have, at leaſt, for this once, "writ out of your own thoughts."

But if this paragraph contain ſo little, in defence of the propoſition, which your Lordſhip, in the beginning of it, ſet down, on purpoſe to defend; what follows, is viſibly more remote from it: but, ſince your Lordſhip has been pleaſed to tack it on here, tho', without applying of it any way, that I ſee, to the defence of the propoſition to be defended, which is already got clean out of ſight; I am taught, that it is fit I conſider it here, in this, which your Lordſhip has thought the proper place for it.

In the next paragraph, your Lordſhip is pleaſed to take notice of this part of my complaint, viz. that I ſay, more than twice or ten times, "that you blame "thoſe, who place certainty in clear and diſtinct ideas, but I do not; and yet "you bring me in, among them." And for this, your Lordſhip quotes ſeventeen ſeveral pages of my ſecond letter. Whoever will give himſelf the trouble to turn to thoſe pages, will ſee how far I am, in thoſe places, from barely ſaying, "that you blame thoſe, who place certainty," &c. and what reaſon you had to point to ſo many places, for my ſo ſaying, as a repetition of my complaint: and, I believe, they will find the propoſition, about placing certainty only in clear and diſtinct ideas, is mentioned in them, upon ſeveral occaſions, and to different purpoſes, as the argument required. P. 9.

Be that as it will, this is a part of my complaint, and you do me a favour, that after having, as you ſay, met with it, in ſo many places, you are pleaſed at laſt to take notice of it, and promiſe me a full anſwer to it. The firſt part of which full anſwer is, in theſe words; "you that do not deny, but the firſt occaſion of "your Lordſhip's charge, was in the ſuppoſition, that clear and diſtinct ideas "were neceſſary, in order to any certainty in our minds." And that the only way, "to attain this certainty, was by comparing theſe ideas together." P. 9.

My Lord, tho' I have faithfully ſet down theſe words, out of your ſecond anſwer, yet I muſt own, I have printed them in ſomething a different character from that which they ſtand in, in your letter. For your Lordſhip has publiſhed this ſentence ſo, as "if the ſuppoſition, that clear and diſtinct ideas were neceſſary, "in order to any certainty in our minds," were my ſuppoſition; whereas I muſt crave leave, to let my reader know, that that ſuppoſition is purely your Lordſhip's: for you, neither in your defence of the Trinity, nor in your firſt anſwer, produce any thing to prove, that that was either an aſſertion or ſuppoſition of mine; but your Lordſhip was pleaſed to ſuppoſe it for me: as to the latter words, "and that the only way to attain this certainty, was by comparing theſe ideas "together:" if your Lordſhip means, by theſe ideas, ideas in general; then I acknowledge theſe to be my words, or to be my ſenſe; but then, they are not any ſuppoſition in my book, tho' they are made part of the ſuppoſition here; but their ſenſe is expreſſed in my Eſſay, at large, in more places than one. But if, by theſe ideas, your Lordſhip means only clear and diſtinct ideas, I crave leave to deny that to be my ſenſe, or any ſuppoſition of mine. P. 9.

Your Lordſhip goes on: "but to prove this." Prove what, I beſeech you, my Lord? That certainty was to be attained by comparing ideas, was a ſuppoſition of mine? To prove that, there needed no words, or principles, of mine, to be produced, unleſs your Lordſhip would prove, that, which was never denied. P. 9.

But if it were to prove this, viz. that "it was a ſuppoſition of mine, that "clear and diſtinct ideas were neceſſary to certainty;" and that, to prove this to be a ſuppoſition of mine, "my words were produced, and my principles of cer- "tainty laid down, and none elſe;" I anſwer, I do not remember any words or principles of mine, produced, to ſhew any ground for ſuch a ſuppoſition, that I placed certainty, only in clear and diſtinct ideas; and if there had been any ſuch produced, your Lordſhip would have done me, and the reader, a favour, to have marked the pages, wherein one might have found them produced; unleſs your Lordſhip thinks, you make amends for quoting ſo many pages of my ſecond letter, which might have been ſpared, by neglecting wholly to quote any of your own, P. 9.

own, where it needed. When your Lordſhip ſhall pleaſe to direct me to thoſe places, where ſuch words and principles of mine were produced, to prove ſuch a ſuppoſition, I ſhall readily turn to them, to ſee how far they do really give ground for it. But my bad memory not ſuggeſting to me any thing like it, your Lordſhip, I hope, will pardon me, if I do not turn over your defence of the Trinity, and your firſt letter, to ſee, whether you have any ſuch proofs, which you yourſelf ſeem ſo much to doubt, or think ſo meanly of, that you do not ſo much as point out the places, where they are to be found; tho' we have, in this very page, ſo eminent an example, that you are not ſparing of your pains, in this kind, where you have the leaſt thought, that it might ſerve your Lordſhip, to the meaneſt purpoſe.

But tho' you produced no words, or principles, of mine, to prove this a ſuppoſition of mine; yet, in your next words here, your Lordſhip produces a reaſon why you yourſelf ſuppoſed it: for you ſay, "you could not imagine that I could "place certainty in the agreement, or diſagreement, of ideas, and not ſuppoſe "thoſe ideas to be clear and diſtinct:" ſo that, at laſt, the ſatisfaction you give me, why my book was brought into a controverſy, wherein it was not concerned, is, that your Lordſhip imagined, I ſuppoſed in it, what I did not ſuppoſe in it. And here I crave leave to aſk, whether the reader may not well ſuppoſe, that you had a great mind to bring my book into that controverſy, when the only handle, you could find for it, was an imagination of a ſuppoſition to be in it, which in truth was not there? P. 9.

P. 9. Your Lordſhip adds, "that I finding myſelf joined in ſuch company, which I "did not deſire to be ſeen in, I rather choſe to diſtinguiſh myſelf from them, by "denying clear and diſtinct ideas to be neceſſary to certainty."

If it might be permitted to another, to gueſs at your thoughts, as well as you do at mine, he perhaps would turn it thus; that your Lordſhip finding no readier way, as you thought, to ſet a mark upon my book, than, by bringing ſeveral paſſages of it, into a controverſy, concerning the Trinity, wherein they had nothing to do; and ſpeaking of them, under the name of thoſe, and them, as if your adverſaries, in that diſpute, had made uſe of thoſe paſſages againſt the Trinity, when no one oppoſer of the doctrine of the Trinity, that I know, or that you have produced, ever made uſe of one of them. You thought fit to jumble my book, with other people's opinions, after a new way, never uſed by any other writer, that I ever heard of. If any one will conſider, what your Lordſhip has ſaid, for my ſatisfaction (wherein you have, as I humbly conceive I have ſhewn, produced nothing but imaginations of imaginations, and ſuppoſitions of ſuppoſitions) he will, I conclude, without ſtraining of his thoughts, be carried to this conjecture.

P. 9. But conjectures apart, your Lordſhip ſays, "that I finding myſelf joined in "ſuch company, which I did not deſire to be ſeen in, I rather choſe to diſtinguiſh myſelf;" if keeping to my book can be called diſtinguiſhing myſelf. You ſay, "I rather choſe:" rather! than what, my Lord, I beſeech you? Your learned way of writing, I find, is every where beyond my capacity; and unleſs I will gueſs at your meaning (which is not very ſafe) beyond what I can certainly underſtand by your words, I often know not what to anſwer to. It is certain, you mean here, that I preferred "diſtinguiſhing myſelf from them, I "found myſelf joined with," to ſomething; but to what, you do not ſay. If you mean, to owning that for my notion of certainty, which is not my notion of certainty, this is true; I did, and ſhall always, rather chuſe to diſtinguiſh myſelf from any of them, than own that for my notion, which is not my notion. If you mean that I preferred "my diſtinguiſhing myſelf from them, to my being "joined with them;" you make me chuſe, where there neither is, nor can be any choice: for what is wholly out of one's power, leaves no room for choice; and I think I ſhould be laughed at, if I ſhould ſay, "I rather chuſe to diſtinguiſh "myſelf from the Papiſts, than that it ſhould rain:" for it is no more in my choice not to be joined, as your Lordſhip has been pleaſed to join me, with the unknown they, and them, than it is in my power, than it ſhould not rain.

It is like you will ſay here again, this is a nice criticiſm; I grant, my Lord, it is about words and expreſſions. But ſince I cannot know your meaning, but by your words and expreſſions, if this defect in my underſtanding very frequently overtake me, in your writings to, and concerning me, it is troubleſome, I confeſs; but what muſt I do? Muſt I play at blind-man's-buff? Catch at what I do not ſee? Anſwer to what I know not; to no meaning, i. e. to nothing? Or muſt I preſume to know your meaning, when I do not?

For example, ſuppoſe I ſhould preſume it to be your meaning here, that I found myſelf joined in company, by your Lordſhip, with the author of Chriſtianity not myſterious, by your Lordſhip's imputing the ſame notions of certainty to us both: that I did not deſire to be ſeen in his company, i. e. to be thought to be of his opinion, in other things; and therefore, "I choſe rather to diſtinguiſh "myſelf from him, by denying clear and diſtinct ideas to be neceſſary to certainty, than to be ſo joined with him:" if I ſhould preſume this, to be the ſenſe of theſe your words here, and that by the doubtful ſignification of the expreſſions, of being joined in company, and ſeen in company, uſed equivocally, your Lordſhip ſhould mean, that, becauſe I was ſaid to be of his opinion, in one thing, I was to be thought to be of his opinion, in all things; and, therefore, diſowned to be of his opinion in that, wherein I was of his opinion, becauſe I would not be thought of his opinion all thro'; would not your Lordſhip be diſpleaſed with me, for ſuppoſing you to have ſuch a meaning as this, and aſk me again, "whether I could think you a man of ſo little ſenſe, to talk thus?" And yet, my Lord, this is the beſt I can make of theſe words, which ſeem to me rather to diſcover a ſecret, in your way of dealing with me, than any thing in me, that I am aſhamed of.

For I am not, nor ever ſhall be, aſhamed to own any opinion, I have, becauſe another man holds the ſame; and ſo far, as that brings me into his company, I ſhall not be troubled to be ſeen in it: but I ſhall never think, that that intitles me to any other of his opinions, or makes me of his company, in any other ſenſe, how much ſoever that be the deſign: for your Lordſhip has uſed no ſmall art and pains to make me of his, and the Unitarians, company in all that they ſay, only, becauſe that author has ten lines, in the beginning of his book, which agrees with ſomething, I have ſaid in mine: from whence we become companions, ſo univerſally united in opinion, that they muſt be entitled to all that I ſay, and I to all that they ſay.

My Lord, when I writ my book, I could not deſign "to diſtinguiſh myſelf "from the gentlemen of the new way of reaſoning," who were not then in being, nor are, that I ſee, yet: ſince I find nothing produced out of the Unitarians, nor the author of Chriſtianity not myſterious, to ſhew, that they make clear and diſtinct ideas neceſſary to certainty. And all that I have done ſince, has been to ſhew, that you had no reaſon to join my book with men (let them be what they, or thoſe, you pleaſe) who found certainty, only upon clear and diſtinct ideas, when my book did not found it only upon clear and diſtinct ideas. And I cannot tell, why the appealing to my book now, ſhould be called "a chuſing rather "to diſtinguiſh myſelf."

My reader muſt pardon me here, for this uncouth phraſe of joining my book with men. For as your Lordſhip ordered the matter (pardon me, if I ſay, in your new way of writing) ſo, as it was, if your own word may be taken in the caſe: for, to give me ſatisfaction, you inſiſt upon this, that you did not join me with thoſe gentlemen, in their opinions, but tell me, "they uſed my notions to "other purpoſes, than I intended them;" and ſo there was no need for me "to "diſtinguiſh myſelf from them," when your Lordſhip had done it for me, as you plead all along: tho' here you are pleaſed to tell me, that I was joined with them, and that "I found myſelf joined in ſuch company, as I did not deſire to be "ſeen in."

My Lord, I could find myſelf joined in no company, upon this occaſion, but what you joined me in. And therefore I beg leave to aſk your Lordſhip, did you join me in company with thoſe, in whoſe company, you here ſay, "I do "not deſire to be ſeen?" If you own that you did, how muſt I underſtand that

paſſage

Vindic. p. 239. Anſw. 1. p. 37. paſſage where you ſay, that "you muſt do that right to the ingenious author of "the Eſſay of Human Underſtanding, from whence theſe notions were borrowed, to ſerve other purpoſes, than he intended them;" which you repeat again, as matter of ſatisfaction to me, and as a proof of the care you took not to be miſunderſtood? If you did join me with them, what is become of all the ſatisfaction in the point, which your Lordſhip has been at ſo much pains about? And if you did not join me with them, you could not think I found myſelf joined with them, or choſe to diſtinguiſh myſelf from men, I was never joined with. For my book was innocent of what made them gentlemen of the new way of reaſoning.

THERE ſeems to me, ſomething very delicate in this matter. I ſhould be ſuppoſed joined to them, and your Lordſhip ſhould not be ſuppoſed to have joined me to them, upon ſo ſlight, or no occaſion; and yet all this comes ſolely from your Lordſhip. How to do this to your ſatisfaction, I confeſs myſelf to be too dull: and, therefore, I have been at the pains to examine, how far I have this obligation to your Lordſhip, and how far you would be pleaſed to own it, that the world might underſtand your Lordſhip's, to me, incomprehenſible way of writing on this occaſion.

FOR if you had a mind, by a new and very dextrous way, becoming the learning and caution of a great man, to bring me into any ſuch company, which you think "I did not deſire to be ſeen in;" I thought ſuch a pattern, ſet by ſuch a hand, as your Lordſhip's, ought not to be loſt, by being paſſed over too ſlightly. Beſides, I hope, that you will not take it amiſs, that I was willing to ſee, what obligation I had to your Lordſhip, in the favour you deſigned me. But I crave leave to aſſure your Lordſhip, I ſhall never be aſhamed to own any opinion I have, becauſe another man (of whom perhaps your Lordſhip, or others, have no very good thoughts) is of it, nor be unwilling to be, ſo far, ſeen in his company: tho' I ſhall always think, I have a right to demand, and ſhall deſire to be ſatisfied, why any one makes to himſelf, or takes an occaſion from thence, in a manner that ſavours not too much of charity, to extend this ſociety to thoſe opinions of that man, with which I have nothing to do; that the world may ſee the juſtice and good-will of ſuch endeavours, and judge whether ſuch arts ſavour not a little of the ſpirit of the inquiſition.

FOR, if I miſtake not, it is the method of that holy office, and the way of thoſe reverend guardians of, what they call the chriſtian faith, to raiſe reports, or ſtart occaſions of ſuſpicion, concerning the orthodoxy of any one, they have no very good-will towards, and require him to clear himſelf; gilding all this with the care of religion, and the profeſſion of reſpect and tenderneſs to the perſon himſelf, even when they deliver him up to be burnt, by the ſecular power.

I SHALL not, my Lord, ſay, that you have had any ill-will to me; for I never deſerved any from you. But I ſhall be better able to anſwer thoſe, who are apt to think the method, you have taken, has ſome conformity, ſo far as it has 1 gone, with what Proteſtants complain of in the inquiſition, when you ſhall have cleared this matter, a little otherwiſe, and aſſigned a more ſufficient reaſon, for bringing me into the party of thoſe, that oppoſe the doctrine of the Trinity, than only, becauſe the author of Chriſtianity not myſterious has, in the beginning of his book, half a ſcore of lines, which you gueſs he borrowed out of mine. For that, in truth, is all the matter of fact, upon which all this duſt is raiſed; and the matter ſo advanced by degrees, that now, I am told, "I ſhould "have cleared myſelf, by owning the doctrine of the Trinity:" as if I had been ever accuſed of diſowning it. But that, which ſhews no ſmall ſkill in this management, is, that I am called upon to clear myſelf, by the very ſame perſon, who raiſing the whole diſpute, has himſelf, over and over again, cleared me; and, upon that, grounds the ſatisfaction, he pretends to give me and others, in anſwer to my complaint of his having, without any reaſon at all, brought my book into the controverſy concerning the Trinity. But to go on:

IF the preceding part of this paragraph had nothing in it, of defence of this propoſition, "that thoſe who offer at clear and diſtinct ideas, bid much fairer "for certainty than I do," &c. it is certain, that what follows, is altogether as remote from any ſuch defence.

Your Lordſhip ſays, "that certainty by ſenſe, certainty by reaſon, and cer- P. 10. "tainty by remembrance, are to be diſtinguiſhed from the certainty" under debate, and to be ſhut out from it: and upon this you ſpend the 11th, 12th, and 13th pages. Suppoſing it ſo, how does this at all tend to the defence of this propoſition, that "thoſe, who offer at clear and diſtinct ideas, bid much fairer "for certainty than I do?" For whether certainty by ſenſe, by reaſon, and by remembrance, be, or be not, comprehended in the certainty under debate, this propoſition, "that thoſe, who offer at clear and diſtinct ideas, bid much fairer "for certainty than I do," will not at all be confirmed, or invalidated thereby.

The proving therefore, that "certainty by ſenſe, by reaſon, and by remembrance," is to be excluded from the certainty under debate, ſerving nothing to the defence of the propoſition to be defended, and ſo having nothing to do here; let us now conſider it as a propoſition, that your Lordſhip has a mind to prove, as ſerving to ſome other great purpoſe of your own, or, perhaps, in ſome other view againſt my book: for you ſeem to lay no ſmall ſtreſs upon it, by your way of introducing it. For you very ſolemnly ſet yourſelf to prove, "that the P. 9, 10. "certainty under debate, is the certainty of knowledge; and that a propoſition, "whoſe ideas are to be compared, as to their agreement or diſagreement, is "the proper object of this certainty." From whence your Lordſhip infers, that "therefore, this certainty is to be diſtinguiſhed from a certainty by ſenſe, by P. 10, 11, 12. "reaſon and by remembrance." But by what logick this is inſer'd, is not eaſy to me to diſcover: for "if a propoſition, whoſe ideas are to be compared as to "their agreement, or diſagreement, be the proper object of the certainty" under debate; if propoſitions, whoſe certainty we arrive at, by ſenſe, reaſon, or remembrance, be of ideas, which may be compared as to their agreement, or diſagreement; then they cannot be excluded from that certainty, which is to be had, by ſo comparing thoſe ideas: unleſs they muſt be ſhut out, for the very ſame reaſon, that others are taken in.

1. Then as to certainty by ſenſe, or propoſitions of that kind:

"The object of the certainty under debate, your Lordſhip owns, is a propo- "ſition whoſe ideas are to be compared, as to their agreement, or diſagreement." The agreement, or diſagreement, of the ideas of a propoſition to be compared, may be examined and perceived by ſenſe, and is certainty by ſenſe: and therefore, how this certainty is to be diſtinguiſhed, and ſhut out, from that which conſiſts in the perceiving the agreement, or diſagreement, of the ideas of any propoſition, will not be eaſy to ſhew; unleſs one certainty is diſtinguiſhed from another, by having that, which makes the other to be certainty, viz. the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of two ideas, as expreſſed in that propoſition: v. g. may I not be certain, that a ball of ivory, that lies before my eyes, is not ſquare? And is it not my ſenſe of ſeeing, that makes me perceive the diſagreement of that ſquare figure, to that round matter, which are the ideas expreſſed in that propoſition? How then is certainty, by ſenſe, excluded, or diſtinguiſhed from that knowledge, which conſiſts in the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of ideas?

2. Your Lordſhip diſtinguiſhes, the certainty, which conſiſts in the perceiving P. 11. the agreement, or diſagreement, of ideas, as expreſſed in any propoſition, from certainty by reaſon. To have made good this diſtinction, I humbly conceive, you would have done well to have ſhewed that the agreement, or diſagreement, of two ideas could not be perceived by the intervention of a third, which I, and as I gueſs, other people call reaſoning, or knowing by reaſon. As for example, cannot the ſides of a given triangle be known to be equal, by the intervention of two circles, whereof one of theſe ſides is a common radius?

To which, it is like, your Lordſhip will anſwer, what I find you do here, about P. 12. the knowledge of the exiſtence of ſubſtance, by the intervention of the exiſtence of modes, "that you grant, one may come to certainty of knowledge in the "caſe; but not a certainty by ideas, but by a conſequence of reaſon, deduced "from the ideas, we have by our ſenſes." This, my Lord you, have ſaid, and thus you have more than once oppoſed reaſon and ideas, as inconſiſtent; which I ſhould be very glad to ſee proved once, after theſe ſeveral occaſions, I have given your Lordſhip, by excepting againſt that ſuppoſition. But ſince the word, idea, has the ill luck to be ſo conſtantly oppoſed by your Lordſhip, to reaſon, permit me, if you pleaſe, inſtead of it, to put what I mean by it, viz. the immediate objects of the mind in thinking (for that is it, which I would ſignify by the word ideas) and then let us ſee how your anſwer will run: You grant that, from the ſenſible modes of bodies, we may come to a certain knowledge, that there are bodily ſubſtances; but this, you ſay, is not a certainty, by the immediate objects of the mind in thinking, "but by a conſequence of reaſon, deduced from the immediate objects of the mind in thinking, which we have "by our ſenſes." When you can prove that we can have a certainty by a conſequence of reaſon, which certainty ſhall not alſo be, by the immediate objects of the mind, in uſing its reaſon; you may ſay ſuch certainty is not by ideas, but by conſequence of reaſon. But that I believe will not be, until you can ſhew, that the mind can think, or reaſon, or know, without immediate objects of thinking, reaſoning, or knowing; all which objects, as your Lordſhip knows, I call ideas.

P. 12. You ſubjoin, "and this can never prove that we have certainty by ideas, where "the ideas themſelves are not clear and diſtinct:" the queſtion is not, "whether "we can have certainty by ideas, that are not clear and diſtinct?" or, whether my words (if by the particle, this, you mean my words ſet down in the foregoing page) prove any ſuch thing? which, I humbly conceive, they do not; but whether certainty by reaſon be excluded from the certainty under debate? which I humbly conceive you have not from my words, or any other way proved.

P. 12. 3. The third ſort of propoſitions, that your Lordſhip excludes, are thoſe, whoſe certainty we know by remembrance; but in theſe two, the agreement, or diſagreement, of the ideas contained in them, is perceived, not always, indeed, as it was at firſt, by an actual view of the connection of all the intermediate ideas, whereby the agreement, or diſagreement, of thoſe, in the propoſition, was at firſt perceived; but by other intermediate ideas, that ſhew the agreement, or diſagreement, of the ideas contained in the propoſition, whoſe certainty we remember.

As in the inſtance, you here make uſe of, viz. that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones: the certainty of which propoſition we know by remembrance, "tho' the demonſtration had ſlipt out of our minds;" but we know it in a different way, from what your Lordſhip ſuppoſes. The agreement of the two ideas, as joined in that propoſition, is perceived; but it is by the intervention of other ideas, than thoſe, which at firſt produced that perception. I remember, i. e. I know (for remembrance is but the reviving of ſome paſt knowledge) that I was once certain of the truth of this propoſition, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones. The immutability of the ſame relations between the ſame immutable things, is now the idea, that ſhews me, that, if the three angles of a triangle were once equal to two right ones, they will always be equal to two right ones; and hence I come to be certain, that, what was once true, in the caſe, is always true; what ideas once agreed, will always agree; and conſequently, what I once knew to be true, I ſhall always know to be true, as long as I can remember, that I once knew it.

P. 9. Your Lordſhip ſays, "that the debate between us is about certainty of knowledge, with regard to ſome propoſition, whoſe ideas are to be compared, as to "their agreement, or diſagreement:" out of this debate, you ſay, certainty by ſenſe, by reaſon, and by remembrance, is to be excluded. I deſire you then, my Lord, to tell what ſort of propoſitions will be within the debate, and to name me one of them; if propoſitions, whoſe certainty we know by ſenſe, reaſon, or remembrance are excluded?

However, from what you have ſaid concerning them, your Lordſhip, in the next paragraph, concludes them out of the queſtion; your words are, "theſe "things, then, being out of the queſtion."

OUT of what queſtion, I beſeech you, my Lord? The queſtion here, and that of your own propoſing to be defended in the affirmative, is this, "whether "thoſe, who offer at clear and diſtinct ideas, bid much fairer for certainty than "I do? And how certainty by ſenſe, by reaſon, and by remembrance, comes to have any particular exception, in reference to this queſtion, it is my misfortune not to be able to find.

BUT your Lordſhip, leaving the examination of the queſtion under debate, by a new ſtate of the queſtion, would pin upon me what I never ſaid. Your words are, "theſe things, then, being put out of the queſtion, which belong "not to it, the queſtion, truly ſtated, is, whether we can attain to any certainty of knowledge, as to the truth of a propoſition, in the way of ideas, where "the ideas themſelves, by which we came to that certainty, be not clear and "diſtinct?" With ſubmiſſion, my Lord, that which I ſay in the point, is, that we may be certain of the truth of a propoſition, concerning an idea, which is not in all its parts clear and diſtinct; and therefore, if your Lordſhip will have any queſtion with me, concerning this matter, "the queſtion, truly ſtated, is, "whether we can frame any propoſition, concerning a thing, whereof we have "but an obſcure and confuſed idea, of whoſe truth we can be certain?"

THAT this is the queſtion, you will eaſily agree, when you will give yourſelf the trouble to look back to the riſe of it.

YOUR Lordſhip having found out a ſtrange ſort of men, who had broached "a doctrine, which ſuppoſed that we muſt have clear and diſtinct ideas of whatever we pretend to a certainty of, in our minds," was pleaſed for this, to call them "the gentlemen of a new way of reaſoning," and to make me one of them. I anſwered, that I placed not certainty, only in clear and diſtinct ideas, and ſo ought not to have been made one of them, being not guilty of what made "a gentleman of this new way of reaſoning." It is pretended ſtill, that I am guilty; and endeavoured to be proved. To know now, whether I am, or no, it muſt be conſidered what you lay to their charge, as the conſequence of that opinion; and that is, that upon this ground, "we cannot come to any certainty, that there is ſuch a thing as ſubſtance." This appears by more places than one. Your Lordſhip aſks, "how is it poſſible, that we may be certain, "that there are both bodily and ſpiritual ſubſtances, if our reaſon depend upon "clear and diſtinct ideas?" And again, "how come we to be certain, that there "are ſpiritual ſubſtances in the world, ſince we can have no clear and diſtinct "ideas concerning them?" And your Lordſhip having ſet down ſome words, out of my book, as if they were inconſiſtent with my principle of certainty, founded only in clear and diſtinct ideas, you ſay, "from whence it follows, that "we may be certain of the being of a ſpiritual ſubſtance, tho' we have no clear "and diſtinct ideas of it."

Vindic. p. 232.

Vindic. p. 240.

Ibid.

Vindic. p. 244.

OTHER places might be produced, but theſe are enough to ſhew, that thoſe, who held clear and diſtinct ideas neceſſary to certainty, were accuſed to extend it thus far, that, where any idea was obſcure and confuſed, there no propoſition could be made concerning it, of whoſe truth we could be certain; v. g. we could not be certain that there was, in the world, ſuch a thing as ſubſtance, becauſe we had but an obſcure and confuſed idea of it.

IN this ſenſe therefore, I denied, that clear and diſtinct ideas were neceſſary to certainty, v. g. I denied it to be my doctrine, that where an idea was obſcure and confuſed, there no propoſition could be made concerning it, of whoſe truth we could be certain. For I held we might be certain of the truth of this propoſition, that there was ſubſtance in the world, tho' we have but an obſcure and confuſed idea of ſubſtance. And your Lordſhip endeavoured to prove we could not, as may be ſeen at large, in that tenth chapter of your Vindication, &c.

FROM all which, it is evident, that the queſtion between us, truly ſtated, is this, whether we can attain certainty of the truth of a propoſition, concerning any thing, whereof we have but an obſcure and confuſed idea?

THIS being the queſtion, the firſt thing you ſay, is, that Des Cartes was of your opinion againſt me. Anſw. If the queſtion were to be decided by authority, I had rather it ſhould be by your Lordſhip's, than Des Cartes's:

and, therefore, I ſhould excuſe myſelf to you, as not having needed, that you ſhould have added his authority to yours, to ſhame me into a ſubmiſſion; or that you ſhould have been at the pains, to have tranſcribed ſo much, out of him, for my ſake, were it fit for me to hinder the diſplay of the riches of your Lordſhip's univerſal reading; wherein, I doubt not, but I ſhould take pleaſure myſelf, if I had it to ſhew.

I come, therefore, to what I think your Lordſhip principally aimed at; which, as I humbly conceive, was to ſhew, out of my book, that I founded certainty, only on clear and diſtinct ideas. “And yet, as you ſay, I have complained of
P. 15. “your Lordſhip, in near twenty places of my ſecond Letter, for charging this “upon me. By this the world will judge of the juſtice of my complaints, and “the conſiſtency of my notion of ideas.”

Answ. What “conſiſtency of my notion of ideas” has to do here, I know not; for I do not remember that I made any complaint, concerning that. But ſuppoſing my complaints were ill-grounded, in this one caſe, concerning certainty; yet they might be reaſonable in other points; and therefore, with ſubmiſſion, I humbly conceive, the inference was a little too large, to conclude from this particular, againſt my complaints in general.

In the next place, I anſwer, that ſuppoſing the places, which your Lordſhip brings out of my book, did prove, what they do not, viz. that I founded certainty, only in clear and diſtinct ideas; yet, my complaints, in the caſe, are very juſt. For your Lordſhip, at firſt, brought me into the controverſy, and made me one of “the gentlemen of the new way of reaſoning,” for founding all certainty on clear and diſtinct ideas, only upon a bare ſuppoſition that I did ſo; which,
P. 9. I think, your Lordſhip confeſſes in theſe words, where you ſay, “that you do “not deny, but the firſt occaſion of your charge, was the ſuppoſition that clear “and diſtinct ideas were neceſſary, in order to any certainty in our minds; and “that the only way to attain this certainty, was the comparing theſe, i. e. clear “and diſtinct ideas, together: but to prove this, my words, your Lordſhip ſays, “were produced, and my principles of certainty laid down, and none elſe.” Anſw. It is ſtrange that when my principles of certainty were laid down, this (if I held it) was not found among them. Having looked, therefore, I do not find, in that place, that any words, or principles, of mine were produced, to prove that I held, that the only way to attain certainty, was by comparing only clear and diſtinct ideas; ſo that all that then made me one of the gentlemen of the new way of reaſoning, was only your ſuppoſing, that I ſuppoſed that clear and diſtinct ideas are neceſſary to certainty. And, therefore, I had then, and have ſtill, reaſon to complain, that your Lordſhip brought me into this controverſy, upon ſo ſlight grounds, which, I humbly conceive, will always ſhew it to have proceeded, not ſo much from any thing, you had then found in my book, as from a great willingneſs, in your Lordſhip, at any rate, to do it; and of this the paſſages, which you have here now produced, out of my Eſſay, are an evident proof.

For if your Lordſhip had then known any thing, that ſeemed ſo much to your purpoſe, “when you produced, as you ſay, my words and my principles to “prove,” that I held clear and diſtinct ideas neceſſary to certainty: it cannot be believed that you would have omitted theſe paſſages, either then, or in your anſwer to my firſt letter, and deferred them to this your anſwer to my ſecond. Theſe paſſages, therefore, now quoted here, by your Lordſhip, give me leave, my Lord, to ſuppoſe, have been, by a new and diligent ſearch, found out, and are now, at laſt, brought, poſt factum, to give ſome colour to your way of proceeding with me; tho' theſe paſſages being, as I ſuppoſe, then unknown to you, they could not be the ground of making me one of thoſe, who place certainty only in clear and diſtinct ideas.

Let us come to the paſſages themſelves, and ſee what help they afford you.

The firſt words you ſet down out of my Eſſay are theſe; “the mind not
B. iv. c. 18. § 8. “being certain of the truth of that it doth not evidently know.” From theſe words, that which I infer, in that place, is, “that therefore the mind is bound, “in ſuch caſes, to give up its aſſent to an unerring teſtimony.” But your Lord-

ſhip from them infers here, "therefore I make clear ideas neceſſary to certainty;" or therefore, by conſidering the immediate objects of the mind in thinking, we cannot be certain that ſubſtance, (whereof we have an obſcure and confuſed idea) doth exiſt. I ſhall leave your Lordſhip to make good this conſequence, when you think fit, and proceed to the next paſſage you alledge, which, you ſay, proves it more plainly. I believe it will be thought, it ſhould be proved more plainly, or elſe it will not be proved at all.

THIS plainer proof is out of B. iv. c. 4. § 8. in theſe words, "that, which "is requiſite, to make our knowledge certain, is the clearneſs of our ideas." Anſw. The certainty here ſpoken of, is the certainty of general propoſitions in morality, and not of the particular exiſtence of any thing; and therefore tends not at all, to any ſuch poſition, as this, that we cannot be certain of the exiſtence of any particular ſort of being, tho' we have but an obſcure and confuſed idea of it: tho' it doth affirm, that we cannot have any certain perception of the relations of general, moral ideas (wherein conſiſts the certainty of general, moral propoſitions) any farther than thoſe ideas are clear in our minds. And that this is ſo, I refer my reader to that chapter for ſatisfaction.

THE third place produced by your Lordſhip, out of B. iv. c. 12. § 14. is, "For it being evident that our knowledge cannot exceed our ideas, where they "are only imperfect, confuſed, or obſcure; we cannot expect to have certain, "perfect, or clear knowledge." To underſtand theſe words aright, we muſt ſee, in what place they ſtand; and that is, in a chapter of the improvement of our knowledge, and therein are brought, as a reaſon, to ſhew how neceſſary it is "for the enlarging of our knowledge, to get and ſettle in our minds, as far as "we can, clear, diſtinct, and conſtant ideas of thoſe things, we would conſider "and know." The reaſon whereof there given, is this; that, as far as they are only imperfect, confuſed, and obſcure, we cannot expect to have certain, perfect, or clear knowledge; i. e. that our knowledge will not be clear and certain, ſo far as the idea is imperfect and obſcure. Which will not at all reach your Lordſhip's purpoſe, who would argue, that becauſe I ſay, our idea of ſubſtance is obſcure and confuſed, therefore, upon my grounds, we cannot know that ſuch a thing as ſubſtance exiſts; becauſe I placed certainty only in clear and diſtinct ideas. Now to this I anſwered; that I did not place all certainty, only on clear and diſtinct ideas, in ſuch a ſenſe as that; and therefore, to avoid being miſtaken, I ſaid, "that my notion of certainty by ideas, is, that certainty conſiſts in the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of ideas; ſuch as we have, whether they be, in all their parts, perfectly clear and diſtinct, or no." Viz. If they are clear and diſtinct enough to be capable of having their agreement, or diſagreement, with any other idea perceived, ſo far they are capable of affording us knowledge, tho', at the ſame time, they are ſo obſcure and confuſed, as that there are other ideas, with which we can by no means ſo compare them, as to perceive their agreement, or diſagreement, with them. This was the clearneſs and diſtinctneſs, which I denied to be neceſſary to certainty.

P. 50.

Anſw. 2. p. 50.

IF your Lordſhip would have done me the honour to have conſidered what I underſtood by obſcure and confuſed ideas, and what every one muſt underſtand by them, who thinks clearly and diſtinctly concerning them, I am apt to imagine, you would have ſpared yourſelf the trouble of raiſing this queſtion, and omitted theſe quotations out of my book, as not ſerving to your Lordſhip's purpoſe.

THE fourth paſſage, which you ſeem to lay moſt ſtreſs on, proves as little to your purpoſe, as either of the former three. The words are theſe: "but obſcure and confuſed ideas can never produce any clear and certain knowledge; "becauſe, as far as any ideas are confuſed, or obſcure, the mind can never perceive clearly, whether they agree, or no." The latter part of theſe words are a plain interpretation of the former, and ſhew their meaning to be this; viz. our obſcure and confuſed ideas, as they ſtand in contra-diſtinction to clear and diſtinct, have all of them ſomething in them, whereby they are kept from being wholly imperceptible, and perfectly confounded with all other ideas, and ſo

Eſſay; B. IV. c. 2. § 15.

their agreement, or diſagreement, with (at leaſt) ſome other ideas, may be perceived, and thereby produce certainty, tho' they are obſcure and confuſed ideas. But, ſo far as they are obſcure and confuſed, ſo that their agreement, or diſagreement, cannot be perceived, ſo far they cannot produce certainty; v. g. the idea of ſubſtance is clear and diſtinct enough to have its agreement, with that of actual exiſtence, perceived: but yet it is ſo far obſcure and confuſed, that there be a great many other ideas, with which, by reaſon of its obſcurity and confuſedneſs, we cannot compare it, ſo, as to produce ſuch a perception; and, in all thoſe caſes, we neceſſarily come ſhort of certainty. And that this was ſo, and that I meant ſo, I humbly conceive, you could not but have ſeen, if you had P. 7. given yourſelf the trouble to reflect on that paſſage, which you quoted, viz. "that "certainty conſiſts in the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of ideas, "ſuch as we have, whether they be, in their parts, perfectly clear and diſtinct, "or no." To which, what your Lordſhip has here brought, out of the ſecond book of my Eſſay, is no manner of contradiction; unleſs it be a contradiction to ſay, that an idea, which cannot be well compared with ſome ideas, from which it is not clearly and ſufficiently diſtinguiſhable, is yet capable of having its agreement, or diſagreement, perceived with ſome other idea, with which it is not ſo confounded, but that it may be compared: and therefore I had, and have ſtill, reaſon to complain of your Lordſhip, for charging that upon me, which I never ſaid, nor meant.

To make this yet more viſible, give me leave to make uſe of an inſtance, in the object of the eyes, in ſeeing, from whence the metaphor of obſcure and confuſed is transfered to ideas, the objects of the mind in thinking. There is no object, which the eye ſees, that can be ſaid to be perfectly obſcure, for then it would not be ſeen at all; nor perfectly confuſed, for then it could not be diſtinguiſhed from any other, no not from a clearer. For example, one ſees in the duſk, ſomething of that ſhape and ſize, that a man, in that degree of light and diſtance, would appear. This is not ſo obſcure, that he ſees nothing; nor ſo confuſed, that he cannot diſtinguiſh it from a ſteeple, or a ſtar; but it is ſo obſcure, that he cannot, tho' it be a ſtatue, diſtinguiſh it from a man; and therefore, in regard of a man, it can produce no clear and diſtinct knowledge: but yet, as obſcure and confuſed an idea as it is, this hinders not but there may many propoſitions be made, concerning it; as particularly that it exiſts, of the truth of which we may be certain. And that without any contradiction to what I ſay in my Eſſay, viz. "that obſcure and confuſed ideas can never produce any "clear and certain knowledge; becauſe, as far as they are confuſed, or obſcure, "the mind cannot perceive clearly, whether they agree, or no." This reaſon, that I there give, plainly limiting it only to knowledge, where the obſcurity and confuſion is ſuch, that it hinders the perception of agreement, or diſagreement, which is not ſo great, in any obſcure and confuſed idea, but that there are ſome other ideas, with which it may be perceived to agree, or diſagree, and there it is capable to produce certainty in us.

And thus I am come to the end of your defence of your firſt anſwer, as you call it, and deſire the reader to conſider, how much, in the eight pages imployed in it, is ſaid to defend this propoſition, "that thoſe, who offer at clear and diſtinct ideas, bid much fairer for certainty than I do."

But your Lordſhip having, under this head, taken occcaſion to examine my making clear and diſtinct ideas neceſſary to certainty, I crave leave to conſider here, what you ſay of it in another place. I find one argument more to prove, P. 63. that I place certainty, only in clear and diſtinct ideas. Your Lordſhip tells me, and bids me obſerve my own words, that I poſitively ſay, "that the mind, not "being certain of the truth of that it doth not evidently know: ſo that, ſays "your Lordſhip, it is plain here, that I place certainty in evident knowledge, or "in clear and diſtinct ideas, and yet my great complaint of your Lordſhip was, "that you charged this upon me, and now you find it in my own words." Anſwer. I do obſerve my own words, but do not find in them, "or in clear and "diſtinct ideas," tho' your Lordſhip has ſet theſe down, as my words. I there, indeed, ſay, "the mind is not certain of what it does not evidently know."

Whereby I place certainty, as your Lordſhip ſays, only in evident knowledge, but evident knowledge may be had in the clear and evident perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of ideas; tho' ſome of them ſhould not be, in all their parts, perfectly clear and diſtinct, as is evident in this propoſition, " that " ſubſtance does exiſt."

But you give not off this matter ſo; for theſe words of mine, above quoted P. 15. by your Lordſhip, viz. " It being evident, that our knowledge cannot exceed our " ideas, where they are imperfect, confuſed, or obſcure, we cannot expect to " have certain, perfect, or clear knowledge;" your Lordſhip has here up again: P. 63. and thereupon charge it on me as a contradiction, that confeſſing our ideas to be imperfect, confuſed and obſcure; I ſay, I do not yet place certainty in clear and diſtinct ideas. Anſwer, The reaſon is plain, for I do not ſay, that all our ideas are imperfect, confuſed and obſcure; nor, that obſcure and confuſed ideas are, in all their parts, ſo obſcure and confuſed, that no agreement, or diſagreement, between them and other ideas can be perceived; and therefore my confeſſion of imperfect, obſcure, and confuſed ideas, takes not away all knowledge, even concerning thoſe very ideas.

But, ſays your Lordſhip, " can certainty be had with imperfect and obſcure " ideas, and yet no certainty be had by them?" Add, if you pleaſe, my Lord, [by thoſe parts of them, which are obſcure and confuſed.] And then, the queſtion will be right put, and have this eaſy anſwer: yes, my Lord; and that, without any contradiction, becauſe an idea that is not, in all its parts, perfectly clear and diſtinct; and is, therefore, an obſcure and confuſed idea, may yet, with thoſe ideas, with which, by any obſcurity it has, it is not confounded, be capable to produce knowledge by the perception of its agreement, or diſagreement, with them. And yet it will hold true, that in that part, wherein it is imperfect, obſcure, and confuſed, we cannot expect to have certain, perfect, or clear knowledge.

For example: he that has the idea of a leopard, as only of a ſpotted animal, muſt be confeſſed to have but a very imperfect, obſcure and confuſed idea of that ſpecies of animals; and yet this obſcure and confuſed idea is capable, by a perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of the clear part of it, viz. that of animal, with ſeveral other ideas, to produce certainty: tho', as far as the obſcure part of it confounds it with the idea of a lynx, or other ſpotted animal, it can, joined with them, in many propoſitions, produce no knowledge.

This might eaſily be underſtood to be my meaning, by theſe words, which your Lordſhip quotes out of my Eſſay, viz. " That our knowledge conſiſting in " the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of any two ideas, its clear- P. 122. " neſs, or obſcurity, conſiſts in the clearneſs, or obſcurity, of that percep- " tion, and not in the clearneſs, and obſcurity, of the ideas themſelves." Upon which your Lordſhip aſks, " how is it poſſible for the mind to have " a clear perception of the agreement of ideas, if the ideas themſelves be P. 122. " not clear and diſtinct?" Anſwer, Juſt as the eyes can have a clear perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of the clear and diſtinct parts of a writing, with the clear parts of another, tho' one, or both of them, be ſo obſcure and blurred in other parts, that they cannot perceive any agreement, or diſagreement, they have one with another. And I am ſorry that theſe words of mine, " my notion of certainty by ideas, is, that certainty conſiſts in the perception of Letter 2. " the agreement, or diſagreement, of ideas, ſuch as we have, whether they be, p. 50. " in all their parts, perfectly clear and diſtinct, or no;" were not plain enough to make your Lordſhip underſtand my meaning, and ſave you all this new, and, as it ſeems to me, needleſs trouble.

In your fifteenth page, your Lordſhip comes to your ſecond of the three anſwers, which you ſay you had given, and would lay together and defend.

You ſay, (2) you anſwered, " that it is very poſſible the author of Chriſtianity P. 7. P. 15. " not myſterious might miſtake, or miſapply, my notions; but there is too " much reaſon to believe, he thought them the ſame; and we have no reaſon " to be ſorry, that he hath given me this occaſion, for the explaining my mean- " ing, and for the vindication of myſelf, in the matters, I apprehend, he had " charged me with." Theſe words your Lordſhip quotes out of the thirty-ſixth page of your firſt letter. But, as I have already obſerved, they are not there given, as an anſwer to this, that you make me here ſay; and, therefore, to what purpoſe you repeat them here, is not eaſy to diſcern, unleſs it can be thought that an unſatisfactory anſwer, in one place, can become ſatisfactory, by being repeated in another, where it is, as I humbly conceive, leſs to the purpoſe, and no anſwer at all. It was there, indeed, given as an anſwer to my ſaying, that I did not place certainty in clear and diſtinct ideas, which I ſaid to ſhew, that you had no reaſon to bring me into the controverſy, becauſe the author of Chriſtianity not myſterious placed certainty in clear and diſtinct ideas. To ſatisfy me, for your doing ſo, your Lordſhip anſwers, "that it was very poſſible, that author might "miſtake, or miſapply, my notions." A reaſon, indeed, that will equally juſtify your bringing my book into any controverſy: for there is no author ſo infallible, write he in what controverſy he pleaſes, but it is poſſible he may miſtake, or miſapply my notions.

That was the force of this your Lordſhip's anſwer, in that place of your firſt letter; but what it ſerves for, in this place of your ſecond letter, I have not wit enough to ſee. The remainder of it I have anſwered, in the 37th and 38th pages of my ſecond letter, and therefore cannot but wonder to ſee it repeated here again, without any notice taken of what I ſaid in anſwer to it, tho' you ſet it down here again, as you ſay, p. 7. on purpoſe to defend.

P. 16. But all the defence made, is only to that part of my reply, which you ſet down as a freſh complaint, that I make in theſe words: "This can be no reaſon, why I ſhould be joined with a man that had miſapplied my notions; and "that no man hath ſo much miſtaken, and miſapplied my notions, as your Lordſhip; and therefore I ought rather to be joined with your Lordſhip." And then you with ſome warmth, ſubjoin: "But is this fair and ingenuous dealing, "to repreſent this matter ſo, as if your Lordſhip had joined us together, becauſe "he had miſunderſtood and miſapplied my notions? Can I think your Lordſhip a man of ſo little ſenſe to make that the reaſon of it?" No, Sir, ſays your Lordſhip, "It was, becauſe he aſſigned no other grounds but mine, and "that in my own words; however, now I would divert the meaning of them "another way."

My Lord, I did not ſet down your words, at large, in my ſecond letter, and therefore do not ſee, how I could be liable to any charge of unfair, or diſingenuous dealing in repreſenting the matter; which, I am ſure, you will allow as a proof of my not miſrepreſenting, ſince I find you uſe it yourſelf, as a ſure fence againſt any ſuch accuſation; where you tell me, that you have ſet down my "own words at large, that I may not complain, that your Lordſhip miſrepreſents "my ſenſe." The ſame anſwer I muſt deſire my reader to apply for me, to your 73d and 90th pages, where your Lordſhip makes complaints of the like kind with this here. P. 133.

The reaſons, you give, for joining me with the author of Chriſtianity not myſterious, are put down verbatim, as you gave them; and if they did not give me that ſatisfaction they were deſigned for, am I to be blamed that I did not find them better than they were? You joined me with that author, becauſe he placed certainty only in clear and diſtinct ideas: I told your Lordſhip, I did not do ſo; and therefore, that could be no reaſon for your joining me with him. You anſwer, "'Twas poſſible he might miſtake, or miſapply, my notions:" ſo that our agreeing in the notion of certainty (the pretended reaſon, for which we were joined) failing, all the reaſon, which is left, and which you offer in this anſwer, for your joining of us, in the poſſibility of his miſtaking my notions: and I think it a very natural inference, that if the mere poſſibility of any one's miſtaking me, be a reaſon for my being joined with him; any one's actual miſtaking me, is a ſtronger reaſon, why I ſhould be joined with him. But if ſuch an inference ſhews (more than you would have it) the ſatisfactorineſs and force of your anſwer, I hope you will not be angry with me, if I cannot change the nature of things.

Anſw. 1. p. 36. Your Lordſhip indeed, adds in that place, that "there is too much reaſon "to believe that the author thought his notions and mine the ſame."

Answer. When your Lordſhip ſhall produce that reaſon, it will be ſeen, whether it were too much, or too little. 'Till it is produced, there appears no reaſon at all; and ſuch concealed reaſon, tho' it may be too much, can be ſuppoſed, I think, to give very little ſatisfaction to me, or any body elſe, in the caſe.

But to make good what you have ſaid, in your anſwer, your Lordſhip here replies, that "you did not join us together, becauſe he had miſunderſtood and "miſapplied my notions." Anſw. Neither did I ſay, that therefore you did join us. But this I crave leave to ſay, that all the reaſon, you there gave, for your joining us together, was the poſſibility of his miſtaking and miſapplying my notions. P. 16.

But your Lordſhip now tells me, "No, Sir," this was not the reaſon of your joining us; but "it was, becauſe he aſſigned no other grounds but mine, and "in my own words." Anſw. My Lord, I do not remember that, in that place, you give this as a reaſon, for your joining of us; and I could not anſwer, in that place, to what you did not there ſay, but to what you there did ſay. Now, your Lordſhip does ſay it here; here I ſhall take the liberty to anſwer it. P. 16.

The reaſon, you now give, for your joining me with that author, is, "becauſe he aſſigned no other grounds, but mine;" which however tenderly expreſſed, is to be underſtood, I ſuppoſe, that he did aſſign my grounds. Of what, I beſeech your Lordſhip, did he aſſign my grounds, and in my words? If it were not my grounds of certainty, it could be no manner of reaſon, for your joining me with him; becauſe the only reaſon, why at firſt you made him (and me with him) a "gentleman of the new way of reaſoning, was his ſuppoſing "clear and diſtinct ideas neceſſary to certainty," which was the opinion, that you declared, you oppoſe. Now, my Lord, if you can ſhew, where that author has, in my words, aſſigned my grounds of certainty, there will be ſome grounds for what you ſay here: but, till your Lordſhip does that, it will be pretty hard to believe that, to be the ground of your joining us together; which, being no where to be found, can ſcarce be thought the true reaſon of your doing it.

Your Lordſhip adds, "however, now I would divert the meaning of them "[i. e. thoſe my words] another way." P. 16.

Anſw. Whenever you are pleaſed to ſet down thoſe words of mine, wherein that author aſſigns my grounds of certainty, it will be ſeen how I now divert my meaning another way; until then, they muſt remain, with ſeveral other of your Lordſhip's inviſible them, which are no where to be found.

But to your aſking me, "whether I can think your Lordſhip a man of that "little ſenſe?" I crave leave to reply, that I hope it muſt not be concluded, that as often as, in your way of writing, I meet with any thing, that does not ſeem to me ſatisfactory, and I endeavour to ſhew that it does not prove, what it is made uſe of for, that "I preſently think your Lordſhip a man of little ſenſe:" This would be a very hard rule, in defending one's ſelf; eſpecially for me, againſt ſo great and learned a man, whoſe reaſons and meaning it is not, I find, always eaſy for ſo mean a capacity, as mine, to reach; and therefore I have taken great care to ſet down your words, in moſt places, to ſecure myſelf from the imputation of miſrepreſenting your ſenſe, and to leave it fairly before the reader to judge, whether I miſtake it, and how far I am to be blamed, if I do. And I would have ſet down your whole letter, page by page, as I anſwered it, would not that have made my book too big. P. 17.

If I muſt write under this fear, that you apprehend I think meanly of you, as often as I think any reaſon, you make uſe of, is not ſatisfactory in the point, it is brought for, the cauſes of uneaſineſs would return too often, and it would be better, once for all, to conclude your Lordſhip infallible, and acquieſce in whatever you ſay, than, in every page, to be ſo rude as to tell your Lordſhip, "I think you have little ſenſe;" if that be the interpretation of my endeavouring to ſhew, that your reaſons come ſhort, any where.

My Lord, when you did me the honour to anſwer my firſt letter (which I thought might have paſſed for a ſubmiſſive complaint of what I did not well underſtand, rather than a diſpute with your Lordſhip) you were pleaſed to inſert into it direct accuſations againſt my book: which looked, as if you had a mind to enter into a direct controverſy with me. This condeſcenſion in your Lordſhip has made me think myſelf under the protection of the laws of controverſy, which allow a free examining and ſhewing the weakneſs of the reaſons brought by the other ſide, without any offence. If this be not permitted me, I muſt confeſs, I have been miſtaken, and have been guilty in anſwering you any thing at all; for how to anſwer, without anſwering, I confeſs I do not know.

I wish you never had writ any thing that I was particularly concerned to examine; and what I have been concerned to examine, I wiſh it had given me no occaſion for any other anſwer, but an admiration of the manner and juſtneſs of your corrections, and an acknowledgment of an increaſe of that great opinion, which I had of your Lordſhip before: but I hope it is not expected from me, in this debate, that I ſhould admit, as good and concluſive, all that drops from your pen, for fear of cauſing ſo much diſpleaſure, as you ſeem here to have, upon this occaſion, or for fear you ſhould object to me the preſumption of thinking you had but little ſenſe, as often as I endeavoured to ſhew, that what you ſay is of little force.

When thoſe words and grounds of mine are produced, that the author of Chriſtianity not myſterious aſſigned, which your Lordſhip thinks a ſufficient reaſon for your joining me with him, in oppoſing the doctrine of the Trinity; I ſhall conſider them, and endeavour to give you ſatisfaction about them, as well as I have already, concerning thoſe ten lines, which you have, more than once, quoted out of him, as taken out of my book, and which is all, that your Lordſhip has produced out of him of that kind: in all which there is not one ſyllable of clear and diſtinct ideas, or of certainty founded in them. In the mean time, in anſwer to your other queſtion, "but is this fair and ingenuous dealing?" I refer my reader to p. 35--38, of my ſecond letter; where he may ſee, at large, all this whole matter, and all the unfairneſs and diſingenuity of it, which I ſubmit to him, to judge, whether for any fault of that kind, it ought to have drawn, on me, the marks of ſo much diſpleaſure. P. 16.

Ibid. Your Lordſhip goes on here, and tells me, that "altho' you were willing to "allow me all reaſonable occaſions for my own vindication, as appears by your "words; yet you were ſenſible enough, that I had given too juſt an occaſion to "apply them, in that manner, as appears by the next page."

What was it, I beſeech you, my Lord, that I was to vindicate myſelf from? and what was thoſe, them, I had given too juſt an occaſion to apply in that manner? and what was that manner they were applied in? and what was the occaſion they were ſo applied? for I can find none of all theſe, in that next page, to which your Lordſhip refers me. When thoſe are ſet down, the world will be the better able to judge of the reaſon, you had to join me, after the manner you did. However, ſaying, my Lord, without proving, I humbly conceive, is but ſaying; and in ſuch perſonal matter, ſo turned, ſhews more the diſpoſition of the ſpeaker, than any ground for what is ſaid. Your Lordſhip, as a proof of your great care of me, tells me, at the top of that page, that you had ſaid ſo much, that nothing could be ſaid more for my vindication: and before you come to the bottom of it, you labour to perſuade the world, that I have need to vindicate myſelf. Another poſſibly, who could find in his heart to ſay two ſuch things, would have taken care, they ſhould not have ſtood in the ſame page, where the juxta-poſition might enlighten them too much, and ſurprize the ſight. But, poſſibly, your Lordſhip is ſo well ſatisfied of the world's readineſs to believe your profeſſions of good-will to me, as a mark whereof you tell me here of your willingneſs "to allow me all reaſonable occaſions to vindicate myſelf;" that no body can ſee any thing, but kindneſs, in whatever you ſay, tho' it appears in ſo different ſhapes. Anſw. 1. p. 36. P. 16.

Ibid. In the following words, your Lordſhip accuſes me of too nice a piece of criticiſm; and tells me it looks like chicaning. Anſw. I did not expect, in a controverſy, begun and managed as this, which your Lordſhip has been pleaſed to have with me, to be accuſed of chicaning, without great provocation; beauſe the mentioning that word might perhaps raiſe in the reader's mind ſome odd thoughts, which were better ſpared. But this accuſation made me look back into the places you quoted in the margent, and there find the matter to ſtand thus:

To a pretty large quotation, ſet down out of the poſtſcript to my firſt letter, Anſw. 1. p. 37.
you ſubjoin; "Which words ſeem to expreſs ſo much of a Chriſtian ſpirit and "temper, that your Lordſhip cannot believe I intended to give any advantage to "the enemies of the Chriſtian faith; but whether there hath not been too juſt "occaſion for them, to apply them in that manner, is a thing very fit for me "to conſider."

In my anſwer I take notice, that the term, them, in this of your Lordſhip's, Lett. 2. p. 45.
can, in the ordinary conſtruction of our language, be applied to nothing, but which words, in the beginning of that paſſage, i. e. to my words immediately preceding. This your Lordſhip calls chicaning; and gives this reaſon for it, viz. P. 17.
"Becauſe any one that reads, without a deſign to cavil, would eaſily interpret "them, of my words, and notions, about which the debate was." Anſw. That any one that reads that paſſage with, or without, deſign to cavil, could hardly make it intelligible, without interpreting them ſo, I readily grant; but that it is eaſy for me, or any body, to interpret any one's meaning, contrary to the neceſſary conſtruction, and plain import of the words, that I crave leave to deny. I am ſure it is not chicaning, to preſume, that ſo great an author, as your Lordſhip, writes according to the rules of grammar, and, as another man writes, who underſtands our language, and would be underſtood: to do the contrary, would be a preſumption, liable to blame, and might deſerve the name of chicaning and cavil. And that, in this caſe, it was not eaſy to avoid interpreting the term, them, as I did, the reaſon, you give, why I ſhould have done it, is a farther proof. Your Lordſhip, to ſhew it was eaſy, ſays, "the poſtſcript comes in, but as a parentheſis:" now I challenge any one living, to ſhew me where, in that place, the parentheſis muſt begin, and where end, which can make, them, applicable to any thing, but the words of my poſtſcript. I have tried, with more care and pains, than is uſually required of a reader, in ſuch caſes, and cannot, I muſt own, find where to make a breach in the thread of your diſcourſe, with the imaginary parentheſis, which your Lordſhip mentions, and was not, I ſuppoſe, omitted by the printer for want of marks to print it. And if this, which you gave as the key, that opens to the interpretation, that I ſhould have made, be ſo hard to be found, the interpretation itſelf could not be ſo very eaſy, as you ſpeak of.

But to avoid all blame, for underſtanding that paſſage as I did, and to ſecure myſelf, from being ſuſpected to ſeek ſubterfuge, in the natural import of your words, againſt what might be conjectured to be your ſenſe, I added; "but if by Lett. 2. p. 45.
"any new way of conſtruction, unintelligible to me, the word, them, here, ſhall "be applied to any paſſages of my Eſſay of Human Underſtanding, I muſt humbly crave leave to obſerve this one thing, in the whole courſe of what your "Lordſhip has deſigned for my ſatisfaction, that tho' my complaint be of your "Lordſhip's manner of applying, what I had publiſhed in my Eſſay, ſo as to "intereſt me in a controverſy, wherein I meddled not; yet your Lordſhip all "along tells me of others, that have miſapplied, I know not what words, in "my book, after I know not what manner. Now as to this matter, I beſeech "your Lordſhip to believe that, when any one, in ſuch a manner applies my "words, contrary to what I intended them, ſo as to make them oppoſite to the "doctrine of the Trinity, and me a party in that controverſy, againſt the Trinity, "as your Lordſhip knows, I complain your Lordſhip has done; I ſhall complain "of them too, and conſider, as well as I can, what ſatisfaction they give me and "others in it." This paſſage of mine your Lordſhip here repreſents thus, viz. that I ſay, that if by an unintelligible new way of conſtruction, the word, them, P. 17.
be applied to any paſſages in my book, what then? Why then, whoever they are, I intended to complain of them too. But, ſays your Lordſhip, the words, juſt before, tell me, who they are, viz. The enemies of the Chriſtian faith. And then your Lordſhip aſks, whether this be all that I intend, viz. only to complain of them, for making me a party in the controverſy againſt the Trinity.

My Lord, were I given to chicaning, as you call my being ſtopt by faults of grammar, that diſturb the ſenſe, and make the diſcourſe incoherent and unintelligible, if we are to take it from the words as they are, I ſhould not want matter enough for ſuch an exerciſe of my pen: as for example, here again, where your Lordſhip makes me ſay, that if the word, them, be applied to any paſſages in my book, then whoever they are, I intend to complain, &c. theſe being ſet down for my words, I would be very glad to be able to put them into a grammatical conſtruction, and make to myſelf an intelligible ſenſe of them. But they, being not a word, that I have an abſolute power over, to place where, and for what, I will, I confeſs I cannot do it. For the term, they, in the words here, as your Lordſhip has ſet them down, having nothing that it can refer to, but paſſages, or them, which ſtand for words, it muſt be a very ſudden metamorphoſis, that muſt change them into perſons, for it is for perſons, that the word they, ſtands here; and yet I crave leave to ſay, that as far as I underſtand Engliſh, they, is a word cannot be uſed, without reference to ſomething mentioned before. Your Lordſhip tells me, "the words, juſt before, tell me, who they are." The words juſt mentioned before are theſe; "if, by an unintelligible new way "of conſtruction, the word them, be applied to any paſſage of my book:" for it is to ſome words, before indeed, but before in the ſame contexture of diſcourſe, that the word, they, muſt refer, to make it any where intelligible. But here are no perſons, mentioned in the words, juſt before, tho' your Lordſhip tells me, the words, juſt before, ſhew who they are; but this, juſt before, where the perſons, are mentioned whom your Lordſhip intends by, they, here, is ſo far off, that ſixteen pages of your Lordſhip's ſecond letter, one hundred and ſeventy four pages of my ſecond letter, and above one hundred pages of your Lordſhip's firſt letter, come between: ſo that one muſt read above two hundred and eighty pages from the enemies of the Chriſtian faith, in the 37th page of your firſt letter, before one can come to the, they, which refers to them here, in the 37th page of your Lordſhip's ſecond letter. P. 17.

My Lord, it is my misfortune that I cannot pretend to any figure, amongſt the men of learning; but I would not, for that reaſon, be rendered ſo deſpicable, that I could not write ordinary ſenſe, in my own language: I muſt beg leave, therefore, to inform my reader, that what your Lordſhip has ſet down here, as mine, is neither my words, nor my ſenſe. For,

1. I say not, "if, by any unintelligible new way of conſtruction;" but I ſay, "if by any new way of conſtruction, unintelligible to me:" which are far different expreſſions. For that may be very intelligible to others, which may be unintelligible to me. And indeed, my Lord, there are ſo many paſſages in your writing, in this controverſy with me, which, for their conſtruction, as well as otherwiſe, are ſo unintelligible to me, that if I ſhould be ſo unmannerly, as to meaſure your underſtanding by mine, I ſhould not know what to think of them. In thoſe caſes, therefore, I preſume not to go beyond my own capacity: I tell your Lordſhip often (which, I hope, modeſty will permit) what my weak underſtanding will not reach; but I am far from ſaying it is, therefore, abſolutely unintelligible. I leave to others the benefit of their better judgments, to be enlightened by your Lordſhip, where I am not.

2. The uſe your Lordſhip here makes of theſe words, "but if, by any new "way of conſtruction, unintelligible to me, the word, them, be applied to any "paſſages in my book:" is not the principal, nor the only (as your Lordſhip makes it) uſe, for which I ſaid them: but this; that if your Lordſhip, by them, in that place, were to be underſtood to mean, that there were others, that miſapplied paſſages of my book; this was no ſatisfaction for what your Lordſhip had done, in that kind. Tho' this, I obſerved, was your way of defence; that when I complained, of what your Lordſhip had done, you told me, that others had done ſo too; as if that could be any manner of ſatisfaction. I added, in the cloſe, "that, when any one, in ſuch a manner, applies my words contrary to what I "intended them, ſo as to make them oppoſite to the doctrine of the Trinity, "and me a party, in that controverſy, againſt the Trinity, as your Lordſhip "knows, I complain your Lordſhip has done; I ſhall complain of them too, Lett. 2. P. 46.

and conſider, as well as I can, what ſatisfaction they give me, and others, in it." Of this, any one of mine, your Lordſhip makes your fore-mentioned they, whether, with any advantage of ſenſe, or clearneſs to my words, the reader muſt judge. However, this latter part of that paſſage, with the particular turn, your Lordſhip gives to it, is what your words would perſuade your reader, is all that I ſay here: Would not your Lordſhip, upon ſuch an occaſion from me, cry out again, "is this fair and ingenuous dealing?" And would not you think, you had reaſon to do ſo? But let us ſee what we muſt gueſs, your Lordſhip makes me ſay, and your exceptions to it.

YOUR Lordſhip makes me ſay, "whoever they are, who miſapply my words, "as I complain your Lordſhip has done (for theſe words muſt be ſupplied, to make the ſentence to me intelligible) "I intend to complain of them too:" And then you find fault with me, for the uſing the indefinite word, whoever; and, as a reproof for the unreaſonableneſs of it, you ſay, "but the words, juſt before, "tell me, who they are." But my words are not, "whoever they are," but my words are, "when any one, in ſuch a manner, applies my words, contrary to what "I intended them, &c." Your Lordſhip would here have me underſtand, that there are thoſe, that have done it, and rebukes me that I ſpeak, as if I knew not any one that had done it; and that I may not plead ignorance, you ſay, "your "words, juſt before, told me, who they were, viz. the enemies of the chriſtian "faith."

WHAT muſt I do now to keep my word, and ſatisfy your Lordſhip? Muſt I complain of the enemies of the chriſtian faith, in general, that they have applied my words as aforeſaid; and then conſider, as well as I can, what ſatisfaction they give me and others in it? For that was all I promiſed to do. But this would be ſtrange, to complain of the enemies of the chriſtian faith, for doing what, it is very likely they never all did, and what I do not know that any one of them has done. Or muſt I, to content your Lordſhip, read over all the writings of the enemies of the chriſtian faith, to ſee whether any one of them has applied my words, i. e. in ſuch a manner, as I complained, your Lordſhip has done, that if they have, I may complain of them too? This truly, my Lord, is more than I have time for; and if it were worth while, when it is done, I perceive I ſhould not content your Lordſhip in it; for you aſk me here, "is this all I intend, only "to complain of them for making me a party in the controverſy againſt the Tri- "nity?" No, my Lord, this is not all. I promiſed too, "to conſider as well "as I can, what ſatisfaction (if they offer any) they give me and others, for ſo "doing." And why ſhould not this content your Lordſhip, in reference to others, as well as it does in reference to yourſelf? I have but one meaſure for your Lordſhip and others. When others treat me, after the manner you have done, why ſhould it not be enough to anſwer them, after the ſame manner I have done your Lordſhip? But perhaps your Lordſhip has ſome dextrous meaning under this, which I am not quick-ſighted enough to perceive, and ſo do not reply right, as you would have me.

I MUST beg my reader's pardon, as well as your Lordſhip's, for uſing ſo many words, about paſſages, that ſeem not in themſelves of that importance. I confeſs, that in themſelves they are not; but yet it is my misfortune, that, in this controverſy, your way of writing, and repreſenting my ſenſe, forces me to it.

YOUR Lordſhip's name in writing is eſtabliſhed, above controul; and, therefore, it would be ill-breeding in one, who barely reads what you write, not to take every thing for perfect in its kind, which your Lordſhip ſays. Clearneſs, and force, and conſiſtence, are to be preſumed always, whatever your Lordſhip's words be: And there is no other remedy for an anſwerer, who finds it difficult, any where, to come at your meaning, or argument, but to make his excuſe for it, in laying the particulars before the reader, that he may be judge, where the fault lies; eſpecially where any matter of fact is conteſted, deductions from the firſt riſe are often neceſſary, which cannot be made in few words, nor without ſeveral repetitions: an inconvenience, poſſibly, fitter to be endured, than that your Lordſhip, in the run of your learned notions, ſhould be ſhackled with the ordinary and ſtrict rules of language; and, in the delivery of your ſublimer ſpeculations, be tied down to the mean and contemptible rudiments of grammar; tho'

tho' your being above theſe, and freed from a ſervile obſervance, in the uſe of trivial particles, whereon the connexion of diſcourſe chiefly depends, cannot but cauſe great difficulties to the reader. And, however it may be an eaſe to any great man, to find himſelf above the ordinary rules of writing, he, who is bound to follow the connexion, and find out his meaning, will have his taſk much increaſed by it.

I AM very ſenſible, how much this has ſwelled theſe papers already, and yet I do not ſee how any thing leſs, than what I have ſaid, could clear thoſe paſſages, which we have hitherto examined, and ſet them in their due light.

P. 17. YOUR next words are theſe, “ but whether I have not made myſelf too much “ a party in it [i. e. the controverſy againſt the Trinity] will appear before we “ have done.” This is an item, for me, which your Lordſhip ſeems ſo very fond of, and ſo careful to inculcate, wherever you bring in any words, it can be tacked to, that, if one can avoid thinking it to be the main end of your writing, one cannot yet but ſee, that it could not be ſo much in the thoughts and words of a great man, who is above ſuch perſonal matters, and which he knows the world ſoon grows weary of, unleſs it had ſome very particular buſineſs there. Whether it be the author that has prejudiced you againſt his book, or the book prejudiced you againſt the author, ſo it is. I perceive, that both I and my Eſſay are fallen under your diſpleaſure.

I AM not unacquainted what great ſtreſs is often laid upon inviduous names, by ſkilful diſputants, to ſupply the want of better arguments. But give me leave, my Lord, to ſay, that it is too late for me now to begin to value thoſe marks of good will, or a good cauſe; and therefore, I ſhall ſay nothing more to them, as fitter to be left to the examination of the thoughts, within your own breaſt, from what ſource ſuch reaſonings ſpring, and whither they tend.

I AM going, my Lord, to a tribunal, that has a right to judge of thoughts, and being ſecure, that I there ſhall be found of no party, but that of truth (for which there is required nothing, but the receiving truth in the love of it) I matter not much, of what party any one ſhall, as may beſt ſerve his turn, denominate me here. Your Lordſhip's is not the firſt pen, from which I have received ſuch ſtrokes as theſe, without any great harm; I never found freedom of ſtile did me any hurt with thoſe, who knew me, and if thoſe, who know me not, will take up borrowed prejudices, it will be more to their own harm than mine: ſo that in this, I ſhall give your Lordſhip little other trouble, but my thanks ſometimes, where I find you ſkilfully and induſtriouſly recommending me to the world, under the character, you have choſen for me. Only give me leave to ſay, that if the Eſſay, I ſhall leave behind me, hath no other fault to ſink it, but hereſy, and inconſiſtency with the articles of the chriſtian faith, I am apt to think it will laſt in the world, and do ſervice to truth, even the truths of religion, notwithſtanding that imputation laid on it, by ſo mighty a hand as your Lordſhip's.

IN your two next paragraphs, your Lordſhip accuſes me of cavilling, in the 43d and 44th pages of my ſecond letter, whither, for ſhortneſs, I refer my reader. P. 18, 19. I ſhall only add, that, tho' in the debate about myſteries of faith, your adverſaries, as you ſay, are not heathens; yet any one among us, whom your Lordſhip ſhould ſpeak of, as not owning the ſcripture to be the foundation and rule of faith, would, I preſume, be thought to receive from you a character, very little different, from that of a heathen. Which being a part of your compliment to me, will, I humbly conceive, excuſe what I there ſaid, from being a cavilling exception.

HITHERTO your Lordſhip, notwithſtanding that you underſtood the world ſo well, has employed your pen in perſonal matters, how unacceptable ſoever to the world, you declare it to be: how muſt I behave myſelf in the caſe? If I anſwer nothing, my ſilence is ſo apt to be interpreted guilt, or conceſſion, that even the defering my anſwer to ſome points, or not giving it in the proper place, is reflected on, as no ſmall tranſgreſſion, whereof there are two examples in the two following pages. And if I do anſwer ſo at large, as your way of writing requires, and as the matter deſerves, I recal to your memory “ the ſprings of Modena, P. 20, 21. “ by the ebullition of my thoughts.” It is hard, my Lord, between theſe two, to manage one's ſelf to your good liking: however, I ſhall endeavour to collect the force of your reaſonings, wherever I can find it, as ſhort as I can, and apply my anſwers to that, tho' with the omiſſion of a great many incidents, deſerving to be taken notice of: if my ſlowneſs, not able to keep pace, every where, with your uncommon flights, ſhall have miſt any argument whereon you lay any ſtreſs, if you pleaſe to point it out to me, I ſhall not fail to endeavour to give you ſatisfaction therein.

In the next paragraph your Lordſhip ſays, "thoſe, who are not ſparing of writing, about articles of faith; and, among them, take great care to avoid "ſome, which have been always eſteemed fundamental," &c. This ſeems alſo to contain ſomething perſonal in it: but how far I am concerned in it, I ſhall know, when you ſhall be pleaſed to tell me, who thoſe are, and then it will be time enough for me to anſwer. P. 19.

This is what your Lordſhip has brought in, under your ſecond anſwer, in theſe four pages, as a defence of it; and how much of it is a defence of that ſecond anſwer, let the reader judge.

I am now come to the third of thoſe anſwers, which you ſaid, p. 7. you would lay together and defend. And it is this: P. 20.

"That my grounds of certainty tend to ſcepticiſm, and that, in an age, where-"in the myſteries of faith are too much expoſed, by the promoters of ſcepticiſm "and infidelity; it is a thing of dangerous conſequence, to ſtart ſuch new me-"thods of certainty, as are apt to leave men's minds more doubtful than be-"fore."

This is what you ſet down here, to be defended: the defence follows, wherein your Lordſhip tells me, that I ſay, "theſe words contain a farther accuſation "of my book, which ſhall be conſidered in its due place. But this is the pro-"per place of conſidering it: for your Lordſhip ſaid, that hereby I have given "too juſt occaſion, to the enemies of the chriſtian faith, to make uſe of my words "and notions, as was evidently proved from my own conceſſions. And if this "be ſo, however you were willing to have had me explain myſelf, to the gene-"ral ſatisfaction; yet, ſince I decline it, you do inſiſt upon it, that I cannot "clear myſelf from laying that foundation, which the author of Chriſtianity not "myſterious built upon."

In which I crave leave to acquaint your Lordſhip, with what I do not underſtand.

First, I do not underſtand what is meant, by "this is the proper place;" for, in ordinary conſtruction, theſe words ſeem to denote this 20th page of your Lordſhip's ſecond letter, which you were then writing, tho' the ſenſe would make me think the 46th page of my ſecond letter, which you were then anſwering, ſhould be meant. This, perhaps, your Lordſhip may think a nice piece of criticiſm; but until it be cleared, I cannot tell what to ſay in my excuſe. For it is likely your Lordſhip would again aſk me, whether I could think you a man of ſo little ſenſe, if I ſhould underſtand theſe words, to mean the 20th page of your ſecond letter, which no-body can conceive, your Lordſhip ſhould think a proper place for me, to conſider, and anſwer, what you had writ in your firſt? It would be as hard to underſtand, this is, to mean a place in my former letter, which was paſt and done; but it is no wonder for me to be miſtaken in your privilege-word, this. Beſides there is this farther difficulty to underſtand, "this is "the proper place," of the 46th page of my former letter; becauſe I do not ſee, why the 82d page of that letter, where I did conſider and anſwer it, was not as proper a place of conſidering it, as the 46th, where I give a reaſon why I defend it. Farther, if I underſtood what you meant here, by "this is the proper "place," I ſhould, poſſibly, apprehend better the force of your argument, ſubjoined to prove this, whatever it be, to be the proper place; the cauſal particle, for, which introduces the following words, making them a reaſon of thoſe preceding. But, in the preſent obſcurity of this matter, I confeſs I do not ſee how your having ſaid, "that I gave occaſion to the enemies of the chriſtian faith," &c. proves any thing concerning the proper place at all.

Another thing, that I do not underſtand in this defence, is your inference, in the next period, where you tell me, "if this be ſo, you inſiſt upon it, that I "ſhould clear myſelf;" for I do not ſee, how your having ſaid, what you there ſaid (for that is it which, this, here, if it be not within privilege, muſt ſignify) can be a reaſon, for your inſiſting on my clearing myſelf of any thing, tho' I allow this to be your Lordſhip's ordinary way of proceeding, to inſiſt upon your ſuggeſtions and ſuppoſitions, in one place, as if they were foundations to build what you pleaſed on, in another.

Thus, then, ſtands your defence: "my grounds of certainty tend to ſcepti-"ciſm; and to ſtart new methods of certainty is of dangerous conſequence." Becauſe I did not conſider this your accuſation, in the proper place of conſidering it, this is the proper place of conſidering it: becauſe your Lordſhip ſaid, "I "had given too juſt occaſion, to the enemies of the chriſtian faith, to make uſe "of my words and notions;" and becauſe your Lordſhip ſaid ſo, therefore you inſiſt upon it, that I clear myſelf, &c. This appears to me to be the connexion and force of your defence hitherto; if I am miſtaken in it, your Lordſhip's words are ſet down, the reader muſt judge whether the conſtruction of the words do not make it ſo.

But, before I leave them, there are ſome things, that I crave permiſſion to repreſent to your Lordſhip, more particularly.

1. That to the accuſation of ſcepticiſm, I have anſwered in another, and, as I think, a proper place.

2. That the accuſation of dangerous conſequence, I have conſidered and anſwered in my former letter; but that being, it ſeems, not the proper place of conſidering it, you have not, in this your defence, thought fit to take any notice of it. Lett. 2. p. 82---95. 109.

3. That your Lordſhip has not any where proved, that my placing of certainty in the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of ideas, is apt to leave men's minds more doubtful, than they were before; which is what your accuſation ſuppoſes.

4. That you ſet down thoſe words of mine, "theſe words contain a farther "accuſation of my book, which ſhall be conſidered in its due place;" as all the anſwer, which I gave to that new accuſation, except what you take notice of, out of my 95th page; and take no notice of what I ſay from page 82 to 95; where I conſidered it, as I promiſed, and, as I thought, fully anſwered it.

5. That the too juſt occaſion, you ſay, I have given to the enemies of the "chriſtian faith, to make uſe of my words and notions," wants to be proved.

6. That "what uſe the enemies of the chriſtian faith have made of my words "and notions," is no where ſhewn, tho' often talked of.

Lett. 2 p. 69, 85. 7. That "if the enemies of the chriſtian faith have made uſe of my words "and notions," yet that, as I have ſhewn, is no proof, that they are of dangerous conſequence; much leſs is it a proof, that this propoſition, "certainty con-"ſiſts in the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of ideas," is of dangerous conſequence. For ſome words, or notions, in a book, that are of dangerous conſequence, do not make all the propoſitions of that book to be of dangerous conſequence.

8. That your Lordſhip tells me, "you were willing to have had me explained "myſelf to the general ſatisfaction;" which is what, in the place, from which the former words are taken, you expreſſed thus: that "my anſwer did not come "fully up in all things, to that, which you could wiſh." To which I have given an anſwer; and methinks your defence here ſhould have been applied to that, and not the ſame thing (which has been anſwered) ſet down again as part of your defence. But pray, my Lord, give me leave to aſk, is not this meant for a perſonal matter? which tho' the world, as you ſay, is ſoon weary of, your Lordſhip, it ſeems, is not. Anſw. 1. p. 37. Lett. 2. p. 38---41.

9. That you ſay, "you inſiſt upon it, that I cannot clear myſelf from "laying that foundation, which the author of Chriſtianity not myſterious built "upon." Certainly this perſonal matter is of ſome very great conſequence, that your Lordſhip, who underſtands the world ſo well, inſiſts ſo much upon it.

But if it be true, that he built upon my foundation, and it be of ſuch moment to your Lordſhip's buſineſs, in the preſent controverſy, methinks, without ſo much intricacy, it ſhould not be hard to ſhew it: it is but proving, what foundation of certainty (for it is of that, all this diſpute is) he went upon, which, as I humbly conceive, your Lordſhip has not done; and then ſhewing that to be my foundation of certainty; and the buſineſs is ended. But inſtead of this, your Lordſhip ſays, that "his account of reaſon ſuppoſes clear and diſtinct ideas, neceſſary to certainty; Vind. p. 232. that he imagined he built upon my grounds; that he "thought his and my notions of certainty to be the ſame; Anſw. 1. that there has been "too juſt occaſion given, p. 36. for the enemies of the Chriſtian faith, to apply my "words, in I know not what manner." Ibid. p. 37. Theſe, and the like arguments, to prove that he goes upon my grounds, your Lordſhip has uſed; but they are, I confeſs, too ſubtle and too fine for me, to feel the force of them, in a matter of fact, (wherein it was ſo eaſy to produce both his and my grounds, out of our books without all this talk, about ſuppoſitions, and imaginations, and occaſions, ſo far remote from any direct proof) if it were a matter of that conſequence, to be ſo inſiſted upon, as your Lordſhip profeſſedly does.

Your Lordſhip has ſpent a great many pages to tie me to that author; and "you ſtill inſiſt upon it, that I cannot clear myſelf, from laying that foundation, "which the author of Chriſtianity not myſterious built upon." What this great concern, in a matter of ſo little moment, means, I leave the reader to gueſs: for, I beſeech your Lordſhip, of what great conſequence is it to the world? What great intereſt has any truth of religion in this, that I and another man (be he who he will) make uſe of the ſame grounds, to different purpoſes? This I am ſure, it tends not to the clearing, or confirming, any one material truth in the world. If the foundation I have laid be true, I ſhall neither diſown, nor diſlike it, whatever this, or any other author ſhall build upon it; becauſe, as your Lordſhip knows, ill things may be built upon a good foundation, and yet the foundation never the worſe for it. And therefore, if that, or any other author hath built upon my foundation, I ſee nothing in it, that I ought to be concerned to clear myſelf from.

If you can ſhew that my foundation is falſe, or ſhew me a better foundation of certainty, than mine, I promiſe you immediately to renounce and relinquiſh mine, with thanks to your Lordſhip: but till you can prove, that he that firſt invented ſyllogiſm, as a rule of right reaſoning, or firſt laid down this principle, "that it is impoſſible for the ſame thing to be and not to be," is anſwerable for all thoſe opinions, which have endeavoured to be proved, by mode and figure, or have been built upon that maxim; I ſhall not think myſelf concerned, whatever any one ſhall build upon this foundation of mine, that certainty conſiſts in the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of any two ideas, as they are expreſſed in any propoſition: much leſs ſhall I think myſelf concerned, for what you ſhall pleaſe to ſuppoſe (for that, with ſubmiſſion, is all, you have done hitherto) any one has built upon it, tho' he were never ſo oppoſite to your Lordſhip, in any of the opinions, he ſhould build on it.

In that caſe, if he ſhould prove troubleſome to your Lordſhip, with any argument, pretended to be built upon my foundation, I humbly conceive, you have no other remedy, but to ſhew either the foundation falſe, and in that caſe I confeſs myſelf concerned; or his deductions from it wrong, and that I ſhall not be at all concerned in. But if, inſtead of this, your Lordſhip ſhall find no other way, to ſubvert this foundation of certainty, but by ſaying, "the enemies of the Chriſtian faith build on it," becauſe you ſuppoſe one author builds on it; this, I fear, my Lord, will very little advantage the cauſe you defend, whilſt it ſo viſibly ſtrengthens and gives credit to your adverſaries, rather than weakens any foundation, they go upon. For the Unitarians, I imagine, will be apt to ſmile at ſuch a way of arguing, viz. that they go on this ground, becauſe the author of Chriſtianity not myſterious goes upon it, or is ſuppoſed by your Lordſhip to go upon it: and by-ſtanders will do little leſs than ſmile, to find my book brought into the Socinian controverſy, and the ground of certainty, laid down in my Eſſay, condemned, only becauſe that author is ſuppoſed by your Lordſhip to build upon it. For this, in ſhort, is the caſe, and this the way your Lordſhip has uſed, in anſwering objections againſt the Trinity, in point of reaſon. I know your Lordſhip cannot be ſuſpected of writing booty: but I fear ſuch a way of arguing, in ſo great a man as your Lordſhip, will, "in an age, wherein the myſteries of faith are too " much expoſed, give too juſt an occaſion to the enemies," and alſo to the friends, of the Chriſtian faith, to ſuſpect that there is a great failure ſomewhere.

BUT to paſs by that: this I am ſure is perſonal matter, which the world, perhaps, will think it need not have been troubled with.

P. 20. 21.

YOUR defence of your third anſwer goes on; and to prove that the author of Chriſtianity not myſterious built upon my foundation, you tell me, that my ground of certainty is the agreement, or diſagreement, of ideas, as expreſſed in any propoſitions; which are my own words. "From hence you urged, that " let the propoſition come to us any way, either by human, or divine authority, " if our certainty depend upon this, we can be no more certain, than we have " clear perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of ideas contained in it. " And from hence the author of Chriſtianity not myſterious thought he had " reaſon to reject all myſteries of faith, which are contained in propoſitions; upon " my grounds of certainty."

SINCE this perſonal matter appears of ſuch weight to your Lordſhip, that it needs to be farther proſecuted; and you think this your argument, to prove that that author built upon my foundation, worth the repeating here again; I am obliged to enter again ſo far, into this perſonal matter, as to examine this paſſage, which I formerly paſſed by, as of no moment. For it is eaſy to ſhew, that what you ſay, viſibly proves not, that he built upon my foundation: and next, it is evident, that if it were proved that he did ſo; yet this is no proof, that my method of certainty is of dangerous conſequence; which is what was to be defended.

As to the firſt of theſe, your Lordſhip would prove, that the author of Chriſtianity not myſterious built upon my ground; and how do you prove it? viz. " becauſe he thought he had reaſon to reject all myſteries of faith, which are con- " tained in propoſitions, upon my ground." How does it appear, that he rejected them upon my grounds? Does he any where ſay ſo? No! that is not offered: there is no need of ſuch an evidence of matter of fact, in a caſe, which is only of matter of fact. But "he thought he had reaſon to reject them, upon " my grounds of certainty." How does it appear that he thought ſo? Very plainly: becauſe, " let the propoſition come to us by human, or divine authori- " ty, if our certainty depend upon the perception of the agreement, or diſagree- " ment, of the ideas contained in it, we can be no more certain, than we have " clear perception of that agreement." The conſequence, I grant, is good, that if certainty, i. e. knowledge, conſiſts in the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of ideas, then we can certainly know the truth of no propoſition further, than we perceive that agreement, or diſagreement. But how does it follow from thence, that he thought he had reaſon, upon my grounds, to reject any propoſition, that contained a myſtery of faith; or, as your Lordſhip expreſſes it, " all myſteries of faith which are contained in propoſitions?"

WHETHER your Lordſhip, by the word rejecting, accuſes him of not knowing, or of not believing, ſome propoſition, that contains an article of faith; or what he has done, or not done, I concern not myſelf: that, which I deny, is the conſequence above-mentioned, which I ſubmit to your Lordſhip to be proved. And when you have proved it, and ſhewn yourſelf to be ſo familiar with the thoughts of that author, as to be able to be poſitive, what he thought, without his telling you; it will remain farther to be proved, that, becauſe he thought ſo, therefore he built right, upon my foundation; for otherwiſe no prejudice will come to my foundation, by any ill uſe he made of it; nor will it be made good, that my method, or way of certainty, is of dangerous conſequence; which is what your Lordſhip is here to defend. Methinks your Lordſhip's argument here is all one with this: Ariſtotle's ground of certainty (except of firſt principles) lies in this, that thoſe things, which agree in a third, agree themſelves; we can be certain of no propoſition (excepting firſt principles) coming to us either by divine, or human, authority, if our certainty depend upon this, farther than there is ſuch an agreement: therefore the author of Chriſtianity not myſterious thought he had reaſon to reject all myſteries of faith, which are contained in propoſitions, upon Ariſtotle's grounds. This conſequence, as ſtrange as it is, is juſt the ſame with what is in your Lordſhip's repeated argument againſt me: for let Ariſtotle's ground of certainty be this, that, I have named, or what it will, how does it follow, that, becauſe my ground of certainty is placed in the agreement, or diſagreement, of ideas, therefore the author of Chriſtianity not myſterious rejected any propoſition more, upon my grounds, than Ariſtotle's? And will not Ariſtotle, by your Lordſhip's way of arguing here, from the uſe any one may make, or think, he makes of it, be guilty alſo of ſtarting a method of certainty, of dangerous conſequence, whether this method be true or falſe, if that, or any other author, whoſe writings you diſlike, thought he built upon it, or be ſuppoſed by your Lordſhip to think ſo? But, as I humbly conceive, propoſitions, ſpeculative propoſitions, ſuch as mine are, about which all this ſtir is made, are to be judged of, by their truth, or falſhood, and not by the uſe, any one ſhall make of them; much leſs by the perſons, who are ſuppoſed to build on them: and, therefore, it may be juſtly wondered ſince you ſay, it is dangerous, why you never proved, or attempted to prove it, to be falſe.

But you complain here again, that I anſwered not a word to this, in the proper place. My Lord, if I offended your Lordſhip by paſſing it by, becauſe I thought there was no argument in it; I hope I have now given you ſome ſort of ſatiſfaction, by ſhewing there is no argument in it, and letting you ſee, that your conſequence, here, could not be inferred from your antecedent. If you think it may, I deſire you to try it in a ſyllogiſm. For, whatever you are pleaſed to ſay, in another place, my way of certainty by ideas will admit of antecedents and conſequents, and of ſyllogiſm, as the proper form, to try whether the inference be right, or no. I ſhall ſet down your following words, that the reader may ſee your Lordſhip's manner of reaſoning, concerning this matter, in its full force and conſiſtency, and try it in a ſyllogiſm, if he pleaſes. Your words are: P. 120.

"By this it evidently appears, that altho' your Lordſhip was willing to allow me all fair ways of interpreting my own ſenſe; yet you by no means thought, that my words were wholly miſunderſtood, or miſapplied, by that author; but rather that he ſaw into the true conſequence of them, as they lie in my book." And what anſwer do I give to this? "Not a word, in proper place for it." P. 21.

You tell me, "you were willing to allow me all fair ways of interpreting my own ſenſe." If your Lordſhip had been conſcious to yourſelf, that you had herein meant me any kindneſs, I think, I may preſume, you would not have minded me here again, of a favour, which you had told me of, but in the preceding page, and, to make it an obligation, need not have been more than once talked of; unleſs your Lordſhip thought the obligation was ſuch, that it would hardly be ſeen, unleſs I were told of it, in words at length, and in more places than one. For what favour, I beſeech you, my Lord, is it to allow me to do that, which needed not your allowance to be done, and I could have done (if it had been neceſſary) of myſelf, without being blamed for taking that liberty? Whatſoever, therefore, your meaning was, in theſe words, I cannot think you took this way, to make me ſenſible of your kindneſs.

Your Lordſhip ſays, "you were willing to allow me to interpret my own ſenſe." What you were willing to allow me to do, I have done. My ſenſe is, that certainty conſiſts in the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of ideas; and my ſenſe therein, I have interpreted to be the agreement, or diſagreement, not only of perfectly clear and diſtinct ideas, but ſuch ideas, as we have, whether they be, in all their parts, perfectly clear and diſtinct, or no. Farther, in anſwer to your objection, that it might be of dangerous conſequence, I ſo explained my ſenſe, as to ſhew, that certainty, in that ſenſe, was not, nor could be of dangerous conſequence. This, which was the point in queſtion between us, your Lordſhip might have found at large explained in the 82d, and ten, or twelve following pages of my ſecond letter, if you had been pleaſed to have taken notice of them.

BUT it ſeems you were more willing to tell me "that tho' you were willing "to allow me all ways of interpreting my own ſenſe, yet you by no means thought "that my words were wholly miſunderſtood, or miſapplied by that author, but "rather that he ſaw into the true conſequence of them, as they lie in my book." Anſw. 1. p. 35. I ſhall here ſet down your Lordſhip's words, where (to give me and others ſatiſfaction) you ſay, "you took care to prevent being miſunderſtood, which will "beſt appear, by your own words, viz. that you muſt do that right to the ingenious author of the Eſſay of Human Underſtanding, from whom theſe notions are borrowed, to ſerve other purpoſes than he intended them. It was "too plain, that the bold writer againſt the myſteries of our faith took his notions and expreſſions from thence; and what could be ſaid more for my Vindication, than that he turned them to other purpoſes than the author intended them?" Anſw. 1. p. 46. This you endeavour to prove, p. 43——46. and then conclude; "by which it is ſufficiently proved, that you had reaſon to ſay, that my notion "was carried beyond my intention." Theſe words, out of your firſt letter, I ſhall leave here, ſet by thoſe out of your ſecond, that you may, at your leiſure, if you think fit (for it will not become me to tell your Lordſhip that I am willing to allow it) explain yourſelf to the general ſatisfaction, that it may be known which of them is now your ſenſe; for they are, I ſuppoſe, too much to be together, in any one's ſenſe, at the ſame time.

Anſw. 1. p. 36. MY intention being thus ſo well vindicated by your Lordſhip, that you think nothing could be ſaid more for my Vindication; the miſunderſtanding, or not miſunderſtanding, of my book, by that, or any other author, is what I ſhall not waſte my time about. If your Lordſhip thinks, he ſaw into the true conſequence of this poſition of mine, that certainty conſiſts in the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of ideas (for it is from the inference, that you ſuppoſe he makes, from that my definition of knowledge, that you are here proving it to be of dangerous conſequence) he is beholden to your Lordſhip for your good opinion of his quick ſight: I take no part in that, one way or other. What conſequences your Lordſhip's quick ſight (which muſt be allowed to have outdone, what you ſuppoſe of that gentleman's) has found and charged on that notion as dangerous, I ſhall endeavour to give you ſatisfaction in.

YOU farther add, that "tho' I anſwered not a word, in the proper place, yet "afterwards, lett. 2. p. 95. (for you would omit nothing, that may ſeem to "help my cauſe) I offer ſomething towards an anſwer."

P. 21. I SHALL be at a loſs hereafter, what to do with the 82d, and following pages, to the 95th; ſince what is ſaid, in thoſe pages of my ſecond letter, goes for nothing, becauſe it is not in its proper place. Though, if any one will give himſelf the trouble to look into my ſecond letter, he will find, that the argument I was upon, in the 46th page, obliged me to defer what I had farther to ſay to your new accuſation: but that I re-aſſumed it in the 82d, and anſwered it in that and the following pages.

BUT ſuppoſing every writer had not that exactneſs of method, which ſhewed, by the natural and viſible connexion of the parts of his diſcourſe, that every thing was laid in its proper place; is it a ſufficient anſwer, not to take any notice of it? The reaſon, why I put this queſtion, is becauſe if this be a rule in controverſy, I humbly conceive, I might have paſſed over the greateſt part of what your Lordſhip has ſaid to me, becauſe the diſpoſition it has, under numerical figures, is ſo far from giving me a view of the orderly connection of the parts of your diſcourſe, that I have often been tempted to ſuſpect the negligence of the printer, for miſplacing your Lordſhip's numbers; ſince, ſo ranked as they are, they do, to me, who am confounded by them, loſe all order and connection quite.

THE next thing in the defence, which you go on with, is an exception to my uſe of the word certainty. In the cloſe of the anſwer, I had made in the Lett. 2. p. 95. pages you paſs over, I add, "that tho' the laws of diſputation allow bare denial, "as a ſufficient anſwer, to ſayings without any offer of a proof; yet, my Lord, to "ſhew how willing I am to give your Lordſhip all ſatisfaction in what you apprehend, may be of dangerous conſequence in my book, as to that article, I ſhall "not ſtand ſtill ſullenly, and put your Lordſhip upon the difficulty of ſhewing,

“ wherein that danger lies; but ſhall, on the other ſide, endeavour to ſhew “ your Lordſhip, that that definition of mine, whether true or falſe, right or “ wrong, can be of no dangerous conſequence to that article of faith. The “ reaſon which I ſhall offer for it, is this; becauſe it can be of no conſequence “ to it, at all.” And the reaſon of it was clear, from what I had ſaid before, that knowing and believing were two different acts of the mind: and that my Lett. 2. placing of certainty, in the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of P. 90. ideas, i. e. that my definition of knowledge, one of thoſe acts of the mind, would not at all alter, or ſhake, the definition of faith, which was another act of the mind diſtinct from it: and, therefore, I added, “ that the certainty of “ faith (if your Lordſhip thinks fit to call it ſo) has nothing to do, with the Lett. 2. “ certainty of knowledge. And to talk of the certainty of faith, ſeems all one P. 95. “ to me, as to talk of the knowledge of believing; a way of ſpeaking, not “ eaſy to me to underſtand.”

These and other words to this purpoſe, in the following paragraphs, your Lordſhip lays hold on, and ſets down, as liable to no ſmall exception, though, as you tell me, “ the main ſtrength of my defence lies in it.” Let what ſtrength P. 23. you pleaſe lie in it, my defence was ſtrong enough without it. For to your bare ſaying, “ my method of certainty might be of dangerous conſequence to any “ article of the chriſtian faith,” without proving it, it was a defence ſtrong enough, barely to deny, and put you upon ſhewing, wherein that danger lies; which, therefore, this main ſtrength of my defence, as you call it, apart, I inſiſt on.

But, as to your exception to what I ſaid, on this occaſion, it conſiſts in this, that there is a certainty of faith, and therefore you ſet down my ſaying, “ that “ to talk of the certainty of faith, ſeems all one, as to talk of the knowledge “ of believing;” as that, “ which ſhews the inconſiſtency of my notion of ideas “ with the articles of the chriſtian faith.” Theſe are your words here, and yet P. 23. you tell me, “ it is not my way of ideas, but my way of certainty by ideas, P. 74. “ that your Lordſhip is unſatiſfied about.” What muſt I do now, in the caſe, when your words are expreſly, that my nature of ideas have an inconſiſtency with the articles of the chriſtian faith? Muſt I preſume that your Lordſhip means my notion of certainty? All that I can do is to ſearch out your meaning, the beſt I can, and then ſhew, where I apprehend it not concluſive. But this uncertainty, in moſt places, what you mean, makes me ſo much work, that a great deal is omitted, and yet my anſwer is too long.

Your Lordſhip aſks, in the next paragraph, “ how comes the certainty of P. 23. “ faith to be ſo hard a point with me?” Anſw. I ſuppoſe you aſk this queſtion, more to give others hard thoughts of my opinion of faith, than to be informed yourſelf. For you cannot be ignorant that, all along in my Eſſay, I uſe certainty for knowledge; ſo that for you to aſk me, “ how comes the certainty of faith “ to become ſo hard a point with me?” is the ſame thing, as for you to aſk, how comes the knowledge of faith, or if you pleaſe, the knowledge of believing, to be ſo hard a point with me? A queſtion which, I ſuppoſe, you will think needs no anſwer, let your meaning, in that doubtful phraſe, be what it will.

I used in my book the term certainty, for knowledge, ſo generally, that no body, that has read my book, tho' much leſs attentively than your Lordſhip, can doubt of it. That I uſed it in that ſenſe there, I ſhall refer my reader but to two places, amongſt many, to convince him. This, I am ſure, your Lord- B. iv. c. 1. ſhip could not be ignorant of, that by certainty, I mean knowledge, ſince I have § 1. and ſo uſed it in my letters to you, inſtances whereof are not a few; ſome of them c. 11. § 9. may be found, in the places marked in the margent: and in my ſecond letter, Lett. 1. p. what I ſay in the leaf, immediately preceding that, which you quote upon this 81, 82, 107. occaſion, would have put it paſt a poſſibility, for any one, to make ſhew of a 111, 115, doubt of it, had not that been amongſt thoſe pages of my anſwer, which, for 118, 131, its being out of its proper place, it ſeems you were reſolved not to take notice 138, 158, of, and, therefore, I hope it will not be beſides my purpoſe here, to mind you 171, 185. of it again.

After having ſaid ſomething to ſhew, why I uſed certainty, and knowledge, Letter 2. p. 93. for the ſame thing, I added, “ that your Lordſhip could not but take notice of “ this, in the 18 ſect. of chap. iv. of my fourth book, it being a paſſage you “ had quoted, and runs thus; “ Wherever we perceive the agreement, or diſa- “ greement, of any of our ideas, there is certain knowledge; and wherever we “ are ſure thoſe ideas agree with the reality of things, there is certain real know- “ ledge: of which having given the marks, I think I have ſkewn, wherein “ certainty, real certainty, conſiſts.” And I farther add, in the immediately following words; “ that my definition of knowledge, in the beginning of the P. 94. “ fourth book of my Eſſay, ſtands thus: knowledge ſeems to be nothing, but “ the perception of the connection, and agreement, or diſagreement, and re- “ pugnancy of any of our ideas.” Which is the very definition of certainty, that your Lordſhip is here conteſting.

Since, then, you could not but know that, in this diſcourſe, certainty with me ſtood for, or was the ſame thing with, knowledge; may not one juſtly wonder, how you come to aſk me ſuch a queſtion, as this, “ how comes the know- “ ledge of believing, to become ſo hard a point with me?” For that was, in effect, the queſtion that you aſked, when you put in the term certainty, ſince you knew, as undoubtedly, that I meant knowledge, by certainty, as that I meant believing, by faith; i. e. you could doubt of neither. And that you did not doubt of it, is plain, from what you ſay in the next page, where you endeavour to prove this an improper way of ſpeaking.

Whether it be a proper way of ſpeaking, I allow to be a fair queſtion. But when you knew what I meant, tho' I expreſſed it improperly, to put queſtions in a word of mine, uſed in a ſenſe different from mine, which could not but be apt to inſinuate to the reader, that my notion of certainty derogated from the πληροφορία or full aſſurance of faith, as the ſcripture calls it: is what, I gueſs, in another, would make your Lordſhip aſk again, “ is this fair and ingenuous dealing?”

Heb. x. 22. My Lord, my bible expreſſes the higheſt degree of faith, which the apoſtle recommended to believers in his time, by full aſſurance. But aſſurance of faith, P. 26. tho' it be what aſſurance ſoever, will by no means down with your Lordſhip, in my writing. You ſay, I allow aſſurance of faith. God forbid I ſhould do otherwiſe: but then you aſk, “ why not certainty as well as aſſurance?” My Lord, I think it may be a reaſon not miſbecoming a poor layman, and ſuch, as he might preſume, would ſatisfy a biſhop of the church of England, that he found his bible to ſpeak ſo. I find my bible ſpeaks of the aſſurance of faith, but no where, that I can remember, of the certainty of faith, tho', in many places, it ſpeaks of the certainty of knowledge, and therefore I ſpeak ſo too; and ſhall not, I think, be condemned for keeping cloſe to the expreſſions of our bible, tho' the ſcripture language, as it is, does not ſo well ſerve your Lordſhip's turn, in the preſent caſe. When I ſhall ſee, in an authentick tranſlation of our bible, the phraſe changed, it will be time enough for me, to change it too, and call it not the aſſurance, but certainty of faith: but till then, I ſhall not be aſhamed of P. 31. it, notwithſtanding you reproach me with it, by terming it, the aſſurance of faith, as I call it; when you might as well have termed it, the aſſurance of faith, as our bible calls it.

It being plain, that by certainty I meant knowledge, and by faith, the act of believing; that theſe words where you aſk, “ how comes the certainty of faith “ to become ſo hard a point with me?” and where you tell me, “ I will allow P. 23. “ no certainty of faith;” may make no wrong impreſſion on men's minds, who P. 26. may be apt to underſtand them, of the object, and not merely of the act of believing; I crave leave to ſay with Mr. Chillingworth, “ that I do heartily ac- C. 6. § 3. “ knowledge and believe the articles of our faith, to be in themſelves truths, as “ certain and infallible, as the very common principles of geometry and meta- “ phyſicks. But that there is not required of us a knowledge of them, and an “ adherence to them, as certain as that of ſenſe, or ſcience:” and that for this reaſon (amongſt others, given both by Mr. Chillingworth, and Mr. Hooker.) viz. “ that faith is not knowledge, no more than three is four, but eminently con- “ tained in it: ſo that he that knows, believes, and ſomething more; but he,

“ that believes, many times does not; nay, if he doth barely, and merely believe, he doth never know.” Theſe are Mr. Chillingworth's own words. C. 6. § 2.

That this aſſurance of faith may approach very near to certainty, and not come ſhort of it, in a ſure and ſteady influence on the mind, I have ſo plainly declared, that no body, I think, can queſtion it. In my chapter of reaſon, which has received the honour of your Lordſhip's animadverſions, I ſay of ſome propoſitions wherein knowledge, [i. e. in my ſenſe, certainty,] fails us, “ that their probability is ſo clear and ſtrong, that aſſent as neceſſarily follows, as knowledge does demonſtration.” Eſſay, B. IV. c. 17. § 16. Does your Lordſhip aſcribe any greater certainty than this, to an article of mere faith? If you do not, we are, it ſeems, agreed in the thing; and ſo, all that you have ſo emphatically ſaid about it, is but to correct a miſtake of mine, in the Engliſh tongue, if it prove to be one: a weighty point, and well worth your Lordſhip's beſtowing ſo many pages upon! I ſay, mere faith, becauſe, tho' a man may be a chriſtian, who merely believes that there is a God; yet that is not an article of mere faith, becauſe it may be demonſtrated that there is a God, and ſo may certainly be known.

Your Lordſhip goes on to aſk, “ have not all mankind, who have talked of matters of faith, allowed a certainty of faith, as well as a certainty of knowledge?” P. 23. To anſwer a queſtion, concerning what all mankind, who have talked of faith, have done, may be within the reach of your great learning: as for me, my reading reaches not far. The apoſtles and the evangeliſts, I can anſwer, have talked of matters of faith; but I do not find in my bible, that they have any where ſpoke (for it is of ſpeaking, here, the queſtion is) of the certainty of faith; and what they allow, which they do not ſpeak of, I cannot tell. I ſay, in my bible, meaning the Engliſh tranſlation, uſed in our church: tho' what all mankind, who ſpeak not of faith in Engliſh, can do, towards the deciding of this queſtion, I do not ſee; it being about the ſignification of an Engliſh word. And whether, in propriety of ſpeech, it can be applied to faith, can only be decided by thoſe, who underſtand Engliſh, which all mankind, who have talked of matters of faith, I humbly conceive, did not.

To prove that certainty in Engliſh may be applied to faith, you ſay, that among the Romans it was oppoſed to doubting; P. 24. and, for that, you bring this Latin ſentence, “ Nil tam certum eſt, quam quod de dubio certum.” Anſw. Certum among the Romans, might be oppoſed to doubting, and yet not be applied to faith, becauſe knowledge, as well as believing, is oppoſed to doubting: and therefore, unleſs it had pleaſed your Lordſhip to have quoted the author, out of which this Latin ſentence is taken, one cannot tell, whether certum be not in it ſpoken of a thing known, and not of a thing believed: tho' if it were ſo, I humbly conceive, it would not prove what you ſay, viz, that it, i. e. the word certainty, (for to that, it, muſt refer here, or to nothing, that I underſtand) was among the Romans, applied to faith; for, as I take it, they never uſed the Engliſh word, certainty: and tho' it be true, that the Engliſh word, certainty, be taken from the Latin word, certus; yet that, therefore, certainty in Engliſh, is uſed exactly in the ſame ſenſe, that certus is in Latin, that I think you will not ſay; for then certainty in Engliſh muſt ſignify purpoſe and reſolution of mind, for to that certus is applied in Latin.

You are pleaſed here to tell me, “ that, in my former letter,” I ſaid that “ if we knew the original of words, we ſhould be much helped to the ideas, they were firſt applied to, and made to ſtand for.” P. 24 I grant it true, nor ſhall I unſay it here. For I ſaid not, that a word, that had its original in one language, kept always exactly the ſame ſignification, in another language, into which it was from thence tranſplanted. But if you will give me leave to remind you of it, I remember that you, my Lord, ſay in the ſame place, “ that little weight is to be laid upon a bare grammatical etymology, when a word is uſed in another ſenſe, by the beſt authors.” Vin. p. 237. And I think you could not have brought a more proper inſtance, to verify that ſaying, than that which you produce here.

But pray, my Lord, why ſo far about? Why are we ſent to the ancient Romans? Why muſt we conſult (which is no eaſy taſk) all mankind who have talked of faith, to know whether certainty be properly uſed for faith, or no;

when, to determine it between your Lordſhip and me, there is ſo ſure a remedy, and ſo near at hand? It is but for you to ſay, wherein certainty conſiſts. This, Anſw. 1. p. 69. when I gently offered to your Lordſhip in my firſt letter, you interpreted it to be a deſign, to draw you out of your way.

I am ſorry, my Lord, you ſhould think it out of your way, to put an end, a ſhort end, to a controverſy, which you think of ſuch moment: methinks it ſhould not be out of your way, with one blow, finally to overthrow an aſſertion, which you think "to be of dangerous conſequence to that article of faith, which your Letter 2. p. 94. "Lordſhip has endeavoured to defend." I propoſed the ſame again, where I ſay; "for this there is a very eaſy remedy: it is but for your Lordſhip to ſet "aſide this definition of knowledge, by giving us a better, and this danger is "over. But you chuſe rather to have a controverſy with my book, for having "it in it, and to put me upon the defence of it." This is ſo expreſs, that your taking no notice of it, puts me at a loſs what to think. To ſay that a man, ſo great in letters, does not know, wherein certainty conſiſts, is a greater preſumption, than I will be guilty of; and yet to think that you do know, and will not tell, is yet harder. Who can think, or will dare to ſay, that your Lordſhip, ſo much concerned for the articles of faith, and engaged in this diſpute with me, by your duty, for the preſervation of them, ſhould chuſe to keep up a controverſy with me, rather than remove that danger, which my wrong notion of certainty threatens to the articles of faith? For, my Lord, ſince the queſtion is moved, and it is brought by your Lordſhip to a publick diſpute wherein certainty conſiſts, a great many, knowing no better, may take up with what I have ſaid, and, rather than have no notion of certainty, at all, will ſtick by mine, till a better be ſhewed them. And if mine tends to ſcepticiſm, as you ſay, and you will not furniſh them with one that does not, what is it but to give way to ſcepticiſm, and let it quietly prevail on men, as either having my notion of certainty, or none at all? Your Lordſhip, indeed, ſays ſomething in excuſe, in your 75th page; which, that my anſwer may be in the proper place, ſhall be conſidered, when we come there.

P. 25. Your Lordſhip declares, "that you are utterly againſt any private mints of "words." I know not what the publick may do, for your particular ſatisfaction in the caſe; but till publick mints of words are erected, I know no remedy for it, but that you muſt patiently ſuffer this matter to go on, in the ſame courſe, that I think it has gone in, ever ſince language has been in uſe. Here, in this iſland, as far as my knowledge reaches, I do not find, that, ever ſince the Saxons time, in all the alterations that have been made, in our language, that any one word, or phraſe, has had its authority from the great ſeal, or paſſed by act of parliament.

When the dazling metaphor of the mint, and new milled words, &c. (which mightily, as it ſeems, delighted your Lordſhip, when you were writing that paragraph) will give you leave to conſider this matter, plainly as it is, you will find that the coining of money, in publickly authorized mints, affords no manner of argument againſt private men's meddling, in the introducing new, or changing the ſignification of old, words; every one of which alterations always has its riſe, from ſome private mint. The caſe in ſhort, is this; money, by virtue of the ſtamp, received in the publick mint, which vouches its intrinſick worth, has authority to paſs. This uſe of the publick ſtamp would be loſt, if private men were ſuffered to offer money ſtamped by themſelves. On the contrary, words are offered to the publick, by every private man, coined in his private mint, as he pleaſes; but it is the receiving of them by others, their very paſſing, that gives them their authority and currency, and not the mint, they come out of. De Arte Poet. Horace, I think, has given a true account of this matter, in a country, very jealous of any uſurpation upon the publick authority:

"Multa renaſcentur, quæ jam cecidere, cadentque,
"Quæ nunc ſunt in honore, vocabula, ſi volet uſus,
"Quem penes arbitrium eſt & jus & norma loquendi."

But yet, whatever change is made in the ſignification, or credit of any word, by publick uſe, this change has always its beginning, in ſome private mint; ſo Horace tells us, it was in the Roman language, quite down to his time.

——" Ego cur acquirere pauca
" Si poſſum, invideor? quum lingua Catonis & Enni
" Sermonem patrium ditaverit, & nova rerum
" Nomina protulerit? Licuit, ſemperque licebit,
" Signatum præſente notâ procudere nomen."

HERE we ſee Horace expreſly ſays, that private mints of words were always licenced; and, with Horace, I humbly conceive, ſo they will always continue, how utterly ſoever your Lordſhip may be againſt them. And, therefore, he that offers, to the publick, new-milled words, from his own private mint, is not always, in that, ſo bold an invader of the publick authority, as you would make him.

THIS, I ſay, not to excuſe myſelf in the preſent caſe; for I deny, that I have at all changed the ſignification of the word, certainty. And, therefore, if you had pleaſed, you might, my Lord, have ſpared your ſaying on this occaſion,
" that it ſeems our old words muſt not now paſs, in the current ſenſe; and thoſe P. 24, 25.
" perſons aſſume too much authority to themſelves, who will not ſuffer com-
" mon words to paſs in their general acceptation:" and other things, to the ſame purpoſe, in this paragraph, till you had proved, that, in ſtrict propriety of ſpeech, it could be ſaid, that a man was certain of that, which he did not know, but only believed.

IF you had had time, in the heat of diſpute, to have made a little reflection, on the uſe of the Engliſh word, certainty, in ſtrict ſpeaking, perhaps your Lordſhip would not have been ſo forward to have made my uſing it, only for preciſe knowledge, ſo enormous an impropriety; at leaſt, you would not have accuſed it of weakening the credibility of any article of faith.

IT is true, indeed, people commonly ſay, they are certain of what they barely believe, without doubting. But it is as true, that they as commonly ſay, that they know it too. But no body from thence concludes, that believing is knowing. As little can they conclude, from the like vulgar way of ſpeaking, that believing is certainty. All that is meant thereby, is no more but this, that the full aſſurance of their faith as ſteadily determines their aſſent, to the embracing of that truth, as if they actually knew it.

BUT, however ſuch phraſes, as theſe, are uſed to ſhew the ſteadineſs and aſſurance of their faith, who thus ſpeak; yet they alter not the propriety of our language, which, I think, appropriates certainty, only to knowledge, when, in ſtrict and philoſophical diſcourſe, it is, upon that account, contra-diſtinguiſhed to faith; as, in this caſe, here, your Lordſhip knows it is: whereof there is an expreſs evidence, in my firſt letter, where I ſay, " that I ſpeak of belief, and P. 115.
" your Lordſhip of certainty; and that I meant belief, and not certainty. And
" that I made not an improper, nor unjuſtifiable uſe of the word, certainty,
" in contra-diſtinguiſhing it thus to faith, I think I have an unqueſtionable au-
" thority, in the learned and cautious Dr. Cudworth, who ſo uſes it: what eſ-
" ſence, ſays he, is to generation, the ſame is certainty of truth, or knowledge,
" to faith, p. $\frac{1}{8}\frac{3}{9}\frac{4}{9}$.

YOUR Lordſhip ſays, " certainty is common to both knowledge and faith, P. 25.
" unleſs I think it impoſſible to be certain, upon any teſtimony whatſoever." I think it is poſſible to be certain upon the teſtimony of God (for that, I ſuppoſe, you mean) where I know that it is the teſtimony of God; becauſe, in ſuch a caſe, that teſtimony is capable, not only to make me believe, but, if I conſider it right, to make me know the thing to be ſo; and ſo I may be certain. For the veracity of God is as capable of making me know a propoſition to be true, as any other way of proof can be; and, therefore, I do not, in ſuch a caſe, barely believe, but know ſuch a propoſition to be true, and attain certainty.

THE ſum of your accuſation is drawn up thus: " that I have appropriated P. 26.
" certainty to the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of ideas, in

" any propoſition; and now I find this will not hold, as to articles of faith; and " therefore, I will allow no certainty of faith; which you think is not for the " advantage of my cauſe." The truth of the matter of fact is, in ſhort, this; that I have placed knowledge in the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of ideas. This definition of knowledge, your Lordſhip ſaid, " might be of dangerous conſequence to that article of faith, which you have endeavoured to de" fend." This I denied, and gave this reaſon for it, viz. that a definition of know-

Letter 2. p. 94---98. ledge, whether a good or bad, true or falſe definition, could not be of ill, or any conſequence to an article of faith: becauſe a definition of knowledge, which was one act of the mind, did not at all concern faith, which was another act of the mind, quite diſtinct from it. To this then, which was the propoſition in queſtion between us, your Lordſhip, I humbly conceive, ſhould have anſwered. But, inſtead of that, your Lordſhip, by the uſe of the word, certainty, in a ſenſe that I uſed it not, (for you knew, I uſed it, only for knowledge) would repreſent me, as having ſtrange notions of faith. Whether this be for the advantage of your cauſe, your Lordſhip will do well to conſider.

Upon ſuch a uſe of the word, certainty, in a different ſenſe, from what I uſe

P. 27---31. it in, the force of all your Lordſhip ſays, under your firſt head, contained in the two or three next paragraphs, depends, as I think: for I muſt own (pardon my dulneſs) that I do not clearly comprehend the force of what your Lordſhip there

P. 27, 28. ſays: and it will take up too many pages, to examine it, period by period. In ſhort, therefore, I take your Lordſhip's meaning to be this:

" That there are ſome articles of faith, viz. the fundamental principles of " natural religion, which mankind may attain to a certainty in, by reaſon, with" out Revelation; which, becauſe a man, that proceeds upon my grounds, can" not attain to a certainty in, by reaſon, their credibility to him, when they are " conſidered as purely matters of faith, will be weakened." Thoſe which your Lordſhip inſtances in, are the being of a God, providence, and the rewards and puniſhments of a future ſtate.

This is the way, as I humbly conceive, your Lordſhip takes here, to prove my grounds of certainty (for ſo you call my definition of knowledge) to be of dangerous conſequence to the articles of faith.

To avoid ambiguity and confuſion, in the examining this argument of your Lordſhip's, the beſt way, I humbly conceive, will be to lay by the term, certainty; which your Lordſhip and I uſing in different ſenſes, is the leſs fit to make what we ſay to one another, clearly underſtood; and inſtead thereof, to uſe the term knowledge, which, with me, your Lordſhip knows, is equivalent.

Your Lordſhip's propoſition then, as far as it has any oppoſition to me, is this, that if knowledge be ſuppoſed to conſiſt in the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of ideas, a man cannot attain to the knowledge, that theſe propoſitions, viz. " that there is a God, a providence, and rewards and puniſhments " in a future ſtate, are true; and therefore the credibility of theſe articles, con" ſidered purely as matters of faith, will be weakened to him." Wherein there are theſe things to be proved by your Lordſhip.

1. That, upon my grounds of knowledge, i. e. upon a ſuppoſition that knowledge conſiſts in the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of ideas, we cannot attain to the knowledge of the truth of either of thoſe propoſitions, viz. " that there is a God, providence, and rewards and puniſhments in a future ſtate."

2. Your Lordſhip is to prove, that the not knowing the truth of any propoſition, leſſens the credibility of it; which, in ſhort, amounts to this, that want of knowledge leſſens faith, in any propoſition propoſed. This is the propoſition to be proved, if your Lordſhip uſe certainty, in the ſenſe, I uſe it, i. e. for knowledge; in which only uſe of it, will it here bear upon me.

But ſince I find your Lordſhip, in theſe two or three paragraphs, to uſe the word, certainty, in ſo uncertain a ſenſe, as ſometimes to ſignify knowledge by it, and ſometimes believing, in general, i. e. any degree of believing; give me leave

P. 27. to add, that if your Lordſhip means by theſe words, " let us ſuppoſe a perſon, by " natural reaſon, to attain to a certainty, as to the being of a God, &c. i. e. " attain to a belief, that there is a God, &c. or the ſoul's immortality," I ſay, if you take certainty in ſuch a ſenſe, then it will be incumbent upon your Lordſhip to prove, that if a man finds the natural reaſon, whereupon he entertained the belief of a God, or of the immortality of the ſoul, uncertain, that will weaken the credibility of thoſe fundamental articles, as matters of faith, or, which is in effect the ſame, that the weakneſs of the credibility of any article of faith from reaſon, weakens the credibility of it from Revelation. For it is this, which theſe following words of your import: "for before, there was a natural credi- P. 28. "bility in them on account of reaſon: but by going on wrong grounds of "certainty, all that is loſt."

To prove the firſt of theſe propoſitions, viz. that upon the ſuppoſition, that knowledge conſiſts in the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of ideas, we cannot attain to the knowledge of the truth of this propoſition, that there is a God; your Lordſhip urges, that I have ſaid, "that no idea proves the exiſ-"tence of the thing, without itſelf;" which argument, reduced to form, will ſtand thus; if it be true, as I ſay, that no idea proves the exiſtence of the thing without itſelf, then upon the ſuppoſition that knowledge conſiſts in the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of ideas, we cannot attain to the knowledge of the truth of this propoſition, "that there is a God;" which argument ſo manifeſtly proves not, that there needs no more to be ſaid to it, than to deſire that conſequence to be proved.

Again, as to the immortality of the ſoul, your Lordſhip urges, that I have P. 28. ſaid, that I cannot know but that "matter may think;" therefore upon my ground of knowledge, i. e. upon a ſuppoſition, that knowledge conſiſts in the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of ideas, there is an end of the ſoul's immortality. This conſequence I muſt alſo deſire your Lordſhip to prove: only I crave leave, by the by, to point out ſome things, in theſe paragraphs, too remarkable to be paſſed over, without any notice.

One is, that you, "ſuppoſe a man is made certain, upon my general grounds P. 28. "of certainty," i. e. knows by the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of ideas, that there is a God, and yet "upon a further examination of my "method, he finds that the way of ideas will not do." Here, my Lord, if by my grounds of certainty, my method, and my way of ideas, you mean one and the ſame thing; then your words will have a conſiſtency, and tend to the ſame point. But then, I muſt beg your Lordſhip to conſider, that your ſuppoſition carries a contradiction in it, viz. that your Lordſhip ſuppoſes, that by my grounds, my method, and my way of certainty, a man is made certain, and not made certain, that there is a God. If your Lordſhip means here, by my grounds of certainty, my method, and my way of ideas, different things (as it ſeems to me, you do) then, whatever your Lordſhip may ſuppoſe here, it makes nothing to the point in hand, which is to ſhew, that, by this my ground of certainty, viz. that knowledge conſiſts in the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of ideas; a man firſt attains to a knowledge that there is a God, and afterwards, by the ſame grounds of certainty, he comes to loſe the knowledge that there is a God, which, to me, ſeems little leſs than a contradiction.

'Tis likely your Lordſhip will ſay, you mean no ſuch thing; for you alledge this propoſition, "that no idea proves the exiſtence of any thing, without itſelf," and give that as an inſtance, that my way of ideas will not do, i. e. will not prove the being of a God. 'Tis true your Lordſhip does ſo. But withal, my Lord, 'tis as true, that this propoſition, ſuppoſing it to be mine (for it is not here ſet down, in my words) contains not my method, or way, or notion of certainty; tho' 'tis in that ſenſe alone, that it can here be uſeful to your Lordſhip, to call it my method, or the way of ideas.

Your Lordſhip undertakes to ſhew, that my defining knowledge to conſiſt in the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of ideas, "weakens the credi-"bility of this fundamental article of faith," that there is a God: what is your Lordſhip's proof of it? Juſt this: the ſaying that no idea proves the exiſtence of the thing, without itſelf, will not do; ergo, the ſaying, that knowledge conſiſts in the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement of ideas, weakens the credibility of this fundamental article. This, my Lord, ſeems to me no proof; and all that I can find, that is offered to make it a proof, is only your calling theſe propoſitions "my general grounds of certainty, my method of proceeding, the "way of ideas, and my own principles in point of reaſon;" as if that made theſe two propoſitions the ſame thing, and whatſoever were a conſequence of one, may be charged as a conſequence of the other: tho' it be viſible, that tho' the latter of theſe be ever ſo falſe, or ever ſo far from being a proof of a God, yet it will by no means thence follow, that the former of them, viz. that knowledge conſiſts in the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of ideas, weakens the credibility of that fundamental article. But it is but for your Lordſhip to call them both, "the way of ideas," and that is enough.

THAT I may not be accuſed by your Lordſhip "for unfair and diſingenuous "dealing, for repreſenting this matter ſo;" I ſhall here ſet down your Lordſhip's words at large: "let us now ſuppoſe a perſon, by natural reaſon, to attain to a "certainty, as to the being of a God, and immortality of the ſoul; and he pro"ceeds upon J. L's general grounds of certainty, from the agreement, or diſa"greement, of ideas; and ſo from the ideas of God and the ſoul, he is made "certain of theſe two points before-mentioned. But let us again ſuppoſe, that "ſuch a perſon upon a farther examination of J. L's method of proceeding, finds "that the way of ideas, in theſe caſes, will not do;" for no idea proves the ex"iſtence of the thing without itſelf, any more than the picture of man proves his "being, or the viſions of a dream make a true hiſtory (which are J. L's own ex"preſſions) and, for the ſoul, he cannot be certain, but that matter may think, "(as J. L. affirms) and then, what becomes of the ſoul's immateriality (and con"ſequently immortality) from its operations? But for all this, ſays J. L. his "aſſurance of faith remains firm, on its own baſis. Now you appeal to any man "of ſenſe, whether the finding the uncertainty of his own principles, which he "went upon in point of reaſon, doth not weaken the credibility of theſe funda"mental articles, when they are conſidered purely as matters of faith? For be"fore, there was a natural credibility in them, on the account of reaſon, but by "going on wrong grounds of certainty, all that is loſt; and, inſtead of being "certain, he is more doubtful than ever." Theſe are your Lordſhip's own words: and now I appeal to any man of ſenſe, whether they contain any other argument againſt my placing of certainty, as I do, but this, viz. a man miſtakes and thinks that this propoſition, no idea proves the exiſtence of the thing without itſelf, ſhews that, in the way of ideas, one cannot prove a God; ergo, this propoſition, "certainty conſiſts in the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, "of ideas, weakens the credibility of this fundamental article, that there is a "God." And ſo, of the immortality of the ſoul; becauſe, I ſay, I know not but matter may think; your Lordſhip would infer, ergo, my definition of certainty weakens the credibility of the revelation of the ſoul's immortality.

YOUR Lordſhip is pleaſed here to call this propoſition, "that knowledge, or "certainty, conſiſts in the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of ideas," my general grounds of certainty; as if I had ſome more particular grounds of certainty. Whereas I have no other ground, or notion, of certainty but this one alone; all my notion of certainty is contained in that one particular propoſition; but perhaps your Lordſhip did it, that you might make the propoſition above quoted, viz. "no idea proves the exiſtence of the thing without "itſelf, under the title you give it, of the way of ideas, paſs for one of my par"ticular grounds of certainty;" whereas it is no more any ground of certainty of mine, or definition of knowledge, than any other propoſition in my book.

ANOTHER thing, very remarkable, in what your Lordſhip here ſays, is that you make the failing to attain knowledge, by any way of certainty, in ſome particular inſtances, to be the finding the uncertainty of the way itſelf; which is all one as to ſay, that if a man miſſes by algebra, the certain knowledge of ſome propoſitions in mathematics, therefore he finds the way, or principles, of algebra to be uncertain, or falſe. This is your Lordſhip's way of reaſoning here: your Lordſhip quotes out of me, "that I ſay no idea proves the exiſtence of the "thing, without itſelf;" and that I ſay, "that one cannot be certain, that "matter cannot think:" From whence your Lordſhip argues, that he, who ſays ſo,

cannot

cannot attain to certainty that there is a God, or that the ſoul is immortal; and thereupon your Lordſhip concludes, “ he finds the uncertainty of the principles “ he went upon, in point of reaſon,” i. e. that he finds this principle, or ground P. 28. of certainty, he went upon, in reaſoning, viz. that certainty or knowledge, conſiſts in the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of ideas, to be uncertain. For if your Lordſhip means here, by “ principles he went upon, in point “ of reaſon,” any thing elſe, but that definition of knowledge, which your Lordſhip calls, my way, method, grounds, &c. of certainty, which I and others, to the endangering ſome articles of faith, go upon; I crave leave to ſay, it concerns nothing at all the argument, your Lordſhip is upon, which is to prove, that the placing of certainty in the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of ideas, may be of dangerous conſequence to any article of faith.

Your Lordſhip, in the next place, ſays, “ before we can believe any thing, P. 29, 30. “ upon the account of revelation, we muſt ſuppoſe there is a God.” What uſe does your Lordſhip make of this? Your Lordſhip thus argues; but by my way of certainty, a man is made uncertain, whether there be a God, or no: for that to me is the meaning of thoſe words, “ how can his faith ſtand firm, as to divine P. 29. “ revelation, when he is made uncertain, by his own way, whether there be a “ God, or no?” or they can to me mean nothing, to the queſtion in hand. What is the concluſion from hence? This it muſt be, or nothing to the purpoſe; ergo, my definition of knowledge, or, which is the ſame thing, my placing of certainty in the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of ideas, leaves not the articles of faith the ſame credibility they had before.

To excuſe my dulneſs, in not being able to comprehend this conſequence, pray, my Lord, conſider, that your Lordſhip ſays: “ before we can believe any thing, Ibid. “ upon the account of revelation, it muſt be ſuppoſed that there is a God.” But cannot he, who places certainty in the perception of the agreement, and diſagreement, of ideas, ſuppoſe there is a God?

But your Lordſhip means by ſuppoſe, that one muſt be certain that there is a God. Let it be ſo, and let it be your Lordſhip's privilege in controverſy, to uſe one word for another, tho' of a different ſignification, as, I think, to ſuppoſe, and be certain, are; cannot one that places certainty in the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of ideas, be certain there is a God? I can aſſure you, my Lord, I am certain there is a God; and yet, I own, that I place certainty in the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of ideas: Nay, I dare venture to ſay to your Lordſhip, that I have proved there is a God, and ſee no inconſiſtency at all, between theſe two propoſitions, that certainty conſiſts in the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of ideas, and that it is certain there is a God. So that this my notion of certainty, this definition of knowledge, for any thing your Lordſhip has ſaid to the contrary, leaves, to this fundamental article, the ſame credibility, and the ſame certainty it had before.

Your Lordſhip ſays farther, “ to ſuppoſe divine revelation, we muſt be cer- P. 29. “ tain, that there is a principle above matter and motion in the world.” Here again, my Lord, your way of writing makes work for my ignorance; and before I can either admit, or deny this propoſition, or judge what force it has, to prove the propoſition in queſtion, I muſt diſtinguiſh it into theſe different ſenſes, which, I think, your Lordſhip's way of ſpeaking may comprehend. For your Lordſhip may mean it thus; “ to ſuppoſe divine revelation, we muſt be certain, i. e. we “ muſt believe, that there is a principle above matter and motion in the world.” Or your Lordſhip may mean thus, “ we muſt be certain, i. e. we muſt know, “ that there is ſomething above matter and motion in the world.” In the next place your Lordſhip may mean, by ſomething above matter and motion, either ſimply an intelligent being; for knowledge, without determining, what being it is in, is a principle above matter and motion: or your Lordſhip may mean an immaterial, intelligent being. So that this undetermined way of expreſſing, includes, at leaſt, four diſtinct propoſitions, whereof ſome are true, and others not ſo. For,

1. My Lord, if your Lordſhip means, that to ſuppoſe a divine revelation, a man muſt be certain, i. e. muſt certainly know, that there is an intelligent being

in the world, and that that intelligent being is immaterial, from whence that revelation comes; I deny it. For a man may ſuppoſe revelation, upon the belief of an intelligent being, from whence it comes, without being able to make out to himſelf, by a ſcientifical reaſoning, that there is ſuch a being. A proof whereof, I humbly conceive, are the Anthropomorphites among the chriſtians, heretofore, who, nevertheleſs, rejected not the revelation of the New Teſtament: and he that will talk with illiterate people, in this age, will, I doubt not, find many, who believe the bible to be the word of God, though they imagine God himſelf, in the ſhape of an old man ſitting in heaven; which they could not do, if they knew, i. e. had examined and underſtood any demonſtration, whereby he is proved to be immaterial, without which they cannot know it.

2. If your Lordſhip means, that to ſuppoſe a divine revelation, it is neceſſary to know, that there is ſimply an intelligent being; this alſo I deny. For to ſuppoſe a divine revelation, it is not neceſſary that a man ſhould know that there is ſuch an intelligent being in the world: I ſay, know, i. e. from things, that he does know, demonſtratively deduce the proof of ſuch a being: it is enough, for the receiving divine revelation, to believe, that there is ſuch a being, without having, by demonſtration, attained to the knowledge that there is a God. Every one, that believes right, does not always reaſon exactly, eſpecially in abſtract, metaphyſical ſpeculations: and if no-body can believe the bible to be of divine revelation, but he, that clearly comprehends the whole deduction, and ſees the evidence of the demonſtration, wherein the exiſtence of an intelligent being, on whoſe will all other beings depend, is ſcientifically proved; there are, I fear, but few chriſtians, among illiterate people, to look no farther. He that believes there is a God, tho' he does no more than believe it, and has not attained to the certainty of knowledge, i. e. does not ſee the evident demonſtration of it, has ground enough to admit of divine revelation. The apoſtle tells us, "that "he that will come to God, muſt believe that he is;" but I do not remember the ſcripture any where ſays, that he muſt know that he is.

3. In the next place, if your Lordſhip means, that "to ſuppoſe divine revelation, a man muſt be certain," i. e. explicitly believe, that there is a perfectly immaterial being; I ſhall leave it to your Lordſhip's conſideration, whether it may not be ground enough for the ſuppoſition of a revelation, to believe that there is an all-knowing, unerring being, who can neither deceive, nor be deceived, without a man's preciſely determining in his thoughts, whether that unerring, omniſcient being be immaterial, or no. It is paſt all doubt, that every one, that examines and reaſons right, may come to a certainty that God is perfectly immaterial: but it may be a queſtion, whether every one who believes a revelation to be from God, may have entered into the diſquiſition of the immateriality of his being: whether, I ſay, every ignorant day-labourer, who believes the bible to be the word of God, has, in his mind, conſidered materiality and immateriality, and does explicitly believe God to be immaterial, I ſhall leave to your Lordſhip to determine, if you think fit, more expreſly than your words do here.

4. If your Lordſhip means, "that to ſuppoſe a divine revelation, a man muſt "be certain, i. e. believe, that there is a ſupreme, intelligent being," from whence it comes, who can neither deceive, nor be deceived; I grant it to be true.

These being the ſeveral propoſitions, either of which may be meant, in your Lordſhip's ſo general, and, to me, doubtful, way of expreſſing yourſelf; to avoid the length, which, a particular anſwer to each of them, would run me into, I will venture (and it is a venture to anſwer, to an ambiguous propoſition in one ſenſe, when the author has the liberty of ſaying, he meant it in another; a great convenience of general, looſe, and doubtful expreſſions! I will, I ſay, venture) to anſwer to it, in the ſenſe, I gueſs moſt ſuited to your Lordſhip's purpoſe; and ſee what your Lordſhip proves by it. I will, therefore, ſuppoſe your Lordſhip's reaſoning to be this; that,

"To ſuppoſe divine revelation, a man muſt be certain, i. e. believe, that "there is a principle above matter and motion, i. e. an immaterial, intelligent "being, in the world" Let it be ſo; what does your Lordſhip infer? "There-

"fore upon the principle of certainty, by ideas, he [i. e. he that places certainty P. 29. in the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of ideas] cannot be certain of [i. e. believe] this." This conſequence ſeems a little ſtrange, but your Lordſhip proves it thus; "becauſe he does not know, but matter may think:" which argument, put into form, will ſtand thus;

IF one, who places certainty in the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of ideas, does not know, but matter may think; then, whoever places certainty ſo, cannot believe, there is an immaterial, intelligent being, in the world.

BUT there is one, who, placing certainty in the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of ideas, does not know, but matter may think:

ERGO, whoever places certainty in the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of ideas, cannot believe that there is an intelligent, immaterial being.

THIS argumentation is ſo defective, in every part of it, that, for fear I ſhould be thought to make an argument, for your Lordſhip, in requital for the anſwer your Lordſhip made for me, I muſt deſire the reader to conſider, your Lordſhip ſays, "we muſt be certain; he cannot be certain, becauſe he doth not know:" P. 29. which, in ſhort, is, we cannot, becauſe he cannot; and he cannot, becauſe he doth not. This conſidered, will juſtify the ſyllogiſm I have made, to contain your Lordſhip's argument, in its full force.

I COME, therefore, to the ſyllogiſm itſelf, and there, firſt, I deny the minor, which is this:

"THERE is one who, placing certainty in the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of ideas, doth not know, but matter may think."

I BEGIN with this, becauſe this is the foundation of all your Lordſhip's argument; and, therefore, I deſire your Lordſhip would produce any one, who, placing certainty in the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of ideas, does not know but matter may think.

THE reaſon, why I preſs this, is, becauſe, I ſuppoſe, your Lordſhip means me here, and would have it thought, that I ſay, I do not know but that matter may think: but that I do not ſay ſo; nor any thing elſe, from whence may be inferred, what your Lordſhip adds, in the annexed words, if they can be inferred from it; "and conſequently all revelation may be nothing, but the effects P. 29. of an exalted fancy, or the heats of a diſordered imagination, as Spinoſa affirmed:" On the contrary, I do ſay, "it is impoſſible that matter, either B. iv. c. 10. § 10. with, or without, motion, could have originally in, and from, itſelf perception and knowledge." And, having in that chapter eſtabliſhed this truth, that there is an eternal, immaterial, knowing being; I think no body, but your Lordſhip, could have imputed to me, the doubting, that there was ſuch a being, becauſe, I ſay, in another place, and to another purpoſe, "it is impoſſible for us, B. iv. c. 3. § 6. by the contemplation of our own ideas, without revelation, to diſcover, whether omnipotency has not given to ſome ſyſtems of matter, fitly diſpoſed, a power to perceive and think, or elſe joined and fixed to matter, ſo diſpoſed, a thinking immaterial ſubſtance: it being, in reſpect of our notions, not much more remote from our comprehenſions, to conceive, that God can, if he pleaſes, ſuperadd to our idea of matter, a faculty of thinking, than that he ſhould ſuperadd to it, another ſubſtance, with a faculty of thinking." From my ſaying thus, that God (whom I have proved to be an immaterial being) by his omnipotency, may, for ought we know, ſuperadd, to ſome parts of matter, a faculty of thinking, it requires ſome ſkill, for any one, to repreſent me, as your Lordſhip does here, as one ignorant, or doubtful, whether matter may not think; to that degree, "that I am not certain, or I do not believe that there is a principle above matter and motion in the world; and conſequently all revelation may be nothing, but the effects of an exalted fancy, or the heats of a diſordered imagination, as Spinoſa affirmed." For thus I, or ſomebody elſe (whom I deſire your Lordſhip to produce) ſtands painted, in this your Lordſhip's argument, from the ſuppoſition of a divine revelation; which your Lordſhip brings here to prove, that the defining of knowledge, as I do, to conſiſt in the perception

tion of agreement, or diſagreement, of ideas, weakens the credibility of the articles of the chriſtian faith.

But if your Lordſhip thinks it ſo dangerous a poſition to ſay, "it is not much "harder for us to conceive, that God can, if he pleaſes, ſuperadd, to matter, a "faculty of thinking, than that he ſhould ſuperadd to it, another ſubſtance, "with a faculty of thinking;" (which is the utmoſt I have ſaid, concerning the faculty of thinking in matter:) I humbly conceive, it would be more to your purpoſe to prove, that the infinite, omnipotent Creator of all things, out of nothing, cannot, if he pleaſes, ſuperadd to ſome parcels of matter, diſpoſed as he ſees fit, a faculty of thinking, which the reſt of matter has not; rather than to repreſent me, with that candour, your Lordſhip does, as one, who ſo far makes matter a thinking thing, as thereby to queſtion the being of a principle, above matter and motion, in the world, and conſequently to take away all revelation: which, how natural and genuine a repreſentation it is of my ſenſe, expreſſed in the paſſages of my Eſſay, which I have above ſet down, I humbly ſubmit to the reader's judgment, and your Lordſhip's zeal for truth, to determine; and ſhall not ſtay to examine, whether man may not have an exalted fancy, and the heats of a diſordered imagination, equally overthrowing divine revelation, tho' the power of thinking be placed only in an immaterial ſubſtance.

I come now to the ſequel of your major, which is this:

"If any one, who places certainty in the perception of the agreement, or diſ"agreement, of ideas, does not know, but matter may think; then, whoever "places certainty ſo, cannot believe there is an immaterial, intelligent being in "the world."

The conſequence here is from does not, to cannot, which I cannot but wonder to find, in an argument of your Lordſhip's. For he that does not, to-day, believe, or know, that matter cannot be ſo ordered by God's omnipotency, as to think (if that ſubverts the belief of an immaterial, intelligent being in the world) may know, or believe, it to-morrow; or, if he ſhould never know, or believe it, yet others, who define knowledge, as he does, may know, or believe it; unleſs your Lordſhip can prove, that it is impoſſible for any one, who defines knowledge to conſiſt in the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of ideas, to know, or believe, that matter cannot think. But this, as I remember, your Lordſhip has not, any where, attempted to prove. And yet without this, your Lordſhip's way of reaſoning is no more, than to argue, that one cannot do a thing, becauſe another does not do it. And yet, upon this ſtrange conſequence, is built all, that your Lordſhip brings here to prove, that my definition of knowledge weakens the credibility of articles of faith, v. g.

It weakens the credibility of this fundamental article of faith, that there is a God! How ſo? Becauſe I, who have ſo defined knowledge, ſay in my Eſſay, "That the knowledge of the exiſtence of any other thing [but of God] we can "have only by ſenſation: For there being no neceſſary connexion, of real ex"iſtence, with any idea, a man hath in his memory, nor of any other exiſtence, "but that of God, with the exiſtence of any particular man; no particular man "can know the exiſtence of any other being, but only when, by actual opera"ting upon him, it makes itſelf perceived by him: for the having the idea of "any thing, in our mind, no more proves the exiſtence of that thing, than the "picture of a man evidences his being in the world, or the viſions of a dream "make thereby a true hiſtory." B. iv. c. 11. § 1. For ſo are the words of my book, and not, as your Lordſhip has been pleaſed to ſet them down here: P. 28. and they were well choſen by your Lordſhip, to ſhew, that the way of ideas would not do; i. e. in my way by ideas, I cannot prove there is a God.

But ſuppoſing I had ſaid in that place, or any other, that which would hinder the proof of a God, as I have not, might I not ſee my error, and alter, or renounce, that opinion, without changing my definition of knowledge? Or could not another man, who defined knowledge, as I do, avoid thinking, as your Lordſhip ſays, I ſay, that no idea proves the exiſtence of the thing, without "itſelf;" and ſo be able, notwithſtanding my ſaying ſo, to prove that there is a God?

Again, your Lordſhip argues, that my definition of knowledge weakens the credibility of the articles of faith, becauſe it takes away revelation; and your proof of that is, "becauſe I do not know, whether matter may not think."

The ſame ſort of argumentation your Lordſhip goes on with, in the next page, where you ſay; "again, before there can be any ſuch thing, as aſſurance of P. 30. "faith, upon divine revelation, there muſt be a certainty, as to ſenſe and tradition; for there can be no revelation pretended now, without immediate inſpiration; and the baſis of our faith is a revelation, contained in an ancient "book, whereof the parts were delivered at diſtant times, but conveyed down "to us, by an univerſal tradition. But now, what if my grounds of certainty "can give us no aſſurance, as to theſe things? Your Lordſhip ſays, you do not "mean, that they cannot demonſtrate matters of fact, which it were moſt unreaſonable to expect, but that theſe grounds of certainty make all things uncertain; for your Lordſhip thinks, you have proved, that this way of ideas "cannot give a ſatisfactory account, as to the exiſtence of the plaineſt objects of "ſenſe; becauſe reaſon cannot perceive the connexion between the objects and "the ideas: how then can we arrive to any certainty, in perceiving thoſe objects "by their ideas?"

All the force of which argument lies in this, that I have ſaid (or am ſuppoſed to have ſaid, or to hold; for that I ever ſaid ſo, I do not remember) that "reaſon "cannot perceive the connexion between the objects and the ideas:" Ergo, whoever holds that knowledge conſiſts in the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of ideas, cannot have any aſſurance of faith, upon divine revelation.

My Lord, let that propoſition, viz. "that reaſon cannot perceive the connexion between the objects and the ideas," be mine, as much as your Lordſhip pleaſes, and let it be as inconſiſtent, as you pleaſe, with the aſſurance of faith, upon divine revelation; how will it follow, from thence, that the placing of certainty in the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of ideas, is the cauſe, that "there cannot be any ſuch thing, as the aſſurance of faith, upon "divine revelation," to any body? Tho' I, who hold knowledge to conſiſt in the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of ideas, have the misfortune to run into this error, viz. "that reaſon cannot perceive the connection between "the objects and the ideas," which is inconſiſtent with the aſſurance of faith upon divine revelation; yet it is not neceſſary that all others, who with me hold, that certainty conſiſts in the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of ideas, ſhould alſo hold, "that reaſon cannot perceive the connection between the objects and the ideas," or that I myſelf ſhould always hold it; unleſs your Lordſhip will ſay, that whoever places certainty, as I do, in the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of ideas, muſt neceſſarily hold all the errors that I do, which are inconſiſtent with, or weaken, the belief of any article of faith, and hold them incorrigibly. Which has as much conſequence, as if I ſhould argue, that becauſe your Lordſhip, who lives at Worceſter, does, ſometime, miſtake in quoting me; therefore, no body, who lives at Worceſter, can quote my words right, or your Lordſhip can never mend your wrong quotations. For, my Lord, the holding certainty to conſiſt in the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement of ideas, is no more a neceſſary cauſe of holding thoſe erroneous propoſitions, which your Lordſhip imputes to me, as weakening the credibility of the mentioned articles of faith, than the place of your Lordſhip's dwelling is a neceſſary cauſe of wrong quoting.

I shall not here go about to trouble your Lordſhip, with divining again what may be your Lordſhip's preciſe meaning, in ſeveral of the propoſitions, contained in the paſſages above ſet down; eſpecially that remarkably ambiguous, and, to me, obſcure, one, viz. "there muſt be a certainty, as to ſenſe and tradition." I fear, I have waſted too much of your Lordſhip's, and my reader's time, in that imployment already; and there would be no end, if I ſhould endeavour to explain, whatever I am at a loſs about the determined ſenſe of, in any of your Lordſhip's expreſſions.

Only I will crave leave to beg my reader to obſerve, that, in this firſt head, P. 27.--31. which we are upon, your Lordſhip has uſed the terms, certain, and certainty, near twenty times, but without determining, in any of them, whether you mean knowledge, or the full aſſurance of faith, or any degree of believing; tho' it be evident, that in theſe pages, your Lordſhip uſes certainty, for all theſe three: which ambiguous uſe of the main word, in that diſcourſe, cannot but render your Lordſhip's ſenſe clear and perſpicuous, and your argument very cogent; and no doubt will do ſo, to any one, who will be but at the pains to reduce that one word to a clear, determined ſenſe, all thro' theſe few paragraphs.

P. 23. YOUR Lordſhip ſays, "have not all mankind, who have talked of matters of "faith, allowed a certainty of faith, as well as a certainty of knowledge?" Anſw. But did ever any one, of all that mankind, allow it as tolerable way of ſpeaking, that believing, in general (for which your Lordſhip has uſed it) which contains in it the loweſt degree of faith, ſhould be called certainty? Could he, who ſaid, "I believe; Lord, help my unbelief," or any one, who is weak in faith, or of little faith; be properly ſaid to be certain, or "de dubio certus," of what he believes, but with a weak degree of aſſent? I ſhall not queſtion what your Lordſhip's great learning may authorize; but I imagine, every one hath not ſkill, or will not aſſume the liberty to ſpeak ſo.

IF a witneſs before a judge, aſked upon his oath, whether he were certain of ſuch a thing, ſhould anſwer, yes, he was certain; and, upon further demand, ſhould give this account of his certainty, that he believed it; would he not make the court and auditors believe ſtrangely of him? For to ſay, that a man is certain, when he barely believes, and that, perhaps, with no great aſſurance of faith, is to ſay that he is certain, where he owns an uncertainty. For he that ſays, he barely believes, acknowledges that he aſſents to a propoſition, as true, upon bare probability. And where any one aſſents thus, to any propoſition, his aſſent excludes not a poſſibility, that it may be otherwiſe; and where, in any one's judgment, there is a poſſibility to be otherwiſe, there one cannot deny, but there is ſome uncertainty; and the leſs cogent the probabilities appear, upon which he aſſents, the greater the uncertainty. So that all barely probable proofs, which procure aſſent, always containing ſome viſible poſſibility, that it may be otherwiſe (or elſe it would be demonſtration) and conſequently the weaker the probability appears, the weaker the aſſent, and the more the uncertainty; it thence follows, that, where there is ſuch a mixture of uncertainty, there a man is ſo far uncertain: and therefore to ſay, that a man is certain, where he barely believes, or aſſents but weakly, tho' he does believe, ſeems to me to ſay, that he is certain and uncertain together. But tho' bare belief always includes ſome degrees of uncertainty, yet it does not, therefore, neceſſarily include any degree of wavering; the evidently ſtrong probability may as ſteadily determine the man to aſſent to the truth, or make him take the propoſition for true, and act accordingly, as knowledge makes him ſee, or be certain, that it is true. And he that doth ſo, as to truths revealed in the ſcripture, will ſhew his faith by his works; and has, for ought I can ſee, all the faith neceſſary to a Chriſtian, and required to ſalvation.

MY Lord, when I conſider the length of my anſwer here, to theſe few pages of your Lordſhip's, I cannot but bemoan my own dulneſs, and own my unfitneſs to deal with ſo learned an adverſary, as your Lordſhip, in controverſy; for I know not how to anſwer, but to a propoſition of a determined ſenſe. Whilſt it is vague and uncertain, in a general, or equivocal uſe of any of the terms, I cannot tell what to ſay to it. I know not but ſuch comprehenſive ways of expreſſing one's ſelf, may do well enough in declamation; but, in reaſoning, there can be no judgment made, till one can get to ſome poſitive determined ſenſe of the ſpeaker. If your Lordſhip had pleaſed to have condeſcended ſo far to my low capacity, as to have delivered your meaning here, determined to any one of the ſenſes above ſet down, or any other, that you may have in theſe words, I gathered them from, it would have ſaved me a great deal of writing, and your Lordſhip's loſs of time in reading. I ſhould not ſay this here to your Lordſhip, were it only in this one place, that I find this inconvenience: it is every where, in all your Lordſhip's reaſonings, that my want of underſtanding cauſes me this difficulty, and, againſt my will, multiplies the words of my anſwer: for notwithſtanding all that great deal, that I have already ſaid, to theſe few pages of your Lordſhip's; yet my defence is not clear, and ſet in its due light, unleſs I ſhew in particular, of every one of thoſe propoſitions (ſome whereof I admit as true, others I deny, as not ſo) that it will not prove, what is to be proved, viz. That my placing of knowledge in the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of ideas, leſſens the credibility of any article of faith, which it had before.

Your Lordſhip having done with the fundamental article of natural religion, you come, in the next place, to thoſe of revelation; to enquire, as your Lordſhip ſays, "whether thoſe, who embrace the articles of faith, in the way of "ideas, can retain their certainty of thoſe articles, when theſe ideas are quit-"ted?" What this inquiry is, I know not very well, becauſe I neither underſtand what it is, to embrace articles of faith in the way of ideas, nor know what your Lordſhip means by retaining their certainty of thoſe articles, when theſe ideas are quitted. But it is no ſtrange thing, for my ſhort ſight, not always diſtinctly to diſcern your Lordſhip's meaning: yet here I preſume to know that this is the thing to be proved, viz. "that my definition of knowledge does not "leave to the articles of the Chriſtian faith, the ſame credibility, they had be-"fore." The articles your Lordſhip inſtances in, are, P. 31.

1. The reſurrection of the dead. And here your Lordſhip proceeds, juſt in the ſame method of arguing, as you did in the former: your Lordſhip brings ſeveral paſſages, concerning identity, out of my Eſſay, which you ſuppoſe inconſiſtent with the belief of the reſurrection of the ſame body; and this is your argument to prove, that my defining of knowledge to conſiſt in the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of ideas, "alters the foundation of this article "of faith, and leaves it not the ſame credibility, it had before." Now, my Lord, granting all that your Lordſhip has here quoted, out of my chapter of identity and diverſity, to be as falſe, as your Lordſhip pleaſes, and as inconſiſtent as your Lordſhip would have it, with the article of the reſurrection from the dead; nay, granting all the reſt of my whole Eſſay to be falſe; how will it follow from thence, that the placing certainty in the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of ideas, weakens the credibility of this article of faith, that the dead ſhall riſe? Let it be, that I, who place certainty in the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of ideas, am guilty of errors, that weaken the credibility of this article of faith; others, who place certainty in the ſame perception, may not run into thoſe errors, and ſo not have their belief of this article at all ſhaken. P. 32.

Your Lordſhip, therefore, by all the long diſcourſe, you have made here, againſt my notion of perſonal identity, to prove that it weakens the credibility of the reſurrection of the dead, ſhould you have proved it ever ſo clearly, has not, I humbly conceive, ſaid therein any one word, towards the proving, that my definition of knowledge weakens the credibility of this article of faith. For, this, my Lord, is the propoſition to be proved, as your Lordſhip cannot but remember, if you pleaſe to recollect what is ſaid, in your 21ſt and following pages, and what, in the 95th page of my ſecond letter, quoted by your Lordſhip, it was deſigned as an anſwer to. And ſo I proceed to the next articles of faith, your Lordſhip inſtances in. Your Lordſhip ſays,

2. "The next articles of faith, which my notion of ideas is inconſiſtent "with, are no leſs than thoſe of the Trinity, and the incarnation of our Savi-"our." Where I muſt humbly crave leave to obſerve to your Lordſhip, that in this ſecond head, here, your Lordſhip has changed the queſtion from my notion of certainty, to my notion of ideas. For the queſtion, as I have often had occaſion to obſerve to your Lordſhip, is, whether my notion of certainty, i. e. my placing of certainty in the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of ideas, alters the foundation, and leſſens the credibility of any article of faith? This being the queſtion, between your Lordſhip and me, ought, I humbly conceive, moſt eſpecially to have been kept cloſe to, in this article of the Trinity; becauſe it was upon the account of my notion of certainty, as prejudicial to the doctrine of the Trinity, that my book was firſt brought into this diſpute. But your Lordſhip offers nothing, that I can find, to prove that my definition of know- P. 44.

knowledge, or certainty, does any way leſſen the credibility of either of the articles, here mentioned, unleſs your inſiſting upon ſome ſuppoſed errors of mine, about nature and perſon, muſt be taken for proofs of this propoſition, that my definition of certainty leſſens the credibility of the articles of the Trinity, and our Saviour's incarnation. And then the anſwer I have already given, to the ſame way of argumentation, uſed by your Lordſhip, concerning the articles of a God, revelation, and the reſurrection, I think may ſuffice.

Having, as I beg leave to think, ſhewn that your Lordſhip has not in the leaſt proved this propoſition, that the placing of certainty in the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of ideas, weakens the credibility of any one article of faith, which was your former accuſation againſt this (as your Lordſhip is pleaſed to call it) "new method of certainty, of ſo dangerous conſequence to that "article of faith, which your Lordſhip has endeavoured to defend;" and all that your terrible repreſentation of it, being, as I humbly conceive, come to juſt nothing; I come now to vindicate my book from your new accuſation, in your laſt letter, and to ſhew, that you no more prove the paſſages, you allege out of my Eſſay, to have any inconſiſtency with the articles of the Chriſtian faith, you oppoſe them to, than you have proved by them, that my definition of knowledge weakens the credibility of any of thoſe articles.

1. "The article of the Chriſtian faith your Lordſhip begins with, is that of "the reſurrection of the dead;" and concerning that, you ſay, "the reaſon of "believing the reſurrection of the ſame body, upon my grounds, is from the idea "of identity." Anſw. Give me leave, my Lord, to ſay, that the reaſon of believing any article of the Chriſtian faith (ſuch as your Lordſhip is here ſpeaking of) to me, and upon my grounds, is its being a part of divine revelation. Upon this ground I believed it, before I either writ that chapter of identity and diverſity; and before I ever thought of thoſe propoſitions, which your Lordſhip quotes out of that chapter: and, upon the ſame ground, I believe it ſtill; and not from my idea of identity. This ſaying of your Lordſhip's, therefore, being a propoſition neither ſelf-evident, nor allowed by me to be true, remains to be proved. So that your foundation failing, all your large ſuperſtructure built thereon, comes to nothing. P. 32.

But, my Lord, before we go any farther, I crave leave humbly to repreſent to your Lordſhip, that I thought you undertook to make out, that my notion of ideas was inconſiſtent with the articles of the Chriſtian faith. But that, which your Lordſhip inſtances in here, is not, that I yet know, an article of the Chriſtian faith. The reſurrection of the dead, I acknowledge to be an article of the Chriſtian faith; but that the reſurrection of the ſame body, in your Lordſhip's ſenſe of the ſame body, is an article of the Chriſtian faith, is what, I confeſs, I do not yet know.

In the New Teſtament (wherein, I think, are contained all the articles of the Chriſtian faith) I find our Saviour and the Apoſtles to preach the reſurrection of the dead, and the reſurrection from the dead, in many places: but I do not remember any place, where the reſurrection of the ſame body is ſo much as mentioned. Nay, which is very remarkable in the caſe, I do not remember, in any place of the New Teſtament (where the general reſurrection at the laſt day is ſpoken of) any ſuch expreſſion, as the reſurrection of the body, much leſs of the ſame body. "And it may ſeem to be, not without ſome ſpecial reaſon, "that where St. Paul's diſcourſe was particularly, concerning the body, and ſo "led him to name it; yet when he ſpeaks of the reſurrection, he ſays, you, and "not your bodies," 1 Cor. vi. 14.

I say, the general reſurrection at the laſt day; becauſe where the reſurrection of ſome particular perſons, preſently upon our Saviour's reſurrection, is mentioned, the words are, "The graves were opened, and many bodies of the ſaints, "which ſlept, aroſe, and came out of the graves, after his reſurrection, and "went into the holy city, and appeared to many." Of which peculiar way of ſpeaking of this reſurrection, the paſſage itſelf gives a reaſon in theſe words, "appeared to many;" i. e. thoſe who ſlept appeared, ſo as to be known to be riſen. But this could not be known, unleſs they brought with them the evidence, that Mat. xxvii. 52, 53.

that they were thoſe, who had been dead, whereof there were theſe two proofs; their graves were opened, and their bodies not only gone out of them, but appeared to be the ſame to thoſe, who had known them formerly alive, and knew them to be dead and buried. For if they had been thoſe, who had been dead ſo long, that all, who knew them once alive, were now gone, thoſe to whom they appeared might have known them to be men, but could not have known they were riſen from the dead, becauſe they never knew they had been dead. All that by their appearing, they could have known, was, that they were ſo many living ſtrangers, of whoſe reſurrection they knew nothing. It was neceſſary, therefore, that they ſhould come in ſuch bodies, as might, in make and ſize, &c. appear to be the ſame they had before, that they might be known to thoſe of their acquaintance, whom they appeared to. And it is probable, they were ſuch as were newly dead, whoſe bodies were not yet diſſolved and diſſipated; and therefore, it is particularly ſaid here (differently from what is ſaid of the general reſurrection) that "their bodies aroſe;" becauſe they were the ſame, that were then lying in their graves, the moment before they aroſe.

BUT your Lordſhip endeavours to prove, it muſt be the ſame body: and let us grant, that your Lordſhip, nay, and others too, think you have proved, it muſt be the ſame body; will you therefore ſay, that he holds, what is inconſiſtent with an article of faith, who having never ſeen this your Lordſhip's interpretation of the ſcripture, nor your reaſons for the ſame body, in your ſenſe of ſame body; or, if he has ſeen them, yet not underſtanding them, or not perceiving the force of them, believes what the ſcripture propoſes to him, viz. that at the laſt day, the dead ſhall be raiſed, without determining, whether it ſhall be with the very ſame bodies, or no?

I KNOW, your Lordſhip pretends not to erect your particular interpretations of ſcripture, into articles of faith; and, if you do not, he that believes the dead ſhall be raiſed, believes that article of faith, which the ſcripture propoſes; and cannot be accuſed of holding any thing inconſiſtent with it, if it ſhould happen, that what he holds, is inconſiſtent with another propoſition, viz. "that "the dead ſhall be raiſed with the ſame bodies," in your Lordſhip's ſenſe; which I do not find propoſed in Holy Writ, as an article of faith.

BUT your Lordſhip argues, "it muſt be the ſame body;" which, as you explain ſame body, "is not the ſame individual particles of matter, which were "united at the point of death; nor the ſame particles of matter, that the ſinner "had, at the time of the commiſſion of his ſins: but that it muſt be the ſame "material ſubſtance, which was vitally united to the ſoul here;" i. e. as I underſtand it, the ſame individual particles of matter, which were, ſome time or other, during his life here, vitally united to his ſoul. P. 34, 35.

YOUR firſt argument, to prove that it muſt be the ſame body, in this ſenſe of the ſame body, is taken from theſe words of our Saviour: "All that are in the "graves ſhall hear his voice, and ſhall come forth." From whence your Lordſhip argues, that theſe words, "all that are in their graves," relate to no other ſubſtance than what was united to the ſoul, in life; becauſe "a different ſub"ſtance cannot be ſaid to be in the graves, and to come out of them." Which words of your Lordſhip's, if they prove any thing, prove that the ſoul too is lodged in the grave, and raiſed out of it, at the laſt day. For your Lordſhip ſays, "can a different ſubſtance be ſaid to be in their graves, and come out of them?" So that, according to this interpretation of theſe words of our Saviour, no other ſubſtance, being raiſed, but what hears his voice; and no other ſubſtance hearing his voice, but what being called comes out of the grave; and no other ſubſtance coming out of the grave, but what was in the grave; any one muſt conclude, that the ſoul, unleſs it be in the grave, will make no part of the perſon that is raiſed, unleſs, as your Lordſhip argues againſt me, "you "can make it out that a ſubſtance, which never was in the grave, may come out of it," or that the ſoul is no ſubſtance. P. 37. John v. 28, 29. P. 37.

BUT ſetting aſide the ſubſtance of the ſoul; another thing, that will make any one doubt, whether this your interpretation of our Saviour's words be neceſſarily to be received, as their true ſenſe, is, that it will not be very eaſily reconciled

P. 34. ciled to your ſaying, you do not mean, by the ſame body, "the ſame individual "particles, which were united, at the point of death." And yet, by this interpretation of our Saviour's words, you can mean no other particles, but ſuch as were united at the point of death; becauſe you mean no other ſubſtance, but what comes out of the grave, and no ſubſtance, no particles, come out, you ſay, but what were in the grave: and I think your Lordſhip will not ſay, that the particles, that were ſeparate from the body by perſpiration, before the point of death, were laid up in the grave.

P. 37. BUT your Lordſhip, I find, has an anſwer to this; viz, "that, by comparing this with other places, you find that the words [of our Saviour above quoted] are to be underſtood of the ſubſtance of the body, to which the ſoul was "united; and not to (I ſuppoſe your Lordſhip writ, of) thoſe individual particles," i. e. thoſe individual particles, that are in the grave, at the reſurrection; for ſo they muſt be read, to make your Lordſhip's ſenſe entire, and to the purpoſe of your anſwer here. And then, methinks, this laſt ſenſe of our Saviour's words, given by your Lordſhip, wholly overturns the ſenſe which you have given of them above; where, from thoſe words, you preſs the belief of the reſurrection of the ſame body, by this ſtrong argument, that a ſubſtance could not, upon hearing the voice of Chriſt, "come out of the grave, which was never in "the grave;" there (as far as I can underſtand your words) your Lordſhip argues, that our Saviour's words muſt be underſtood of the particles in the grave, "unleſs, as your Lordſhip ſays, one can make it out, that a ſubſtance, which "never was in the grave, may come out of it." And here your Lordſhip expreſsly ſays, that "our Saviour's words are to be underſtood of the ſubſtance of "that body, to which the ſoul was [at any time] united, and not to thoſe individual particles, that are in the grave." Which, put together, ſeems to me to ſay, that our Saviour's words are to be underſtood of thoſe particles only that are in the grave, and not of thoſe particles only, which are in the grave; but of others alſo, which have, at any time, been vitally united to the ſoul, but never were in the grave.

THE next text your Lordſhip brings, to make the reſurrection of the ſame
2 Cor. v. 10. body, in your ſenſe, an article of faith, are theſe words of St. Paul: "For we "muſt all appear before the judgment-ſeat of Chriſt, that every one may receive the things done in his body, according to that he hath done, whether it "be good or bad." To which your Lordſhip ſubjoins this queſtion; "can
P. 38. "theſe words be underſtood of any other material ſubſtance, but that body, in "which theſe things were done?" Anſw. A man may ſuſpend his determining the meaning of the apoſtle to be, that a ſinner ſhall ſuffer for his ſins in the very ſame body, wherein he committed them; becauſe St. Paul does not ſay he ſhall have the very ſame body, when he ſuffers, that he had when he ſinned. The apoſtle ſays indeed, "done in his body." The body he had, and did things in, at five, or fifteen, was no doubt his body, as much as that, which he did things in, at fifty, was his body, tho' his body were not the very ſame body, at thoſe different ages: and ſo will the body, which he ſhall have, after the reſurrection, be his body, tho' it be not the very ſame with that, which he had at five, or fifteen, or fifty. He that at threeſcore is broke on the wheel, for a murder he committed at twenty, is puniſhed for what he did in his body; tho' the body he has, i. e. his body at threeſcore, be not the ſame, i. e. made up of the ſame individual particles of matter, that that body was, which he had forty years before. When your Lordſhip has reſolved with yourſelf, what that ſame immutable, he, is, which at the laſt judgment ſhall receive the things done in his body; your Lordſhip will eaſily ſee, that the body he had, when an embryo in the womb, when a child playing in coats, when a man marrying a wife, and when bed-rid, dying of a conſumption, and, at laſt, which he ſhall have after his reſurrection; are each of them, his body, tho' neither of them be the ſame body, the one with the other.

BUT farther, to your Lordſhip's queſtion; "can theſe words be underſtood "of any other material ſubſtance, but that body, in which theſe things were "done?" I anſwer, theſe words of St. Paul may be underſtood of another material ſubſtance, than that body, in which theſe things were done; becauſe your Lordſhip teaches me, and gives me a ſtrong reaſon, ſo to underſtand them. Your Lordſhip ſays, that, "you do not ſay the ſame particles of matter, which the P. 34. "ſinner had, at the very time of the commiſſion of his ſins, ſhall be raiſed at "the laſt day." And your Lordſhip gives this reaſon for it: "for then a long P. 35. "ſinner muſt have a vaſt body, conſidering the continual ſpending of particles "by perſpiration." Now, my Lord, if the apoſtle's words, as your Lordſhip would argue, cannot be underſtood of any other material ſubſtance, but that body, in which theſe things were done; and no body, upon the removal, or change, of ſome of the particles that, at any time, make it up, is the ſame material ſubſtance, or the ſame body: it will, I think, thence follow, that either the ſinner muſt have all the ſame individual particles, vitally united to his ſoul when he is raiſed, that he had vitally united to his ſoul, when he ſinned: or elſe St. Paul's words, here, cannot be underſtood to mean the ſame body, in which "the things were done." For if there were other particles of matter, in the body, wherein the things were done, than in that, which is raiſed, that which is raiſed, cannot be the ſame body in which they were done: unleſs that alone, which has juſt all the ſame individual particles, when any action is done, being the ſame body, wherein it was done, that alſo, which has not the ſame individual particles, wherein that action was done, can be the ſame body, wherein it was done; which is, in effect, to make the ſame body, ſometimes to be the ſame, and ſometimes not the ſame.

Your Lordſhip thinks it ſuffices to make the ſame body, to have not all, but no other particles of matter, but ſuch as were ſome time, or other, vitally united to the ſoul before: but ſuch a body, made up of part of the particles ſome time, or other, vitally united to the ſoul, is no more the ſame body, wherein the actions were done, in the diſtant parts of the long ſinner's life, than that is the ſame body, in which a quarter, or half, or three quarters, of the ſame particles, that made it up, are wanting. For example; a ſinner has acted here, in his body, an hundred years; he is raiſed at the laſt day; but with what body? The ſame, ſays your Lordſhip, that he acted in; becauſe St. Paul ſays, "he muſt receive the things done in his body." What, therefore, muſt his body at the reſurrection conſiſt of? Muſt it conſiſt of all the particles of matter, that have ever been vitally united to his ſoul? For they, in ſucceſſion, have, all of them, made up his body, wherein he did theſe things. No, ſays your Lordſhip, that P. 35. would make his body too vaſt; it ſuffices to make the ſame body, in which the things were done, that it conſiſts of ſome of the particles, and no other, but ſuch as were, ſome time, during his life, vitally united to his ſoul. But, according to this account, his body at the reſurrection being, as your Lordſhip ſeems to limit it, near the ſame ſize it was, in ſome part of his life; it will be no more the ſame body, in which the things were done, in the diſtant parts of his life, than that is the ſame body, in which half, or three quarters, or more of the individual matter, that then made it up, is now wanting. For example; let his body at fifty years old, conſiſt of a million of parts; five hundred thouſand at leaſt of thoſe parts will be different from thoſe, which made up his body at ten years, and at an hundred. So that to take the numerical particles, that made up his body at fifty, or any other ſeaſon of his life; or to gather them promiſcuouſly out of thoſe, which at different times, have ſucceſſively been vitally united to his ſoul: they will no more make the ſame body, which was his, wherein ſome of his actions were done, than that is the ſame body, which has but half the ſame particles: and yet all your Lordſhip's argument, here, for the ſame body, is, becauſe St. Paul ſays it muſt be his body, in which theſe things were done; which it could not be, "if any other ſubſtance were joined to it," i. e. if any other particles of matter made up the body, which were not vitally united to the ſoul, when the action was done.

Again, your Lordſhip ſays, "that you do not ſay the ſame individual P. 34. "particles [ſhall make up the body at the reſurrection] which were united "at the point of death; for there muſt be a great alteration in them, in a lingering diſeaſe, as, if a fat man falls into a conſumption." Becauſe it is likely your Lordſhip thinks theſe particles of a decrepit, waſted, withered body would be too few, or unfit to make ſuch a plump, ſtrong, vigorous, well-ſized body, as it has pleaſed your Lordſhip to proportion out, in your thoughts, to men, at the reſurrection; and therefore, ſome ſmall portion of the particles formerly united vitally to that man's ſoul, ſhall be re-aſſumed to make up his body to the bulk, your Lordſhip judges convenient: but the greateſt part of them ſhall be left out, to avoid the making his body more vaſt, than your Lordſhip thinks will be fit, as appears, by theſe your Lordſhip's words, immediately following, P. 35. viz. "that you do not ſay the ſame particles the ſinner had, at the very time of "commiſſion of his ſins; for then a long ſinner muſt have a vaſt body."

But then pray, my Lord, what muſt an embrio do, who, dying within a few hours after his body was vitally united to his ſoul, has no particles of matter, which were formerly vitally united to it, to make up his body, of that ſize and proportion, which your Lordſhip ſeems to require, in bodies at the reſurrection? or muſt we believe he ſhall remain content with that ſmall pittance of matter, and that yet imperfect body, to eternity; becauſe it is an article of faith, to believe the reſurrection of the very ſame body? i. e. made up of only ſuch particles, as have been vitally united to the ſoul. For if it be ſo, as your Lordſhip ſays, "that P. 43. "life is the reſult of the union of ſoul and body," it will follow, that the body of an embrio, dying in the womb, may be very little, not the thouſandth part of any ordinary man. For ſince, from the firſt conception and beginning of formation, it has life, and "life is the reſult of the union of the ſoul with the body;" an embrio, that ſhall die, either by the untimely death of the mother, or by any other accident, preſently after it has life, muſt, according to your Lordſhip's doctrine, remain a man, not an inch long, to eternity; becauſe there are not particles of matter, formerly united to his ſoul, to make him bigger; and no other can be made uſe of, to that purpoſe: tho' what greater congruity the ſoul hath with any particles of matter, which were once vitally united to it, but are now ſo no longer, than it hath with particles of matter, which it was never united to, would be hard to determine, if that ſhould be demanded.

By theſe, and not a few other the like conſequences, one may ſee, what ſervice they do to religion, and the chriſtian doctrine, who raiſe queſtions, and make articles of faith, about the reſurrection of the ſame body, where the ſcripture ſays nothing of the ſame body; or, if it does, it is with no ſmall reprimand 1 Cor. xv. 35, &c. to thoſe, who make ſuch an enquiry. "But ſome man will ſay, how are the "dead raiſed up? and with what body do they come? Thou fool, that, which "thou ſoweſt, is not quickened, except it die. And that, which thou ſoweſt, "thou ſoweſt not that body, that ſhall be, but bare grain; it may chance of "wheat, or of ſome other grain: but God giveth it a body, as it hath pleaſed "him." Words, I ſhould think, ſufficient to deter us from determining any thing for, or againſt, the ſame body's being raiſed at the laſt day. It ſuffices, that all the dead ſhall be raiſed, and every one appear and anſwer for the things done in this life, and receive according to the things, he hath done in his body, whether good or bad. He that believes this, and has ſaid nothing inconſiſtent herewith, I preſume, may, and muſt, be acquitted from being guilty of any thing inconſiſtent with the articles of the reſurrection of the dead.

P. 38. But your Lordſhip, to prove the reſurrection of the ſame body to be an article of faith, farther aſks, "how could it be ſaid, if any other ſubſtance be joined "to the ſoul, at the reſurrection, as its body, that they were the things done in, "or by the body?" Anſw. Juſt as it may be ſaid of a man, at an hundred years old, that hath then another ſubſtance joined to his ſoul, than he had at twenty, that the murder, or drunkenneſs, he was guilty of, at twenty, were things done in the body: how, by the body, comes in here, I do not ſee.

Your Lordſhip adds, "and St. Paul's diſpute, about the manner of raiſing "the body, might ſoon have ended, if there were no neceſſity of the ſame body." Anſw. When I underſtand what argument there is in theſe words, to prove the reſurrection of the ſame body, without the mixture of one new atom of matter, I ſhall know what to ſay to it. In the mean time, this I underſtand, that St. Paul would have put as ſhort an end to all diſputes about this matter, if he had ſaid, that there was a neceſſity of the ſame body, or that it ſhould be the ſame body.

The next text of ſcripture you bring, for the ſame body, is, "if there be no "reſurrection of the dead, then is not Chriſt raiſed." From which your Lordſhip argues; "it ſeems, then, other bodies are to be raiſed, as his was." I grant other dead, as certainly raiſed, as Chriſt was; for elſe his reſurrection would be of no uſe to mankind: but I do not ſee how it follows, that they ſhould be raiſed with the ſame body, as Chriſt was raiſed with the ſame body, as your Lordſhip infers, in theſe words annexed; "and can there be any doubt, whether his body "was the ſame material ſubſtance, which was united to his ſoul before?" I anſwer, none at all; nor that it had juſt the ſame diſtinguiſhing lineaments and marks; yea, and the ſame wounds, that it had at the time of his death. If, therefore, your Lordſhip will argue, from other bodies being raiſed, as his was, that they muſt keep proportion with his, in ſameneſs; then we muſt believe, that every man ſhall be raiſed with the ſame lineaments, and other notes of diſtinction, he had, at the time of his death, even with his wounds yet open, if he had any, becauſe our Saviour was ſo raiſed; which ſeems, to me, ſcarce reconcileable with what your Lordſhip ſays of a fat man falling into a conſumption, and dying. 2 Cor. xv. 16. P. 38.

But whether it will conſiſt, or no, with your Lordſhip's meaning in that place, this to me ſeems a conſequence, that will need to be better proved, viz. that our bodies muſt be raiſed the ſame, juſt as our Saviour's was; becauſe St. Paul ſays, "if there be no reſurrection of the dead, then is not Chriſt riſen." For it may be a good conſequence, Chriſt is riſen; and, therefore, there ſhall be a reſurrection of the dead; and yet this may not be a good conſequence, Chriſt was raiſed with the ſame body he had at his death, therefore all men ſhall be raiſed with the ſame body they had at their death, contrary to what your Lordſhip ſays, concerning a fat man dying of a conſumption. But the caſe I think far different, betwixt our Saviour, and thoſe to be raiſed at the laſt day. P. 34.

1. His body ſaw not corruption, and, therefore, to give him another body, new molded, mixed with other particles, which were not contained in it, as it lay in the grave, whole and intire, as it was laid there, had been to deſtroy his body, to frame him a new one, without any need. But why with the remaining particles of a man's body, long ſince diſſolved, and mouldered into duſt and atoms (whereof, poſſibly, a great part may have undergone variety of changes, and entered into other concretions, even in the bodies of other men) other new particles of matter mixed with them, may not ſerve to make his body again, as well as the mixture of new and different particles of matter with the old, did, in the compaſs of his life, make his body; I think no reaſon can be given.

This may ſerve to ſhew, why, tho' the materials of our Saviour's body were not changed at his reſurrection; yet it does not follow, but that the body of a man, dead and rotten in his grave, or burnt, may, at the laſt day, have ſeveral new particles in it, and that without any inconvenience: ſince, whatever matter is vitally united to his ſoul, is his body, as much as is that, which was united to it, when he was born, or in any other part of his life.

2. In the next place, the ſize, ſhape, figure, and lineaments of our Saviour's body, even to his wounds, into which doubting Thomas put his fingers and his hand, were to be kept, in the raiſed body of our Saviour, the ſame they were at his death, to be a conviction to his diſciples, to whom he ſhewed himſelf, and who were to be witneſſes of his reſurrection, that their maſter, the very ſame man, was crucified, dead and buried, and raiſed again; and, therefore, he was handled by them, and eat before them, after he was riſen, to give them, in all points, full ſatisfaction, that it was really he, the ſame, and not another, nor a ſpectre, or apparition, of him: tho' I do not think your Lordſhip will thence argue, that becauſe others are to be raiſed, as he was, therefore it is neceſſary to believe, that becauſe he eat after his reſurrection, others, at the laſt day, ſhall eat and drink, after they are raiſed from the dead; which ſeems to me, as good an argument, as becauſe his undiſſolved body was raiſed out of the grave, juſt as it there lay, entire, without the mixture of any new particles, therefore the cor-

rupted and conſumed bodies of the dead, at the reſurrection, ſhall be new framed, only out of thoſe ſcattered particles, which were once vitally united to their ſouls, without the leaſt mixture of any one ſingle atom of new matter. But, at the laſt day, when all men are raiſed, there will be no need to be aſſured of any one particular man's reſurrection. It is enough, that every one ſhall appear before the judgment-ſeat of Chriſt, to receive according to what he had done, in his former life; but, in what ſort of body he ſhall appear, or of what particles made up, the ſcripture having ſaid nothing, but that it ſhall be a ſpiritual body, raiſed in incorruption, it is not for me to determine.

P. 39. Your Lordſhip aſks, "were they [who ſaw our Saviour after his reſurrection] "witneſſes only of ſome material ſubſtance, then united to his ſoul?" In anſwer, I beg your Lordſhip to conſider, whether you ſuppoſe our Saviour was to be known, to be the ſame man (to the witneſſes, that were to ſee him, and teſtify his reſurrection) by his ſoul, that could neither be ſeen, nor known to be the ſame; or by his body, that could be ſeen, and by the diſcernible ſtructure and marks of it, be known to be the ſame? When your Lordſhip has reſolved that, all that you ſay in that page will anſwer itſelf. But, becauſe one man cannot know another to be the ſame, but by the outward, viſible lineaments, and ſenſible marks, he has been wont to be known and diſtinguiſhed by; will your Lordſhip therefore argue, that the great judge, at the laſt day, who gives to each man, whom he raiſes, his new body, ſhall not be able to know who is who, unleſs he give to every one of them a body, juſt of the ſame figure, ſize, and features, and made up of the very ſame individual particles, he had in his former life? Whether ſuch a way of arguing for the reſurrection of the ſame body, to be an article of faith, contributes much to the ſtrengthening the credibility of the article of the reſurrection of the dead, I ſhall leave to the judgment of others.

Farther, for the proving the reſurrection of the ſame body to be an article P. 40. of faith, your Lordſhip ſays; "but the apoſtle inſiſts upon the reſurrection of "Chriſt, not merely as an argument of the poſſibility of ours, but of the certainty of it; becauſe he roſe, as the firſt-fruits; Chriſt the firſt-fruits, afterwards they that are Chriſt's at his coming." 1 Cor. xv. 20, 23. Anſ. No doubt the reſurrection of Chriſt is a proof of the certainty of our reſurrection. But is it, therefore, a proof of the reſurrection of the ſame body, conſiſting of the ſame individual particles, which concurred to the making up of our body, here, without the mixture of any one other particle of matter? I confeſs, I ſee no ſuch conſequence.

P. 40. But your Lordſhip goes on: "St. Paul was aware of the objections, in men's "minds, about the reſurrection of the ſame body; and it is of great conſequence, "as to this article, to ſhew upon what grounds he proceeds. But ſome men "will ſay, how are the dead raiſed up, and with what body do they come? "Firſt, he ſhews, that the ſeminal parts of plants are wonderfully improved by "the ordinary providence of God, in the manner of their vegetation." Anſw. I do not perfectly underſtand what it is, "for the ſeminal parts of plants, to be "wonderfully improved, by the ordinary providence of God, in the manner of "their vegetation;" or elſe, perhaps, I ſhould better ſee, how this here tends to the proof of the reſurrection of the ſame body, in your Lordſhip's ſenſe.

P. 40. It continues, "they ſow bare grain of wheat, or of ſome other grain, but God "giveth it a body, as it hath pleaſed him, and to every ſeed his own body. Here, "ſays your Lordſhip, is an identity of the material ſubſtance ſuppoſed." It may be ſo: but to me a diverſity of the material ſubſtance, i. e. of the component particles, is here ſuppoſed, or in direct words ſaid. For the words of St. Paul, taken all together, run thus; "that which thou ſoweſt, thou ſoweſt not that Ver. 37. "body, which ſhall be, but bare grain:" and ſo on, as your Lordſhip has ſet down in the remainder of them. From which words of St. Paul, the natural argument ſeems to me to ſtand thus: if the body, that is put in the earth, in ſowing, is not that body that ſhall be; then the body, that is put in the grave, is not that, i. e. the ſame body that ſhall be.

P. 40. But your Lordſhip proves it to be the ſame body, by theſe three Greek words of the text, τὸ ἴδιον σῶμα, which your Lordſhip interprets thus, "that proper "body, which belongs to it." Anſ. Indeed by thoſe Greek words, τὸ ἴδιον σῶμα, whether our tranſlators have rightly rendered them, “ his own body,” or your Lordſhip more rightly, “ that proper body, which belongs to it,” I formerly underſtood no more but this; that, in the production of wheat, and other grain, from ſeed, God continued every ſpecies diſtinct; ſo that, from grains of wheat ſown, root, ſtalk, blade, ear, grains of wheat were produced, and not thoſe of barley, and ſo of the reſt; which I took to be the meaning of “ to every ſeed “ his own body.” No, ſays your Lordſhip, theſe words prove, that to every plant of wheat, and to every grain of wheat, produced in it, is given the proper body, that belongs to it, which is the ſame body with the grain that was ſown. Anſw. This, I confeſs, I do not underſtand; becauſe I do not underſtand, how one individual grain be the ſame with twenty, fifty, or an hundred individual grains, for ſuch, ſometimes, is the increaſe.

But your Lordſhip proves it. For, ſays your Lordſhip, “ every ſeed, having P. 40.
“ that body in little, which is afterwards ſo much inlarged; and, in grain, the “ ſeed is corrupted, before its germination; but it hath its proper organical parts, “ which make it the ſame body with that, which it grows up to. For, altho’ “ grain be not divided into lobes, as other ſeeds are, yet it hath been found, by “ the moſt accurate obſervations, that upon ſeparating the membranes, theſe “ ſeminal parts are diſcerned in them, which afterwards grow up to that body, “ which we call corn.” In which words I crave leave to obſerve, that your Lordſhip ſuppoſes, that a body may be enlarged by the addition of a hundred, or a thouſand, times as much in bulk, as its own matter, and yet continue the ſame body; which, I confeſs, I cannot underſtand.

But, in the next place, if that could be ſo, and that the plant, in its full growth, at harveſt, increaſed by a thouſand, or a million, of times as much new matter added to it, as it had, when it lay in little, concealed in the grain that was ſown, was the very ſame body; yet I do not think that your Lordſhip will ſay, that every minute, inſenſible and inconceivably ſmall grain of the hundred grains, contained in that little, organized, ſeminal plant, is every one of them the very ſame with that grain, which contains that whole little ſeminal plant, and all thoſe inviſible grains in it: for then it will follow, that one grain is the ſame with an hundred, and an hundred, diſtinct grains, the ſame with one; which I ſhall be able to aſſent to, when I can conceive that all the wheat in the world is but one grain.

For I beſeech you, my Lord, conſider, what it is St. Paul here ſpeaks of; it is plain he ſpeaks of that, which is ſown and dies, i. e. the grain, that the huſbandman takes out of his barn, to ſow in his field. And of this grain, St. Paul ſays, “ that it is not that body, that ſhall be.” Theſe two, viz. “ that which is “ ſown, and that body, that ſhall be,” are all the bodies, that St. Paul here ſpeaks of, to repreſent the agreement or difference of men’s bodies after the reſurrection, with thoſe they had, before they died. Now I crave leave to aſk your Lordſhip, which of theſe two is that little, inviſible ſeminal plant, which your Lordſhip here ſpeaks of? Does your Lordſhip mean by it, the grain, that is ſown? But that is not what St. Paul ſpeaks of; he could not mean this embryonated, little plant, for he could not denote it by theſe words, “ that which “ thou ſoweſt,” for that, he ſays, muſt die; but this little embryonated plant, contained in the ſeed that is ſown, dies not: or does your Lordſhip mean by it, “ the body that ſhall be?” But neither by theſe words, “ the body that ſhall be,” can St. Paul be ſuppoſed to denote this, inſenſible, little, embryonated plant; for that is already in being, contained in the ſeed that is ſown; and, therefore, could not be ſpoke of, under the name of the body that ſhall be. And, therefore, I confeſs, I cannot ſee, of what uſe it is to your Lordſhip, to introduce, here, this third body, which St. Paul mentions not; and to make that the ſame, or not the ſame, with any other, when thoſe, which St. Paul ſpeaks of, are, as I humbly conceive, theſe two, viſible ſenſible bodies, the grain ſown, and the corn grown up to ear; with neither of which this inſenſible, embryonated plant can be the ſame body, unleſs an inſenſible body can be the ſame body with a ſenſible body, and a little body can be the ſame body with one ten thouſand, or an hundred thouſand times, as big as itſelf. So that yet, I confeſs, I ſee not the reſurrection of the ſame body proved from theſe words of St. Paul, to be an article of faith.

P. 41. YOUR Lordſhip goes on; "St. Paul indeed ſaith, that we ſow not that body "that ſhall be; but he ſpeaks not of the identity, but the perfection of it." Here my underſtanding fails me again: for I cannot underſtand St. Paul to ſay, that the ſame, identical, ſenſible grain of wheat, which was ſown at ſeed-time, is the very ſame, with every grain of wheat, in the ear, at harveſt, that ſprang from it: yet ſo I muſt underſtand it, to make it prove, that the ſame, ſenſible body, that is laid in the grave, ſhall be the very ſame with that, which ſhall be raiſed at the reſurrection. For I do not know of any ſeminal body in little, contained in the dead carcaſe of any man, or woman; which, as your Lordſhip ſays, in ſeeds, having its proper organical parts, ſhall afterwards be enlarged, and at the reſurrection, grow up into the ſame man. For I never thought of any ſeed, or ſeminal parts, either of plant, or animal, "ſo wonderfully improved by the providence of God," whereby the ſame plant or animal, ſhould beget itſelf; nor ever heard, that it was, by divine providence, deſigned to produce the ſame individual, but for the producing of future and diſtinct individuals, for the continuation of the ſame ſpecies.

P. 41. YOUR Lordſhip's next words are, "and altho' there be ſuch a difference, from "the grain itſelf, when it comes up to be perfect corn, with root, ſtalk, blade "and ear, that it may be ſaid, to outward appearance, not to be the ſame body; "yet, with regard to the ſeminal and organical parts, it is as much the ſame, as "a man, grown up, is the ſame with the embryo in the womb." Anſw. It does not appear, by any thing, I can find in the text, that St. Paul here compared the body produced, with the ſeminal and organical parts contained in the grain, it ſprang from, but with the whole, ſenſible grain, that was ſown. Microſcopes had not then diſcovered the little embryo plant in the ſeed; and ſuppoſing it ſhould have been revealed to St. Paul (tho', in the ſcripture, we find little revelation of natural philoſophy) yet an argument, taken from a thing perfectly unknown to the Corinthians, whom he writ to, could be of no manner of uſe to them, nor ſerve at all, either to inſtruct, or convince them. But granting that thoſe, St. Paul writ to, knew it, as well as Mr. Lewenhooke; yet your Lordſhip thereby proves not the raiſing of the ſame body: your Lordſhip ſays, it is as much the ſame [I crave leave to add body] "as a man grown up is the ſame "(ſame what, I beſeech your Lordſhip?) with the embryo in the womb." For that the ſame body of the embryo in the womb, and body of the man grown up, is the ſame body, I think no one will ſay, unleſs he can perſuade himſelf that a body, that is not the hundredth part of another, is the ſame with that other; which, I think, no one will do, till having renounced this dangerous way by ideas, of thinking and reaſoning, he has learnt to ſay that a part and the whole are the ſame.

P. 41. YOUR Lordſhip goes on: "and altho' many arguments may be uſed to prove, "that a man is not the ſame; becauſe life, which depends upon the courſe of "the blood, and the manner of reſpiration and nutrition is ſo different in both "ſtates; yet that man would be thought ridiculous, that ſhould ſeriouſly affirm, "that it was not the ſame man. And your Lordſhip ſays, I grant that the variation of great parcels of matter in plants, alters not the identity; and that "the organization of the parts in one coherent body, partaking of one common "life, makes the identity of a plant." Anſw. My Lord, I think the queſtion is not about the ſame man, but the ſame body: for tho' I do ſay (ſomewhat differently from what your Lordſhip ſets down, as my words, here) "that that, "which has ſuch an organization, as is fit to receive and diſtribute nouriſhment, "ſo as to continue and frame the wood, bark, and leaves, &c. of a plant, in which "conſiſts the vegetable life; continues to be the ſame plant, as long as it partakes of the ſame life, tho' that life be communicated to new particles of matter, vitally united to the living plant:" yet I do not remember that I any where ſay, that a plant, which was once no bigger than an oaten-ſtraw, and afterwards

Eſſay, b. ii. c. 27. § 4.

wards grows to be above a fathom about, is the ſame body, tho' it be ſtill the ſame plant.

The well-known tree in Epping-foreſt, called the King's-oak, which, from not weighing an ounce at firſt, grew to have many tuns of timber in it, was all along the ſame oak, the very ſame plant; but no body, I think, will ſay it was the ſame body, when it weighed a tun, as it was when it weighed but an ounce; unleſs he has a mind to ſignalize himſelf, by ſaying, that that is the ſame body, which has a thouſand particles of different matter in it, for one particle that is the ſame; which is no better than to ſay, that a thouſand different particles are but one and the ſame particle, and one and the ſame particle is a thouſand different particles; a thouſand times a greater abſurdity, than to ſay, half is the whole, or the whole is the ſame with the half. Which will be improved ten thouſand times yet farther, if a man ſhall ſay (as your Lordſhip ſeems to me, to argue here) that that great oak is the very ſame body with the acorn, it ſprang from, becauſe there was, in that acorn, an oak in little, which was afterwards (as your Lordſhip expreſſes it) ſo much enlarged, as to make that mighty tree: for this embryo, if I may ſo call it, or oak in little, being not the one hundredth, or perhaps the thouſandth, part of the acorn, and the acorn being not the thouſandth part of the grown oak; it will be very extraordinary, to prove the acorn and the grown oak to be the ſame body, by a way wherein it cannot be pretended, that above one particle of an hundred thouſand, or a million, is the ſame in the one body, that it was in the other. From which way of reaſoning, it will follow, that a nurſe and her ſucking child have the ſame body; and be paſt doubt, that a mother and her infant have the ſame body. But this is a way of certainty, found out to eſtabliſh the articles of faith, and to overturn the new method of certainty, that your Lordſhip ſays, "I have ſtarted, which is apt to "leave men's minds more doubtful than before."

And now I deſire your Lordſhip to conſider, of what uſe it is to you, in the preſent caſe, to quote out of my Eſſay theſe words, "that partaking of one "common life, makes the identity of a plant;" ſince the queſtion is not about the identity of a plant, but about the identity of a body; it being a very different thing, to be the ſame plant, and to be the ſame body: for that, which makes the ſame plant, does not make the ſame body; the one being the partaking in the ſame, continued, vegetable life, the other the conſiſting of the ſame numerical particles of matter. And, therefore, your Lordſhip's inference from my words above quoted, in theſe which you ſubjoin, ſeems to me a very ſtrange one, viz. "ſo that, in things capable of any ſort of life, the identity is conſiſtent with P. 42. "a continued ſucceſſion of parts; and ſo the wheat, grown up, is the ſame "body, with the grain that was ſown:" for, I believe if my words, from which you infer, "and ſo the wheat, grown up, is the ſame body with the "grain that was ſown," were put into a ſyllogiſm, this would hardly be brought to be the concluſion.

But your Lordſhip goes on, with conſequence upon conſequence, tho' I have not eyes acute enough, every where to ſee the connexion, until you bring it to the reſurrection of the ſame body. The connexion of your Lordſhip's words is as followeth: "and thus the alteration of the parts of the body, at the reſurrec- P. 41. "tion, is conſiſtent with its identity, if its organization and life be the ſame; "and this is a real identity of the body, which depends not upon conſciouſneſs: "from whence it follows, that to make the ſame body, no more is required, "but reſtoring life to the organized parts of it." If the queſtion were about raiſing the ſame plant, I do not ſay, but there might be ſome appearance, for making ſuch an inference from my words as this; "whence it follows, that to "make the ſame plant, no more is required, but to reſtore life to the organized "parts of it." But this deduction, wherein, from thoſe words of mine, that ſpeak only of the identity of a plant, your Lordſhip infers, there is no more required to make the ſame body, than to make the ſame plant; being too ſubtle for me, I leave to my reader to find out.

Your Lordſhip goes on, and ſays, "that I grant likewiſe, that the identity P. 42. "of the ſame man conſiſts in a participation of the ſame continued life, by con-

" ſtantly fleeting particles of matter, in ſucceſſion, vitally united to the ſame or-" ganized body." Anſw. I ſpeak, in theſe words, of the identity of the ſame man; and your Lordſhip thence roundly concludes, " ſo that there is no difficul-" ty of the ſameneſs of the body." But your Lordſhip knows, that I do not take theſe two ſounds, man and body, to ſtand for the ſame thing; nor the identity of the man to be the ſame, with the identity of the body.

P. 42. BUT let us read out your Lordſhip's words: " ſo that there is no difficulty, as " to the ſameneſs of the body, if life were continued; and if, by divine power, " life be reſtored to that material ſubſtance, which was before united, by a re-" union of the ſoul to it, there is no reaſon to deny the identity of the body: " not from the conſciouſneſs of the ſoul, but from that life, which is the reſult " of the union of the ſoul and body."

IF I underſtand your Lordſhip right, you, in theſe words, from the paſſages above quoted out of my book, argue, that, from thoſe words of mine, it will follow, that it is, or may be, the ſame body, that is raiſed at the reſurrection. If ſo, my Lord, your Lordſhip has then proved, that my book is not inconſiſtent with, but conformable to this article of the reſurrection of the ſame body which your Lordſhip contends for, and will have to be an article of faith: for tho' I do, by no means, deny that the ſame bodies ſhall be raiſed at the laſt day, yet I ſee nothing your Lordſhip has ſaid to prove it to be an article of faith.

P. 43. BUT your Lordſhip goes on, with your proofs, and ſays; " but St. Paul ſtill " ſuppoſes, that it muſt be that material ſubſtance, to which the ſoul was before " united. For, ſaith he, " it is ſown in corruption, it is raiſed in incorruption; " it is ſown in diſhonour, it is raiſed in glory; it is ſown in weakneſs, it is raiſ-" ed in power; it is ſown a natural body, it is raiſed a ſpiritual body." Can ſuch " a material ſubſtance, which was never united to the body, be ſaid to be ſown " in corruption, and weakneſs, and diſhonour? Either, therefore, he muſt ſpeak " of the ſame body, or his meaning cannot be comprehended." I anſwer, " can " ſuch a material ſubſtance, which was never laid in the grave, be ſaid to be " ſown," &c? For your Lordſhip ſays, " you do not ſay the ſame individual

P. 34. " particles, which were united at the point of death, ſhall be raiſed at the laſt " day;" and no other particles are laid in the grave, but ſuch as are united at the point of death; either, therefore, your Lordſhip muſt ſpeak of another body, different from that, which was ſown, which ſhall be raiſed; or elſe your meaning, I think, cannot be comprehended.

BUT, whatever be your meaning, your Lordſhip proves it to be St. Paul's meaning, that the ſame body ſhall be raiſed, which was ſown, in theſe following words; " for what does all this relate to a conſcious principle?" Anſw. The

P. 43. ſcripture being expreſs, that the ſame perſons ſhould be raiſed, and appear before the judgment-ſeat of Chriſt, that every one may receive, according to what he had done in his body; it was very well ſuited to common apprehenſions (which refined not, " about particles, that had been vitally united to the ſoul") to ſpeak of the body, which each one was to have, after the reſurrection, as he would be apt to ſpeak of it, himſelf. For it being his body, both before and after the reſurrection, every one ordinarily ſpeaks of his body, as the ſame, tho' in a ſtrict and philoſophical ſenſe, as your Lordſhip ſpeaks, it be not the very ſame. Thus it is no impropriety of ſpeech to ſay, " this body of mine, which was formerly " ſtrong and plump, is now weak and waſted;" tho' in ſuch a ſenſe as you are ſpeaking here, it be not the ſame body. Revelation declares nothing, any where, concerning the ſame body, in your Lordſhip's ſenſe of the ſame body, which appears not to have been then thought of. The apoſtle directly propoſes nothing for, or againſt, the ſame body, as neceſſary to be believed: that which he is plain and direct in, is his oppoſing and condemning ſuch curious queſtions about the body which could ſerve only to perplex, not to confirm, what was material and neceſſary for them to believe, viz. a day of judgment, and retribution to men in a future ſtate; and, therefore, it is no wonder that, mentioning their bodies, he ſhould uſe a way of ſpeaking, ſuited to vulgar notions, from which it would be hard poſitively to conclude any thing, for the determining of this queſtion (eſpecially againſt expreſſions, in the ſame diſcourſe, that plainly incline to the other ſide) in a matter which, as it appears, the apoſtle thought not neceſſary to determine, and the Spirit of God thought not fit to gratify any one's curioſity in.

BUT your Lordſhip ſays, "the apoſtle ſpeaks plainly of that body, which "was once quickened, and afterwards falls to corruption, and is to be reſtored "with more noble qualities." P. 43. I wiſh your Lordſhip had quoted the words of St. Paul, wherein he ſpeaks plainly of that numerical body, that was once quickened; they would preſently decide this queſtion. But your Lordſhip proves it, by theſe following words of St. Paul; "for this corruption muſt put on incorruption, and this mortal muſt put on immortality;" to which your Lordſhip adds, "that you do not ſee how he could more expreſly affirm the identity of this corruptible body, with that after the reſurrection." How expreſly it is affirmed by the apoſtle, ſhall be conſidered by and by. In the mean time, it is paſt doubt, that your Lordſhip beſt knows, what you do, or do not ſee: but this I will be bold to ſay, that if St. Paul had any where, in this chapter (where there are ſo many occaſions for it, if it had been neceſſary to have been believed) but ſaid in expreſs words, that the ſame bodies ſhould be raiſed; every one elſe, who thinks of it, will ſee, he had more expreſly affirmed the identity of the bodies, which men now have, with thoſe, they ſhall have, after the reſurrection.

THE remainder of your Lordſhip's period, is; "and that without any reſpect "to the principle of ſelf-conſciouſneſs." P. 44. Anſw. Theſe words, I doubt not, have ſome meaning, but, I muſt own, I know not what; either, towards the proof of the reſurrection of the ſame body, or to ſhew that any thing I have ſaid, concerning ſelf-conſciouſneſs, is inconſiſtent: for I do not remember, that I have any where ſaid, that the identity of body conſiſted in ſelf-conſciouſneſs.

FROM your preceeding words, your Lordſhip concludes thus: "and ſo, if the "ſcripture be the ſole foundation of our faith, this is an article of it." P. 44. My Lord, to make the concluſion unqueſtionable, I humbly conceive, the words muſt run thus; "and ſo, if the ſcripture, and your Lordſhip's interpretation of "it, be the ſole foundation of our faith; the reſurrection of the ſame body is an "article of it." For, with ſubmiſſion, your Lordſhip has neither produced expreſs words of ſcripture for it, nor ſo proved that to be the meaning of any of thoſe words of ſcripture, which you have produced for it, that a man, who reads, and ſincerely endeavours, to underſtand the ſcripture, cannot but find himſelf obliged to believe, as expreſly, "that the ſame bodies of the dead," in your Lordſhip's ſenſe, ſhall be raiſed, as "that the dead ſhall be raiſed." And I crave leave to give your Lordſhip this one reaſon for it:

HE who reads, with attention, this diſcourſe of St. Paul, where he diſcourſes of the reſurrection, will ſee, that he plainly diſtinguiſhes between the dead, that ſhall be raiſed, and the bodies of the dead. 1 Cor. xv. For it is *νεκροὶ*, *πάντες*, *οἱ*, are the nominative caſes to *ἐγείρονται*, *ζωοποιηθήσονται*, *ἐγερθήσονται*, all along, and not *σώματα*, bodies; Ver. 15, 22, 23, 29, 32, 35, 52. which one may, with reaſon, think, would, ſomewhere or other, have been expreſſed, if all this had been ſaid, to propoſe it, as an article of faith, that the very ſame bodies ſhould be raiſed. The ſame manner of ſpeaking, the Spirit of God obſerves, all thro' the New Teſtament, where it is ſaid, "raiſe * the dead, quicken, or make alive, the dead, the reſurrection of the dead." Nay, theſe very words of our † Saviour, urged by your Lordſhip, for the reſurrection of the ſame body, run thus: *Πάντες οἱ ἐν τοῖς μνημείοις ἀκούσονται τῆς φωνῆς αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἐκπορεύσονται, οἱ τὰ ἀγαθὰ ποιήσαντες εἰς ἀνάστασιν ζωῆς, οἱ δὲ τὰ φαυλα πράξαντες εἰς ἀνάστασιν κρίσεως.* Would a well-meaning ſearcher of the ſcriptures be apt to think, that if the thing, here intended by our Saviour, were to teach and propoſe it as an article of faith, neceſſary to be believed by every one, that the very ſame bodies of the dead ſhould be raiſed; would not, I ſay, any one be apt to think, that, if our Saviour meant ſo, the words ſhould rather have been, *πάντα τὰ σώματα ἁ εν τοῖς μνημείοις*, i. e. "all the bodies, that are in the graves," rather than "all, who are in the graves;" which muſt denote perſons, and not preciſely bodies?

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* Mat. xxii. 31. Mark xii. 26. John v. 21. Acts xxvi. 7. Rom. iv. 17. 2 Cor. i. 9. 1 Theſſ. iv. 14, 16.

† John v. 28, 29.

Another evidence, that St. Paul makes a diſtinction between the dead, and the bodies of the dead, ſo that the dead cannot be taken in this, 1 Cor. xv. to ſtand preciſely for the bodies of the dead, are theſe words of the apoſtle; "but Ver. 35. "ſome man will ſay, how are the dead raiſed? and with what bodies do they "come?" Which words, dead, and, they, if ſuppoſed to ſtand preciſely for the bodies of the dead, the queſtion will run thus: "how are the dead bodies "raiſed? and, with what bodies do the dead bodies come?" which ſeems to have no very agreeable ſenſe.

This, therefore, being ſo, that the Spirit of God keeps ſo expreſsly to this phraſe, or form of ſpeaking, in the New Teſtament, "of raiſing, quickening, "riſing, reſurrection, &c. of the dead," where the reſurrection at the laſt day is ſpoken of; and that the body is not mentioned, but in anſwer to this queſtion, "with what bodies ſhall thoſe dead, who are raiſed, come?" So that, by the dead, cannot preciſely be meant, the dead bodies; I do not ſee but a good Chriſtian, who reads the ſcripture, with an intention to believe all, that is there revealed to him, concerning the reſurrection, may acquit himſelf of his duty therein, without entring into the inquiry, whether the dead ſhall have the very ſame bodies, or no; which ſort of inquiry, the apoſtle, by the appellation he beſtows here, on him that makes it, ſeems not much to encourage. Nor, if he ſhall think himſelf bound to determine, concerning the identity of the bodies of the dead, raiſed at the laſt day; will he, by the remainder of St. Paul's anſwer, find the determination of the apoſtle, to be much in favour of the very ſame body; unleſs the being told, that the body, ſown, is not that body that ſhall be; that the body raiſed is as different, from that which was laid down, as the fleſh of man is from the fleſh of beaſts, fiſhes, and birds, or as the ſun, moon, and ſtars, are different one from another; or as different as a corruptible, weak, natural, mortal body, is from an incorruptible, powerful, ſpiritual, immortal body; and laſtly, as different as a body, that is fleſh and blood, is from a body that is not 1 Cor. xv. 50. fleſh and blood; "for fleſh and blood cannot, ſays St. Paul, in this very place, "inherit the kingdom of God:" unleſs, I ſay, all this, which is contained in St. Paul's words, can be ſuppoſed to be the way to deliver this, as an article of faith, which is required to be believed by every one, viz. "that the dead ſhould "be raiſed, with the very ſame bodies that they had before, in this life;" which article, propoſed in theſe, or the like plain and expreſs words, could have left no room for doubt, in the meaneſt capacities, nor for conteſt, in the moſt perverſe minds. P. 44.

Your Lordſhip adds, in the next words; "and ſo it hath been always under- "ſtood, by the chriſtian church, viz. that the reſurrection of the ſame body, in "your Lordſhip's ſenſe of the ſame body, is an article of faith." Anſw. What the chriſtian church has always underſtood, is beyond my knowledge. But for thoſe who, coming ſhort of your Lordſhip's great learning, cannot gather their articles of faith, from the underſtanding of all the whole chriſtian church, ever ſince the preaching of the Goſpel (who make the far greater part of Chriſtians, I think I may ſay, nine hundred ninety and nine of a thouſand) but are forced to have recourſe to the ſcripture, to find them there; I do not ſee, that they will eaſily find there, this propoſed as an article of faith, that there ſhall be a reſurrection of the ſame body; but that there ſhall be a reſurection of the dead, without explicitly determining, that they ſhall be raiſed with bodies made up wholly of the ſame particles, which were once vitally united to their ſouls, in their former life; without the mixture of any one other particle of matter: which is that, which your Lordſhip means, by the ſame body.

But ſuppoſing your Lordſhip to have demonſtrated this to be an article of faith, tho' I crave leave to own, that I do not ſee, that all that your Lordſhip has ſaid, here, makes it ſo much as probable; what is all this to me? Yes, ſays P. 44. your Lordſhip, in the following words, "my idea of perſonal identity is incon- "ſiſtent with it; for it makes the ſame body, which was here united to the ſoul, "not to be neceſſary to the doctrine of the reſurrection. But any material ſub- "ſtance, united to the ſame principle of conſciouſneſs, makes the ſame body."

THIS is an argument of your Lordſhip's, which I am obliged to anſwer to. But is it not fit, I ſhould firſt underſtand it, before I anſwer it? Now, here I do not well know, what it is "to make a thing not to be neceſſary to the "doctrine of the reſurrection." But to help myſelf out, the beſt I can, with a gueſs, I will conjecture (which, in diſputing with learned men, is not very ſafe) your Lordſhip's meaning is, that "my idea of perſonal identity makes "it not neceſſary," that, for the raiſing the ſame perſon, the body ſhould be the ſame.

YOUR Lordſhip's next word is, but; to which I am ready to reply, but what? What does my idea of perſonal identity do? for ſomething of that kind the adverſative particle, but, ſhould, in the ordinary conſtruction of our language, introduce, to make the propoſition clear and intelligible: but here is no ſuch thing; but is one of your Lordſhip's privileged particles, which I muſt not meddle with, for fear your Lordſhip complain of me again, "as ſo ſevere a critick, that for "the leaſt ambiguity in any particle, fill up pages in my anſwer, to make my "book look conſiderable, for the bulk of it. But ſince this propoſition here, "my idea of perſonal identity makes the ſame body, which was here united to "the ſoul, not neceſſary to the doctrine of the reſurrection; but, any material "ſubſtance being united to the ſame principle of conſciouſneſs, makes the ſame "body, is brought to prove my idea of perſonal identity inconſiſtent with the "article of the reſurrection." I muſt make it out, in ſome direct ſenſe, or other, that I may ſee, whether it be both true and concluſive. I therefore venture to read it thus, "my idea of perſonal identity makes the ſame body, which was here "united to the ſoul, not to be neceſſary at the reſurrection; but allows, that any "material ſubſtance being united to the ſame principle of conſciouſneſs, makes "the ſame body: Ergo, my idea of perſonal identity is inconſiſtent with the "article of the reſurrection of the ſame body.

IF this be your Lordſhip's ſenſe, in this paſſage, as I here have gueſſed it to be; or elſe I know not what it is: I anſwer,

1. "THAT my idea of perſonal identity does not allow, that any material "ſubſtance being united to the ſame principle of conſciouſneſs, makes the ſame "body." I ſay no ſuch thing in my book, nor any thing, from whence it may be inferred; and your Lordſhip would have done me a favour, to have ſet down the words, where I ſay ſo, or thoſe from which you infer ſo, and ſhewed how it follows from any thing I have ſaid.

2. GRANTING that it were a conſequence from my idea of perſonal identity, that "any material ſubſtance, being united to the ſame principle of conſciouſneſs, "makes the ſame body;" this would not prove that my idea of perſonal identity was inconſiſtent with this propoſition, "that the ſame body ſhall be "raiſed;" but, on the contrary, affirms it; ſince if I affirm, as I do, that the ſame perſons ſhall be raiſed, and it be a conſequence of my idea of perſonal identity, that "any material ſubſtance, being united to the ſame principle of conſciouſneſs, makes the ſame body;" it follows, that if the ſame perſon be raiſed, the ſame body muſt be: and ſo I have herein not only ſaid nothing inconſiſtent with the reſurrection of the ſame body, but have ſaid more for it, than your Lordſhip. For there can be nothing plainer, than that, in the ſcripture, it is revealed, that the ſame perſons ſhall be raiſed, and appear before the judgment-ſeat of Chriſt, to anſwer for what they have done in their bodies. If, therefore, whatever matter be joined to the ſame principle of conſciouſneſs makes the ſame body; it is demonſtration, that if the ſame perſons are raiſed, they have the ſame bodies.

How, then, your Lordſhip makes this an inconſiſtency with the reſurrection, is beyond my conception. "Yes, ſays your Lordſhip, it is inconſiſtent with "it; for it makes the ſame body, which was here united to the ſoul, not to "be neceſſary." P. 44.

3. I ANSWER, therefore, thirdly, that this is the firſt time, I ever learnt, that not neceſſary, was the ſame with, inconſiſtent. I ſay, that a body, made up of the ſame numerical parts of matter, is not neceſſary to the making of the ſame perſon; from whence it will, indeed, follow, that to the reſurrection of

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the ſame perſon, the ſame numerical particles of matter are not required. What does your Lordſhip infer from hence? to wit, this; therefore, he, who thinks that the ſame particles of matter are not neceſſary to the making of the ſame perſon, cannot believe that the ſame perſons ſhall be raiſed with bodies, made of the very ſame particles of matter, if God ſhould reveal that it ſhall be ſo, viz. that the ſame perſons ſhall be raiſed, with the ſame bodies they had before: which is all one as to ſay, that he, who thought the blowing of rams-horns was not neceſſary, in itſelf, to the falling down of the walls of Jericho, could not believe that they ſhould fall, upon the blowing of rams-horns, when God had declared it ſhould be ſo.

Your Lordſhip ſays, “ my idea of perſonal identity is inconſiſtent with the “ article of the reſurrection;” the reaſon you ground it on is this, becauſe it makes not the ſame body neceſſary, to the making the ſame perſon. Let us grant your Lordſhip's conſequence to be good, what will follow from it? No leſs than this, that your Lordſhip's notion (for I dare not ſay your Lordſhip has any ſo dangerous things, as ideas) of perſonal identity, is inconſiſtent with the article of the reſurrection. The demonſtration of it is thus; your Lordſhip ſays, P. 34, 35. it is not neceſſary that the body, to be raiſed at the laſt day, “ ſhould conſiſt of “ the ſame particles of matter, which were united at the point of death; for “ there muſt be a great alteration in them, in a lingring diſeaſe; as if a fat man “ falls into a conſumption: you do not ſay, the ſame particles, which the ſinner “ had at the very time of commiſſion of his ſins; for then a long ſinner muſt “ have a vaſt body, conſidering the continual ſpending of particles by perſpira- P. 44. “ tion.” And again, here your Lordſhip ſays, “ you allow the notion of per- “ ſonal identity to belong to the ſame man, under ſeveral changes of matter.” From which words it is evident, that your Lordſhip ſuppoſes a perſon, in this world, may be continued and preſerved the ſame, in a body, not conſiſting of the ſame individual particles of matter; and hence it demonſtratively follows, that, let your Lordſhip's notion of perſonal identity be what it will, it makes “ the ſame “ body not to be neceſſary to the ſame perſon;” and therefore, it is, by your Lordſhip's rule, inconſiſtent with the article of the reſurrection. When your Lordſhip ſhall think fit to clear your own notion of perſonal identity, from this inconſiſtency with the article of the reſurrection, I do not doubt, but my idea of perſonal identity will be thereby cleared too. 'Till then, all inconſiſtency with that article, which your Lordſhip has here charged on mine, will unavoidably fall upon your Lordſhip's too.

But, for the clearing of both, give me leave, to ſay, my Lord, that whatſoever is not neceſſary, does not thereby become inconſiſtent. It is not neceſſary to the ſame perſon, that his body ſhould always conſiſt of the ſame numerical particles; this is demonſtration, becauſe the particles of the bodies of the ſame perſons, in this life, change every moment, and your Lordſhip cannot deny it; and yet this makes it not inconſiſtent with God's preſerving, if he thinks fit, to the ſame perſons, bodies conſiſting of the ſame numerical particles always from the reſurrection to eternity. And ſo likewiſe, tho' I ſay any thing, that ſuppoſes it not neceſſary, that the ſame numerical particles, which were vitally united to the ſoul in this life, ſhould be re-united to it, at the reſurrection, and conſtitute the body it ſhall then have; yet it is not inconſiſtent with this, that God may, if he pleaſes, give to every one a body, conſiſting only of ſuch particles, as were before vitally united to his ſoul. And thus, I think, I have cleared my book from all that inconſiſtency, which your Lordſhip charges on it, and would perſuade the world it has, with the article of the reſurrection of the dead.

Only before I leave it, I will ſet down the remainder of what your Lordſhip ſays upon this head, that, tho' I ſee not the coherence, nor tendency of it, nor the force of any argument in it, againſt me; yet nothing may be omitted, that your Lordſhip has thought fit to entertain your reader with, on this new point; nor any one have reaſon to ſuſpect, that I have paſſed by any word of your Lordſhip's (on this now firſt introduced ſubject) wherein he might find, your P. 44. Lordſhip had proved what you had promiſed in your title page. Your remaining words are theſe: “ the diſpute is not how far perſonal identity in itſelf may "conſiſt, in the very ſame material ſubſtance; for we allow the notion of perſonal identity to belong to the ſame man, under ſeveral changes of matter; but, "whether it doth not depend upon a vital union between the ſoul and body, "and the life, which is conſequent upon it: and therefore, in the reſurrection, "the ſame material ſubſtance muſt be re-united, or elſe it cannot be called a "reſurrection, but a renovation; i. e. it may be a new life, but not a raiſing the "body from the dead." I confeſs, I do not ſee how what is here uſhered in, by the words, and therefore, is a conſequence from the preceding words; but, as to the propriety of the name, I think it will not be much queſtioned, that, if the ſame man riſe, who was dead, it may very properly be called the reſurrection of the dead; which is the language of the ſcripture.

I MUST not part with this article of the reſurrection, without returning my thanks to your Lordſhip, for making me take notice of a fault, in my Eſſay. When I writ that book, I took it for granted, as I doubt not, but many others P. 62. have done, that the ſcripture had mentioned, in expreſs terms, "the reſurrection of "the body:" But upon the occaſion your Lordſhip has given me, in your laſt letter, to look a little more narrowly into what revelation has declared, concerning the reſurrection, and finding no ſuch expreſs words in the ſcripture, as that "the body ſhall riſe, or be raiſed, or the reſurrection of the body;" I ſhall in the next edition of it, change theſe words of my book, "the dead bodies of men ſhall Eſſay, B. 4. "riſe," into theſe of the ſcripture, "the dead ſhall riſe." Not that I queſtion, C. 18. § 7. that the dead ſhall be raiſed with bodies: But in matters of revelation, I think it not only ſafeſt, but our duty, as far as any one delivers it for revelation, to keep cloſe to the words of the ſcripture; unleſs he will aſſume to himſelf the authority of one inſpired, or make himſelf wiſer than the Holy Spirit himſelf. If I had ſpoke of the reſurrection, in preciſely ſcripture terms, I had avoided giving your Lordſhip the occaſion, of making here ſuch a verbal reflection on my words; P. 63. "What! not if there be an idea of identity as to the body?"

I COME now to your Lordſhip's ſecond head of accuſation: Your Lordſhip P. 44. ſays,

"2. THE next articles of faith, which my notion of ideas is inconſiſtent with, "are no leſs, than thoſe of the Trinity, and the Incarnation of our Saviour." But all the proof of inconſiſtency, your Lordſhip here brings, being drawn from my notions of nature and perſon, whereof ſo much has been ſaid already, the ſwelling my anſwer into too great a volume, will excuſe me from ſetting down, at large, all that you have ſaid hereupon, ſo particularly, as I have done, in the preceding article of the reſurrection, which is wholly new.

YOUR Lordſhip's way of proving, "that my ideas of nature and perſon can- P. 45, 46. "not conſiſt" with the articles of the Trinity and Incarnation, is, as far as I can underſtand it, this, that, I ſay, we have no ſimple ideas, but by ſenſation and reflection; "but, ſays your Lordſhip, we cannot have any ſimple ideas of nature P. 45. "and perſon, by ſenſation and reflection; ergo, we can come to no certainty, "about the diſtinction of nature and perſon, in my way of ideas." Anſw. If your Lordſhip had concluded from thence, that, therefore, in my way of ideas, we can have no ideas at all, of nature and perſon, it would have had ſome appearance of a conſequence; but, as it is, it ſeems to me ſuch an argument as this: No ſimple colours, in Sir Godfrey Kneller's way of painting, come into his exact and lively pictures, but by his pencil; but no ſimple colours, of a ſhip and a man, come into his picture by his pencil; ergo, "we can come to no certainty about the diſtinction of a ſhip and a man, in Sir Godfrey Kneller's "way of painting."

YOUR Lordſhip ſays, "it is not poſſible for us to have any ſimple ideas of na- P. 45. "ture and perſon, by ſenſation and reflection," and I ſay ſo too; as impoſſible as it is to have a true picture of a rainbow, in one ſimple colour, which conſiſts in the arangement of many colours. The ideas ſignified by the ſounds, nature and perſon, are each of them complex ideas; and, therefore, it is as impoſſible to have a ſimple idea of either of them, as to have a multitude in one, or a compoſition in a ſimple. But if your Lordſhip means, that, by ſenſation and reflection, we cannot have the ſimple ideas, of which the complex ones, of nature

ture and perſon, are compounded; that I muſt crave leave to diſſent from, 'till your Lordſhip can produce a definition (in intelligible words) either of nature, or perſon, in which, all that is contained cannot ultimately be reſolved into ſimple ideas of ſenſation and reflection.

Vindic. p. 261. Your Lordſhip's definition of perſon, is, "that it is a compleat, intelligent "ſubſtance, with a peculiar manner of ſubſiſtence." And my definition of perſon, which your Lordſhip quotes, out of my Eſſay, is, P. 59. "that perſon ſtands for "a thinking, intelligent being, that has reaſon and reflection, and can conſider "it ſelf as it ſelf, the ſame thinking thing, in different times and places." When your Lordſhip ſhall ſhew any repugnancy in this my idea (which I denote by the ſound, perſon) to the incarnation of our Saviour, with which your Lordſhip's notion of perſon may not be equally charged; I ſhall give your Lordſhip an anſwer to it. P. 46. This I ſay, in anſwer to theſe words, "which is repugnant to the "article of the incarnation of our Saviour:" For the preceding reaſoning, to which they refer, I muſt own, I do not underſtand.

The word, perſon, naturally ſignifies nothing, that you allow; your Lordſhip, in your definition of it, makes it ſtand for a general, abſtract idea. Perſon then, in your Lordſhip, is liable to the ſame default, which you lay on it, in me, viz. P. 52. That "it is no more, than a notion in the mind." The ſame will be ſo, of the word, nature, when ever your Lordſhip pleaſes to define it; without which Ibid. you can have no notion of it. And then the conſequence, which you there draw, from their being no more, than notions of the mind, will hold, as much in reſpect of your Lordſhip's notion of nature and perſon, as of mine, viz. "that "one nature and three perſons can be no more." This I crave leave to ſay, in anſwer to all that your Lordſhip has been pleaſed to urge, from page 46, to theſe words of your Lordſhip's, p. 52.

General terms (as nature and perſon are, in their ordinary uſe, in our language) are the ſigns of general ideas, and general ideas exiſt only in the mind; but particular things (which are the foundations of theſe general ideas, if they are abſtracted, as they ſhould be) do, or may exiſt, conformable to thoſe general ideas, and ſo fall under thoſe general names; as he that writes this paper, is a perſon to him, i. e. may be denominated a perſon by him, to whoſe abſtract idea, of perſon, he bears a conformity; juſt as what I here write, is to him a book, or a letter, to whoſe abſtract idea of a book, or a letter, it agrees. This is what I have ſaid, concerning this matter, all along, and what, I humbly conceive, will ſerve for an anſwer to thoſe words of your Lordſhip, where you ſay, P. 54. "you affirm that thoſe, who make nature and perſon to be only abſtract and "complex ideas, can neither defend nor reaſonably believe the doctrine of the "Trinity;" and to all that you ſay, p. 52--58. Only give me leave to wiſh, that what your Lordſhip, out of a miſtake of what I ſay, concerning the ideas of nature and perſon, has urged, as you pretend, againſt them, do not furniſh your adverſaries, in that diſpute, with ſuch arguments againſt you, as your Lordſhip will not eaſily anſwer.

P. 58. Your Lordſhip ſets down theſe words of mine, "perſon in itſelf, ſignifies "nothing; but as ſoon as the common uſe of any language has appropriated it "to any idea, then, that is the true idea of a perſon," which words your Lordſhip interprets thus: i. e. "men may call a perſon, what they pleaſe, for there "is nothing but common uſe, required to it: they may call a horſe, or a tree, "or a ſtone, a perſon, if they think fit." Anſw. Men, before common uſe had appropriated this name, to that complex idea, which they now ſignify by the ſound, perſon, might have denoted it by the ſound, ſtone, and vice verſa: but can your Lordſhip thence argue, as you do here, men are at the ſame liberty, in a country, where thoſe words are already in common uſe? there, he that will ſpeak properly, and ſo as to be underſtood, muſt appropriate each ſound, uſed in that language, to an idea in his mind (which to himſelf is defining the word) which is, in ſome degree, conformable to the idea, that others apply to it.

P. 59. Your Lordſhip, in the next paragraph, ſets down my definition of the word, perſon, viz. "that perſon ſtands for a thinking, intelligent being, that hath "reaſon and reflection, and can conſider itſelf, as itſelf, the ſame thinking "being, in different times and places;" and then aſks many queſtions, upon it.

I ſhall ſet down your Lordſhip's definition of perſon, which is this: " A perſon Vind.p.261. " is a complete, intelligent ſubſtance, with a peculiar manner of ſubſiſtence," and then crave leave to aſk your Lordſhip the ſame queſtion, concerning it, which your Lordſhip here aſks me concerning mine; " how comes perſon to ſtand for P. 59. " this, and nothing elſe? from whence comes complete ſubſtance, or peculiar " manner of ſubſiſtence, to make up the idea of a perſon? Whether it be true, " or falſe, I am not now to enquire; but how it comes into this idea of a perſon? " Has common uſe of our language appropriated it to this ſenſe? If not, this " ſeems to be a mere arbitrary idea; and may as well be deny'd as affirm'd. " And what a fine paſs are we come to, (in your Lordſhip's way) if a mere arbitrary idea muſt be taken into the only true method of certainty?——But if this " be the true idea of a perſon, then there can be no union of two natures in one " perſon. For if a compleat, intelligent ſubſtance be the idea of a perſon, and " the divine and human natures be compleat, intelligent ſubſtances; then the " doctrine of the union of two natures and one perſon is quite ſunk, for here muſt " be two perſons, in this way of your Lordſhip's. Again, if this be the idea of " a perſon, then where there are three perſons, there muſt be three diſtinct, " complete, intelligent ſubſtances; and ſo there cannot be three perſons in the " ſame individual eſſence. And thus both theſe doctrines of the Trinity, and " Incarnation, are, paſt recovery, gone, if this way (of your Lordſhip's) hold." Theſe, my Lord, are your Lordſhip's very words; what force there is in them, I will not enquire; but I muſt beſeech your Lordſhip to take them, as objections I make, againſt your notion of perſon, to ſhew the danger of it, and the inconſiſtency, it has with the doctrine of the Trinity and Incarnation of our Saviour; and when your Lordſhip has removed the objections, that are in them, againſt your own definition of perſon, mine alſo, by the very ſame anſwers, will be clear'd.

YOUR Lordſhip's argument, in the following words, to page 65. ſeems to me P. 61---65. (as far as I can collect) to lie thus: Your Lordſhip tells me, that I ſay, " That P. 61. " in propoſitions, whoſe certainty is built on clear and perfect ideas, and evident " deductions of reaſon, there no propoſition can be receiv'd for divine revelation, " which contradicts them." This propoſition, not ſerving your Lordſhip's turn ſo well, for the concluſion you deſign'd to draw from it, your Lordſhip is pleas'd to enlarge it: For you aſk, " But, ſuppoſe I have ideas ſufficient for certainty, P. 62. " what is to be done then?" From which words, and your following diſcourſe, if I can underſtand it, it ſeems to me, that your Lordſhip ſuppoſes it reaſonable for me to hold, That where-ever we are, any how, certain of any propoſitions, whether their certainty be built on clear and perfect ideas, or no, there no propoſition can be received for divine revelation, which contradicts them. And thence your Lordſhip concludes, That becauſe I ſay, we may make ſome propoſitions, P. 64. of whoſe truth we may be certain, concerning things, whereof we have not ideas, in all their parts perfectly clear and diſtinct; " therefore my " notion, of certainty by ideas, muſt overthrow the credibility of a matter of faith, " in all ſuch propoſitions, which are offered to be believed on the account of " divine revelation:" a concluſion, which I am ſo unfortunate, as, not to find, how it follows, from your Lordſhip's premiſes, becauſe I cannot any way bring them into mode, and figure, with ſuch a concluſion. But this being no ſtrange thing to me, in my want of ſkill, in your Lordſhip's way of writing, I, in the mean time, crave leave to aſk, whether there be any propoſitions, your Lordſhip can be certain of, that are not divinely revealed? And here I will preſume, that your Lordſhip is not ſo ſceptical, but that you can allow certainty, attainable in many things, by your natural faculties. Give me leave, then, to aſk your Lordſhip, whether, where there be propoſitions, of whoſe truth you have certain knowledge, you can receive any propoſition for divine revelation, which contradicts that certainty? whether that certainty be built upon the agreement of ideas, ſuch as we have, or on whatever elſe your Lordſhip builds it? If you cannot, as I preſume your Lordſhip will ſay you cannot, I make bold to return you your Lordſhip's queſtions, here, to me, in your own words: " Let " us, now, ſuppoſe that you are to judge of a propoſition, delivered as a matter P. 4.

"of faith, where you have a certainty, by reaſon, from your grounds, ſuch as "they are: can you, my Lord, aſſent to this as a matter of faith, when you are "already certain of the contrary, by your way? how is this poſſible? can you "believe that to be true, which you are certain is not true? Suppoſe it be, that "there are two natures in one perſon, the queſtion is, whether you can aſſent to "this, as a matter of faith? If you ſhould ſay, where there are only probabi-"lities, on the other ſide, I grant that you then allow revelation is to prevail. "But when you ſay, you have certainty by ideas, or without ideas to the contrary, "I do not ſee how it is poſſible for you to aſſent to a matter of faith, as true, "when you are certain, from your method, that it is not true. For how can "you believe againſt certainty,—becauſe the mind is actually determined by "certainty. And ſo your Lordſhip's notion of certainty by ideas, or without "ideas, be it what it will, muſt overthrow the credibility of a matter of faith, in "all ſuch propoſitions, which are offered to be believed on the account of divine "revelation." This argumentation and concluſion is good againſt your Lordſhip, if it be good againſt me: for certainty is certainty, and he that is certain, is certain, and cannot aſſent to "that as true, which he is certain is not true," whether he ſuppoſes certainty to conſiſt in the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of ideas, ſuch as a man has, or in any thing elſe. For whether thoſe, who have attained certainty, not by the way of ideas, can believe againſt certainty, any more than thoſe, who have attained certainty by ideas, we ſhall then ſee, when your Lordſhip ſhall be pleaſed to ſhew the world your way to certainty, without ideas.

INDEED, if what your Lordſhip inſinuates, in the beginning of this paſſage, which we are now upon, be true, your Lordſhip is ſafer (in your way without ideas, i. e. without immediate objects of the mind in thinking, if there be any ſuch way) as to the underſtanding divine revelation right, than thoſe, who make uſe of ideas: but yet you are ſtill as far as they, from aſſenting to that as true, which you are certain is not true. Your Lordſhip's words are: "So great a "difference is there between forming ideas firſt, and then judging of revelation by "them, and the believing of revelation on its proper grounds, and the interpret-"ing the ſenſe of it, by the due meaſures of reaſon." If it be the privilege of thoſe alone, who renounce ideas, i. e. the immediate objects of the mind in thinking, to believe revelation on its proper grounds, and the interpreting the ſenſe of it, by the due meaſures of reaſon; I ſhall not think it ſtrange, that any one, who undertakes to interpret the ſenſe of revelation, ſhould renounce ideas, i. e. that he who would think right of the meaning of any text of ſcripture, ſhould renounce, and lay by, all immediate objects of the mind in thinking. P. 60.

BUT, perhaps, your Lordſhip does not here extend this difference of believing revelation, on its proper grounds, and not on its proper grounds, to all thoſe, who are not, and all thoſe, who are, for ideas. But your Lordſhip makes this compariſon here only between your Lordſhip and me, who, you think, am guilty of forming ideas firſt, and then judging of revelation by them. Anſw. If ſo, then this lays the blame not on my doctrine of ideas, but on my particular ill uſe of them. That, then, which your Lordſhip would inſinuate of me here, as a dangerous way, to miſtaking the ſenſe of the ſcripture, is, "that I form "ideas firſt, and then judge of revelation by them;" i. e. in plain Engliſh, that I get to myſelf, the beſt I can, the ſignification of the words, wherein the revelation is delivered, and ſo endeavour to underſtand the ſenſe of the revelation delivered in them. And pray, my Lord, does your Lordſhip do otherwiſe? Does the believing of revelation upon its proper grounds, and the due meaſures of reaſon, teach you to judge of revelation, before you underſtand the words it is delivered in; i. e. before you have formed the ideas in your mind, as well as you can, which thoſe words ſtand for? If the due meaſures of reaſon teach your Lordſhip this, I beg the favour of your Lordſhip to tell me thoſe due meaſures of reaſon, that I may leave thoſe undue meaſures of reaſon, which I have hitherto followed, in the interpreting the ſenſe of the ſcripture, whoſe ſenſe, it ſeems, I ſhould have interpreted firſt, and underſtood the ſignification of the words afterwards.

My Lord, I read the revelation of the holy ſcriptures, with a full aſſurance, that all it delivers is true: and tho' this be a ſubmiſſion to the writings of thoſe inſpired authors, which I neither have, nor can have, for thoſe of any other men; yet I uſe (and know not how to help it, 'till your Lordſhip ſhew me a better method, in thoſe due meaſures of reaſon, which you mention) the ſame way to interpret to myſelf the ſenſe of that book, that I do of any other. Firſt, I endeavour to underſtand the words and phraſes of the language I read it in, i. e. to form ideas they ſtand for. If your Lordſhip means any thing elſe, by forming ideas firſt, I confeſs I underſtand it not. And if there be any word, or expreſſion, which, in that author, or in that place of that author, ſeems to have a peculiar meaning, i. e. to ſtand for an idea, which is different from that, which the common uſe of that language has made it a ſign of, that idea, alſo, I endeavour to form in my mind, by comparing this author with himſelf, and obſerving the deſign of his diſcourſe, that ſo, as far as I can, by a ſincere endeavour, I may have the ſame ideas, in every place, when I read the words, which the author had, when he writ them. But here, my Lord, I take care not to take thoſe for words of divine revelation, which are not the words of inſpired writers: nor think myſelf concerned with that ſubmiſſion to receive the expreſſions of fallible men, and to labour to find out their meaning, or, as your Lordſhip phraſes it, interpret their ſenſe, as if they were the expreſſions of the Spirit of God, by the mouths or pens of men, inſpired and guided by that infallible Spirit. This, my Lord, is the method I uſe, in interpreting the ſenſe of the revelation of the ſcriptures; if your Lordſhip knows that I do otherwiſe, I deſire you to convince me of it; and if your Lordſhip does otherwiſe, I deſire you to ſhew me, wherein your method differs from mine, that I may reform, upon ſo good a pattern: for, as for what you accuſe me of, in the following words, it is that which either has no fault in it, or if it has, your Lordſhip, I humbly conceive, is as guilty as I. Your words are,

" I MAY pretend what I pleaſe, that I hold the aſſurance of faith, and the " certainty by ideas, to go upon very different grounds; but when a propoſition " is offered me out of ſcripture to be believed, and I doubt about the ſenſe of it, " is not recourſe to be made to my ideas?" Give me leave, my Lord, with all ſubmiſſion, to return your Lordſhip the ſame words. " Your Lordſhip may " pretend what you pleaſe, that you hold the aſſurance of faith, and the certain- " ty of knowledge to ſtand upon different grounds" (for I preſume your Lordſhip will not ſay, that believing and knowing ſtand upon the ſame grounds, for that would, I think, be to ſay, that probability and demonſtration are the ſame thing) " but when a propoſition is offered you out of ſcripture to be believed, " and you doubt about the ſenſe of it, is not recourſe to be made to your noti- " ons?" What, my Lord, is the difference here between your Lordſhip's, and my way, in the caſe? I muſt have recourſe to my ideas, and your Lordſhip muſt have recourſe to your notions. For, I think, you cannot believe a propoſition, contrary to your own notions, for then you would have the ſame, and different notions, at the ſame time. So that all the difference between your Lordſhip and me, is, that we do both the ſame thing; only your Lordſhip ſhews a great diſlike to my uſing the term, idea. P. 60.

But the inſtance your Lordſhip here gives, is beyond my comprehenſion. You ſay, " a propoſition is offered me out of ſcripture to be believed, and I " doubt about the ſenſe of it.——As in the preſent caſe, whether there can be " three perſons in one nature, or two natures and one perſon." My Lord, my bible is faulty again; for I do not remember that I ever read in it, either of theſe propoſitions, in theſe preciſe words, " there are three perſons in one nature, or, " there are two natures and one perſon." When your Lordſhip ſhall ſhew me a bible, wherein they are ſo ſet down, I ſhall then think them a good inſtance of propoſitions, offered me out of ſcripture; 'till then, whoever ſhall ſay that they are propoſitions in the ſcripture, when there are no ſuch words, ſo put together, to be found in holy writ, ſeems to me to make a new ſcripture in words and propoſitions, that the Holy Ghoſt dictated not. I do not here queſtion their truth, nor deny that they may be drawn from the ſcripture: but I deny, that theſe P. 60.

theſe very propoſitions are, in expreſs words, in my bible. For that is the only thing I deny here; if your Lordſhip can ſhew them me, in your's, I beg you to do it.

In the mean time, taking them to be as true, as if they were the very words of divine revelation; the queſtion then is, how muſt we interpret the ſenſe of them? For ſuppoſing them to be divine revelation, to aſk, as your Lordſhip here does, what reſolution I, or any one, can come to, about their poſſibility, ſeems to me to involve a contradiction in it. For whoever admits a propoſition to be of divine revelation, ſuppoſes it not only to be poſſible, but true. Your Lordſhip's queſtion then can mean only this, what ſenſe can I, upon my principles, come to, of either of theſe propoſitions, but in the way of ideas? And I crave leave to aſk your Lordſhip, what ſenſe of them can your Lordſhip, upon your principles, come to, but in the way of notions? Which, in plain Engliſh, amounts to no more than this; that your Lordſhip muſt underſtand them according to the ſenſe, you have of thoſe terms, they are made up of, and I according to the ſenſe, I have of thoſe terms. Nor can it be otherwiſe, unleſs your Lordſhip can take a term, in any propoſition, to have one ſenſe, and yet underſtand it in another: and thus we ſee, that in effect, men have differently underſtood and interpreted the ſenſe of theſe propoſitions; whether they uſed the way of ideas, or not, i. e. whether they called what any word ſtood for, notion, or ſenſe, or meaning, or idea.

I think myſelf obliged to return your Lordſhip my thanks, for the news P. 61. you write me here, of one who has found a ſecret way, how the ſame body may be in diſtant places at once. It making no part, that I can ſee, of the reaſoning your Lordſhip was then upon, I can take it only for a piece of news: and the favour was the greater, that your Lordſhip was pleaſed to ſtop yourſelf, in the midſt of ſo ſerious an argument, as the articles of the Trinity and Incarnation, to tell it me. And methinks, it is a pity that that author had not uſed ſome of the words of my book, which might have ſerved to have tied him and me together. For his ſecret, about a body, in two places at once, which he does keep up; and, "my ſecret about certainty, which your Lordſhip thinks "had been better kept up too," being all your words; bring me into his company but very untowardly. If your Lordſhip would be pleaſed to ſhew, that my ſecret about certainty (as you think fit to call it) is falſe, or erroneous, the world would ſee a good reaſon, why you ſhould think it better kept up; 'till then, perhaps, they may be apt to ſuſpect, that the fault is not ſo much in my publiſhed ſecret about certainty, as ſomewhere elſe. But ſince your Lordſhip thinks it had been better kept up, I promiſe, that, as ſoon as you ſhall do me the favour, to make publick a better notion of certainty, than mine, I will, by a publick retraction, call in mine: which, I hope, your Lordſhip will do, for, I dare ſay, no body will think it good, or friendly advice, to your Lordſhip, if you have ſuch a ſecret, that you ſhould keep it up.

Your Lordſhip, with ſome emphaſis, bids me obſerve my own words, that P. 63. I here poſitively ſay, "that the mind not being certain of the truth of that it "doth not evidently know. So that it is plain here, that I place certainty only "in evident knowledge, or in clear and diſtinct ideas; and yet my great com"plaint of your Lordſhip, was, that you charged this upon me; and now your "Lordſhip finds it in my own words." Anſw. My own words, in that place, are, "the mind is not certain of what it doth not evidently know;" but in them, or that paſſage, as ſet down by your Lordſhip, there is not the leaſt mention of clear and diſtinct ideas: and, therefore, I ſhould wonder to hear your Lordſhip ſo ſolemnly call them my own words, when they are but what your Lordſhip would have to be a conſequence of my words; were it not, as I humbly conceive, a way, not unfrequent with your Lordſhip, to ſpeak of that, which you think a conſequence from any thing ſaid, as if it were the very thing ſaid. It reſts, therefore, upon your Lordſhip to prove, that evident knowledge can be only, where the ideas, concerning which it is, are perfectly clear and diſtinct. I am certain, that I have evident knowledge, that the ſubſtance of my ſoul and body exiſts; tho' I am as certain, that I have but a very obſcure and confuſed idea of any ſubſtance at all: ſo that my complaint of your Lordſhip, upon that account, remains very well founded, notwithſtanding any thing you allege here.

Your Lordſhip, ſumming up the force of what you have ſaid, adds, "that P. 65. "you have pleaded, (1.) That my method of certainty ſhakes the belief of "revelation in general. (2.) That it ſhakes the belief of particular propoſitions, "or articles of faith, which depend upon the ſenſe of words contained in "ſcripture."

That your Lordſhip has pleaded, I grant: but with ſubmiſſion, I deny that you have proved,

(1.) That my definition of knowledge, which is that, which your Lordſhip calls my method of certainty, ſhakes the belief of revelation in general. For all that your Lordſhip offers for proof of it, is only the alleging ſome other paſſages out of my book, quite different from that my definition of knowledge, which you endeavour to ſhew, to ſhake the belief of revelation in general: but, indeed, have not, nor, I humbly conceive, cannot ſhew, that they do any ways ſhake the belief of revelation in general. But, if they did, it does not at all follow from thence, that my definition of knowledge; i. e. my method of certainty, at all ſhakes the belief of revelation in general, which was what your Lordſhip undertook to prove.

(2.) As to the ſhaking the belief of particular propoſitions, or articles of faith, P. 65. which depend, as you here ſay, upon the ſenſe of words; I think I have ſufficiently cleared myſelf from that charge, as will yet be more evident from what your Lordſhip here farther urges.

Your Lordſhip ſays, "My placing certainty in the perception of the agree-"ment or diſagreement of ideas, ſhakes the foundations of the articles of faith "[above-mentioned] which depend upon the ſenſe of words, contained in the "ſcripture:" and the reaſon your Lordſhip gives for it, is this, "becauſe I do "not ſay, we are to believe all, that we find there expreſſed." My Lord, upon reading theſe words, I conſulted the errata, to ſee whether the printer had injured you: for I could not eaſily believe, that your Lordſhip ſhould reaſon after a faſhion, that would juſtify ſuch a concluſion as this, viz. your Lordſhip, in your Letter to me, "does not ſay, that we are to believe all, that we find ex-"preſſed in ſcripture;" therefore your notion of certainty ſhakes the belief of this article of faith, that Jeſus Chriſt deſcended into hell. This, I think, will ſcarce hold for a good conſequence, till the not ſaying any truth, be the denying of it: and then if my not ſaying, in my book, that we are to believe all there expreſſed, be to deny, that we are to believe all that we find there expreſſed, I fear many of your Lordſhip's books will be found to ſhake the belief of ſeveral, or all the articles of our faith. But ſuppoſing this conſequence to be good, viz. I do not ſay, therefore I deny, and thereby I ſhake the belief of ſome articles of faith; how does this prove, that my placing of certainty, in the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of ideas, ſhakes any article of faith? unleſs my ſaying, that certainty conſiſts in the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of ideas, B. iv. chap. 12. § 6. of my Eſſay, be a proof, that I do not ſay, in any other part of that book, "that we are to believe all, that we find expreſſed "in ſcripture."

But, perhaps, the remaining words of the period will help us out, in your Lordſhip's argument, which all together ſtands thus: "becauſe I do not ſay, we P. 65. "are to believe all that we find there expreſſed; but [I do ſay] in caſe we have "any clear and diſtinct ideas, which limits the ſenſe another way, than the words "ſeem to carry it, we are to judge that to be the true ſenſe." My Lord, I do not remember, where I ſay, what in the latter part of this period, your Lordſhip makes me ſay; and your Lordſhip would have done me a favour, to have quoted the place. Indeed I do ſay, in the chapter your Lordſhip ſeems to be upon, "that no propoſition can be received for divine revelation, or obtain the "aſſent, due to all ſuch, if it be contradictory to our clear, intuitive knowledge." This is what I there ſay, and all that I there ſay; which in effect, is this, that no propoſition can be received for divine revelation, which is contradictory to a ſelf-evident propoſition; and if that be it, which your Lordſhip makes me ſay here, in the foregoing words, I agree to it, and would be glad to know, whether your Lordſhip differs in opinion from me, in it. But this not anſwering your P. 65. purpoſe, your Lordſhip would in the following words of this paragraph, change ſelf-evident propoſition, into a propoſition, we have attained certainty of, tho' by imperfect ideas: in which ſenſe, the propoſition your Lordſhip argues from, as mine, will ſtand thus, that no propoſition can be received for divine revelation, or obtain the aſſent, due to all ſuch, if it be contradictory to any propoſition, of whoſe truth we are, by any way, certain. And, then, I deſire your Lordſhip to name the two contradictory propoſitions, the one of divine revelation, I do not aſſent to; the other, that I have attained to a certainty of, by my imperfect ideas, which makes me reject, or not aſſent to, that of divine revelation. The very ſetting down of theſe two contradictory propoſitions, will be demonſtration againſt me, and if your Lordſhip cannot (as I humbly conceive you cannot) name any two ſuch propoſitions, it is an evidence, that all this duſt, that is raiſed, is only a great deal of talk about what your Lordſhip cannot prove: for that your Lordſhip has not yet proved any ſuch thing, I am humbly of opinion I have already ſhewn.

P. 66-69. Your Lordſhip's diſcourſe of Des Cartes, in the following pages, is, I think, as far as I am concerned in it, to ſhew, that certainty cannot be had by ideas; becauſe Des Cartes, uſing the term, idea, miſſed of it. Anſw. The queſtion between your Lordſhip and me, not being about Des Cartes's, but my notion of certainty, your Lordſhip will put an end to my notion of certainty by ideas, whenever your Lordſhip ſhall prove, that certainty cannot be attained, any way, by the immediate objects of the mind in thinking, i. e. by ideas; or that certainty does not conſiſt in the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of ideas; or laſtly, when your Lordſhip ſhall ſhew us what elſe certainty does conſiſt in. When your Lordſhip ſhall do either of theſe three, I promiſe your Lordſhip to renounce my notion, or way, or method, or grounds (or whatever elſe your Lordſhip has been pleaſed to call it) of certainty by ideas.

P. 69, 70. The next paragraph is to ſhew the inclination your Lordſhip has to favour me in the words, it may be. I ſhall be always ſorry to have miſtaken any one's, eſpecially your Lordſhip's inclination to ſavour me: but ſince the preſs has publiſhed this to the world, the world muſt now be judge of your Lordſhip's inclination to favour me.

P. 70--74. The three or four following pages are to ſhew, that your Lordſhip's exception againſt ideas, was not againſt the term, ideas, and that I miſtook you in it. Anſw. My Lord, I muſt own that there are very few pages of your Letters, when I come to examine, what is the preciſe meaning of your words, either as making diſtinct propoſitions, or a continued diſcourſe, wherein I do not think myſelf in danger to be miſtaken; but whether, in the preſent caſe, one much more learned than I, would not have underſtood your Lordſhip, as I did, muſt be left to thoſe, who will be at the pains to conſider your words, and my reply to Anſwer 1. P. 133. them. Your Lordſhip ſaying, "as I have ſtated my notion of ideas, it may be of "dangerous conſequence," ſeemed to me to ſay no more, but that my book, in general, might be of dangerous conſequence. This ſeeming too general an accuſation, I endeavoured to find what it was more particularly in it, which your Lordſhip thought might be of dangerous conſequence. And the firſt thing I thought you excepted againſt, was the uſe of the term, idea: but your Lordſhip tells me here, I P. 72. was miſtaken, it was not the term, idea, you excepted againſt, but the way of certainty by ideas. To excuſe my miſtake, I have this to ſay for myſelf, that reading, Anſwer 1. P. 23. in your firſt letter, theſe expreſs words; "When new terms are made uſe of, by "ill men, to promote ſcepticiſm and infidelity, and to overthrow the myſteries "of our faith, we have then reaſon to enquire into them, and to examine the "foundation and tendency of them;" it could not be very ſtrange, if I underſtood, them, to refer to terms; but, it ſeems, I was miſtaken, and ſhould have underſtood by them, "my way of certainty by ideas," and ſhould have read your Lordſhip's words thus: "When new terms are made uſe of, by "ill men, to promote ſcepticiſm and infidelity, and to overthrow the myſteries "of faith, we have then reaſon to inquire into them," i. e. Mr. L's definition of knowledge, (for that is my way of certainty by ideas) “ and then to examine “ the foundation and tendency of them,” i. e. this propoſition, viz. that knowledge, or certainty, conſiſts in the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of ideas. Them, in your Lordſhip's words, as I thought (for I am ſcarce ever ſure, what your Lordſhip means, by them) neceſſarily referring to what ill men made uſe of, for the promoting of ſcepticiſm and infidelity, I thought it had referred to terms. Why ſo? ſays your Lordſhip: “ Your quarrel, you ſay, was “ not with the term ideas. But that, which you inſiſted upon, was the way of “ certainty by ideas, and the new terms, as employed to that purpoſe;” and, therefore, 'tis that which your Lordſhip muſt be underſtood to mean, by what ill men make uſe of, &c. Now I appeal to my reader, whether I may not be excuſed, if I took, them, rather to infer to terms, a word in the plural number, preceding in the ſame period, than to way of certainty by ideas, which is of the ſingular number, and neither preceding, no nor ſo much as expreſſed in the ſame ſentence? And if, by my ignorance in the uſe of the pronoun, them, 'tis my misfortune to be often at a loſs, in the underſtanding of your Lordſhip's writing, I hope I ſhall be excuſed.

Another excuſe, for my underſtanding that one of the things in my book, which your Lordſhip thought might be of dangerous conſequence, was the term, idea, may be found in theſe words of your Lordſhip: “ But what need all this “ great noiſe about ideas and certainty, true and real certainty by ideas: if, after “ all, it comes only to this, that our ideas only preſent to us ſuch things, from “ whence we bring arguments to prove the truth of things? But the world has “ been ſtrangely amuſed with ideas of late; and we have been told, that ſtrange “ things might be done, by the help of ideas, and yet theſe ideas at laſt come to “ be common notions of things, which we muſt make uſe of, in our reaſoning.” I ſhall offer one paſſage more, for my excuſe, out of the ſame page. I had ſaid, in my chapter about the exiſtence of God, I thought it moſt proper to expreſs myſelf, in the moſt uſual and familiar way, by common words and expreſſions: “ Your Lordſhip wiſhes, I had done ſo, quite thro' my book; for then, I had “ never given that occaſion to the enemies of our faith, to take my new way “ of ideas, as an effectual battery (as they imagined) againſt the myſteries of the “ chriſtian faith. But I might have enjoyed the ſatisfaction of my ideas, long “ enough, before your Lordſhip had taken notice of them, unleſs you had found “ them employed in doing miſchief.” Thus this paſſage ſtands, in your Lordſhip's former letter, tho' here your Lordſhip gives us but a part of it; and that part your Lordſhip breaks off into two, and gives us inverted, and in other words. Perhaps thoſe, who obſerve this, and better underſtand the arts of controverſy than I do, may find ſome ſkill in it. But your Lordſhip breaks off the former paſſage, at theſe words, “ ſtrange things might be done by the help of ideas;” and then adding theſe new ones, i. e. “ as to matter of certainty,” leave out thoſe which contain your wiſh, “ that I had expreſſed myſelf, in the moſt uſual way, “ by common words and expreſſions, quite through my book,” as I had done in my chapter of the exiſtence of a God; for then, ſays your Lordſhip, “ I had “ not given that occaſion to the enemies of our faith to take up my new way of “ ideas, as an effectual battery, &c.” Which wiſh of your Lordſhip's is, that I had all along left out the term idea, as is plain from my words, which you refer to, in your wiſh, as they ſtand in my firſt letter, viz. “ I thought it moſt proper “ to expreſs myſelf, in the moſt uſual and familiar way,——by common words, “ and known ways of expreſſion; and therefore, as I think, I have ſcarce uſed “ the word, idea, in that whole chapter.” Now I muſt again appeal to my reader, whether your Lordſhip, having ſo plainly wiſhed, that I had uſed common words and expreſſions, in oppoſition to the term idea, I am not excuſable, if I took you to mean that term? tho' your Lordſhip leaves out the wiſh, and inſtead of it, puts in, i. e. “ as to matter of certainty,” words which were not in your former letter; tho' it be for miſtaking you, in my anſwer to that letter, that you here blame me. I muſt own, my Lord, my dulneſs will be very apt to miſtake you in expreſſions, ſeeming ſo plain as theſe, 'till I can preſume myſelf quickſighted enough to underſtand men's meaning, in their writings, not by their expreſſions;

Anſw. 1. p. 92, 93.

Anſw. 1. p. 93.

P. 72, 73.

P. 72.

Anſ. 1. p. 93.

Lett. 1. p. 127.

preſſions; which I confeſs I am not, and is an art, I find myſelf too old now to learn.

P. 73. BUT bare miſtake is not all; your Lordſhip accuſes me alſo of unfairneſs and diſingenuity, in underſtanding theſe words of your's, "the world has been "ſtrangely amuſed with ideas, and yet theſe ideas at laſt come to be only com- "mon notions of things, as if in them your Lordſhip owned ideas to be only "common notions of things." To this, my Lord, I muſt humbly crave leave to anſwer, that there was no unfairneſs, or diſingenuity, in my ſaying your Lordſhip owned ideas for ſuch, becauſe I underſtood you to ſpeak, in that place, in your own ſenſe; and thereby to ſhew that the new term, idea, need not be introduced, when it ſignified only the common notion of things, i. e. ſignified no more than notion doth, which is a more uſual word. This I took to be your meaning, in that place; and whether I, or any one, might not ſo underſtand it, P. 73. without deſerving to be told, that "this is a way of turning things upon your "Lordſhip, which you did not expect from me," or ſuch a ſolemn appeal as this, "judge now, how fair and ingenuous this anſwer is;" I leave to any one, who will but do me the favour to caſt his eye on the paſſage above quoted, as it ſtands Anſw. 1. p. 92, 93. in your Lordſhip's own words, in your firſt letter. For I humbly beg leave to ſay, that I cannot but wonder to find, that when your Lordſhip is charging me, with want of fairneſs and ingenuity, you ſhould leave out, in the quoting of your own words, thoſe which ſerved moſt to juſtify the ſenſe, I had taken them in, and put others in the ſtead of them. In your firſt letter they ſtand thus: "But the Anſ. 1. p. 93. "world has been ſtrangely amuſed with ideas of late, and we have been told, "that ſtrange things might be done by the help of ideas; and yet theſe ideas, at "laſt, come to be only common notions of things, which we muſt make uſe of, "in our reaſoning;" and ſo on, to the end of what is above ſet down: all which Lett. 1. p. 62. I quoted, to ſecure myſelf from being ſuſpected to turn things upon your Lordſhip, in a ſenſe which your words (that the reader had before him) would not bear: and, in your ſecond letter, in the place now under conſideration, they P. 73. ſtand thus; "but the world hath been ſtrangely amuſed with ideas of late, and "we have been told, that ſtrange things may be done with ideas, i. e. as to "matter of certainty;" and there your Lordſhip ends. Will your Lordſhip give me leave now to uſe your own words, "judge now, how fair and ingenuous this "is!" words which I ſhould not uſe, but that I find them uſed by your Lordſhip, in this very paſſage, and upon this very occaſion.

I GRANT myſelf, a mortal man, very liable to miſtakes, eſpecially in your writings; but that, in my miſtakes, I am guilty of any unfairneſs, or diſingenuity, your Lordſhip will, I humbly conceive, pardon me, if I think it will paſs for want of fairneſs and ingenuity, in any one without clear evidence, to accuſe me. To avoid any ſuch ſuſpicion, in my firſt letter, I ſet down every word, contained in thoſe pages of your book, which I was concerned in; and in my ſecond, I ſet down moſt of the paſſages of your Lordſhip's firſt anſwer, that I replyed to. But becauſe the doing it all along in this, would, I find, too much increaſe the bulk of my book; I earneſtly beg every one, who will think this, my reply, worth his peruſal, to lay your Lordſhip's letter before him, that he may ſee whether in theſe pages, I direct my anſwer to, without ſetting them down at large, there be any thing material unanſwered, or unfairly, or diſingenuouſly repreſented.

YOUR Lordſhip, in the next words, gives a reaſon, why I ought to have P. 73. underſtood your words, as a conſequence of my aſſertion, and not as your own ſenſe, viz. "becauſe you, all along, diſtinguiſh the way of reaſon, by deducing "one thing from another, from my way of certainty in the agreement, or diſagree- "ment, of ideas." Anſw. I know your Lordſhip does all along talk of reaſon, and my way by ideas, as diſtinct or oppoſite: But this is the thing I have, and do complain of, that your Lordſhip does ſpeak of them, as diſtinct, without ſhewing, wherein they are different; ſince the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement of ideas, which is my way of certainty, is alſo the way of reaſon. For the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of ideas, is either by an immediate compariſon of two ideas, as in ſelf-evident propoſitions; which way of knowledge of truth, is the way of reaſon; or, by the intervention of intermediate ideas, i. e. by the deduction of one thing from another, which is alſo the way of reaſon, as I have ſhewn; where I anſwer to your ſpeaking of certainty placed in Lett. 1. p. 128. good and ſound reaſon, and not in ideas. In which place, as in ſeveral others, your Lordſhip oppoſes ideas and reaſon, which your Lordſhip calls here diſtinguiſhing them. But to continue to ſpeak frequently of two things, as different, or of two ways, as oppoſite, without ever ſhewing any difference, or oppoſition, in them, after it has been preſſed for, is a way of ingenuity, which your Lordſhip will pardon to my ignorance, if I have not formerly been acquainted with; and therefore, when you ſhall have ſhewn, that reaſoning about ideas, or by ideas, is not the ſame way of reaſoning, as that about, or by notions, or conceptions, and that what I mean by ideas, is not the ſame, that your Lordſhip means by notions; you will have ſome reaſon to blame me, for miſtaking you, in the P. 73. paſſages above quoted.

For if your Lordſhip, in thoſe words, does not except againſt the term, ideas, but allows it to have the ſame ſignification with notions, or conceptions, or apprehenſions; then your Lordſhip's words will run thus: "But what need all "this great noiſe about notions, or conceptions, or apprehenſions? and the "world has been ſtrangely amuſed with notions, or conceptions, or apprehen-"ſions of late;" which, whether it be that, which your Lordſhip will own to be your meaning, I muſt leave to your conſideration.

Your Lordſhip proceeds to examine my new method of certainty, as you are P. 74. pleaſed to call it.

To my aſking, "whether there be any other, or older, method of certainty? "your Lordſhip anſwers, that is not the point; but whether mine be any at all: P. 75. "which your Lordſhip denies." Anſw. I grant, to him that barely denies it to be any at all, it is not the point, whether there be any older; but to him, that calls it a new method, I humbly conceive it will not be thought wholly beſides the point, to ſhew an older; at leaſt, that it ought to have prevented theſe following words of your Lordſhip's, viz. "that your Lordſhip did never pretend to in-"form the world of new methods;" which, being in anſwer to my deſire, that you would be pleaſed to ſhew me an older, or another method, plainly imply, that your Lordſhip ſuppoſes, that whoever will inform the world of another method of certainty, than mine, can do it only by informing them of a new one. But ſince this is the anſwer, your Lordſhip pleaſes to make to my requeſt, I crave leave to conſider it a little.

Your Lordſhip having pronounced, concerning my definition of knowledge, which you call my method of certainty, that it might be of dangerous conſequence to an article of the chriſtian faith; I deſired you to ſhew in what certainty lies: Lett. 1. p. 87, 88. and deſired it of your Lordſhip by theſe preſſing conſiderations, that it would ſecure that article of faith againſt any dangerous conſequence from my way, and be a great ſervice to truth in general. To which your Lordſhip replies here, that P. 75. you did never pretend to inform the world of new methods; and therefore are not bound to go any farther, than what you found fault with, which was my new method.

Anſw. My Lord, I did not deſire any new method of you; I obſerved your Lordſhip, in more places than one, reflected on me, for writing out of my own thoughts; and, therefore, I could not expect, from your Lordſhip, what you ſo much condemn in another. Beſides, one of the faults, you found with my method, was, that it was new: and therefore, if your Lordſhip will look again into that paſſage, where I deſire you to ſet the world right, in a thing of that great Lett. 2. p. 88. conſequence, as it is to know, wherein certainty conſiſts; you will not find, that I mention any thing, of a new method of certainty; my words were, another, whether old or new, was indifferent. In truth, all that I requeſted, was, only ſuch a method of certainty, as your Lordſhip approved of, and was ſecured in; and therefore I do not ſee, how your not pretending to inform the world, in any new method, can be any way alleged as a reaſon, for refuſing ſo uſeful and ſo charitable a thing.

Your Lordſhip farther adds, "that you are not bound to go any farther, than "what you found fault with." Anſw. I ſuppoſe your Lordſhip means, that "you are not bound, by the law of diſputation;" nor are you, as I humbly conceive, by this law forbid; or if you were, the law of the ſchools could not diſpenſe with the eternal divine law of charity. The law of diſputing, whence had it its ſo mighty a ſanction? It is at beſt but the law of wrangling, if it ſhut out the great ends of information and inſtruction; and ſerves only to flatter a little guilty vanity, in a victory over an adverſary, leſs ſkilful in this art of fencing. Who can believe, that, upon ſo ſlight an account, your Lordſhip ſhould neglect your deſign, of writing againſt me? the great motives of your concern, for an article of the chriſtian faith, and of that duty, which, you profeſs, has made you do, what you have done, will be believed to work more uniformly in your Lordſhip, than to let a father of the church, and a teacher in Iſrael, not tell one who aſks him, which is the right and ſafe way, if he knows it. No, no, my Lord, a character ſo much to the prejudice of your charity, no body will receive, of your Lordſhip; no, not from yourſelf: whatever your Lordſhip may ſay, the world will believe, that you would have given a better method of certainty, if you had had one; when thereby you would have ſecured men from the danger of running into errors, in articles of faith, and effectually have recalled them from my way of certainty, which leads, as your Lordſhip ſays, to ſcepticiſm and infidelity. For to turn men from a way, they are in, the bare telling them it is dangerous, puts but a ſhort ſtop to their going on, in it; there is nothing effectual to ſet them a-going right, but to ſhew them, which is the ſafe and ſure way; a piece of humanity, which, when aſked, no-body, as far as he knows, refuſes another; and this I have earneſtly aſked of your Lordſhip.

P. 75. Your Lordſhip repreſents to me the unſatisfactorineſs and inconſiſtency of my way of certainty, by telling me, "that it ſeems ſtill a ſtrange thing to you, that "I ſhould talk ſo much of a new method of certainty by ideas; and yet allow, "as I do, ſuch a want of ideas, ſo much imperfection in them, and ſuch a "want of connection between our ideas, and the things themſelves." Anſw. This objection being ſo viſibly againſt the extent of our knowledge, and not the certainty of it, by ideas, would need no other anſwer, but this, that it proved nothing to the point; which was to ſhew, "that my way by ideas, was no way "to certainty at all; not to true certainty," which is a term your Lordſhip uſes here, which I ſhall be able to conceive, what you mean by, when you ſhall be pleaſed to tell me, what falſe certainty is. P. 76.

But becauſe what you ſay here, is in ſhort, what you ground your charge of ſcepticiſm on, in your former letter, I ſhall here, according to my promiſe, conſider, what your Lordſhip ſays there, and hope you will allow this to be no unfit place.

Anſw. 1. p. 125—131. Your charge of ſcepticiſm, in your former letter, is as followeth.

Your Lordſhip's firſt argument conſiſts in theſe propoſitions, viz.

1. That I ſay, Book IV. Chap. 1. that knowledge is the perception of the agreement or diſagreement of ideas.

2. That I go about to prove, that there are very many more beings, of which we have no ideas, than thoſe, of which we have; from whence your Lordſhip draws this concluſion, "that we are excluded from attaining any knowledge, as "to the far greateſt part of the univerſe;" which I agree to. But, with ſubmiſſion, this is not the propoſition to be proved, but this, viz. that my way by ideas, or my way of certainty by ideas, for to that your Lordſhip reduces it; i. e. my placing of certainty, in the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of ideas; leads to ſcepticiſm.

Anſw. 1. p. 126. Farther, from my ſaying, that the intellectual world is greater and more beautiful, certainly, than the material, your Lordſhip argues, that if certainty may be had by general reaſons, without particular ideas, in one, it may alſo, in other caſes. Anſw. It may, no doubt: but this is nothing againſt any thing I have ſaid; for I have neither ſaid, nor ſuppoſe, that certainty, by general reaſons, or any reaſons, can be had, without ideas; no more than I ſay, or ſuppoſe, that we can reaſon, without thinking, or think, without immediate objects of our minds in thinking, i. e. think without ideas. But your Lordſhip aſks, “whence “comes this certainty (for I ſay certainly) where there be no particular ideas,” if knowledge conſiſts in the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of ideas? I anſwer, we have ideas, as far as we are certain; and beyond that, we have neither certainty, no nor probability. Every thing, which we either know, or believe, is ſome propoſition: now no propoſition can be framed, as the object of our knowledge, or aſſent, wherein two ideas are not joined to, or ſeparated from one another. As for example, when I affirm that “ſomething exiſts in the “world, whereof I have no idea,” exiſtence is affirmed of ſomething, ſome being: and I have as clear an idea of exiſtence, and ſomething, the two things joined in that propoſition, as I have of them in this propoſition, “ſomething “exiſts in the world, whereof I have an idea.” When, therefore, I affirm, that the intellectual world is greater and more beautiful than the material; whether I ſhould know the truth of this propoſition, either by divine revelation, or ſhould aſſert it, as highly probable (which is all I do, in that chapter, out of which Eſſay, B. 4. C. 3. this inſtance is brought) it means no more but this, viz. that there are more, and more beautiful beings, whereof we have no ideas, than there are, of which we have ideas; of which beings, whereof we have ideas, we can, for want of ideas, have no farther knowledge, but that ſuch beings do exiſt.

If your Lordſhip ſhall now aſk me, “how I know there are ſuch beings?” I Eſſay, B. 4. C. 3. anſwer, that, in that chapter of the extent of our knowledge, I do not ſay I know, but I endeavour to ſhew, that it is moſt highly probable: but yet a man is capable of knowing it to be true, becauſe he is capable of having it revealed to him by God, that this propoſition is true, viz. that, in the works of God, there are more, and more beautiful beings, whereof we have no ideas, than there are, whereof we have ideas. If God, inſtead of ſhewing the very things to St. Paul, had only revealed to him, that this propoſition was true, viz. that there were things in heaven, “which neither eye had ſeen, nor ear had heard, nor had “entered into the heart of man to conceive;” would he not have known the truth of that propoſition, of whoſe terms he had ideas, viz. of beings, whereof he had no other ideas, but barely as ſomething, and of exiſtence; tho’, in the want of other ideas of them, he could attain no other knowledge of them, but barely that they exiſted? So that, in what I have there ſaid, there is no contradiction, nor ſhadow of a contradiction, to my placing knowledge in the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of ideas.

But if I ſhould any where miſtake, and ſay any thing inconſiſtent with that way of certainty of mine; how, I beſeech your Lordſhip, could you conclude from thence, that the placing of knowledge in the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of ideas, tends to ſcepticiſm? that, which is the propoſition here to be proved, would remain ſtill unproved: for I might ſay things inconſiſtent with this propoſition, that “knowledge conſiſts in the perception of the connexion, and agreement, or diſagreement, and repugnancy of our ideas;” and yet that propoſition be true, and very far from tending to ſcepticiſm, unleſs your Lordſhip will argue that every propoſition, that is inconſiſtent with what a man any where ſays, tends to ſcepticiſm; and then I ſhould be tempted to infer, that many propoſitions, in the letters your Lordſhip has honoured me with, will tend to ſcepticiſm.

Your Lordſhip’s ſecond argument is, from my ſaying, “we have no ideas of Anſw. I. p. 126, 167. “the mechanical affections of the minute particles of bodies, which hinders “our certain knowledge of univerſal truths, concerning natural bodies:” from whence your Lordſhip concludes, “that ſince we can attain to no ſcience, as to “bodies or ſpirits, our knowledge muſt be confined to a very narrow compaſs.” I grant it; but I crave leave to mind your Lordſhip again, that this is not the propoſition to be proved: a little knowledge is ſtill knowledge, and not ſcepticiſm. But let me have affirmed our knowledge to be comparatively very little; how, I beſeech your Lordſhip, does that any way prove, that this propoſition, “knowledge “conſiſts in the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of our ideas,” any way tends to ſcepticiſm? which was the propoſition to be proved. But the

Anſw. I. p. 127. inference, your Lordſhip ſhuts up this head with, in theſe words: "ſo that all certainty is given up, in the way of knowledge, as to the viſible and inviſible world, or at leaſt the greateſt part of them;" ſhewing, in the firſt part of it, what your Lordſhip ſhould have inferred, and was willing to infer, does at laſt, by theſe words in the cloſe, "or at leaſt the greateſt part of them," I gueſs, come juſt to nothing: I ſay, I gueſs; for what them, by grammatical conſtruction, is to be referred to, ſeems not clear to me.

Anſw. I. p. 128. Your third argument being juſt of the ſame kind with the former, only to ſhew, that I reduce our knowledge to a very narrow compaſs, in reſpect of the whole extent of beings; is already anſwered.

Anſw. I. p. 129. In the fourth place, your Lordſhip ſets down ſome words of mine concerning reaſoning and demonſtration; and then concludes, "but, if there be no way of coming to demonſtration but this, I doubt we muſt be content without it." Which being nothing but a declaration of your doubt, is, I grant, a very ſhort way of proving any propoſition, and I ſhall leave to your Lordſhip the ſatisfaction you have, in ſuch a proof, ſince, I think, it will ſcarce convince others.

Anſw. I. p. 129---131. In the laſt place, your Lordſhip argues, that becauſe I ſay, that the idea in the mind proves not the exiſtence of that thing, whereof it is an idea, therefore we cannot know the actual exiſtence of any thing, by our ſenſes; becauſe we know nothing, but by the perceived agreement of ideas. But if you had been pleaſed to have conſidered my anſwer there, to the ſcepticks, whoſe cauſe you here ſeem, with no ſmall vigour, to manage; you would, I humbly conceive, have found that you miſtake one thing for another, viz. the idea that has by a former ſenſation, been lodged in the mind, for actually receiving any idea, i. e. actual ſenſation; which, I think, I need not go about to prove, are two diſtinct things, after what you have here quoted out of my book. Now the two ideas, that, in this caſe, are perceived to agree, and do thereby produce knowledge, are the idea of actual ſenſation (which is an action whereof I have a clear and diſtinct idea) and the idea of actual exiſtence of ſomething without me, that cauſes that ſenſation. And what other certainty your Lordſhip has, by your ſenſes, of the exiſting of any thing without you, but the perceived connexion of thoſe two ideas, I would gladly know. When you have deſtroyed this certainty, which I conceive is the utmoſt, as to this matter, which our infinitely wiſe and bountiful maker has made us capable of, in this ſtate; your Lordſhip will have well aſſiſted the ſcepticks, in carrying their arguments againſt certainty by ſenſe, beyond what they could have expected.

I cannot but fear, my Lord, that what you have ſaid here, in favour of ſcepticiſm, againſt certainty by ſenſe (for it is not at all againſt me, 'till you ſhew we can have no idea of actual ſenſation) without the proper antidote annexed, in ſhewing, wherein that certainty conſiſts (if the account, I give, be not true) after you have ſo ſtrenuouſly endeavoured to deſtroy, what I have ſaid for it; will, by your authority, have laid no ſmall foundation of ſcepticiſm; which they will not fail to lay hold of, with advantage to their cauſe, who have any diſpoſition that way. For I deſire any one to read this your fifth argument, and then judge, which of us two is a promoter of ſcepticiſm; I, who have endeavoured, and, as I think, proved certainty by our ſenſes; or your Lordſhip, who has (in your thoughts at leaſt) deſtroyed theſe proofs, without giving us any other to ſupply their place. All your other arguments amount to no more but this; that I have given inſtances to ſhew, that the extent of our knowledge, in compariſon of the whole extent of being, is very little and narrow: which, when "your Lordſhip writ your Vindication of the doctrine of the Trinity, were very fair and ingenuous confeſſions, of the ſhortneſs of human underſtanding, with reſpect to the nature and manner of ſuch things, which we are moſt certain of the being of, by conſtant and undoubted experience:" tho' ſince you have ſhewed your diſlike of them, in more places then one, particularly p. 33. and again, more at large, p. 43. and, at laſt, you have thought fit to repreſent them, as arguments for

Vindic. p. 244.

Anſ. I. p. 33.

Ib. p. 43-45.

for ſcepticiſm. And thus I have acquitted myſelf, I hope to your Lordſhip's ſatiſfaction, of my promiſe to anſwer your accuſation of a tendency to ſcepticiſm.

But to return to your ſecond letter, where I left off; in the following pages, P. 76--78. you have another argument, "to prove my way of certainty to be none, but to "lead to ſcepticiſm," which, after a ſerious peruſal of it, ſeems to me to amount to no more but this, that Des Cartes and I go both, in the way of ideas, and we differ; ergo, the placing of certainty in the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of ideas, is no way of certainty, but leads to ſcepticiſm: which is a conſequence I cannot admit, and I think is no better, than this; your Lordſhip and I differ, and yet we both go, in the way of ideas; ergo, the placing of knowledge in the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of ideas, is no way of certainty at all, but leads to ſcepticiſm.

Your Lordſhip will, perhaps, think I ſay more than I can juſtify, when I ſay your Lordſhip goes in the way of ideas; for you will tell me, you do not place certainty in the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of ideas. Anſw. No more does Des Cartes; and therefore, in that reſpect, he and I went no more in the ſame way of ideas, than your Lordſhip and I do. From whence it follows, that how much ſoever he, and I, may differ, in other points, our difference is no more an argument againſt this propoſition, that knowledge, or certainty, conſiſts in the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of ideas, than your Lordſhip's and my difference, in any other point, is an argument againſt the truth of that my definition of knowledge, or that it tends to ſcepticiſm.

But you will ſay that Des Cartes built his ſyſtem of philoſophy upon ideas; and ſo, I ſay, does your Lordſhip too, and every one elſe, as much as he, that has any ſyſtem of that, or any other, part of knowledge. For ideas are nothing, but the immediate objects of our minds in thinking; and your Lordſhip, I conclude, in building your ſyſtem of any part of knowledge, thinks on ſomething; and, therefore, you can no more build, or have any ſyſtem of knowledge, without ideas, than you can think without ſome immediate objects of thinking. Indeed, you do not ſo often uſe the word, ideas, as Des Cartes, or I, have done; but uſing the things ſignified by that term, as much as either of us (unleſs you can think, without an immediate object of thinking) your's alſo is the way of ideas, as much as his, or mine. Your condemning the way of ideas, in thoſe general terms, which one meets with, ſo often in your writings, on this occaſion, amounts, at laſt, to no more but an exception, againſt a poor ſound of three ſyllables, tho' your Lordſhip thinks fit not to own, that you have any exception to it.

If, beſides this, theſe ten or twelve pages have any other argument in them, which I have not ſeen, I humbly deſire, you would be pleaſed to put it into a ſyllogiſm, to convince my reader that I have ſilently paſſed by an argument of importance, and then I promiſe an anſwer to it: and the ſame requeſt and promiſe I make to your Lordſhip, in reference to all other paſſages, in your letter, wherein you think there is any thing of moment unanſwered.

Your Lordſhip comes to anſwer what was in my former letter, to ſhew, that P. 87.
what you had ſaid, concerning nature and perſon, was to me, and ſeveral others,
whom I had talked with, about it, hardly to be underſtood. To this purpoſe
the ſixteen next pages are chiefly employed, to ſhew what Ariſtotle and others P. 87--103.
have ſaid, about φύσις and natura, a Greek and a Latin word; neither of which
is the Engliſh word, nature, nor can it concern it at all, 'till it be proved that na-
ture, in Engliſh, has, in the propriety of our tongue, preciſely the ſame ſignifi-
cation, that φύσις had among the Greeks, and natura among the Romans. For
would it not be pretty harſh to an Engliſh ear, to ſay with Ariſtotle, "that nature
"is a corporeal ſubſtance, or a corporeal ſubſtance is nature?" to inſtance but in P. 92. & 96.
this one, among thoſe many various ſenſes, which your Lordſhip proves, he uſed
the term φύσις in: or with Anaximander, "that nature is matter, or matter
"nature? or with Sextus Empericus, that nature is a principle of life, or a prin- P. 66.
"ciple of life is nature?" So that, tho' the philoſophers of old, of all kinds, did P. 98.
underſtand the ſenſe of the terms φύσις, and natura, in the languages of their
countries, yet it does not follow, what you would here conclude from thence,

P. 99. that they underſtood the proper ſignification of the term, nature, in Engliſh: nor has an Engliſhman any more need to conſult thoſe Grecians, in their uſe of the ſound φύσις, to know what nature ſignifies in Engliſh, than thoſe Grecians had need to conſult our writings, or bring inſtances of the uſe of the word, nature, in Engliſh authors, to juſtify their uſing of the term φύσις, in any ſenſe, they had P. 99, 100. uſed it in Greek. The like may be ſaid of what is brought out of the Greek chriſtian writers; for, I think, an Engliſhman could ſcarce be juſtified in ſaying in Engliſh, "that the angels were natures;" becauſe Theodoret and St. Baſil P. 102. call them φύσεις. "To theſe, I think, there might be added other ſenſes, "wherein the word φύσις may be found, made uſe of by the Greeks, which "are not taken notice of, by your Lordſhip: As particularly Ariſtotle, if I "miſtake not, uſes it for a plaſtick power, or a ſtind of anima mundi, preſiding "over the material world, and producing the order and regularity of motions, "formations and generations in it."

Indeed, your Lordſhip brings a proof from an authority, that is proper in the caſe, and would go a great way in it; for it is of an Engliſhman, who writing of nature, gives an account of the ſignification of the word nature, in Engliſh. But the miſchief is, that, among eight ſignifications of the word nature, which he gives, that is not to be found, which you quote him for, and had need of. For he ſays not that nature, in Engliſh, is uſed for ſubſtance, which is the ſenſe your Lordſhip has uſed it in, and would juſtify, by the authority of that ingenious and honourable perſon: and to make it out, you tell us, "Mr. Boyle ſays "the word, eſſence, is of great affinity to nature, if not of an adequate import; "to which your Lordſhip adds, but the real eſſence of a thing is a ſubſtance." So that, in fine, the authority of this excellent perſon, and philoſopher, amounts to thus much, that he ſays that nature and eſſence are two terms, that have a great affinity; and you ſay, that nature and ſubſtance are two terms, that have a great affinity. For the learned Mr. Boyle ſays no ſuch thing, nor can it appear, that he ever thought ſo, 'till it can be ſhewn, that he has ſaid that eſſence and ſubſtance have the ſame ſignification.

I humbly conceive, it would have been a ſtrange way in any body, but your Lordſhip, to have quoted an author for ſaying, that nature and ſubſtance had the ſame ſignification, when one of thoſe terms, viz. ſubſtance, he does not, upon that occaſion, ſo much as name. But your Lordſhip has this privilege, it ſeems, to ſpeak of your inferences, as if they were other men's words, whereof, I think, P. 63. I have given ſeveral inſtances; I am ſure, I have given one, where you ſeem to ſpeak of clear and diſtinct ideas, as my words, when they are only your words, there inferr'd from my words, evident knowledge: and other the like inſtances might be produced, were there any need.

Had your Lordſhip produced Mr. Boyle's teſtimony, that nature, in our tongue, had the ſame ſignification with ſubſtance, I ſhould preſently have ſubmitted to ſo great an authority, and taken it for proper Engliſh, and a clear way of expreſſing one's ſelf, to uſe nature and ſubſtance promiſcuouſly, one for another. But ſince, I think, there is no inſtance of any one, who ever did ſo, and therefore it muſt be a new, and conſequently no very clear, way of ſpeaking; give me leave, my Lord, to wonder, why, in all this diſpute, about the term, nature, upon the clear and right underſtanding whereof, you lay ſo much ſtreſs, you have not been pleaſed to define it; which would put an end to all diſputes, about the meaning of it, and leave no doubtfulneſs, no obſcurity, in your uſe of it, nor any room for any diſpute, what you mean by it. This would have ſaved many pages of paper, tho' perhaps it would have made us loſe your learned account, of what the ancients have ſaid, concerning φύσις, and the ſeveral acceptations they uſed it in.

All the other authors, Greek and Latin, your Lordſhip has quoted, may, for ought I know, have uſed the terms φύσις natura, properly, in their languages; and have diſcourſed very clearly and intelligibly about what thoſe terms, in their countries, ſignified. But how that proves, there were no difficulties, in the ſenſe, or conſtruction, in that diſcourſe of your's, concerning nature, which I, and thoſe I conſulted upon it, did not underſtand; is hard to ſee. Your Lordſhip's diſcourſe was obſcure, and too difficult, then, for me, and ſo I muſt own it is ſtill. Whether my friend be any better inlightened by what you have ſaid to him here, out of ſo many ancient authors, I am too remote from him at the writing of this, to know, and ſo ſhall not trouble your Lordſhip with any converſation, which perhaps, when we meet again, we may have upon it.

The next paſſage of your vindication, which was complained of, to be very hard to be underſtood, was this, where you ſay, "that you grant that, by ſenſation and reflection, we come to know the powers and properties of things: but our reaſon is ſatisfied that there muſt be ſomething beyond theſe, becauſe it is impoſſible, they ſhould ſubſiſt by themſelves. So that the nature of things properly belongs to our reaſon, and not to mere ideas." To rectify the miſtake, that had been made in my firſt letter, p. 157. in taking reaſon, here, to mean the faculty of reaſon, you tell me, "I might eaſily have ſeen, that, by reaſon, your Lordſhip underſtood principles of reaſon allowed by mankind." To which it was replyed, that then this paſſage of your's muſt be read thus, viz. "that your Lordſhip grants that by ſenſation, and reflection, we come to know the properties of things; but our reaſon, i. e. the principles of reaſon allowed by mankind, are ſatisfied that there muſt be ſomething beyond theſe; becauſe it is impoſſible, they ſhould ſubſiſt by themſelves. So that the nature of things properly belongs to our reaſon," i. e. to the principles of reaſon allowed by mankind, "and not to mere ideas; which made it ſeem more unintelligible, than it was before." Vind. p. 253. Anſw. 1. p. 101. Lett. 2. p. 125, 126.

To the complaint was made, of the unintelligibleneſs of this paſſage, in this laſt ſenſe, given by your Lordſhip, you anſwer nothing. So that we [i. e. my friends, whom I conſulted, and I] are ſtill excuſable, if not underſtanding what is ſignified by theſe expreſſions; "the principles of reaſon, allowed by mankind are ſatisfied, and the nature of things properly belongs to the principles of reaſon, allowed by mankind," we ſee not the connexion or the propoſitions here tyed together, by the words, ſo that, which was the thing complained of, in theſe words, viz. "that the inference here, both for its connexion and expreſſion, ſeemed hard to be underſtood;" and more to the purpoſe, which your Lordſhip takes no notice of. Lett. 2. p. 121.

Indeed, your Lordſhip repeats theſe words of mine, "That, in both ſenſes of the word, reaſon, either taken for a faculty, or for the principles of reaſon, allowed by mankind, reaſon, and ideas, may conſiſt together:" and then ſubjoins, "that this leads your Lordſhip to the examination of that, which may be of ſome uſe, viz. to ſhew the difference of my method of certainty, by ideas, and the method of certainty, by reaſon." Which, how it any way juſtifies your oppoſing ideas, and reaſon, as you here, and elſewhere, often do; or ſhews, that ideas are inconſiſtent with the principles of reaſon, allowed by mankind; I leave to the reader to judge. Your Lordſhip, for the clearing of what you had ſaid in your vindication, &c. from obſcurity and unintelligibleneſs, which were complained of, in it, is to prove, that ideas are inconſiſtent with the principles of reaſon, allowed by mankind; and, in anſwer to this, you ſay, "you will ſhew the difference of my method of certainty, by ideas, and the method of certainty by reaſon." P. 105.

My Lord, as I remember, the expreſſion in queſtion was not, "that the nature of things properly belongs to our reaſon, and not to my method of certainty by ideas; but this, that the nature of things belongs to our reaſon, and not to mere ideas. So that the thing, you were here to ſhew, was, that reaſon, i. e. the principles of reaſon, allowed by mankind, and ideas, and not the principles of reaſon, and my method of certainty by ideas, cannot conſiſt together;" for the principles of reaſon, allowed by mankind, and ideas, may conſiſt together; tho', perhaps, my method of certainty by ideas, ſhould prove inconſiſtent with thoſe principles. So that if all, that you ſay, from this to the 153d page, i. e. forty eight pages, were as clear demonſtration, as I humbly conceive it is the contrary; yet it does nothing to clear the paſſage in hand, but leaves that part of your diſcourſe, concerning nature, lying ſtill under the objection was made againſt it, as much as if you had not ſaid one word.

BUT ſince I am not unwilling that my method of certainty ſhould be examined, and I ſhould be glad (if there be any faults in it) to learn the defects of that my definition of knowledge, from ſo great a maſter as your Lordſhip; I will conſider what you here ſay, "to ſhow the difference of my method of certainty by ideas, "and the method of certainty by reaſon."

P. 105. YOUR Lordſhip ſays, "that the way of certainty, by reaſon, lies in two "things:

"1. THE certainty of principles.

"2. THE certainty of deductions."

I GRANT, that a part of that, which is called certainty of reaſon, lies in the certainty of principles; which principles, I preſume, your Lordſhip and I are agreed, are ſeveral propoſitions.

IF, then, theſe principles are propoſitions, to ſhew the difference between your Lordſhip's way of certainty by reaſon, and my way of certainty by ideas; I think it is viſible, that you ought to ſhew, wherein the certainty of thoſe propoſitions conſiſts, in your way by reaſon, different from that, wherein I make it conſiſt, in my way by ideas. As for example: your Lordſhip and I are agreed, that this propoſition, whatſoever is, is; is a principle of reaſon, or a maxim. Now my way of certainty, by ideas, is, that the certainty of this propoſition conſiſts in this, that there is a perceivable connexion, or agreement, between the idea of being and the idea of being, or between the idea of exiſtence and the idea of exiſtence, as is expreſſed in that propoſition. But now, in your way of reaſon, pray, wherein does the certainty of this propoſition conſiſt? If it be, in any thing, different from that perceiveable agreement of the ideas, affirmed of one another in it, I beſeech your Lordſhip to tell it me; if not, I beg leave to conclude, that your way of certainty by reaſon, and my way of certainty by ideas, in this caſe, are juſt the ſame.

BUT, inſtead of ſaying any thing, to ſhew wherein the certainty of principles is different in the way of reaſon, from the certainty of principles, in the way of ideas, upon my friend's ſhewing, that you had no ground to ſay, as you did, that I had no idea of reaſon, as it ſtands for principles of reaſon; your Lordſhip takes occaſion (as, what will not, in a ſkilful hand, ſerve to introduce any thing, one has a mind to?) to tell me, "what ideas I have of them, muſt appear from my "book, and you do there find a chapter of ſelf-evident propoſitions and maxims, "which you cannot but think extraordinary for the deſign of it, which is thus "ſummed in the concluſion, viz. that it was to ſhew, that theſe maxims, as "they are of little uſe, where we have clear and diſtinct ideas, ſo they are of "dangerous uſe, where our ideas are not clear and diſtinct. And is not this a fair "way to convince your Lordſhip, that my way of ideas is very conſiſtent with "the certainty of reaſon, when the way of reaſon hath been always ſuppoſed to "proceed upon general principles, and I aſſert them to be uſeleſs and dangerous?"

P. 106.

B. 4. C. 7. §. 20.

IN which words I crave leave to obſerve,

1. THAT the pronoun, them, here, ſeems to have reference to ſelf-evident propoſitions, to maxims, and to principles, as terms uſed by your Lordſhip and me; tho' it be certain, that you and I uſe them, in a far different ſenſe: for, if I miſtake not, you uſe them all three promiſcuouſly, one for another; whereas 'tis plain, that, in that chapter, out of which you bring your quotations here, I diſtinguiſh ſelf-evident propoſitions, from thoſe, which I there mention, under the name of maxims, which are principally theſe two, "whatſoever is, is; and it is "impoſſible for the ſame thing to be, and not to be." Farther, it is plain out of the ſame place, that, by maxims, I there mean general propoſitions, which are ſo univerſally received, under the name of maxims, or axioms, that they are looked upon, as innate; the two chief whereof, principally there meant, are thoſe above-mentioned: but what the propoſitions are, which you comprehend, under maxims, or principles of reaſon, cannot be determined, ſince your Lordſhip neither defines, nor enumerates them; and ſo, 'tis impoſſible preciſely, to know what you mean, by them, here: and that, which makes me more at a loſs, is, that, in this argument, you ſet down for principles, or maxims, propoſitions, that

Eſſay, B. 4. C. 7.

P. 108.

that are not ſo much as ſelf-evident, viz. this, "that the eſſential properties of a "man, are to reaſon and diſcourſe, &c."

2. I CRAVE leave to obſerve, that you tell me, that in my book, "you find "a chapter of ſelf-evident propoſitions and maxims;" whereas I find no ſuch chapter in my book: I have in it, indeed, a chapter of maxims, but never an one intitled, "of ſelf-evident propoſitions and maxims." This, 'tis poſſible, your Lordſhip will call a nice criticiſm; but yet it is ſuch an one, as is very neceſſary in the caſe: for in that chapter, I, as is before obſerved, expreſſly diſtinguiſh ſelf-evident propoſitions, from the received maxims, or axioms, which I there ſpeak of: whereas it ſeems to me, to be your deſign (in joining them, in a title of a chapter, contrary to what I had done) to have it thought, that I treated of them, as one and the ſame thing; and ſo all that I ſaid there, of the uſeleſſneſs of ſome few general propoſitions, under the title of received maxims, might be applied to all ſelf-evident propoſitions; the quite contrary whereof, was the deſign of that chapter. For that, which I endeavour to ſhew there, is, that all our knowledge is not built on those few, received, general propoſitions, which are ordinarily called maxims, or axioms; but that there are a great many truths may be known, without them: but that there is any knowledge, without ſelf-evident propoſitions, I am ſo far from denying, that I am accuſed by your Lordſhip, for requiring in demonſtration, more ſuch than you think are neceſſary. This ſeems, I ſay, to be your deſign; and I wiſh your Lordſhip, by intitling my chapter, as I myſelf did, and not as it would beſt ſerve your turn, had not made it neceſſary for me, to make this nice criticiſm. This is certain, that, without thus confounding maxims and ſelf-evident propoſitions, what you here ſay, would not ſo much, as in appearance, concern me: for,

3. I CRAVE leave to obſerve, that all the argument, your Lordſhip uſes here againſt me, to prove, that my way of certainty by ideas, is inconſiſtent with "the way of certainty by reaſon, which lies in the certainty of principles, is this; "that the way of reaſon hath been always ſuppoſed to proceed upon general "principles, and I aſſert them to be uſeleſs and dangerous." Be pleaſed, my Lord, to define, or enumerate, your general principles; and, then, we ſhall ſee, whether I aſſert them to be uſeleſs and dangerous, and whether they, who ſuppoſed the way of reaſon was to proceed upon general principles, differed from me; and if they did differ, whether theirs was more the way of reaſon than mine: but to talk thus of general principles, which have always been ſuppoſed the way of reaſon, without telling ſo much, as which, or what they are, is not ſo much, as by authority to ſhew, that my way of certainty by ideas, is inconſiſtent with the way of certainty by reaſon; much leſs is it, in reality, to prove it. Becauſe admitting I had ſaid any thing contrary to what, as you ſay, has been always ſuppoſed, its being ſuppoſed, proves it not to be true; becauſe we know that ſeveral things have been, for many ages, generally ſuppoſed, which, at laſt, upon examination, have been found not to be true.

WHAT hath been always ſuppoſed, is fit only for your Lordſhip's great reading to declare; but ſuch arguments, I confeſs are wholly loſt upon me, who have not time, or occaſion, to examine, what has always been ſuppoſed; eſpecially in thoſe queſtions, which concern truths, that are to be known from the nature of things; becauſe, I think, they cannot be eſtabliſhed by majority of votes, not eaſy to be collected; nor, if they were collected, can convey certainty, till it can be ſuppoſed, that the greater part of mankind are always in the right. In matters of fact, I own, we muſt govern ourſelves, by the teſtimonies of others; but, in matters of ſpeculation, to ſuppoſe on, as others have ſuppoſed before us, is ſuppoſed, by many, to be only a way to learned ignorance, which enables to talk much, and know but little. The truths, which the penetration and labours of others, before us, have diſcovered and made out, I own we are infinitely indebted to them for; and ſome of them are of that conſequence, that we cannot acknowledge too much the advantages, we receive from thoſe great maſters in knowledge: but where they only ſuppoſed, they left it to us to ſearch and advance farther. And, in thoſe things, I think, it becomes our induſtry to imploy itſelf, for the improvement of the knowledge, and adding to the ſtock of diſcoveries, left us by our inquiſitive and thinking predeceſſors.

4. One thing more, I crave leave to obſerve, viz. that, to theſe words, "theſe maxims, as they are of little uſe, where we have clear and diſtinct ideas, "ſo they are of dangerous uſe, where our ideas are not clear and diſtinct, quoted out of my Eſſay; you ſubjoin, and is not this a fair way to convince your "Lordſhip, that my way of ideas is very inconſiſtent with the certainty of reaſon?" Anſw. My Lord, my Eſſay, and thoſe words in it, were writ many years, before I dreamt that you, or any body elſe, would ever queſtion the conſiſtency of my way of certainty, by ideas, with the way of certainty by reaſon; and ſo could not be intended to convince your Lordſhip, in this point: and ſince you firſt ſaid, that theſe two ways are inconſiſtent, I never brought thoſe words to convince you, "that my way is conſiſtent with the certainty of reaſon;" and therefore, why you aſk, whether that be a fair way to convince you, which was never made uſe of, as any way to convince you, of any ſuch thing, is hard to imagine. P. 106.

P. 106, 107. Eſſay, B. 4. C. 7. § 4. But your Lordſhip goes on, in the following words, with the like kind of argument, where you tell me, that I ſay, "that my firſt deſign is to prove, that "the conſideration of thoſe general maxims adds nothing to the evidence, or "certainty, of knowledge; which, ſays your Lordſhip, overthrows all that, "which has been accounted ſcience and demonſtration, and muſt lay the foundation of ſcepticiſm; becauſe our true grounds of certainty depend upon ſome "general principle of reaſon. To make this plain, you ſay, you will put a "caſe, grounded upon my words; which are, that I have diſcourſed with very "rational men, who have actually denied, that they are men. Theſe words "J. S. underſtands, as ſpoken of themſelves, and charges them with very ill "conſequences; but you think they are capable of another meaning: however, "ſays your Lordſhip, let us put the caſe, that men did in earneſt queſtion, "whether they were men or not; and then you do not ſee, if I ſet aſide general maxims, how I can convince them, that they are men. For the way your "Lordſhip looks on, as moſt apt to prevail, upon ſuch extraordinary ſceptical "men, is by general maxims and principles of reaſon."

Anſw. I can neither in that paragraph, nor chapter, find that I ſay, "that "my firſt deſign is to prove, that theſe general maxims" (i. e. thoſe, which your Lordſhip calls general principles of reaſon) add nothing to the evidence and certainty of knowledge in general: for ſo theſe words muſt be underſtood, to make good the conſequence, which your Lordſhip charges on them, viz. "that "they overthrow all, that has been accounted ſcience and demonſtration, and "lay the foundation of ſcepticiſm."

Eſſay, B. 4. C. 7. § 3. What my deſign in that place is, is evident from theſe words, in the foregoing paragraph; "let us conſider, whether this ſelf-evidence be peculiar only "to thoſe propoſitions, which are received for maxims, and have the dignity of "axioms allowed: and here it is plain, that ſeveral other truths, not allowed "to be axioms, partake equally with them, in this ſelf-evidence." Which ſhews, that my deſign, there, was to evince, that there were truths, that are not called maxims, that are as ſelf-evident, as thoſe received maxims. Purſuant to this deſign, I ſay, "that the conſideration of theſe axioms [i. e. whatſoever is, is; and "it is impoſſible for the ſame thing to be, and not to be] can add nothing to "the evidence and certainty of its [i. e. the mind's] knowledge;" [i. e. of the truth of more particular propoſitions, concerning identity.] Theſe are my words, in that place, and that the ſenſe of them is according to the limitation, annexed to them, between thoſe crotchets, I refer my reader to that fourth ſection; where he will find that all, that I ſay, amounts to no more, but what is expreſſed in theſe words, in the cloſe of it: "I appeal to every one's own mind, whe- "ther this propoſition, a circle is a circle, be not as ſelf-evident a propoſition, "as that conſiſting of more general terms, whatſoever is, is: and again, whe- "ther this propoſition, blue is not red, be not a propoſition, that the mind can "no more doubt of, as ſoon as it underſtands the words, than it does of that "axiom, it is impoſſible for the ſame thing to be, and not to be; and ſo of all "the like." And now I aſk your Lordſhip, whether you do affirm of this, that "it overthrows all that, which hath been counted ſcience and demonſtra- § 4.

“ tion, and muſt lay the foundation of ſcepticiſm?” If you do, I ſhall deſire you to prove it; if you do not, I muſt deſire you to conſider, how fairly my ſenſe has been repreſented.

But, ſuppoſing you had repreſented my ſenſe right, and that the little, or dangerous uſe, which I there limit to certain maxims, had been meant of all principles of reaſon, in general, in your ſenſe; what had this been, my Lord, to the queſtion under debate? Your Lordſhip undertakes to ſhew, that your way of certainty, by reaſon, is different from my way of certainty, by ideas. To do this, you ſay, in the preceding page, “ that certainty, by reaſon, lies, 1. in cer- “ tainty of principles; 2. in certainty of deductions.” The firſt of theſe, you P. 105. are upon here; and if, in order to what you had undertaken, your Lordſhip had ſhewn, that, in your way, by reaſon, thoſe principles were certain; but, in my way, by ideas, we could not attain to any certainty, concerning them; this, indeed, had been to ſhew a difference, between my way of certainty, which you call the way, by ideas, and your's, which you call the way, by reaſon, in this part of certainty, that lies in the certainty of principles. I have ſaid, in the words quoted by your Lordſhip, that the conſideration of thoſe two maxims, “ what is, is; and it is impoſſible for the ſame thing to be, and not to be;” are not of uſe, to add any thing to the evidence, or certainty, of our knowledge of the truth of identical predications; but I never ſaid thoſe maxims were, in the leaſt, uncertain: I may, perhaps, think otherwiſe of their uſe, than your Lordſhip does, but I think no otherwiſe of their truth and certainty, than you do; they are left in their full force and certainty, for your uſe, if you can make any better uſe of them, than what I think can be made. So that, in reſpect of the allowed certainty of thoſe principles, my way differs not at all from your Lordſhip's.

Pray, my Lord, look over that chapter again, and ſee, whether I bring their truth and certainty, any more into queſtion, than you yourſelf do; and 'tis about their certainty, and not uſe, that the queſtion, here, is between your Lordſhip and me: we both agree, that they are both undoubtedly certain; all, then, that you bring, in the following pages, about their uſe, is nothing to the preſent queſtion, about the certainty of principles, which your Lordſhip is upon, in this place: and you will prove, that your way of certainty, by reaſon, is different from my way of certainty, by ideas, when you can ſhew, that you are certain of the truth of thoſe, or any other, maxims, any otherwiſe, than by the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of ideas, as expreſſed in them.

But your Lordſhip, paſſing by that wholly, endeavours to prove, that my ſaying that the conſideration of thoſe two general maxims can add nothing to the evidence, and certainty, of knowledge, in identical predications, (for that is all, that I there ſay) “ overthrows all, that has been accounted ſcience and “ demonſtration, and muſt lay the foundation of ſcepticiſm;” and, 'tis by a very remarkable proof, viz. “ becauſe our true grounds of certainty depend upon “ ſome general principles of reaſon;” which is the very thing I there, not only deny, but have diſproved; and, therefore, ſhould not, I humbly conceive, have been reſted on as a proof of any thing elſe, till my arguments againſt it had been anſwered.

But inſtead of that, your Lordſhip ſays, you will put a caſe, that ſhall make P. 107. it plain, which is the buſineſs of the ſix following pages, which are ſpent in this caſe.

The caſe is founded upon a ſuppoſition, which you ſeem willing to have thought that you borrowed either from J. S. or from me; whereas truly, that ſuppoſition is neither that gentleman's, nor mine, but purely your Lordſhip's own. For however groſly Mr. J. S. has miſtaken (which he has ſince acknowledged in print) the obvious ſenſe of my Eſſay, on which you ſay, you ground your B. vi. c. 7. caſe; yet I muſt do him right herein, that he himſelf ſuppoſed not, that any § 17. man, in his wits, ever in earneſt, queſtioned, whether he himſelf were a man, or no: tho', by a miſtake, (which I cannot but wonder at, in one ſo much exerciſed in controverſy, as Mr J. S.) he charged me with ſaying it.

P. 107 YOUR Lordſhip, indeed, ſays, "that you think my words there may have "another meaning." Would you thereby inſinuate, that you think it poſſible, they ſhould have that meaning, which J. S. once gave them? If you do not, my Lord, Mr. J. S. and his underſtanding them ſo, is in vain brought in, here, to countenance your making ſuch a ſuppoſition. If you do think thoſe words of my Eſſay, capable of ſuch a meaning, as J. S. gave them, there will appear a ſtrange harmony between your Lordſhip's and Mr. J. S's underſtanding, when he miſtakes, what is ſaid in my book: whether it will continue, now Mr. J. S. takes me right, I know not: but let us come to the caſe, as you put it. Your words are,

P. 107. "LET us put the caſe, that men did in earneſt queſtion, whether they were "men or not. Your Lordſhip ſays, you do not then ſee, if I ſet aſide general "maxims, how I can convince them, that they are men." Anſw. And do you, my Lord, ſee that, with maxims, you can convince them, of that, or any thing elſe? I confeſs, whatever you ſhould do, I ſhould think it ſcarce worth while, to reaſon with them, about any thing. I believe you are the firſt, that ever ſuppoſed a man ſo much beſide himſelf, as to queſtion, whether he were a man, or no, and yet ſo rational, as to be thought capable of being convinced of that, or any thing, by diſcourſe of reaſon. This, methinks, is little different from ſuppoſing a man in, and out of his wits, at the ſame time.

BUT, let us ſuppoſe your Lordſhip ſo lucky with your maxims, that you do convince a man (that doubts of it) that he is a man; what proof, I beſeech you, my Lord, is that of this propoſition, "that our true grounds of certainty depend "upon ſome general principles of reaſon?"

ON the contrary, ſuppoſe it ſhould happen, as is the more likely, that your ſetting upon him, with your maxims, cannot convince him; are we not, by this your caſe, to take this for a proof, "that general principles of reaſon are "not the grounds of certainty?" for 'tis upon the ſucceſs, or not ſucceſs of your endeavours, to convince ſuch a man with maxims, that your Lordſhip put the proof of this propoſition, "that our true grounds of certainty depend upon general principles of reaſon:" the iſſue whereof muſt remain in ſuſpence, 'till you have found ſuch a man, to bring it to trial; and ſo the proof is far enough off, unleſs you think the caſe ſo plain, that every one ſees ſuch a man will be preſently convinced by your maxims, tho' I ſhould think it probable that moſt people may think, he will not.

P. 107. YOUR Lordſhip adds, "for the way you look on, as moſt apt to prevail upon "ſuch extraordinary ſceptical men, is by general maxims and principles of reaſon." Anſw. This, indeed, is a reaſon, why your Lordſhip ſhould uſe maxims, when you have to do with ſuch extraordinary ſceptical men; becauſe you look on it as the likelieſt way, to prevail. But pray, my Lord, is your looking on it as the beſt way, to prevail on ſuch extraordinary ſceptical men, any proof, that "our true grounds of certainty depend upon ſome general principles of rea"ſon?" for it was to make this plain, that this caſe was put.

FARTHER, my Lord, give me leave to aſk, what we have here to do, with the ways of convincing others, of what they do not know, or aſſent to? Your Lordſhip and I are not, as I think, diſputing of the methods of perſuading others, of what they are ignorant of, and do not yet aſſent to; but our debate here, is about the ground of certainty, in what they do know, and aſſent to.

P. 107, 108. HOWEVER, you go on to ſet down ſeveral maxims, which you look on, as moſt apt to prevail, upon your extraordinary ſceptical man, to convince him, that he exiſts, and that he is a man. The maxims are,

P. 108. "THAT nothing can have no operation.

"THAT all different ſorts of being are diſtinguiſhed by eſſential properties.

"THAT the eſſential properties of a man, are reaſon, diſcourſe, &c.

"THAT theſe properties cannot ſubſiſt by themſelves, without a real ſub"ſtance."

I WILL not queſtion, whether a man cannot know, that he exiſts, or be certain (for 'tis of knowledge, and certainty, the queſtion here is) that he is a man, without the help of theſe maxims. I will only crave leave to aſk, how you

know

know that theſe are maxims? For methinks this, "that the eſſential properties "of a man are reaſon, diſcourſe, &c." an imperfect propoſition, with, and ſo forth, at the end of it, is a pretty ſort of maxim. That therefore, which I deſire to be informed here, is, how your Lordſhip knows theſe, or any other, propoſitions to be maxims? and how propoſitions, that are maxims, are to be diſtinguiſhed from propoſitions that are not maxims? and the reaſon, why I inſiſt upon it, is this: becauſe this, and this only, would ſhew, whether, what I have ſaid, in my chapter about maxims, "overthrows all, that has been account-"ed ſcience and demonſtration, and lays the foundation of ſcepticiſm." But I fear my requeſt, that you would be pleaſed to tell me, what you mean, by maxims, that I may know what propoſitions, according to your Lordſhip, are, and what are not maxims, will not eaſily be granted me; becauſe it would preſently put an end to all, that you impute to me, as ſaid in that chapter, againſt maxims, in a ſenſe, that I uſe not the word there.

YOUR Lordſhip makes me, out of my book, anſwer to the uſe, you make of the four above-mentioned propoſitions, which you call maxims, as if I were declared of an opinion, that maxims could not be of any uſe, in arguing with others: which, methinks, you ſhould not have done, if you had conſidered my chapter of maxims, which you ſo often quote. For I there ſay, "maxims are "uſeful to ſtop the mouths of wranglers,——to ſhew, that wrong opinions "lead to abſurdities, &c." P. 109. Eſſay, B. vi. c. 7. § 11.

YOUR Lordſhip, nevertheleſs, goes on to prove, that "without the help of "theſe principles, or maxims, I cannot prove, to any, that doubt it, that they "are men, in my way of ideas." Anſw. I beſeech you, my Lord, to give me leave to mind you again, that the queſtion is not, what I can prove; but whether, in my way, by ideas, I cannot, without the help of theſe principles, know that I am a man; and be certain of the truth of that, and ſeveral other propoſitions; I ſay of ſeveral other propoſitions: For I do not think you, in your way of certainty, by reaſon, pretend to be certain of all truths; or to be able to prove (to thoſe who doubt) all propoſitions, or ſo much as be able to convince every one of the truth of every propoſition, that you yourſelf are certain of. There be many propoſitions, in Mr. Newton's excellent book, which there are thouſands of people, and thoſe a little more rational, than ſuch as ſhould deny themſelves to be men, whom Mr. Newton himſelf would not be able, with, or without, the uſe of maxims, uſed in mathematicks, to convince of the truth of: and yet this would be no argument, againſt his method of certainty, whereby he came to the knowledge, that they are true. What, therefore, you can conclude, as to my way of certainty, from a ſuppoſition of my not being able, in my way by ideas, to convince thoſe, who doubt of it, that they are men, I do not ſee. But your Lordſhip is reſolved to prove, that I cannot, ſo you go on. P. 109.

YOUR Lordſhip ſays, that "I ſuppoſe, that we muſt have a clear and diſtinct "idea of that we are certain of;" and this you prove, out of my chapter of maxims, where I ſay, "that every one knows the ideas, that he has, and that "diſtinctly and unconfuſedly, one from another." Anſw. I ſuſpected all along, that you miſtook what I meant, by confuſed ideas. If your Lordſhip pleaſes to turn to my chapter of diſtinct and confuſed ideas, you will there find, that an idea, which is diſtinguiſhed in the mind from all others, may yet be confuſed: the confuſion being made, by a careleſs application of diſtinct names, to ideas, that are not ſufficiently diſtinct. Which having explained at large, in that chapter, I ſhall not need here again to repeat. Only permit me to ſet down an inſtance: he that has the idea of the liquor that, circulating through the heart of a ſheep, keeps that animal alive, and he, that has the idea of the liquor that circulates through the heart of a lobſter, has two different ideas; as diſtinct as an idea of an aqueous, pellucid, cold liquor, is from the idea of a red, opake, hot liquor: but yet, theſe two may be confounded, by giving the name blood, to this vital, circulating liquor of a lobſter. P. 110. Eſſay, B. ii. c. 29. § 4, 5, 6.

THIS being conſidered, will ſhew, how what I have ſaid, there, may conſiſt with my ſaying, that to certainty, ideas are not required, that are, in all their parts, perfectly clear and diſtinct: becauſe certainty being ſpoken there, of the knowledge of the truth of any propoſition; and propoſitions being made in words, it may be true, that notwithſtanding all the ideas we have, in our minds, are, as far as we have them there, clear and diſtinct, yet thoſe, which we would ſuppoſe the terms, in the propoſition, to ſtand for, may not be clear and diſtinct: either,

1. By making the term ſtand for an uncertain idea, which we have not yet preciſely determined in our minds, whereby it comes to ſtand, ſometimes for one idea, ſometimes for another. Which tho', when we reflect on them, they are diſtinct in our minds, yet by this uſe of a name, undetermined in its ſignification, come to be confounded. Or,

2. By ſuppoſing the name to ſtand for ſomething more, than really is in the idea, in our minds, which we make it a ſign of; v. g. let us ſuppoſe, that a man, many years ſince, when he was young, eat a fruit, whoſe ſhape, ſize, conſiſtency, and colour, he has a perfect remembrance of; but the particular taſte, he has forgot, and only remembers, that it very much delighted him: this complex idea, as far as it is in his mind, 'tis evident, is there; and, as far as he perceives it, when he reflects on it, is, in all its parts, clear and diſtinct: but when he calls it a pine-apple, and will ſuppoſe, that name ſtands for the ſame, preciſe, complex idea, for which another man, (who newly eat of that fruit, and has the idea of the taſte of it, alſo, freſh in his mind) uſes it, or for which he himſelf uſed it, when he had the taſte freſh in his memory; 'tis plain his complex idea, in that part, which conſiſts in the taſte, is very obſcure.

P. 110. To apply this, to what your Lordſhip here makes me ſuppoſe, I anſwer,

1. I do not ſuppoſe, that to certainty it is requiſite, that an idea ſhould be, in all its parts, clear and diſtinct. I can be certain, that a pine-apple is not an artichoak, tho' my idea, which I ſuppoſe that name to ſtand for, be in me obſcure and confuſed, in regard of its taſte.

2. I do not deny, but on the contrary, I affirm, that I can have a clear and diſtinct idea of a man (i. e. the idea, I give the name, man, to, may be clear and diſtinct) tho' it ſhould be true, that men are not yet agreed on the determined idea, that the name man ſhall ſtand for. Whatever confuſion, there may be, in the idea, to which that name is indeterminately applied; I do allow and affirm, that every one, if he pleaſes, may have a clear and diſtinct idea of a man, to himſelf, i. e. which he makes the word, man, ſtand for; which, if he makes known to others, in his diſcourſe with them, about man, all verbal diſpute will ceaſe, and he cannot be miſtaken, when he uſes the term, man; and if this were but done, with moſt of the glittering terms, brandiſhed in diſputes, it would often be ſeen, how little ſome men have to ſay, who with equivocal words and expreſſions, make no ſmall noiſe in controverſy.

P. 114. Your Lordſhip concludes this part by ſaying, "thus you have ſhewed, how "inconſiſtent my way of ideas is, with true certainty, and of what uſe and neceſſity theſe general principles of reaſon are." Anſw. By the laws of diſputation, which, in another place, you expreſs ſuch a regard to, one is bound not to change the terms of the queſtion. This I crave leave humbly to offer to your Lordſhip, becauſe, as far as I have looked into controverſy, I do not remember to have met with any one ſo apt, ſhall I ſay? to forget, or change, the queſtion, as your Lordſhip. This, my Lord, I ſhould not venture to ſay, but upon very good grounds, which I ſhall be ready to give you an account of, whenever you ſhall demand it of me. One example of it, we have here: you ſay, "you have "ſhewed how inconſiſtent my way of ideas is with true certainty, and of what "uſe and neceſſity theſe general principles of reaſon are:" my Lord, if you pleaſe to look back to the 105th page, you will ſee, what you there promiſed, was, "to ſhew the difference of my method of certainty, by ideas, and the me"thod of certainty, by reaſon:" and particularly, in the pages between that and this, the certainty of principles, which you ſay, is one of thoſe two things, wherein the way of certainty, by reaſon, lies. Inſtead of that, your Lordſhip concludes here, that you have ſhewed two things:

"1. How inconſiſtent my way of ideas is with true certainty." Whereas it ſhould be "to ſhew the inconſiſtency, or difference, of my method of certainty,

" by ideas, and the method of certainty, by reaſon;" which are two very different propoſitions. And, before you undertake to ſhew, that my method of certainty is inconſiſtent with true certainty, it will be neceſſary for you to define, and tell us wherein true certainty conſiſts, which your Lordſhip hitherto has ſhewn no great forwardneſs to do.

2. Another thing, which, you ſay, you have done, is, that "you have ſhewn of what Uſe and Neceſſity theſe general Principles of reaſon are." Anſw. Whether, by theſe general principles, you mean thoſe propoſitions, which you ſet down, p. 108, and call there maxims, or any other propoſitions, which you have not any where ſet down, I cannot tell. But, whatſoever they are, that you mean here, by theſe, I know not how the Uſefulneſs of theſe, your general principles, be they what they will, came to be a queſtion between your Lordſhip and me, here. If you have a mind to ſhew any miſtakes of mine, in my chapter of maxims, which, you ſay, you think extraordinary, for the deſign of it, I ſhall not be unwilling to be rectified; but that the uſefulneſs of principles is not, what is here under debate between us, I, with ſubmiſſion, affirm. That, which your Lordſhip is here to prove, is, that the certainty of principles, which is the way of certainty, by reaſon, is different from my way of certainty, by ideas. Upon the whole, I crave leave to ſay, in your words, that "thus I have," I humbly conceive, made it appear, that you have not "ſhewed any difference, " much leſs any inconſiſtency of my method of certainty, by ideas, and the " method of certainty, by reaſon," in that firſt part, which you aſſign of certainty by reaſon, viz. certainty of prrinciples.

I come now to the ſecond part, which you aſſign of certainty, by reaſon, P. 105.
viz. certainty of deductions. I only crave leave firſt to ſet down theſe words, in the latter end of your diſcourſe, which we have been conſidering, where your Lordſhip ſays, "you begin to think J. S. was in the right, when he made me " ſay, That I had diſcourſed with very rational men, who denied themſelves to " be men." Anſw. I do not know what may be done, by thoſe, who have ſuch a command over the pronouns they, and them, as to put they themſelves, for they. I ſhall, therefore, deſire my reader to turn to that paſſage of my
book, and ſee, whether he too can be ſo lucky, as your Lordſhip, and can, Eſſay, B. iv,
with you, begin to think, that by theſe words, "who have actually denied, that c. 7. § 17.
" they, i. e. infants and changelings, are men," I meant, who actually denied, that they themſelves were men.

Your Lordſhip, to prove my method of certainty, by ideas, to be different from, and inconſiſtent with your ſecond part of the certainty, by reaſon, which,
you ſay, lies in the certainty of deductions, begins thus: "that you come now P. 114.
" to the certainty of reaſon, in making deductions; and here you ſhall briefly " lay down the grounds of certainty, which the antient philoſophers went upon, " and then compare my way of ideas, with them." To which give me leave, my Lord, to reply;

(1.) That, I humbly conceive, it ſhould have been grounds of certainty [in making deductions] which the antient philoſophers went upon; or elſe, they will be nothing to the propoſition, which your Lordſhip has undertaken here to prove. Now, of the certainty, in making deductions, I ſee none of the antients, produced by your Lordſhip, who ſay any thing to ſhew, wherein it
conſiſts, but Ariſtotle; who, as you ſay, "in his method of inferring one thing P. 116.
" from another, went upon this common principle of reaſon, that what things
" agree in a third, agree among themſelves." And it ſo falls out, that ſo far as he B. iv. c. 2.
goes, towards the ſhewing, wherein the certainty of deductions conſiſts, he and § 2. and c.
I agree, as is evident, by what I ſay in my Eſſay. And if Ariſtotle had gone any 17. § 15.
farther to ſhew, how we are certain, that thoſe two things agree with a third, he would have placed that certainty in the perception of that agreement, as I have done, and then he and I ſhould have perfectly agreed. I preſume to ſay, if Ariſtotle had gone farther in this matter, he would have placed our knowledge, or certainty of the agreement of any two things, in the perception of their agreement: and let not any one from hence think, I attribute too much to myſelf, in ſaying, that that acute and judicious philoſopher, if he had gone farther in that matter, would

have done, as I have done. For if he omitted it, I imagine it was not that he did not ſee it, but that it was ſo obvious and evident, that it appeared ſuperfluous to name it. For who can doubt, that the knowledge, or being certain, that any two things agree, conſiſts in the perception of their agreement? What elſe can it poſſibly conſiſt in? It is ſo obvious, that it would be a little extraordinary to think, that he that went ſo far, could miſs it. And I ſhould wonder, if any one ſhould allow the certainty of deduction to conſiſt, in the agreement of two things in a third, and yet ſhould deny, that the knowledge, or certainty, of that agreement, conſiſted in the perception of it.

(2.) In the next place, my Lord, ſuppoſing my method of certainty, in making deductions, were different from thoſe of the antients; this, at beſt, Eſſay, B. 4. c. 17. § 19. would be only, that which I call "argumentum ad verecundiam;" which proves not, on which ſide reaſon is, tho' I, in modeſty, ſhould anſwer nothing to their authorities.

(3.) The antients, as it ſeems by your Lordſhip, not agreeing, one among another, about the grounds of certainty; what can their authorities ſignify, in the caſe? or, how will it appear, that I differ from reaſon, in differing from any of them, more than that they differ from reaſon, in differing one from another? And therefore, after all the different authorities, produced by you, out of your great meaſure of reading, the matter will at laſt, reduce it ſelf to this point, that your Lordſhip ſhould tell us, wherein the certainty of reaſon, in making deductions, conſiſts; and then ſhew, wherein my method of making deductions, differs from it; which, whether you have done, or no, we ſhall ſee in what follows.

Your Lordſhip cloſes your very learned, and, to other purpoſes, very uſeful, account of the opinions of the antients, concerning certainty, with theſe words; P. 120. "that thus you have, in as few words as you could, laid together thoſe old methods of certainty, which have obtained greateſt reputation in the world." Whereupon I muſt crave leave to mind you again, that the propoſition you are here upon, and have undertaken to prove, in this place, is concerning the certainty of deductions, and not concerning certainty, in general. I ſay not this, that I am willing to decline the examination of my method of certainty in general, any way, or in any place: but I ſay it to obſerve, that, in diſcourſes of this nature, the laws of diſputation have wiſely ordered the propoſition under debate, to be kept to, and that, in the ſame terms, to avoid wandering, obſcurity and confuſion.

I therefore proceed now to conſider, what uſe your Lordſhip makes of the antients, againſt my way of certainty in general; ſince you think fit to make no uſe of them, as to the certainty of reaſon, in making deductions: tho' it is under this, your ſecond branch of certainty, by reaſon, that you bring them in.

Ibid. Your firſt objection here, is that old one again, that my way of certainty, by ideas, is new. Anſw. Your calling of it new, does not prove it to be different from that of reaſon: but your Lordſhip proves it to be new;

Ibid. "1. Because here [i. e. in my way] we have no general principles." Anſw. I do, as your Lordſhip knows, own the truth and certainty of the received, general maxims; and I contend for the uſefulneſs and neceſſity of ſelf-evident propoſitions, in all certainty, whether of inſtitution or demonſtration. What therefore thoſe general principles are, which you have not, in my way of certainty, by ideas, which your Lordſhip has, in your way of certainty, by reaſon, I beſeech you to tell, and thereby to make good this aſſertion againſt me.

Ibid. 2. Your Lordſhip ſays, "that here [i. e. in my way] we have no antecedents and conſequents, no ſyllogiſtical methods of demonſtration." Anſw. If your Lordſhip here means, that there be no antecedents and conſequents in my book, or that I ſpeak not, or allow not of ſyllogiſm, as a form of argumentation, that has its uſe, I humbly conceive, the contrary is plain. But if by, "here, "we have no antecedents and conſequents, no ſyllogiſtical methods of demonſtration," you mean, that I do not place certainty, in having antecedents and conſequents, or in making of ſyllogiſms, I grant, I do not; I have ſaid ſyllogiſms, inſtead of your words, ſyllogiſtical methods of demonſtration; which examined, amount here to no more, than ſyllogiſms: for ſyllogiſtical methods are nothing, but mode and figure, i. e. ſyllogiſms; and the rules of ſyllogiſms are the ſame, whether the ſyllogiſms be uſed in demonſtration, or in probability. But it was convenient for you to ſay, "ſyllogiſtical methods of demonſtration," if you would have it thought, that certainty is placed in it: for to have named bare ſyllogiſm, without annexing demonſtration to it, would have ſpoiled all, ſince every one, who knows what ſyllogiſm is, knows, it may as well be uſed in topical, or fallacious arguments, as in demonſtration.

Your Lordſhip charges me then, that in my way, by ideas, I do not place certainty, in having antecedents and conſequents: and pray, my Lord, do you, in your way, by reaſon, do ſo? If you do, this is certain, that every body has, or may have certainty, in every thing, he diſcourſes about; for every one, in any diſcourſe he makes, has, or may, if he pleaſes, have antecedents and conſequents.

Again, your Lordſhip charges me, that I do not place certainty in ſyllogiſm. I crave leave to aſk again, and does your Lordſhip? And is this the difference between your way of certainty, by reaſon, and my way of certainty, by ideas? Why elſe is it objected to me, that I do not, if your Lordſhip does not, place certainty in ſyllogiſm? And if you do, I know nothing ſo requiſite, as that you ſhould adviſe all people, women and all, to betake themſelves immediately to the univerſities, and to the learning of logick; to put themſelves out of the dangerous ſtate of ſcepticiſm: for there young lads, by being taught ſyllogiſm, arrive at certainty; whereas, without mode and figure, the world is in perfect ignorance and uncertainty, and is ſure of nothing. The merchant cannot be certain that his account is right caſt up, nor the lady, that her coach is not a wheel-barrow; nor her dairy-maid, that one and one pound of butter are two pounds of butter, and two and two four; and all for want of mode and figure: nay, according to this rule, whoever lived before Ariſtotle, or him, whoever it was, that firſt introduced ſyllogiſm, could not be certain of any thing; no, not that there was a God, which will be the preſent ſtate of the far greateſt part of mankind (to paſs by whole nations of the eaſt, as China and Indoſtan, &c.) even in the chriſtian world, who, to this day, have not the ſyllogiſtical methods of demonſtration, and ſo cannot be certain of any thing.

3. Your Lordſhip farther ſays, that "in my way of certainty by ideas, we "have no criterion." Anſw. To perceive the agreement, or diſagreement, of two ideas, and not to perceive the agreement, or diſagreement, of two ideas, is, I think, a criterion to diſtinguiſh, what a man is certain of, from what he is not certain of. Has your Lordſhip any other, or better, criterion, to diſtinguiſh certainty from uncertainty? If you have, I repeat again my earneſt requeſt, that you would be pleaſed to do that right to your way of certainty, by reaſon, as not to conceal it. If your Lordſhip has not, why is the want of a criterion, when I have ſo plain a one, objected to my way of certainty, and my way ſo often accuſed of a tendency to ſcepticiſm, and infidelity, when you yourſelf have not a better? And I think I may take the liberty to ſay, if your's be not the ſame, you have not one ſo good.

Perhaps, your Lordſhip will cenſure me here, and think it is more than becomes me to preſs you ſo hard, concerning your own way; and to aſk, whether your way of certainty lies in having antecedents and conſequents, and ſyllogiſms; and whether it has any other, or better, criterion, than what I have given? Your Lordſhip, will, poſſibly, think it enough, that "you have laid down the "grounds of certainty, which the antient Grecians went upon." My Lord, if you think ſo, I muſt be ſatisfied with it; tho', perhaps, others will think it ſtrange, that, in a diſpute, about a method of certainty, which, for its ſuppoſed coming ſhort of certainty, you charge with a tendency to ſcepticiſm and infidelity, you ſhould produce only the different opinions of other men, concerning certainty, to make good this charge, without declaring any of thoſe different opinions, or grounds, of certainty, to be true, or falſe: and ſome may be apt to ſuſpect, that you your ſelf are not yet reſolved, wherein to place it.

But, my Lord, I know too well, what your diſtance above me requires of me, to ſay any ſuch thing to your Lordſhip. Your own opinions are to your ſelf, and your not diſcovering them, muſt paſs for a ſufficient reaſon for your not diſcovering them: and if you think fit to overlay a poor, infant, modern notion, with the great and weighty names of Pythagoras, Plato, Ariſtotle, Plutarch, and the like; and heaps of quotations, out of the antients; who is not preſently to think it dead, and that there is an end of it? Eſpecially, when it will have too much envy, for any one, to open his mouth, in defence of a notion, which is declared, by your Lordſhip, to be different from what thoſe great men ſaid, whoſe words are to be taken, without any more ado, and who are not to be thought ignorant, or miſtaken, in any thing. Tho' I crave leave to ſay, that however infallible oracles they were, to take things, barely upon their, or any man's authority, is barely to believe, but not to know, or be certain.

Thus your Lordſhip has ſufficiently proved my way of certainty, by ideas, to be inconſiſtent, with the way of certainty, by reaſon, by proving it new; which you prove only by ſaying, that "it is ſo wholly new, that here we have no general principles; no criterion; no antecedents and conſequents; no ſyllogiſtical "methods of demonſtration: and, yet we are told of a better way of certainty, "to be attained, merely by the help of ideas;" add, if your Lordſhip pleaſes, ſignified by words: which put into propoſitions, whereof ſome are general principles, ſome are, or may be, antecedents, and ſome conſequents, and ſome put together in mode and figure, ſyllogiſtical methods of demonſtration. For, pray, my Lord, may not words, that ſtand for ideas, be put into propoſitions, as well as any other? And may not thoſe propoſitions, wherein the terms ſtand for ideas, be as well put into antecedents and conſequents, or ſyllogiſms, and make maxims, as well as any other propoſitions, whoſe terms ſtand not for ideas, if your Lordſhip can find any ſuch? And, if thus ideas can be brought into maxims, antecedents, and conſequents, and ſyllogiſtical methods of demonſtration, what inconſiſtency has the way of certainty by ideas, with thoſe ways of certainty, by reaſon, if, at laſt, your Lordſhip will ſay, that certainty conſiſts in propoſitions, put together, as antecedents, and conſequents, and in mode and figure? For as for principles, or maxims, we ſhall know, whether your principles, or maxims, are a way to certainty, when you ſhall pleaſe to tell us, what it is that, to your Lordſhip, makes a maxim, or principle, and diſtinguiſhes it from other propoſitions; and whether it be any thing, but an immediate perception of the agreement, or diſagreement of the ideas, as expreſſed in that propoſition. To conclude, by all, that your Lordſhip has alleged out of the antients, you have not, as I humbly conceive, proved, that my way of certainty is new, or that they had any way of certainty, different from mine; much leſs have you proved, that my way of certainty, by ideas, is inconſiſtent with the way of certainty, by reaſon, which was the propoſition to be proved.

Your Lordſhip having thought it enough, againſt my way of certainty, by P. 120. ideas, thus to prove its newneſs, you betake yourſelf preſently, to your old topic, of obſcure and confuſed ideas; and aſk, "but, how comes there to be ſuch a "way of certainty, by ideas, and yet the ideas themſelves are ſo uncertain and "obſcure?" Anſw. No idea, as it is in the mind, is uncertain; tho' to thoſe, who uſe names uncertainly, it may be uncertain, what idea that name ſtands for. And, as to obſcure and confuſed ideas, no idea is ſo obſcure, in all its parts, or ſo confounded with all other ideas, but that one, who in a propoſition joins it with another, in that part, which is clear and diſtinct, may perceive its agreement, or diſagreement, as expreſſed in that propoſition: tho' when names are uſed for ideas, which are, in ſome part, obſcure, or confounded with other ideas, there can be no propoſitions made, which can produce certainty concerning that, wherein the idea is obſcure and confuſed. And therefore, to your P. 122. Lordſhip's queſtion, "how is it poſſible for us, to have a clear perception of the "agreement of ideas, if the ideas themſelves be not clear and diſtinct?" I anſwer, very well; becauſe an obſcure, or confuſed idea, i. e. that is not perfectly clear and diſtinct, in all its parts, may be compared with another, in that part of it, which is clear and diſtinct; which will, I humbly conceive, remove all thoſe difficulties, inconſiſtencies, and contradictions, which your Lordſhip ſeems to be troubled with, from my words, quoted in thoſe two pages. P. 121, 122.

Your Lordſhip having, as it ſeems, quite forgot, that you were to ſhew, wherein the certainty of deductions, in the way of ideas, was inconſiſtent with the certainty of deductions, in the way of reaſon, brings here a new charge upon my way of certainty, viz. "that I have no criterion to diſtinguiſh falſe and doubt- P. 122. "ful ideas, from true and certain." Your Lordſhip ſays, the Academics went P. 123. upon ideas, or repreſentations of things to their minds; and pray, my Lord, does not your Lordſhip do ſo too? Or has Mr. J. S. ſo won upon your Lordſhip, by his ſolid philoſophy, againſt the fancies of the ideiſts, that you begin to think him in the right, in this too; where he ſays, "that notions are the materials of Solid Philo- "our knowledge; and that a notion is the very thing, itſelf, exiſting in the ſophy, p. 24. "underſtanding?" and 27. For ſince I make no doubt but that, in all your Lordſhip's knowledge, you will allow, that you have ſome immediate objects of your thoughts, which are the materials of that knowledge, about which it is employed, thoſe immediate objects, if they are not, as Mr. J. S. ſays, the very things themſelves, muſt be ideas. Not thinking your Lordſhip, therefore, yet ſo perfect a convert of Mr. J. S's, that you are perſuaded, that, as often as you think of your cathedral church, or of Des Cartes's vortices, that the very cathedral church at Worceſter, or the motion of thoſe vortices, itſelf, exiſts in your underſtanding; when one of them never exiſted, but in that one place, at Worceſter, and the other never exiſted any where, in rerum natura; I conclude your Lordſhip has immediate objects of your mind, which are not the very things themſelves, exiſting in your underſtanding; which if, with the Academics, you will pleaſe to call repreſentations, as I ſuppoſe you will, rather than, with me, ideas, it will make no difference.

This being ſo, I muſt, then, make the ſame objection, againſt your way of certainty by reaſon, that your Lordſhip does, againſt my way of certainty, by ideas (for, upon the compariſon of the two, we now are) and then I return your words here again, viz. "that you have no criterion to diſtinguiſh falſe and P. 122, 123. "doubtful repreſentations, from true and certain; how, then, can any man be "ſecure, that he is not impoſed upon, in your Lordſhip's way of repreſenta- "tions?"

Your Lordſhip ſays, "I tell you, of a way of certainty, by ideas, and never P. 124, 125. "offer any ſuch method, for examining them, as the Academics required for "their probability." Anſw. I was not, I confeſs, ſo well acquainted with what the Academics went upon, for the criterion of a greater probability, as your Lordſhip is; or if I had, I writing, as your Lordſhip knows, out of my own thoughts, could not well tranſcribe out of them. But that you ſhould tell me, I never offer any criterion, to diſtinguiſh falſe, from true ideas; I cannot but wonder; and therefore crave leave to beg your Lordſhip, to look again into b. ii. c. 32. of my Eſſay; and there, I perſuade myſelf, you will find a criterion, whereby true and falſe ideas may be diſtinguiſhed.

Your Lordſhip brings, for inſtance, the idea of ſolidity; but what it is an P. 125. inſtance of, I confeſs, I do not ſee. "Your Lordſhip charges, on my way of P. 122. "certainty, that I have no criterion to diſtinguiſh falſe and doubtful ideas, from "true and certain; which is followed by an account you give, how the Acade- "mics examined their ideas, or repreſentations, before they allowed them, to pre- "vail on them, to give an aſſent, as to a greater probability." And then you tell me, that "I never offer any ſuch method for examining them, as the Academics P. 123, 124. "required for their probability:" To which your Lordſhip ſubjoins theſe words; "as for inſtance, my firſt idea, which I go upon, of ſolidity." Would not one P. 125. now expect, that this ſhould be an inſtance, to make good your Lordſhip's charge, that I had no criterion to diſtinguiſh, whether my idea of ſolidity were falſe and doubtful, or true and certain?

To ſhew that I have no ſuch criterion, your Lordſhip aſks me two queſtions; the firſt is, "how my idea of ſolidity comes to be clear and diſtinct?" I will ſup- P. 125. poſe, for once, that I know not, how it comes to be clear and diſtinct: how will this prove, that I have no criterion, to know whether it be true or falſe? For the queſtion here is not about knowing, how an idea comes to be clear and diſtinct; but how I ſhall know, whether it be true, or falſe? But your Lordſhip's following words ſeem to aim at a farther objection; your words all together are, "how this idea" [i. e. my idea of ſolidity, which conſiſts in repletion of ſpace, with an excluſion of all other ſolid ſubſtances] "comes to be clear and diſtinct "to me, when others, who go in the ſame way of ideas, have quite another "idea of it?" My Lord, I deſire your Lordſhip to name, who thoſe others are, who go in the ſame way of ideas with me, who have quite another idea of this my idea, than I have; for to this idea, I could be ſure, that it, in any other writer but your Lordſhip, muſt here refer: but, my Lord, it is one of your privileged particles, and I have nothing to ſay to it. But let it be ſo, that others have quite another idea of it, than I; how does that prove, that I have no criterion, to diſtinguiſh, whether my idea of ſolidity be true, or no?

P. 125. Your Lordſhip farther adds, "that thoſe others think, that they have as plain "and diſtinct an idea, that extenſion and body are the ſame:" and then your Lordſhip aſks, "now what criterion is there, to come to a certainty in this "matter?" Anſw. In what matter, I beſeech your Lordſhip? If it be, whether my idea of ſolidity be a true idea, which is the matter here in queſtion, in this B. ii. c. 32. matter, I have given a criterion to know, in my Eſſay: if it be to decide the queſtion, whether the word, body, more properly ſtands for the ſimple idea of ſpace, or for the complex idea of ſpace and ſolidity together, that is not the queſtion here; nor can there be any other criterion to decide it by, but the propriety of our language.

P. 126. But your Lordſhip adds, "ideas can have no way of certainty in themſelves, "if it be poſſible, for even philoſophical and rational men to fall into ſuch contrary ideas about the ſame thing; and both ſides think their ideas to be clear "and diſtinct." If this were ſo, I do not ſee, how this would any way prove, that I had no criterion, whereby it might be diſcerned, whether my idea of ſolidity were true, or no: which was to be proved.

But at laſt, this, which your Lordſhip calls "contrary ideas about the ſame "thing," is nothing, but a difference about a name. For I think no-body will ſay, that the idea of extenſion, and the idea of ſolidity, are the ſame ideas: all the difference, then, between thoſe philoſophical and rational men, which your Lordſhip mentions here, is no more but this, whether the ſimple idea of pure extenſion ſhall be called body, or whether the complex ideas of extenſion and ſolidity, joined together, ſhall be called body; which will be no more than a bare verbal diſpute to any one, who does not take ſounds for things, and make the word, body, ſomething more than a ſign of what the ſpeaker would ſignify by it. But what the ſpeaker makes the term, body, ſtand for, cannot be preciſely known, till he has determined it in his own mind, and made it known to another; and then there can, between them, be no longer a diſpute, about the ſignification of the word: v. g. if one of thoſe philoſophical rational men tells your Lordſhip, that he makes the term, body, to ſtand preciſely for the ſimple idea of pure extenſion, your Lordſhip, or he, can be in no doubt, or uncertainty, concerning this thing; but, whenever he uſes the word, body, your Lordſhip muſt ſuppoſe, in his mind, the ſimple idea of extenſion, as the thing he means, by body. If, on the other ſide, another of thoſe philoſophical rational men ſhall tell your Lordſhip, that he makes the term, body, to ſtand preciſely for a complex idea, made up of the ſimple ideas, of extenſion and ſolidity joined together; your Lordſhip, or he, can be in no doubt, or uncertainty, concerning this thing: but, whenever he uſes the word, body, your Lordſhip muſt think on, and allow the idea, belonging to it, to be that complex one.

As your Lordſhip can allow this different uſe of the term, body, in theſe different men, without changing any idea, or any thing, in your own mind, but the application of the ſame term, to different ideas, which changes neither the truth, nor certainty, of any of your Lordſhip's ideas, from what it was before: ſo thoſe two philoſophical, rational men may, in diſcourſe one with another, agree to uſe that term, body, for either of thoſe two ideas, which they pleaſe, without at all making their ideas, on either ſide, falſe or uncertain. But if they will conteſt, which of theſe ideas the ſound, body, ought to ſtand for, it is viſible their difference is not about any reality of things, but the propriety of ſpeech; and their diſpute and doubt is about the ſignification of a word.

Your Lordſhip's ſecond queſtion is, "whether, by this idea of ſolidity, we P. 126.
"may come to know what it is?" Anſw. I muſt aſk you here again, what you mean by it? If your Lordſhip by, it, means, ſolidity, then your queſtion runs thus: "whether by this [i. e. my] idea of ſolidity, we may come to know "what ſolidity is?" Anſw. Without doubt, if your Lordſhip means by the term, ſolidity, what I mean by the term, ſolidity; for then I have told you what it is, in the chapter above-cited by your Lordſhip: if you mean any thing B. ii. c. 4.
elſe by the term, ſolidity, when your Lordſhip will pleaſe to tell me, what you mean by it, I will tell your Lordſhip what ſolidity is. This, I humbly conceive, you will find yourſelf obliged to do, if what I have ſaid of ſolidity, does not ſatisfy you what it is. For you will not think it reaſonable, I ſhould tell your Lordſhip what a thing is, when expreſſed by you in a term, which I do not know what your Lordſhip means by, nor what you make it ſtand for.

But your Lordſhip aſks, "wherein it conſiſts?" If you mean, wherein the P. 126.
idea of it conſiſts, that I have already told your Lordſhip, in the chapter of my Eſſay above-mentioned. If your Lordſhip means, what is the real, internal conſtitution, that phyſically makes ſolidity in things; if I anſwer, I do not know, that will no more make my idea of ſolidity, not to be true, or certain (if your Lordſhip thinks certainty may be attributed to ſingle ideas) than the not knowing the phyſical conſtitution, whereby the parts of bodies are ſo framed, as to cohere, makes my idea of coheſion not true, or certain.

To my ſaying, in my Eſſay, "that if any one aſk me, what this ſolidity is, B. ii. c. 2.
"I ſend him to his ſenſes, to inform him;" your Lordſhip replies "you thought 5, 6.
"the deſign of my book would have ſent him to his ideas, for certainty; and P. 226.
"are we, ſays your Lordſhip, ſent back again from our ideas, to our ſenſes?" Anſw. I cannot help it, if your Lordſhip miſtakes the deſign of my book: for what concerns certainty, i. e. the knowledge of the truth of propoſitions, my book ſends every one to his ideas; but, for the getting of ſimple ideas of ſenſation, my book ſends him only to his ſenſes. But your Lordſhip uſes, certainty, here, in a ſenſe, I never uſed it, nor do underſtand it in; for what the certainty of any ſimple idea is, I confeſs I do not know, and ſhall be glad you would tell me, what you mean by it.

However, in this ſenſe, you aſk me, and that, as if your queſtion carried a demonſtration of my contradicting myſelf; "and are we ſent back again, P. 127.
"from our ideas to our ſenſes?" Anſw. My Lord, every one is ſent to his ſenſes, to get the ſimple ideas of ſenſation, becauſe they are no other way to be got.

Your Lordſhip preſſes on, with this farther queſtion, "what do theſe ideas Ibid.
"ſignify, then?" i. e. if a man be ſent to his ſenſes, for the idea of ſolidity. I anſwer, to ſhew him the certainty of propoſitions, wherein the agreement, or diſagreement, of ideas, is perceived; which is the certainty I ſpeak of, and no other: but what the certainty is, which your Lordſhip ſpeaks of, in this and the following page, I confeſs I do not underſtand. For, P. 127, 128.

Your Lordſhip adds, that I ſay farther, "that if this be not a ſufficient ex- P. 127.
"plication of ſolidity, I promiſe to tell any one, what it is, when he tells me, "what thinking is; or explains to me, what extenſion and motion are." "Are "we not, now, in the true way to certainty, when ſuch things, as theſe, are "given over, of which we have the cleareſt evidence, by ſenſation and reflec"tion? For here I make it as impoſſible, to come to certain, clear, and diſtinct no"tions of theſe things, as to diſcourſe into a blind man the ideas of light and "colours. Is not this a rare way of certainty?" Anſw. What things, my Lord, I beſeech you, are thoſe, which you here tell me, are given over, of which we have the cleareſt evidence, by ſenſation, or reflection? It is likely you will tell me, they are extenſion and motion. But, my Lord, I crave the liberty to ſay, that, when you have conſidered again, you will be ſatisfied, there are no things given

over, in the caſe, but only the names, extenſion and motion; and, concerning them too, nothing is given over, but a power of defining them. When you will be pleaſed to lay by a little the warmth of thoſe queſtions of triumph, which I meet with, in this paſſage, and tell me, what things your Lordſhip makes theſe names, extenſion and motion, to ſtand for; you perhaps will not find, that I make it impoſſible for thoſe, who have their ſenſes, to get the ſimple ideas, ſignified by theſe names, very clear and diſtinct, by their ſenſes: tho' I do ſay, that theſe, as well as all other names of ſimple ideas, cannot be defined; nor any ſimple ideas be brought into our minds, by words, any more, than the ideas of light and colours can be diſcourſed into a blind man; which is all I do ſay in thoſe words of mine, which your Lordſhip quotes, as ſuch, wherein I have given over things, whereof we have the cleareſt evidence. And ſo, from my being of opinion, that the names of ſimple ideas cannot be defined, nor thoſe ideas, got, by any words whatſoever, which is all that I there ſay; your Lordſhip very pathetically expreſſes your ſelf, as if in my way, all were gone, certainty were loſt; and if my method ſhould be allowed, there is an end of all knowledge in the world.

The reaſon your Lordſhip gives, againſt my way of certainty, is, "That I P. 127. "here make it as impoſſible to come to certain, clear, and diſtinct notions of "theſe things, [i. e. extenſion and motion] as to diſcourſe, into a blind man, "the idea of light and colours." Anſw. What clear and diſtinct notions, or ideas, are, I do underſtand: but what your Lordſhip means, by certain notions, ſpeaking here, as you do, of ſimple ideas, I muſt own, I do not underſtand. That, for the attaining thoſe ſimple ideas, I ſend men to their ſenſes, I ſhall think, I am in the right, 'till I hear, from your Lordſhip, better arguments, to P. 127. convince me of my miſtake, than theſe: "Are we not now in the true way to "certainty? Is not this a rare way of certainty?" And, if your Lordſhip has a better way, to get clear and diſtinct ſimple ideas, than by the ſenſes, you will oblige me, and, I think, the world too, by a diſcovery of it. 'Till then, I Eſſay, B. 2. c. 4. § 5, 6. ſhall continue in the ſame mind I was of, when I writ that paſſage, viz. That words can do nothing towards it, and that for the reaſon, which I there promiſed, and is to be found, Eſſay, b. iii. c. 4. § 7, &c. And therefore, to your P. 127. Lordſhip's ſaying, "That thus you have ſhewed, that I have no ſecurity againſt "falſe and uncertain ideas, no criterion, to judge them by;" I think I may ſecurely reply, that, with ſubmiſſion, thus ſhewing it is no ſhewing it at all; nor ever will ſhew, that I have no ſuch criterion, even, when we ſhall add your P. 128. Lordſhip's farther inference, "now here again our ideas deceive us." Which ſuppoſing it a good inference from theſe words of mine, "that moſt of our "ſimple ideas are not the likeneſs of things without us;" yet it ſeems to me, to come in here, a little out of ſeaſon; becauſe the propoſition to be proved, is, as I humbly conceive, not that our ideas deceive us, but that "I have not a "criterion to diſtinguiſh true from falſe ideas."

If it be brought to prove, that I have no criterion, I have this to ſay, that I neither well underſtand, what it is, for our ideas to deceive us, in the way of certainty; nor, in the beſt ſenſe, that I can give it, do I ſee, how it proves that I have no criterion; nor, laſtly, how it follows from my ſaying, that moſt of our ſimple ideas are not reſemblances.

P. 128. Your Lordſhip ſeems, by the following words, to mean, that, in this way, by ideas, which are confeſſed not to be reſemblances, men are hindered and cannot go far in the knowledge of what they deſire to know, of the nature of thoſe objects, of which we have the ideas, in our minds. If this ſhould be ſo, what is this, I beſeech your Lordſhip, to your ſhewing, that I have no criterion? but that this is a fault, in the way by ideas, I ſhall be convinced, when your Lordſhip ſhall be pleaſed to ſhew me, how, in your way of certainty, by reaſon, we can know more of the nature of things, without us; or of that, which cauſes theſe ideas, or perceptions in us. But, I humbly conceive, 'tis no objection, to the way of ideas, if any one will deceive himſelf, and expect certainty, by ideas, in things where certainty is not to be had; becauſe he is told how knowledge, or certainty, is got by ideas, as far as men attain to it. And, ſince your Lordſhip is here comparing the ways of certainty, by ideas, and by reaſon, as two different and inconſiſtent ways, I humbly crave leave to add, that, when you can ſhew me any one propoſition, which you have attained to a certainty of, in your way of certainty, by reaſon, which I cannot attain to a certainty of, in my way of certainty, by ideas; I will acknowledge my Eſſay to be guilty of whatever your Lordſhip pleaſes.

Your Lordſhip concludes, "ſo that theſe ideas are really nothing but P. 128. "names if they be not repreſentations." Anſw. This does not yet ſhew, that I have no criterion, to diſtinguiſh true from falſe ideas; the thing, that your Lordſhip is thus ſhewing. For I may have a criterion to diſtinguiſh true from falſe ideas, tho' that criterion concerns not names at all. For your Lordſhip, in this propoſition, allowing none to be ideas, but what are repreſentations; the other, which you ſay are nothing, but names, are not concerned in the criterion, that is to diſtinguiſh true from falſe ideas; becauſe it relates to nothing but ideas, and the diſtinguiſhing of them one from another; unleſs true and falſe ideas can be any thing, but ideas, i. e. ideas and not ideas, at the ſame time.

But further, I crave leave to anſwer, that your Lordſhip's propoſition, viz. "that theſe ideas are really nothing but names, if they be not the repreſenta- "tions of things," ſeems to me no conſequence from my words, to which it is ſubjoined, tho' introduced with, ſo that; for, methinks, it carries ſomething like a contradiction in it. I ſay, "moſt of our ſimple ideas of ſenſation, are "not the likeneſs of ſomething without us." Your Lordſhip infers, "if ſo, theſe "ideas are really nothing but names;" which, as it ſeems to me, is as much as to ſay, theſe ideas, that are ideas, are not ideas, but names only. Methinks they might be allowed to be ideas, and that is all they pretend to be, tho' they do not reſemble that which produces them. I cannot help thinking, a ſon ſomething really more, than a bare name, tho' he has not the luck to reſemble his father, who begot him: and the black and blue, which I ſee, I cannot conclude but to be ſomething beſides the words, black and blue, (where-ever your Lordſhip ſhall place that ſomething, either in my perception only, or in my ſkin) tho' it reſembles not at all the ſtone, that with a knock produced it.

Should your Lordſhip put your two hands, whereof one is hot and the other cold, into lukewarm water, it would be hard to think, that the idea of heat produced in you, by one of your hands, and the idea of cold by the other, were the likeneſſes and very reſemblances of ſomething, in the ſame water ſince the ſame water could not be capable of having, at the ſame time, ſuch real contrarieties. Wherefore ſince, as 'tis evident, they cannot be repreſentations of any thing, in the water, it follows, by your Lordſhip's doctrine, here, that if you ſhould declare, what you feel, viz. that you feel heat and cold, in that water, viz. heat by one hand, and cold by the other, you mean nothing, by heat and cold: heat and cold, in the caſe, are nothing but names; and your Lordſhip, in truth, feels nothing, but theſe two names.

Your Lordſhip, in the next place, proceeds to examine my way of demonſtration. Whether you do this, to ſhew, that I have no criterion, whereby to diſtinguiſh true from falſe ideas; or to ſhew, "that my way of certainty, by P. 129. "ideas, is inconſiſtent with the certainty of deductions, by reaſon," (for theſe were the things, you ſeemed to me, to have undertaken to ſhew, and therefore to be upon, in this place) does not appear; but this appears, by the words, wherewith you introduce this examen, that it is to avoid doing me wrong.

Your Lordſhip, as if you had been ſenſible that your former diſcourſe had led you, towards doing me wrong, breaks it off, of a ſudden, and begins this new one of demonſtration, by telling me, "you will do me no wrong." Can it Ibid. be thought now, that you forget this promiſe, before you get half through your examen? or, is a miſciting my words, and miſrepreſenting my ſenſe, no wrong? Your Lordſhip, in this very examen, ſets down a long quotation out of my Eſſay; and in the cloſe you tell me, "theſe are my own words, which "your Lordſhip has ſet down at large, that I may not complain, that you miſ- P. 133.

“ repreſent my ſenſe.” This one would think guaranty enough, in a leſs man than your Lordſhip: and yet, my Lord, I muſt crave leave to complain, that not only my ſenſe, but my very words, are, in that quotation, miſrepreſented.

To ſhew that my complaint is not groundleſs, give me leave, my Lord,
Eſſay, b. iv. to ſet down my words, as I read them, in that place of my book, which
c. 7. §. 10. your Lordſhip quotes for them, and as I find them, here in your ſecond
Anſw. 2. p. letter.
132.

> ‘ If we add all the ſelf-evident propoſitions, may be made, about all our diſtinct ideas, principles will be almoſt infinite, at leaſt innumerable, which men arrive to the knowledge of, at different ages; and a great many of theſe innate principles, they never come to know, all their lives. But whether they come in view of the mind, earlier or later, this is true of them, that they are all known, by their native evidence, are wholly independent, receive no light, nor are capable of any proof, one from another, &c.

> ‘ That it is true, of our particular, diſtinct ideas, that they are all known, by their native evidence, are wholly independent, receive no light, nor are capable of any proof, one from another, &c.

By their ſtanding thus together, the reader will, without any pains, ſee whether thoſe, your Lordſhip has ſet down, in your Letter, are my own words; and whether, in that place, which ſpeaks only of ſelf-evident propoſitions, or principles, I have any thing, in words, or in ſenſe like this, “ that our particular “ diſtinct ideas are known, by their native evidence,” &c. Tho' your Lordſhip cloſes the quotation, with that ſolemn declaration above-mentioned, “ That they “ are my own words, which you have ſet down at large, that I may not com-
“ plain you miſrepreſent my ſenſe.” And yet nothing can more miſrepreſent my
ſenſe, than they do, applying all that, to particular ideas, which I ſpeak there,
only, of ſelf-evident propoſitions, or principles; and that ſo plainly, that I think,
I may venture any one's miſtaking it, in my own words: And, upon this miſ-
repreſentation of my ſenſe, your Lordſhip raiſes a diſcourſe, and manages a diſpute
P. 133, 146. for, I think, a dozen pages following, againſt my placing demonſtration, on ſelf-
evident ideas; tho' ſelf-evident ideas are things wholly unknown to me, and are
no where, in my book, nor were ever in my thoughts.

P. 129. But let us come to your exceptions, againſt my way of demonſtration, which
your Lordſhip is pleaſed to call demonſtration, without principles. Anſw. If
you mean by principles, ſelf-evident propoſitions, then you know my demonſtra-
tion is not without principles, in that ſenſe of the term, principles: For your
P. 130. Lordſhip, in the next page, blames my way; becauſe I ſuppoſe every interme-
diate idea, in demonſtration, to have a ſelf-evident connection with the other idea;
for two ſuch ideas, as have a ſelf-evident connection, joined together in a propo-
ſition, make a ſelf-evident propoſition. If your Lordſhip means by principles,
thoſe, which in the place, there quoted, by your Lordſhip, I mean, viz. “ what-
Eſſay, B. iv. “ ever is, is; and it is impoſſible for the ſame thing to be, and not to be;” and
c. 2. § 8. ſuch other general propoſitions, as are received under the name of maxims; I
grant, that I do ſay, that they are not abſolutely requiſite in every demonſtration;
and I think I have ſhewn, that there be demonſtrations, which may be made
without them: tho' I do not, that I remember, ſay, that they are excluded, and
cannot be made uſe of, in demonſtration.

P. 129. Your Lordſhip's firſt argument againſt my way of demonſtration, is, “ that “ it muſt ſuppoſe ſelf-evidence muſt be, in the ideas of my mind; and that every “ intermediate idea, which I take to demonſtrate any thing by, muſt have a ſelf- “ evident connection with the others.” Anſw. Taking ſelf-evidence, with the ideas of the mind, to mean, in the perceived agreement, or diſagreement, of ideas, in the mind; I grant, I do not only ſuppoſe but ſay ſo.

P. 130. To prove it not to be ſo in demonſtration, your Lordſhip ſays, “ that it is ſuch “ a way of demonſtration, as the old philoſophers never thought of.” Anſw. No body, I think, will queſtion, that your Lordſhip is very well read in the old philoſophers: but he, that will anſwer for what the old philoſophers ever did, or did not think of, muſt not only underſtand their extant writings, better than any man ever did, but muſt have ways to know their thoughts, that other men have not: for all of them thought more than they writ; ſome of them writ not at all, and others writ a great deal more, than ever came to us. But if it ſhould happen, that any of them placed the proof of any propoſition, in the agreement of two things in a third, as, I think, ſome of them did; then it will, I humbly conceive, appear, that they did think of my way of demonſtration, unleſs your Lordſhip can ſhew, that they could ſee, that two things agreed in a third, without perceiving their agreement with that third; and if they did, in every ſyllogiſm of a demonſtration, perceive that agreement, then there was a ſelf-evident connexion; which is that which your Lordſhip ſays, they never thought of.

But, ſuppoſing they never thought of it, muſt we put out our eyes, and not ſee whatever they over-loooked? Are all the diſcoveries made by Galileo, my Lord Bacon, Mr. Boyle, Mr. Newton, &c. to be rejected, as falſe, becauſe they teach us, what the old philoſophers never thought of? Miſtake me not, my Lord, in thinking, that I have the vanity here to rank myſelf, on this occaſion, with theſe great diſcoverers of truth and advancers of knowledge. On the contrary, I contend, that my way of certainty, my way of demonſtration, which your Lordſhip ſo often condemns, for its newneſs, is not new, but is the very ſame, that has always been uſed, both by ancients and moderns. I am only conſidering, here, your Lordſhip's argument, of never having been thought of, by the old philoſophers; which is an argument, that will make nothing for, or againſt, the truth of any propoſition, advanced by a modern writer, 'till your Lordſhip has proved, that theſe old philoſophers (let the happy age of old philoſophers determine, where your Lordſhip pleaſes) did diſcover all truth, or that they had the ſole privilege to ſearch after it; and, beſides them, no body was to ſtudy nature, no body was to think, or reaſon, for himſelf, but every one was to be barely a reading philoſopher, with an implicit faith.

P. 130.

Your objection, in the next words, that, then, every demonſtration carries its own light with it, ſhews, that your way, by reaſon, is what I do not underſtand. For this I thought, heretofore, was the property of demonſtration, and not a proof, that it was not a demonſtration, that it carried its own light with it: but yet, tho' in every demonſtration, there is a ſelf-evident connexion of the ideas, by which it is made; yet that it does not follow, from thence, as your Lordſhip here objects, that, then, every demonſtration would be as clear and unqueſtionable, as that two and two make four, your Lordſhip may ſee, in the ſame chapter, and the reaſon of it.

Eſſay, B. iv. c. 2. § 4, 5, 6.

P. 130.

You ſeem, in the following words, to allow, that there is ſuch a connexion of the intermediate ideas in mathematical demonſtrations, but ſay, "you "ſhould be glad to ſee any demonſtration (not about figures and numbers) of "this kind." And if that be a good argument againſt it, I crave leave to uſe it too, on my ſide; and to ſay, "that I would be glad to ſee any demonſtration "(not about figures and numbers) not of this kind," i. e. wherein there is not a ſelf-evident connexion of all the intermediate ideas. If you have any ſuch, I earneſtly beg your Lordſhip to favour me with it; for I crave liberty to ſay, that the reaſon, and form, and way of evidence, in demonſtration, where-ever there is demonſtration, is always the ſame.

Ibid.

But you ſay, "THIS is a quite different caſe from mine:" I ſuppoſe your Lordſhip means by THIS, mathematical demonſtration, the thing mentioned in the preceding period; and then your ſenſe will run thus: mathematical demonſtrations, wherein certainty is to be had, by the intuition of the ſelf-evident connexion of all the intermediate ideas, are different from that demonſtration, which I am there treating of. If you mean not ſo, I muſt own, I know not what you mean, by ſaying, "THIS is a quite different caſe from mine." And if your Lordſhip does mean ſo, I do not ſee, how it can be ſo, as you ſay: your words taken altogether runs thus; "My principal ground is from mathematical demonſtrations, and my examples are brought from them. But this is a quite different "caſe from mine;" i. e. I am ſpeaking, in that chapter of my Eſſay, concern-

Ibid.

ing demonſtration, in general, and the certainty we have by it. The examples I uſe, are brought from mathematics, and yet you ſay, "mathematical demonſtrations are quite a different caſe from mine." If I here miſunderſtand your Lordſhip's, this, I muſt beg your pardon for it; it is one of your privileged particles, and I am not maſter of it. Miſrepreſent your ſenſe, I cannot; for your very words are ſet down, and let the reader judge.

P. 130. But your Lordſhip gives a reaſon for what you had ſaid, in theſe words ſubjoined, where you ſay, "I grant that thoſe ideas, on which mathematical demonſtrations proceed, are wholly in the mind, and do not relate to the exiſtence of things; but our debate goes upon a certainty of knowledge of things, as really exiſting." In which words there are theſe things remarkable:

1. That your Lordſhip's exception here, is againſt what I have ſaid, concerning demonſtration, in my Eſſay, and not againſt any thing, I have ſaid, in either of my letters to your Lordſhip. If, therefore, your Lordſhip and I have ſince, in our letters, had any debate, about the certainty of the knowledge of things, as really exiſting; that which was writ, before that debate, could have no relation to it, nor be limited by it. If, therefore, your Lordſhip makes any exception (as you do) to my way of demonſtration, as propoſed in my Eſſay, you muſt, as I humbly conceive, take it, as delivered there, comprehending mathematical demonſtrations; which cannot be excluded, becauſe your Lordſhip ſays, "our debate now goes upon a certainty of the knowledge of things, as really exiſting, ſuppoſing mathematical demonſtrations did not afford a certainty of knowledge of things, as really exiſting."

2. But, in the next place, mathematical demonſtrations do afford a certainty of the knowledge of things, as really exiſting, as much as any other demonſtrations whatſoever; and therefore they afford your Lordſhip no ground upon that account to ſeparate them, as you do here, from demonſtrations in other ſubjects.

P. 130. Your Lordſhip, indeed, thinks I have given you ſufficient grounds to charge me with the contrary: for you ſay, "I grant that thoſe ideas, on which mathematical demonſtrations proceed, are wholly in the mind," (this indeed I grant) "and do not relate to the exiſtence of things;" but theſe latter words I do not remember, that I any where ſay; and I wiſh you had quoted the place, where I grant any ſuch thing: I am ſure it is not, in that place, where it is likelieſt to be found; I mean, where I examine, whether the knowledge we have of mathematical truths, be the knowledge of things, as really exiſting: there I ſay (and I think I have proved) that it is, tho' it conſiſts in the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of ideas, that are only in the mind; becauſe it takes in all thoſe things, really exiſting, which anſwer thoſe ideas. Upon which ground it was, that I there affirmed moral knowledge alſo, capable of certainty. And pray, my Lord, what other way can your Lordſhip proceed, in any demonſtration you would make, about any other thing, but figures and numbers, but the ſame that you do in demonſtrations about figures and numbers? If you would demonſtrate any thing, concerning man, or murder, muſt not you firſt ſettle, in your mind, the idea, or notion, you have of that animal, or that action, and then ſhew what you would demonſtrate neceſſarily to belong to that idea, in your mind, and to things exiſting, only as they correſpond with, and anſwer that idea in your mind? How elſe you can make any general propoſition, that ſhall contain the knowledge of things, as really exiſting, I, that am ignorant, ſhould be glad to learn, when your Lordſhip ſhall do me the favour to ſhew me any ſuch.

Eſſay, B. iv. c. 4. § 6.

§ 7.

In the mean time, there is no reaſon why you ſhould except demonſtrations about figures and numbers, from demonſtrations about other ſubjects, upon the account, that I grant, "that thoſe ideas, on which mathematical demonſtrations proceed, are wholly in the mind," when I ſay the ſame, of all other demonſtrations. For the ideas, that other demonſtrations proceed on, are wholly in the mind; and no demonſtration whatſoever concerns things, as really exiſting, any farther, than as they correſpond with, and anſwer, thoſe ideas in the mind, which the demonſtration proceeds on. This diſtinction, therefore, here, of your Lordſhip's,

P. 131.

Lordſhip's, between mathematical and other demonſtrations, having no foundation, your inference founded on it, falls with it; viz. "So that, altho' we "ſhould grant all that I ſay about the intuition of ideas, in mathematical de- "monſtrations, yet it comes not at all to my buſineſs, unleſs I can prove, that "we have as clear and diſtinct ideas of beings, as we have of numbers and figures." Tho' how beings here, and numbers and figures, come to be oppoſed againſt one another, I ſhall not be able to conceive, till I am better inſtructed, than hitherto I am, that numbers and figures are no beings; and that the mathematicians and philoſophers, old ones and all, have, in all the pains taken about them, employed their thoughts about nothing. And I would be glad to know what thoſe things are, which your Lordſhip ſays, "our debate "goes upon, here, as really exiſting," that are beings more than numbers and figures.

P. 131.

Your Lordſhip's next exception, againſt my way of demonſtration, is, that "in it I am inconſiſtent with my ſelf." For proof of it, you ſay, "I deſign "to prove demonſtrations, without general principles; and yet every one knows, "that general principles are ſuppoſed in mathematics." Anſw. Every one may know that general principles are ſuppoſed in mathematics, without knowing, or ever being able to know, that I, who ſay alſo that mathematicians do often make uſe of them, am inconſiſtent with myſelf; tho' I alſo ſay, that a demonſtration about numbers and figures may be made without them.

P. 131.

To prove me inconſiſtent with myſelf, you add; "and that perſon would be "thought ridiculous, who ſhould go about to prove, that general principles are "of little, or of dangerous uſe, in mathematical demonſtrations." Anſw. A man may make other ridiculous faults, in writing, beſides inconſiſtency, and there are inſtances enough of it: but, by good luck, I am, in this place, clear of what would be thought ridiculous, which yet is no proof of inconſiſtency: for I never went "about to prove, that general principles are of little or dangerous uſe in mathematical demonſtrations."

B. iv. c. 3. § 18.

To prove me inconſiſtent with myſelf, your Lordſhip uſes one argument more, and that is, "that I confeſs, that the way of demonſtration in morality, is from "principles, as thoſe of mathematics, by neceſſary conſequences." Anſw. With ſubmiſſion, my Lord, I do not ſay, in the place, quoted by your Lordſhip, "that the way of demonſtration in morality is from principles, as thoſe of the "mathematics, by neceſſary conſequences," but this is that, which I ſay, "that "I doubt not, but in morality, from principles, as inconteſtable, as thoſe of "the mathematics, by neceſſary conſequences, the meaſures of right and wrong "might be made out." Which words, I humbly conceive, have no inconſiſtency with my ſaying, there may be demonſtrations, without the help of maxims; whatever inconſiſtency the words, which you here ſet down for mine, may have with it.

My Lord, the words you bring out of my book, are ſo often different from thoſe I read in the places, which you refer to, that I am ſometimes ready to think, you have got ſome ſtrange copy of it, whereof I know nothing, ſince it ſo ſeldom agrees with mine. Pardon me, my Lord, if, with ſome care, I examine the objection of inconſiſtency with myſelf; that, if I find any, I may retract the one part, or the other of it. Human frailty, I grant, and variety of thoughts, in long diſcourſes, may make a man, unwittingly, advance inconſiſtences. This may conſiſt with ingenuity, and deſerve to be excuſed: but for any one to perſiſt in it, when it is ſhewed him, is to give himſelf the lie; which cannot but ſtick cloſer to him, in the ſenſe of all rational men, than if he received it from another.

I own, I have ſaid, in my Eſſay, that there be demonſtrations, which may be made, without thoſe general maxims, that I there treated of. But I cannot recollect, that I ever ſaid, that thoſe general maxims could not be made uſe of, in demonſtration: for they are no more ſhut out of my way of demonſtration, than any other ſelf-evident propoſitions. And, therefore, there is no inconſiſtency in thoſe two propoſitions, which are mine, viz. "Some demonſtra- "tions may be made, without the help of thoſe general maxims;" and "morality, I doubt not, may be demonſtrated from principles;" whatever inconſiſtency may be, in theſe two following propoſitions, which are your Lordſhip's, P. 131, 132. and not mine, viz. "the way of demonſtration in morality is from principles; "and general maxims are not the way to proceed on, in demonſtration, as to "other parts of knowledge." For to admit ſelf-evident propoſitions, which is B. iv. c. 3. § 18. what I mean by principles, in the place of my Eſſay, which your Lordſhip quotes, for the firſt of my inconſiſtent propoſitions, and to ſay (as I do, in the B. iv. c. 7. § 10. other place, quoted by your Lordſhip) "that thoſe magnified maxims are not "the principles and foundations of all our other knowledge;" has no manner of inconſiſtency. For tho' I think them not neceſſary to every demonſtration, ſo neither do I exclude them, any more than other ſelf-evident propoſitions, out of any demonſtration, wherein any one ſhould make uſe of them.

P. 133. The next objection againſt my way of demonſtration, from my placing demonſtration on the ſelf-evidence of ideas, having been already anſwered, I ſhall need to ſay nothing in defence of it; or in anſwer to any thing raiſed againſt it, in your twelve and thirteen following pages, upon that topick. But that your Lordſhip may not think that I do not pay a due reſpect to all that you ſay, I ſhall not wholly paſs thoſe pages over in ſilence.

1. Your Lordſhip ſays, that "I confeſs that ſome of the moſt obvious ideas P. 134. "are far from being ſelf-evident." Anſw. Suppoſing I did ſay ſo, how, I beſeech your Lordſhip, does it prove, that "it is impoſſible to come to a demon- Ibid. "ſtration, about real beings, in this way of intuition, by ideas?" Which is the propoſition you promiſe to make appear, and you bring this, as the firſt reaſon, to make it appear. For ſhould I confeſs a thouſand times over, "that ſome of "the moſt obvious ideas are far from being ſelf-evident;" and ſhould I, which I do not, make ſelf-evident ideas, neceſſary to demonſtration; how will it thence follow, that it is impoſſible to come to a demonſtration, &c. ſince, tho' I ſhould confeſs ſome of the moſt obvious ideas not to be ſelf-evident, yet my confeſſion, being but of ſome, it will not follow from my confeſſion, but that there may be alſo ſome ſelf-evident: and ſo ſtill it might be poſſible to come to a demonſtration, by intuition, becauſe ſome, in my uſe of the word, never ſignifies all.

In the next place, give me leave to aſk, where it is, that I confeſs, that "ſome "ideas are not ſelf-evident?" Nay, where it is, that I once mention any ſuch thing as a ſelf-evident idea? For ſelf-evident is an epithet, that I do not remember, I ever gave to any idea, or thought belonged, at all, to ideas. In all the places, you have produced, out of my Eſſay, concerning matter, motion, time, duration, and light; which are thoſe ideas, your Lordſhip is pleaſed to inſtance in, to prove, that "I have confeſſed it of ſome;" I crave leave humbly to offer it to your Lordſhip, that there is not any ſuch confeſſion. However, you go on to prove it. The propoſition, then, to be proved, is, that "I confeſs, that theſe are far from being ſelf-evident ideas." It is neceſſary to ſet it down, and carry it in our minds; for the propoſition to be proved, is, I find, a very ſlippery thing, and apt to ſlide out of the way.

Ibid. Your Lordſhip's proof is, that, according to me, "we can have no intuition "of theſe things, which are ſo obvious to us, and conſequently we can have no "ſelf-evident ideas of them." The force of which proof, I confeſs, I do not underſtand. "We have no intuition of the obvious thing, matter, and the ob- "vious thing, motion, ergo, we have no ſelf-evident ideas of them." Granting that they are obvious things, and that, obvious as they are, we have, as you expreſs it, no intuition of them; it will not follow from thence, that we have no intuition of the ideas, we ſignify by the names, matter and motion, and ſo have no ſelf-evident ideas of them. For, whoever has in his mind, an idea, which he makes the name, matter or motion, ſtand for, has, no doubt, that idea, there, and ſees, or has, in your phraſe, an intuition of it there; and ſo has a ſelf-evident idea of it, if intuition, according to your Lordſhip, makes a ſelf-evident idea (for of ſelf-evident ideas, as I have before remarked, I have ſaid nothing, nor made any ſuch diſtinction, as ſelf-evident and not ſelf-evident ideas) and if intuition of an idea does not make a ſelf-evident idea, the want of it is in vain brought here, to prove the idea of matter, or motion, not ſelf-evident.

But your Lordſhip proceeds to inſtances; and your firſt inſtance is in matter: and here, for fear of miſtaking, let us remember, what the propoſition to be proved, is, viz. that "according to me, we have no intuition, as you call it, of the "idea of matter." Your Lordſhip begins and tell me, that I give this account P. 135. of the idea of matter, that "it conſiſts in a ſolid ſubſtance, every where the "ſame." Whereupon you tell me, "you would be glad to come to a certain Ibid. "knowledge of theſe two things; firſt, the manner of the coheſion of the parts "of matter, and the demonſtration of the diviſibility of it, in the way of ideas." Anſw. It happened juſt as I feared, the propoſition to be proved is ſlipt already, quite out of ſight: you own that I ſay, matter is a ſolid ſubſtance, every P. 137. where the ſame. This idea, which is the idea I ſignify, by the word, matter, I have in my mind, and have an intuition of it, there: how then does this prove, that, according to me, "there can be no intuition of the idea of matter!" P. 135. 137. Leaving, therefore, this propoſition, which was to be proved, you bring places out of my book to ſhew, that we do not know, wherein the union and coheſion of the parts of matter conſiſt; and that the diviſibility of matter involves us in difficulties: neither of which, either is, or proves, that, according to me, we cannot have an intuition of the idea of matter; which was the propoſition to be proved, and ſeems quite forgotten, during the three following pages, wholly employed upon this inſtance of matter. You aſk, indeed, "whether I can ima- P. 136. "gine, that we have intuition into the idea of matter?" But thoſe words ſeem to me to ſignify, quite another thing, than having an intuition of the idea of matter, as appears by your explication of them, in theſe words ſubjoined; "or Ibid. "that it is poſſible to come to a demonſtration, about it, by the help of any intervening ideas:" whereby it ſeems to me plain, that, by intuition into it, your Lordſhip means, "demonſtration about it," i. e. ſome knowledge concerning matter, and not a bare view, or intuition, of the idea, you have of it. And that your Lordſhip ſpeaks of knowledge, concerning ſome affection of matter, in this and the following queſtion, and not of the bare intuition of the idea of matter, is farther evident from the introduction of your two queſtions, wherein you ſay, "there are two things concerning matter, that you would be glad to come P. 135. "to a certain knowledge of." So that all, that can follow, or, in your ſenſe of them, does follow, from my words quoted by you, is, that I own, that the coheſion of its parts is an affection of matter, that is hard to be explained; but from them, it can neither be inferred, nor does your Lordſhip attempt to infer, that any one cannot view, or have, an intuition of the idea, he has in his own mind, which he ſignifies to others, by the word, matter: and that you did not make any ſuch inference, from them, is farther plain, by your aſking, in the place above quoted, not only, "whether I can imagine, that it is poſſible to "come to a demonſtration about it?" But your Lordſhip alſo adds, "by the "help of any intervening ideas." For I do not think, you demand a demonſtration, by the help of intervening ideas, to make you ſee, i. e. have an intuition of, your own idea of matter. It would miſbecome me, to underſtand your Lordſhip, in ſo ſtrange a ſenſe: for, then, you might have juſt occaſion, to aſk me again, "whether I could think you a man of ſo little ſenſe?" I therefore ſuppoſe, as your words import, that you demand a demonſtration, by the help of intervening ideas, to ſhew you, how the parts of that thing, which you repreſent to yourſelf, by that idea, to which you give the name, matter, cohere together; which is nothing to the queſtion, of the intuition of the idea: tho', to cover the change of the queſtion, as dextrouſly as might be, "the intuition "of the idea," is changed into "intuition into the idea;" as if there were no difference, between looking upon a watch, and looking into a watch, i. e. between the idea that, taken from an obvious view, I ſignify, by the name, watch, and have in my mind, when I uſe the word, watch; and the being able to reſolve any queſtion, that may be propoſed to me, concerning the inward make and contrivance of a watch. The idea, which, taken from the outward, viſible parts, I give the name, watch, to, I perceive, or have an intuition of, in my mind equally, whether or no, I know any thing more of a watch, than what is repreſented in that idea.

P. 137. Upon this change of the queſtion, all that follows, to the bottom of the next page, being to ſhew, that, from what I ſay, it follows, that there be many difficulties, concerning matter, which I cannot reſolve; many queſtions concerning it, which, I think, cannot be demonſtratively decided; and, not to ſhew, that any one cannot perceive, or have an intuition, as you call it, of his own idea of matter, I think, I need not trouble your Lordſhip with an anſwer to it.

In this one inſtance of matter, you have been pleaſed to aſk me two hard queſtions. To ſhorten your trouble, concerning this buſineſs, of intuition of ideas, will you, my Lord, give me leave to aſk you this one eaſy queſtion, concerning all your four inſtances, matter, motion, and duration and light, viz. What you mean, by theſe four words? That your Lordſhip may not ſuſpect it to be, either captious, or impertinent, I will tell you the uſe, I ſhall make of it: If your Lordſhip tell me, what you mean by theſe names, I ſhall preſently reply, that there, then, are the ideas, that you have of them, in your mind; and 'tis plain, you ſee, or have an intuition of, them, as they are in your mind, or, as I ſhould have expreſſed it, perceive them, as they are there, becauſe you can tell them to another. And ſo it is with every one, who can tell what he means, by thoſe words; and therefore, to all ſuch (amongſt which I crave leave to be one) there can be no doubt, of the intuition of thoſe ideas. But if your Lordſhip will not tell me, what you mean, by theſe terms, I fear, you will be thought to uſe very hard meaſure, in diſputing, by demanding to be ſatisfied, concerning queſtions, put in terms, which you yourſelf cannot tell the meaning of.

This conſidered, will perhaps ſerve to ſhew, that all that you ſay, in the following paragraphs to n. 2. p. 141. contains nothing, againſt intuition of ideas, which is what you are upon, tho' it be no notion of mine; much leſs, does it contain any thing, againſt my way of demonſtration, by ideas, which, is the point under proof. For,

1. What your Lordſhip has ſaid, about the idea of matter, hath been conſidered already.

P. 138. 2. From motion, which is your ſecond inſtance, your argument ſtands thus; that becauſe I ſay, the definitions, I meet with, of motion, are inſignificant, therefore the idea fails us. This ſeems to me a ſtrange conſequence, and all one as to ſay, that a deaf and dumb man, becauſe he could not underſtand the words, uſed in the definitions, that are given, of motion, therefore he could not have the idea of motion, or the idea of motion failed him. And yet, this conſequence, as foreign as it is to that antecedent, is forced from it, to no purpoſe: the propoſition to be inferred, being this, that then "we can have no intuition of the "idea of motion."

3. As to time, tho' the intuition of the idea of time, be not my way of ſpeaking, yet what your Lordſhip here infers, from my words, granting it to be a right inference, with ſubmiſſion, proves nothing againſt the intuition of that idea. The propoſition to be proved, is, "that we can have no intuition of the idea of P. 139. "time;" and the propoſition, which from my words, you infer, is, "that we "have not the knowledge of the idea of time, by intuition, but by rational de-"duction." What can be more remote than theſe two propoſitions? The one of them ſignifying (if it ſignifies any thing) the view the mind has of it; the other, as I gueſs, the original and riſe of it. For "what it is to have the know-"ledge of an idea, not by intuition, but by deduction of reaſon," I confeſs, I do not well underſtand; only I am ſure, in terms, it is not the ſame, with having the intuition of an idea: but if changing of terms were not ſome men's privilege, perhaps ſo much controverſy would not be written. The meaning of either of theſe propoſitions, I concern not myſelf about, for neither of them is mine: I only here ſhew, that you do not prove the propoſition, that you yourſelf, framed, and undertook to prove.

P. 139. Since, my Lord, you are ſo favourable to me, as to ſeem willing to correct, whatever you can find any way amiſs, in my Eſſay; therefore I ſhall endeavour to ſatisfy you, concerning the riſe of our idea of duration, from the ſucceſſion of ideas, in our minds. Againſt this, tho' it be nothing to the matter in hand, you object, "that ſome people reckon ſucceſſion of time right, by knots, and notches,

" and figures, without ever thinking of ideas." Anſw. 'Tis certain, that men, who wanted better ways, might, by knots, or notches, keep accounts of the numbers of certain ſtated lengths of time, as well as of the numbers of men, in their country, or of any other numbers; and that too, without ever conſidering the immediate objects of their thoughts, under the name of ideas: but that they ſhould count time, without ever thinking of ſomething, is very hard to me to conceive; and the things, they thought on, or were preſent in their minds, when they thought, are what I call ideas: thus much in anſwer, to what your Lordſhip ſays. But to any one, that ſhall put the objection ſtronger, and ſay, many have had the idea of time, who never reflected on the conſtant train of ideas, ſucceeding one another in their minds, whilſt waking; I grant it: but add, that want of reflection makes not any thing ceaſe to be: if it did, many men's actions would have no cauſe, nor riſe, nor manner; becauſe many men never reflect ſo far, on their own actions, as to conſider what they are bottomed on, or how they are performed. A man may meaſure duration by motion, of which he has no other idea, but of a conſtant ſucceſſion of ideas in train; and yet never reflect on that ſucceſſion of ideas, in his mind. A man may gueſs at the length of his ſtay by himſelf, in the dark; here is no ſucceſſion to meaſure by, but that of his own thoughts; and without ſome ſucceſſion, I think there is no meaſure of duration. But though in this caſe, he meaſures the length of the duration, by the train of his ideas, yet he may never reflect on that, but conclude, he does it, he knows not how.

You add, " but, beſides ſuch arbitrary meaſures of time, what need any recourſe to ideas, when the returns of days, and months, and years, by the planetary motions, are ſo eaſy and ſo univerſal?" Such here, as I ſuppoſe, refers to the knots, and notches, and figures before-mentioned: if it does not, I know not what it refers to; and if it does, it makes thoſe knots, and notches, meaſures of time, which I humbly conceive, they are not, but only arbitrary ways of recording (as all other ways of recording are) certain numbers of known lengths of time. For though any one ſets down, by arbitrary marks, as notches on a ſtick, or ſtrokes of chalk on a trenchard, or figures on paper, the number of yards of cloth, or pints of milk, that are delivered to a cuſtomer; yet I ſuppoſe, no body thinks, that the cloth, or milk, were meaſured by thoſe notches, ſtrokes of chalk, or figures, which therefore are by no means the arbitrary meaſures of thoſe things. But what this is againſt, I confeſs I do not ſee: This, I am ſure, it is not againſt any thing I have ſaid. For, as I remember, I have ſaid (though not the planetary motions, yet) that the motion of the ſun and the moon are the beſt meaſures of time. But if you mean, that the idea of duration is rather taken from the planetary motions, than from the ſucceſſion of ideas in our minds, I crave leave to doubt of that; becauſe motion no other way diſcovers itſelf to us, but by a ſucceſſion of ideas. P. 140. Ibid.

Your next argument, againſt my thinking the idea of time to be derived from the train of ideas ſucceeding one another, in our minds, is, that your Lordſhip thinks the contrary. This, I muſt own, is an argument, by way of authority, and I humbly ſubmit to it; though I think ſuch arguments produce no certainty, either in my way of certainty, by ideas, or in your way of certainty, by reaſon. Ibid.

4. As to your fourth inſtance, you having ſet down my exceptions to the Peripatetick and Carteſian definitions of light, you ſubjoin this queſtion: " And is this " a ſelf-evident idea of light?" I beg leave to anſwer, in the ſame way, by a queſtion, And who ever ſaid, or thought, that it was, or meant that it ſhould be? He muſt have a ſtrange notion of ſelf-evident ideas, let them be what they will (for I know them not) who can think, that the ſhewing others definition of light to be unintelligible, is a ſelf-evident idea of light. But further, my Lord, what, I beſeech you, has a ſelf-evident idea of light, to do here? I thought, in this your inſtance of light, you were making good what you undertook to prove from myſelf, that we can have no intuition of light. But becauſe that, perhaps, would have ſounded pretty oddly, you thought fit (which I, with all ſubmiſſion, crave leave ſometimes to take notice of) to change the queſtion; but the misfortune is, that put as it is, not concerning our intuition, but the ſelf-evidence of the idea of light, P. 141. P. 134.

light, the one is no better proved than the other: and yet your Lordſhip con-
P. 141. cludes this your firſt head, according to your uſual form: "Thus we have ſeen
" what account the author of the Eſſay himſelf has given of theſe ſelf-evident
" ideas, which are the ground-work of demonſtration." With ſubmiſſion, my
Lord, he muſt have good eyes, who has ſeen an account, I have given, in my
Eſſay, of ſelf-evident ideas, when neither, in all that your Lordſhip has quoted
out of it, no, nor in my whole Eſſay, ſelf-evident ideas are ſo much as once men-
tioned. And where the account I have given of a thing, which I never thought
upon, is to be ſeen, I cannot imagine. What your Lordſhip farther tells me,
concerning them, viz. "that ſelf-evident ideas are the ground-work of demon-
" ſtration," I alſo aſſure you, is perfect news to me, which I never met with,
any where, but in your Lordſhip: tho' if I had made them the ground-work of
demonſtration, as you ſay, I think they might remain ſo, notwithſtanding any
thing your Lordſhip has produced to the contrary.

Ibid. We are now come to your ſecond head, where I expected to have found this
conſequence made good, "that there may be contradictory opinions, about
" ideas, which I account moſt clear and diſtinct; ergo, it is impoſſible to come
" to a demonſtration about real beings in the way of intuition of ideas." For
P. 134. this, you told me, was your ſecond reaſon to prove this propoſition. This con-
ſequence, your Lordſhip, it ſeems, looks upon as ſo clear, that it needs no proof;
I can find none here, where you take it up again. To prove ſomething, you ſay,
P. 141. " ſuppoſe an idea happen to be thought, by ſome, to be clear and diſtinct, and
" others ſhould think the contrary to be ſo." In obedience to your Lordſhip, I
do ſuppoſe it. But when it is ſuppoſed, will not make good the above-mentioned
conſequence? You, yourſelf, my Lord, do not ſo much as pretend it; but in this
Ibid. queſtion ſubjoined, [" What hopes of demonſtration by clear and diſtinct ideas
then?"] infer a quite different propoſition. For, it is impoſſible to come to a
demonſtration, about real beings, in the way of intuition of ideas; and, there is
" no hopes of demonſtration by clear and diſtinct ideas;" appear to me two very
different propoſitions.

There appears ſomething to me, yet more incomprehenſible, in your way of
managing this argument here. Your reaſon is, as we have ſeen, in theſe words,
" there may be contradictory opinions about ſome ideas, that I account moſt clear
" and diſtinct:" and your inſtance of it is in theſe words, " ſuppoſe an idea
" happen to be thought, by ſome, to be clear and diſtinct, and others ſhould
" think the contrary to be ſo?" Anſw. So they may, without having any con-
tradictory opinions about any idea, that I account moſt clear and diſtinct. A
man may think his idea of heat to be clear and diſtinct, and another may think
his idea of cold (which I take to be the contrary idea to that of heat) to be clear
and diſtinct, and be both in the right, without the leaſt appearance of any con-
tradictory opinions. All, therefore, that your Lordſhip ſays, in the remaining
part of this paragraph, having nothing in it, of contradictory opinions, about ideas,
that I think moſt clear, ſerves not at all to make good your ſecond reaſon. The
truth is, all that you ſay here, concerning Des Cartes's idea of ſpace, and another
man's idea of ſpace, amounts to no more but this; that different men may ſig-
nify different ideas, by the ſame name, and will never fix on me, what your
Lordſhip would perſuade the world I ſay, " that both parts of a contradiction
" may be true." Tho' I do ſay, that in ſuch a looſe uſe of the terms, body and
vacuum, it may be demonſtrated both that there is, and is not a vacuum: which
is a contradiction in words, and is apt to impoſe, as if it were ſo in ſenſe, on thoſe,
who miſtake words for things; who are a kind of reaſoners, whereof I perceive
Eſſay, B. iv. there is a greater number, than I thought there had been. All that I have ſaid,
c. 7. § 12. in that place, quoted by your Lordſhip, is nothing but to ſhew the danger of
relying upon maxims, without a careful guard upon the uſe of words, without
which they will ſerve to make demonſtrations, on both ſides. That this is ſo,
I dare appeal to any reader, ſhould your Lordſhip preſs me again, as you do
here, with all the force of theſe words, " Say you ſo? what, demonſtrations
P. 143. " on both ſides? and in the way of ideas too? This is extraordinary in-
" deed!"

That all the oppoſition between Des Cartes and thoſe others, is only about the naming of ideas, I think may be made appear, from theſe words of your Lordſhip, in the next paragraph; "in the ideas of ſpace and body, the queſtion Ibid. "ſuppoſed is, whether they be the ſame, or no?" That this is a queſtion only about names, and not about ideas themſelves, is evident from hence, that no body can doubt, whether the ſingle idea of pure diſtance, and the two ideas of diſtance and ſolidity, are one and the ſame idea, or different ideas, any more than he can doubt whether one and two are different. The queſtion then, in the caſe, is not whether extenſion conſidered ſeparately by itſelf, or extenſion and ſolidity together, be the ſame idea, or no; but, whether the ſimple idea of extenſion alone ſhall be called body, or the complex idea, of ſolidity and extenſion together, ſhall be called body. For that theſe ideas themſelves are different, I think, I need not go about to prove, to any one, who ever thought of emptineſs, or fulneſs: for whether, in fact, the bottle in a man's hand be empty, or no, or can by him be emptied, or no; this, I think, is plain, that his idea of fulneſs, and his idea of emptineſs, are not the ſame. This, the very diſpute concerning a vacuum ſuppoſes; for if men's idea of pure ſpace were not different from their idea of ſolidity, and ſpace together, they could never ſo far ſeparate them in their thoughts, as to make a queſtion, whether they did always exiſt together, any more, than they could queſtion, whether the ſame thing exiſted with itſelf. Motion cannot be ſeparated in exiſtence from ſpace: and yet no body ever took the idea of ſpace and the idea of motion to be the ſame. Solidity likewiſe cannot exiſt without ſpace; but will any one from thence ſay, the idea of ſolidity and the idea of ſpace are one and the ſame?

Your Lordſhip's third reaſon, to prove that "it is impoſſible to come to a P. 134. "demonſtration, about real beings, in this way of intuition of ideas, is, that "granting the ideas to be true, there is no ſelf-evidence of the connexion of them, "which is neceſſary to make a demonſtration." This, I muſt own, is to me as incomprehenſible a conſequence, as the former; as alſo is that, which your Lordſhip ſays, to make it out, which I ſhall ſet down, in your own words, that its force may be left entire to the reader: "But granting the ideas to be true, yet P. 143. "when their connexion is not ſelf-evident, then an intermediate idea muſt compleat the demonſtration. But how doth it appear, that this middle idea is "ſelf-evidently connected with them? For it is ſaid, if that intermediate idea be "not known by intuition, that muſt need a proof; and ſo there can be no demonſtration, which your Lordſhip is very apt to believe, in this way of ideas; "unleſs theſe ideas get more light by being put between two others." Whatever there be, in theſe words, to prove the propoſition in queſtion, I leave the reader to find out; but that he may not be led into a miſtake, that there is any thing, in my words, that may be ſerviceable to it, I muſt crave leave to acquaint him, that theſe words ſet down by your Lordſhip, as out of my Eſſay, are not to be found, in that place, nor any where in my book, or any thing to this purpoſe, B. 4. c. 2. § 7. "that the intermediate idea is to be known by intuition;" but this, that there muſt be an intuitive knowledge, or perception, of the agreement, or diſagreement, of the intermediate idea, with thoſe, whoſe agreement, or diſagreement, by its intervention, it demonſtrates.

Leaving, therefore, all that your Lordſhip brings, out of Gaſſendus, the Carteſians, Morinus, and Bernier, in their argument, from motion, for, or againſt a vacuum, as not being at all concerned in it; I ſhall only crave leave to obſerve, that you ſeem to make uſe here, of the ſame way of argumentation, which I think I may call your main, if not only one, it occurs ſo often, viz. that when I have ſaid any thing to ſhew, wherein certainty, or demonſtration, &c. conſiſts, you think it ſufficiently overthrown, if you can produce any inſtance out of my book, of any thing advanced by me, which comes ſhort of certainty, or demonſtration: whereas, my Lord, I humbly conceive, it is no proof, againſt my notion of certainty, or my way of demonſtration, that I cannot attain to them in all caſes; I only tell, wherein they conſiſt, wherever they are; but if I miſs of either of them, either by reaſon of the nature of the ſubject, or by inadvertency, in my way of proof, that is no objection to the truth of my notions of them:

for I never undertook that my way of certainty, or demonſtration, if it ought to be called my way, ſhould make me, or any one omniſcient, or infallible.

THAT, which makes it neceſſary for me, here again, to take notice of this your way of reaſoning, is the queſtion, wherewith you wind up the account, you have given of the diſpute of the parties, above-named, about a vacuum; "and P. 145. "is it poſſible to imagine, that there ſhould be a ſelf-evident connexion in the "caſe?" Anſw. It concerns not me to examine, whether, or on which ſide, in that diſpute, ſuch a ſelf-evident connexion is, or is not poſſible: but this I take the liberty to ſay, that wherever it is not, there is no demonſtration, whether it be the Carteſians, or the Gaſſendiſts, that failed in this point. And I humbly conceive, that to conclude, from any one's failing in this, or any other caſe, of a ſelf-evident connexion, in each ſtep of his proof, that, therefore, it is not neceſſary in demonſtration, is a concluſion without grounds, and a way of arguing that proves nothing.

P. 145. IN the next paragragh you come to wind up the argument, which you have been ſo long upon, viz. to make good what you undertook; i. e. "to ſhew the P. 105. "difference of my method of certainty, by ideas, and the method of certainty, "by reaſon;" in anſwer to my ſaying, I can find no oppoſition between them: which oppoſition, according to the account, you give of it, after forty pages ſpent in it, amounts at laſt to this:

P. 146. (1.) THAT I affirm, that general principles and maxims of reaſon are of little or no uſe; and your Lordſhip ſays, "they are of very great uſe, and the only "proper foundation of certainty." To which I crave leave to ſay, that if by principles and maxims, your Lordſhip means all ſelf-evident propoſitions, our ways are, even in this part, the ſame; for, as you know, my Lord, I make my ſelf-evident propoſitions neceſſary to certainty, and found all certainty only in them. If, by principles and maxims, you mean a ſelect number of ſelf-evident propoſitions, diſtinguiſhed from the reſt, by the name of maxims, which is the ſenſe, in which I uſe the term, maxims, in my Eſſay; then, to bring it to a deciſion, which of us two, in this point, is in the right, it will be neceſſary for your Lordſhip, to give a liſt of thoſe maxims; and then to ſhew, that a man can be certain of no truth, without the help of thoſe maxims. For to affirm maxims to be the only foundation of certainty, and yet not to tell, which are thoſe maxims, or how they may be known; is, I humbly conceive, ſo far from laying any ſure grounds of certainty, that it leaves even the very foundations of it uncertain. When your Lordſhip has thus ſettled the grounds, of your way of certainty, by reaſon, one may be able to examine, whether it be truly the way of reaſon, and how far my way of certainty, by ideas, differs from it.

THE ſecond difference that you aſſign, between my way of certainty by ideas, P. 146. and your's by reaſon, is, that "I ſay that demonſtration is by way of intuition "of ideas, and that reaſon is only the faculty employed in diſcovering and com"paring ideas with themſelves, or with others intervening; and that this is the "only way of certainty." Whereas your Lordſhip "affirms, and, as you ſay, "have proved, that there can be no demonſtration, by intuition of ideas; but "that all the certainty, we can attain to, is from general principles of reaſon, "and neceſſary deductions, made from them." Anſw. I have ſaid, that demonſtration conſiſts in the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of the intermediate idea, with thoſe, whoſe agreement, or diſagreement it is to ſhew, in each ſtep of the demonſtration: and, if you will ſay this is different from the way of demonſtration, by reaſon, it will then be to the point above-mentioned, which you have been ſo long upon. If this be your meaning here, it ſeems pretty ſtrangely expreſſed, and remains to be proved; but if any thing elſe be your meaning, that meaning not being the propoſition to be proved, it matters not, whether you have proved it, or no.

YOUR Lordſhip further ſays here, "that all the certainty, we can attain to, is Ibid. "from general principles of reaſon, and neceſſary deductions made from them." This, you ſay, "you have proved." What has been proved, is to be ſeen, in what has been already conſidered: but if your proof, "that all the certainty, "we can attain to, is from general principles of reaſon, and neceſſary deductions "made from them," were as clear and cogent, as it ſeems to me the contrary; this will not reach to the point in debate; till your Lordſhip has proved that this is oppoſite to my way of certainty, by ideas. 'Tis ſtrange (and perhaps to ſome may be matter of thought) that in an argument, wherein you lay ſo much ſtreſs on maxims, general principles of reaſon, and neceſſary deductions from them, you ſhould never once tell us, what, in your account, a maxim or general principle of reaſon is, nor the marks it is to be known by; nor offer to ſhew what a neceſſary deduction is, nor how it is to be made, or may be known. For I have ſeen men pleaſe themſelves, with deductions upon deductions, and ſpin conſequences, it mattered not, whether out of their own, or other men's thoughts, which, when looked into, were viſibly nothing but mere ropes of ſand.

'Tis true, your Lordſhip ſays, "you now come to certainty of reaſon, by P. 114. "deductions." But when all that truly-learned diſcourſe, which follows, is read over and over again, I would be glad to be told what it is your Lordſhip calls a neceſſary deduction; and by what criterion, you diſtinguiſh it, from ſuch deductions, as come ſhort of certainty, or even of truth itſelf. I confeſs I have read over thoſe pages, more than once, and can find no ſuch criterion laid down in them, by your Lordſhip, though a criterion be there much talked of. But, whether it be my want of capacity, for your way of writing, that makes me not find any light, given by your Lordſhip, into this matter; or whether, in truth, you have not ſhewed, wherein, what you call, a neceſſary deduction conſiſts, and how it may be known, from what is not ſo, the reader muſt judge. This I crave leave to ſay, that, when you have ſhewn what general principles of reaſon, and neceſſary deductions, are, the world will then ſee, and not till then, whether this your way of certainty, by reaſon, from general principles and neceſſary deductions, made from them, be oppoſite to, or ſo much as different from, my way of certainty, by ideas; which was the thing to be ſhewn.

In the paragraph, under conſideration, you blame me, that, in my chapter, P. 145. concerning reaſon, I have treated it only as a faculty, and not in the other ſenſes, which I there give, of that word. This exception to my book, is, I ſuppoſe, only from your Lordſhip's general care, of letting nothing paſs, in my Eſſay, which you think needs an amendment. For any particular reaſon, that brings it in here, or ties it on, to this part of your diſcourſe, I confeſs I do not ſee. However, to this I anſwer,

1. The underſtanding, as a faculty, being the ſubject of my Eſſay, it carried me to treat directly of reaſon, no otherwiſe, than as a faculty. But yet reaſon, as ſtanding for true and clear principles, and alſo, as ſtanding for clear and fair deductions from thoſe principles, I have not wholly omitted; as is manifeſt, from what I have ſaid of ſelf-evident propoſitions, intuitive knowledge, and demonſtration, in other parts of my Eſſay. So that your queſtion, "why, in a P. 145. "chapter of reaſon, are the two other ſenſes of the word neglected?" blaming me for no other fault, that I am really guilty of, but want of order, and not putting every thing in its proper place; does not appear to be of ſo mighty weight, but that I ſhould have thought, it might have been left to the little nibblers in controverſy, without being made uſe of, by ſo great a man, as your Lordſhip. But the putting things out of their proper place, being that, which your Lordſhip thinks fit to except againſt, in my writings, it ſo falls out, that to this too, I can plead, not guilty. For in that very chapter, of reaſon, I have not omited to treat of principles and deductions; and, what I have ſaid there, I preſume, § 2, 3, 4. is enough to let others ſee, that I have not neglected to declare my poor ſenſe, 14, 15, 16, about ſelf-evident propoſitions, and the cogency and evidence of demonſtrative, 17, 18. or probable, deductions of reaſon: tho' what I have ſaid there, not being backed with authorities, nor warranted by the names of antient philoſophers, was not worth your Lordſhip's taking notice of.

I have, I confeſs, been ſo unwary, to write out of my own thoughts, which your Lordſhip has, more than once, with ſome ſort of reprimand, taken notice of. I own it, your Lordſhip is much in the right; the ſafer way is, never to declare one's own ſenſe, in any material point. If I had filled my book, with quotations and collections of other men's opinions, it had ſhewn much more learning, and had much more ſecurity in it; and I myſelf had been ſafe from the attacks of the men of arms, in the commonwealth of letters: but, in writing my book, I had no thoughts of war, my eye was fixed only on truth, and that with ſo ſincere and unbiaſſed an endeavour, that I thought, I ſhould not have incurred much blame, even where I had miſſed it. This I perceive, too late, was the wrong way: I ſhould have kept myſelf ſtill ſafe upon the reſerve. Had I learnt this wiſdom of Thraſo, in Terence, and reſolved with myſelf, "Hic "ego ero poſt principia;" perhaps I might have deſerved the commendation was given him, "illuc eſt ſapere, ut hos inſtruxit, ipſus ſibi cavit loco." But I deſerved to be ſoundly corrected, for not having profited by reading, ſo much as this comes to.

P. 145. BUT to return to your accuſation here, which all together ſtands thus: "why in "a chapter of reaſon, are the other two ſenſes neglected? We might have expect"ed, here, full ſatisfaction, as to the principles of reaſon, as diſtinct from the "faculty, but the author of the Eſſay wholly avoids it." What I gueſs theſe words accuſe me to have avoided, I think I have ſhewn, already, that I did not avoid.

P. 146. "BEFORE you conclude, you ſay, you muſt obſerve that I prove, that de"monſtration muſt be by intuition, in an extraordinary manner, from the ſenſe
Eſſay, B. iv. c. 2. § 3. "of the word." He that will be at the pains to read that paragraph, which you quote for it, will ſee that I do not prove, that it muſt be by intuition, becauſe it is called demonſtration; but that it is called demonſtration, becauſe it is by intuition. And, as to the propriety of it, what your Lordſhip ſays, in the following words, "it would be moſt proper for ocular demonſtration, or by the
P. 147. "finger," will not hinder it from being proper, alſo, in mental demonſtration, as long as the perception of the mind is properly expreſſed by ſeeing.

AGAINST my obſerving, that the notation of the word imported ſhewing, or
P. 152. making to ſee, your Lordſhip farther ſays, "demonſtration among ſome philo"ſophers, ſignified only the concluſion of an argument, whereby we are brought "from ſomething we did perceive, to ſomething we did not;" which ſeems to me to agree with what I ſay, in the caſe, viz. that, by the agreement of ideas, which we do perceive, we are brought to perceive the agreement of ideas, which before we did not perceive. To which, no doubt, will be anſwered, as in a
P. 152. like caſe, "not by way of intuition, but by a deduction of reaſon;" i. e. we perceive not, in a way, that affords us intuition, or a ſight, but by deductions of reaſon, wherein we ſee nothing. Whereas, my Lord, I humbly conceive, that the force of a deduction of reaſon conſiſts in this, that, in each ſtep of it, we ſee what a connection it has, i. e. have an intuition of the certain agreement or diſagreement, of the ideas, as in demonſtration; or an intuition, or perception, that they have a probable, or not ſo much as a probable, connexion, as in other deductions of reaſon.

P. 147. YOU farther overthrow the neceſſity of intuitive knowledge, in every ſtep of a demonſtration, by the authority of Ariſtotle, who ſays, "things, that are ſelf"evident, cannot be demonſtrated." And ſo I ſay too, in ſeveral places of my
B. iv. c. 7. § 10, 19. and elſewhere. B. iv. c. 2. Eſſay. When your Lordſhip can ſhew any inconſiſtency between theſe two propoſitions, viz. "that intuitive knowledge is neceſſary, in each ſtep of a de"monſtration, and things that are ſelf-evident cannot be demonſtrated;" then I ſhall own you have overthrown the neceſſity of intuition, in every ſtep of a demonſtration, by reaſon, as well as by Ariſtotle's authority.

IN the remainder of this paragraph, I meet with nothing, but your Lordſhip
P. 148, 150. finding fault with ſome, who, in this age, have made uſe of mathematical demonſtrations, in natural philoſophy. Your Lordſhip's two reaſons againſt this way of advancing knowledge, upon the ſure grounds of mathematical demonſtration, are theſe;

P. 148. (1.) "THAT Des Cartes, a mathematical man, has been guilty of miſtakes, "in his ſyſtem." Anſw. When mathematical men will build ſyſtems upon fancy, and not upon demonſtration, they are as liable to miſtakes as others. And that Des Cartes was not led into his miſtakes, by mathematical demonſtrations,

tions, but for want of them, I think, has been demonſtrated by * ſome of thoſe mathematicians, who ſeem to be meant here.

(2.) Your ſecond argument againſt accommodating mathematicks to the nature of material things, is, "that mathematicians cannot be certain of the manner and degrees of force, given to bodies, ſo far diſtant as the fixed ſtars; nor of P. 149. the laws of motion, in other ſyſtems." A very good argument, why they ſhould not proceed demonſtratively, in this our ſyſtem, upon laws of motion, obſerved to be eſtabliſhed here: a reaſon, that may perſuade us, to put out our eyes, for fear they ſhould miſlead us, in what we do ſee, becauſe there be things out of our ſight.

It is great pity, Ariſtotle had not underſtood mathematics, as well as Mr. Newton, and made uſe of it, in natural philoſophy, with as good ſucceſs: his example had then authorized the accommodating of it to material things: but it is not to be ventured, by a man of this age, to go out of the method, which Ariſtotle has preſcribed, and which your Lordſhip, out of him, has ſet down, in the following pages, as that, which ſhould be kept to; P. 150, 153. for it is a dangerous preſumption to go out of a track, chalked out by that ſuppoſed dictator, in the commonwealth of letters, tho' it led him to the eternity of the world. I ſay not this, that I do not think him a very great man; he made himſelf ſo, by not keeping preciſely to beaten tracks; which ſervile ſubjection of the mind, if we take my Lord Bacon's word for it, kept the little knowledge the world had, from growing greater, for more than a few ages. That the breaking looſe from it, in this age, is a fault, is not directly ſaid; but there is enough ſaid to ſhew, there is no great approbation of ſuch a liberty. Mathematics in groſs, it is plain, are a grievance in natural philoſophy: and with reaſon; for mathematical proofs, like diamonds, are hard as well as clear, and will be touched with nothing but ſtrict reaſoning. Mathematical proofs are out of the reach of topical arguments, and are not to be attacked by the equivocal uſe of words, or declamation, that make ſo great a part of other diſcourſes; nay, even of controverſies. How well you have proved my way, by ideas, guilty of any tendency to ſcepticiſm, the reader will ſee; but this I will crave leave to ſay, that the ſecluding mathematical reaſoning from philoſophy; and, inſtead thereof, reducing it to Ariſtotelian rules and ſayings, will not be thought to be much in favour of knowledge againſt ſcepticiſm.

Your Lordſhip, indeed, ſays, "you did not by any means, take off from P. 149. the laudable endeavours of thoſe, who have gone about to reduce natural ſpeculation to mathematical certainty." What can we underſtand by this, but your Lordſhip's great complaiſance and moderation? who, notwithſtanding you ſpend four pages to "ſhew, that the endeavours of mathematical men, to accommodate the principles of that ſcience, to the nature of material things, has been the occaſion of great miſtakes, in the philoſophy of this age;" and that, therefore, Ariſtotle's method is to be followed: yet you make this compliment to the mathematicians, that you leave them to their liberty, to go on, if they pleaſe, "in their laudable endeavours, to reduce natural ſpeculations to mathematical certainty."

And thus we are come to the end of your Lordſhip's clearing this paſſage; "that you grant that, by ſenſation and reflection, we come to know the powers and properties of things; but our reaſon [i. e. the principles of reaſon, agreed on by mankind] is ſatisfied, that there muſt be ſomething beyond theſe; becauſe it is impoſſible, they ſhould ſubſiſt by themſelves: ſo that the nature of things properly belongs to reaſon [i. e. the principles of reaſon, agreed on by mankind] and not to mere ideas." Which, if any one be ſo lucky as to underſtand, by theſe your Lordſhip's fifty pages, ſpent upon it, better than my friend did, when he confeſſed himſelf gravelled by it, as it ſtands here recited, he ought to enjoy the advantage of his happy genius, whilſt I miſs that ſatisfaction, by the dulneſs of mine; which hinders me alſo, from ſeeing, how the oppoſition of the way of certainty, by ideas, and the way of certainty, by reaſon,

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* Mr. Newton, Phil. Natur. Princip. Mathemat. l. 2. § 9.

comes in, in the explication of this paſſage; or, at leaſt, if it does belong to it, yet I muſt own, what is a greater misfortune, that I do not ſee what the oppoſition, or difference, is, which your Lordſhip has ſo much talked of, between the way of certainty, by ideas, and the method of certainty, by reaſon. For my excuſe, I think others will be as much in the dark as I, ſince you no where tell, wherein you yourſelf, my Lord, place certainty. So that to talk of a difference, between certainty by ideas, and certainty that is not by ideas, without declaring, in what that other certainty conſiſts, is like to have no better ſucceſs, than might be expected from one, who would compare two things together, the one whereof is not known.

P. 154. You now return to your diſcourſe of nature and perſon, and tell me, that, to what you ſaid, about the general nature, in diſtinct individuals, I object theſe three things:

(1.) "That I cannot put together one and the ſame and diſtinct;" this I own to be my objection: "and conſequently there is no foundation for the diſ-" Letter 2. p. 127. "tinction of nature and perſon." This, with ſubmiſſion, I deny to be any objection of mine, either in the place, quoted by your Lordſhip, or any where elſe. There may be foundation enough for diſtinction, as there is, of theſe two, and yet they may be treated of, in a way ſo obſcure, ſo confuſed, or perhaps, ſo ſublime, that an ordinary capacity may not from thence get, as your Lordſhip expreſſes it, "clear and diſtinct apprehenſions of them." This was that which my friend and I complained of, in that place, want of clearneſs in your Lordſhip's diſcourſe, not of want of diſtinction, in the things themſelves.

(2.) "That what your Lordſhip ſaid about common nature, and particular "ſubſtance in individuals, was wholly unintelligible to me and my friends." To which, my Lord, you may add, if you pleaſe, that it is ſtill ſo to me.

(3.) That I ſaid, "that to ſpeak truly and preciſely of this matter, as in "reality it is, there is no ſuch thing as one and the ſame common nature in ſe-"veral individuals; for all that in truth is in them, is particular, and nothing "but particular, &c." Anſw. This was ſaid, to ſhew how unapt theſe expreſſions, "the ſame common nature, in ſeveral individuals; and ſeveral individuals being in the ſame common nature;" were to give true and clear notions P. 156. of nature. To this your Lordſhip anſwers, that other, and thoſe very rational men, have ſpoken ſo: to which I ſhall ſay no more, but that it is an argument, with which any thing may be defended, and all the jargon of the ſchools be juſtified; but, I preſume, not ſtrong enough to bring it back again, let men ever ſo rational make uſe of it.

P. 146. Your Lordſhip adds, "but now, it ſeems, nothing is intelligible, but what "ſuits with the new way of ideas." My Lord, the new way of ideas, and the old way of ſpeaking intelligibly, was always, and ever will be, the ſame. And if I may take the liberty to declare my ſenſe of it, herein it conſiſts: (1.) That a man uſe no words, but ſuch as he makes the ſigns of certain, determined objects of his mind, in thinking, which he can make known to another. (2.) Next, that he uſe the ſame word ſteadily, for the ſign of the ſame, immediate object of his mind in thinking. (3.) That he join thoſe words together, in propoſitions, according to the grammatical rules of that language, he ſpeaks in. (4.) That he unite thoſe ſentences, in a coherent diſcourſe. Thus, and thus only, I humbly conceive, any one may preſerve himſelf from the confines and ſuſpicion of jargon, whether he pleaſes to call thoſe immediate objects of his mind, which his words do, or ſhould ſtand for, ideas, or no.

P. 156. You again accuſe the way of ideas, to make a common nature no more than a common name. That, my Lord, is not my way, by ideas. When your Lordſhip ſhews me, where I have ſaid ſo, I promiſe your Lordſhip to ſtrike it Ibid. out: and the like I promiſe, when you ſhew me, where "I preſume that we are "not to judge of things, by the general principles of reaſon," which you call my P. 157. fundamental miſtake. "Theſe principles of reaſon, you ſay, muſt be the ſtan-"dard to mankind." If they are of ſuch conſequence, would it not have been convenient, we ſhould have been inſtructed, ſomething more particularly, about them, than by barely being told their name; that we might be able to know what are, and what are not principles of reaſon?

BUT, be they what they will, becauſe they muſt be the ſtandard to mankind, your Lordſhip ſays, "you ſhall, in this debate, proceed upon the following principles, to make it appear, that the difference, between nature and perſon, is "not imaginary and fictitious; but grounded upon the real nature of things." With ſubmiſſion, my Lord, you need not be at the pains, to draw up your great artillery, of ſo many maxims, where you meet with no oppoſition. The thing in debate, whether in this debate, or no, I know not, but what led into this debate, was about theſe expreſſions; "one common nature, in ſeveral individuals; "and ſeveral individuals, in one common nature:" and the queſtion, I thought, was, whether a general, or common nature, could be in particulars, i. e. exiſt in individuals? But, ſince your Lordſhip turns your artillery againſt thoſe, who deny that there is any foundation of diſtinction, between nature and perſon, I am out of gun-ſhot; for I am none of thoſe, who ever ſaid, or thought, there was no foundation of diſtinction between nature and perſon. Ibid.

THE maxims you lay down in the following paragraph, are to make me underſtand, how one and the ſame and diſtinct may conſiſt: I confeſs, I do not ſee how your Lordſhip's words, there, at all make it out. This, indeed, I do underſtand, that ſeveral particular beings may have a conformity in them, to one general, abſtract idea, which may, if you pleaſe, be called their general, or common nature: but how that idea, or general nature, can be the ſame and diſtinct, is ſtill paſt my comprehenſion. P. 158.

To my ſaying, that your Lordſhip had not told me, what nature is, I am told, that "if I had a mind to underſtand you, I could not but ſee, that by na-"ture you meant the ſubject of eſſential properties." A lady aſking a learned phyſician what the ſpleen was, received this anſwer, that it was the receptacle of the melancholy humour. She had a mind to underſtand what the ſpleen was, but, by this definition of it, found herſelf not much enlightened; and, therefore, went on to aſk, what the melancholy humour was: and, by the doctor's anſwer, found that the ſpleen and the melancholy humour had a relation one to another; but what the ſpleen was, ſhe knew not one jot better than ſhe did before he told her any thing about it. My Lord, relative definitions of terms, that are not relative, uſually, do no more, than lead us into a circuit, to the ſame place, from whence we ſet out, and there leave us in the ſame ignorance, we were in at firſt. So, I fear, it would fall out with me here, if I, willing as I am to underſtand, what your Lordſhip means, by nature, ſhould go on to aſk, what you mean by eſſential properties? P. 159.

THE three or four next pages, I hope your Lordſhip does not think contain any ſerious anſwer, to what my friend ſaid, concerning Peter, James, and John; and as for the pleaſantry of your countryman, I ſhall not pretend to meddle with that, ſince your Lordſhip, who knows, better than any body, his way of chopping of logick, was fain to give it off, becauſe it was growing too rough. What work ſuch a dangerous chopper of logick would make, with an argument, that ſuppoſed the names, Peter, James, and John, to ſtand for men, and then without ſcruple affirmed, that the nature of men was in them, if he were let looſe upon it, who can tell? eſpecially, if he might have the liberty ſtrenuouſly to uſe the phraſe, "for his life," and to obſerve what a turn the chiming of words, without determined ideas annexed to them, give to the underſtanding, when they are gone deep into a man's head, and paſs there for things. P. 159-161. Lett. 2. P. 132-135.

To ſhew, that the common, or general, nature of man could not be in Peter, or James, I alleged, that whatever exiſted (as whatever was in Peter, or James, did) was particular, and that it confounded my underſtanding, to make a general, a particular. In anſwer, your Lordſhip tells me, that to make me underſtand this, you had told me, in your anſwer to my firſt letter, "that we "are to conſider beings, as God had ordered them in their ſeveral ſorts and "ranks," &c. And thereupon you aſk me, "why it was not anſwered in the "proper place for it?" Anſw. I own, I am not always ſo fortunate, as to ſay things in that, which your Lordſhip thinks the proper place; but having been rebuked P. 164. P. 165.

buked for repetitions, I thought your Lordſhip could not be ignorant, that, "I "had conſidered beings, as God had ordered them, in their ſeveral ſorts and Eſſay. B. iii. c. 3. § 13. "ranks," &c. ſince you could not but have read theſe words of mine: "I would "not here be thought to forget, much leſs to deny, that nature, in the produc-"tion of things, makes ſeveral of them alike. There is nothing more obvious, "eſpecially in the races of animals, and all things propagated by ſeed, &c." And I have expreſſed my ſenſe in this point, ſo fully, here, and in other places, particularly B. iii. c. 6. that I dare leave it to my reader, without any farther explication.

P. 165. Your Lordſhip farther aſks, "Is not that a real nature, which is the ſubject of "real properties? And is not the nature really in thoſe, who have the eſſential "properties?" I anſwer to both theſe queſtions, Yes; ſuch as is the reality of the ſubject, ſuch is the reality of its properties: the abſtract, general idea is really in the mind of him, that has it, and the properties, that it has, are really and inſeparably annexed to it; let this reality be whatever your Lordſhip pleaſes: But this will never prove, that this general nature exiſts in Peter, or James. Thoſe properties, with ſubmiſſion, do not, as your Lordſhip ſuppoſes, exiſt in Peter and James: thoſe qualities, indeed, may exiſt in them, which your Lordſhip calls properties; but they are not properties, in either of them, but are properties only, of that ſpecific, abſtract nature, which Peter and James, for their ſuppoſed conformity to it, are ranked under. For example, rationality, as much a property as it is, of a man, is no property of Peter. He was rational, a good part of his life, could write and read, and was a ſharp fellow at a bargain; but about thirty, a knock ſo altered him, that for theſe twenty years paſt he has been able to do none of theſe things; there is, to this day, not ſo much appearance of reaſon in him, as in his horſe, or monkey, and yet he is Peter ſtill.

P. 165. Your Lordſhip aſks, "is not that a real nature, that is the ſubject of real "properties? And is not that nature really in thoſe, who have the ſame eſſen-"tial properties?" Give me leave, I beſeech you, to aſk, are not thoſe diſtinct, real natures, that are the ſubjects of diſtinct, eſſential properties? For example, the nature of an animal is the ſubject of eſſential properties of an animal, with the excluſion of thoſe of a man, or a horſe; or elſe the nature of an animal, and the nature of a man, and the nature of a horſe would be the ſame: and ſo wherever the ſubject of the eſſential properties of an animal is, there alſo would be the ſubject of the eſſential properties of a man, and of a horſe; and ſo, in effect, whatever is an animal, would be a man; the real nature of an animal, and the real nature of a man, being the ſame. To avoid this, there is no other way (if this reality, your Lordſhip builds ſo much on, be any thing, beyond the reality of two abſtract diſtinct ideas, in the mind) but that there be one real nature of an animal, the ſubject of the eſſential properties of an animal, and another real nature of a man, the ſubject of the eſſential properties of a man: both which real natures muſt be in Peter, to make him a man. So that every individual man, or beaſt, muſt, according to this account, have two real natures in him, to make him what he is; nay, if this be ſo, two will not ſerve the turn. Bucephalus muſt have the real natures of ens, or beings, and the real nature of body, and the real nature of vivens, and the real nature of animal, and the real nature of a horſe, i. e. five diſtinct real natures in him, to make him Bucephalus: for theſe are all really diſtinct, common natures, whereof one is not the ſubject of preciſely the ſame eſſential properties as the other. This, tho' very hard to my underſtanding, muſt be really ſo, if every diſtinct, common, or general nature, be a real being, that really exiſts any where, but in the underſtanding: "common nature, P. 164. "taken in my way of ideas, your Lordſhip truly ſays, will not make me under-"ſtand ſuch a common nature, as you ſpeak of, which ſubſiſts in ſeveral indivi-"duals, becauſe I can have no ideas of real ſubſtances, but ſuch as are particu-"lar; all others are only abſtract ideas, and made only by the act of the mind." But what your Lordſhip farther promiſes there, I find, to my ſorrow, does not hold, viz. that in your Lordſhip's way (as far as you have diſcovered it) which you call the way of reaſon, "I may come to a better underſtanding of this mat-P. 166. "ter."

YOUR Lordſhip, in the next paragraph, declares yourſelf really aſhamed to be put to explain theſe things, that, which you had ſaid, being ſo very plain and eaſy: and yet I am not aſhamed to own, "that, for my life," I cannot underſtand them, as they are now farther explained. Your Lordſhip thinks it proved, that every common nature, is a real being: let it be ſo, that it is the ſubject of real properties, and that thereby it is demonſtrated to be a real being, this makes it harder for me, to conceive, that this common nature of a man, which is a real being, and but one, ſhould yet be really in Peter, in James, and in John. Had Amphitruo been able to conceive this, he had not been ſo much puzzled, or thought Soſia to talk idly, when he told him, "domi ego ſum, inquam, & " apud te adſum, Soſia idem." For the common nature of man, is a real being, as your Lordſhip ſays, and Soſia is no more: and he that can conceive any one, and the ſame real being to be in divers places at once, can have no difficulty to conceive it of another real being. And ſo Soſia may at the ſame time be at home, and with his maſter abroad: and Amphitruo might have been aſhamed to demand the explication of ſo plain a matter; or at leaſt, if he had ſtuck a little at here, and there, too, ought he not to have been ſatisfied, as ſoon as Soſia had told him, I am another diſtinct, I, here, from the ſame I, that I was there? Which, no doubt, Soſia could have made out: let your Lordſhip's countryman chop logick with him, and try whether he cannot. Countryman. But how is it poſſible, Socia, that thou, the real ſame, as thou ſayeſt, ſhouldſt be at home and here too? Soſia. Very eaſily, becauſe I am really the ſame, and yet diſtinct. Countryman. How can this be? Soſia. By a trick that I have. Countryman. Canſt thou teach me the trick? Soſia. Yes; 'tis but for thee to get a particular ſubſiſtence, proper to thy real ſelf, at home, and another particular ſubſiſtence, proper to thy ſame real ſelf abroad, and the buſineſs is done: thou wilt, then, eaſily be the ſame real thing, and diſtinct from thyſelf; and thou mayeſt be, in as many places together, as thou canſt get particular ſubſiſtences, and be ſtill the ſame, one, real being. Countrym. But what is that particular ſubſiſtence? Soſia. Hold ye, hold ye, friend, that's the ſecret! I thought once it was particular exiſtence, but that I find is an ineffectual drug, and will not do: every one ſees it will not make the ſame real being, diſtinct from itſelf; nor bring it into two different places at once, and therefore it is laid aſide, and ſubſiſtence is taken to do the feat. Countrym. Exiſtence, my boy's ſchoolmaſter made me underſtand, the other day, when my grey mare foled. For he told me that a horſe, that never was before, began then to exiſt; and when the poor fole died, he told me the ſame horſe ceaſed to exiſt. Soſia. But did he tell thee, what became of the real, common nature of an horſe, that was in it, when the fole died? Countrym. No: but this I know, that my real horſe, was really deſtroyed. Soſia. There's now thy ignorance! So much of thy horſe, as had a real exiſtence, was really deſtroyed, that's true: but there was ſomething in thy horſe, which having a real, particular ſubſiſtence, was not deſtroyed; nay, and the beſt part of thy horſe too: for it was that, which had in it all thoſe properties, that made thy horſe better than a broomſtick. Countrym. Thou tell's me wonders of this ſame, ſubſiſtence; what, I pray thee, is it? Soſia. I beg your pardon for that; it is the very philoſopher's ſtone; thoſe who are adepti, and can do ſtrange things with it, are wiſer than to tell what it is. Countrym. Where may it be bought, then? Soſia, that I know not: but I will tell thee, where thou mayeſt meet with it. Countrym. Where? Soſia. In ſome of the ſhady thickets of the ſchoolmen; and 'tis worth the looking after. For if particular ſubſiſtence has ſuch a power, over a real being, as to make one and the ſame real being, to be diſtinct, and in divers places, at once, it may perhaps be able to give thee an account, what becomes of that real nature of thy horſe, after thy horſe is dead; and if thou canſt but find, whither that retires, who knows but thou mayſt get as uſeful thing, as thy horſe, again? ſince to that real nature of thy horſe, inſeparably adheres the ſhape, and motion, and other properties of thy horſe.

I HOPE, my Lord, your countryman will not be diſpleaſed to have met with Soſia to chop logick with, who, I think, has made it as intelligible, how his real ſelf might be the ſame, and diſtinct, and be really, in diſtinct places, at once, by the help of a particular ſubſiſtence, proper to him, in each place; as it is intelligible, how any real being, under the name of a common nature, or under any other name, beſtowed upon it, may be the ſame and diſtinct, and really be in divers places, at once, by the help of a particular ſubſiſtence, proper to each of thoſe diſtinct ſames. At leaſt, if I may anſwer for myſelf, I underſtand one as well as the other: and if my head be turned from common ſenſe (as I find your P. 169. Lordſhip very apt to think) ſo that it is great news to you, that I underſtand any thing; if in my way of ideas, I cannot underſtand words, that appear to me, either to ſtand for no ideas, or to be ſo joined, that they put inconſiſtent ideas together; I think your Lordſhip uſes me right to turn me off for deſperate, and P. 169. "leave me, as you do, to the reader's underſtanding."

To your Lordſhip's many queſtions, concerning men and drills, in the paragraph, where you begin to explain, what my friend and I found difficult, in your P. 169, 170. diſcourſe, concerning perſon; I anſwer, that theſe two names, man and drill, are perfectly arbitrary, whether founded on real, diſtinct properties, or no; ſo perfectly arbitrary, that, if men had pleaſed, drill might have ſtood for what man now does, and vice verſa. I anſwer, further, that theſe two names ſtand for two abſtract ideas, which are (to thoſe, who know what they mean, by theſe two names) the diſtinct eſſences of two diſtinct kinds; and as particular exiſtences, or things exiſting, are found by men (who know what they mean, by theſe names) to agree to either of thoſe ideas, which theſe names ſtand for; theſe names reſpectively are applied to thoſe particular things, and the thing, ſaid to be of that kind. This I have ſo fully and at large explained, in my Eſſay, that I ſhould have thought it needleſs to have ſaid any thing again of it here, had it not been to ſhew my readineſs to anſwer any queſtions, you ſhall be pleaſed to aſk, concerning any thing I have writ, which your Lordſhip either finds difficult, or has forgot.

Vind. p. 259. In the next place, your Lordſhip comes to clear what you had ſaid, in anſwer to this queſtion, put by yourſelf, "what is this diſtinction of Peter, James, Ibid. "and John founded upon?" To which you anſwered, "that they may be diſ-"tinguiſhed from each other, by our ſenſes, as to difference of features, diſtance "of place, &c. But that is not all; for ſuppoſing there was no external difference, "yet there is a difference between them, as ſeveral individuals, in the ſame "common nature." Theſe words, when my friend and I came to conſider, we P. 171. owned, as your Lordſhip here takes notice, that we could underſtand, no more by them, but this; "the ground of diſtinction, between ſeveral individuals, "in the ſame common nature, is, that they are ſeveral individuals in the ſame Ibid. "common nature." Hereupon your Lordſhip tells me, "the queſtion now is "what this diſtinction is founded upon? whether on our obſerving the difference "of features, diſtance of place, &c. or on ſome antecedent ground?"

Pursuant hereunto, as if this were the queſtion, you in the next paragraph, (as far as I can underſtand it) make the ground of the diſtinction between theſe Ibid. individuals, or the principium individuationis, to be the union of the ſoul and body. But with ſubmiſſion, my Lord, the queſtion is, whether I and my friend were to blame: becauſe, when your Lordſhip, in the words above-cited, having removed all other grounds of diſtinction, ſaid, "there was yet a difference, be-"tween Peter and James, as ſeveral individuals in the ſame common nature;" we could underſtand no more by it, but this, "that the ground of diſtinction "between ſeveral individuals in the ſame common nature, is, that they are ſe-"veral individuals in the ſame common nature."

Let the ground, that your Lordſhip now aſſigns of the diſtinction of individuals, be what it will, or let what you ſay be as clear, as you pleaſe, viz. That the ground of their diſtinction is in the union of ſoul and body; it will, I humbly conceive, be nevertheleſs true, that what you ſaid before, might amount to no more but this, "that the ground of the diſtinction between ſeveral individuals "in the ſame common nature, is, that they are ſeveral individuals in the "ſame common nature;" and therefore, we might not be to blame for ſo underſtanding it. For the words, which our underſtandings were, then, employed

P. 171-173. about, were thoſe, which you had there ſaid, and not thoſe, which you would ſay five months after: tho' I muſt own, that thoſe, which your Lordſhip here ſays, concerning the diſtinction of individuals, leave it as much in the dark to me, as what you ſaid before. But, perhaps, I do not underſtand your Lordſhip's words right; becauſe I conceive that the principium individuationis is the ſame, in all the ſeveral ſpecies of creatures, men as well as others; and therefore, if the union of ſoul and body be that, which diſtinguiſhes two individuals, in the human ſpecies, one from another, I know not how two cherries, or two atoms of matter, can be diſtinct individuals; ſince, I think, there is, in them, no union of a ſoul and body. And, upon this ground, it will be very hard to tell, what made the ſoul and the body individuals (as certainly they were) before their union.

But I ſhall leave what your Lordſhip ſays, concerning this matter, to the examination of thoſe, whoſe health and leiſure allows them more time, than I have, for this weighty queſtion, wherein the diſtinction of two men, or two cherries, conſiſts: for I fear, I ſhould make your Lordſhip's countryman a little wonder again, to find a grave philoſopher make a ſerious queſtion of it.

P. 173, 174. To your next paragraph, I anſwer, that if the true idea of perſon, or the true ſignification of the word, perſon, lies in this, that ſuppoſing there was no other difference, in the ſeveral individuals, of the ſame kind; yet there is a difference between them as ſeveral individuals in the ſame common nature; it will follow from hence, that the name, perſon, will agree to Bucephalus and Podargus, as well as to Alexander and Hector. But whether this conſequence will agree, with what your Lordſhip ſays, concerning perſon, in another place, I am not concerned; I am only anſwerable for this conſequence.

P. 173. Your Lordſhip is pleaſed here to call my endeavour to find out the meaning of your words, as you had put them together, "trifling exceptions." To which I muſt ſay, that I am heartily ſorry, that either my underſtanding, or your Lordſhip's way of writing, obliges me ſo often to ſuch trifling. I cannot, as I have ſaid, anſwer to what I do not underſtand: and I hope, here, my trifling, in ſearching out your Lordſhip's meaning, was not much out of the way, becauſe, I think, every one will ſee, by the ſteps I took, that the ſenſe I found out by it, was that which your words implied; and your Lordſhip does not diſown it, but only replies, that I ſhould not have drawn that, which was the natural conſequence from it, becauſe that conſequence would not well conſiſt with what you had ſaid, in another place.

P. 174, 175. What your Lordſhip adds farther, to clear your ſaying, "that an individual, "intelligent ſubſtance is rather ſuppoſed to the making of a perſon, than the "proper definition of it;" tho', in your definition of perſon, you put a compleat, intelligent ſubſtance; muſt have its effect upon others underſtandings: I muſt ſuffer under the ſhort-ſightedneſs of my own, who neither underſtood it, as it ſtood in your firſt anſwer, nor do I now, as it is explained in your ſecond.

P. 176. Your Lordſhip being here, as you ſay, come to the end of this debate, I ſhould here have ended too; and it was time, my letter being grown already to too great a bulk: but I being engaged, by promiſe, to anſwer ſome things, in your firſt letter, which, in my reply to it, I had omitted, I now come to them, and ſhall endeavour to give your Lordſhip ſatisfaction in thoſe points; tho' to make room for them, I leave out a great deal that I had writ, in anſwer to this your Lordſhip's ſecond letter. And if, after all, my anſwer ſeems too long, I muſt beg your Lordſhip, and my reader to excuſe it, and impute it to thoſe occaſions of length, which I have mentioned in more places than one, as they have occurred.

The original and main queſtion, between your Lordſhip and me, being, "whether there were any thing in my Eſſay repugnant to the doctrine of the "Trinity?" I endeavoured, by examining the grounds and manner of your Lordſhip's drawing my book into that controverſy, to bring that queſtion to a deciſion. And, therefore, in my anſwer to your Lordſhip's firſt letter, I inſiſted particularly, on what had a relation to that point. This method your Lordſhip, in your ſecond letter, cenſured, as if it contained only perſonal matters, which were fit to be laid aſide. And by mixing new matter, and charging my book with new accuſations, before the firſt was made out, avoided the deciſion of what was in debate, between us; a ſtrong preſumption to me, that your Lordſhip had little to ſay, to ſupport what began the controverſy, which you were ſo willing to have me let fall; whilſt, on the other ſide, my ſilence to other points, which I had promiſed an anſwer to, was often reflected on, and I rebuked for not anſwering in the proper place.

Your Lordſhip's calling upon me on this occaſion, ſhall not be loſt; it is fit your expectation ſhould be ſatisfied, and your objections conſidered; which, for the reaſons above-mentioned, were not examined in my former anſwer: and which, whether true, or falſe, as I humbly conceive, make nothing for, or againſt, the doctrine of the Trinity. I ſhall, therefore, conſider them barely, as ſo many philoſophical queſtions, and endeavour to ſhew your Lordſhip where, and upon what grounds it is I ſtick; and what it is, that hinders me from the ſatisfaction, it would be to me, to be in every one of them of your mind.

Anſw. 1. p. 7. Your Lordſhip tells me, “whether I do own ſubſtance, or not, is not the point before us; but whether, by virtue of theſe principles, I can come to any certainty of reaſon about it. And your Lordſhip ſays, the very places, I produce, do prove the contrary; which you ſhall, therefore, ſet down, in my own words, both as to corporeal and ſpiritual ſubſtances.”

Here again, my Lord, I muſt beg your pardon, that I do not diſtinctly comprehend your meaning in theſe words, viz. “that, by virtue of theſe principles, one cannot come to certainty of reaſon, about ſubſtance:” for it is not very clear to me, whether your Lordſhip means, that we cannot come to certainty, that there is ſuch a thing in the world, as ſubſtance; or, whether we cannot make any other propoſition, about ſubſtance, of which we can be certain; or whether we cannot, by my principles, eſtabliſh any idea of ſubſtance, of which we can be certain. For to come to certainty of reaſon, about ſubſtance, may ſignify either of theſe, which are far different propoſitions: and I ſhall waſte your Lordſhip's time, my reader's, and my own (neither of which would I willingly do) by taking it in one ſenſe, when you mean it in another, leſt I ſhould meet with ſome ſuch reproof as this; that “I miſrepreſent your meaning, or might have underſtood it, if I had a mind to it,” &c. And, therefore, cannot but wiſh, that you had ſo far condeſcended to the ſlowneſs of my apprehenſion, as to have given me your ſenſe ſo determined, that I might not trouble you with anſwers, to what was not your preciſe meaning.

To avoid it, in the preſent caſe, and to find in what ſenſe, I was here to take theſe words, “come to no certainty of reaſon, about ſubſtance,” I looked into what followed, and when I came to the 13th page, I thought I had there got a clear explication of your Lordſhip's meaning; and that by no certainty of Anſw. 1. p. 13. reaſon about ſubſtance, your Lordſhip here meant no certain idea of ſubſtance. Your Lordſhip's words are, “I do not charge them” (i. e. me, as one of the gentlemen of the new way of reaſoning) “with diſcarding the notion of ſubſtance, becauſe they have but an imperfect idea of it; but becauſe, upon thoſe principles, there can be no certain idea, at all, of it.” Here I thought myſelf ſure, and that theſe words plainly interpreted the meaning of your propoſition, p. 7. to be, “that, upon my principles, there can be no certain idea, at all, of Anſw. 1. p. 13. ſubſtance.” But, before I came to the end of that paragraph, I found myſelf at a loſs again; for that paragraph goes on, in theſe words: “whereas your Lordſhip aſſerts it to be one of the moſt natural and certain ideas in our minds, becauſe it is a repugnance to our firſt conception of things, that modes, or accidents, ſhould ſubſiſt by themſelves; and, therefore, you ſaid, the rational idea of ſubſtance is one of the firſt ideas, in our minds: and however imperfect and obſcure our notion be, yet we are as certain that ſubſtances are, and muſt be, as that there are any beings in the world.” Here the certainty, which your words ſeem to mean, is “certainty of the being of ſubſtance.”

Anſw. 1. p. 7, 8. In this ſenſe, therefore, I ſhall take it, till your Lordſhip ſhall determine it otherwiſe: and the reaſon, why I take it ſo, is, becauſe what your Lordſhip goes on to ſay, ſeems to me to look moſt that way. The propoſition, then, that your Lordſhip undertakes to prove, is this; “that, by virtue of my principles, we cannot come to any certainty of reaſon, that there is any ſuch “ thing as ſubſtance:” and your Lordſhip tells me, “ that the very places I produce do prove the contrary; which you, therefore, will ſet down, in my own words, both as to corporeal and ſpiritual ſubſtances.” Anſw. 1. p. 7.

The firſt your Lordſhip brings, are theſe words of mine: “When we talk, or think, of any particular ſort of corporeal ſubſtances, as horſe, ſtone, &c. Anſw. 1. p. 6. “ tho’ the idea we have of either of them be but the complication, or collection, “ of thoſe ſeveral, ſimple ideas of ſenſible qualities, which we uſe to find united “ in the thing, called horſe or ſtone; yet, becauſe we cannot conceive how they “ ſhould ſubſiſt alone, nor one in another, we ſuppoſe them exiſting in, and “ ſupported by ſome common ſubject; which ſupport we denote by the name, “ ſubſtance; tho’ it be certain, we have no clear and diſtinct idea of that thing, “ we ſuppoſe a ſupport.” And again,

“ The ſame happens concerning the operations of the mind, viz. thinking, “ reaſoning, fearing, &c. which we conſidering, not to ſubſiſt of themſelves, “ nor apprehending, how they can belong to body, or be produced by it, we “ are apt to think theſe the actions of ſome other ſubſtance, which we call “ ſpirit; whereby yet it is evident, that having no other idea, or notion, of “ matter, but ſomething, wherein thoſe many ſenſible qualities, which affect “ our ſenſes, do ſubſiſt; by ſuppoſing a ſubſtance, wherein thinking, knowing, “ doubting, and a power of moving, &c. do ſubſiſt; we have as clear a notion “ of the nature, or ſubſtance, of ſpirit, as we have of body; the one being “ ſuppoſed to be (without knowing what it is) the ſubſtratum to thoſe ſimple “ ideas, we have from without; and the other ſuppoſed (with a like ignorance “ of what is) to be the ſubſtratum to thoſe operations, which we experiment “ in ourſelves.”

But how theſe words prove, “ that upon my principles, we cannot come “ to any certainty of reaſon, that there is any ſuch thing, as ſubſtance, in the “ world;” I confeſs I do not ſee, nor has your Lordſhip, as I humbly conceive, ſhewn. And I think it would be a hard matter, from theſe words of mine, to make a ſyllogiſm, whoſe concluſion ſhould be, ergo, “ from my principles we “ cannot come to any certainty of reaſon, that there is any ſubſtance in the world.”

Your Lordſhip, indeed, tells me, that I ſay, “ that theſe and the like faſhions “ of ſpeaking, that ſubſtance is always ſuppoſed ſomething;” Anſw. 1. p. 9. and grant that I ſay over and over, that ſubſtance is ſuppoſed: but that, your Lordſhip ſays, is not what you looked for, but ſomething in the way of certainty, by reaſon.

What your Lordſhip looks for, is not, I find, always eaſy for me to gueſs. But what I brought that, and ſome other paſſages, to the ſame purpoſe, for, out of my Eſſay, that, I think, they prove, viz. that “ I did not diſcard, nor “ almoſt diſcard ſubſtance out of the reaſonable part of the world:” for he, that ſuppoſes, in every ſpecies of material beings, ſubſtance, to be always ſomething, doth not diſcard, or almoſt diſcard, it out of the world, or deny any ſuch thing to be. The paſſages alleged, I think, prove this; which was all I brought them for. And, if they ſhould happen to prove no more, I think, you can hardly infer from thence, “ that, therefore, upon my principles, we can come to no “ certainty, that there is any ſuch thing, as ſubſtance, in the world.”

Your Lordſhip goes on to inſiſt mightily, upon my ſuppoſing; Anſw. 1. p. 9. and to theſe words of mine, “ we cannot conceive, how theſe ſenſible qualities ſhould ſubſiſt alone; and, therefore, we ſuppoſe a ſubſtance to ſupport them,” your Lordſhip replies, “ it is but ſuppoſing ſtill; becauſe we cannot conceive it other- “ wiſe: but what certainty follows from not being barely able to conceive?” Anſw. The ſame certainty that follows from repugnancy, to our firſt conceptions of things, upon which your Lordſhip grounds the relative idea of ſubſtance. Your words are, “ it is a mere effect of reaſon, because it is a repugnancy to “ our firſt conceptions of things, that modes, or accidents, ſhould ſubſiſt by “ themſelves.” Anſw. 1. p. 25. Your Lordſhip then, if I underſtand your reaſoning here, concludes, that there is ſubſtance, “ becauſe it is a repugnancy to our conceptions

“ of things” (for whether that repugnancy be to our firſt, or ſecond conceptions, I think that is all one) “ that modes, or accidents, ſhould ſubſiſt by themſelves;” and I conclude the ſame thing, becauſe we cannot conceive how ſenſible qualities ſhould ſubſiſt by themſelves. Now what the difference of certainty is, from a repugnancy to our conceptions, and from our not being able to conceive; I confeſs, my Lord, I am not acute enough to diſcern. And, therefore, it ſeems to me, that I have laid down the ſame certainty of the being of ſubſtance, that your Lordſhip has done.

Anſw. 1. p. 9. Your Lordſhip adds, “ are there not multitudes of things, which we are not able to conceive? and yet it would not be allowed us to ſuppoſe, what we think fit, upon that account.” Anſw. Your Lordſhip's is certainly a very juſt rule; it is pity it does not reach the caſe. “ But, becauſe it is not allowed us to ſuppoſe, what we think fit, in things, which we are not able to conceive;” it does not, therefore, follow, that we may not with certainty ſuppoſe, or infer, that which is a natural or undeniable conſequence of ſuch an inability to conceive, as I call it, or repugnancy to our conceptions, as you call it. We cannot conceive the foundation of Harlem church to ſtand upon nothing; but, becauſe it is not allowed us to ſuppoſe what we think fit, viz. that it is laid upon a rock of diamond, or ſupported by faries, yet I think all the world will allow the infallible certainty of this ſuppoſition from thence, that it reſts upon ſomething. This I take to be the preſent caſe; and, therefore, your next words, I think, do leſs concern Mr. L. than my Lord B. of W. I ſhall ſet them down, that the reader may apply them, to which of the two he thinks they moſt belong. Anſw. 1. p. 9. They are, “ I could hardly conceive that Mr. L. would have brought ſuch evidence as this againſt himſelf; but I muſt ſuppoſe ſome unknown ſubſtratum, in this caſe.” For theſe words, that your Lordſhip has laſt quoted of mine, do not only not prove, “ that, upon my principles we cannot come to any certainty, that there is any ſuch thing, as ſubſtance, in the world;” but prove the contrary, that there muſt certainly be ſubſtance in the world; and, upon the very ſame grounds, that your Lordſhip takes it to be certain.

Anſw. 1. p. 10. Your next paragraph, which is to the ſame purpoſe, I have read, more than once, and can never forbear, as often as I read it, to wiſh myſelf young again; or that a livelineſs of fancy, ſuitable to that age, would teach me to ſport with words, for the diverſion of my readers. This I find your Lordſhip thinks ſo neceſſary, to the quickning of controverſy, that you will not truſt the debate to the greatneſs of your learning, nor the gravity of your ſubject, without it, whatever authority the dignity of your character might give, to what your Lordſhip Ibid. ſays: for you, having quoted theſe words of mine; “ as long as there is any ſimple idea, or ſenſible quality left, according to my way of arguing, ſubſtance cannot be diſcarded; becauſe all ſimple ideas, all ſenſible qualities, carry with them the ſuppoſition of a ſubſtratum, to exiſt in, and a ſubſtance, wherein they inhere;” you add, “ what is the meaning of carrying with them a ſuppoſition of a ſubſtratum, and a ſubſtance? Have theſe ſimple ideas the notion of a ſubſtance in them? No, but they carry it with them: How ſo? Do ſenſible qualities carry a corporeal ſubſtance along with them? Then a corporeal ſubſtance muſt be intromitted by the ſenſes, together with them: no, but they carry the ſuppoſition with them; and, truly, that is burden enough for them. But which way do they carry it? It ſeems, it is only, becauſe we cannot conceive it otherwiſe: What is this conceiving! It may be ſaid, it is an act of the mind, not built on ſimple ideas, but lies in the comparing the ideas of accident and ſubſtance together; and, from thence, finding that an accident muſt carry ſubſtance along with it: but this will not clear it; for the ideas of accidents are ſimple ideas, and carry nothing along with them, but the impreſſion made by ſenſible objects.”

In this paſſage, I conclude, your Lordſhip had ſome regard to the entertainment of that part of your readers, who would be thought men, as well by being riſible, as rational creatures. For I cannot imagine, you meant this for an argument; if you did, I have this plain ſimple anſwer, that, “ by carrying with them a ſuppoſition,” I mean according to the ordinary import of the phraſe, that ſenſible qualities imply a ſubſtratum, to exiſt in. And, if your Lordſhip pleaſe to change one of theſe equivalent expreſſions, into the other, all the argument here, I think, will be at an end: what will become of the ſport and ſmiling, I will not anſwer.

Hitherto, I do not ſee any thing, in my words, brought by your Lordſhip, that proves, "that, upon my principles, we can come to no certainty of reaſon, "that there is ſubſtance in the world;" but the contrary.

Anſwer 1. p. 11, 12.
B. ii. c. 13. § 19.
Anſwer 1. p. 11.

Your Lordſhip's next words are to tell the world, that my ſimile, about the elephant and tortoiſe, "is to ridicule the notion of ſubſtance, and the European "philoſophers for aſſerting it." But, if your Lordſhip pleaſe to turn again to my Eſſay, you will find thoſe paſſages were not intended to ridicule the notion of ſubſtance, or thoſe who aſſerted it, whatever that, it, ſignifies: but to ſhew, that tho' ſubſtance did ſupport accidents, yet philoſophers, who had found ſuch a ſupport neceſſary, had no more a clear idea, of what that ſupport was, than the Indian had, of that, which ſupported his tortoiſe, tho' ſure he was, it was ſomething. Had your pen, which quoted ſo much of the nineteenth ſection of the thirteenth chapter of my ſecond book, but ſet down the remaining line and a half of that paragraph, you would, by theſe words, which follow there, "ſo "that, of ſubſtance, we have no idea, of what it is, but only a confuſed and "obſcure one of what it does;" have put it paſt doubt, what I meant. But your Lordſhip was pleaſed to take only thoſe, which you thought would ſerve beſt to your purpoſe; and I crave leave to add, now, theſe remaining ones, to ſhew my reader what was mine.

B. ii. c. 23. § 2.

'Tis to the ſame purpoſe, I uſe the ſame illuſtration again, in that other place, which you are pleaſed to cite likewiſe; which your Lordſhip ſays, you did, "only to ſhew that it was a deliberate, and (as I thought) lucky ſimilitude." It was upon ſerious conſideration, I own, that I entertained the opinion, that we had no clear and diſtinct idea of ſubſtance. But, as to that ſimilitude, I do not remember that it was much deliberated on; ſuch inaccurate writers as I am, who aim at nothing but plainneſs, do not much ſtudy ſimilies: and, for the fault of repetition, you have been pleaſed to pardon it. But, ſuppoſing you had proved, that that ſimile was to ridicule the notion of ſubſtance, publiſhed in the writings of ſome European philoſophers; it will, by no means, follow from thence, "that, upon my principles, we cannot come to any certainty of reaſon, that there "is any ſuch thing, as ſubſtance in the world." Men's notions of a thing may be laughed at, by thoſe, whoſe principles eſtabliſhed the certainty of the thing itſelf; and one may laugh at Ariſtotle's notion of an orb of fire, under the ſphere of the moon, without principles, that will make him uncertain, whether there be any ſuch thing as fire. My ſimile did, perhaps, ſerve to ſhew, that there were philoſophers, whoſe knowledge, was not ſo clear, nor ſo great, as they pretended. If your Lordſhip thereupon thought, that the vanity of ſuch a pretenſion had ſomething ridiculous in it, I ſhall not conteſt your judgment in the caſe: for, as human nature is framed, 'tis not impoſſible that whoever is diſcovered to pretend to know more, than really he does, will be in danger to be laughed at.

Anſwer 1. p. 12.

In the next paragraph, your Lordſhip beſtows the epithet, of dull, on Burgerſdicius, and Sanderſon, and the tribe of logicians. I will not queſtion your right to call any body dull, whom you pleaſe: but if your Lordſhip does it, to inſinuate that I did ſo, I hope I may be allowed to ſay thus much, in my own defence, that I am neither ſo ſtupid, or ill-natured, to diſcredit thoſe, whom I quote, for being of the ſame opinion with me. And he that will look into the eleventh and twelfth pages of my reply, which your Lordſhip refers to, will find, that I am very far from calling them dull, or ſpeaking diminiſhingly of them. But if I had been ſo ill-bred, or fooliſh, as to have called them dull; I do not ſee how that does at all ſerve to prove this propoſition, "that upon my principles, "we cannot come to a certainty of reaſon, that there is any ſuch thing, as ſub-"ſtance;" any more than what follows, in the next paragraph.

Anſwer 1. p. 13.

Your Lordſhip in it aſks me, as if it were of ſome great importance, to the propoſition to be proved, "whether, there be no difference between the bare "being of a thing, and its ſubſiſtence by itſelf?" Anſw. Yes, there is a difference, as I underſtand thoſe terms: and then I beſeech your Lordſhip to make uſe of it, to prove the propoſition before us. But becauſe you ſeem, by this queſtion, to conclude, " that the idea of a thing, that ſubſiſts by itſelf, is a clear " and diſtinct idea of ſubſtance," I beg leave to aſk, is the idea of the manner of ſubſiſtence of a thing, the idea of the thing itſelf? If it be not, we may have a clear and diſtinct idea of the manner, and yet have none but a very obſcure and confuſed one of the thing. For example, I tell your Lordſhip, that I know a thing, that cannot ſubſiſt without a ſupport, and I know another thing that does ſubſiſt without a ſupport, and ſay no more of them; can you, by having the clear and diſtinct ideas of having a ſupport, and not having a ſupport, ſay, that you have a clear and diſtinct idea of the thing, that I know, which has, and of the thing, that I know, which has not, a ſupport? If your Lordſhip can, I beſeech you to give me the clear and diſtinct ideas of theſe, which I only call, by the general name, things, that have or have not ſupports; for ſuch there are, and ſuch I ſhall give your Lordſhip clear and diſtinct ideas of, when you ſhall pleaſe to call upon me, for them: tho', I think, your Lordſhip will ſcarce find them, by the general and confuſed idea, of things, nor in the clearer and more diſtinct idea, of having, or not having, a ſupport.

To ſhow a blind man, that he has no clear and diſtinct idea of ſcarlet, I tell him, that his notion of it, that it is a thing, or being, does not prove, he has any clear, or diſtinct idea of it; but barely, that he takes it to be ſomething, he knows not what. He replies, that he knows more than that; v. g. he knows that it ſubſiſts, or inheres, in another thing: " and is there no difference, ſays " he, in your Lordſhip's words, between the bare being of a thing, and its ſub- " ſiſtence in another?" Yes, ſay I to him, a great deal; but they are very different ideas. But for all that, you have no clear and diſtinct idea of ſcarlet, not ſuch a one as I have, who ſee and know it, and have another kind of idea of it, beſides that of inherence.

Your Lordſhip has the idea of ſubſiſting by itſelf, and, therefore, you conclude, you have a clear and diſtinct idea of the thing, that ſubſiſts by itſelf; which, methinks, is all one, as if your countryman ſhould ſay, he hath an idea of a cedar of Lebanon, that it is a tree of a nature to need no prop to lean on, for its ſupport, therefore he hath a clear and diſtinct idea of a cedar of Lebanon; which clear and diſtinct idea, when he comes to examine, is nothing, but a general one of a tree, with which his indetermined idea of a cedar is confounded. Juſt ſo, is the idea of ſubſtance, which, however called clear and diſtinct, is confounded with the general, indetermined idea of ſomething. But ſuppoſe, that the manner of ſubſiſting by itſelf, give us a clear and diſtinct idea of ſubſtance, how does that prove, " that, upon my principles, we can come to no certainty " of reaſon, that there is any ſuch thing, as ſubſtance in the world?" which is the propoſition to be proved.

Anſwer 1. p. 13. In what follows, your Lordſhip ſays, " you do not charge any one with diſ- " carding the notion of ſubſtance, becauſe he has but an imperfect idea of it; " but becauſe, upon thoſe principles, there can be no certain idea, at all, of it."

Your Lordſhip ſays here, thoſe principles, and in other places, theſe principles, without particularly ſetting them down, that I know. I am ſure, without laying down propoſitions, that are mine, and proving that, thoſe granted, " we can- " not come to any certainty, that there is any ſuch thing, as ſubſtance," which is the thing to be proved; your Lordſhip proves nothing, in the caſe, againſt me. What, therefore, the certain idea, which I do not underſtand, or idea of ſubſtance has to do here, is not eaſy to ſee. For that which I am charged with, is the diſcarding ſuſtance. But the diſcarding ſubſtance, is not the diſcarding the notion of ſubſtance. Mr. Newton has diſcarded Des Cartes's vortices, i. e. laid down principles, from which he proves, there is no ſuch thing; but he has not thereby diſcarded the notion, or ideas of thoſe vortices, for that he had, when he confuted their being, and every one, who now reads and underſtands him, will have. But as I have already obſerved, your Lordſhip here, I know not upon what ground, nor with what intention, confounds the ideas of ſubſtance, and ſubſtance itſelf:

Anſwer 1. p. 13. for, to the words above ſet down, your Lordſhip ſubjoins, " that you aſſert it to be

“ one of the moſt natural and certain ideas in our minds; becauſe it is a repugnance to our firſt conception of things, that modes, or accidents, ſhould ſubſiſt by themſelves; and, therefore, your Lordſhip ſaid, the rational idea of ſubſtance is one of the firſt ideas in our minds; and, however imperfect and obſcure our notion be, yet we are as certain that ſubſtances are, and muſt be, as that there are any beings in the world.” Herein I tell your Lordſhip, that I agree with you, and therefore, I hope this is no objection againſt the Trinity. “Your Lordſhip ſays, you never thought it was: but to lay all foundations of certainty, as to matters of faith, upon clear and diſtinct ideas, which was the opinion you oppoſed, does certainly overthrow all myſteries of faith, and excludes the notion of ſubſtance, out of rational diſcourſe, which your Lordſhip affirms to have been your meaning.”

How theſe words, as to matters of faith, came in, or what they had to do againſt me, in an anſwer only to me, I do not ſee; neither will I here examine what it is to be “one of the moſt natural and certain ideas in our minds.” But be it what it will, this I am ſure, that neither that, nor any thing elſe, contained in this paragraph, any way proves, that, “upon my principles, we cannot come to any certainty, that there is any ſuch thing, as ſubſtance, in the world;” which was the propoſition to be proved.

In the next place, then, I crave leave to conſider, how that is proved, which tho' nothing to the propoſition to be proved, is yet, what you here aſſert; viz. “that the idea of ſubſtance is one of the moſt natural and certain ideas in our minds?” Your proof of it is this, becauſe it is a repugnancy to our firſt conception of things, that modes and accidents ſhould ſubſiſt by themſelves, and therefore the rational idea of ſubſtance is one of the firſt ideas in our minds.”

From whence, I grant it to be a good conſequence, that to thoſe, who find this repugnance, the idea of a ſupport is very neceſſary; or, if you pleaſe to call it ſo, very rational: but a clear and diſtinct idea of the thing itſelf, which is the ſupport, will not thence be proved to be one of the firſt ideas in our minds; or, that any ſuch idea is ever there at all. He that is ſatisfied that Pendennis-caſtle, if it were not ſupported, would fall into the ſea, muſt think of a ſupport, that ſuſtains it: but whether the thing, that it reſts on, be timber, or brick, or ſtone, he has, by his bare idea of the neceſſity of ſome ſupport, that props it up, no clear and diſtinct idea at all.

In this paragraph you farther ſay, “that the laying all foundation of certainty, as to matters of faith, on clear and diſtinct ideas, does certainly exclude the notion of ſubſtance, out of rational diſcourſe. Anſw. This is a propoſition, that will need a proof; becauſe every body, at firſt ſight, will think it hard to be proved. For it is obvious, that let certainty, in matters of faith, or any matters whatſoever, be laid on what it will, it excludes not the notion of ſubſtance certainly out of rational diſcourſe; unleſs it be certainly true, that we can rationally diſcourſe of nothing, but what we certainly know. But whether it be a propoſition eaſy, or not eaſy, to be proved, this is certain, that it concerns not me; for I lay “not all foundation of certainty, as to matters of faith, upon clear and diſtinct ideas:” and therefore, if it does diſcard ſubſtance out of the reaſonable part of the world, as your Lordſhip phraſes it above, or excludes the notion of ſubſtance out of rational diſcourſe; whatever havock it makes of ſubſtance, or its idea, no jot of the miſchief is to be laid at my door, becauſe that is no principle of mine.

Your Lordſhip ends this paragraph with telling me, that “I, at length, apprehend your Lordſhip's meaning.” Anſw. 1. p. 14.

I wish heartily that I did, becauſe it would be much more for your eaſe, as well as my own. For in this caſe of ſubſtance, I find it not eaſy to know your meaning, or what it is, I am blamed for. For, in the beginning of this diſpute, Vind. p. 236. it is the being of ſubſtance, and here again, it is ſubſtance itſelf, is diſcarded: and, in this very paragraph, writ, as it ſeems, to explain yourſelf; ſo that, in the cloſe of it, you tell me, that “at length I apprehend your meaning to be, P. 7. “that the notion of ſubſtance is excluded out of rational diſcourſe;” the explication is ſuch, that it renders your Lordſhip's meaning to me, more obſcure and uncertain, than it was before; for, in the ſame paragraph, your Lordſhip ſays, that, P. 13, 14.

“ upon my principles, there can be no certain idea at all, of ſubſtance;” and alſo, that “ however imperfect and obſcure our notions be, yet we are as certain that “ ſubſtances are, and muſt be, as that there are any beings in the world.” So that ſuppoſing I did know (as I do not) what your Lordſhip means, by certain idea of ſubſtance; yet I muſt own ſtill, that what your meaning is, by diſcarding of ſubſtance, whether it be the idea of ſubſtance, or the being of ſubſtance, I do not know. But that I think, need not much trouble me, ſince your Lordſhip does not, that I ſee, ſhew how any poſition, or principle of mine overthrows, either ſubſtance itſelf, or the idea of it, or excludes either of them out of rational diſcourſe.

Anſwer 1. p. 14. In your next paragraph, you ſay, “ I declare, p. 35. that if any one aſſert, “ that we can have no ideas, but from ſenſation and reflection, it is not my opi- “ nion.” My Lord, I have looked over that 35th page, and find no ſuch words of mine, there, but refer my reader to that and the following pages, for my opinion, concerning ideas from ſenſation and reflection, how far they are the foundation and materials of all our knowledge. And this I do, becauſe, to thoſe words, which your Lordſhip has ſet down as mine, out of the 35th page, but Anſwer 1. p. 14. are not there, you ſubjoin, “ that you are very glad of it, and will do me all the “ right you can, in this matter;” which ſeems to imply, that it is a matter of Lett. 1. p. 35-38. great conſequence; and, therefore, I deſire my meaning may be taken, in my own words, as they are ſet down at large.

The promiſe, your Lordſhip makes me, “ of doing me all the right, you “ can,” I return my humble thanks for, becauſe it is a piece of juſtice, ſo ſeldom done in controverſy; and becauſe I ſuppoſe you have here made me this promiſe, to authorize me to mind you of it, if at any time your haſte ſhould make you miſtake my words, or meaning: to have one's words exactly quoted and their meaning interpreted, by the plain and viſible deſign of the author, in his whole diſcourſe, being a right, which every writer has a juſt claim to, and ſuch as a lover of truth will be very wary of violating. An inſtance of ſome ſort of intrenchment on this, I humbly conceive, there is in the next page but one, where you interpret my words, as if I excuſed a miſtake, I had made, by calling it a Anſwer 1. p. 16. ſlip of my pen; whereas, my Lord, I do not own any ſlip of my pen, in that place, but ſay, that the meaning of my expreſſion there, is to be interpreted by other places, and particularly by thoſe, where I treat profeſſedly of that ſubject: and that, in ſuch caſes, where an expreſſion is only incident to the matter in hand, and may ſeem not exactly to quadrate with the author's ſenſe, where he deſignedly treats of that ſubject, it ought rather to be interpreted, as a ſlip of his pen, than as his meaning. I ſhould not have taken ſo particular a notice of this, but that you, by having up theſe words with an air, that makes me ſenſible, how wary I ought to be, ſhew what uſe would be made of it, if ever I had pleaded the ſlip of my pen.

Anſw. 1. p. 15--29. Anſwer 1. p. 20. In the following pages, I find a diſcourſe drawn up, under ſeveral ranks of numbers, to prove, as I gueſs, this propoſition, “ that, in my way of ideas, we “ cannot come to any certainty, as to the nature of ſubſtance.” I ſhall be in a condition to anſwer to this accuſation, when I ſhall be told, what particular propoſition, as to the nature of ſubſtance, it is, which, in my way of ideas, we cannot come to any certainty of. Becauſe, probably, it may be ſuch a propoſition concerning the nature of ſubſtance, as I ſhall readily own, that, in my way of ideas, we can come to no certainty of; and yet, I think, the way of ideas not at all to be blamed, till there can be ſhewn another way, different from that of ideas, whereby we may come to a certainty of it. For it was never pretended, that, by ideas, we could come to certainty, concerning every propoſition, that could be made, concerning ſubſtance, or any thing elſe.

Besides the doubtfulneſs, viſible in the phraſe itſelf, there is another reaſon, that hinders me from underſtanding preciſely, what is meant by theſe words, to “ come to a certainty, as to the nature of ſubſtance,” viz. becauſe your Lordſhip makes nature, and ſubſtance, to be the ſame: ſo that to come to a certainty, as P. 100, 101. to the nature of ſubſtance, is, in your Lordſhip's ſenſe of nature, to come to a certainty, as to the ſubſtance of ſubſtance; which, I own, I do not clearly underſtand.

ANOTHER thing, that hinders me, from giving particular anſwers to the arguments, that may be ſuppoſed to be contained in ſo many pages, is, that I do not ſee how, what is diſcourſed, in thoſe thirteen or fourteen pages, is brought to prove this propoſition, "that in my way of ideas, we cannot come to any certainty, as to the nature of ſubſtance:" and it will require too many words to examine every one of thoſe heads, period by period, to ſee what they prove; when you yourſelf do not apply them, to the direct probation of any propoſition, that I underſtand.

INDEED, you wind up this diſcourſe with theſe words, "that you leave the reader to judge, whether this be a tolerable account of the idea of ſubſtance, by ſenſation and reflection." Anſw. That which your Lordſhip has given in the preceding pages, "I think is not a very tolerable account of my idea of ſubſtance;" ſince the account you give, over and over again, of my idea of ſubſtance is, that "it is nothing but a complex idea of accidents." This is your account of my idea of ſubſtance, which you inſiſt ſo much on, and which you ſay, you took out of thoſe places, I myſelf produced, in my firſt letter. But if you had been pleaſed to have ſet down this one, which is to be found there, amongſt the reſt produced by me, out of B. ii. c. 12. § 6. of my Eſſay, viz. "that the ideas of ſubſtances are ſuch combinations of ſimple ideas, as are taken to repreſent diſtinct, particular things, ſubſiſting by themſelves; in which, the ſuppoſed or confuſed idea of ſubſtance is always the firſt and chief;" this would have been a full anſwer to all, that I think, you have, under that variety of heads, objected againſt my idea of ſubſtance. But your Lordſhip, in your repreſentation of my idea of ſubſtance, thought fit to leave this paſſage out; tho' you are pleaſed to ſet down ſeveral others, produced both before and after it, in my firſt letter; which, I think, gives me a right humbly to return your Lordſhip your own words, "and now I freely leave the reader to judge, whether this, which your Lordſhip has given, be a tolerable account of my idea of ſubſtance."

Anſw. 1. p. 29.

Anſw. 1. p. 15, 16, 17, 20, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29.

Anſw. 1. p. 24.

Lett. 1. p. 10.

THE next point to be conſidered, is, concerning the immateriality of the ſoul; whereof there is a great deal ſaid. The original of this controverſy, I ſhall ſet down in your Lordſhip's own words. You ſay, "the only reaſon you had, to engage in this matter, was this bold aſſertion, that the ideas we have, by ſenſation, or reflection, are the ſole matter and foundation of all our reaſoning, and that our certainty lies in perceiving the agreement and diſagreement of ideas, as expreſſed in any propoſition; which laſt, you ſay, are my own words."

Anſw. 1. p. 47---79.

Anſw. 1. p. 67.

To overthrow this bold aſſertion, you urge my acknowledgment, "that, upon my principles, it cannot be demonſtratively proved, that the ſoul is immaterial, tho' it be in the higheſt degree probable:" and then aſk, "is not this the giving up the cauſe of certainty?" Anſw. Juſt as much the giving up the cauſe of certainty, on my ſide, as it is on your Lordſhip's; who, tho' you will not pleaſe to tell, wherein you place certainty, yet it is ſuppoſed you do place certainty, in ſomething or other. Now let it be what you will, that you place certainty in, I take the liberty to ſay, that you cannot certainly prove, i. e. demonſtrate, that the ſoul of man is immaterial. I am ſure, you have not ſo much as offered at any ſuch proof, and therefore you give up the cauſe of certainty, upon your principles: becauſe, if the not being able to demonſtrate that the ſoul is immaterial, upon his principles, who declares, wherein he thinks certainty conſiſts, be the giving up of the cauſe of certainty; the not being able to demonſtrate the immateriality of the ſoul, upon his principles, who does not tell, wherein certainty conſiſts, is no leſs a giving up of the cauſe of certainty. The only odds between theſe two, is more art and reſerve in the one, than the other. And, therefore, my Lord, you muſt either, upon your principles of certainty, demonſtrate that the ſoul is immaterial, or you muſt allow me to ſay, that you too give up the cauſe of certainty, and your principles tend to ſcepticiſm, as much as mine. Which of theſe two your Lordſhip ſhall pleaſe to do, will be to me advantageous; for, by the one, I ſhall get a demonſtration of the ſoul's immateriality, (of which I ſhall be very glad) and that upon principles, which, reaching farther than mine, I ſhall embrace, as better than mine, and become your Lordſhip's

Anſw. 1. p. 68.

Lett. 1. p. 67.

Ibid.

Lordſhip's profeſſed convert. Till then I ſhall reſt ſatisfied that my principles, be they as weak and fallible, as your Lordſhip pleaſes, are no more guilty of any ſuch tendency, than theirs, who, talking more of certainty, cannot attain to it, in caſes, where they condemn the way of ideas, for coming ſhort of it.

Anſw. 1. p. 68.

Lett. 1. p. 81.

You a little lower, in the ſame page, ſet down theſe as my words, "that I "never offered it as a way of certainty, where we cannot reach certainty." I have already told you, that I have been ſometimes in doubt, what copy you had got of my Eſſay; becauſe I often found your quotations out of it, did not agree with what I read in mine: but, by this inſtance here, and ſome others, I know not what to think; ſince in my letter, which I did myſelf the honour to ſend your Lordſhip, I am ſure the words are not, as they are here ſet down. For I ſay not that I offered the way of certainty, there ſpoken of; which looks, as if it were a new way of certainty, that I pretended to teach the world. Perhaps, the difference in theſe, from my words, is not ſo great, that, upon another occaſion, I ſhould take notice of it: but it being to lead people into an opinion, that I ſpoke of the way of certainty, by ideas, as ſomething new, which I pretended to teach the world, I think it worth while to ſet down my words themſelves; which, I think, are ſo penned, as to ſhew a great caution in me, to avoid ſuch an opinion: my words are, "I think it is a way to bring us to a cer"tainty, in thoſe things, which I have offered as certain; but I never thought "it a way to certainty, where we cannot reach certainty."

Anſw. 1. p. 68.

Eſſay, B. ii. c. 11. § 17.

Anſw. 1. p. 68.

What uſe your Lordſhip makes of the term, offered, applied to what I applied it not, is to be ſeen in your next words, which you ſubjoin to thoſe, which you ſet down for mine: "but did you not offer to put us into a way of certain"ty? And what is that but to attain certainty in ſuch things, where we could "not otherwiſe do it?" Anſw. If this your way of reaſoning here carries certainty in it, I humbly conceive, in your way of certainty, by reaſon, certainty may be attained, where it could not otherwiſe be had. I only beg you, my Lord, to ſhew me the place, where I ſo offer, to put you in a way of certainty, different from what had formerly been the way of certainty, that men, by it, might attain to certainty in things, which they could not, before my book was writ. No body, who reads my Eſſay, with that indifferency, which is proper to a lover of truth, can avoid ſeeing, that what I ſay, of certainty, was not to teach the world a new way of certainty (tho' that be one great objection of your's, againſt my book) but to endeavour to ſhew, wherein the old, and only way of certainty conſiſts. What was the occaſion and deſign of my book, may be ſeen plainly enough, in the epiſtle to the reader, without any need that any thing more ſhould be ſaid of it. And I am too ſenſible of my own weakneſs, not to profeſs, as I do, "that I pretend not to teach, but to inquire." I cannot but wonder, what ſervice you, my Lord, who are a teacher of authority, mean to truth, or certainty, by condemning the way of certainty by ideas; becauſe I own, by it, I cannot demonſtrate that the ſoul is immaterial. May it not be worth your conſidering, what advantage this will be to ſcepticiſm, when, upon the ſame grounds, your words here ſhall be turned upon you; and it ſhall be aſked, "what a ſtrange way of certainty is this," (your Lordſhip's way by reaſon) "if it fails us in ſome of the firſt foundations of the real knowledge of ourſelves?"

Anſw. 1. p. 69.

Eſſay, B. iv. c. 3. § 6.

To avoid this, you undertake to prove, from my own principles, that we may be certain, "that the firſt, eternal, thinking being, or omnipotent ſpirit, cannot, "if he would, give to certain ſyſtems of created, ſenſible matter, put together, "as he ſees fit, ſome degrees of ſenſe, perception, and thought." For this, my Lord, is my propoſition, and this the utmoſt, that I have ſaid, concerning the power of thinking, in matter.

Anſw. 1. p. 69-73.

Your firſt argument I take to be this, that, according to me, the knowledge we have being by our ideas, and our idea of matter, in general, being a ſolid ſubſtance, and our idea of body a ſolid, extended, figured ſubſtance; if I admit matter to be capable of thinking, I confound the idea of matter, with the idea of a ſpirit: to which I anſwer, No; no more than I confound the idea of matter, with the idea of an horſe, when I ſay that matter, in general, is a ſolid extended ſubſtance: and that an horſe is a material animal, or an extended, ſolid ſubſtance, with ſenſe and ſpontaneous motion.

The idea of matter is an extended, ſolid ſubſtance; wherever there is ſuch a ſubſtance, there is matter, and the eſſence of matter, whatever other qualities, not contained in that eſſence, it ſhall pleaſe God to ſuperadd to it. For example, God creates an extended, ſolid ſubſtance, without the ſuperadding any thing elſe to it, and ſo we may conſider it at reſt: to ſome parts of it he ſuperadds motion, but it has ſtill the eſſence of matter: other parts of it he frames into plants, with all the excellencies of vegetation, life, and beauty, which is to be found in a roſe, or peach-tree, &c. above the eſſence of matter in general, but it is ſtill but matter: to other parts he adds ſenſe and ſpontaneous motion, and thoſe other properties, that are to be found in an elephant. Hitherto it is not doubted, but the power of God may go, and that the properties of a roſe, a peach, or an elephant, ſuperadded to matter, change not the properties of matter; but matter is, in theſe things, matter ſtill. But if one venture to go one ſtep further, and ſay, God may give to matter, thought, reaſon, and volition, as well as ſenſe and ſpontaneous motion, there are men ready preſently to limit the power of the omnipotent creator, and tell us, "he cannot do it; becauſe it deſtroys the eſ-" ſence, or changes the eſſential properties of matter." To make good which aſſertion, they have no more to ſay, but that thought and reaſon are not included in the eſſence of matter. I grant it; but whatever excellency, not contained in its eſſence, be ſuperadded to matter, it does not deſtroy the eſſence of matter, if it leaves it an extended, ſolid ſubſtance; wherever that is, there is the eſſence of matter: and if every thing of greater perfection, ſuperadded to ſuch a ſubſtance, deſtroys the eſſence of matter, what will become of the eſſence of matter in a plant, or an animal, whoſe properties far exceed thoſe of a mere, extended, ſolid ſubſtance?

But it is farther urged, that we cannot conceive how matter can think. I grant it; but to argue from thence, that God, therefore, cannot give to matter a faculty of thinking, is to ſay, God's omnipotency is limited to a narrow compaſs, becauſe man's underſtanding is ſo; and brings down God's infinite power to the ſize of our capacities. If God can give no power to any parts of matter, but what men can account for, from the eſſence of matter, in general; if all ſuch qualities, and properties muſt deſtroy the eſſence, or change the eſſential properties of matter, which are, to our conceptions, above it, and we cannot conceive to be the natural conſequence of that eſſence; it is plain, that the eſſence of matter is deſtroyed, aud its eſſential properties changed, in moſt of the ſenſible parts of this our ſyſtem. For it is viſible, that all the planets have revolutions about certain, remote centers, which I would have any one explain, or make conceivable, by the bare eſſence, or natural powers, depending on the eſſence of matter in general, without ſomething added to that eſſence, which we cannot conceive: for the moving of matter in a crooked line, or the attraction of matter by matter, is all that can be ſaid in the caſe: either of which, it is above our reach to derive from the eſſence of matter, or body in general; tho' one of theſe two muſt unavoidably be allowed to be ſuperadded, in this inſtance, to the eſſence of matter in general. The omnipotent creator adviſed not with us, in the making of the world, and his ways are not the leſs excellent, becauſe they are paſt our finding out.

In the next place, the vegetable part of the creation is not doubted to be wholly material; and yet he that will look into it will obſerve excellencies and operations, in this part of matter, which he will not find contained in the eſſence of matter in general, nor be able to conceive, how they can be produced in it. And will he therefore ſay, that the eſſence of matter is deſtroyed in them, becauſe they have properties and operations, not contained in the eſſential properties of matter, as matter, nor explicable by the eſſence of matter, in general?

Let us advance one ſtep farther, and we ſhall in the animal world, meet with yet greater perfections and properties, no ways explicable, by the eſſence of matter, in general. If the omnipotent creator had not ſuperadded to the earth, which produced the irrational animals, qualities far ſurpaſſing thoſe of the dull, dead earth, out of which they were made, life, ſenſe, and ſpontaneous motion, nobler qualities, than were before in it, it had ſtill remained rude, ſenſeleſs matter; and if, to the individuals of each ſpecies, he had not ſuperadded a power of propagation, the ſpecies had periſhed with thoſe individuals: but, by theſe eſſences, or properties, of each ſpecies ſuperadded to the matter, which they were made of, the eſſence, or properties, of matter, in general, were not deſtroyed, or changed, any more than any thing, that was in the individuals before was deſtroyed, or changed, by the power of generation, ſuperadded to them, by the firſt benediction of the Almighty.

IN all ſuch caſes, the ſuperinducement of greater perfections and nobler qualities, deſtroys nothing of the eſſence, or perfections, that were there before, unleſs there can be ſhewed a manifeſt repugnancy between them; but all the proof, offered for that is only, that we cannot conceive how matter, without ſuch ſuperadded perfections, can produce ſuch effects; which is, in truth, no more than to ſay, matter in general, or every part of matter, as matter, has them not; but is no reaſon to prove, that God, if he pleaſes, cannot ſuperadd them to ſome parts of matter, unleſs it can be proved to be a contradiction, that God ſhould give to ſome parts of matter, qualities, and perfections, which matter, in general, has not; tho' we cannot conceive how matter is inveſted with them, or how it operates, by virtue of thoſe new endowments. Nor is to be wondered, that we cannot, whilſt we limit all its operations to thoſe qualities, it had before, and would explain them, by the known properties of matter, in general, without any ſuch ſuperinduced perfections. For, if this be a right rule of reaſoning, to deny a thing to be, becauſe we cannot conceive the manner how it comes to be; I ſhall deſire them, who uſe it, to ſtick to this rule, and ſee what work it will make, both in divinity, as well as philoſophy; and whether they can advance any thing more in favour of ſcepticiſm.

FOR to keep within the preſent ſubject of the power of thinking and ſelf-motion, beſtowed by omnipotent power, on ſome parts of matter; the objection to this is, I cannot conceive how matter ſhould think. What is the conſequence? ergo, God cannot give it a power to think. Let this ſtand for a good reaſon, and then proceed in other caſes, by the ſame. You cannot conceive how matter can attract matter, at any diſtance, much leſs at the diſtance of 1,000,000 miles; ergo, God cannot give it ſuch a power. You cannot conceive, how matter ſhould feel, or move itſelf, or affect an immaterial being, or be moved by it; ergo, God cannot give it ſuch powers: which is in effect, to deny gravity and the revolution of the planets about the ſun; to make brutes mere machines, without ſenſe, or ſpontaneous motion; and to allow man neither ſenſe, nor voluntary motion.

LET us apply this rule one degree farther: you cannot conceive how an extended, ſolid ſubſtance ſhould think, therefore God cannot make it think: can you conceive how your own ſoul, or any ſubſtance thinks? You find, indeed, that you do think, and ſo do I; but I want to be told how the action of thinking is performed: this, I confeſs, is beyond my conception; and I would be glad, any one, who conceives it, would explain it to me. God, I find has given me this faculty; and ſince I cannot but be convinced of his power, in this inſtance, which, tho' I every moment experiment, in myſelf, yet I cannot conceive the manner of; what would it be leſs, than an inſolent abſurdity, to deny his power, in other like caſes, only for this reaſon, becauſe I cannot conceive the manner how?

To explain this matter a little farther: God has created a ſubſtance; let it be, for example, a ſolid, extended ſubſtance: is God bound to give it, beſides being, a power of action? that I think, no-body will ſay. He, therefore, may leave it in a ſtate of inactivity, and it will be nevertheleſs a ſubſtance; for action is not neceſſary to the being of any ſubſtance that God does create. God has, likewiſe, created and made to exiſt, de novo, an immaterial ſubſtance, which will not loſe its being of a ſubſtance, tho' God ſhould beſtow on it nothing more, but this bare being, without giving it any activity at all. Here are now two diſtinct ſubſtances, the one material, the other immaterial, both in the ſtate of perfect inactivity: now, I aſk, what power God can give to one of theſe ſubſtances (ſuppoſing them to retain the ſame diſtinct natures, that they had, as ſubſtances, in their ſtate of inactivity) which he cannot give to the other; In that ſtate, 'tis plain, neither of them thinks; for thinking being an action, it cannot be denied, that God can put an end to any action, of any created ſubſtance, without annihilating of the ſubſtance, whereof it is an action: and if it be ſo, he can alſo, create, or give exiſtence to, ſuch a ſubſtance, without giving that ſubſtance any action at all. By the ſame reaſon, it is plain, that neither of them can move itſelf. Now I would aſk, why omnipotency cannot give to either of theſe ſubſtances, which are equally in a ſtate of perfect inactivity, the ſame power, that it can give to the other? Let it be, for example, that of ſpontaneous, or ſelf-motion, which is a power that it is ſuppoſed God can give to an unſolid ſubſtance, but denied that he can give to a ſolid ſubſtance.

If it be aſked, why they limit the omnipotency of God, in reference to the one, rather than the other, of theſe ſubſtances? All that can be ſaid to it, is, that they cannot conceive, how the ſolid ſubſtance ſhould ever be able to move itſelf. And as little, ſay I, are they able, to conceive how a created, unſolid ſubſtance, ſhould move itſelf. But there may be ſomething in an immaterial ſubſtance, that you do not know: I grant it; and in a material one too: for example, gravitation of matter towards matter, and in the ſeveral proportions obſervable, inevitably ſhews, that there is ſomething in matter, that we do not underſtand, unleſs we can conceive ſelf-motion in matter; or an inexplicable and inconceivable attraction in matter, at immenſe and almoſt incomprehenſible diſtances: It muſt, therefore, be confeſſed, that there is ſomething in ſolid, as well as unſolid ſubſtances, that we do not underſtand. But this we know, that they may, each of them, have their diſtinct beings, without any activity, ſuperadded to them; unleſs you will deny, that God can take from any being its power of acting, which, 'tis probable, will be thought too preſumptuous for any one to do; and, I ſay, 'tis as hard to conceive ſelf-motion in a created, immaterial, as in a material being, conſider it how you will: and, therefore, this is no reaſon to deny omnipotency to be able to give a power of ſelf-motion to a material ſubſtance, if he pleaſes, as well as to an immaterial; ſince neither of them can have it from themſelves, nor can we conceive, how it can be in either of them.

The ſame is viſible, in the other operation of thinking; both theſe ſubſtances may be made, and exiſt without thought; neither of them has, or can have, the power of thinking, from itſelf; God may give it to either of them, according to the good pleaſure of his omnipotency; and in which-ever of them it is, it is equally beyond our capacity to conceive, how either of thoſe ſubſtances thinks. But for that reaſon, to deny that God, who had power enough to give them both a being out of nothing, can, by the ſame omnipotency, give them what other powers and perfections he pleaſes; has no better a foundation, than to deny his power of creation, becauſe we cannot conceive how it is performed; and there, at laſt this way of reaſoning muſt terminate.

That omnipotency cannot make a ſubſtance to be ſolid, and not ſolid, at the ſame time, I think, with due reverence, we may ſay; but that a ſolid ſubſtance may not have qualities, perfections, and powers, which have no natural, or viſibly neceſſary connexion with ſolidity and extenſion, is too much for us (who are but of yeſterday, and know nothing) to be poſitive in. If God cannot join things together by connexions inconceivable to us, we muſt deny even the conſiſtency and being of matter itſelf; ſince every particle of it, having ſome bulk, has its parts connected by ways inconceivable to us. So that all the difficulties, that are raiſed, againſt the thinking of matter, from our ignorance, or narrow conceptions, ſtand not at all in the way of the power of God, if he pleaſes to ordain it ſo; nor prove any thing againſt his having actually endued ſome parcels of matter, ſo diſpoſed, as he thinks fit, with a faculty of thinking, till it can be ſhewn that it contains a contradiction to ſuppoſe it.

Tho' to me ſenſation be comprehended, under thinking in general, yet, in the foregoing diſcourſe, I have ſpoke of ſenſe in brutes, as diſtinct from thinking: becauſe your Lordſhip, as I remember, ſpeaks of ſenſe in brutes. But here

I take liberty to obſerve, that if your Lordſhip allows brutes to have ſenſation, it will follow, either that God can, and doth, give to ſome parcels of matter a power of perception and thinking; or that all animals have immaterial, and conſequently, according to your Lordſhip, immortal ſouls, as well as men: and to ſay that fleas and mites, &c. have immortal ſouls, as well as men, will poſſibly be looked on, as going a great way to ſerve an hypotheſis, and it would not very well agree with what your Lordſhip ſays, Anſw. 2. p. 64. to the words of Solomon, quoted out of Eccleſ. c. iii.

I HAVE been pretty large, in making this matter plain, that they, who are ſo forward to beſtow hard cenſures, or names, on the opinions of thoſe, who differ from them, may conſider, whether ſometimes they are not more due to their own: and that they may be perſuaded a little to temper that heat, which ſuppoſing the truth, in their current opinions, gives them (as they think) a right to lay what imputations they pleaſe, on thoſe, who would fairly examine the grounds they ſtand upon. For talking with a ſuppoſition, and inſinuations, that truth and knowledge, nay, and religion too, ſtands and falls with their ſyſtems, is, at beſt, but an imperious way of begging the queſtion, and aſſuming to themſelves, under the pretence of zeal for the cauſe of God, a title to infallibility. It is very becoming, that men's zeal for truth ſhould go, as far as their proofs, but not go for proofs themſelves. He that attacks received opinions, with any thing, but fair arguments, may, I own be juſtly ſuſpected not to mean well, nor to be led by the love of truth; but the ſame may be ſaid of him too, who ſo defends them. An error is not the better for being common, nor truth the worſe for having lain neglected: and if it were put to the vote, any where in the world, I doubt, as things are managed, whether truth would have the majority; at leaſt, whilſt the authority of men, and not the examination of things, muſt be its meaſure. The imputation of ſcepticiſm, and thoſe broad inſinuations, to render what I have writ, ſuſpected, ſo frequent, as if that were the great buſineſs of all this pains, you have been at about me, has made me ſay thus much, my Lord, rather as my ſenſe of the way to eſtabliſh truth in its full force and beauty, than that I think the world will need to have any thing ſaid to it, to make it diſtinguiſh between your Lordſhip's and my deſign in writing; which, therefore, I ſecurely leave to the judgment of the reader, and return to the argument in hand.

Anſwer 1. p. 73.

Eſſay, B. ii. c. 8. § 11.

WHAT I have above ſaid, I take to be a full anſwer to all that your Lordſhip would infer, from my idea of matter, of liberty, and of identity, and from the power of abſtracting. You aſk, "how can my idea of liberty agree with the "idea, that bodies can operate, only by motion and impulſe?" Anſw. By the omnipotency of God, who can make all things agree, that involve not a contradiction. 'Tis true, I ſay, that bodies operate by impulſe, and nothing elſe." And ſo I thought, when I writ it, and can yet conceive no other way of their operation: but I am ſince convinced, by the judicious Mr. Newton's incomparable book, that 'tis too bold a preſumption to limit God's power, in this point, by my narrow conceptions. The gravitation of matter towards matter, by ways unconceivable to me, is not only a demonſtration, that God can, if he pleaſes, put into bodies, powers, and ways of operation, above what can be derived from our idea of body, or can be explained by what we know of matter; but alſo an unqueſtionable, and every where viſible, inſtance, that he has done ſo: and, therefore, in the next edition of my book, I ſhall take care to have that paſſage rectified.

Anſwer 1. p. 75.

Ibid.

As to ſelf-conſciouſneſs, your Lordſhip aſks, "what is there, like ſelf-conſci-"ouſneſs, in matter?" Nothing at all, in matter, as matter: but that God cannot beſtow, on ſome parcels of matter, a power of thinking, and, with it, ſelf-conſciouſneſs, will never be proved by aſking, "how is it poſſible to apprehend, "that mere body ſhould perceive that it doth perceive?" The weakneſs of our apprehenſion I grant, in the caſe: I confeſs, as much as you pleaſe, that we cannot conceive how a ſolid, no, nor how an unſolid, created ſubſtance thinks; but this weakneſs of our apprehenſions reaches not the power of God, whoſe weakneſs is ſtronger than any thing in man.

Your argument from abſtraction, we have, in this queſtion, "if it may be, Anſwer 1. p. 76. "in the power of matter to think, how comes it to be ſo impoſſible for ſuch "organized bodies, as the brutes have, to enlarge their ideas, by abſtraction?" Anſw. This ſeems to ſuppoſe, that I place thinking, within the natural power of matter. If that be your meaning, my Lord, I neither ſay, nor ſuppoſe, that all matter has naturally in it, a faculty of thinking, but the direct contrary. But if you mean that certain parcels of matter, ordered by the divine power, as ſeems fit to him, may be made capable of receiving from his omnipotency, the faculty of thinking; that, indeed, I ſay, and that being granted, the anſwer to your queſtion, is eaſy; ſince, if omnipotency can give thought to any ſolid ſubſtance, it is not hard to conceive, that God may give that faculty in an higher, or lower, degree, as it pleaſes him, who knows what diſpoſition of the ſubject is ſuited to ſuch a particular way, or degree, of thinking.

Another argument to prove, that God cannot endue any parcel of matter with the faculty of thinking, is taken from thoſe words of mine, where I ſhew Letter 1. p. 139. by what connexion of ideas, we may come to know, that God is an immaterial ſubſtance. They are theſe: "the idea of an eternal, actual, knowing being, "with the idea of immateriality, by the intervention of the idea of matter, and "of its actual diviſion, diviſibility, and want of perception, &c." From whence your Lordſhip thus argues, "here the want of perception is owned to be ſo eſſen- Anſwer 1. p. 77. "tial to matter, that God is, therefore, concluded to be immaterial." Anſw. Perception and knowledge, in that one, eternal being, where it has its ſource, 'tis viſible, muſt be eſſentially inſeparable from it; therefore the actual want of perception in ſo great part of the particular parcels of matter, is a demonſtration, that the firſt being, from whom perception and knowledge is inſeparable, is not matter. How far this makes the want of perception, an eſſential property of matter, I will not diſpute; it ſuffices, that it ſhews, that perception is not an eſſential property of matter; and, therefore, matter cannot be that eternal, original being, to which perception and knowledge is eſſential. Matter, I ſay, naturally is without perception: "ergo, ſays your Lordſhip, want of perception is "an eſſential property of matter, and God doth not change the eſſential proper- "ties of things, their nature remaining." From whence you infer, that God cannot beſtow on any parcel of matter (the nature of matter remaining) a faculty of thinking. If the rules of logick, ſince my days, be not changed, I may ſafely deny this conſequence. For an argument that runs thus, "God does not, ergo, "he cannot;" I was taught when I came firſt to the univerſity, would not hold. For I never ſaid God did; but "that I ſee no contradiction in it, that he ſhould, B. iv. c. 3. § 6. "if he pleaſed, give to ſome ſyſtems of ſenſeleſs matter, a faculty of thinking:" and I know no-body, before Des Cartes, that ever pretended to ſhew that there was any contradiction in it. So that at worſt, my not being able to ſee in matter, any ſuch incapacity, as makes it impoſſible for omnipotency to beſtow on it, a faculty of thinking, makes me oppoſite only to the Carteſians. For, as far as I have ſeen, or heard, the fathers of the chriſtian church never pretended to demonſtrate, that matter was incapable to receive a power of ſenſation, perception, and thinking, from the hand of the omnipotent Creator. Let us, therefore, if you pleaſe, ſuppoſe the form of your argumentation right, and that your Lordſhip means, God cannot: and then, if your argument be good, it proves, that God could not give to Balaam's aſs a power, to ſpeak to his maſter, as he did; for the want of rational diſcourſe, being natural to that ſpecies, it is but for your Lordſhip to call it an eſſential property, and then God cannot change the eſſential properties of things, their nature remaining; whereby it is proved, that God cannot, with all his omnipotency, give to an aſs a power to ſpeak, as Balaam's did.

You ſay, my Lord, "you do not ſet bounds to God's omnipotency: for he Anſwer 1. p. 78. "may, if he pleaſe, change a body into an immaterial ſubſtance;" i. e. take away from a ſubſtance the ſolidity, which it had before, and which made it matter, and then give it a faculty of thinking, which it had not before, and which makes it a ſpirit, the ſame ſubſtance remaining. For if the ſame ſubſtance remains not, body is not changed into an immaterial ſubſtance, but the ſolid ſubſtance, and all belonging to it, is annihilated, and an immaterial ſubſtance created; which is not a change of one thing into another, but the deſtroying of one, and making another de novo. In this change, therefore, of a body, or material ſubſtance, into an immaterial, let us obſerve theſe diſtinct conſiderations.

First, you ſay, God may, if he pleaſes, take away, from a ſolid ſubſtance, ſolidity, which is that, which makes it a material ſubſtance, or body; and may make it an immaterial ſubſtance, i. e. a ſubſtance, without ſolidity. But this privation of one quality, gives it not another: the bare taking away a lower, or leſs noble, quality, does not give it an higher, or nobler; that muſt be the gift of God. For the bare privation of one, and a meaner quality, cannot be the poſition of an higher and better; unleſs any one will ſay, that cogitation, or the power of thinking, reſults from the nature of ſubſtance itſelf, which if it do, then, where-ever there is ſubſtance, there muſt be cogitation, or a power of thinking. Here then, upon your Lordſhip's own principles, is an immaterial ſubſtance, without the faculty of thinking.

In the next place, you will not deny, but God may give to this ſubſtance, thus deprived of ſolidity, a faculty of thinking; for you ſuppoſe it made capable of that, by being made immaterial; whereby you allow, that the ſame numerical ſubſtance may be ſometimes wholly incogitative, or without a power of thinking, and at other times, perfectly cogitative, or endued with a power of thinking.

Farther, you will not deny but God can give it a ſolidity, and make it material again: for I conclude, it will not be denyed, that God can make it again, what it was before. Now I crave leave to aſk your Lordſhip, why God, having given to this ſubſtance the faculty of thinking, after ſolidity was taken from it, cannot reſtore to it ſolidity again, without taking away the faculty of thinking? When you have reſolved this, my Lord, you will have proved it impoſſible, for God's omnipotence, to give a ſolid ſubſtance, a faculty of thinking; but till then, not having proved it impoſſible, and yet, denying that God can do it, is to deny, that he can do, what is in itſelf poſſible; which, as I humbly conceive, is viſibly to ſet bounds to God's omnipotency; tho' you ſay here, "you do not ſet bounds "to God's omnipotency." Anſwer 1. p. 78.

If I ſhould imitate your Lordſhip's way of writing, I ſhould not omit to bring in Epicurus here, and take notice that this was his way, "deum verbis ponere, "re tollere:" and then add, "I am certain, you do not think, he promoted "the great ends of morality and religion." For 'tis, with ſuch candid and kind inſinuations as theſe, that you bring in both * Hobbes and † Spinoza, into your diſcourſe here, about God's being able, if he pleaſe, to give to ſome parcels of matter, ordered as he thinks fit, a faculty of thinking: neither of thoſe authors, having, as appears by any paſſages, you bring out of them, ſaid any thing to this queſtion, nor having, as it ſeems, any other buſineſs here, but, by their names, ſkilfully, to give that character to my book, with which you would recommend it to the world.

* Anſwer 1. p. 55.

† Ibid. p. 79.

I pretend not to enquire what meaſure of zeal, nor for what, guides your Lordſhip's pen, in ſuch a way of writing, as your's has all along been with me: only, I cannot but conſider, what reputation it would give to the writings of the fathers of the church, if they ſhould think truth required, or religion allowed them, to imitate ſuch patterns. But, God be thanked, there be thoſe amongſt them, who do not admire ſuch ways of managing the cauſe of truth, or religion; they being ſenſible, that, if every one, who believes, or can pretend he has, truth on his ſide, is thereby authorized, without proof, to inſinuate, whatever may ſerve to prejudice men's minds againſt the other ſide, there will be a great ravage made on charity and practice, without any gain to truth, or knowledge: and that the liberties frequently taken by diſputants, to do ſo, may have been the cauſe, that the world, in all ages, has received ſo much harm, and ſo little advantage, from controverſies in religion.

These are the arguments, which your Lordſhip has brought to confute one ſaying, in my book, by other paſſages in it; which, therefore, being all but "argumenta ad hominem," if they did prove, what they do not, are of no other uſe, than to gain a victory over me: a thing, methinks, ſo much beneath your

Lordſhip, that it does not deſerve one of your pages. The queſtion is, whether God can, if he pleaſes, beſtow on any parcel of matter, ordered as he thinks fit, a faculty of perception and thinking, You ſay, “ you look upon a miſtake herein, Anſwer 1. p. 79. to be of dangerous conſequence, as to the great ends of religion and morality:” if this be ſo, my Lord, I think one may well wonder, why your Lordſhip has brought no arguments, to eſtabliſh the truth itſelf, which you look on to be of ſuch dangerous conſequence, to be miſtaken in; but have ſpent ſo many pages, only in a perſonal matter, in endeavouring to ſhew, that I had inconſiſtencies in my book; which, if any ſuch thing had been ſhewed, the queſtion would be ſtill as far from being decided, and the danger of miſtaking about it, as little prevented, as if nothing of all this had been ſaid. If, therefore, your Lordſhip's care of the great ends of religion and morality have made you think it neceſſary to clear this queſtion, the world has reaſon to conclude there is little to be ſaid, againſt that propoſition, which is to be found in my book, concerning the poſſibility, that ſome parcels of matter might be ſo ordered by omnipotence, as to be endued with a faculty of thinking, if God ſo pleaſed; ſince your Lordſhip's concern, for the promoting the great ends of religion and morality, has not enabled you to produce one argument, againſt a propoſition, that you think of ſo dangerons conſequence to them.

And here I crave leave to obſerve, that tho', in your title-page, you promiſe to prove, that my notion of ideas is inconſiſtent with itſelf (which if it were, it could hardly be proved to be inconſiſtent with any thing elſe) and with the articles of the Chriſtian faith; yet your attempts, all along, have been to prove me, in ſome paſſages of my book, inconſiſtent with my ſelf, without having ſhewn any propoſition, in my book, inconſiſtent with any articles of the Chriſtian faith.

I think, your Lordſhip has, indeed, made uſe of one argument of your own: but it is ſuch an one, that I confeſs, I do not ſee, how it is apt much to promote religion, eſpecially the Chriſtian religion, ſounded on revelation. I ſhall ſet down your Lordſhip's words, that they may be conſidered. You ſay, “ that you Anſwer 1. p. 54, 55. are of opinion, that the great ends of religion and morality are beſt ſecured, by the proofs of the immortality of the ſoul, from its nature and properties; and which, you think, proves it immaterial. Your Lordſhip does not queſtion, whether God can give immortality to a material ſubſtance; but you ſay, it takes off very much from the evidence of immortality, if it depend wholly upon God's giving that, which, of its own nature, is not capable of,” &c. So likewiſe you ſay, “ if a man cannot be certain, but that matter may think Anſwer 2. p. 28. (as I affirm) then what becomes of the ſoul's immateriality (and conſequently immortality) from its operations? But for all this, ſay I, his aſſurance of faith remains on its own baſis.” Now you appeal to any man of ſenſe, whether the finding the uncertainty of his own principles, which he went upon, in point of reaſon, doth not weaken the credibility of theſe fundamental articles, when they are conſidered, purely as matters of faith? for before, there was a natural credibility in them, on the account of reaſon; but, by going on wrong grounds of certainty, all that is loſt; and, inſtead of being certain, he is more doubtful than ever. And, if the evidence of faith fall ſo much ſhort of that of reaſon, it muſt needs have leſs effect upon men's minds, when the ſubſerviency of reaſon is taken away; as it muſt be, when the grounds of certainty, by reaſon, are vaniſhed. Is it at all probable that he, who finds reaſon deceive him, in ſuch fundamental points, ſhould have his faith ſtand firm and unmoveable, on the account of revelation? For, in matters of revelation, there muſt be ſome antecedent principles ſuppoſed, before we can believe any thing, on the account of it.”

More to the ſame purpoſe we have ſome pages farther; where, from ſome Ibid. p. 35. of my words, your Lordſhip ſays, “ you cannot but obſerve, that we have no certainty, upon my grounds, that ſelf-conſciouſneſs depends upon an individual, immaterial ſubſtance; and, conſequently, that a material ſubſtance may, according to my principles, have ſelf-conſciouſneſs in it; at leaſt, that I am not certain of the contrary. Whereupon your Lordſhip bids me conſider, whether this doth not a little effect the whole article of the reſurrection?” What does all this tend to, but to make the world believe, that I have leſſened the credibility of the immortality of the ſoul, and the reſurrection, by ſaying, that, tho' it be moſt highly probable, that the ſoul is immaterial; yet, upon my principles, it cannot be demonſtrated; becauſe it is not impoſſible to God's omnipotency, if he pleaſes, to beſtow upon ſome parcels of matter, diſpoſed as he ſees fit, a faculty of thinking?

THIS your accuſation, of my leſſening the credibility of theſe articles of faith, is founded on this, that the article of the immortality of the ſoul abates of its credibility, if it be allowed, that its immateriality (which is the ſuppoſed proof, from reaſon and philoſophy, of its immortality) cannot be demonſtrated from natural reaſon. Which argument of your Lordſhip's bottoms, as I humbly conceive, on this, that divine revelation abates of its credibility, in all thoſe articles it propoſes, proportionably as human reaſon fails to ſupport the teſtimony of God. And all that your Lordſhip, in thoſe paſſages, has ſaid, when examined, will, I ſuppoſe, be found to import thus much, viz. Does God propoſe any thing to mankind, to be believed? it is very fit and credible to be believed, if reaſon can demonſtrate it to be true. But, if human reaſon comes ſhort, in the caſe, and cannot make it out, its credibility is thereby leſſened; which is, in effect, to ſay, that the veracity of God is not a firm and ſure foundation of faith to rely upon, without the concurrent teſtimony of reaſon; i. e. with reverence be it ſpoken, God is not to be believed, on his own word, unleſs, what he reveals, be in itſelf credible, and might be believed without him.

IF this be a way to promote religion, the Chriſtian religion, in all its articles, I am not ſorry, that it is not a way to be found, in any of my writings; for I imagine any thing, like this, would (and I ſhould think deſerved to) have other titles, than bare ſcepticiſm, beſtowed upon it, and would have raiſed no ſmall outcry againſt any one, who is not to be ſuppoſed to be in the right, in all that he ſays, and ſo may ſecurely ſay what he pleaſes. Such as I, the "profanum "vulgus;" who take too much upon us, if we would examine, have nothing to do, but to hearken and believe, tho' what he ſaid ſhould ſubvert the very foundations of the Chriſtian faith.

WHAT I have obſerved, is ſo viſibly contained in your Lordſhip's argument, that when I meet with it, in your anſwer to my firſt letter, it ſeemed ſo ſtrange, for a man of your Lordſhip's character, and in a diſpute in defence of the doctrine of the Trinity, that I could hardly perſuade myſelf but it was a ſlip of your pen: but, when I found it, in your ſecond letter, made uſe of again, and ſeriouſly enlarged, as an argument of weight, to be inſiſted upon, I was convinced, that it was a principle, that you heartily embraced, how little favourable ſoever it was to the articles of the Chriſtian religion, and particularly thoſe, which you undertook to defend. Anſw. 2. p. 28, 29.

I DESIRE my reader to peruſe the paſſages, as they ſtand in your letters themſelves, and ſee, whether what you ſay, in them, does not amount to this, that a revelation from God is more, or leſs credible, according as it has a ſtronger, or weaker, confirmation from human reaſon. For,

Anſw. 1. p. 55. 1. YOUR Lordſhip ſays, "you do not queſtion, whether God can give immortality to a material ſubſtance; but you ſay, it takes off very much from the evidence of immortality, if it depends wholly upon God's giving that, which, of its own nature, it is not capable of."

To which I reply, any one's not being able to demonſtrate the ſoul to be immaterial, takes off, not very much, nor at all, from the evidence of its immortality, if God has revealed that it ſhall be immortal: becauſe the veracity of God is a demonſtration of the truth of what he has revealed, and the want of another demonſtration of a propoſition, that is demonſtratively true, takes not off from the evidence of it. For where there is a clear demonſtration, there is as much evidence, as any truth can have, that is not ſelf-evident. God has revealed that the ſouls of men ſhall live for ever: but, ſays your Lordſhip, "from this evidence, it takes off very much, if it depends wholly upon God's giving that, which, of its own nature, it is not capable of;" i. e. the revelation and teſtimony of God loſes much of its evidence, if this depends wholly upon the good

pleaſure of God, and cannot be demonſtratively made out, by natural reaſon, that the ſoul is immaterial, and, conſequently, in its own nature, immortal. For that is all that here is, or can be meant, by theſe words, "which, of its own nature, it is not capable of," to make them to the purpoſe. For the whole of your Lordſhip's diſcourſe here, is to prove, that the ſoul cannot be material, becauſe, then the evidence of its being immortal, would be very much leſſened. Which is to ſay, that it is not as credible, upon divine revelation, that a material ſubſtance ſhould be immortal, as an immaterial; or, which is all one, that God is not equally to be believed, when he declares that a material ſubſtance ſhall be immortal, as when he declares, that an immaterial ſhall be ſo; becauſe the immortality of a material ſubſtance cannot be demonſtrated, from natural reaſon.

Let us try this rule of your Lordſhip's a little farther. God hath revealed, that the bodies men ſhall have, after the reſurrection, as well as their ſouls, ſhall live to eternity: does your Lordſhip believe the eternal life of the one of theſe, more than of the author, becauſe you think you can prove it, of one of them, by natural reaſon, and of the other not? Or can any one, who admits of divine revelation, in the caſe, doubt of one of them, more than the other? Or think this propoſition leſs credible, the bodies of men, after the reſurrection ſhall live for ever; than this, that the ſouls of men ſhall, after the reſurrection, live for ever? For that he muſt do, if he thinks either of them is leſs credible, than the other. If this be ſo, reaſon is to be conſulted, how far God is to be believed, and the credit of divine teſtimony muſt receive its force from the evidence of reaſon: which is evidently to take away the credibility of divine revelation, in all ſupernatural truths, wherein the evidence of reaſon fails. And how much ſuch a principle, as this, tends to the ſupport of the doctrine of the Trinity, or the promoting the Chriſtian religion, I ſhall leave it to your Lordſhip to conſider. This, I think, I may be confident in, that few Chriſtians have founded their belief of the immortality of the ſoul, upon any thing but revelation; ſince, if they had entertained it, upon natural and philoſophical reaſons, they could not have avoided the believing its pre-exiſtence, before its union to the body, as well as its future exiſtence, after its ſeparation from it. This is juſtified by that obſervation of Dr. Cudworth, B. i. c. 1. § 31. where he affirms, "that there was never any of the antients, before chriſtianity, that held the ſoul's future permanency after death, who did not likewiſe aſſert its pre-exiſtence."

I am not ſo well read, in Hobbes, or Spinoza, as to be able to ſay, what were their opinions, in this matter. But, poſſibly, there be thoſe, who will think your Lordſhip's authority of more uſe to them, in the caſe, than thoſe juſtly decried names; and be glad to find your Lordſhip, a patron of the oracles of reaſon, ſo little to the advantage of the oracles of divine revelation. This, at leaſt, I think, may be ſubjoined to the words, at the bottom of the next page, that thoſe, who have gone about to leſſen the credibility of the articles of faith, which evidently they do, who ſay, they are leſs credible, becauſe they cannot be made out demonſtratively, by natural reaſon; have not been thought to ſecure ſeveral of the articles of the Chriſtian faith; eſpecially thoſe of the Trinity, Incarnation, and Reſurrection of the body, which are thoſe, upon the account of which, I am brought, by your Lordſhip, into this diſpute.

Anſw. 1. p. 65.

I shall not trouble the reader with your Lordſhip's endeavours, in the following words, to prove, that, if the ſoul be not an immaterial ſubſtance, it can be nothing but life; your very firſt words viſibly confuting all, that you allege to that purpoſe. They are, "if the ſoul be a material ſubſtance, it is really nothing but life;" which is to ſay, that, if the ſoul be really a ſubſtance, it is not really a ſubſtance, but really nothing elſe, but an affection of a ſubſtance; for the life, whether of a material, or immaterial ſubſtance, is not the ſubſtance itſelf, but an affection of it.

Anſwer 1. p. 55.

2. You ſay, "altho' we think the ſeparate ſtate of the ſoul, after death, is ſufficiently revealed in the ſcripture; yet it creates a great difficulty, in underſtanding it, if the ſoul be nothing but life, or a material ſubſtance, which muſt be diſſolved, when life is ended. For, if the ſoul be a material ſubſtance, it

Anſwer 1. p. 57.

" muſt be made up, as others are, of the coheſion of ſolid and ſeparate parts, " how minute and inviſible ſoever they be. And what is it ſhould keep them " together, when life is gone? So that it is no eaſy matter to give an account, " how the ſoul ſhould be capable of immortality, unleſs it be an immaterial " ſubſtance; and then we know, the ſolution and texture of bodies cannot reach " the ſoul, being of a different nature."

Let it be as hard a matter as it will, " to give an account what it is, that " ſhould keep the parts of a material ſoul together," after it is ſeparated from the body; yet it will be always as eaſy, to give an account of it, as to give an account, what it is, which ſhall keep together a material and immaterial ſubſtance: and yet the difficulty that there is, to give an account of that, I hope does not, with your Lordſhip, weaken the credibility of the inſeparable union of ſoul and body, to eternity: and I perſuade myſelf, that the men of ſenſe, to whom your Lordſhip appeals, in the caſe, do not find their belief of this fundamental point, much weakened by that difficulty. I thought heretofore (and by your Lordſhip's permiſſion, would think ſo ſtill) that the union of parts of matter, one with another, is as much in the hands of God, as the union of a material, and immaterial ſubſtance; and that it does not take off, very much, or at all, from the evidence of immortality, which depends on that union, that it is no eaſy matter to give an account, what it is, that ſhould keep them together: tho' its depending wholly, upon the gift and good pleaſure of God, where the manner creates great difficulty in the underſtanding, and our reaſon cannot diſcover, in the nature of things, how it is, be that, which your Lordſhip ſo poſitively ſays, " leſſens the credibility of the fundamental articles of the reſurrection and immortality."

But, my Lord, to remove this objection a little, and to ſhew of how ſmall force it is, even with your ſelf; give me leave to preſume, that your Lordſhip as firmly believes the immortality of the body, after the reſurrection, as any other article of faith: if ſo, then it being no eaſy matter to give an account, what it is, that ſhall keep together the parts of a material ſoul, to one, that believes it is material, can no more weaken the credibility of its immortality, than the like difficulty weakens the credibility of the immortality of the body. For, when your Lordſhip ſhall find it an eaſy matter, to give an account, what it is, beſides the good pleaſure of God, which ſhall keep together the parts of our material bodies to eternity, or even ſoul and body; I doubt not but any one, who ſhall think the ſoul material, will alſo find it is as eaſy to give an account, what it is, that ſhall keep thoſe parts of matter alſo together to eternity.

Were it not, that the warmth of controverſy is apt to make men ſo far forget, as to take up thoſe principles themſelves (when they will ſerve their turn) which they have highly condemned in others, I ſhould wonder to find your Lordſhip to argue, that becauſe " it is a difficulty to underſtand, what ſhould keep " together the minute parts of a material ſoul, when life is gone; and, becauſe " it is not an eaſy matter to give an account how the ſoul ſhould be capable of " immortality, unleſs it be an immaterial ſubſtance:" therefore, it is not ſo credible, as if it were eaſy to give an account, by natural reaſon, how it could be. For to this it is, that all this your diſcourſe tends, as is evident, by what is already ſet down, out of page 55, and will be more fully made out, by what your Lordſhip ſays, in other places, tho' there needs no ſuch proofs, ſince it would all be nothing againſt me, in any other ſenſe.

I thought your Lordſhip had, in other places, aſſerted, and inſiſted on this truth, that no part of divine revelation was the leſs to be believed, becauſe the thing itſelf created great difficulty, in the underſtanding, and the manner of it was hard to be explained, and it was no eaſy matter to give an account how it was. This, as I take it, your Lordſhip condemned in others, as a very unreaſonable principle, and ſuch, as would ſubvert all the articles of the Chriſtian religion, that were mere matters of faith, as I think it will: and is it poſſible, that you ſhould make uſe of it, here, yourſelf, againſt the article of life and immortality, that Chriſt hath brought to light, thro' the Goſpel; and neither was, nor could be made out, by natural reaſon, without revelation? But, you will ſay, you ſpeak only of the ſoul, and your words are, that, " it is no eaſy matter to give an account, how the ſoul "ſhould be capable of immortality, unleſs it be an immaterial ſubſtance." I grant it; but crave leave to ſay, that there is not any one of thoſe difficulties, that are, or can be raiſed, about the manner, how a material ſoul can be immortal, which do not as well reach the immortality of the body.

But if it were not ſo, I am ſure this principle of your Lordſhip's would reach other articles of faith, wherein our natural reaſon finds it not ſo eaſy to give an account, how thoſe myſteries are; and which, therefore, according to your principles, muſt be leſs credible, than other articles, that create leſs difficulty to the underſtanding. For your Lordſhip ſays, that you appeal to any man of ſenſe, whether to a man who thought, by his principles, he could, from natural grounds, demonſtrate the immortality of the ſoul, the finding the uncertainty of thoſe principles he went upon in point of reaſon, i. e. the finding he could not certainly prove it, by natural reaſon, doth not weaken the credibility of that fundamental article, when it is conſidered, purely as a matter of faith. Which, in effect, I humbly conceive, amounts to this; that a propoſition divinely revealed, that cannot be proved by natural reaſon, is leſs credible, than one that can: which ſeems to me to come very little ſhort of this, with due reverence be it ſpoken, that God is leſs to be believed, when he affirms a propoſition, that cannot be proved by natural reaſon, than, when he propoſes what can be proved by it. The direct contrary to which, is my opinion; tho' you endeavour to make it good, by theſe following words: "if the evidence of faith falls ſo much ſhort of that of reaſon, it muſt needs "have leſs effect upon men's minds, when the ſubſerviency of reaſon is taken "away; as it muſt be, when the grounds of certainty, by reaſon, are vaniſhed. "Is it at all probable, that he, who finds his reaſon deceive him, in ſuch fun-"damental points, ſhould have his faith ſtand firm and unmoveable, on the ac-"count of revelation?" Than which, I think, there are hardly plainer words to be found out, to declare, that the credibility of God's teſtimony depends on the natural evidence of probability, of the things, we receive from revelation, and riſes and falls with it; and that the truths of God, or the articles of mere faith, loſe ſo much of their credibility, as they want proof from reaſon; which, if true, revelation may come to have no credibility at all. For if, in this preſent caſe, the credibility of this propoſition, the ſouls of men ſhall live for ever, revealed in the ſcripture, be leſſened by confeſſing it cannot be demonſtratively proved from reaſon, tho' it be aſſerted to be moſt highly probable; muſt not, by the ſame rule, its credibility dwindle away to nothing, if natural reaſon ſhould not be able to make it out, to be ſo much as probable, or ſhould place the probability, from natural principles, on the other ſide? For if mere want of demonſtration leſſens the credibility of any propoſition, divinely revealed, muſt not want of probability, or contrary probability from natural reaſon, quite take away its credibility? Here at laſt it muſt end, if, in any one caſe, the veracity of God, and the credibility of the truths we receive from him, by revelation, be ſubjected to the verdicts of human reaſon, and be allowed to receive any acceſſion, or diminution, from other proofs, or want of other proofs of its certainty, or probability.

Answer 2. p. 28.

Anſwer 2. p. 29.

If this be your Lordſhip's way to promote religion, or defend its articles, I know not what argument the greateſt enemies of it could uſe, more effectual for the ſubverſion of thoſe, you have undertaken to defend; this being to reſolve all revelation, perfectly and purely, into natural reaſon, to bound its credibility by that, and leave no room for faith, in other things, than what can be accounted for, by natural reaſon, without revelation.

Your Lordſhip inſiſts much upon it, as if I had contradicted what I had ſaid in my Eſſay, by ſaying, that, upon my principles, it cannot be demonſtratively proved, that it is an immaterial ſubſtance in us, that thinks, however probable it be. He that will be at the pains to read that chapter of mine, and conſider it, will find that my buſineſs, there, was to ſhew, that it was no harder to conceive an immaterial, than a material ſubſtance; and that, from the ideas of thought, and a power of moving of matter, which we experienced in ourſelves (ideas originally not belonging to matter, as matter) there was no more difficulty to conclude, there was an immaterial ſubſtance in us, than that we had material parts.

Anſw. 1. p. 48---54.

Theſe ideas of thinking, and power of moving of matter, I, in another place, ſhewed, did demonſtratively lead us to the certain knowledge of the exiſtence of an immaterial, thinking being, in whom we have the idea of ſpirit, in the ſtricteſt ſenſe; in which ſenſe I alſo applied it to the ſoul; in that 23d chapter of my Eſſay; the eaſily conceivable poſſibility, nay, great probability, that that thinking ſubſtance, in us, is immaterial, giving me ſufficient ground for it. In which ſenſe, I ſhall think I may ſafely attribute it to the thinking ſubſtance in us, until your Lordſhip ſhall have better proved, from my words, that it is impoſſible it ſhould be immaterial. For I only ſay, that it is poſſible, i. e. involves no contradiction, that God, the omnipotent, immaterial ſpirit, ſhould, if he pleaſes, give to ſome parcels of matter, diſpoſed as he thinks fit, a power of thinking and moving; which parcels of matter, ſo endued with a power of thinking and motion, might properly be called ſpirits, in contra-diſtinction to unthinking matter. In all which, I preſume, there is no manner of contradiction.

Anſwer 1. p. 58---60.

I JUSTIFIED my uſe of the word, ſpirit, in that ſenſe, from the authorities of Cicero and Virgil, applying the Latin word, ſpiritus, from whence ſpirit is derived, to a ſoul, as a thinking thing, without excluding materiality out of it. To which your Lordſhip replies, "that Cicero, in his Tuſculan Queſtions, ſuppoſes "the ſoul not to be a finer ſort of body, but of a different nature from the body. "——That he calls the body the priſon of the ſoul.——And ſays that a wiſe "man's buſineſs is to draw off his ſoul from his body." And then your Lordſhip concludes, as is uſual, with a queſtion, "is it impoſſible, now, to think ſo "great a man looked on the ſoul, but as a modification of the body, which muſt "be at an end with life?" Anſw. No, it is impoſſible that a man of ſo good ſenſe, as Tully, when he uſes the word, corpus, or body, for the groſs and viſible parts of a man, which he acknowledges to be mortal; ſhould look on the ſoul, to be a modification of that body, in a diſcourſe, wherein he was endeavouring to perſuade another, that it was immortal. It is to be acknowledged that truly great men, ſuch as he was, are not wont ſo manifeſtly to contradict themſelves. He had, therefore, no thought, concerning the modification of the body of man, in the caſe; he was not ſuch a trifler, as to examine, whether the modification of the body of a man was immortal, when that body itſelf was mortal: and, therefore, that, which he reports, as Dicœarchus's opinion, he diſmiſſes in the beginning, without any more ado, c. 11. But Cicero's was a direct, plain, and ſenſible enquiry, viz. What the ſoul was? to ſee whether, from thence, he could diſcover its immortality. But, in all that diſcourſe, in his firſt Book of Tuſculan Queſtions, where he lays out ſo much of his reading and reaſon, there is not one ſyllable, ſhewing the leaſt thought, that the ſoul was an immaterial ſubſtance; but many things directly to the contrary.

Chap. 19, 22, 30, 31, &c. So ſpeaks Ennius: "Terra corpus eſt, at mens ignis eſt."

INDEED, (1.) he ſhuts out the body, taken in the ſenſe he uſes, corpus, all along, for the ſenſible, organical parts of a man, and is poſitive, that is not the ſoul: and body, in this ſenſe, taken for the human body, he calls the priſon of the ſoul; and ſays, a wiſe man, inſtancing in Socrates and Cato, is glad of a fair opportunity to get out of it. But he no where ſays any ſuch thing of matter: he calls not matter, in general, the priſon of the ſoul, nor talks a word of being ſeparate from it.

(2.) HE concludes, that the ſoul is not like other things, here below, made up of a compoſition of the elements, c. 27.

(3.) HE excludes the two groſs elements, earth and water, from being the ſoul, c. 26.

So far he is clear and poſitive: but, beyond this, he is uncertain; beyond this he could not get. For, in ſome places, he ſpeaks doubtfully, whether the ſoul be not air or fire: "anima ſit animus, ignisve neſcio," c. 25. And therefore he agrees with Panœtius, that, if it be at all elementary, it is, as he calls it, "inflammata anima, inflamed air;" and, for this, he gives ſeveral reaſons, c. 18, 19. And tho' he thinks it to be of a peculiar nature of its own, yet he is ſo far from thinking it immaterial, that he ſays, c. 19. that the admitting it to be of an aerial, or igneous, nature, would not be inconſiſtent with any thing he had ſaid.

THAT, which he ſeems moſt to incline to, is, that the ſoul was not at all elementary, but was of the ſame ſubſtance with the heavens: which Ariſtotle, to diſtinguiſh from the four elements, and the changeable bodies here below, which he ſuppoſed made up of them, called "quinta eſſentia." That this was Tully's opinion, is plain from theſe words: "Ergo, animus, qui, ut ego dico, divinus "eſt, ut Euripides audet dicere, deus; & quidem, ſi deus, aut anima, aut ignis "eſt, idem eſt animus hominis. Nam ut illa natura cœleſtis & terra vacat & "humore, ſic utriuſque harum rerum humanus animus eſt expers. Sin autem "eſt quinta quædam natura, ab Ariſtotele inducta; primum hæc & deorum eſt "& animorum. Hanc nos ſententiam ſecuti, his ipſis verbis in conſolatione hæc "expreſſimus;" c. 26. And then he goes on, c. 27. to repeat thoſe his own words, which your Lordſhip has quoted, out of him, wherein he had affirmed, in his treatiſe de Conſolatione, the ſoul not to have its original from the earth, or to be mixed, or made, of any thing earthly; but had ſaid, "Singularis eſt igitur "quædam natura & vis animi ſejuncta ab his uſitatis notiſque naturis." Whereby he tells us, he meant nothing but Ariſtotle's "quinta eſſentia;" which being unmixed, being that, of which the gods and ſouls conſiſted, he calls it "divinum, "cœleſte," and concludes it eternal; it being, as he ſpeaks, "ſejuncta ab omni "mortali concretione." From which it is clear, that in all his enquiry about the ſubſtance of the ſoul, his thoughts went not beyond the four elements, or Ariſtotle's quinta eſſentia, to look for it. In all which there is nothing of immateriality, but quite the contrary.

HE was willing to believe (as good and wiſe men have always been) that the ſoul was immortal; but, for that, it is plain, he never thought of its immateriality; but as the eaſtern people do, who believe the ſoul to be immortal, but have nevertheleſs no thought, no conception of its immateriality. It is remarkable, what a very conſiderable and judicious author ſays in the caſe: "No opinion, "ſays he, has been ſo univerſally received, as that of the immortality of the ſoul; "but its immateriality is a truth, the knowledge whereof has not ſpread ſo far. "And, indeed, it is extremely difficult, to let into the mind of a Siamite, the "idea of a pure ſpirit. This the miſſionaries, who have been longeſt among "them, are poſitive in: all the Pagans of the eaſt do truly believe, that there "remains ſomething of a man after his death, which ſubſiſts independently and "ſeparately from his body. But they give extenſion and figure to that, which "remains, and attribute to it all the ſame members, all the ſame ſubſtances, both "ſolid and liquid, which our bodies are compoſed of. They only ſuppoſe, that "the ſouls are of a matter, ſubtle enough to eſcape being ſeen, or handled —— "Such were the Shades and Manes of the Greeks and the Romans. And it is, "by theſe figures of the ſouls, anſwerable to thoſe of the bodies, that Virgil "ſuppoſed Æneas knew Palinurus, Dido and Anchiſes, in the other world."

Loubere du Royaume de Siam, t. 1. c. 19. § 4.

THIS gentleman was not a man, that travelled into thoſe parts for his pleaſure, and to have the opportunity to tell ſtrange ſtories collected by chance, when he returned; but one choſen on purpoſe (and he ſeems well choſen for the purpoſe) to enquire into the ſingularities of Siam. And he has ſo well acquitted himſelf of the commiſſion, which his epiſtle dedicatory tells us, he had, to inform himſelf exactly of what was moſt remarkable there, that had we but ſuch an account of other countries of the eaſt, as he has given us of this kingdom, which he was an envoy to, we ſhould be much better acquainted, than we are, with the manners, notions, and religions, of that part of the world, inhabited by civilized nations, who want neither good ſenſe nor acuteneſs of reaſon, tho' not caſt into the mold of the logick and philoſophy of our ſchools.

BUT to return to Cicero: 'tis plain, that, in his enquiries about the ſoul, his thoughts went not at all beyond matter. This the expreſſions, that dropt from him in ſeveral places of this book, evidently ſhew: for example, that the ſouls of excellent men and women aſcended into heaven; of others, that they remained here on earth, c. 12. that the ſoul is hot, and warms the body: that, at its leaving the body, it penetrates and divides, and breaks thro' our thick, cloudy, moiſt air: that it ſtops in the region of fire, and aſcends no farther, the equality

lity of warmth and weight making that its proper place, where it is nouriſhed and ſuſtained with the ſame things wherewith the ſtars are nouriſhed and ſuſtained; and that, by the convenience of its neighbourhood, it ſhall there have a clearer view and fuller knowledge of the heavenly bodies, c. 19. that the ſoul alſo, from this height, ſhall have a pleaſant and fairer proſpect of the globe of the earth, the diſpoſition of whoſe parts will then lie before it, in one view, c. 20. that it is hard to determine what conformation, ſize, and place, the ſoul has, in the body: that it is too ſubtile to be ſeen: that it is in the human body, as in a houſe, or a veſſel, or a receptacle, c. 22. All which are expreſſions, that ſufficiently evidence, that he, who uſed them, had not, in his mind, ſeparated materiality, from the idea of the ſoul.

It may, perhaps, be replied, that a great part of this, which we find in chap. 19. is ſaid upon the principles of thoſe, who would have the ſoul to be "anima "inflammata, inflamed air." I grant it: but it is alſo to be obſerved, that in this 19th and the two following chapters, he does not only, not deny, but even admits, that ſo material a thing, as inflamed air, may think.

The truth of the caſe, in ſhort, is this: Cicero was willing to believe the ſoul immortal, but, when he ſought, in the nature of the ſoul itſelf, ſomething to eſtabliſh this his belief, into a certainty of it, he found himſelf at a loſs. He confeſſed, he knew not what the ſoul was; but the not knowing what it was, he argues, c. 2. was no reaſon to conclude it was not. And thereupon he proceeds to the repetition of what he had ſaid, in his 6th book De Repub. concerning the ſoul. The argument, which, borrowed from Plato, he there makes uſe of, if it have any force in it; not only proves the ſoul to be immortal, but more than, I think, your Lordſhip will allow to be true: for it proves it to be eternal, and without beginning, as well as without end: "Neque nata certe eſt, & æterna "eſt," ſays he.

Indeed, from the faculties of the ſoul, he concludes right, that it is of divine original: but as to the ſubſtance of the ſoul, he, at the end of this diſcourſe concerning its faculties, c. 25. as well as at the beginning of it, c. 22. is not aſhamed to own his ignorance of what it is; "anima ſit animus, ignisve, neſcio, "nec me pudet, ut iſtos, fateri neſcire quod neſciam. Illud, ſi ulla alia de re "obſcura affirmare poſſum, ſive anima, ſive ignis ſit, animus, eum jurarem eſſe "divinum," c. 25. So that all the certainty he could attain to, about the ſoul, was, that he was confident there was ſomething divine in it; i. e. there were faculties in the ſoul, that could not reſult from the nature of matter, but muſt have their original from a divine power: but yet thoſe qualities, as divine as they were, he acknowledged might be placed in breath, or fire, which, I think, your Lordſhip will not deny to be material ſubſtances. So that all thoſe divine qualities, which he ſo much, and ſo juſtly, extols in the ſoul, led him not, as appears, ſo much as to any the leaſt thought of immateriality. This is demonſtration, that he built them not, upon an excluſion of materiality out of the ſoul; for he avowedly profeſſes, he does not know, but breath, or fire, might be this thinking thing in us: and in all his conſiderations about the ſubſtance of the ſoul itſelf, he ſtuck in air and fire, or Ariſtotle's "quinta eſſentia;" for beyond thoſe, 'tis evident, he went not.

But, with all his proofs out of Plato, to whoſe authority he defers ſo much, with all the arguments, his vaſt reading and great parts could furniſh him with, for the immortality of the ſoul, he was ſo little ſatisfied, ſo far from being certain, ſo far from any thought, that he had, or could, prove it, that he, over and over again, profeſſes his ignorance and doubt of it. In the beginning, he enumerates the ſeveral opinions of the philoſophers, which he had well ſtudied, about it; and then, full of uncertainty, ſays, "harum ſententiarum, quæ vera "ſit, deus aliquis viderit, quæ veri-ſimillima magna quæſtio," c. 11. And towards the latter end, having gone them all over again, and, one after another, examined them, he profeſſes himſelf ſtill at a loſs, not knowing, on which to pitch, nor what to determine: "Mentis acies, ſays he, ſeipſam intuens, non-"nunquam hebeſcit, ob eamque cauſam contemplandi diligentiam omittimus. "Itaque dubitans, circumſpectans, hæſitans, multa adverſa revertens, tanquam

“ in rate, in mari immenſo, noſtra vehitur oratio,” c. 30. And, to conclude this argument, when the perſon he introduces, as diſcourſing with him, tells him, he is reſolved to keep firm, to the belief of immortality; Tully anſwers, c. 82. “ Laudo id quidem, etſi nihil animis opportet confidere; movemur enim “ ſæpe aliquo acute concluſo, labamus, mutamuſque ſententiam clarioribus etiam “ in rebus; in his eſt enim aliqua obſcuritas.”

So unmoveable is that truth, delivered by the Spirit of truth, that, though the light of nature gave ſome obſcure glimmering, ſome uncertain hopes of a future ſtate; yet human reaſon could attain to no clearneſs, no certainty about it, but that it was “ Jesus Christ, alone, who had brought life and immortality to “ light, thro' the Goſpel.” Though we are now told, that to own the inability of natural reaſon, to bring immortality to light, or, which paſſes for the ſame, to own principles, upon which the immateriality of the ſoul (and, as 'tis urged, conſequently its immortality) cannot be demonſtratively proved; does leſſen the belief of this article of revelation, which Jesus Christ alone has brought to light, and which conſequently, the ſcripture aſſures us, is eſtabliſhed and made certain, only by revelation. This would not perhaps have ſeemed ſtrange from thoſe, who are juſtly complained of, for ſlighting the revelation of the Goſpel; and therefore, would not be much regarded, if they ſhould contradict ſo plain a text of ſcripture, in favour of their all-ſufficient reaſon: but what uſe the promoters of ſcepticiſm and infidelity, in an age, ſo much ſuſpected by your Lordſhip, may make, of what comes from one of your great authority and learning, may deſerve your conſideration.

2 Tim. i. 10.

And thus, my Lord, I hope I have ſatisfied you concerning Cicero's opinion, about the ſoul, in his firſt book of Tuſculan Queſtions; which, tho' I eaſily believe, as your Lordſhip ſays, you are no ſtranger to, yet I humbly conceive, you have not ſhewn (and upon a careful peruſal of that treatiſe again, I think I may boldly ſay, you cannot ſhew) one word in it, that expreſſes any thing like a notion in Tully, of the ſoul's immateriality, or its being an immaterial ſubſtance.

Anſwer I. p. 62, 63.

From what you bring out of Virgil, your Lordſhip concludes, “ that he, no “ more than Cicero, does me any kindneſs, in this matter, being both aſſertors “ of the ſoul's immortality.” My Lord, were not the queſtion of the ſoul's immateriality, according to cuſtom, changed here, into that of its immortality, which I am no leſs an aſſertor of, than either of them, Cicero and Virgil do me all the kindneſs I deſired of them in this matter; and that was to ſhew, that they attributed the word, ſpiritus, to the ſoul of man, without any thought of its immateriality; and this the verſes, you yourſelf bring, out of Virgil, Æn. iv. 385.

“ Et cum frigida mors animæ reduxerit artus,
“ Omnibus umbra locis adero; dabis, improbe, pœnas;

confirm, as well as thoſe I quoted, out of his 6th book: and, for this, Monſieur de la Loubere ſhall be my witneſs, in the words above ſet down, out of him; where he ſhews, that there be thoſe, amongſt the heathens of our days, as well as Virgil, and others, amongſt the antient Greeks and Romans, who thought the ſouls, or ghoſts, of men departed, did not die with the body, without thinking them to be perfectly immaterial; the latter being much more incomprehenſible to them than the former. And what Virgil's notion of the ſoul is, and that corpus, when put in contra-diſtinction to the ſoul, ſignifies nothing, but the groſs tenement of fleſh and bones, is evident from this verſe of his Æneid. 6. l. 202.

— tenues ſine corpore vitas.

Anſwer I. p. 64, 65.

Your Lordſhip's anſwer concerning what is ſaid, Eccleſ. xii. turns wholly upon Solomon's taking the ſoul to be immortal, which was not what I queſtioned. All that I quoted that place for, was to ſhew that, ſpirit, in Engliſh, might properly be applied to the ſoul, without any notion of its immateriality, as רוח was by Solomon; which, whether he thought the ſouls of men to be immaterial,

material, does little appear, in that paſſage, where he ſpeaks of the ſouls of men and beaſts together, as he does. But farther, what I contended for, is evident from that place, in that the word, ſpirit, is there applied, by our tranſlators, to the ſouls of beaſts, which your Lordſhip, I think, does not rank amongſt the immaterial, and conſequently immortal ſpirits, tho' they have ſenſe and ſpontaneous motion.

Anſw. 1. p. 65.

But you ſay, "if the ſoul be not of itſelf a free-thinking ſubſtance, you do "not ſee what foundation there is in nature, for a day of judgment." Anſw. Tho' the heathen world did not of old, nor do to this day, ſee a foundation, in nature, for a day of judgment; yet in revelation, if that will ſatiſfy your Lordſhip, every one may ſee a foundation for a day of judgment, becauſe God has poſitively declared it; tho' God has not, by that revelation, taught us, what the ſubſtance of the ſoul is; nor has any where ſaid, "that the ſoul of itſelf is a "free agent." Whatſoever any created ſubſtance is, is not of itſelf, but is, by the good pleaſure of its Creator. Whatever degrees of perfection it has, it has from the bountiful hand of its Maker. For it is true, in a natural, as well as a ſpiritual, ſenſe, what St. Paul ſays, "not that we are ſufficient of ourſelves, to "think any thing, as of ourſelves, but our ſufficiency is of God."

2 Cor. iii. 5.

But your Lordſhip, as I gueſs, by your following words, would argue, that a material ſubſtance cannot be a free agent; whereby, I ſuppoſe, you only mean, that you cannot ſee, or conceive, how a ſolid ſubſtance ſhould begin, ſtop, or change its own motion. To which give me leave to anſwer, that, when you can make it conceivable, how any created, finite, dependent ſubſtance, can move itſelf, or alter, or ſtop, its own motion, which it muſt, to be a free agent; I ſuppoſe, you will find it no harder, for God, to beſtow this power, on a ſolid, than an unſolid, created ſubſtance. Tully, in the place above quoted, could not conceive this power to be, in any thing, but what was from eternity; "cum "pateat, igitur, æternum id eſſe, quod ſeipſum moveat, quis eſt, qui hanc na"turam animis eſſe tributam neget?" But tho' you cannot ſee, how any created ſubſtance, ſolid, or not ſolid, can be a free agent (pardon me, my Lord, if I put in both, until your Lordſhip pleaſe to explain it, of either, and ſhew the manner, how either of them can, of itſelf, move itſelf, or any thing elſe) yet I do not think, you will ſo far deny men to be free agents, from the difficulty there is to ſee, how they are free agents, as to doubt, whether there be foundation enough for a day of judgment.

Tuſculan. Quæſt. l. 1. c. 23.

Ecc. xi. 5. p. 66.

It is not for me to judge, how far your Lordſhip's ſpeculations reach; but finding in myſelf nothing to be truer, than what the wiſe Solomon tells me; "As thou knoweſt not, what is the way of the ſpirit, nor how the bones do "grow, in the womb of her that is with child; even ſo, thou knoweſt not the "works of God, who maketh all things:" I gratefully receive, and rejoice in the light of revelation, which ſets me at reſt, in many things; the manner whereof my poor reaſon can, by no means, make out to me: omnipotency, I know, can do any thing, that contains in it no contradiction; ſo that I readily believe whatever God has declared, tho' my reaſon find difficulties in it, which it cannot maſter. As, in the preſent caſe, God having revealed that there ſhall be a day of judgment, I think that foundation enough, to conclude men are free enough to be made anſwerable for their actions, and to receive, according to what they have done; tho' how man is a free agent, ſurpaſs my explication, or comprehenſion.

Chap. xxiv. ver. 39. Anſwer 1.

In anſwer to the place I brought out of St. Luke, your Lordſhip aſks, "Whether, from theſe words of our Saviour, it follows that a ſpirit is only an "appearance?" I anſwer, No; nor do I know, who drew ſuch an inference from them: but it follows, that, in apparitions, there is ſomething that appears, and that, that which appears, is not wholly immaterial; and yet this was properly called Πνεῦμα, and was often looked upon, by thoſe, who called it Πνεῦμα, in Greek, and now call it, ſpirit, in Engliſh, to be the ghoſt, or ſoul, of one departed: which, I humbly conceive, juſtifies my uſe of the word, ſpirit, for a thinking, voluntary agent, whether material, or immaterial.

Your Lordſhip ſays, that I grant, that it cannot, upon theſe principles, be demonſtrated, that the ſpiritual ſubſtance, in us, is immaterial: from whence you conclude, "that, then, my grounds, of certainty, from ideas, are plainly "given up." This being a way of arguing, that you often make uſe of, I have often had occaſion to conſider it, and cannot, after all, ſee the force of this argument. I acknowledge, that this, or that propoſition cannot, upon my principles, be demonſtrated; ergo, I grant this propoſition to be falſe, that certainty conſiſts in the perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of ideas: for that is my ground of certainty, and, 'till that be given up, my grounds of certainty are not given up. Anſwer 1. p. 67.

You farther tell me, that I ſay, "the ſoul's immateriality may be proved probable, to the higheſt degree;" to which your Lordſhip replies, "that is not the "point: for it is not probability, but certainty, that you are promiſed, in this "way of ideas; and that the foundation of our knowledge and real certainty "lies in them; and is it dwindled into a probability, at laſt?" This is, alſo, what your Lordſhip has pleaſed to object to me, more than once, that I promiſed certainty. I would be glad to know, in what words this promiſe is made, and where it ſtands, for I love to be a man of my word. I have, indeed, told wherein I think certainty, real certainty, does conſiſt, as far as any one attains it; and I do not yet, from any thing, your Lordſhip has ſaid againſt it, find any reaſon to change my opinion therein; but I do not remember, that I promiſed certainty, in this queſtion, concerning the ſoul's immateriality, or in any of thoſe propoſitions, wherein you, thinking I come ſhort of certainty, infer from thence that my way of certainty by ideas is given up. And I am ſo far from promiſing certainty in all things, that I am accuſed, by your Lordſhip, of ſcepticiſm, for ſetting too narrow bounds to our knowledge and certainty. Why, therefore, your Lordſhip aſks me, "and is the certainty" [of the ſoul's being immaterial] "dwindled into a probability, at laſt?" will be hard to ſee a reaſon for, 'till you can ſhew that I promiſed to demonſtrate, that it is immaterial; or that others, upon their principles, without ideas, being able to demonſtrate it immaterial, it comes to dwindle into bare probability, upon my principles, by ideas. Ibid.

One thing more, I am obliged to take notice of. I had ſaid, "that the belief of God being the foundation of all religion and genuine morality, I thought "no arguments, that are made uſe of, to work the perſuaſion of a God, into "men's minds, ſhould be invalidated, which I grant, is of ill conſequence." To which words of mine, I find, according to your particular favour to me, this reply; "that here I muſt give your Lordſhip leave to aſk me, what I think of "the univerſal conſent of mankind, as to the being of God? Hath not this "been made uſe of, as an argument, not only by Chriſtians, but by the wiſeſt "and greateſt men among the heathens? And what then would I think of one, "who ſhould go about to invalidate this argument? And that, by proving, that "it hath been diſcovered in thoſe latter ages, by navigation, that there are whole "nations at the bay of Soldania, in Braſil, in the Caribbee-iſlands and Paraquaria, among whom there was found no notion of a God: and even the author "of the Eſſay of Human Underſtanding hath done this." Letter 1. p. 113. Anſwer 1. p. 89.

To this your queſtion, my Lord, I anſwer, that I think that the univerſal conſent of mankind, as to the being of a God, amounts to thus much, that the vaſtly greater majority of mankind, have, in all the ages of the world, actually believed a God; that the majority of the remaining part have not actually diſbelieved it; and, conſequently, thoſe, who have actually oppoſed the belief of a God, have truly been very few. So that, comparing thoſe, that have actually diſbelieved, with thoſe who have actually believed a God, their number is ſo inconſiderable, that, in reſpect of this incomparably greater majority of thoſe, who have owned the belief of a God, it may be ſaid to be the univerſal conſent of mankind.

This is all the univerſal conſent, which truth of matter of fact will allow; and, therefore, all that can be made uſe of, to prove a God. But, if any one would extend it farther, and ſpeak deceitfully for God; if this univerſality ſhould be urged in a ſtrict ſenſe, not for much the majority, but for a general conſent of every one, even to a man in all ages and countries; this would make it, either no argument, or a perfectly uſeleſs and unneceſſary one. For, if any one deny a God, ſuch a perfect univerſality of conſent is deſtroyed; and if no body does deny a God, what need of arguments to convince atheiſts?

I WOULD crave leave to aſk your Lordſhip, were there ever in the world any atheiſt, or no? If there were not, what need is there of raiſing a queſtion, about the being of a God, when no body queſtions it? What need of proviſional arguments againſt a fault, from which mankind are ſo wholly free; and which, by an univerſal conſent, they may be preſumed to be ſecure from? If you ſay (as I doubt not, but you will) that there have been atheiſts in the world, when your Lordſhip's univerſal conſent reduces itſelf to only a great majority; and then make that majority as great as you will, what I have ſaid, in the place quoted by your Lordſhip, leaves it in its full force, and I have not ſaid one word, that does, in the leaſt, invalidate this argument for a God. The argument, I was upon there, was to ſhew, that the idea of God was not innate; and to my purpoſe it was ſufficient, if there were but a leſs number found in the world, who had no idea of God, than your Lordſhip will allow, there have been, of profeſſed atheiſts: for whatſoever is innate, muſt be univerſal in the ſtricteſt ſenſe; one exception is a ſufficient proof againſt it. So that all, that I ſaid, and which was quite to another purpoſe, did not at all tend, nor can be made uſe of, to invalidate the argument for a deity, grounded on ſuch an univerſal conſent, as your Lordſhip, and all that build on it, muſt own, which is only a very diſproportioned majority: ſuch an univerſal conſent my argument, there, neither affirms, nor requires, to be leſs, than you will be pleaſed to allow it. Your Lordſhip therefore, might, without any prejudice to thoſe declarations of good-will and favour you have, for the author of the Eſſay of Human Underſtanding, have ſpared the mentioning his quoting authors, that are in print, for matters of fact, to quite another purpoſe, "as going about to invalidate the argument for a deity, from "the univerſal conſent of mankind;" ſince he leaves that univerſal conſent, as entire, and as large, as you yourſelf do, or can own or ſuppoſe it. But here I have no reaſon to be ſorry, that your Lordſhip has given me this occaſion, for the vindication of this paſſage of my book, if there ſhould be any one, beſides your Lordſhip, who ſhould ſo far miſtake it, as to think it, in the leaſt, invalidates the argument for a God, from the univerſal conſent of mankind.

Anſw. 1. p. 89. BUT, becauſe you queſtion the credibility of thoſe authors I have quoted, which you ſay, in the next paragraph, were very ill choſen; I will crave leave to ſay, that he, whom I relied on, for his teſtimony, concerning the Hotentots of Soldania, was no leſs a man, than an ambaſſador from the king of England, to the Great Mogul: of whoſe relation, Monſieur Thevenot, no ill judge in the caſe, had ſo great an eſteem, that he was at the pains to tranſlate it into French, and publiſh it in his (which is counted no injudicious) collection of travels. But to intercede with your Lordſhip, for a little more favourable allowance of credit, to Sir Thomas Roe's relation, Coore, an inhabitant of the country, who could ſpeak Engliſh, aſſured Mr. Terry, that they of Soldania had no God. But if he too have the ill-luck to find no credit with you, I hope you will be a little more favourable to a divine of the church of England, now living, and admit of his teſtimony in confirmation of Sir Thomas Roe's. This worthy gentleman, in the relation of his voyage to Surat, printed but two years ſince, ſpeaking of the ſame people, has theſe words; "they are ſunk even below idolatry, are deſtitute of "both prieſt and temple, and ſaving a little ſhew of rejoicing, which is made at "the full and new moon, have loſt all kind of religious devotion. Nature has "ſo richly provided for their convenience in this life, that they have drowned all "ſenſe of the God of it, and are grown quite careleſs of the next."

Terry's Voyage, p. 17 & 23.

Mr Ovington, p. 489.

BUT, to provide againſt the cleareſt evidence of atheiſm, in theſe people, you ſay, "that the account given of them, makes them not fit to be a ſtandard for the "ſenſe of mankind." This, I think, may paſs for nothing, 'till ſome body be found, that makes them to be a ſtandard for the ſenſe of mankind: all the uſe, I made

Anſw. 1. p. 90.

made of them, was to ſhew, that there were men in the world, that had no innate idea of a God. But to keep ſomething like an argument going (for what will not that do?) you go near denying thoſe caſers to be men: what elſe do theſe words ſignify? "a people ſo ſtrangely bereft of common ſenſe, that they can "hardly be reckoned among mankind; as appears by the beſt accounts of the "caſers of Soldania," &c. I hope, if any of them were called Peter, James, or John, it would be paſt ſcruple, that they were men; however, Courvee, Wewena, and Couſheda, and thoſe others, who had names, that had no place in your Nomenclator, would hardly paſs muſter with your Lordſhip. Ibid.

My Lord, I ſhould not mention this, but that what you yourſelf ſay here, may be a motive to you to conſider, that, what you have laid ſuch a ſtreſs on, concerning the general nature of man, as a real being, and the ſubject of properties, amounts to nothing, for the diſtinguiſhing of ſpecies; ſince you your ſelf own that there may be individuals, wherein there is a common nature, with a particular ſubſiſtence, proper to each of them; whereby you are ſo little able to know, of which of the ranks, or ſorts, they are, into which you ſay, "God "has ordered beings, and which he hath diſtinguiſhed by eſſential properties, "that you are in doubt, whether they ought to be reckoned among mankind, "or no?" P. 165.

Give me leave now to think, my Lord, that I have given an anſwer to all, that is, any way, material, in either of the letters you have honoured me with. If there be any argument, which you think of weight, that you find omitted; upon the leaſt intimation from your Lordſhip where it is, I promiſe to conſider it, and to endeavour to give you ſatisfaction concerning it, either by owning my conviction, or ſhewing what hinders it. This reſpect I ſhall think due from me, to your Lordſhip: tho' I know better to imploy the little time, my buſineſs and health afford me, than to trouble myſelf with the little cavillers, who may either be ſet on, or be forward (in hope to recommend themſelves) to meddle in this controverſy.

Before I conclude, it is fit I take notice of the obligation I have to you, for the pains you have been at, about my Eſſay, which, I conclude, could not have been any way ſo effectually recommended to the world, as by your manner of writing againſt it. And, ſince your Lordſhip's ſharp ſight, ſo carefully employed for its correction, has, as I humbly conceive, found no faults in it, which your Lordſhip's great endeavours, this way, have made out to be really there; I hope, I may preſume it will paſs the better in the world, and the judgment of all conſidering men, and make it, for the future, ſtand better, even in your Lordſhip's opinion. I beg your Lordſhip's pardon for this long trouble, and am,

My LORD,

Oates, May 4,
1706.

Your Lordſhip's moſt Humble, and

Moſt Obedient Servant,

JOHN LOCKE.

THE

made of them, was to ſhew, that there were men in the world, that had no innate idea of a God. But to keep ſomething like an argument going (for what will not that do?) you go near denying thoſe caſers to be men; what elſe do theſe words ſignify? "a people ſo ſtrangely bereft of common ſenſe, that they can hardly be reckoned among mankind; as appears by the beſt accounts of the caſers of Soldania," &c. I hope, if any of them were called Peter, James, or John, it would be paſt ſcruple that they were men; however, Couwee, Wewena, and Couſheda, and thoſe others who had names, that had no place in your Nomenclator, would hardly paſs muſter with your Lordſhip.

My Lord, I ſhould not mention this, but that what you yourſelf ſay here, may be a motive to you to conſider, that what you have laid ſuch a ſtreſs on, concerning the general nature of man, as a real being, and the ſubject of properties, amounts to nothing for the diſtinguiſhing of ſpecies; ſince you your ſelf own that there may be individuals, wherein there is a common nature, with a particular ſubſiſtence, proper to each of them; whereby you are ſo little able to know, of which of the ranks, or ſorts, they are, into which you ſay, "God P. 165. has ordered beings, and which he hath diſtinguiſhed by eſſential properties," that you are in doubt, whether they ought to be reckoned among mankind, or no.

Give me leave now to think, my Lord, that I have given an anſwer to all, that is any way material, in either of the letters you have honoured me with. If there be any argument, which you think of weight, that you find omitted; upon the leaſt intimation from your Lordſhip where it is, I promiſe to conſider it, and to endeavour to give you ſatisfaction concerning it, either by owning my conviction, or ſhewing what hinders it. This reſpect I ſhall think due from me, to your Lordſhip: tho' I know better to imploy the little time, my buſineſs and health afford me, than to trouble myſelf with the little cavillers, who may either be ſet on, or be forward (in hope to recommend themſelves) to meddle in this controverſy.

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My LORD,

Oates, May 4,
1698.

Your Lordſhip's moſt Humble, and

Moſt Obedient Servant,

JOHN LOCKE.

THE

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